# dafyomi

lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) THE POWER OF 'MACHSHAVAH,' THE POWER OF 'DIBUR'</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Mishnah teaches that if a Kohen who is offering a particular Korban has in mind that he is offering a different Korban, the Korban is valid and may be burned on the Mizbe'ach. However, if the Korban was brought in fulfillment of a pledge, the pledge is not considered to have been fulfilled. The one who made the pledge must bring another Korban to replace it.
</p><p>
(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (end of DH Kol) raises the question of whether or not a mere improper <i>thought</i> suffices to invalidate a Korban. Perhaps the Korban remains valid as long as the improper thought was not verbalized. Tosfos refers to what he writes in Bava Metzia (43b, DH ha'Choshev), where he posits that verbalization <i>is</i> required in order to invalidate the Korban. A thought of Pigul alone does not disqualify the Korban.
</p><p>
This is the position of other Rishonim as well. <b>RASHI</b> (Zevachim 41b, DH Kegon) writes, 'All thoughts regarding Kodshim must be expressed orally.' (See also Rashi to Menachos 2b, DH Aval, where he uses a similar expression.) The <b>SEMAG</b> (end of Lo Sa'aseh #337) writes in the same vein, 'u'Machsheves ha'Kodshim Hi Dibur' -- 'the [invalidating] thought with regard to Kodshim means speech.'
</p><p>
(b) However, the <b>MISHNEH L'MELECH</b> (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 13:1), based on the words of the <b>RAMBAM</b> there, proposes that a mere improper thought regarding the particular Korban suffices to disqualify it. This is also the position of the <b>SEFER HA'CHINUCH</b> (Mitzvah #144) and the <b>ME'IRI</b> (Pesachim 63a, DH Kol Ma).
</p><p>
Why, according to the first opinion, does an improper thought alone not suffice to disqualify the Korban? Why is verbalization required? <b>HA'GA'ON RAV ABBA BERMAN</b> zt'l, in <b>SHI'UREI IYUN HA'TALMUD</b> (#3), cites two reasons mentioned in the Rishonim for the requirement of verbalization in the case of Kodshim.
</p><p>
1. Verbalization is required because of the principle, 'Devarim sheb'Lev Einam Devarim' -- intentions in a person's heart (that he has not expressed verbally) are not binding (<b>SEFER HA'ESHKOL</b>, Hilchos Shechitas Chulin #13, and <b>SHE'ELOS U'TESHUVOS <b><b>OR</b></b> ZARU'A</b> #754).
</p><p>
2. Verbalization is required because of a special derivation from verses (see Rashi to Menachos ibid., and to Devarim 17:1).
</p><p>
Rav Abba Berman zt'l notes that these two reasons given by the Rishonim might reflect a fundamental difference of opinion in the basic understanding of the principle of 'Devarim sheb'Lev Einam Devarim.' One way of understanding this principle is based on its literal translation, 'Words in the heart are not words.' Since thoughts in the heart are 'not words' and do not quality as speech, they are powerless and have no effect.
</p><p>
Another way of understanding this principle limits it to situations in which the 'words in the heart' <i>contradict</i> the words that the person expresses verbally, or they contradict an action that the person does. According to this view, 'words in the heart' essentially <i>are</i> 'words' as long as they do not interfere with explicitly expressed words or actions.
</p><p>
The Rishonim who apply the rule of 'Devarim sheb'Lev Einam Devarim' in the case of improper thoughts for a Korban evidently agree with the first way of understanding: 'words in the heart' can never affect any action done by a person. Therefore, an improper thought during the service of the Korban is ineffectual in compromising its validity. Only when the improper thought is <i>verbalized</i> does the thought carry any importance.
</p><p>
In contrast, the other Rishonim, who see no practical problem with 'Devarim sheb'Lev' in this case, seem to agree with the second way of understanding this principle: 'words in the heart' essentially are 'words' as long as they do not contradict a person's action. Hence, an improper thought during the service of a Korban <i>would</i> compromise its validity, as the relevant thought of Pigul or she'Lo Lishmah does <i>not</i> contradict the fabric of the actual service. (Rashi, therefore, points out specific verses which teach a special rule that in this instance 'Dibur b'Peh' is required to disqualify the Korban.) (C. Mendelson)
</p><p>


<font><b>2) SHIMON, THE BROTHER OF AZARYAH</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Mishnah quotes a Tana named 'Shimon Achi Azaryah,' Shimon the brother of Azaryah. Why, of all Tana'im, is this Tana singled out and identified in association with his brother?
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> explains that Azaryah was a businessman who supported his scholarly brother Shimon and enabled him to pursue his Torah studies. In return for this great deed, Azaryah merited that Shimon became known as 'Achi Azaryah,' the brother of Azaryah, and he earned for himself a place of honor in the Mishnah, his name indelibly etched in the history of the Jewish people. His name serves as a paradigm of the noble virtue of supporting Torah study.
</p><p>
The <b>MAHARSHA</b> in Sotah (21a) comments that Azaryah received a double reward for his great deed. He was rewarded in this world by receiving honorable mention in the halls of Torah. He was also rewarded in Olam ha'Ba by sharing with Shimon, his brother, the reward for Shimon's Torah study.
</p><p>
Was Shimon's reward in Olam ha'Ba in any way diminished by his sharing it with Azaryah? There are two basic approaches to this question.
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI</b> (DH Shimon Achi Azaryah) mentions that 'they stipulated among themselves that Azaryah would receive a <i>part</i> of the reward of the study of Shimon.' See also Rashi to Sotah (ibid.), where he states that Azaryah worked in business so that 'he would <i>divide</i> the reward of Shimon's learning.' These statements of Rashi suggest that he understands that Shimon's reward in fact was diminished by sharing it with Azaryah.
</p><p>
The <b>REMA</b> (YD 246:1) writes that any person may make a similar stipulation with his friend, to the effect that he will study Torah and his friend will support him, 'and he will <i>divide</i> the reward with him.' The <b>SHACH</b> there explains that the Rema means that the reward for the Torah study and the profits of the businessman are to be divided equally. The Shach's observation is supported by the second part of the Rema's statement, where he says that 'if one already studied Torah, he cannot <i>sell</i> his share in exchange for the money that will be given.' These words imply that at the time the agreement is made between the two parties (before the learning has begun), it has the status of a sale, wherein the scholar <i>sells</i> a share of his future reward.
</p><p>
(The <b>ARUCH HA'SHULCHAN</b> explains the difference between a case in which the stipulation is made before the Torah study and a case in which it is made afterwards, as follows. The reward for Torah study is priceless and can be given only to a person who has rightfully earned it by actually studying the Torah. However, when the scholar arranges for a sponsor to support his future learning, the scholar's new learning becomes a joint endeavor of the sponsor and the scholar. As the patron of the Mitzvah who enables this great Mitzvah to be performed, the sponsor is an equal partner in the Mitzvah and is justly entitled to reward.)
</p><p>
The <b>BEIS YOSEF</b>, in <b>SHE'ELOS U'TESHUVOS AVKAS ROCHEL</b> (#2), expresses this point in a similar manner. He rules that one who is so poor that he must leave his Torah studies and work the entire day may give half the reward of his Torah study to someone who will give him half of what he earns. 'This,' he says, 'is equivalent to studying Torah half the day and working the other half.' It is evident from his words that he maintains that the scholar's reward indeed is diminished by such a transaction.
</p><p>
The Rema's source is <b>RABEINU YERUCHAM</b> (end of Nesiv 2:5), who bases his view on the Gemara in Sotah (ibid.). Some authorities point out that the Beis Yosef omits this law in the Shulchan Aruch, and they contend that this omission indicates that the Beis Yosef disagrees with Rabeinu Yerucham's ruling (<b>SHE'ELAS CHEMDAS TZVI</b> 3:33 and 4:40). However, other authorities point out that the Beis Yosef rules (in She'elos u'Teshuvos Avkas Rochel) that one who is impoverished may enter a formal agreement to divide the reward for his future Torah study in exchange for financial support. This ruling is consistent with Rabeinu Yerucham's opinion. An additional support that this in fact was the Beis Yosef's opinion is that he cites Rabeinu Yerucham in his commentary to the Tur (<b>BEIS YOSEF</b> to YD 246). Moreover, the Beis Yosef also cites Rabeinu Yerucham in his work <b>BEDEK HA'BAYIS</b> (which, according to many, was composed by the Beis Yosef after he compiled the Shulchan Aruch; see <b>TZITZ ELIEZER</b> 15:35:2).
</p><p>
This also seems to be the opinion of <b>RAV CHAIM</b> of <b>VOLOZHEN</b> (see <b>KESER ROSH</b> #64; <b>HILCHOS HA'GRA U'MINHAGAV</b> #216, citing manuscript of Rav Yosef Zundel of Salant; see also Tzitz Eliezer 15:35 and end of 15:3).
</p><p>
The <b><b><b>OR</b></b> HA'CHAIM</b>, in <b>CHEFETZ HASH-M</b> (Berachos 8a, DH Al Ken), writes that the scholar who is assisted in his Torah studies by the support of a sponsor must share his reward in Olam ha'Ba with the sponsor. In his work <b>RISHON L'TZIYON</b> (notes to YD 246:21), he notes the arrangement of Shimon and Azaryah as an example of two people mutually sharing the fruits of their labors; the businessman dividing his profits with the scholar, and the scholar dividing his reward with the businessman. (However, see his commentary to Shemos 30:13, where he apparently contradicts himself.) (See also <b>PELE YO'ETZ</b> (Erech Chizuk); the <b>NETZIV</b> in <b>MESHIV DAVAR</b> 3:14, DH Achar; <b>MESHECH CHOCHMAH</b> to Bereishis 49:15; and <b>IGROS MOSHE</b> YD 4:37:16.)
</p><p>
(b) Others, however, assert that the scholar's reward is not diminished by sharing it with his benefactor.
</p><p>
The <b>HAFLA'AH</b> (Hakdamah, #43) maintains that no price can be attached to Torah study, because, as the verse states, 'Far beyond pearls is her worth' (Mishlei 31:10). The reward for Torah study cannot be purchased even by negotiating the 'currency' of Olam ha'Ba, which is likened to pearls. Rather, both the scholar and his supporter will receive a full measure of reward. He draws an analogy to lighting one candle from another; the candle being lit does not diminish the flame of the candle which is already burning. Likewise, the supporter of Torah does not diminish the 'light' of the reward of the scholar. The Hafla'ah writes that this is the meaning of the verse, 'Rejoice, Zevulun, in your going out, and Yisachar, in your tents' (Devarim 33:18). Yisachar and Zevulun both rejoice in full measure, as neither one's reward infringes on the share of the other one.
</p><p>
See also <b><b><b>OR</b></b> HA'CHAIM</b> (Shemos 30:13), who writes that any reward enjoyed by the supporter of Torah does not detract from the reward of the scholar. (As pointed out above, this apparently contradicts his words in Chefetz Hash-m and Rishon l'Tziyon.)
</p><p>
The <b>MAHARAM ALSHAKER</b> (#101) quotes <b>RAV HAI GA'ON</b>, who discusses the case of a person who gave another person a gold coin and stipulated that the recipient was to study Torah and that he, the donor, would acquire the reward for the study. Rav Hai Ga'on derogates this provision as 'Divrei Hevel,' words of nonsense. He asks, 'How does it enter one's mind that he can acquire the reward for the good deed that his friend did? Just as a person is not punished for the misdeeds of his friend, in the same vein a person cannot receive merit for his friend's good deeds! Does he think that the reward for a Mitzvah is something [tangible] that one can carry and go out with?' He concludes, however, that one who supports those who are involved in the performance of Mitzvos, enabling them to perform those Mitzvos, will be rewarded for this. If he helps those who study Torah so that their hearts will be unburdened and available for study, he will be rewarded in an especially great way. 'The reward is for his own action,' he writes, but not for the action of the person whom he supports. After quoting the lengthy response of Rav Hai Ga'on, the Maharam Alshaker appends a concluding note and says, 'All of his (Rav Hai Ga'on's) words are Divrei Kabalah; nothing can be added to them or detracted from them.'
</p><p>
Since Rav Hai Ga'on maintains that a person's reward for a good deed is nontransferable, it follows that he would maintain that the scholar's reward is not affected by the reward received by the benefactor. Any reward received by the benefactor is earned independently 'for his own action' and is distinct from the scholar's reward.
</p><p>
The <b>SHE'ELOS U'TESHUVOS IMREI BINAH</b> (end of 1:13) points out that Rabeinu Yerucham and the Rema apparently disagree with Rav Hai Ga'on. However, see his full discussion for an approach to reconciling their positions. See also <b>RAV CHAIM ALAFANDRI</b> in <b>AISH DAS</b> (Parshas Vayelech). (See also <b>CHIDA</b> in <b>ROSH DAVID</b> (Kedoshim) for a lengthy discussion of the position of <b>MAHARASH PRIMO</b>.) (C. Mendelson)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafbbb'><span class='numt'>1)</span> A GET WRITTEN LO LISHMAH <span class='indexentry'>[Gitin :Lo Lishmah]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question:</span> What is Rava's source that a Get written Stam is Pasul?</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Suggestion (Mishnah):</span> If Reuven overheard a scribe reciting the text of a Get (while writing it), and the names corresponded to him and his wife, he cannot divorce his wife with it.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Rejection:</span> Perhaps the case is as Rav Papa explained. The scribe was writing it to practice. He did not intend that it be used to divorce.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer #1 (Mishnah):</span> Moreover, if Reuven wrote a Get to divorce his wife Leah, and reconsidered, another Reuven in the city with a wife named Leah cannot use it.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rejection:</span> There is different, for Reuven wrote it to divorce his own wife, and decided not to.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer #2 (Mishnah):</span> Moreover, if Reuven wrote a Get to divorce his older wife, he cannot use it to divorce his younger wife, even though she has the same name (even though Reuven wrote it to divorce, and he still wants to)!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rejection:</span> There is different, for it was written for his older wife, and he decided not to use it for her.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer #3 (Mishnah):</span> Moreover, if Reuven told a scribe 'write a Get for my wife Leah. I will decide which of my wives Leah I will use it for', it is Pasul.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rejection:</span> Perhaps it is Pasul because we do not rely on Breirah (to say that (retroactively) the Get was written for whomever Reuven later decides. Perhaps when it was written, he intended to divorce the other wife (and he later retracted, therefore it is Pasul)!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	Gitin 24b (Rav):</span> If any of the Gitin in the Mishnah was given, she becomes forbidden to Kohanim, except for the first case.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Shmuel):</span> Even if the first case, she is disqualified (from Kehunah).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Ze'iri and Rav Asi):</span> Only the Get in the last clause disqualifies.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Yochanan):</span> Even the last case does not disqualify her.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rif and Rosh (Gitin 12b and 3:1):</span> The Halachah is, none of these Gitin disqualify, except for the last. Everyone disqualifies the last, except for R. Yochanan. He is an individual against a Rabim. The Halachah follows the Rabim. Similarly, the first does not disqualify, for only Shmuel says so. Rav and Shmuel disqualify the middle cases. They are a minority against R. Zeira, Rav Asi and R. Yochanan.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Ran (DH v'Hilchesa):</span> I say that the last not only disqualifies form Kehunah. If another man was Mekadesh her afterwards, we are concerned for Kidushin.We hold that Ein Breirah for Torah laws, i.e. we are stringent, but surely we do not say Ein Breirah to be lenient! Therefore, it is Safek divorce. Also the Rambam says so.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Gerushin 3:1):</span> Any Get that was not written for the man who divorces and the woman who is divorced is not a Get. If a scribe was writing a Get to teach or practice, and a man found that the names are those of him and his wife and their cities, and he took it and divorced with it, it is not a Get.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (2):</span>  Moreover, if Reuven wrote a Get to divorce his wife Leah, and reconsidered, and another Reuven in the city with a wife named Leah took it from him and used it, it is not a Get, even though it was written to divorce.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (3):</span> Moreover, if Reuven has two wives with the same name, and he wrote a Get to divorce his older wife, and he reconsidered and used it to divorce his younger wife, it is not a Get. Even though it was written for Reuven, it was not written for this woman that he divorced with it.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (4):</span> Moreover, if Reuven told a scribe 'write, and I will divorce with it whichever I want', and the scribe wrote it with this intent', and he divorced one of them, it is Safek divorce.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rashi (Gitin 25a DH Chutz):</span> R. Zeira is stringent to say Yesh Breirah. A Get that divorces her only from her husband (but does not permit her to anyone) disqualifies from Kehunah. It was written Lishmah. A Get not written Lishmah does not disqualify at all.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (YD 131:1):</span> The writing and signing of a Get must be l'Shem the man who divorces and the woman who is divorced. If it was not written Lishmah, it is not a Get. If a scribe was writing a Get to teach or practice, and a man found that the names are those of him and his wife and the names of their cities, and he took it and divorced with it, it is not a Get.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Shmuel (1):</span> It is not a Get, i.e. it does not disqualify to Kehunah, and Kidushin of another man do not take effect on her. If everything was written Lishmah except for 'you are permitted to any man', one should be concerned for Kidushin, since this was not written in early Gitin, like Tosfos (26b) and the Beis Yosef (123) say. I said (126:27) that also 'a Sefer of cutting' is part of the Toref (that must be written Lishmah).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Pischei Teshuvah (1):</span> Hagahos Yad Efrayim says that even if it was written for a Nochris, it is Pasul. Even though intent for something unrelated does not disqualify, this is no better than Stam, which is Pasul.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Chachmas Shlomo:</span> It is clear in the Gemara and Poskim that the Get must be Lishmo (for the husband). What is the source from the Torah? We learn from 'Lishmah' (for her)! It seems that Lishmo is only mid'Rabanan. They decreed Lishmo due to Lishmah. This would explain why the Tur said that a Get Lo Lishmo is Pasul, i.e. only mid'Rabanan. The Beis Yosef said that he means Batel. This is difficult. If so, why didn't he say Batel?! A Mishnah (24a) says that a Get Lo Lishmah is Pasul. Perhaps we decree that it is only Pasul (and disqualifies to a Kohen) due to Lo Lishmo. However, the Mishnah and Tur say that when he reconsidered to use it for a different wife, it is Batel. However, if the scribe must be the husband's Shali'ach to write the Get, if it is Lo Lishmo it is Batel.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (2):</span>  Moreover, if Reuven wrote a Get to divorce his wife Leah, and reconsidered, and another Reuven in the city with a wife named Leah took it from him and used it, it is not a Get.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (3):</span> Moreover, if Reuven has two wives with the same name, and he wrote a Get to divorce his older wife, and he reconsidered and used it to divorce his younger wife, it is not a Get. Even though it was written for Reuven, it was not written for this woman that he divorced with it.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Shmuel (3):</span> One can divorce the older wife with it, with witnesses who see it given. L'Chatchilah, the Get must be Kosher according to R. Meir, who holds that the signatures empower a Get, so it must Muchach Mitocho (the Get must uniquely specify) whom he divorces. If it was used, she may remarry. Sheiris Yosef (36) disagree. Some say that even R. Elazar requires that the Get be Muchach Mitocho.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Toras Gitin (cited in Rosh Pinah Shulchan Aruch):</span> In the Bi'urim (2), I explain that it is considered Muchach Mitocho because she is holding it.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (4):</span> Moreover, if Reuven told a scribe 'write, and I will divorce with it whichever I want', and the scribe wrote it with this intent', and he divorced one of them, it is Safek divorce. The same applies if he said 'write for the one who will walk out the door first. I will divorce her with it.'</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Gra (OC 413:1):</span> The Poskim rule like R. Zeira, that the last Get disqualifies. We must say that this is because Yesh Breirah, for R. Yochanan disagrees since he holds that Ein Breirah. The Yam Shel Shlomo says that it is a Get only to disqualify from Kehunah, but if someone else was Mekadesh her, we are not concerned. This is wrong. The Gemara says that they argue about Breirah! Rather, we must say like Rashi, that we are stringent to say Yesh Breirah. However, in many places we say Ein Breirah to be lenient! According to Tosfos, we can say that here we are stringent to say Yesh Breirah because he stipulated.</p>
<p class='seealso'>See also:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>3) UNSPECIFIED INTENT WHEN OFFERING A KORBAN</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara proves that a Korban slaughtered without specific intent ('Setama') is fully valid. Even a Korban Chatas or Korban Pesach -- which becomes disqualified if slaughtered with intent that it be a different Korban or for a different owner -- is not disqualified if it is slaughtered with no specific intent. The Gemara proves this from the Mishnah later (56b) which states that there are six specific forms of intent which a person must have when he brings a Korban. Rebbi Yosi there comments that even if a person did not have in mind any of these intents, the Korban remains valid, because Beis Din instituted ('Tenai Beis Din') that a person <i>not</i> specify any of these intents, lest he mistakenly specify the wrong intent (which would invalidate the Korban). Since Beis Din instituted that one have no specific intent when he offers the Korban, and since Rebbi Yosi considers it acceptable for one to have no intent, it is evident that 'Setama' is considered as having proper intent.
</p><p>
The wording of Rebbi Yosi, 'even if he did not have these intents in mind...,' implies that the Korban is valid only b'Di'eved when one does not have any intents in mind. He implies that l'Chatchilah one <i>should</i> have in mind these intents. However, Rebbi Yosi continues and says that there is a Tenai Beis Din that l'Chatchilah a person should <i>not</i> have in mind any of these intents! Why, then, does Rebbi Yosi not phrase his statement by saying that <i>l'Chatchilah</i> a person should not have these intents in mind? (<b>SEFAS EMES</b>)
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>SEFAS EMES</b> answers that the Tenai Beis Din was only that a person should not have in mind <i>two</i> of the six intents -- 'l'Shem Zevach' and 'l'Shem Zove'ach.' For these two intents, the possibility exists that the person will have in mind the wrong intent and invalidate the Korban, since he might have in mind a different type of Korban or a different owner. In contrast, the other intents have no alternative possibilities that could invalidate the Korban. For example, there is no concern that a person will 'accidentally' have intent to bring the Korban for Avodah Zarah and not for Hash-m. Therefore, the Rabanan did not institute that one should not have those other intents in mind when he brings a Korban.
</p><p>
Accordingly, when Rebbi Yosi says that the Korban is valid only b'Di'eved when the Kohen does not have specific intent, he is referring to the other four intents. When Rebbi Yosi says that the Rabanan instituted that one should not have in mind these intents l'Chatchilah, he is referring to the two intents of 'l'Shem Zevach' and 'l'Shem Zove'ach.' (This might be the intention of <b>RASHI</b>, DH she'Lo, who explains that Rebbi Yosi says that the Korban is valid b'Di'eved when the Kohen 'did not have in mind <i>even one</i> of these intents,' meaning that he did not have <i>any</i> intent in mind, referring to any one of the four that he needs to have in mind l'Chatchilah.)
</p><p>
The <b>YOSEF DA'AS</b> points out that not everyone agrees with this approach. The <b>NODA B'YEHUDAH</b> (YD 1:93) writes that it is not necessary to specify verbally that one is doing a Mitzvah 'l'Shem Hash-m' before one performs the Mitzvah, because of the Takanah of the Mishnah not to have these intents in mind. He apparently understands that the Tenai Beis Din applies to all of the Kavanos, and it is not necessary to have even the intent of 'l'Shem Hash-m' in mind.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RASHASH</b> proposes another answer to this question. <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Kayamei) and the <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> (#5) point out that even if the Tenai Beis Din states that it is not necessary to verbally express the specific intent, nevertheless it might be necessary to have the specific intent <i>in mind</i>. Based on this distinction, the Rashash suggests that Rebbi Yosi may mean that l'Chatchilah a person should have in mind all of the specific intents of the Korban. The Takanas Beis Din states only that it is not necessary to verbally express them; he still must have them in mind. This is why Rebbi Yosi teaches that if one did not have these intents in mind, the Korban is valid only b'Di'eved.
</p><p>
Why, though, should a person have in mind the specific Kavanos of the Korban? If he has in mind the <i>wrong</i> intent, he might invalidate the Korban, and thus the Rabanan should have instituted that he should not even <i>think</i> the Kavanos in his mind! The answer is that wrong Kavanos -- which invalidate a Korban -- can invalidate the Korban only when they are expressed verbally, but not when they are thought in one's mind (see Tosfos to 2a, DH Kol, and Insights there). If, however, the Kavanos are not effective when they are not verbally expressed, then why l'Chatchilah should one have the proper Kavanos in mind? Perhaps the purpose of having them in mind is to remember the Torah's original requirement before the Tenai Beis Din was applied.
</p><p>
The Rashash, however, seems to take a different approach. He implies that a wrong Kavanah can invalidate a Korban only when it is spoken, but a correct Kavanah is effective even when it is thought in one's mind. This is also the understanding of the <b>NETZIV</b> (in <b>MEROMEI SADEH</b>, 2a). (It is not clear why there should be such a distinction. Perhaps it is based on a similar concept expressed by the Gemara in Kidushin 39b, 'Machshavah Ra'ah....' (Y. Shaw))
</p><p>
(c) Perhaps Rebbi Yosi means that the Korban would have been valid b'Di'eved without any intent <i>before</i> the Tenai Beis Din was instituted. After the Tenai Beis Din was instituted, l'Chatchilah a person should not have any specific intents.
</p><p>
(d) The <b>RAMBAM</b> in Perush ha'Mishnayos, end of the fourth Perek, proposes a novel interpretation of the Mishnah there. He explains that according to the Tana Kama, both the Kohen <i>and</i> the owner of the Korban must have these six specific intents. When Rebbi Yosi says that there is a Tenai Beis Din to have no intent in mind, he means that Beis Din instituted that the <i>owner</i> should have none of these intents in mind, lest he invalidate the Korban. (The Kohen, however, certainly will have the correct intentions.) This is what the Mishnah means when it concludes that only the wrong Kavanah of the Kohen can invalidate the Korban, but not the wrong Kavanah of the owner.
</p><p>
There are a number of difficulties with the Rambam's explanation. What was the basis for the Rabanan to institute that the wrong Kavanah of the owner will not invalidate the Korban? If the Korban is invalid mid'Oraisa, then how can the Rabanan institute that the Korban is valid and should be offered?
</p><p>
Moreover, how can the Gemara prove from Rebbi Yosi's statement that having no specific intent, 'Setama,' is valid? According to the Rambam, Rebbi Yosi says only that the owner's Kavanah is not taken into account. The Kohen, however, must have the proper Kavanah, and perhaps 'Setama' is not sufficient!
</p><p>
The answer seems to be that according to the Rambam, the Rabanan instituted that the intentions of Beis Din should override the intentions of the owner. This is based on the principle that when a person does a Mitzvah, he does it 'Al Da'ata d'Rabanan' (see Insights to Sukah 3:2). The Rabanan said that <i>they</i> intend for the Korban to be brought for whatever purpose for which it was designated, and not for whatever intentions the owner specifies. This is why the Korban is not disqualified despite the wrong intentions of owner.
</p><p>
This also explains how Rebbi Yosi's statement implies that 'Setama' is valid. The Rabanan do not have in mind any specific intent for the Korban; rather, they say that every Korban should be brought for whatever purpose for which it was designated. This is no better than a Kavanah of 'Setama,' unspecified intent. If the Korban is valid in such a case, then it must be that 'Setama' is considered proper intent.
</p><p>
The teaching of the Rambam may answer the original question posed earlier. When Rebbi Yosi says that l'Chatchilah a person must have in mind the proper intentions, he is referring to the Kohen who brings the Korban. Even if the Kohen does not have in mind the proper specific intents of the Korban, the Korban is valid b'Di'eved. Rebbi Yosi proves this from the Tenai Beis Din, which applies to the <i>owner</i> and teaches that the owner's Kavanah is not taken into account. This shows that the Kavanah of the Rabanan can take the place of the owner even though the Kavanah of the Rabanan is 'Setama,' unspecified.</p><p></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) LACK OF SPECIFIC INTENT WHEN WRITING A 'GET'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: Rava asserts that a Get written without specific intent is Pasul. The Gemara attempts to prove Rava's assertion from the Mishnah that teaches that a man (who has two wives with the same name) cannot divorce one of his wives with a Get which was initially written with intent for whichever wife he would decide later to divorce. Since the husband did not have in mind any specific wife when the Get was written, the Get was <i>not</i> written she'Lo Lishmah, and nevertheless the Get is Pasul. The Gemara refutes this proof, saying that perhaps that case is worse than a case of 'Setama' (no specific intent), and is comparable to specific intent she'Lo Lishmah because of the principle of 'Ein Bereirah.'
</p><p>
The principle of 'Ein Bereirah' is normally understood to mean that if it is not clear at the present time which Kinyan or change of status the person wants to take effect, then a future occurrence has no bearing on the Kinyan, and the Kinyan or change of status does not take effect. How, then, can this Get be worse than a Get that was written with <i>no</i> Kavanah? If 'Ein Bereirah' teaches that the Kavanah of the husband has no effect, then the Get was written without any Kavanah and is 'Setama.' If the law is that such a Get is Pasul, then this shows that a Get written 'Setama' is Pasul! (<b>KOVETZ SHI'URIM</b>, Beitzah #35-36)
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>KOVETZ SHI'URIM</b> points out that <b>RASHI</b> here applies a different understanding of the principle of 'Ein Bereirah.' Rashi writes that according to the opinion which maintains 'Ein Bereirah,' the Get was not written 'Setama,' because perhaps at the time that the Get was written the husband 'intended for the Get to be written for one of his wives.' Later, when he gives the Get to the other wife, for her it is a Get that was written she'Lo Lishmah.
</p><p>
What does Rashi mean when he says that the husband 'intended for the Get to be written for one of his wives'? The case is one in which the husband stated explicitly that he wanted the Get to take effect for whichever wife he later would choose to divorce ('Eizo she'Ertzeh Agaresh')!
</p><p>
Apparently, Rashi means that according to the opinion that maintains 'Ein Bereirah,' future events are not considered 'destined' to occur at an earlier time. Therefore, when the husband attempts to make something dependent on a future event, his words are meaningless, unless he intends to make it dependent on what the circumstances <i>now</i> indicate what will happen in the future. In the case of the Gemara here, the man's stipulation is interpreted to mean that he wants the Get to take effect for the woman whom he presently plans to divorce at a later date. Since we cannot be sure which woman he planned to divorce at the time that he made this statement, the Get is considered 'Safek she'Lo Lishmah.'
</p><p>
It is clear from Rashi that 'Ein Bereirah' does not mean that <i>no</i> Kavanah takes effect. Rather, it means that a Kavanah does take effect, but we can never know which Kavanah it was that took effect. This is evident from Rashi's words elsewhere, and is consistent with the way he explains Bereirah in general. In many places (Gitin 24b, DH l'Eizo, and in all of the Sugyos of Bereirah -- see in particular Gitin 73b, DH u'Meshani, and Chulin 14a, DH Osrin), Rashi explains that even if the Halachah is 'Ein Bereirah,' the Kinyan still takes effect, but the details which were dependent upon the outcome of the future event remain in doubt (see Insights to Eruvin 37:1, Gitin 25:1, and Gitin 73:2). This is also the opinion of the <b>MAHARI</b> quoted by Tosfos to Eruvin (37b, DH Ela).
</p><p>
However, as mentioned elsewhere (see Insights loc. cit.), this does not appear to be the view of <b>TOSFOS</b>. Tosfos and other Rishonim maintain that 'Ein Bereirah' means that <i>nothing</i> takes effect when a Kinyan or intent is linked to a future event. How, then, does Tosfos understand the Gemara?
</p><p>
(b) The <b>KOVETZ SHI'URIM</b> suggests that the Gemara's initial assumption is consistent with the view of Tosfos. Initially, when the Gemara attempts to prove from this Mishnah that a Get written 'Setama' is Pasul, the Gemara already knows that the Mishnah is based on the position of 'Ein Bereirah.' The Gemara's question is that even if the Halachah is 'Ein Bereirah,' the Get is no worse than 'Setama' since it was written with no intent, as Tosfos explains the principle of 'Ein Bereirah.' The Gemara rejects this, saying that perhaps 'Ein Bereirah' indeed means that the Kavanah of 'Lishmah' does take effect, and the Get therefore is 'Safek she'Lo Lishmah.'
</p><p>
The Gemara eventually concludes that a Get <i>is</i> Pasul if it was written 'Setama,' and thus the original assumption of the Gemara returns, that 'Ein Bereirah' makes a Get considered to have been written 'Setama.'
</p><p>
However, it is difficult to propose that the Gemara is questioning the basic meaning of 'Ein Bereirah' without making any open reference to it. The simple understanding of the original assumption of the Gemara is that a Get written in such a manner is comparable to 'Setama,' since the husband knew that he might divorce either one of his two wives (see Tosfos DH Kasav).
</p><p>
(b) Perhaps Tosfos is following his own opinion expressed in Gitin (24b, DH l'Eizo). Tosfos there explains that when the Gemara uses the words 'Ein Bereirah' with regard to a Get, the Gemara is not using those words with their ordinary meaning, referring to the opinion that maintains 'Ein Bereirah.' Rather, the Gemara means that even according to the opinion that rules '<i>Yesh</i> Bereirah,' there still is a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv which teaches that the 'Lishmah' quality of a Get cannot be determined by future events. Therefore, even though it becomes evident retroactively that the Get was written for the woman to whom it was given, this retroactive clarification does not suffice to make the Get considered to have been written Lishmah.
</p><p>
According to this approach, the meaning of the Gemara is clear. The Gemara does not mean that the Get is Pasul because <i>no</i> intent of Lishmah took effect. Rather, the Gemara means that the Get is Pasul because the <i>wrong</i> type of intent of Lishmah took effect -- an intent which was clarified only retroactively. Since this type of Lishmah-intent is not valid for a Get, it is considered like a Get that was written she'Lo Lishmah for another woman, even though in this case it was actually written for the woman to whom it was eventually given.
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span>	MUST THE TOFES OF A GET BE WRITTEN LISHMAH? <span class='indexentry'>[Gitin :Tofes: Lishmah]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Mishnah):</span> One who writes Tofsei Gitim (the part that is the same for everyone) must leave blank the names and the date. This is an enactment.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Rav Yehudah):</span> He must also omit 'you are permitted to any man.'</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Gitin 26a (the same Mishnah):</span> One who writes Tofsim of loan and sale documents must leave blank the names of the lender, borrower, buyer and seller, the amount of the loan/price, the field and the date. This is an enactment.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span>	R. Yehudah says, all of these are Pasul;</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span>	R. Elazar says, all are valid, except for Gitin, for it says 'v'Chasav Lah (he will write for her)' - Lishmah (with intent of her).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Yonason):</span> It is an enactment to help scribes. The first Tana is R. Elazar, who says that 'v'Chasav Lah' refers to writing the Get. We should decree to require even the Tofes to be written Lishmah (lest the Toref, what is particular to this Get, be written Lo Lishmah). Chachamim were lenient to help scribes.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span>	R. Yehudah says that all are Pasul. He decrees that the Tofes be Lishmah, lest the Toref be Lo Lishmah, also for other documents, due to Gitin.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span>	R. Elazar disqualifies only Gitin. He decrees that the Tofes must be written Lishmah, due to the Toref. He does not decree about other documents.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Zeira citing Rav):</span> The Halachah follows R. Elazar.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'>	22b (Mishnah):</span> Anyone can write a Get, even a Cheresh (deaf-mute), lunatic or minor.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question:</span> Why is it valid? They lack Da'as (understanding)!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>12.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer #1 (Rav Huna):</span> The case is, an adult supervises them.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>13.</span><span class='desl2'>Answer #2 (Rav Nachman):</span> The Mishnah is like R. Meir (who does not require a Get to be written Lishmah).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>14.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer #3 (Rav Yehudah):</span> A deaf person, lunatic or minor may write the Tofes, but one with Da'as must write the Toref. The Mishnah is like R. Elazar.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rif (Gitin 11a):</span> Rav Huna said that an adult supervises the (Cheresh, lunatic or) minor. Rav Yehudah taught that the minor must leave over the Toref.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Ran (DH Amar):</span> Rav Yehudah requires a healthy adult to write the Toref. It seems that he argues with Rav Huna. Rav Huna holds that supervision helps even for the Toref, but without it he may not write even the Tofes. Rav Yehudah permits the minor to write the Tofes even without supervision, and supervision does not help for the Toref. We cannot say that Rav Huna and Rav Yehudah rely on each other and require both supervision and leaving over the Toref. It does not seem that Rav Huna relied on what Rav Yehudah says later in the Sugya, or vice-versa. Also, if we do not decree about the Tofes due to the Toref, we should permit even without supervision. If we decree, supervision should not suffice, just like it does not suffice for the Toref! Rather, each said his own answer. They did not rely on each other.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Ran (DH ul'Inyan):</span> Some rule like Rav Huna, and require supervision even for the Tofes. A Mishnah allows Tofsim Lo Lishmah, and R. Elazar disqualifies such Gitin. He decrees about the Tofes due to the Toref. Rav rules like R. Elazar. This is no proof. Regarding scribes, we decree one due to the other, for this is common. We do not decree about a Cheresh, lunatic or minor, for they rarely write Gitin. Even if we equate them, perhaps the Halachah is unlike R. Elazar, even though Rav rules like him. We rule like him for monetary documents, but for Gitin, we follow Rav Yehudah and Rav Huna who do not decree the Tofes due to the Toref. The Rambam holds that Rav Huna and Rav Yehudah rely on each other. I disagree. The Rif brings Rav Huna and Rav Yehudah. Perhaps he holds like the Rambam. Or, he holds that Rav Yehudah argues about how to establish the Mishnah, but he agrees that it is Kosher with supervision *or* if the minor left over the Toref. Even though one could say that Rav Yehudah argues in law, since it is possible to say that he does not, we do not make an argument between them</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Gerushin 3:7):</span> In order to help scribes, Chachamim permitted them to write Tofsei Gitin, and leave off the name of the man, woman, date, and 'you are permitted to any man', in order that he will write it l'Shem the man who divorces, and the woman he divorces.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (18):</span> One may let a deaf person, lunatic or minor write the Tofes of a Get if an adult supervises. Chachamim permitted l'Chatchilah writing the Tofes Lo Lishmah to help scribes</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Gitin 3:2):</span> Some say that R. Elazar decreed only l'Chatchilah not to write the Tofes Lo Lishmah, due to the Toref, but b'Di'eved, she may marry l'Chatchilah with such a Get, like we say about a Get that was written attached (21b). The Rambam disqualifies even b'Di'eved. It is rare to write attached, but Lo Lishmah is common. If we let scribes write the Tofes, amidst distraction they will come to write the Toref. Therefore, we disqualify even b'Di'eved. The Ramah says so. 'R. Elazar is Machshir, except for Gitin' connotes that he disqualifies Gitin. Similarly, R. Yehudah disqualifies all even b'Di'eved. I say that 'R. Elazar is Machshir, except for Gitin' means that he is Posel for Gitin what he is Machshir for other documents, i.e. l'Chatchilah. Also, R. Yehudah equates all documents. Surely he does not disqualify monetary documents b'Di'eved due to the Tofes. In any case it is good to divorce with another Get if the husband is here.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Ran (13a DH Hilkach):</span> For Gitin, one may not write even the Tofes Lo Lishmah. This is why the Rif omitted that he must omit 'you are permitted to any man.' The first Tana, who permits the Tofes Lo Lishmah, said so. The Rambam holds that even though Rav rules like R. Elazar, we follow what Rav Yehudah citing Shmuel, and Rav Huna citing Ula, who explain the Mishnah (22b) to allow a Cheresh, lunatic or minor to write a Get, i.e. the Tofes. I say that one can distinguish between these.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (EH 123:3):</span> If a Cheresh, lunatic or minor write the Toref, it is not a Get.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Chelkas Mechokek (6):</span> The Magid Mishneh and Beis Yosef say that some disagree, so she is Safek divorced.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>Shulchan Aruch (ibid.):</span> If he wrote the Tofes, and a healthy adult wrote Lishmah the Toref, i.e. the man, woman, date, and 'you are permitted to any man', it is Kosher.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rema:</span> Some say that even in this case it is Pasul mid'Rabanan.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Chelkas Mechokek (8):</span> This opinion decrees the Tofes due to the Toref. We need Shlichus to write; supervision does not help for this.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (4):</span> One may let a deaf person, lunatic or minor write the Tofes l'Chatchilah, if an adult supervises.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH ha'Perush):</span> The Rambam says that the minor must omit the Toref, and also he needs supervision. Rav Huna and Rav Yehudah do not argue. Rav Huna requires supervision, i.e. to write the Tofes. This does not help for the Toref. Rav Yehudah is Machshir when he omits the Toref, and also he needs supervision. If not, even the Tofes is Pasul. The Rosh and R. Yerucham say that the Rif and Ramah agree. The Ran was unsure about the Rif's opinion. R. Yerucham says that this opinion is primary. The Ran says that perhaps the Rif holds that Rav Huna and Rav Yehudah argue about how to establish the Mishnah, but both agree that it is Kosher with supervision *or* if the minor left over the Toref. Ba'al ha'Itur leans to say that the Rif holds like this. Rashi holds that Rav Yehudah and Rav Huna argue. Rav Huna requires supervision even for the Toref. Rav Yehudah does not require supervision for the Tofes, and holds that it does not help for the Toref. The Magid Mishneh says that some rule like Rav Huna, and some like Rav Yehudah. Semag and Sefer ha'Terumah rule like Rav Huna. The Rashba says that Bahag wrote only Rav Huna's opinion. The Magid Mishneh says that they hold that supervision helps like for the Toref, and without supervision, it is Batel. If the Tofes was written without supervision.he was unsure if it is Kosher b'Di'eved. The Rashba says that it is Kosher b'Di'eved, but the Ramban (Sefer ha'Zechus) disqualifies. The Magid Mishneh says that those who rule like Rav Yehudah allow the Tofes l'Chatchilah without supervision, but if the Toref was written even with supervision, it is Batel.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (131 DH Tzarich):</span> The Rashba says that the Yerushalmi connotes that the Halachah follows R. Elazar. Some texts of the Rambam are like the Ran and R. Yerucham cite him, to permit Tofsei Gitin Lo Lishmah l'Chatchilah. The Tur says that he forbids, but if it was written he allows divorcing with it b'Di'eved. I did not see any such text. Some texts of the Tur cite this in the name of the Ramban. (This is difficult, for above the Tur said that the Ramban disqualifies b'Di'eved.) It seems that the Ran's text of the Rambam is correct. In Halachah 18, he says that they permitted l'Chatchilah writing the Tofes Lo Lishmah for the sake of scribes.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Shmuel (131:2):</span> The Mechaber did not teach whether a scribe may prepare Tofsei Gitin. The Rambam permits. Most Poskim disagree. One opinion is Machshir when a Cheresh, lunatic or minor wrote the Tofes. He could distinguish. There it is Kosher because it is rare, but it is common for a scribe to prepare Tofsim. Perhaps he will write the Toref (Lo Lishmah)! The Ramban and Ramah forbid remarrying with such a Get. The Rosh holds that if it was written, he may divorce with it. Bahag and the Rashba disqualify. They hold like the Ramban, but if she married she need not leave, like other Pesulim mid'Rabanan. The Tur says that she must leave. This is only according to the Ramban, who says so about Pesulim mid'Rabanan. The Rema (123:3) cited the Ri, who disqualifies if a minor wrote the Tofes. He would disqualify whenever the Tofes was Lo Lishmah.</p>
<p class='seealso'>See also:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) 'LO MINAH LO MACHRIV BAH'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara (3a) teaches that even though a Korban Chatas that is slaughtered with intent to be a different Korban is disqualified and cannot be offered at all, if it is slaughtered with intent to be eaten as Chulin, the wrong intent does not disqualify it. The Gemara explains that this is because 'Lo Minah Lo Machriv Bah' -- having intent to slaughter the animal as an entirely different entity, with a thought that does not relate to the status of a Korban, does not have any effect, and it is considered as though it was slaughtered 'Setama' and is valid.
</p><p>
The Gemara asks that the same principle should apply to the laws of an earthenware vessel (Kli Cheres). Normally, when any Tahor food item enters a Kli Cheres that is Tamei, that food item becomes Tamei. Nevertheless, when there is a Kli Cheres that is Tahor situated inside of an outer Klei Cheres that is Tamei, and the food enters the inner Kli Cheres, the food does not become Tamei. The inner Kli Cheres (the rim of which protrudes above the rim of the outer Kli Cheres) protects the food from the airspace of the outer Kli Cheres which is Tamei. The Beraisa teaches that even if the inner Kli is not a Kli Cheres, but a Kli Shetef (that is, a utensil made of wood, metal, or bone, which can become Tahor by being immersed into a Mikvah), the food in the inner Kli still remains Tahor. The Gemara asks that the food in the inner Kli should not be Tahor according to the principle that 'Lo Minah Lo Machriv Bah,' since a Kli Shetef is an entirely different type of utensil than a Kli Cheres, and therefore its presence should be disregarded (and the food inside of it should become Tamei as though it were inside of the outer, Tamei Kli Cheres).
</p><p>
In numerous places (Yoma 58a, Sukah 37b, Sotah 45b, Zevachim 110a, Bechoros 9b) the Gemara discusses the laws of Chatzitzah, and the Amora'im disagree about whether the law of a Chatzitzah applies to 'Min b'Mino' -- two items of the same type. However, all Amora'im agree that items of different types <i>are</i> considered a Chatzitzah to each other. This seems to contradict the assumption of the Gemara here that items of different types do <i>not</i> interfere with each other as much as items of the same type. How is the principle of 'Min b'Mino Eino Chotzetz' to be reconciled with the principle of 'Lo Minah Lo Machriv Bo'?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>RASHI</b> alludes to the answer to this question. He writes (3a, DH d'Lav Minah) that the Gemara here means that when a Korban was slaughtered for the sake of Chulin, the status ('Shem') of Chulin does not take effect on the Korban to uproot its present status. That is, the Gemara states this principle not with regard to cases of Chatzitzah (cases where physical contact is necessary), but only with regard to cases which involve a change of Halachic status. A thought that is entirely unrelated to the present status of the item cannot change the item's status. Similarly, with regard to food inside of the inner Kli Shetef, if the Kli Shetef is considered a different type of a Kli, then its presence cannot affect the status of the food inside of it such that the food should no longer be considered within a Kli Cheres. On the other hand, if the food was inside an inner Kli <i>Cheres</i>, then the food is no longer considered to be in the airspace of the outer Kli Cheres, but rather its status is that it is inside of the inner Kli (and is thus Tahor). However, when physical contact is necessary, a dissimilar material certainly is considered a Chatzitzah, while a similar material might not be considered a Chatzitzah, since it is considered a continuation of the object to which it is similar.
</p><p>
The Rishonim indeed apply the principle of 'Lo Minah Machriv Bah' to a number of other situations which involve questions of a change of status, as opposed to physical separation. For example, the <b>RAN</b> in Rosh Hashanah (9b of the pages of the Rif) explains that although one fulfills his obligation when he hears someone blow the Shofar with intent to make music, if he hears someone blow the Shofar in order to perform the Mitzvah of teaching children how to blow he does <i>not</i> fulfill his obligation. The reason is that the Kavanah for making music can be ignored because of the rule of 'Lo Minah Lo Machriv Bah.' Therefore, it is considered as though the Shofar was blown without any Kavanah. In contrast, when one blows the Shofar with intent for a different Mitzvah, then it changes the status of the Teki'ah to a Teki'ah for a different Mitzvah, which is not the same as a Teki'ah without any Kavanah.
</p><p>
The <b>RASHBA</b> applies the principle of 'Lo Minah Lo Machriv Bah' in Rosh Hashanah (34a) to explain why a mis-blown Teki'ah can be considered an interruption in a set of Teki'os, while a Teki'ah for a song is not considered an interruption. This, too, is because the Teki'ah that is not blown for the Mitzvah cannot change the status of the ensuing Teki'os to make them unrelated to the first half of Teki'os in the set.
</p><p>
(b) However, the <b>RASHBA</b> (in Teshuvos 3:282) applies the principle of the Gemara here to a question of physical Chatzitzah as well. The Rashba proves that the Tefilin Shel Yad does not have to be placed directly on the skin, but it may be placed on top of the sleeve of one's shirt. The Rashba asks that this seems to contradict the Gemara in Erchin (3b), which teaches that the Kohanim cannot don the Tefilin Shed Yad, because the Bigdei Kehunah will intervene between the Tefilin and the flesh. The Rashba answers that since there is a Mitzvah to wear Bigdei Kehunah just as there is a Mitzvah to wear Tefilin, while there is no Mitzvah to wear a sleeve on one's arm, the principle of 'Lo Minah Lo Machriv Bah' applies.
</p><p>
According to the Rashba, why does the principle of 'Lo Minah Lo Machriv Bah' not apply in every case of Chatzitzah and, consequently, render every case of 'Min b'Mino' a <i>greater</i> form of interruption than 'Min b'she'Eino Mino'?
</p><p>
The answer might be that, usually, when the Gemara discusses Chatzitzah, it refers to a situation in which two items must touch each other but are being prevented from doing so. In such a case, the principle of 'Lo Minah Lo Machriv' would not affect the situation (and would not make the two items considered to be touching each other), because even if the object which is 'Lo Minah' is ignored, there is empty space between the two items that are supposed to be touching each other (i.e., the space where the 'Lo Minah' item is). The only way to make the two objects touch each other in a case of a Chatzitzah which is Min b'Mino is by viewing Min b'Mino as a single, unified object.
</p><p>
However, in the case of the Gemara here, if the Kli Shetef is ignored and is considered to be empty space, then the food inside of it indeed has nothing but empty space separating it from the Kli Cheres, and this suffices to make the food Tamei. If, on the other hand, the inner Kli is a Kli Cheres, then the inner Kli Cheres <i>is </i> Mafsik and the principle of 'Min b'Mino Eino Chotzetz' does not apply, because the inner Kli Cheres cannot be considered a single, unified object with the outer Kli Cheres. It stands by itself and is not resting entirely on the outer Kli.
</p><p>
The Rashba, who applies this principle to the laws of Tefilin, proves from another Gemara that a sleeve is not considered a Chatzitzah between the Tefilin and the skin. Accordingly, the laws of Tefilin do not require that the Tefilin touch the skin, but rather that the Tefilin be placed opposite the Zero'a of the arm. Therefore, if the sleeve is ignored, the Tefilin is separated from the arm only by air, and this is a proper placement of Tefilin. The shirt of the Kohen, however, cannot be ignored (since it is a Mitzvah to wear it), and therefore it is considered a Chatzitzah.
</p><p>
Perhaps these two different views of the principle of 'Lo Minah Machriv Bah' are dependent on the Machlokes between the Rambam and Ra'avad with regard to the Tum'ah of the airspace of a Kli Cheres. The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Metamei Mishkav u'Moshav 8:4) writes that although a Sheretz which falls into the airspace of a Kli Cheres is Metamei the Kli, a Zav who puts his arm into the airspace of a Kli Cheres (without touching the Kli itself) is <i>not</i> Metamei the Kli, because only the arm entered and not the entire Zav. The <b>RA'AVAD</b> argues with the Rambam and says that if the airspace of a Kli Cheres is Metamei with Maga (through touching it), then why should there be any difference between a Zav that touches the Kli on its inner surface and a Zav that touches the airspace in the inside of the Kli?
</p><p>
<b>RABEINU CHAIM HA'LEVI</b> explains that the Rambam and Ra'avad are arguing about the basic understanding of the law of 'Tum'as Avir Kli Cheres.' The Ra'avad understands that the airspace of a Kli Cheres is considered the same as the inner surface of the Kli Cheres. A Kli Cheres does not become Tamei when a Tamei object touches its outer surface, but it does become Tamei when a Tamei object touches its inner surface. The airspace of the Kli Cheres is the same as its inner surface, and therefore one who touches the airspace is considered to have touched the inner surface. The same principle applies to a Kli Cheres, which is Tamei, into which food is placed. If food touches the airspace of the Kli Cheres, it is considered as though it has touched the inner surface of the Kli Cheres.
</p><p>
The Rambam, however, understands that the Tum'ah of the airspace of a Kli Cheres is not a Tum'as Maga. Rather, it is based on a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv that states that if something <i>enters</i> and is <i>inside</i> the airspace of the Kli Cheres, the Torah considers it as though a Kli Cheres had touched it. (This is similar to Tum'as Mes, which can be transferred either by touching a Mes, or through serving as an Ohel over a Mes, without touching it.) Therefore, the Rambam rules that the Zav can be Metamei the Kli only if the entire Zav enters the Kli Cheres; that is when the Torah applies the rule that a Tamei object that is fully contained within a Kli Cheres can spread Tum'ah to the Kli Cheres.
</p><p>
The same principle may be applied to food which is inside a Kli Cheres. According to the Rambam, the food is Tamei not because it is touching the air of the Kli Cheres, but because it has the <i>status</i> of being <i>inside</i> of a Kli Cheres. Accordingly, the case of the Gemara here -- which applies 'Lo Minah Lo Machriv Bah' to the airspace of a Kli Cheres -- has nothing to do with Chatzitzah. Rather, it has to do with a change of status (as mentioned in the first answer above). However, according to the Ra'avad, the airspace of the Kli Cheres is Metamei the food because the food is touching the air. Hence, the inner Kli must act as a Chatzitzah between the airspace of the Kli Cheres and the food. If the rule of 'Lo Minah Lo Machriv Bah' is applied in this case, then it is evident that this rule may be invoked even with regard to laws involving the Chatzitzah, as the Rashba writes.</p><p></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 'SHINUY BA'ALIM' AND 'SHINUY KODESH'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara teaches that Shinuy Kodesh is more severe than Shinuy Ba'alim because it applies to all four of the Avodos -- Shechitah, Kabalah, Holachah, and Zerikah, while Shinuy Ba'alim does not apply to all four Avodos. <b>RASHI</b> explains that a Machshavah of Shinuy Ba'alim is meaningless except when the Kohen has intention to perform the <i>Zerikah</i> for a person other than the owner of the Korban. The reason for this is that the owner of the Korban relates to his Korban only insofar as he receives Kaparah, or fulfills his pledge, through the valid Zerikah of the blood of the Korban. Therefore, having in mind that the Shechitah, Kabalah, or Holachah is being done for a different person has no effect on the Korban.
</p><p>
What does the Gemara mean, then, when it cites verses to show that Shinuy Ba'alim <i>is</i> considered an invalidating thought in any of the four Avodos? Rashi explains that the Gemara means that Shinuy Ba'alim is considered an invalidating thought when the Kohen slaughters the animal with intention to perform the Zerikah for a different person (but not with intention that the Shechitah is being performed for a different person). This is the intent of the Gemara when it states that Shinuy Ba'alim does not apply to all four Avodos, since it is relevant only to thoughts involving Zerikah. The Gemara makes a similar statement with regard to the Chumra of Shinuy Kodesh in Pesachim (60b).
</p><p>
The Gemara in one other place alludes to this difference between Shinuy Kodesh and Shinuy Ba'alim. In the Gemara later (9b), Rebbi Yochanan asserts that if a person slaughters a Korban with the proper intention for the Shechitah, but with intention -- at the time of the Shechitah -- to perform the Zerikah she'Lo Lishmah, his thought is considered a Machshavah she'Lo Lishmah. The Gemara initially says that Rebbi Yochanan derives this law from the laws of Pigul. When a person slaughters a Korban with intention to perform the Zerikah after the proper time has passed ('Chutz l'Zemano'), he invalidates the Korban. In the Gemara later (10a), Rav Ashi finds another source to teach that having intent, during Shechitah, to perform the Zerikah she'Lo Lishmah is considered a Machshavah she'Lo Lishmah. He says that this Halachah may be derived through a Kal va'Chomer: if a Korban is not considered she'Lo Lishmah when one performs Shechitah with intent for a different owner, but it is considered she'Lo Lishmah when he performs Zerikah with intent for a different owner, then with regard to Shinuy Kodesh, where the law is that when one performs the Shechitah with intent for a different Korban it is considered she'Lo Lishmah, certainly if one performs the Shechitah with intent to perform the Zerikah she'Lo Lishmah, the Korban is considered she'Lo Lishmah. It is evident from the Gemara there that the laws of a Machshavah of Shinuy Ba'alim differ from the laws of Shinuy Kodesh.
</p><p>
The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 13:1 and 15:1) records the laws of Shinuy Kodesh and Shinuy Ba'alim, but in no place does he mention any distinction between the two. The <b>MISHNEH L'MELECH</b> (15:1) asks that the Rambam seems to contradict the Gemaras mentioned above. How is the Gemara here to be understood according to the ruling of the Rambam?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>ME'IRI</b> in Pesachim (60b) writes that it seems that the Rambam understands that the Halachah does not follow the Sugya here in Zevachim. Why, though, should it not be the Halachah? On the contrary, the Gemara here implies that it <i>is</i> the Halachah, since the Gemara does not mention that this Chumra of Shinuy Kodesh is 'Lav Davka' as it mentions with regard to the other two Chumras of Shinuy Kodesh!
</p><p>
The <b>KEREN ORAH</b> (10a) points out that there is a similar Sugya in the Yerushalmi in Pesachim (5:2), where the Yerushalmi also seeks a source that it is considered she'Lo Lishmah when a person slaughters a Korban with intent to perform Zerikah for the sake of a different Korban. The Yerushalmi, however, does not make the simple Kal va'Chomer from Shinuy Ba'alim that Rav Ashi makes here in order to prove that it is she'Lo Lishmah. This implies that, according to the Yerushalmi, Shinuy Ba'alim is the same as Shinuy Kodesh and is not limited to Shechitah done with intent to perform Zerikah for another person. Perhaps the Rambam follows the view of the Yerushalmi that argues with the Bavli. (The Rambam occasionally follows the Yerushalmi and not the Bavli.) In addition, it is possible that in the Rambam's Girsa of the Gemara, the Gemara here does not specify which of the two Chumras of Shinuy Kodesh are 'Lav Davka.' Perhaps the Rambam learns that the Chumra that Shinuy Kodesh applies to four Avodos is 'Lav Davka,' and that in truth both types of Shinuy apply to all four Avodos.
</p><p>
(b) Other Acharonim attempt to prove that whether or not Shinuy Ba'alim applies in the same way as Shinuy Kodesh is the subject of dispute even in the Bavli itself. The <b>SEFAS EMES</b> (7a) and the <b>CHAFETZ CHAIM</b> (in <b>ZEVACH TODAH</b>, 7a) suggest that the Rambam might have learned that this Halachah depends on the Machlokes between Rava and Rav Chisda in that Gemara. The <b>KEREN ORAH</b> (4b) shows another Safek in the Bavli, in the Gemara here, upon which this Halachah might depend. The Chafetz Chaim concludes, however, that it is odd for the Gemara to state this Halachah regarding Shinuy Ba'alim as though it is unanimously accepted, if it is actually the subject of a Machlokes elsewhere and is not followed as the Halachah.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>CHAFETZ CHAIM</b> (in <b>ZEVACH TODAH</b> later, 10a) suggests that there are two types of Machshavah of Shinuy Ba'alim. A Kohen can slaughter a Korban thinking that the Shechitah is for another person other than the owner, or a Kohen can slaughter a Korban thinking that the Korban <i>belongs</i> to a person other than the owner. The Gemara says that a Shinuy Ba'alim during Shechitah is acceptable only when it is the first type of Shinuy Ba'alim -- when the Kohen slaughters the Korban with intent that the Shechitah should be for another person, but the Kohen knows that the Korban belongs to the first person. In contrast, if the Kohen slaughters the Korban with intent that the Korban belongs to another person, then the Korban indeed will be considered she'Lo Lishmah, because it is evident that the Kohen -- who has in mind that the Korban belongs to another person -- will also perform the Zerikah for that other person. Thus, it is as if the Kohen had in mind to perform Zerikah for the other person as well.
</p><p>
Accordingly, the Gemara here and later (10a) may be referring to the first type of Shinuy Ba'alim, and it is teaching that this type of Shinuy Ba'alim is not considered a Machshavah of she'Lo Lishmah at the time of Shechitah. However, the Rambam -- who seems to equate Shinuy Kodesh with Shinuy Ba'alim -- may be referring to the other type of Machshavah of Shinuy Ba'alim: the Kohen has in mind to bring the Korban for another person (and not just to perform the Shechitah for another person) at the time of Shechitah. However, the Chafetz Chaim concludes that if this indeed is the way the Rambam learns, the Rambam still should mention that there is another type of Shinuy Ba'alim that does not apply to Shechitah.
</p><p>
<b>RAV SHACH</b> zt'l in <b>AVI EZRI</b> (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 15:1) and the <b>EVEN HA'AZEL</b> (end of 13:1) make a similar suggestion. They add that even if the Kohen slaughters the Korban for the sake of a person other than its owner, it is considered she'Lo Lishmah, because he probably intends to perform the Zerikah for the other person as well. They suggest that the Gemara later (10a) does not mean that Shechitah done for a different person is <i>not</i> considered she'Lo Lishmah. Rather, it means that it would not have been considered she'Lo Lishmah had it not been for the fact that the Kohen intends to do the Zerikah for a different person as well.
</p><p>
However, they have difficulty explaining the Gemara based on this approach. Why is Shinuy Kodesh considered more severe than Shinuy Ba'alim?
</p><p>
(d) Perhaps a new approach may be suggested to explain the words of the Rambam. The Gemara later (10a) first attempts to use a different Kal va'Chomer to teach that it is considered she'Lo Lishmah when a Kohen slaughters the animal with the intent to perform Zerikah she'Lo Lishmah. The Gemara suggests a Kal va'Chomer from the Halachah of slaughtering the Korban in the improper time. The Gemara says that a Korban which is slaughtered with intention that the Shechitah should be performed 'Chutz l'Zemano' is valid, yet if one slaughters it in order to perform the Zerikah 'Chutz l'Zemano,' then the Korban is Pasul. Since the law is that when a person does Shechitah with intent to offer the animal as a different Korban it <i>is</i> considered she'Lo Lishmah, if he does Shechitah with intent that the Zerikah be done for a different Korban then certainly it should be she'Lo Lishmah. <b>RASHI</b> (DH Hareini Shochet and DH Hareini Shochto) explains that having intention, during the Shechitah, that the Shechitah is being done 'Chutz l'Zemano' is a meaningless intention, because the Shechitah is actually being done in the proper time.
</p><p>
Perhaps Rav Ashi's Kal va'Chomer from Shinuy Ba'alim is based on the same type of logic. That is, there are two types of Shinuy Ba'alim. One type is when a Kohen slaughters the Korban of Shimon having in mind that the Shechitah should be done for Reuven, who he knows does not own the Korban. The other type is when a Kohen slaughters the Korban of Shimon and he thinks that Shimon is Reuven. Although the first type of Shinuy Ba'alim indeed gives the Korban the status of she'Lo Lishmah, the second type of Shinuy Ba'alim is a meaningless thought, since, at the time of Shechitah, the owner is standing next to the Korban and the Kohen intends that the Korban belongs to that person. The fact that the Kohen thinks that Shimon is a different person cannot render the Korban she'Lo Lishmah, as long as the Kohen intends for the Korban to be brought for the person (who is the true owner) who is standing before him. However, during the Zerikah, there is no parallel, meaningless thought of Shinuy Ba'alim, because the owner is not standing in front of the Kohen at the time that the Kohen performs the Zerikas ha'Dam upon the Mizbe'ach. Therefore, if the Kohen performs Zerikah with intention that the Korban is for the wrong person, then it indeed is considered she'Lo Lishmah. This might be the meaning of the Gemara later, and the Gemara here, when it says that Shinuy Kodesh applies to more Avodos than Shinuy Ba'alim. The Gemara means that <i>this</i> type of Shinuy Ba'alim (the second type) does not apply during the Shechitah (since the owner is there), but it does apply during the Zerikah.
</p><p>
The Rambam, on the other hand, is justified in not citing this distinction between Shinuy Kodesh and Shinuy Ba'alim, because this distinction is self-evident. This kind of Machshavah of Shinuy Ba'alim during Shechitah is obviously meaningless.
</p><p>
What, then, does the Gemara later (10a) mean when it proves that a Shechitah with intention to do Zerikah for another Korban invalidates the Korban based on a Kal va'Chomer from Shinuy Ba'alim? Shechitah done with intention to do Zerikah with Shinuy Ba'alim does not disqualify the Korban! How, then, can a Kal va'Chomer from Shinuy Ba'alim teach that such a Machshavah with Shinuy Kodesh invalidates the Korban?
</p><p>
The answer is that the Gemara is not assuming that such a Machshavah invalidates the Korban in the case of Shinuy Ba'alim. Rather, it sees from Shinuy Ba'alim that more Machshavos can invalidate the Korban at the time of Zerikah than at the time of Shechitah, since the second type of Shinuy Ba'alim does not apply during the Shechitah. Consequently, a wrong thought during Zerikah is more severe than during Shechitah. If Shechitah with intention that the animal is being slaughtered for a different type of Korban is Pasul, then certainly slaughtering an animal with intention that the Zerikah should be done for a different type of Korban should be considered a Machshavah of she'Lo Lishmah.
</p><p>
Support for this way of reading the Gemara may be found in the words of Rav Ashi. When Rav Ashi expresses his Kal va'Chomer, he is careful to omit the three words 'Shechato Al Menas,' implying that he is not discussing a case where the Kohen slaughters an animal with intention to do the Zerikah for a different person, but rather he is discussing a case in which the Kohen does the Zerikah for a different person, and it is from this case that he makes his Kal va'Chomer. (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafbbb'><span class='numt'>1)</span> ACHARAYUS FOR TZEDAKAH <span class='indexentry'>[Tzedakah :Acharayus]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Beraisa - R. Shimon):</span> 'V'Nirtzah Lo Lechaper *Alav*' - one has Acharayus for a Korban that is Alav. (If it gets stolen or lost or blemished, he must bring another.) If it is not Alav, he has no Acharayus.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Yitzchak bar Avdimi):</span> When he says Alai, he accepts responsibility to bring it no matter what happens.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Chulin 139a (Rav Hamnuna):</span> All agree regarding Erchin (a pledge to give to Hekdesh an amount based on a person's age and gender), even if he said Alai, he has no Acharayus.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span>	This is because 'Alai' is not extra. It is needed to obligate himself! 'My Erech' or 'Ploni's Erech' is meaningless, for he did not say who must give it!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Objection #1 (Rava):</span> He could say '*Hareni* b'Erki (or b'Erech Ploni', I am obligated to give my Erech or Ploni's Erech)!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Objection #2 (Rava - Beraisa - R. Noson) Question:</span> 'v'Nasan Es ha'Erkecha... Kodesh la'Shem' - the verse discusses redeeming a field. Why does it say 'ha'Erkecha'?</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Answer:</span> One has no Acharayus on money given to redeem Hekdesh or Ma'aser Sheni. One might have thought that similarly, there is no Acharayus on money designated to pay Erchin. The verse teaches this is not so. The money is Chulin until it is given to the Gizbar.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	Correction:</span> Rather, Rav Hamnuna taught that all agree about Erchin. Even without 'Alai', he has Acharayus. It is Chulin until it is given to the Gizbar.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	Erchin 6a (Rav Nachman):</span> If one said 'this coin is for Tzedakah', it is permitted to change (borrow) it.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Ze'ira):</span> This is only if he said 'Alai'. If he said 'this', the very coin must be given to Tzedakah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'>	Objection (Rava):</span> Just the contrary! If he said 'this,' we let him change it, so he will have Acharayus. If he said 'Alai', he already has Acharayus, so we need not allow him to change it! Rather, in either case he may change it.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span><span class='desl2'>	Support (for Rava - Beraisa):</span> Neder is Tzedakah, but Hekdesh is not Tzedakah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>12.</span>	This means that Bal Te'acher applies to (a Neder to give) Tzedakah, but Tzedakah is unlike a Korban, for one may use Tzedakah, but not Hekdesh.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>13.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh Hashanah 6a:</span> 'B'Ficha' teaches that Bal Te'acher applies to Tzedakah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>14.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rava:</span> One is liable immediately for delaying to give Tzedakah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>15.</span>	This is because there are Aniyim here.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Matanos Aniyim 8:1):</span> Tzedakah is a Neder. Therefore, if one said 'Alai to give a Sela to Tzedakah' or 'this Sela is for Tzedakah', he must give to Aniyim immediately. If there are not Aniyim, he separates the money and leaves it until he finds Aniyim. If he stipulates not to give until he finds an Oni, he need not separate.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Ran (Rosh Hashanah 1b DH v'Nimtzeis):</span> The Gemara said that Bal Te'acher applies even if he did not separate the Korban yet. Similarly, regarding Tzedakah one must separate the money even if there are not Aniyim here. However, he need not pursue them to give it to them.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Minchas Chinuch (575:12,DH veha'Ram):</span> Why do the Rambam and Ran require separating the money immediately if no Aniyim are around? If an Oni comes, he can separate and give then. Until an Oni comes, he cannot fulfill the Mitzvah, so separating does not help! Perhaps this is a mere stringency in case an Oni will come (so the money will be ready).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shevet ha'Levi (2:116):</span> The Ran holds that letter of the law, one must separate immediately. In every vow, there is separation and giving. Separating itself is Avodas Hash-m. There was a Hava Amina that the Torah was particular only about this, and once he separated he has no Acharayus.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kiryat Sefer (Hilchos Matanos Aniyim 8):</span> When one separates the Sela that he vowed, until it reaches the Gabai he may change it for another coin, since he has Acharayus. Tzedakah is unlike Hekdesh, which is Asur b'Hana'ah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rashi (Erchin 6a DH Lo):</span> When he said 'it is Alai to give this Sela to Tzedakah', since he said Alai, he has Acharayus for theft and loss. It is like his.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Taz (YD 206:4):</span> Resha'im vow. I.e. he says 'Alai', and he has Acharayus, and there is danger lest it be lost and he will not bring another. A Tzadik gives Nedavos. I.e. he says 'this is'; there is no Acharayus.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Chavos Ya'ir (199):</span> If one took Tzedakah money, Beis Din cannot force him to give more, for no one can claim the money (unless the Aniyim of the city make a Harsha'ah together). However, to be Yotzei Yedei Shamayim (fulfill his obligation to Hash-m) he must pay again. We learn from Rosh Hashanah (6) that when one says that he will give Tzedakah, it is as if he gave it to Aniyim. One cannot exempt himself for negligence with their money!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Chavas Da'as (YD 160:10 Bi'urim):</span> The Maharit (YD 39) says that theft does not apply to Tzedakah. Even if one consumed the money, he is exempt, just like a Zar who ate Matanos Kehunah. This is astounding. In Erchin, we permit using money designated for Tzedakah, so that he will be a Shole'ach Yad, and it will be in his Reshus and he will have Acharayus. All the more so one who ate them has Acharayus! Do not say that he is liable merely to be Yotzei Yedei Shamayim. 'Liable' connotes that Beis Din enforces this. We can say that there, he said 'Alai', so he has Acharayus to fulfill his vow. This is like Acharayus of Hekdesh, even though one who damages Hekdesh is exempt. Regarding Hekdesh, one who said 'this' is exempt, for he already fulfilled his vow. Regarding Tzedakah, perhaps he has Acharayus even if he said 'this', for regarding Erchin, all agree that saying 'this' is like saying 'Alai', since it is Chulin until it is given to the Gizbar. Only regarding Hekdesh, once he says 'this (is Hekdesh)', it is considered to be in Hashem's Reshus. Regarding Tzedakah, until the Gizbar gets it the Aniyim did not acquire it, so he did not fulfill his vow. Therefore, one may change the money only until the Gizbar gets it.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question (Tzitz Eliezer 5:13):</span> Erchin 6a proves that regarding Tzedakah, one who said 'this' has Acharayus only if he used the money!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tzitz Eliezer (ibid.):</span> If one took money from his pocket for Aniyim, but they did not come to the Beis ha'Keneses and he forgot and left the money in its place and it is missing, he must give again to be Yotzei Yedei Shamayim. Machaneh Efrayim (Shomerim 17) holds that a Shomer of Tzedakah is exempt even when there is a claimant. Most disagree. However, here is different, for he vowed. Since he was negligent, he was not Yotzei his vow. All agree that it is as if he still did not separate the money he vowed. This is not only if he said Alai. In such a case, one is liable to Hekdesh if it was stolen or lost. He is liable even if he said 'this'. He is exempt from Acharayus of loss or theft. There is no proof to exempt from negligence. One who damages Hekdesh is exempt, but here he is liable because he ruined his Nedavah. Putting the money in an exposed place is negligence. The Rambam (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 14:5) says that there is Acharayus for theft or loss of a Neder, but not for death or theft of a Nedavah. He did not exempt for loss of a Nedavah! We understand this if one is liable for negligence with a Nedavah. We learn from Erchin 6a that if one used Tzedakah money and gave other coins in their place, and they were lost or stolen, even if he said 'this', he is liable. Since he used them, this is like Shlichus Yad (unauthorized use) in a deposit, and it is in his Reshus regarding payment. Even without the Chiyuv of a Shomer, he is liable b'Yedei Adam due to his vow.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Avnei Nezer (YD 293):</span> If David put money in a Tzedakah box without accepting a vow, and the money was stolen, surely he is exempt. If he accepted a vow, what is the law? According to Ri ha'Levi, the box acquired on behalf of Aniyim. It is as if the Gabai received it, so David is exempt. The Ramah holds that a buyer's Kelim do not acquire in the seller's Reshus, so David is liable. However, since there was permission to leave the box there, the Ramah could agree. However, the Rif, Rambam and Rosh hold that Chatzer acquires like a Shali'ach, i.e. only if the receiver wants. Aniyim do not want it to acquire, for then the giver loses Acharayus. Also, they are not near the box, so it is not guarded l'Da'atam. The Ran disagrees, but we follow the Rif, Rambam and Rosh against him. Perhaps David is exempt, for he accepted only to put the money in the box, and the Gaba'im will distribute it. He has no Acharayus after this. However, perhaps he intended that it get to the Gabai, for if not, he did not accept a full Mitzvah. Perhaps if he does not accept this, he has no Chiyuv at all! Acceptance to bring an Olah without Acharayus obligates making it Hekdesh, but accepting to set aside money for Aniyim does not make it the Aniyim's money. Perhaps he only intended to put in the box with intent to transfer ownership to the Aniyim. However, we find that one who vows a Korban has Acharayus until Zerikah, even though from only Kohanim can do Kabalah and onwards.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tzitz Eliezer (16:29):</span> Avnei Nezer leans to obligate David. Ma'amar Mordechai (15) says that putting in the box is as if it came to the Gabai. Many Acharonim agreed. David can say 'I hold like them.' Even if the Halachah does not follow them, perhaps he only accepted to put in the box. (However, if he vowed Stam Tzedakah, he cannot say so.)</p>
<p class='seealso'>See also:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) THE SOURCE THAT 'BECHOR,' 'MA'ASER BEHEMAH,' AND 'PESACH' MUST BE OFFERED 'LISHMAH'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara proves that a Kohen must bring a Korban Shelamim with specific intent for the correct owner and for the correct type of Korban. The Gemara asks what the source is that this requirement applies to other Korbanos as well. Perhaps this requirement applies only to Shelamim, the laws of which are more stringent than other Korbanos, because Shelamim requires Semichah, Nesachim, and Tenufas Chazeh v'Shok. <b>RASHI</b> explains that most other Korbanos require Semichah as well, and the Gemara's question from the Chumra of Semichah of Shelamim is only from the three types of Korbanos which do not require Semichah -- Bechor, Ma'aser Behemah, and Pesach. Since these Korbanos do not require Semichah, they should not require Kavanah Lishmah. The Gemara answers that all other Korbanos are compared by the verse to Shelamim, as the verse says, 'Zos ha'Torah...' (Vayikra 7:37).
</p><p>
How does that verse teach that Kavanah Lishmah is required for Bechor, Ma'aser Behemah, and Pesach? Those three Korbanos are not mentioned in the verse! If the Gemara means that those three Korbanos are included in the category of Shelamim (since they are Kodshim Kalim), then why is it necessary to invoke the Hekesh to show that these Korbanos must be offered Lishmah? The Gemara already knows that Shelamim must be offered Lishmah from the verses cited earlier!
</p><p>
ANSWER: The Gemara apparently is relying on the Beraisa cited later (7b), which teaches that the words 'b'Yom Tzavoso... l'Hakriv Es Korbeneihem' (Vayikra 7:38) in the verse which follows the verse of the Hekesh refer to Bechor, Ma'aser, and Pesach, and thus the Hekesh includes those Korbanos as well.
</p><p>


<font><b>3) A KORBAN THAT IS NOT 'MERATZEH' BUT NEVERTHELESS IS VALID</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: After the Gemara derives the source that teaches that a Korban slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah does not attain atonement (Meratzeh) for its owner, the Gemara asks what the source is that the Korban itself remains valid even though it is not Meratzeh. Perhaps a Korban slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah is entirely Pasul! The Gemara answers that the verse, 'Motza Sefasecha' (Devarim 24:23), teaches that the Korban is valid even though it is not Meratzeh.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> (DH Lifselu) writes that the Gemara's question is that a Korban brought she'Lo Lishmah should be entirely Pasul, because it was not brought according to the proper procedure, and the Zerikah of the Dam of the Korban will not permit its meat to be eaten.
</p><p>
Rashi's words are difficult to understand. Why does Rashi explain that the focus of the Gemara's question is that the meat of the Korban should be prohibited to eat when it is offered she'Lo Lishmah? The Gemara seems to be asking a much stronger question. A Korban offered she'Lo Lishmah should be entirely Pasul and it should be prohibited to continue offering it! (That is, if the Shechitah was done she'Lo Lishmah, then the Korban should be Pasul and the Kohen should not be permitted to perform the Zerikah and the other Avodos at all, and certainly he may not offer the Korban upon the Mizbe'ach!) Why does Rashi limit the Gemara's question to asking that the meat of the Korban should be forbidden to be eaten? (<b>CHIDUSHEI HA'GRIZ</b>)
</p><p>
ANSWER: The <b>NETZIV</b> in <b>MEROMEI SADEH</b> (2a) and the <b>TAHARAS HA'KODESH</b> here explain that Rashi is answering the question of <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Eima). Why does the Gemara suggest that we derive from the verse not only that a Korban she'Lo Lishmah is not Meratzeh but that the Korban itself is Pasul? There is a rule in the laws of Kodshim that states that the failure to adhere to a certain requirement that is taught by only a single verse does <i>not</i> invalidate the Korban. That is, with regard to the laws of Korbanos, a requirement that appears once in the Torah is assumed to be <i>l'Chatchilah</i>, and failure to fulfill that requirement does <i>not</i> invalidate the Korban. Only when the Torah <i>repeats</i> the law is that law 'Me'akev' -- the Korban is disqualified even b'Di'eved if that law is not fulfilled.
</p><p>
The Acharonim propose that Rashi is answering this question by suggesting that the Gemara does not really suggest that we derive from the verse that the Korban is Pasul if it is not brought Lishmah, since the Gemara knows that failure to fulfill a law taught by a single verse cannot disqualify a Korban. Rather, the Gemara is suggesting that a single verse should suffice to disqualify the Korban from being eaten, even if the Korban itself is valid and can be offered upon the Mizbe'ach. (The Taharas ha'Kodesh points out that a similar concept is found with regard to a Korban that is brought b'Tum'ah, where the Korban can be offered on the Mizbe'ach but cannot be eaten.) That is the Gemara's question.
</p><p>
The Gemara answers that the verse of 'Motza Sefasecha' teaches that the Korban may even be eaten.
</p><p>
How does this answer the question of Tosfos? Normally, when a requirement of a Korban is mentioned in a single verse, not only is the Korban valid but it may even be eaten. Why, then, should a single verse make a Korban that is slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah be forbidden to be eaten? The Taharas ha'Kodesh answers that the verse of 'Motza Sefasecha' teaches not only that a Korban slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah may be eaten, but even that any Korban that is missing any requirement of the Torah may be eaten, unless the Torah mentions the requirement twice. (This is similar to the answer in the end of Tosfos DH Eima, in which Tosfos asserts that 'Motza Sefasecha' is the source that teaches that two verses are required to render a Korban invalid.)
</p><p>
(b) Perhaps Rashi is answering the question of Tosfos in another manner. The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> (#10) explains that it is true that a single verse normally does not disqualify a Korban when the verse's requirement is not fulfilled. For example, although the Torah says that a person must mix the Minchah with oil, if he does not mix it, the Minchah is still acceptable. In the case of the Gemara here, however, the Torah is not teaching a new requirement. Rather, the Torah is teaching the way in which one must perform the Avodos that have already been taught (Shechitah, Kabalah, Holachah, and Zerikah). The Torah is teaching how to perform those Avodos. Therefore, if a person does Shechitah (or any of the other Avodos) she'Lo Lishmah, one might have thought that the Korban indeed is Pasul. One would have reasoned that since a Korban that lacks Shechitah, or any of the four Avodos, is obviously Pasul, a Korban in which the Shechitah or other Avodos is done she'Lo Lishmah is also Pasul, because it is considered as though the Avodah was not done at all.
</p><p>
This is what Rashi means as well. Rashi writes that a Korban offered she'Lo Lishmah should be invalid because it was not offered 'k'Hilchaso,' meaning that an Avodah that was done she'Lo Lishmah should be considered as though the Avodah was not done at all. This is what Rashi means when he concludes by saying that the Zerikah will not permit the meat to be eaten. He does not mean to limit the Pesul to the meat, implying that the Korban is valid with regard to the other Avodos. Rather, he means that the Pesul in the Zerikah makes it as though there was no Zerikah at all, and therefore the meat will not be permitted (and, similarly, the Eimurin will not be permitted to be offered upon the Mizbe'ach). Rashi mentions Zerikah (and assumes that the Machshavah of she'Lo Lishmah was in the Zerikah), because the Zerikah is the final Avodah, the Avodah which accomplishes the permitting of the meat to be eaten and the Korban to be offered upon the Mizbe'ach (see Bava Kama 76a). However, the same applies when any one of the previous Avodos is lacking; the Zerikah will not be able complete the process of offering the Korban and will not permit the meat to be eaten. Therefore, by the same logic, it will not be permitted to complete any of the Avodos after a Machshavah of she'Lo Lishmah, since the Korban is Pasul.
</p><p>
Why does Rashi mention only that the Zerikah permits the meat to be eaten, and not that it permits the Korban to be offered on the Mizbe'ach? The answer may be that the Mishnah later (83a) teaches that any Korban which became Pasul in the process of being offered and then was placed on the Mizbe'ach is to be left on the Mizbe'ach, b'Di'eved. This shows that the valid Zerikah is not necessarily the only thing that allows the Korban to be placed on the Mizbe'ach. However, a valid Zerikah <i>is</i> the only process that can permit a Korban to be eaten. Therefore, when Rashi describes a Zerikah that is invalid, Rashi describes it as a Zerikah which cannot permit the meat to be eaten. (M. Kornfeld)</p><p></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) WHY WAS REISH LAKISH ON HIS STOMACH IN THE BEIS MIDRASH?</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara relates that Reish Lakish asked a question while lying on his stomach in the Beis Midrash. Why was Reish Lakish in this position in the Beis Midrash? What lesson does the Gemara intend to teach by mentioning this fact?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The Gemara may be pointing out that Reish Lakish continued to learn Torah even when he had so little strength left that he could not even sit up, but only could lie on his stomach. Despite his lack of strength, his mind remained sharp and active.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>KEREN ORAH</b> suggests that the Gemara might not mean that Reish Lakish actually was on his stomach. Rather, it means that Reish Lakish's question pertains not only to Korbanos brought she'Lo Lishmah, but it also alludes to the food one puts into his stomach.
</p><p>
He prefaces his explanation by quoting the Gemara in Menachos (97a). The Gemara there teaches that now that there is no Mizbe'ach upon which to bring Korbanos, the table of a person serves to atone for his sins. However, the Keren Orah explains, one's table atones for him only if he says Divrei Torah during his meal, or he eats in order to sustain himself for the purpose of serving Hash-m. In this way his food is like a Korban, since he uses the food of the physical world for Avodas Hash-m.
</p><p>
However, often people neglect to say Divrei Torah or to have positive intent to eat in order to serve Hash-m. Such eating cannot be considered a Korban that atones. If his meal, under those circumstances, does not considered like a Korban, then is it in fact considered like an invalid Korban, which is rejected by Hash-m?
</p><p>
Reish Lakish answers with the verse, 'Motza Sefasecha Tishmor' (Devarim 23:24). This means that if one is careful to recite a Berachah Rishonah before he eats, and a Berachah Acharonah after he eats, with proper intent, then even without Divrei Torah or intent to eat in order to strengthen his body to serve Hash-m, his meal is not considered an invalid Korban. It merely does not atone like a Korban, provided that he does not have an explicit 'Pigul' thought while he eats (for example, he eats with intent merely to satisfy his desires) that would 'disqualify' his meal. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>


<font><b>2) A KORBAN ASHAM BROUGHT 'SHE'LO LISHMAH'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: Reish Lakish asks that if Korbanos brought she'Lo Lishmah do not atone, then why are they brought? Rebbi Elazar answers that this should not be considered strange, since a Korban may be brought after the death of its owner. Reish Lakish counters that while this is true in the case of a Korban Olah, a Korban Asham is not brought after the death of its owner.
</p><p>
Reish Lakish therefore gives his own answer from the verse, 'Motza Sefasecha Tishmor' (Devarim 23:24). The Gemara (2a) learns from the verse that if a Korban is not considered sufficiently valid to fulfill one's Neder, it still may be valid enough to be considered a Nedavah. (It is a valid Korban, but it does not fulfill the person's obligation.)
</p><p>
The Gemara asks that this verse discusses only Neder and Nedavah, both of which are donated by a person. Perhaps only these types of Korbanos are valid when they are not brought Lishmah, while other types of Korbanos which one is obligated to bring are <i>not</i> valid when offered she'Lo Lishmah! The Gemara answers that the verse 'Osah' (Vayikra 4:33), which discusses the Korban Chatas, teaches that only a Korban Chatas is invalid when brought she'Lo Lishmah, but not other obligatory Korbanos.
</p><p>
The Gemara then asks that perhaps Nedarim and Nedavos brought she'Lo Lishmah are valid but do not atone, while an Asham should be valid <i>and</i> atone.
</p><p>
The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> (#4) asks that this question seems to contradict the Gemara's previous question. The Gemara originally thought that an Asham should be invalid when brought she'Lo Lishmah, since it is an obligatory Korban, and not a Neder or Nedavah. How can the Gemara now ask that an Asham not only should be valid but also should atone completely, for the very reason that it is not a Neder or Nedavah? This line of reasoning is the exact opposite line of reasoning of the Gemara's initial assumption!
</p><p>
ANSWER: The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> answers that before the Gemara introduced the verse of 'Osah' (which teaches that only a Chatas brought she'Lo Lishmah is invalid), it indeed thought that an Asham brought she'Lo Lishmah was more likely not to atone than a Neder or Nedavah. However, once the Gemara has introduced the teaching from 'Osah,' which essentially implies that an Asham brought she'Lo Lishmah at least should be valid and possibly even atone, as opposed to a Chatas, it is more likely that it should completely atone. This is because once the Torah teaches that such a Korban is valid, it is more likely that it means that the Korban is totally valid, and not that it has an odd status of being valid but not fulfilling the need for atonement.
</p><p>
The logic of the Shitah Mekubetzes does not seem clear. Why is it less likely to assume that the Torah is teaching that a Korban offered she'Lo Lishmah is valid but does not atone? Why should this not be the intent of the Torah when it says 'Osah' with regard to a Korban Chatas?
</p><p>
The <b>SHI'UREI IYUN HA'TALMUD</b> answers that when one vows to bring a Korban, such as an Olah or Shelamim, and he fulfills his vow and brings the Korban, he does two different things. He fulfills his vow to bring the Korban, and he serves Hash-m by bringing a Korban of this nature. These Korbanos are expressions of gratitude and servitude to Hash-m. In contrast, a Korban Asham is exclusively a fulfillment of an obligation to atone for a sin. Without the aspect of atonement, it is void of any role as a Korban.
</p><p>
This is why the Shitah Mekubetzes understands that after the Gemara introduces the derivation from 'Osah,' an Asham should be considered either completely invalid or completely valid.
</p><p>
(This is the reason why the Gemara later (5b) requires the Hekesh of 'Zos ha'Torah.' It teaches that even an Asham can acquire a new status similar to that of a Nedavah, in that it becomes a new Korban of gratitude and servitude to Hash-m despite the fact that it does not atone.) (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> SAYING SHEMA OR LEARNING WHILE LYING DOWN <span class='indexentry'>[Kri'as Shema :lying down]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span>	Reish Lakish lied on his stomach and asked...</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Nidah 14a (Abaye):</span> Kohanim who ride on camels may not eat Terumah. (This heats the Ever. We are concerned lest they had emissions.)</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span>	R. Yehoshua ben Levi cursed one who sleeps Perakdan (on his back; alternatively, face down).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question:</span> Rav Yosef taught that one may not read (before sleeping) 'Shema Yisrael...' while Perakdan;</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Inference:</span> One may not read Shema while Perakdan, but he may sleep Perakdan!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer:</span> One may not read Shema even when leaning slightly to the side. One may sleep that way.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question:</span> R. Yochanan would read Shema this way!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer:</span> He was stout.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bava Basra 74a (Rabah bar bar Chanah):</span> I saw those who died in the Midbar sleeping Perakdan. One had his knees bent. Our guide passed under.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	Pesachim 108a:</span> Perakdan is not considered reclining.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	R. Yonah (Berachos 15a DH Shnayim):</span> Why do we permit two sleeping under one garment to turn away from each other and say Shema? One may not say Kri'as Shema lying down, even if he leans a bit to the side! One may lean while sitting, but not while lying down! We can say that this is when he lies on his back and leans a bit to the side. One may turn totally on his side. A better answer is that when it would be an exertion (to sit up), it is permitted, like for R. Yochanan, for he was fat. Here also, since he took off his clothes, it would be an exertion to get dressed again (to say Shema sitting), so he may read leaning.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Kri'as Shema 2:2):</span> Everyone reads Shema the way he is, whether standing, walking, lying or riding on an animal. One may not read Shema lying face down, or on his back facing up. One may read leaning on his side. If he is very stout and he cannot turn onto his side, or he is sick, he may lean a little on his side and read.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Ra'avad:</span> It is better that he lie. He must do so if possible.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Hagahos Maimoniyos (2):</span> The Rambam is stringent like all the opinions (of what is Perakdan).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kesef Mishneh and Beis Yosef (OC 63 DH u'Mah she'Chasav Chutz):</span> The Rambam permits totally on the side, like the first opinion in R. Yonah. Rashi and the Tur agree. Slightly on the side is permitted only for stout people, for it is painful for them to turn totally on the side. Therefore, the same applies to a sick person. R. Mano'ach says that one who is not stout or sick may read only sitting, like one who stands in awe and fear. The correct text of the Ra'avad must say 'it is better that he *sit*.' This is not difficult for the Rambam. He does not discuss one who can sit!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl3'>	Lechem Mishneh:</span> The Rambam holds like R. Yonah's first answer. This forced him to distinguish between totally and partially on the side. The Ra'avad holds that it is better to lie face down, which shows humility, than face up, which is haughty. However, he should have explicitly said that he should lie face down! It seems that the text of the Ra'avad says 'it is better that he sit.' He holds like R. Yonah's second answer, that it is proper to read while sitting.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tosfos ha'Rosh (Gitin 47a):</span> Reish Lakish used to lie on his stomach, like it says in Zevachim.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tosfos (Nidah 14a DH Afarkid):</span> Bava Basra 74a supports that Afarkid means on the back. The Aruch says that it is face down.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rashi (Nidah 14a DH Afarkid):</span> One may not sleep on his back, lest he have an erection and it will be noticeable to many. Alternatively, perhaps his hands will rest on the Ever and warm it.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tosfos (14a DH Layit):</span> The first Perush does not explain why it is forbidden when he is alone in the house! The Rashbam says that his garments will fall on the Ever and warm it. Some say that lying on the back warms the spine and causes erections, which can lead to emissions.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>Tosfos (Pesachim 108a DH Perakdan):</span> Our Gemara shows that Perakdan means on the back. People do not eat facing down!</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 63:1):</span> One recites Shema walking, standing, lying, riding on an animal, or sitting, but not lying face down or on his back. He may read lying on his side.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Gra (472:3):</span> The Ran is concerned for both opinions of Perakdan. Perhaps both are called Perakdan. It is clear from Nidah that we are concerned lest this warm the Ever.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Aruch ha'Shulchan (5):</span> The Gemara and Rashi connotes that face down is worse, lest the Ever be heated and this cause an emission.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (2):</span> Even leaning slightly is forbidden, for he accepts the yoke of Shamayim in a haughty way.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bi'ur Halachah (DH Aval):</span> If he read Perakdan, b'Di'eved he was Yotzei.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rema:</span> This is because he is already lying, and it is an exertion to stand.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (1):</span> The exertion is to get dressed again. The Mechaber permits totally on the side. The Gemara connotes like this.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</span> If he is very fat and he cannot turn on his side, or he is sick, he leans a little and reads.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Eliyahu Rabah (2):</span> The Kesef Mishneh connotes that if a stout or sick person can sit, he must sit.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (239:1):</span> One reads Al Mitaso the first Parshah of Shema and blesses 'ha'Mapil Sheinah...'</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH ucheshe'Yirtzeh):</span> R. Yonah permits saying Shma while leaning only if it is an exertion to get up. He cannot explain 'Al Mitaso' to literally mean on his bed. Rather, it is shortly before sleeping. Rashi, the Rambam and Tur permit when one is totally on his side. They can explain that he is lying on his bed.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rema (ibid.):</span> See above (63:1) whether one may read while lying.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (5):</span> This is for the Chiyuv Kri'as Shema. If one was Yotzei already and reads just for Shmirah, he may lie. We find that R. Zeira read repeatedly until he fell asleep. (Surely, he was lying down.)</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (6):</span> The Rema said there that l'Chatchilah one may not lie down to read while lying, even if he turns on his side. Some are stringent to stand or sit even if they were already Yotzei Shema. If he is already lying, all permit to lean on his side and read. One should accustom himself to lie on his side. It is a great Isur to lie face down or on his back.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Chayei Adam (35:5):</span> One should accustom himself to lie on his left side and think about Torah until he falls asleep.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (71:5):</span> One should begin sleeping on his left side to hasten digestion, and end sleeping on his right, so the stomach will rest and the waste will leave. One should not turn often from side to side.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Igros Moshe (EH 1:68):</span> Rashi explains that one may not sleep on his back, lest he have an erection and it will be disgraceful. He did not say that it will cause an emission, for this is likely only if he was thinking about women. In Nidah he gave another Perush, lest he put his hand on the Ever, which is called 'adultery of the hand.' Here also, he did not mention an emission, for it is a Sefek Sefekah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shevet ha'Levi (10:237 DH Kibalti):</span> It is good to train boys to lie on the side. This conduct of Kedushah will become their nature, and they will not put their minds to it. Very small boys cannot control this.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Torah Lishmah (367):</span> If it is difficult for one to learn from a Sefer while sitting, and wants to lie on his back or side or stomach, we find that Reish Lakish lied on his stomach. However, one should not do so too regularly, only a little until he rests.</p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>1) RAV ASI'S QUESTION</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara earlier (5a) proves that an Olah may be brought without providing atonement from the case of an Olas Yoledes, which may be brought after the woman's death. Rebbi Eliezer says that the Olas Yoledes proves that even though a Korban Olah brought she'Lo Lishmah does not atone, it remains valid.
</p><p>
Rav Asi questions the Gemara's proof. If the woman would be alive and her Korban would be brought she'Lo Lishmah, she would attain atonement for any Mitzvos Aseh she had transgressed. Consequently, when her Olas Yoledes is offered after her death, it atones for any Mitzvos Aseh transgressed by her heirs who now are bringing the Korban (just as a Korban Olah normally atones for transgressing Mitzvos Aseh). If so, the Olas Yoledes cannot serve as proof that a Korban may be brought when it does not provide atonement, because the Olas Yoledes indeed provides atonement!
</p><p>
The <b>SEFAS EMES</b> has difficulty understanding the Gemara's question. What does the fact that the Korban will provide atonement have to do with the atonement of a Korban brought she'Lo Lishmah? Even if an Olas Yoledes atones for Mitzvos Aseh transgressed by the heirs of the woman, and even if an Olah brought she'Lo Lishmah atones for Mitzvos Aseh transgressed by the owner, this still does not prove that the vow made by the owner to bring a Korban is fulfilled (and he should be required to bring another Korban)!
</p><p>
Apparently, Rebbi Eliezer means that these Korbanos may be brought since they <i>do</i> provide some form of atonement, but they do not fulfill the vow to bring such a Korban. Just as the woman who gave birth and died does not fulfill her obligation (which she no longer has) to bring a Korban after her Korban is brought by her heirs, so, too, a Korban brought she'Lo Lishmah should not fulfill the vow of the owner, even if Mitzvos Aseh are atoned for by its offering! What, then, is the Gemara's question on the proof from Olas Yoledes?
</p><p>
ANSWER: The <b>SEFAS EMES</b> answers that Rav Asi's question is not from Olah, but from Korbanos like Shelamim and Todah. In the case of Olas Yoledes, the Korban should be brought because it provides atonement for Mitzvos Aseh. However, Rebbi Eliezer attempts to prove from Olas Yoledes that all Korbanos brought she'Lo Lishmah should be valid, despite the fact that they do not provide atonement. Rav Asi asks, how is this apparent from an Olas Yoledes, as an Olah always provides atonement for a Mitzvas Aseh? How do we know that this also applies to Korbanos like Shelamim and Todah, which do not provide atonement in general? Perhaps they are not valid at all when they are brought she'Lo Lishmah. (Y. Montrose)</p><p></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 'SHECHITAH' AND 'MILAH'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara discusses the ability of a Korban Olah to atone for sins that were committed after the animal was designated already as a Korban Olah. The Gemara quotes a Beraisa which states that if one neglects to perform Semichah on his Korban, it is 'as if he does not atone, but he does atone.' The Gemara first suggests that this means that he gains atonement for sins done before the animal was designated. The Gemara responds that the Beraisa may mean that he gains atonement for neglecting to do Semichah.
</p><p>
Rava answers that the Beraisa cannot be referring to atonement for the lack of Semichah, because his transgression of not doing Semichah takes effect only after the Shechitah is completed when it is no longer possible to do Semichah. Therefore, the failure to do Semichah is not a sin that occurred after the animal was designated, but a sin that occurred after the Korban was brought.
</p><p>
The <b>AYELES HA'SHACHAR</b> asks that the Gemara here seems to contradict the opinion of the <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Milah 1:2). The Rambam writes that a person who does not perform Bris Milah transgresses a positive Mitzvah everyday, but is not liable to be punished with Kares until he dies uncircumcised. The <b>RA'AVAD</b> argues that he is liable for Kares the first day that he purposely abstains from performing Bris Milah. If he eventually does Milah, he rectifies his sin. (For more on this dispute, see Insights to Shabbos 132:1.)
</p><p>
Rava similarly says that the sin of not doing Semichah is committed only after the Shechitah, when there is no longer the opportunity to do Semichah. If this is also the logic of the Rambam in the case of one who does not perform Bris Milah, then the Rambam implies that the sin of not having a Bris Milah is committed after death. How, though, can a person be liable for sinning when he is no longer alive?
</p><p>
ANSWER: The <b>AYELES HA'SHACHAR</b> answers that there is a difference between Milah and Shechitah. Since a person knows that he is sinning by not having a Bris Milah, when he dies he retroactively becomes liable for Kares for purposely not having a Milah. In contrast, the moment at which a person decides to do or not to do Semichah occurs only in the few seconds before the Shechitah. During this time (and certainly beforehand) he is not sinning when he does not do Semichah, since he still has the opportunity to do Semichah and not transgress any sin. This is why the sin cannot take effect retroactively. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker, Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> WHO ADDS A CHOMESH TO MA'ASER THAT HE DID NOT GROW? <span class='indexentry'>[Ma'aser Sheni :Pidyon :Chomesh]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Yakov of Nehar Pekod):</span> It says about Ma'aser Sheni 'v'Im Ga'ol Yig'al', to include an heir (he redeems and adds a Chomesh, i.e. a quarter of the principal).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kidushin 54b (Mishnah):</span> One who redeems his Ma'aser Sheni must add a Chomesh, whether he grew it or it was given to him for a gift.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Suggestion:</span> This is unlike R. Meir. He holds that Ma'aser Sheni is Mamon Gavoha (Hashem's property), so one cannot give it for a gift! Rather, it is like R. Yehudah (who holds that it is Mamon Hedyot, i.e. the owner's property).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rejection:</span> Really, it is like R. Meir. Tevel (untithed Peros) were given for a gift, and the receiver separated Ma'aser Sheni from it. R. Meir does not consider tithes to be separated until they actually are separated.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak):</span> The Halachah follows R. Meir because a Mishnah in tractate Eduyos is like R. Meir.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bechoros 11a (Rav Nachman):</span> If a Yisrael inherited Tevel after Miru'ach (final processing) from a Kohen, who had inherited it from a Yisrael, he separates Ma'aseros and keeps them.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	Makos 20a:</span> R. Yosi holds that tithes that were not separated are considered as if they were separated.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question (Mishnah - R. Shimon ben Yehudah citing R. Yosi):</span> Beis Hillel and Beis Shamai agree that if Peros entered and left Yerushalayim before Miru'ach, it may be redeemed. If the entered Yerushalayim after Miru'ach, Beis Shamai obligate eating it in Yerushalayim, and Beis Hillel permit redeeming it.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span>	If it is as if as Ma'aser were separated, why do Beis Hillel permit redeeming it after it entered Yerushalayim?</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer:</span> Rava taught that mid'Rabanan, once Ma'aser enters the walls, it cannot be redeemed. Chachamim decreed only about actual Ma'aser. They did not decree about Ma'aser that will be separated from Tevel that entered.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'>	Erchin 25b (Beraisa):</span> 'V'Im Lo Yig'al Es ha'Sadeh' - if one was Makdish his Sedei Achuzah (his ancestral inheritance from the days of Yehoshua), and he did not redeem it, 'v'Im Machar Es ha'Sadeh' (the Gizbar sold it) 'l'Ish Acher' - not to the owner's son, (then, it is given to Kohanim in Yovel).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span><span class='desl2'>	Toras Kohanim (Bechukosai Perek 12,10):</span> 'V'Im Ga'ol Yig'al' includes an heir, a buyer, and one who received a gift.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Ma'aser Sheni 5:1):</span> One who redeems his Ma'aser for himself, whether it is his or he inherited it, or whether he received Tevel for a gift (and separated Ma'aser), he adds a Chomesh.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (3:17):</span> Ma'aser Sheni is Mamon Gavoha. Therefore, David can acquire it for a gift only if he was given Tevel, and David separated the Ma'aser.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Kesef Mishneh:</span> This is like R. Meir; the Gemara rules like him. The Gemara said that according to R. Meir, one can acquire it for a gift only if he was given Tevel and separated the Ma'aser, for he does not consider tithes to be separated until they actually are separated. This is astounding, for the Rambam (Hilchos Ma'aser 6:1 and several other places) considers tithes to be separated even before they actually are separated! Ri Korkus answered that only for this matter it is as if they were not separated, for R. Meir considers Ma'aser to be Mamon Gavoha only once it was separated and called Ma'aser. He learns from 'la'Shem', which discusses after it was separated and called Ma'aser.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Ohr Some'ach (5:1):</span> The question is not difficult. We hold like the first Tana in the Mishnah (Ma'aser Sheni 3:6) that if finished produce (i.e. after Miru'ach) passed through Yerushalayim, the Ma'aser must be returned to Yerushalayim and eaten there, for it is as if the Ma'aser was separated. (Ma'aser that entered Yerushalayim must be eaten there; it may not be redeemed.) If unfinished produce passed through Yerushalayim, Beis Hillel permit redeeming the Ma'aser, for it is as if the Ma'aser was not separated. The Rambam (Hilchos Ma'aser 6:21) rules like this. If a Yisrael inherited *finished* Tevel from his maternal grandfather (a Kohen), he owns the Matanos, for it is as if they were already separated (and his grandfather merited to keep them). This is clear from Bechoros 11a. Before Miru'ach (final processing), they are exempt from Ma'aser, and one may eat (not in a fixed way) without tithing. The Rambam (Hilchos Ma'aser 2:2) holds that one who buys after Miru'ach is exempt from tithing. If so, it should be forbidden to give a gift of Tevel, for then the produce will be exempted! Do not say that it is as if the Ma'aser was separated, and he cannot give (the Ma'aser in the Tevel), so Ma'aser must still be separated. A thief can be Makdish or declare Terumah after despair, for he acquires through despair and Shinuy ha'Shem. The Rashba (Gitin 55b DH v'Hashta) said that the Terumah should not take effect (for it is not his until after Shinuy), and there is no Shinuy ha'Shem! He answered that they come simultaneously. Here also, the gift and the exemption from Ma'aser come simultaneously. Do not say that the exemption is only mid'Oraisa, and mid'Rabanan Ma'aser must still be taken. Surely, regarding Ma'aser mid'Rabanan, it is as if the Ma'aser was not separated, like we say in Makos (20a). However, regarding Tevel nowadays or in a flowerpot without a hole, surely one who inherits from his grandfather (a Kohen) is exempt, for if the Chiyuv were mid'Oraisa, his grandfather would have acquired, and Chachamim did not obligate more than the Torah does. Surely one may give a gift, for regarding this mid'Rabanan it is as if the Ma'aser was not separated, and the Chiyuv mid'Oraisa is uprooted (like we said above).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Erchin 4:5):</span> If the wife or heir of the Makdish redeemed the field, she or he adds a Chomesh.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Mishneh l'Melech:</span> Regarding a Sedei Achuzah, the son is like his father in his father's lifetime. If the father was Makdish the field, if he or his son bought it back, it is not given to Kohanim in Yovel. Ma'aser is different (an heir adds a Chomesh only if he inherited it). Firstly, there only a son is like his father, but for Ma'aser, any heir adds a Chomesh. Also, regarding Ma'aser Sheni we expound 'v'Im Ga'ol Yig'al' to include an heir. That refers to after death, like the Rambam says in Hilchos Ma'aser Sheni. This is clear from Zevachim 6a and Ma'aser Sheni 5:4, which says that one can scheme to avoid adding a Chomesh through telling his adult son to redeem the Ma'aser. If so, when we say that an heir adds a Chomesh regarding Hekdesh, it is after the Makdish died. One might have thought that only the Makdish adds a Chomesh, but not one who inherited him. The verse teaches that this is not so.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Ra'avad (on Toras Kohanim):</span> One who inherited Ma'aser Sheni adds a Chomesh even though he did not separate it, for now it is his. Why must the verse include an heir? He is no worse than one who received a gift, who adds a Chomesh! We can say that these depend on each other. This Tana (of Toras Kohanim, which is assumed to be R. Yehudah - Kidushin 53a) teaches that Ma'aser Sheni is Mamon Hedyot, so one can bequeath it or give it for a gift. He redeems his own Ma'aser. According to R. Meir, one cannot bequeath Ma'aser Sheni or give it for a gift. Alternatively, even R. Meir agrees that one can bequeath it, for an heir is in place of his father. When he redeems he adds a Chomesh, just like an heir is in place of his father to redeem Hekdesh and adds a Chomesh, even though one cannot give a gift of Hekdesh or bequeath it. The Torah included an heir (to be like his father). The same applies here.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	R. Shimshon (on Toras Kohanim):</span> It is a Chidush that a buyer, heir and one who received a gift all add a Chomesh. A buyer has the most ownership of the three, and one who received a gift has the least. This refers to one who bought Tevel. If he bought Ma'aser, he already redeemed it, and it is not his; he need not pay even principal to redeem it. However, the case of heirs and recipients can even be when they received Ma'aser. There was no need to teach an heir. He is no worse than one who received a gift. Alternatively, this teaches that even R. Meir, who holds that one cannot give a gift of Ma'aser, agrees that an heir adds a Chomesh. We find that an heir adds a Chomesh when redeeming his father's Hekdesh, even though one cannot give or bequeath Hekdesh.</p>
<p class='otherhalachos'>Other Halachos relevant to this Daf:</p>
<p class='otherhalachostext'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) SEMICHAH: AN INDEPENDENT MITZVAH OR PART OF THE PROCEDURE OF THE KORBAN</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara (6a) quotes a Beraisa which states that if one neglects to perform Semichah on his Korban, it is 'as if he does not atone, but he does atone.' The Gemara first suggests that this means that he gains atonement for sins done before the animal was designated. The Gemara responds that the Beraisa may mean that he gains atonement for neglecting to do Semichah.
</p><p>
Rav Huna bar Yehudah asked Rava to explain this cryptic phrase. The Gemara (6b) concludes that it means that although the person achieved atonement, 'he did not achieve atonement towards Heaven.' <b>RASHI</b> (DH Lo Kiper) explains that he did not please his Master, since he did not do the Mitzvah in the choice manner.
</p><p>
The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 3:12) writes that a person who did not perform Semichah on his Korban is viewed as though he did not achieve atonement. The <b>AYELES HA'SHACHAR</b> notes that the Rambam usually does not quote Gemaros that are not relevant in practice in some way. Why, then, does the Rambam record this statement of the Gemara?
</p><p>
ANSWER: The <b>AYELES HA'SHACHAR</b> quotes the Mishnah in Gitin (28a) that teaches that when one sends a Korban from overseas, the Kohanim may sacrifice it under the assumption that the sender is still alive. The Gemara asks that before the Korban may be offered, the owner must perform Semichah, but if he is overseas he cannot perform Semichah. The Gemara answers that the Mishnah refers to a case of a Korban sent by a woman, or to a Chatas ha'Of, Korbanos which do not require Semichah.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> there (28b, DH v'Ha) has a lengthy discussion about the requirement of Semichah. He concludes that although the lack of Semichah does not disqualify the Korban, generally a Korban is not brought if it requires Semichah and the owner cannot perform Semichah.
</p><p>
The <b>AYELES HA'SHACHAR</b> notes that although other some other Mitzvos should be performed in part when they cannot be performed in their entirety, the Gemara here implies that one should not offer a Korban at all when he cannot perform Semichah. Accordingly, the Rambam teaches that one should not think that Semichah is merely one of the laws that one should follow when he brings a Korban, but if he is unable to fulfill the requirement of Semichah he still should bring the Korban. Rather, Semichah is a prerequisite for proper atonement. The Rambam implies that one should not send a Korban when he cannot perform Semichah, since the Korban in such a case will not properly atone for him. The Rambam, therefore, indeed is teaching a practical law with these words. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker, Y. Montrose)</p><p></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) A 'KORBAN TODAH' SLAUGHTERED FOR SOMEONE OTHER THAN ITS OWNER</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara discusses a case of a Korban Todah sacrificed for someone other than its owner. Rabah rules that the Korban is valid and fulfills the obligation of the owner. Rav Chisda rules that it is valid but does not fulfill the obligation of the owner.
</p><p>
Rashi (DH Todah) emphasizes that the case is <i>not</i> where Reuven's Korban was slaughtered for Shimon, since this would constitute a Shinuy Ba'alim, a change of intent for a different owner. Rather, the Gemara refers to a case of Shinuy Kodesh, changing the intent from this type of Korban to a different type of Korban, 'as one of the Korbanos was slaughtered for the other one.' Rashi explains that this case is similar to a case of a person who slaughters a Chatas, which he originally designated to atone for his sin of eating forbidden fat, with intention to atone for his sin of eating blood.
</p><p>
Rashi's words are difficult to understand.
</p><p>
1. What is the case of the Gemara according to Rashi? Rashi says that the Korban was slaughtered for its proper owner, but there is a problem of Shinuy Kodesh. How can there be a problem of Shinuy Kodesh if both Korbanos were Korbenos Todah?
</p><p>
2. Rashi writes that the Gemara's case is one in which both Reuven and Shimon had Korbenos Todah. If the problem is, as Rashi explains, that the Korban was offered with intent that it was a different Korban, then why is it necessary for that the case involve two separate Korbenos Todah? A Shinuy Kodesh occurs when an animal is offered with intent that it is a different type of Korban, but not necessarily with intent that it is a different animal. Why does Rashi stipulate that the intent is for an actual animal?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) Many Acharonim (see <b>BIRKAS HA'ZEVACH</b> and <b>CHOK NASAN</b>) explain that Rashi means that both Reuven and Shimon set aside Korbenos Todah, each due to a different miracle that occurred to him. (There are four main reasons for bringing a Korban Todah: being released from prison, safely crossing an ocean, safely traversing a desert, and recovering from a serious illness; see Shulchan Aruch OC 219:1.) Rashi means that Reuven's Korban Todah that was designated, for example, for his release from prison was brought instead for his recovery from illness. Shimon's Korban Todah that was designated for his recovery from illness was brought instead for his release from prison. This is considered a Shinuy Kodesh.
</p><p>
The <b>KEREN ORAH</b>, <b>SEFAS EMES</b>, <b>YAD BINYAMIN</b> and others ask that it is not clear how this answers the question. The Halachah is that if one designates a Korban Todah for a certain salvation that he experienced, but it ends up being offered with intent for a different salvation, it is not a Shinuy Kodesh. Why does the fact that Shimon designated another Korban Todah for this second form of salvation make the change of intent for Reuven's Korban into a Shinuy Kodesh?
</p><p>
(b) The <b>KEREN ORAH</b> focuses on the last part of Rashi. Rashi says that slaughtering a Chatas for a different sin invalidates the Korban, even if it is for the owner's own different sin. This is because when a person designates a Chatas for a specific sin, he 'locks' it into its purpose to atone solely for that particular sin. Changing the sin for which the Chatas was designated to atone is considered a Shinuy Kodesh.
</p><p>
While this is not always the law in the case of a Korban Todah, because, as mentioned above, if one designates a Korban Todah for one miracle but it ends up being offered with intent for another miracle, it is not a Shinuy Kodesh, this is only because a Todah is brought as a freewill offering. Since it is a freewill offering, the Korban is not considered 'locked in' like a Chatas such that it should be invalid if brought for a different miracle. However, if a person has intent for a different miracle for which an actual Korban is being brought by someone else, it is enough to render it a Shinuy Kodesh.
</p><p>
(It should be noted that <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Hagahah Rav Chisda) writes that the reason for this law is that the verse says, 'Zevach Todas Shelamav' -- 'his Korban Todah peace-offering,' implying that the Torah is stringent that a Todah must be brought for his own purpose. According to this reason, this law should apply only to a Korban Todah, and not to any other Korban brought for the purpose of someone else's similar Korban.) (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafbbb'><span class='numt'>1)</span> TEFILAH OF A RASHA IS DESPISED <span class='indexentry'>[Tefilah :Zevach Resha'im To'evah]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span>	If the owner did not repent, Hash-m does not desire his Korban - 'Zevach Resha'im To'evah'!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Berachos 22b (Beraisa #1):</span> If during Shemoneh Esreh one saw excrement in front of him, he should go four Amos in front of it.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Contradiction (Beraisa #2):</span> He should go (four Amos) to the side.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Resolution:</span> If he can, he goes in front of it. If not, he goes to the side.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Rabah):</span> If one prayed and later found excrement, even though he transgressed, his Tefilah was valid.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Objection (Rava):</span> 'Zevach Resha'im To'evah' - it was abominable.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	24b (Rav Ada bar Ahavah):</span> If one was walking in a filthy alley, and he was saying Shema, and he did not stop, this is 'Ki Devar Hash-m Bazah.'</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	Eruvin 64a (Rabah bar Rav Huna):</span> A Shasuy (one who drank) may not pray. If he did, it was a valid prayer. A Shikor (one who is drunk) may not pray. If he did, it was an abomination.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Aba or R. Menasiya):</span> A Shasuy is one who can speak (properly) in front of the king. A Shikor is one who cannot.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rif and Rosh (Berachos 14a and 3:22):</span> (Rabah): If one prayed and later found excrement, his Tefilah was valid.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (ibid):</span> The Ri says that we discuss one who prayed in a place where there was reason to suspect that there is excrement. Therefore, he transgressed, and his Tefilah was an abomination. If there was no reason to suspect, his Tefilah was valid, and he need not pray again. R. Yonah proved this from the previous Beraisa (one who saw excrement in front of him during Tefilah). He need not pray again, because there was no reason for him to suspect.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Eruvin 6:5):</span> If a Shasuy prayed, it was a valid prayer. If a Shikor prayed, it was an abomination. It is not clear whether we equate Berachos to Tefilah regarding a Shikor or excrement. They are not totally the same. L'Chatchilah, a Shasuy may not pray until the wine wears off, but the Yerushalmi says that he may bless Birkas ha'Mazon and all Berachos. 'You will eat and be satiated (and bless)' - even a Medumdam (Shasuy).</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 76:8):</span> If one recited Kri'as Shema in a place where there was reason to suspect that there is excrement, and later he found excrement, he must repeat Shema.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH v'Im):</span> Even though the Gemara discussed Tefilah, the Tur learns from it to Kri'as Shema.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (28):</span> A place where young children are found is a place where there was reason to suspect that there is excrement.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (29):</span> The excrement was within his four Amos. If it was outside four Amos but he could see it, see below 81:2.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (30):</span> 'Zevach Resha'im To'evah' applies, for he should have checked the place. The same applies if after Tefilah he found excrement on his clothes or shoes, and before Tefilah he was in a filthy place such as a privy and he did not guard himself. If at night one sat in a place with cat excrement or similar things and it stuck to his clothes and he prayed in the Beis ha'Keneses and he found the filth when he returned home, this is like a place where one did not need to suspect that there is excrement.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (31):</span> He repeats Shema with the Berachos. The same applies to Tefilah. If the time for Tefilah passed, he does not pray again at the next Tefilah, for he was negligent. Tashlumim is only for Ohnes.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (37):</span> Kri'as Shema is mid'Oraisa, and there is no concern for Berachah Levatalah, so he repeats it, without the Berachos.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bi'ur Halachah (DH Kara):</span> If one needed to check but did not, and after Tefilah he left and cannot return to check, the Pri Megadim was unsure. He leans to exempt from praying again. Yeshhu'os Yakov is stringent if there was a wasteheap there, for almost surely it has excrement, so we are stringent even for a mid'Rabanan law. If it is an even Safek, one prays again only if he found excrement there.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>viii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (40):</span> If this occurred, one should be pained, and give Tzedakah or fast one day.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</span> If there was no reason to suspect that there is excrement, he need not repeat Shema.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (42):</span> In such a case one does not pray again Nedavah, for nowadays we do not pray Nedavah, but he should read Shema again without the Berachos, for there is no concern for Berachah Levatalah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</span> If one said Shema in a place where there was reason to be concerned for urine (and later he found urine), he need not repeat it.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH v'Chasvu):</span> Tosfos says that even if Berachos are like Tefilah regarding excrement, one need not pray again if he found urine. It is not as stringent as excrement. The Torah forbids only facing urine in midair. Once it is on the ground, it is forbidden only mid'Rabanan.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (33):</span> L'Chatchilah one may pray without checking for urine. However, if he knew that there is definitely urine there, and transgressed and read Shema or prayed, he must repeat it, for he transgressed a Vadai mid'Rabanan law.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (81:2):</span> If one recited Shema and found excrement in front of him, he moves so it will be four Amos in back of him. If he cannot, he goes four Amos to the side. He resumes from where he stopped reading. According to R. Yonah, if he was in a place where there was reason to suspect that there is excrement, he must start again from the beginning.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH Hayah, citing the Rashba):</span> Finding excrement in one's place is more stringent than seeing it in front of him. One must check due to 'Machanecha Kodesh'. In front of him is forbidden only due to 'Lo Yir'eh Vecha', and he did not see it when he began, so he was not negligent at all. Chachamim did not obligate him to check as far as he can see. Lo Yir'eh Vecha did not apply, for he did not see it until now.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH v'Nir'eh):</span> Even when in the middle he saw excrement in front of him and there was reason to suspect, he need not start again from the beginning. His Tefilah was valid, for Chachamim did not obligate him to check. However, R. Yonah says that the Gemara discusses a place where there was no reason to suspect. This implies that if there was reason to suspect, he must pray again, like when excrement was found in his place. It seems that we follow the Rashba, for he was later.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (3):</span> The Gemara discusses Tefilah, in which one must face Yerushalayim. For Kri'as Shema he can turn so the excrement will be in back! Perhaps the case is that there is excrement also in back.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (8):</span> Likewise, if one sees urine in front of him he must move so it is in back of him.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (9):</span> We discuss when he is more than four Amos from where the smell of the excrement ceases. If not, all agree that he repeats from the beginning, since he was negligent for not checking.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (13):</span> Eliyahu Rabah says that the Rosh and Roke'ach hold like R. Yonah. Still, b'Di'eved we are lenient, for many Acharonim bring only the first opinion.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (13):</span> When the Mechaber brings a law and then 'some say', he rules like the first opinion, but l'Chatchilah one should be concerned for the latter opinion. One repeats Shma, but not the Berachos.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (185:4):</span> Even if one is so drunk that he cannot speak properly, he blesses Birkas ha'Mazon.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (5):</span> If one blessed Birkas ha'Mazon and excrement was in front of him, or he was (Rema - totally) drunk, Tosfos and the Rosh were unsure if he must bless again. Surely, he need not do so due to urine.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Taz (2):</span> Tosfos says that the Yerushalmi allows a Medumdam to say Birkas ha'Mazon. There is room for doubt only if Medumdam is only Shasuy, but not drunk. If one need not bless again if he was drunk, the same applies regarding excrement. Surely these are the same. The Rema (99:1) said that one who is drunk may bless. In Sa'if 4, the Mechaber obligates a Shikor to bless, for it is a Safek mid'Oraisa (perhaps he is Yotzei). Other Berachos are mid'Rabanan, so he does not bless. Why did the Rema say that he blesses, without distinguishing?</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (6):</span> We discuss one who could not talk in front of the king. Perhaps he must bless again when he sobers up if the food was not yet digested. If he was as drunk as Lot, all agree that he was not Yotzei and he blesses again. Sa'if 4 discusses one who cannot talk properly, but he can talk in front of the king. Acharonim ask that this is illogical! If this occurred, he blesses; l'Chatchilah one must bless before getting so drunk.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (13):</span> The Mechaber rules in Sa'if 4 like Tosfos in Berachos. Here he brings Tosfos' opinion in Eruvin (who was unsure), to teach that one should be careful to avoid this.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (14):</span> One does not bless again due to Safek. It is best to eat more and bless with intent also for his first meal, or hear Birkas ha'Mazon from another. If not, he thinks Birkas ha'Mazon in his heart.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bi'ur Halachah (DH Im):</span> Seemingly, if he knew that there is excrement here, surely he must bless again. However, the Pri Megadim says that also this is a Safek, and Chayei Adam says that he does not bless again even in this case. Surely this is wrong. All agree that all Divrei Kedushah are forbidden near excrement. He disgraced Hashem's word (Berachos 24b). How was he Yotzei?! Many are stringent even when he did not know initially.</p>
<p class='seealso'>See also:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) AN OWNERLESS KORBAN</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara discusses whether or not Shinuy Ba'alim (offering a Korban with intent that it atone for someone other than the owner) applies after the demise of the person who originally designated the Korban. Rava says that although there may be a problem of Shinuy Kodesh (changing intent from this type of Korban to a different type of Korban), there is no problem of Shinuy Ba'alim, because the owner of the Korban died. Rav Pinchas, the son of Rav Ami, says that there is still a problem of Shinuy Ba'alim. Rashi explains that the heirs are considered the owners.
</p><p>
Rav Ashi asks whether, according to Rav Pinchas, the heirs are the actual owners, and thus they must bring another Korban if their Korban was slaughtered with intent for someone else (the <b>YAD BINYAMIN</b> notes that they would have to bring a Korban from their father's estate, not from their own money), or whether Rav Pinchas means to say that due to the change of intent, the heirs would not gain atonement with this Korban for their transgressions of any Mitzvos Aseh. This would mean that they are not obligated to bring another Korban to fulfill their father's obligation.
</p><p>
If the heirs are considered owners, this should constitute a Shinuy Ba'alim that requires a new Korban to be brought for their father. If they are not owners, the Korban should be completely valid and it should atone for the heirs as well!
</p><p>
ANSWER: The <b>SHI'UREI IYUN HA'TALMUD</b> explains that in order to answer this question, it is necessary to understand how a Korban Olah atones for the heirs' transgressions of Mitzvos Aseh. The Gemara earlier states that although the Korban does not atone for the heirs 'mi'Kiv'a,' in a 'permanent,' normal procedural manner, it does atone 'mi'Kufya,' 'as an aside.' This means that a regular Korban designated by the sinner provides a direct atonement, while heirs who bring a Korban of their father indirectly attainment atonement. This indirect atonement is a result of their financial stake in the Korban.
</p><p>
Rav Pinchas agrees with Rava that there is no Shinuy Ba'alim that will stop the Korban from fulfilling the deceased person's obligation, since he did what he could; namely, he designated the Korban to atone for his sin. While the original purpose of the Korban remains, there is the added benefit that the one (the heir) who has a financial stake in the Korban also achieves atonement, since he owns the animal. However, if one brings the Korban with intent for a different owner, he changes the one detail of the Korban which would possibly give the heirs atonement, but he does not change the basic designation of the Korban (that it should atone for a particular sin). This is why it may be valid for its original owner, but not give atonement to the heirs.
</p><p>
This approach explains the difference between the atonement of the heirs, which is lost as a result of the Shinuy Ba'alim, and the ability of the Korban to fulfill the obligation of the deceased, which is not lost as a result of the same Shinuy Ba'alim. The Korban has no owner for whom it is being sacrificed, because the original owner died and the heirs attain atonement only 'mi'Kufya.'
</p><p>
On this point, Rav Pinchas agrees with Rava that there is no Shinuy Ba'alim to stop the Korban from fulfilling the obligation of the deceased. However, there still is the ownership of the heirs in the Korban which links them to the Korban enough to receive atonement 'mi'Kufya' even without the Korban being brought specifically for them. If one offers the Korban with intent of changing the ownership, he changes a detail in the Korban such that the heir's ownership is no longer effective to provide them with atonement via this Korban. Through the Shinuy Ba'alim, the heirs do not attain atonement even 'mi'Kufya.' Nevertheless, this is not a Shinuy Ba'alim to ruin the effect of the Korban for the father, since the father no longer owns it, and thus it still fulfills his obligation. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker, Y. Montrose)</p><p></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) THE SOURCE THAT A 'SHINUY KODESH' INVALIDATES A KORBAN CHATAS</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara asks what the source in the Torah is for the law that if a Kohen has in mind, during any of the various stages of offering a Korban Chatas, intent that the animal should be a different type of Korban, the Chatas is Pasul and may not be offered at all. The Gemara says that the source that such intent -- during the Shechitah of the animal -- invalidates the Chatas is the verse, 'v'Shachat Osah l'Chatas' -- 'he shall slaughter it for a Chatas' (Vayikra 4:33), which teaches that it is a valid Chatas only when slaughtered with the intent that it be a Chatas. Similarly, the next verse, 'The Kohen will take from the blood of the Chatas' (4:34), teaches that the Kabalas ha'Dam must be done with intent that the Korban is a Chatas, and it is Pasul if the Kohen has intent that it be any other Korban. The same law applies to the Zerikas ha'Dam, as derived from the verse, 'v'Chiper Alav ha'Kohen me'Chataso' -- 'the Kohen will provide atonement for him for his sin' (Vayikra 5:6). All of the Derashos seem to be based on the fact that the verse emphasizes that the Korban must be offered for the sake of a Chatas and not with any other Korban in mind.
</p><p>
The two verses from which the Gemara derives that the wrong intent during Shechitah or during Kabalah invalidates the Korban Chatas are written with regard to an ordinary Korban Chatas. However, the verse that the Gemara quotes that discusses the Zerikas ha'Dam of a Chatas is written with regard to a Korban Oleh v'Yored, which is not the ordinary type of Korban Chatas. Why does the Gemara cite a verse about Zerikah which is written with regard to an unusual form of Korban Chatas, when the same verse is written with regard to the normal Korban Chatas: 'v'Chiper Alav ha'Kohen Al Chataso Asher Chata' -- 'The Kohen will provide atonement for him for his sin which he transgressed' (4:35)? (<b>TOSFOS</b> DH Zerikah)
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> answers that the verse written with regard to the normal Korban Chatas (4:35) does not refer to the Zerikas ha'Dam of the Korban Chatas, but rather to the Kohen who provides atonement for the sinner 'for his sin (Chataso) which he transgressed (Asher Chata).' <b>TOSFOS</b> adds that, similarly, when the Torah says that the 'Kohen will provide atonement for him from his sin (me'Chataso)' with regard to the Korban of the Nasi (Vayikra 4:26), it does not refer to the Korban Chatas itself, but rather to the actual sin that was transgressed, as indicated by the words 'v'Nislach Lo' -- 'and it will be forgiven for him.' Only in the verse of the Korban Oleh v'Yored is it written, 'The Kohen will provide atonement for him for his sin (me'Chataso),' without any other modifier to imply that this 'Chatas' refers to the sin and not to the Korban. Therefore, it is from this verse that the Gemara learns that the Zerikas ha'Dam must not be done with intent for any other Korban other than a Chatas.
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b>, in his first answer, explains that the context of the verse written with regard to the normal Chatas (4:35) shows that it is not discussing the Zerikas ha'Dam of the Chatas. The Torah there states that the Kohen is to put the blood on the Mizbe'ach, and then it states that the fats must be burned on the Mizbe'ach. Only afterwards does the verse say that the Kohen will provide atonement for him. Even though atonement is usually accomplished at the moment of Zerikas ha'Dam, it is not clear that this verse is referring to Zerikah, because it is separated from the earlier verse which discusses the Zerikah of a normal Chatas. Therefore, the Gemara instead derives the Derashah from the verse regarding the Oleh v'Yored, which clearly refers to Zerikah.
</p><p>
Tosfos has difficulty with this explanation. The Gemara later (8b) asks that now that there is a source that the Zerikah must be done l'Shem Chatas for an ordinary Chatas, what is the source that the same applies for an Oleh v'Yored? What is the Gemara's question? The very verse from which the Gemara derives that the Zerikah must be done l'Shem Chatas is written with regard to the Oleh v'Yored!
</p><p>
Tosfos answers that the intention of the Gemara later is as follows. The Gemara earlier (7b) teaches that in the case of a Korban Shelamim, there is no reason to differentiate between Shechitah and the other Avodos with regard to the requirement to perform them with proper intent. Similarly, for an ordinary Chatas, all that is necessary is a verse teaching that the <i>Shechitah</i> must be done l'Shem Chatas and not for the sake of any other Korban. Once such a verse is found, it follows that all of the other Avodos also have this requirement. In contrast, in the case of a Korban Oleh v'Yored, the only verse that implies that it must be l'Shem Chatas is the verse regarding Zerikah. The law of Zerikah cannot teach anything about the other Avodos, since the Zerikah is the main part of the atonement, and what applies to it might not apply to the other Avodos. Therefore, other sources still are needed to teach that the other Avodos of an Oleh v'Yored cannot be performed with another Korban in mind.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>KEREN ORAH</b> has difficulty with the approach of Tosfos. He suggests instead that the text of the Gemara should be corrected, and the correct text indeed quotes the verse of an ordinary Chatas as the source for the law of Zerikah. Accordingly, the Gemara later (8b) certainly is justified in asking for the source that the Zerikah of an Oleh v'Yored must be done with the proper intent. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> THE HETER TO WEAR TEFILIN AT NIGHT IN ORDER TO GUARD THEM <span class='indexentry'>[Tefilin :night: Shemirah]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Beraisa):</span> If a Korban Pesach was slaughtered not at the proper time, Lishmah it is Pasul, and Lo Lishmah it is Kosher (but he was not Yotzei).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Menachos 36a (Beraisa):</span> One blesses on Tefilin from the time to wear them. If one had to start traveling early, and for the safety of the Tefilin he must wear them, he wears them. When the proper time comes, he touches them and blesses.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Beraisa - R. Yosi ha'Galili):</span> 'V'Shamarta Es ha'Chukah ha'Zos l'Mo'adah mi'Yamim Yamimah.' 'Yamim' excludes nights. '*Mi*'Yamim' excludes some days, i.e. Shabbos and Yom Tov.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span>	R. Akiva says, the 'Chok' referred to is Pesach (which was discussed before Tefilin).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span>	R. Akiva learns from another source that the Mitzvah does not apply on Shabbos.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	(Beraisa - R. Akiva) Suggestion:</span> Perhaps a person should wear Tefilin on Shabbos and Yom Tov!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Rejection:</span> 'V'Hayah l'Os Al Yadcha...' - the Mitzvah applies only on days when Yisrael need an Os (sign of their closeness to Hash-m), but not Shabbos or Yom Tov, which are themselves signs.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Elazar):</span> One who wears Tefilin at night transgresses an Aseh;</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Yochanan):</span> He transgresses a Lav.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span>	R. Elazar holds that when it says 'Hishamer' regarding a Lav, this is a Lav. 'Hishamer' regarding an Aseh is an Aseh. R. Yochanan holds that in both cases it is a Lav.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Elazar):</span> One may wear Tefilin at night in order to guard them.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	Ravina:</span> I saw Rav Ashi put on Tefilin at night. I asked if this was in order to guard them, and he said 'yes'. I could tell that it really wasn't in order to guard them. He holds that the Halachah permits this, but Ein Morin Ken (we do not tell this to one who asks).</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rif and Rosh (Hilchos Tefilin 9a and 16):</span> One may wear Tefilin at night, but Ein Morin Ken.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Tefilin 4:11):</span> If one put on Tefilin before Shki'ah (sundown) and it became dark, even if they are on the entire night, it is permitted, but Ein Morin Ken.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (12):</span> If one did not remove Tefilin after Shki'ah because he had no place to guard them, and he wears them to guard them, it is permitted.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Sha'agas Arye (43):</span> The Rambam did not rule like R. Elazar, who permits putting on Tefilin at night to guard them, for he holds that R. Elazar permits only without intent for the Mitzvah. The Isur to wear Tefilin at night is learned from 'v'Shamarta Es ha'Chukah... mi'Yamim Yamimah.' It is like the Mitzvah to wear during the day, i.e. for the sake of the Mitzvah. Anything not for the sake of the Mitzvah is permitted. This is called 'to guard them', for normally Tefilin are worn only for the Mitzvah or to guard them. If it were forbidden even not for the sake of the Mitzvah, and R. Elazar permits only in order to guard them, what is his source? The Torah does not hint to guarding them! Rather, the Torah permits anything not for the Mitzvah. If so, we can explain why the Rambam rules unlike R. Elazar. What is the source for R. Elazar and R. Yochanan to say that one who wears Tefilin at night transgresses a Lav or Aseh? They should say v'Shamarta discusses the Mitzvah to wear Tefilin during the day, and the Diyuk (inference) to exclude nights is only from a Chiyuv to wear Tefilin! The Torah excludes night from the Mitzvah of Tzitzis. We do not say that there is any Isur to wear Tzitzis at night! If we can explain v'Shamarta to discuss the Mitzvah itself, we should not say that it discusses the Diyuk. The Rosh says so in Mo'ed Katan in the name of Rabbeinu Meir mi'Rottenberg. This is logical. Also, R. Akiva says that Chukah refers to Pesach. In Eruvin, the Gemara suggested that he holds that there is a Lav of Korban Pesach, and answered that Hishamer' regarding an Aseh is an Aseh. I.e. Hishamer obligates people to offer Pesach in its time. He does not say that it forbids Pesach not in its time. Why do R. Elazar and R. Yochanan say that R. Yosi ha'Glili uses the verse to forbid wearing Tefilin at night? It is because we already have many verses obligating during the day. One who does not wear Tefilin transgresses eight Mitzvos Aseh (Menachos 43). Therefore, v'Shamarta forbids at night, which has no other source. R. Akiva says that Chukah refers to Pesach. Even if it forbids Pesach not in its time, e.g. before midday or on other days, it must be for an extra Isur. Pesach Lishmah at these times is Pasul, because it says many times that it must be in the afternoon of Erev Pesach. Therefore, it is better to say that the verse discusses Pesach itself. We cannot say so for R. Yosi ha'Glili. R. Yochanan must say that Hishamer teaches a Lav because he does not hold like R. Elazar, who permits in order to guard them.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 30:2):</span> One may not put on Tefilin at night, lest he forget them and sleep in them. If he did not remove Tefilin at Shki'ah because he had no place to guard them, and he wears them to guard them, it is permitted and Morin Ken.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (OC 30 DH u'Mah she'Chosav Rabeinu Hainu):</span>  Sefer ha'Terumah and the Mordechai say that mid'Rabanan one may not put on Tefilin after Shki'ah, i.e. the end of Shki'ah, close to Tzeis ha'Kochavim. Rashi and the Rosh explain that R. Elazar says that in order to guard them, one may put them on even after Shki'ah. However, the Rambam says that the need to guard them permits only leaving them on, but not to put them on. This is like the Rif's text. All the Poskim hold like this. If so, we do not hold like R. Elazar. However, perhaps we rule like R. Elazar. Even though to guard them one may put them on l'Chatchilah, the Poskim omitted this, for they relied on what they wrote that if one needs to travel, he must put them on before the time. This is in order to guard them. The Rosh said that Rav Ashi put on Tefilin after Shki'ah. He told Ravina that this was to guard them, but really he holds that the Halachah permits this, but Ein Morin Ken. If so, one may put them on after Shki'ah, but Ein Morin Ken. This is unlike the Poskim. It seems that even the texts that say 'he was Meni'ach after Shki'ah' mean that he did not remove them. Surely one may not put them on if not to guard them. However, R. Yonah connotes that the Halachah permits putting them on at night, but Ein Morin Ken.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH veha'Rambam):</span> The Rambam permitted one who put on Tefilin before Shki'ah to leave them on the entire night. Why does he say afterwards that he may leave them on to guard them? Perhaps it is because in the latter case, Morin Ken. This is why he wrote only 'it is permitted', and did not say 'but Ein Morin Ken'. The case with Rav Ashi connotes that in order to guard them, it is permitted and Morin Ken. One could reject this and say that really, even to guard them Ein Morin Ken, but Rav Ashi said that he wore them to guard them because Ravina knew that it is permitted to guard them. This is why he asked 'do you intend to guard them?' This is not called Morin Ken. If the questioner did not know, perhaps Rav Ashi would not have said that it is permitted in order to guard them! The Rambam holds that since he admitted that it is permitted in order to guard them, this is Morin Ken. Since the Rif and Rambam agree that one may not put them on at night, we rule like them.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (4):</span> The Gemara connotes that one must say that he wears them in order to guard them.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (9):</span> One should not put them on l'Chatchilah at night to guard them. Some are lenient.</p>
<p class='seealso'>See also:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) A KORBAN PESACH SLAUGHTERED WITH INTENT TO BE ANY OTHER KORBAN</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara discusses the source for the law that a Korban Pesach slaughtered at any time other than Erev Pesach is a valid Korban Shelamim, as long as it was not slaughtered with intent that it serve as a Korban Pesach. The Gemara at one stage suggests that this law is derived from the verse, 'If his Korban, for a Zevach Shelamim to Hash-m, is from the flock...' (Vayikra 3:6). Using the method of 'Klal u'Frat u'Chlal,' the words 'l'Zevach' and 'la'Hashem' are general terms, and the word 'Shelamim' is a specific term. Accordingly, the verse teaches that just as a Korban Pesach which was slaughtered to be a Shelamim is a valid Korban, it is a valid Korban if it is slaughtered with intent to be any other type of Korban, with one exception. The only time it should not be valid is when it was slaughtered, on any day other than Erev Pesach, with intent that it be a Korban Pesach.
</p><p>
The Gemara asks that if a law is being derived from the 'Prat,' then the law should be that only if the Pesach is slaughtered in the name of a Korban which can be offered voluntarily is it a valid Korban, but not if it is slaughtered in the name of a Chatas or Asham (which cannot be offered voluntarily). The Gemara answers that the word 'l'Zevach' is a 'Ribuy' (inclusive). How does this answer the Gemara's question?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>RASHI</b> (DH Ela) explains that the Gemara, in its answer, is giving an entirely different approach which has nothing to do with 'Klal u'Frat u'Chlal.' The Gemara retracts its application of 'Klal u'Frat' here, because it determines that the word 'l'Zevach' is not a 'Klal' (a general term) but rather a 'Ribuy' (an inclusive word). A 'Klal' in this context would be the word 'Behemah,' for example, which would include all animals. The word 'Zevach,' however, is not only a general term -- it is also an unnecessary one, since it is connected to the next word of 'Shelamim.' Hence, the Gemara decides to derive the law through the methodology of 'Ribuy' instead of the methodology of 'Klal u'Frat.'
</p><p>
(There are three different opinions regarding the correct Girsa of Rashi's words in his explanation for what 'l'Zevach Shelamim' means. Our text in Rashi is that of the <b>TZON KODASHIM</b>. See other texts of Rashi in the <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b>, and in the <b>CHOK NASAN</b> in the name of the <b>PANIM ME'IROS</b>.)
</p><p>
The verse could have said merely 'l'Shelamim.' Since the word 'l'Zevach' is extra and therefore inclusive, it cannot be used to derive a 'Klal u'Frat u'Chlal.' The Gemara explains that the principle of 'Klal u'Frat u'Chlal' is not applied here, but instead the extra word 'l'Zevach' teaches that regardless of what Korban it is slaughtered for, the animal remains a valid Korban.
</p><p>
The Shitah Mekubetzes (in Hashmatos) writes that Rashi does not mean that a word used in a 'Klal u'Frat u'Chlal' cannot be inclusive. Rather, Rashi means that in this verse, there are two consecutive words that are both inclusive. The verse states, 'v'Im Min ha'Tzon Korbano, l'Zevach Shelamim la'Hashem' -- both the word 'Korbano' and the word 'l'Zevach' are general terms. Two consecutive general terms in a verse teaches that all things are considered valid. In this context, this means that a Korban Pesach offered with the intent of any Korban is valid, including a Chatas and an Asham as well.
</p><p>
The Shitah Mekubetzes has difficulty with his explanation of Rashi. If all things are included by the words 'Korbano l'Zevach,' then how can the Gemara immediately ask that this Korban Pesach should acquire the status and laws of the Korban for which it was intended? This certainly cannot be the case, because the word 'Shelamim' in the verse teaches that the Korban Pesach should have the status and laws of a Shelamim!
</p><p>
(b) The Shitah Mekubetzes concludes that the correct explanation is that of <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Ela). Tosfos explains that the word 'l'Zevach' is not a Klal (a general term), but rather a 'Ribuy' (an inclusive term). There is a similar principle, known as 'Ribah u'Mi'et v'Ribah,' when there are two inclusive terms and one exclusive term. This principle teaches that the verse includes everything possible, besides one thing, regardless of whether or not all of the things being included are similar to the exclusive word or not (this is in contrast to the principle of 'Klal u'Frat u'Chlal'). Now that the Gemara learns that the verse is teaching a 'Ribuy' from the word 'l'Zevach,' the question that Chatas and Asham are not similar is no longer a problem, since they do not need to be similar. The only thing that the verse excludes is a Korban Pesach slaughtered on any day other than Erev Pesach with the intention that it be a Korban Pesach, which indeed is unfit. (Y. Montrose)</p><p></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) MALKUS FOR SELLING A 'BECHOR' AFTER IT IS SLAUGHTERED</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara teaches that a Korban Pesach slaughtered at any time other than Erev Pesach is a valid Korban Shelamim, as long as it is not slaughtered with intention that it should serve as a Korban Pesach. This is derived from the verse, 'If his Korban, for a Zevach Shelamim to Hash-m, is from the flock...' (Vayikra 3:6; see Insights to 8b).
</p><p>
The Gemara asks, why does the Korban not have all of the Halachos of the Korban that was intended? Why does it have the Halachos of a Shelamim? Rebbi Avin answers that a Korban which can be eaten by anyone (Korban Pesach) can become another type of Korban which is fit to be eaten by anyone (Shelamim), but it cannot became a Korban which is not eaten at all (Olah) or a Korban eaten only by Kohanim (Chatas). Rebbi Yosi bar Avin answers that one form of Kodshim Kalim (Korban Pesach) can become another form of Kodshim Kalim (Shelamim), but it cannot become a form of Kodshei Kodashim (such as an Olah).
</p><p>
Rav Yitzchak bar Savrin questions these explanations. Among his questions he asks that according to Rebbi Yosi bar Avin, one who intended that his Korban should be a Bechor should have to treat it with the Halachos of a Bechor, since a Bechor is also Kodshim Kalim, like Shelamim. The Gemara asks what difference does it make if the Korban has the Halachic status of a Bechor or of a Shelamim. The Gemara answers that one difference is the prohibition of 'Lo Yiga'el' (Vayikra 27:28), which applies to a Bechor but not to a Shelamim. The Gemara in Bechoros (32b) teaches that this prohibition is the same as that of Temurah, and one who sells a Bechor is punished with Malkus. There is no such prohibition which obligates Malkus in the case of a Shelamim.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (DH l'Mai) has difficulty with the Gemara's practical difference between whether the Korban is considered a Bechor or a Shelamim. The Gemara is discussing a difference which applies <i>after</i> the Korban is slaughtered, and which depends on which Korban was intended at the time of the Shechitah. The Gemara in Bechoros (ibid.) clearly states that the Torah's prohibition against selling a Bechor applies only while the animal is alive! If this Korban Pesach becomes a Bechor only when it is slaughtered with the intent that it be a Bechor, then, obviously, selling it while it is alive -- before the Shechitah -- will not constitute a transgression of 'Lo Yiga'el.'
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> quotes the <b>RIVA</b> who explains that although the animal becomes a Bechor only when it is slaughtered, it still can live a short time longer. This is apparent from the Gemara in Yevamos (120b) which says that if both Simanim of a person are cut, he still is considered alive at that moment. Accordingly, if the owner would sell the animal immediately after he slaughters it with intent that it be a Bechor, then he indeed would transgress the Isur of 'Lo Yiga'el' and be punished with Malkus, if the animal has the Halachic status of a Bechor and not a Shelamim.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>SEFAS EMES</b> points out that, as Tosfos explains, the source that Malkus is administered only when a Bechor is sold while still alive is the Gemara in Bechoros (32b). The Gemara there arrives at this conclusion by comparing the prohibition of Temurah (attempting to exchange a Korban's Kedushah onto a different animal) to Bechor. Just as the Torah's prohibition against selling an animal involved in a transfer of Kedushah (Temurah) applies only while it is alive, the prohibition against redeeming a Bechor also applies only while it is alive. Rav Yitzchak bar Savrin asks from many cases of Korbanos, which he maintains should retain their original Halachic status regardless of the specific intent that the owner had while slaughtering them. One of these cases is that of Temurah. The Sefas Emes suggests that all of these questions were raised at the same time. Since Rav Yitzchak bar Savrin assumes that an animal can become a Temurah <i>after</i> it is slaughtered, he clearly does not agree with the source for the law in Bechoros. Since the law is that one who sells a Temurah animal after its death is punished with Malkus, one who sells a Bechor after death should be punished with Malkus as well. When the Gemara answers the questions of Rav Yitzchak, the Gemara in Bechoros is accepted as the Halachah, and thus there is no Torah prohibition against selling a Bechor after its death.
</p><p>
(c) In a similar vein, the <b>MEROMEI SADEH</b> answers that Tosfos is not taking into account that Abaye in Bechoros (31b) and Ravina in Bava Kama (53b) both argue with Rava and maintain that the prohibition against selling a Bechor applies even after its death, and Rav Yitzchak is following the opinion of those Amora'im. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> SELLING MA'ASER BEHEMAH DOES NOT TAKE EFFECT <span class='indexentry'>[Ma'aser Behemah :selling]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question (R. Yitzchak b'Rebbi Savrin):</span> If a Korban Pesach was slaughtered l'Shem Ma'aser, it should become Ma'aser!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span>	This would cause one who sells to be lashed for 'Lo Yiga'el'.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer:</span> 'Ha'Asiri Yihyeh Kodesh' - the only way an animal can become Ma'aser is if it is the tenth (to leave the pen).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Temurah 4b (Abaye):</span> Wherever the Torah forbade something, if one transgressed, he accomplished something. If not, he would not be punished!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Rava):</span> His Aveirah does not accomplish anything. He is punished for acting contrary to Torah!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	5a -Question (against Abaye):</span> The Torah says that Cherem cannot be sold or redeemed. Even b'Di'eved, it does not take effect!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Mishnah):</span> Chermei Kohanim cannot be redeemed. They must be given to Kohanim.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer:</span> 'Kodesh Kodashim Hu' teaches that it remains Kodesh (until it is given to Kohanim).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	5b - Question (against Abaye):</span> The Torah forbids redeeming Bechor, and doing so does not help!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Mishnah):</span> Any Korban or Temurah that has a Mum may be redeemed, except for Bechor and Ma'aser.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer:</span> We learn from 'Hem' - they retain their Kedushah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question (against Abaye):</span> The Torah forbids redeeming Ma'aser. Even b'Di'eved, it does not take effect!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Mishnah):</span> Any Korban or Temurah that has a Mum may be redeemed, except for Bechor and Ma'aser.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer:</span> We learn Ma'aser from a Gezeirah Shavah 'Ha'avarah-Ha'avarah' from Bechor.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span><span class='desl2'>	6a - Question:</span> What do Rava and Abaye argue about?</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>12.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer #1 (Rav Ashi):</span> They argue about Ribis Ketzutzah. Abaye exempts from returning it, and Rava obligates returning it.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>13.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rejection:</span> Abaye does not exempt!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>14.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer #2:</span> They argue about whether or not Shinuy acquires.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>15.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bechoros 32b:</span> Had it said 'Lo Yimacher,' one might have thought that one may not sell Ma'aser Behemah, for that is treating it like Chulin, but it may be redeemed, for the money becomes Hekdesh. Therefore, it says 'Lo Yiga'el,' to teach that it may not be sold or redeemed.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Bechoros 6:5):</span> One may not sell Ma'aser Behemah when it is Tamim (unblemished) - Lo Yiga'el. This includes an Isur to sell it. It may not be redeemed or sold at all. It seems that one who sold it did not accomplish anything, and the buyer did not acquire it, therefore, he is not lashed, just like one who sold Cherem that is given to Kohanim or an Eshes Yefas To'ar.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Ri Korkus:</span> In Temurah we say that all agree that Pidyon does not take effect in Cherem, Bechor and Ma'aser. Since the Torah used an expression of Pidyon to teach that Ma'aser cannot be sold, likewise a sale does not take effect. Perhaps 'Hem' also teaches that they stay in the Reshus of their owner.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tosfos (6a DH v'Hashta):</span> R. Baruch asked why we don't say that they argue about one who redeemed Cherem, Bechor and Ma'aser. Abaye holds that he is not lashed, for he did not accomplish anything, and Rava holds that he is lashed, for he transgressed. This requires investigation.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Ri Korkus:</span> The Rambam (Hilchos Malveh 4:3) holds that one is not lashed for Ribis Ketzuzah, for it can be returned. Therefore, he holds that one is not lashed in all cases that Abaye agrees that one did not accomplish anything. This includes redeeming Cherem, Bechor and Ma'aser. One Perush of Rashi explains like this. The Sugya is slightly difficult according to this, but it answers R. Baruch's question. R. Baruch holds that since the Halachah follows Rava, one is lashed for these, and also for Ribis Ketzuzah. Tosfos could answer that the Gemara failed to find a case in which they argue about whether it takes effect, which is what they explicitly argued about. I see no source in the Sugya whether or not sale of an Eshes Yefas To'ar takes effect.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Gezeilah 1:9):</span> If one coveted an item and pressured the owner until he took it and gave much money, he transgressed a Lav. He is not lashed because there is no action.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Ra'avad:</span> This is astounding. There is no greater action than taking it! Rather, he is not lashed because he is like a robber who must return what he stole. We discuss when the owner did not say 'I consent.'</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Magid Mishneh:</span> The Rambam holds that even if he did not say 'I consent', the 'buyer' acquires. Even though Rava holds that if one transgressed, he did not accomplish anything, here is like one who stole wool and made a Keli. He acquires through Shinuy and owes the initial value. He is not lashed for taking it, for the owner consented. He transgressed for pressuring him, and this has no action. The Ra'avad holds that he acquires only if the seller consented. This is primary.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Lechem Mishneh (8):</span> In Temurah, Rava says that one is lashed for transgressing, even though his Aveirah did not accomplish anything! If so, one should be lashed even though the sale is invalid! In Temurah, we asked against Abaye why one is lashed for selling Cherem or Ma'aser, even though it does not take effect. We should have asked according to Rava why one is not lashed, like we asked about a rapist who divorced! To answer R. Baruch's question, I say that even though normally the Halachah follows Rava against Abaye, here the Rambam rules like Abaye, because the Gemara concluded that they argue about Shinuy Koneh. One version of Rashi says that this discusses one who stole wood and made Kelim. We hold like Abaye, that he acquires them and pays only the value of the wood. However, the Magid Mishneh holds that the Rambam rules like Rava, and Rava holds that Shinuy Koneh. This is like Rashi's other Perush, that Abaye and Rava argue only about how to expound the verses. I do not know how the Magid Mishneh can explain the Rambam here.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Ohr Some'ach (DH v'Yir'eh):</span> The Tosefta (Kidushin 4:6) says that if one was Mekadesh with meat of Ma'aser, she is not Mekudeshes. Before Shechitah, this is Torah law. After Shechitah, Chachamim uprooted the Kidushin. This shows that the buyer does not acquire. Bechoros 32b says that one might have thought that one may not sell it, for that is treating it like Chulin, but it may be redeemed, for the money becomes Hekdesh. Therefore, it says 'Lo Yiga'el,' to teach that it may not be sold or redeemed. Just like redemption does not take effect b'Di'eved, also a sale, The Tosefta (Bechoros 3:6) says that one cannot sell Ma'aser Behemah because it is not one's property; the correct text of the Yerushalmi says the same. All agree that one is not lashed for trying to sell it.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Chasdei David (on Tosefta Kidushin 4:6):</span> The Tosefta discusses an animal bought with money of Ma'aser Sheni.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl3'>	Mishneh l'Melech:</span> In Sefer ha'Mitzvos (Lav 263), the Rambam says that one is lashed for selling an Eshes Yefas To'ar, unlike he wrote here.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Melachim 8:6):</span> If one did not desire his Eshes Yefas To'ar and sold her, he transgressed a Lav and she is not sold. He returns the money.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Radvaz:</span> He is lashed, for this is a Lav with an action.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Hagahah in Frankel Rambam:</span> Most texts of Sefer ha'Mitzvos do not mention lashes. The Rambam lists all Aveiros with lashes in Perek 19 of Sanhedrin, and does not list selling an Eshes Yefas To'ar.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Avnei Nezer (YD 308:2-4):</span> Even R. Yosi ha'Glili agrees that Bechor and Ma'aser are Mamon Gavoha (Hashem's property). The Gizbar is not authorized to sell them. Even if he accepted money, this is like selling something that one does not own. Transgressing Hashem's command is only when he did a proper Kinyan, and the Torah forbids it. This is why the Rambam did not discuss the law of redeeming, only the law of selling. One is not lashed for trying to redeem it, for this is mere speech. If it worked, it would be considered an action and he would be lashed, like one is lashed for Temurah. One may not sell an Eshes Yefas To'ar or force her to work, so it is as if she is not his, so one cannot do a Kinyan to sell her. One is lashed for trying to sell his field permanently (because he owns it).</p>
<p class='otherhalachos'>Other Halachos relevant to this Daf:</p>
<p class='otherhalachostext'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) THOUGHTS DURING ONE 'AVODAH' ABOUT A DIFFERENT 'AVODAH'</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Gemara records a dispute between Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding a person who -- while slaughtering a Korban Chatas -- has in mind to perform the Zerikah later with intent that it should be a different type of Korban. Rebbi Yochanan says that the Chatas is Pasul, because the thought that one has in mind during one Avodah about a different Avodah is able to invalidate a Korban. Reish Lakish disagrees and maintains that a thought about a different Avodah cannot invalidate the Korban.
</p><p>
What is the reasoning behind Rebbi Yochanan's opinion? If the present Avodah was done properly, then why does a thought about a later Avodah invalidate the Korban?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 15:10) rules like Rebbi Yochanan and explains that the thought which the person has during Shechitah is considered as though it took place during Zerikah, and thus the Korban is invalid.
</p><p>
The source for the Rambam's explanation seems to be the Gemara in Pesachim (78b). The Gemara there discusses the law that one is not allowed to slaughter a Korban Pesach with intention that a person who is unable to eat a k'Zayis of the meat (such as an old or sick person; see <b>RASHI</b> there, DH Ein) should be included in the group that will eat the Korban. If he has such intention during the Shechitah, the Korban is Pasul. The Gemara says that if -- while performing the Shechitah of the Korban Pesach -- a person has in mind that he will perform the Zerikah for a person who is unable to eat a k'Zayis of the Korban, the Korban is still fit to be eaten and used for the Mitzvah of Korban Pesach. The Rambam rules this way in Hilchos Korban Pesach (2:6). The Gemara's logic apparently is that the person's thought, during Shechitah, about other people eating the Korban Pesach is considered to have taken place during the Zerikah, when such a thought does not invalidate the Korban. If the thought, on the other hand, would be considered to have taken place during the Shechitah, then the Korban should be Pasul. This shows that a thought during Shechitah about Zerikah is considered to be taking place during Zerikah.
</p><p>
The <b>KEHILOS YAKOV</b> has difficulty with the words of the Rambam. The Gemara later (10a) records another, similar argument between Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding one who slaughters an animal with intent to do the Zerikah later for the sake of idolatry. Rebbi Yochanan says that because intent during one Avodah regarding another Avodah is effective, the animal becomes forbidden from benefit immediately. If the Rambam considers a thought about Zerikah during Shechitah to have taken place during Zerikah, then the animal should not be forbidden from benefit until after the Zerikah! Moreover, if the person never performs the Zerikah, then the animal should not be forbidden even according to Rebbi Yochanan!
</p><p>
The Kehilos Yakov explains that the intent of the Rambam is that once the person has the wrongful thought of the Zerikah in mind during the Shechitah, it is considered as though the Zerikah <i>has already occurred</i> with that thought. According to Rebbi Yochanan, the animal is forbidden because the Zerikah is deemed to have already occurred.
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> in Pesachim (61a, DH Shechato; see Insights to Pesachim 61:2) discusses Rav Chisda's opinion that if one slaughters a Korban Pesach with intent that Arelim (uncircumcised people) should also gain atonement from the Korban (during the Zerikah, the process of the Korban that atones), then the Korban is Pasul. The Gemara later qualifies this and says that if one has in mind during the <i>Zerikah</i> itself that Arelim should gain atonement, then the Korban Pesach is valid. This is because thoughts during Zerikah about who will eat the Korban do not invalidate the Korban; only such thoughts during <i>Shechitah</i> invalidate the Korban. Tosfos understands that this shows that having a thought during Shechitah about Zerikah is considered as though the thought occurred during the Shechitah.
</p><p>
How, though, does Tosfos understand the Gemara in Pesachim (78b) which is the source for the Rambam's ruling? Tosfos explains that the correct text in that Gemara should read that the <i>Zerikah</i> itself was done for people who were not part of the group, and not that the Shechitah was done with intent to perform the Zerikah for people not in the group ('Shechato l'Ochlav <i>v'Nizrak</i> Damo she'Lo l'Ochlav,' instead of 'Shechato <i>Lizrok</i> Damo she'Lo l'Ochlav').
</p><p>
However, the question now must be asked on the Rambam's explanation. How does the Rambam understand the Gemara in Pesachim (61a) which discusses slaughtering the Korban Pesach for Arelim?
</p><p>
<b>RABEINU CHAIM HA'LEVI</b> (Hilchos Korban Pesach 2:6) points out that the Gemara in Pesachim implies that Rav Chisda's opinion -- that a thought of gaining atonement for Arelim during the Shechitah of the Korban Pesach invalidates the Korban -- is based on the prohibition of Shinuy Ba'alim, and is not a special law regarding the Korban Pesach. The problem of Shinuy Ba'alim, where the thought of changing (or adding to) the owner of the Korban invalidates the Korban, applies only when the 'new owner' has some potential connection to the obligation to bring that Korban. Arelim are considered to be connected to the obligation to bring the Korban Pesach, since they could perform Bris Milah and then be obligated to bring the Korban. Therefore, Shinuy Ba'alim applies to a thought of bringing the Korban for Arelim.
</p><p>
This explains the view of the Rambam, who says that this type of thought is considered to have taken place during Zerikah. Having a thought to include Arelim in a Korban Pesach (the prohibition against including people who cannot fulfill the Mitzvah in the group of a Korban Pesach) is only a problem during Shechitah, but not during Zerikah. Rav Chisda -- who says that the Korban is Pasul -- maintains that this Pesul is due to the general prohibition of Shinuy Ba'alim, which applies during Zerikah. On the other hand, the Gemara later in Pesachim (78b) is discussing an old or sick person, who does not have the ability to heal himself. Since he cannot heal himself, he is deemed to have no connection with this Korban, and therefore he cannot be an alternate 'owner' who would cause the Korban to become Pasul merely through Shinuy Ba'alim. The Rambam understands that this is why the Korban that is slaughtered in order to atone for an old or sick person is valid, while Rav Chisda rules that a Korban that is slaughtered in order to atone for Arelim is invalid. (Y. Montrose)</p><p></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) WRONGFUL THOUGHTS THAT ARE NOT CARRIED OUT IN PRACTICE</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Gemara (9b) records a dispute between Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding a person who -- while slaughtering a Korban Chatas -- has in mind to perform the Zerikah later with intent that it should be a different type of Korban. Rebbi Yochanan says that the Chatas is Pasul, because the thought that one has in mind during one Avodah about a different Avodah is able to invalidate a Korban. Reish Lakish disagrees and maintains that a thought about a different Avodah cannot invalidate the Korban. Similarly, they argue (10a) about whether or not slaughtering a Korban with intent that the Zerikah will be done in the name of Avodah Zarah forbids the animal from benefit. Rebbi Yochanan says that one may not benefit from the animal, while Reish Lakish says that one may benefit from the animal.
</p><p>
What exactly is the case in which Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish argue? Must the person slaughtering the animal have intent that he will do the Zerikah <i>himself</i> in a wrongful manner, or do these arguments apply even when he intends to have someone else do the Zerikah in a wrongful manner?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>RASHBA</b> in <b>TORAS HA'BAYIS</b> (Hilchos Shechitah 1:1) discusses the opinion in Chulin (39b) that rules that Jewish butchers may slaughter animals of Nochrim in return for the meat and skin, even though it is apparent that the Nochrim will sprinkle the blood of the animals for Avodah Zarah. The Rashba points out that the Jewish butchers may not have in mind that their slaughtering is being done in order to enable the Nochri to sprinkle the blood, because such an intent would prohibit the meat and skin from benefit, as stated by Rebbi Yochanan here in Zevachim. If the argument between Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish applies in a case in which the person who slaughtered the animal (with intent to do the Zerikah for the sake of Avodah Zarah) is the one who also performs the Zerikah, then even Reish Lakish should agree that the meat is forbidden, because the person who slaughters the animal is considered a Mumar whose Shechitah is forbidden! The Gemara, therefore, must be referring to a person who slaughters with intent that a Nochri will perform the Zerikah for Avodah Zarah, and nevertheless Rebbi Yochanan maintains that the animal is forbidden. Even though the Rashba is unsure about the proof from the Gemara here, he says that this is the correct conclusion.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RE'AH</b> in <b>BEDEK HA'BAYIS</b> writes that he does not understand the Rashba's words at all. It is obvious from context that the Gemara is discussing only a case of a person who will do the Zerikah himself. Moreover, the Rashba's proof is not clear. The Rashba says that Reish Lakish would agree that the animal is forbidden in a case in which the person who slaughtered the animal planned to perform the Zerikah himself. This is problematic, because Reish Lakish maintains that until the Zerikah is actually performed for Avodah Zarah, the animal is permitted like any other animal! The Re'ah also asserts that even if the person slaughtering the Korban arranged beforehand that someone else would perform the Zerikah for Avodah Zarah, it is not clear that appointing a Shali'ach for such a thing is effective.
</p><p>
The <b>ME'IRI</b> in Sanhedrin (60b) understands the case like the Re'ah. He explains that the case involving Avodah Zarah refers to a case in which the person had in mind during Shechitah 'that <i>he</i> would sprinkle the blood... to Avodah Zarah.' He adds that this also applies to having intention to <i>delay</i> the Zerikah beyond the proper time -- 'as long as the <i>Kohen doing the Avodah</i> has in mind to sprinkle the blood the next day after the correct time, it is Pigul.' It is apparent that the Me'iri maintains that only one who intends to do the Zerikah, during the Shechitah, can nullify the Korban through this thought. This is why the case of a Korban being nullified in such a way can apply only to a Kohen (as the Me'iri writes) -- for a Yisrael is not able to do the Zerikah!
</p><p>
(c) It seems that <b>RABEINU GERSHOM</b> in Chulin (39a) has a third opinion. He states that the case involving a thought during Shechitah about the Zerikah is referring to a Kohen's thought, but he does not mention (as the Me'iri does) that the case of Avodah Zarah is referring to a case in which the slaughterer intends to perform the Zerikah himself.
</p><p>
The <b>SHA'AR MORDECHAI</b> writes that Rabeinu Gershom's opinion may be understood based on a different statement of Rabeinu Gershom. The Gemara in Menachos (5b) teaches that a number of conditions must be met in order for a wrongful thought to invalidate a Korban. One of these conditions is that the thought must be done by 'one who is fit to perform the Avodah.' What does this mean? The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> in Menachos quotes Rabeinu Gershom as saying that if a Yisrael slaughters the Korban with a wrongful thought in mind, his thought does not invalidate the Korban. This seems to contradict the Mishnah later in Zevachim (31b) which explicitly states that a Yisrael can invalidate a Korban with his thoughts during Shechitah! (The wording of the Shitah Mekubetzes in the margin of our text is indeed amended to read, 'a Yisrael who performed the <i>Kabalah</i> or <i>Zerikah,</i>' an emendation apparently made because of this question.)
</p><p>
The Sha'ar Mordechai answers that it must be that Rabeinu Gershom means that a Yisrael cannot invalidate a Korban by having in mind that a different Yisrael will do the Zerikah. This is why he states in Chulin that the case there is discussing a Kohen. In most cases, the slaughterer will also be the one intending to do the Zerikah. When he explains the normal case, Rabeinu Gershom says that only a Kohen could make the Korban unfit, not a Yisrael. This does not imply that he rules like the Me'iri or the Re'ah regarding slaughtering for Avodah Zarah, for in that case he might rule like the Rashba that the slaughtering could be done with intent that someone else will do the Zerikah. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> DOES ONE BECOME A MUMAR DUE TO ONE TRANSGRESSION? <span class='indexentry'>[Mumar :becoming]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Yochanan):</span> If one slaughtered a (Chulin) animal in order to pour the blood or burn the Chelev to idolatry, the animal is forbidden.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Reish Lakish):</span> The animal is permitted.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span>	He does not consider this Avodah (Shechitah) to be for idolatry. We do not learn from Avodas ha'Mikdash (Pigul) to Chulin outside the Mikdash. R. Yochanan holds that since he later intends to serve idolatry with this animal, we consider this Avodah to be for idolatry. We learn from Avodah in the Mikdash to Chulin outside the Mikdash..</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Chulin 14a (Mishnah):</span> If one slaughters on Shabbos or Yom Kipur, even though he is Chayav Misah, the Shechitah is Kosher.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	41a:</span> Only a Nochri forbids another's property. If a Yisrael poured libations, he did not really intend for idolatry, rather to vex the owner of the wine.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question (Mishnah):</span> If Yakov and Do'eg slaughtered together, and Yakov intended for idolatry, and Do'eg intended for Shechitah, it is invalid.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer:</span> The case is, Do'eg is a Mumar (he truly serves idolatry.)</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	81b (Mishnah - R. Shimon):</span> One is exempt (for Oso v'Es Beno, slaughtering an animal and its mother on one day) if he slaughtered for idolatry.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span>	Chachamim say, this is considered Shechitah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Reish Lakish):</span> Chachamim are Mechayev for Oso v'Es Beno only if the second was slaughtered with proper intent. If the second was slaughtered for idolatry, since he is liable to death, he is exempt for Oso v'Es Beno.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Yochanan):</span> Even if the second was for idolatry, he is liable for Oso v'Es Beno if he was warned only for it, but he was not warned about idolatry.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span><span class='desl2'>	Gitin 47a:</span> A man in mortal danger asked R. Ami to redeem him. Rabanan said 'he is a Mumar. We saw him eat Neveilos and Treifos.'</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>12.</span>	R. Ami suggested that perhaps he desired eating them. When he heard that sometimes he prefers Isur to Heter, he refused to redeem him.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Shechitah 1:29):</span> One who slaughters on Shabbos, even though he would be Chayav Misah if he were Mezid, it is valid Shechitah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tosfos (14a DH ha'Shochet):</span> The Gemara suggested that our Mishnah discusses even b'Mezid. If so, why is the Shechitah valid? He is a Mumar to be Mechalel Shabbos! Perhaps this is only when he does so in public. Also, we can say that one is not a Mumar due to one Aveirah. We learn from Reish Lakish. He permits a Shechitah with intent to pour the blood to idolatry, even though the Shochet is Chayav Misah. Also, we tried to prove that a Yisrael can forbid another's property from a Mishnah about two who slaughtered, and one intended for idolatry (41a). We answered that he is a Mumar. If so, even if he intended for Shechitah, the Shechitah is Pasul! If we say that one Aveirah does not disqualify Shechitah, this is not difficult (he served idolatry only once before).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rashba (14a DH Masnisin):</span> Tosfos says that one is not a Mumar due to one Aveirah. We learn from 81b. R. Yochanan obligates even if the second Shechitah was for idolatry, but he was not warned about idolatry. Shechitah of a Mumar is not Shechitah at all! Rather, he is not a Mumar until after the Shechitah in which he transgresses. We need not say so in the conclusion, for our Mishnah discusses Shogeg. It means that if he were Mezid, he would be Chayav Misah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Hagahos Ashri (Chulin 1:7):</span> After he transgressed (idolatry or Shabbos) two or three times, one may not eat from his Shechitah, for he is like a Nochri. The first time he was Shochet (to idolatry or on Shabbos) is not forbidden. There is no clear proof to permit what he slaughters after this.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (YD 2:5):</span> A Mumar Lehach'is (to anger Hash-m), even in one matter, is like a Kusi.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shach (16):</span> This is even for one Aveirah (Maharshal).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</span> A Mumar to serve idolatry is like a Nochri.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shach (17):</span> Poskim argue, and the primary opinion holds that for idolatry, one becomes a Mumar to the entire Torah even for one Aveirah in private. One becomes a Mumar for even one Chilul Shabbos in public. However, he is not a Mumar for that Shechitah on Shabbos or for idolatry. That Shechitah is forbidden only because it was for the sake of idolatry (but not due to the person). The Shulchan Aruch connotes like this in Siman 4 and 11, and the Maharshal connotes like this in Chulin 1:7.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (6):</span> Only the Rambam requires checking the knife for a Mumar to any other Aveirah. If he is merely Pasul for testimony due to an Aveirah, even the Rambam does not require checking.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shach (19):</span> A Mumar is Mu'ad (to transgress). Pasul for testimony is when he transgressed once.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Sifsei Da'as:</span> Mu'ad is when he transgressed three times.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (4:3):</span> If a Yisrael slaughtered a Nochri's animal for idolatry, even if the Nochri intended for idolatry, it is Kosher. If the Yisrael thought that the Nochri will throw the blood for idolatry, it is Pasul.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shach (4):</span> The Rashba learned this in Toras ha'Adam from his question that it should be due to Shechitas Mumar. This is not difficult for the Poskim who say that one Aveirah does not make a Mumar. However, the Beis Yosef (below) brings from the Rashba that one becomes a Mumar only after three times! Also, there is no difficulty for the Poskim who say that he does not become a Mumar for that Shechitah itself. The Rashba himself concluded that there is no proof, for one can say that he intended to serve it through the end of Shechitah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (119 DH Od, citing R. Yonah, and DH Kosav ha'Rashba):</span> One is Meshumad to be Mechalel Shabbos in public, if he was established to transgress three times, in front of 10. The Rashba (Teshuvah 430, 687) says that the former is a Meshumad in every way.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Har Tzvi (YD 105 DH Mechalel):</span> For slaughter to idolatry, the Rashba holds that one is a Mumar after one Aveirah. Tevu'os Shor (11) says that the Rashba is more lenient about Yayin Nesech (and requires three times). Hagahos Ashri connotes that three Aveiros make a Mumar. He is unsure about one who transgressed twice. Tosfos said only that once does not make a Mumar. Perhaps also he is unsure if three times are needed!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (11:2):</span> If one slaughters on Shabbos, even though he would be Chayav Misah if he were Mezid, the Shechitah is Kosher.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH ha'Shochet):</span> The Gemara said that he was Shogeg. It connotes that if he were Mezid, it would be forbidden. It seems that the Rambam holds like this. However, Tosfos said that we could say that he was Mezid, but it was in private. Also, we can say that he does not become a Mumar due to one Aveirah. Zevachim 10a supports this.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Taz (2):</span> This connotes that if he were Mezid, it would be forbidden, for he is a Mumar. If so, we discuss in public. Why didn't the Tur teach a bigger Chidush, and permit even b'Mezid but not in public? The Tur holds that one is not a Mumar due to one Aveirah. He discussed only Shogeg because the Gemara said that if he was Mezid, we fine (to forbid the food).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (YD 251:1):</span> A transgresser regarding a Torah Mitzvah, if he did not repent, one need not sustain him or lend to him.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Taz (1):</span> The Prishah says that one is not called a Mumar Lehach'is due to one transgression. This is unlike the Rambam, Tur, and Beis Yosef. Also Gitin 47a connotes like them; 'Zimnim (sometimes)' means once (Kesuvos 85). Tosfos was unsure whether one becomes a Mumar to the entire Torah for one Chilul Shabbos, but there is no Safek about a Mumar Lehach'is. One does not save him until he repents. This resembles a Moser, whom we kill due to one Aveirah (Bava Kama 117a, CM 388:10).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shach (3):</span> One is a Mumar Lehach'is once he seeks to anger Hash-m. He is an Apikores. We seek his death, and do not save him. There is no reason to require more Aveiros.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (CM 388:10):</span> One may kill a Moser before he is Moser, even nowadays. If Do'eg says 'I will be Moser Ploni or his money', we warn him. If he persists, it is a Mitzvah to kill him.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (15):</span> If one is established three times to be Moser, we seek strategies to exterminate him from the world.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shach (57):</span> Maharam bar Baruch and Teshuvas ha'Rosh (17:1) say that this is after three times, which all agree makes a Chazakah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Chasam Sofer (2:120, cited in Pischei Teshuvah 120:1):</span> If Levi pressed wine on Shabbos in front of 10 Yisre'elim, he is called Mechalel Shabbos in public.</p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) AN ATONEMENT WHICH IS 'PASUL'</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Gemara discusses the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer who maintains that just as a Chatas slaughtered with intent to be brought as a different Korban is Pasul, an Asham slaughtered with such intent is also Pasul. Rebbi Eliezer attempts to demonstrate how these two Korbanos are comparable, such that an Asham should have the same Halachah as a Chatas in this regard. At one point, the Gemara asks that a Chatas differs significantly from an Asham in the Halachah that if the blood of a Chatas is brought into the Heichal, then the Korban becomes Pasul, while an Asham, in contrast, does not become Pasul if its blood is brought into the Heichal.
</p><p>
This Halachah regarding a Chatas is derived from the verse, 'Any Chatas whose blood is brought into the Ohel Mo'ed to make atonement in the sanctuary (l'Chaper ba'Kodesh) may not be eaten; it must be burned in fire' (Vayikra 6:23). The Torah, however, does not specify the exact case to which this law applies. To what exactly does this verse refer?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>RASHI</b> (DH she'Im, and in his commentary to Vayikra 6:23) explains that the verse is discussing a Chatas 'Chitzonah' (an 'outer' Chatas) which is not supposed to be taken into the Heichal.
</p><p>
The <b>RAMBAN</b> in Vayikra (ibid.) explains that according to Rashi, when the verse says that the Korban is 'l'Chaper ba'Kodesh' -- 'to make atonement in the sanctuary,' it cannot mean that the purpose of the Chatas is to <i>attain atonement</i> for the owner by being brought into the Kodesh (the Heichal) -- because, to the contrary, entering the Heichal makes the Korban Pasul! The verse must be teaching that if a Kohen brought some of the blood of the Chatas into the Heichal <i>with the intent</i> to perform a Zerikah of a Chatas Penimis (an 'inner' Chatas), then the Korban is Pasul and the animal must be burned. Consequently, the Ramban suggests that perhaps the Korban is Pasul only when its blood was brought into the Heichal <i>for the purpose of atonement</i>. If the blood was not brought in for that purpose, then the Korban remains fit. (According to the opinion of Rebbi Shimon (82a), who says that the Chatas is Pasul only if an actual <i>Zerikah</i> was performed in the Heichal, the Zerikah must have been done with the intent of performing a Zerikah for a Chatas Penimis, which was supposed to be done in the Heichal.)
</p><p>
The <b>MINCHAS CHINUCH</b> (#139) proves the Ramban's point that in order to be considered Pasul, the intent of the Zerikah must be that of a Chatas Penimis and not that of a Chatas Chitzonah. Later in the Gemara (83a), Rebbi Eliezer learns a Gezeirah Shavah ('l'Chaper') from this verse (6:23) to a verse later (16:17) that discusses the Se'irim ha'Nisrafim offered on Yom Kippur. The Gezeirah Shavah teaches that the verse here of 'l'Chaper' is related in some way to a Chatas Penimis. It must be that the word 'l'Chaper,' which is written regarding the case of a Chatas Chitzonah that is invalidated, also refers to a Kohen who has <i>intention</i> to do the Zerikah of a Chatas Penimis.
</p><p>
(b) It is questionable whether Rashi agrees with the Ramban that the thought only invalidates the Korban when the thought is to perform a Zerikah of a Chatas Penimis, and not that of a Chatas Chitzonah. In explaining Rebbi Yehudah's opinion later (36a), Rashi (DH Hichnis) says that as long as the blood was sprinkled <i>on the inner Mizbe'ach</i> the Korban is Pasul. (Rebbi Yehudah's opinion is similar to the opinion of Rebbi Shimon, who says that one must actually do the Zerikah to make it Pasul, and not just bring the blood inside with intent to do the Zerikah.) The law is that a full Zerikah for a Chatas Penimis includes being sprinkled on the Paroches seven times and on the Mizbe'ach four times, without any allowance for error. If Rashi agrees with the Ramban, then why does he mention only that the blood was placed on the inner Mizbe'ach without mentioning the amount of times, and without mentioning the sprinkling on the Paroches? Apparently, Rashi maintains that the Korban becomes invalidated even if it was not brought into the Heichal for the purpose of performing the Avodah of a Chatas Penimis.
</p><p>
The Minchas Chinuch, however, rejects this proof, suggesting that it is possible that Rashi did not want to get involved with this aspect of the Zerikah and thus did not detail the steps of Zerikah necessary to make the Korban Pasul, but he indeed may agree with the Ramban.
</p><p>
The <b>SHA'AR MORDECHAI</b> suggests that the <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 2:16), who says merely that the blood was 'brought inside in order to atone in the inner area,' indeed rules that the Korban becomes Pasul with intent to perform a regular Zerikah of a Chatas Chitzonah.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>ME'IRI</b> in Pesachim (83a) writes that the verse is discussing a Chatas Penimis. It is teaching that one is forbidden to eat a Chatas Penimis once the Zerikah is done, since the Korban is supposed to be burned (as a normal Chatas is burned). Accordingly, the verse is saying that once the blood is brought for Zerikah <i>in order to atone</i>, the prohibition against eating the Korban takes effect. (See also the <b>MOSHAV ZEKENIM</b> and the Ramban (end of his commentary to Vayikra 6:23), who say that this is the straightforward explanation of the verse, and the explanation of Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili.)
</p><p>
The Me'iri adds that even though in some places the Gemara teaches that a Chatas Chitzonah becomes Pasul if its blood is brought into the Heichal, it is possible that both laws are learned from the verse. Alternatively, he suggests that the source for the Halachah that bringing the blood of a Chatas Chitzonah into the Heichal makes it Pasul is a different verse which says, 'Behold, the blood was not brought to the Kodesh inside' (Vayikra 10:18). When Moshe Rabeinu rebuked the Kohanim for not eating the Chatas, he said, 'Since the blood was not yet brought inside, why are you not eating the Korban?' This teaches that if the blood <i>was</i> brought into the Heichal, then it would be forbidden to eat the meat of the Korban. (Y. Montrose)</p><p></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
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<font><b>1) THE 'HEKESH' COMPARING 'ASHAM' TO 'CHATAS'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Rabanan and Rebbi Eliezer disagree in the Mishnah (2a) about whether a Korban Asham is valid when it is slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah. The Gemara says that Rebbi Eliezer derives that an Asham is Pasul when it is slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah from a Hekesh to Chatas. The verse says, 'ka'Chatas ka'Asham' (Vayikra 7:7), comparing an Asham to a Chatas. Since a Chatas slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah is Pasul (Zevachim 5b), so, too, is an Asham slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah.
</p><p>
The Gemara explains that the Rabanan do not agree that the Hekesh is teaching this Halachah. Their reasoning is that the Hekesh is used to teach a different law -- that an Asham requires Semichah, just as a Chatas requires Semichah.
</p><p>
An oft-cited rule in the Gemara is that 'Ein Hekesh l'Mechetzah.' This means that when a Hekesh exists between two categories of Halachah, the Hekesh is used in full to teach that all of the Halachos of one apply to the other, unless the Torah specifies otherwise. Why, then, according to the Rabanan, does the fact that the Hekesh teaches that an Asham requires Semichah preclude deriving from the Hekesh the law that an Asham slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah is Pasul?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The Gemara in Menachos (4a) asks a similar question. The Gemara there attempts to derive that a Minchas Sotah offered she'Lo Lishmah is Pasul from a Gezeirah Shavah of 'Avon, Avon.' The Gemara asks that if there exists such a Gezeirah Shavah, then the same Gezeirah Shavah should teach that an Asham offered she'Lo Lishmah is Pasul. The Gemara answers that the Gezeirah Shavah cannot be used to teach that an Asham -- or a Minchas Sotah -- offered she'Lo Lishmah is Pasul. Instead, the Gezeirah Shavah teaches that money set aside for an Asham or a Minchas Sotah that was not used to purchase the Asham or Minchas Sotah is used to purchase an Olas Nedavah. The Torah states that money left over from a Chatas is used to purchase an Olas Nedavah, and the Gezeirah Shavah teaches that the same law applies to an Asham. Since <i>this</i> law is derived from the Gezeirah Shavah, the Gezeirah Shavah cannot also be teaching that an Asham offered she'Lo Lishmah is Pasul. The Gemara asks that <i>both</i> laws should be derived from the Gezeirah Shavah, because 'Ein Gezeirah Shavah l'Mechetzah.'
</p><p>
The Gemara there answers that the verse, 'v'Shachat Osah l'Chatas' (Vayikra 4:33), teaches that a Chatas slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah is Pasul. The word 'Osah' in that verse is a Mi'ut which teaches that only the Chatas, and no other Korban, is Pasul when slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah. This verse overrides the Gezeirah Shavah.
</p><p>
The <b>TOSFOS CHADASHIM</b> (on the first Mishnah in Zevachim) explains that the Gemara here is relying on the same form of logic. When the Gemara says that the Hekesh teaches that Semichah is performed on a Korban Asham, it means that the Hekesh will be left unused if it does not teach that an Asham brought she'Lo Lishmah is Pasul. Since the Hekesh is teaching the law of Semichah for an Asham, it is not necessarily teaching the law of she'Lo Lishmah. Consequently, the verse of 'v'Shachat Osah l'Chatas' teaches that only a Chatas is Pasul when offered she'Lo Lishmah, while no other Korban is Pasul when offered she'Lo Lishmah, and the Hekesh is not applied to invalidate an Asham that is offered she'Lo Lishmah. (Had there been no other Halachah to learn from the Hekesh, we would have no choice but to learn from the Hekesh that an Asham is an exception to the verse of 'v'Shachat Osah l'Chatas.' However, now that the law of Semichah can be learned from the Hekesh, there is no need to make an exception from the rule of 'Osah' which validates other Korbanos, besides Chatas, that are slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah.)
</p><p>
What, then, is the logic of Rebbi Eliezer, who <i>does</i> apply the Hekesh to teach that an Asham offered she'Lo Lishmah is Pasul? The answer is that in the Gemara earlier (10b), Rebbi Eliezer says that there is already one exception to the rule of 'v'Shachat Osah l'Chatas' (which teaches that all Korbanos she'Lo Lishmah are valid); that exception is the Korban Pesach. Since there already is one exception, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that the Korban Asham is an exception to the rule as well. Therefore, the Hekesh overrides the Mi'ut of 'Osah' and teaches that the Asham is another exception to that verse.
</p><p>
<b>REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b> (on the Mishnah) points out that Tosfos seems to disagree with this analysis of the Machlokes between Rebbi Eliezer and the Rabanan. <b>TOSFOS</b> (10b, DH Harei) writes that Rebbi Eliezer does not derive that an Asham she'Lo Lishmah is Pasul from the Gezeirah Shavah of 'Avon, Avon' that is recorded in Menachos (4a), because of the Mi'ut of 'Osah l'Chatas,' as the Gemara in Menachos concludes. If Rebbi Eliezer agrees that the Mi'ut of 'Osah' overrides the Gezeirah Shavah, then why should 'Osah l'Chatas' not override the Hekesh of 'ka'Chatas ka'Asham' as well? The Hekesh should apply to teach the law of Semichah and <i>not</i> to teach the law that an Asham she'Lo Lishmah is Pasul, as mentioned above according to the Rabanan.
</p><p>
Perhaps the answer to this question is that Tosfos understands that an Asham does <i>not</i> require Semichah according to Rebbi Eliezer, since an Asham Metzora does not require Semichah (see 33a). Since the Hekesh does not compare Chatas to Asham for Semichah, the verse must be comparing them with regard to she'Lo Lishmah. Support for this may be found in Tosfos in Kidushin (55b, DH v'Dilma Asham Hu), who implies that an Asham does not require Semichah. The <b>PNEI YEHOSHUA</b> and <b>SEFER HA'MIKNAH</b> point out that this seems to contradict the Gemara here. Perhaps Tosfos there means that there is one opinion among the Tana'im that maintains that an Asham does not require Semichah.
</p><p>
Alternatively, Tosfos may mean that a Hekesh is a stronger form of comparison than a Gezeirah Shavah (see Zevachim 48a, Gitin 41b), and, therefore, the Hekesh can override the Mi'ut of 'Osah l'Chatas,' even though the Gezeirah Shavah cannot.
</p><p>
(b) <b>RASHI</b> (10b, DH Harei Hu Omer) takes another approach to explain why the rule of 'Ein Hekesh l'Mechetzah' does not apply here, according to the Rabanan. Rashi writes that the Rabanan maintain that there is a different Hekesh that overrides the Hekesh of 'ka'Chatas ka'Asham.' Apparently, Rashi refers to the verse of 'ka'Chatas ka'Asham' in the preceding Perek (Vayikra 6:10), which is stated with regard to a Minchah offering and which compares a Minchah to both a Chatas and an Asham to teach that some types of Minchah offerings are valid when offered she'Lo Lishmah, while others are Pasul when offered she'Lo Lishmah. However, this can be derived from the verse only if an Asham she'Lo Lishmah is valid. Therefore, the Hekesh which compares a Minchah to an Asham -- which demonstrates that an Asham she'Lo Lishmah is valid -- overrides the other Hekesh of 'ka'Chatas ka'Asham' (in Vayikra 7:7) which implies that an Asham she'Lo Lishmah is Pasul. This is why the rule of 'Ein Hekesh l'Mechetzah' does not apply.
</p><p>
Rebbi Eliezer, who disagrees with the Rabanan, learns like Rebbi Shimon (cited by the Gemara here), who does not derive from the Hekesh written with regard to the Minchah offering that some Minchah offerings are valid she'Lo Lishmah. Since no Hekesh contradicts the Hekesh which teaches that an Asham she'Lo Lishmah is Pasul, the rule of 'Ein Hekesh l'Mechetzah' applies to invalidate the Asham that was slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah.
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafbbb'><span class='numt'>1)</span> THE FAST OF FIRSTBORNS ON EREV PESACH <span class='indexentry'>[Ta'anis Bechoros]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Elazar):</span> Ben Beseira says that a Pesach slaughtered in the morning of Erev Pesach is Kosher, because the entire day is its proper time.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Pesachim 5a (Rava):</span> We learn that Chametz is Asur on Erev Pesach from 'Lo Sishchat Al Chametz Dam Zivchi' - do not slaughter Pesach while you still have Chametz.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span>	Surely, we do not say that each individual must get rid of his Chametz before he slaughters. Rather, there is a fixed time for everyone.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span>	Rav Sheshes used to fast every Erev Pesach.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Suggestion:</span> He holds that the Mishnah forbids eating shortly before Minchah Gedolah, lest he neglect to offer Pesach, and he holds like Ben Beseira, who is Machshir a Pesach slaughtered in the morning.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rejection:</span> No. Rav Sheshes fasted because his nature was such that if he would eat (even earlier) during the day, he would not have appetite at night.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Maseches Sofrim (21:3):</span> We do not fast in Nisan, just Bechoros on Erev Pesach, and Tzenu'im, to enable them to eat Matzah with appetite.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Milchamos Hash-m and Ran (Pesachim 15b and 16a):</span> The correct text in the Yerushalmi says that R. Levi forbids eating Matzah on Erev Pesach. R. Yehudah (ben Beseira) forbids Chametz and Matzah,for he holds that the entire day is Kosher for Shechitas Pesach. R. Simon says that Rebbi did not eat Matzah on Erev Pesach due to R. Levi, and not Chametz due to R. Yehudah. We challenged this, for only R. Yehudah's Talmidim are concerned for his opinion. Rebbi was not his Talmid. Surely he holds like Chachamim! Rather, Rebbi was a Bechor. R. Yonah says, my father was a Bechor, and he did not eat on Erev Pesach. R. Tanchuma disagrees. He says that Rebbi was an Istandis (had a delicate nature). If he would eat during the day, he would not eat at night. He refrained on Erev Pesach, in order to eat Matzah at night with appetite.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Pesachim 10:19):</span> The Yerushalmi suggested that Rebbi was a Bechor, but concluded that he was an Istandis. This supports the custom for Bechoros to fast on Erev Pesach, like it says in Maseches Sofrim.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tosfos (Pesachim 108a DH Neima):</span> Even though there is no Pesach nowadays (in the days of Rav Sheshes), the Isur that applied at the time of the Mikdash still applies. Even though R. Yehudah is Machshir only b'Di'eved, but l'Chatchilah one must slaughter after midday, due to 'Lo Sishchat Al Chametz', and we do not find anyone who forbids Chametz before midday, he holds that we must be stringent not to eat Chametz from the morning.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Terumas ha'Deshen (126):</span> The Roke'ach says that when Erev Pesach is on Shabbos, Bechoros fast on Thursday. A Chacham wanted to prove that they do not fast at all. Amora'im in the Yerushalmi argued about why Rebbi fasted. If Bechoros must fast (before Shabbos) even when Erev Pesach is on Shabbos, they should have known based on whether he fasted beforehand! Fasting before Shabbos would not help to eat Matzah with appetite on Motza'ei Shabbos. It would be only for Ta'anis Bechoros. This is not a proof. Perhaps the Amora'im did not know what he did when Erev Pesach was on Shabbos! We find that Benei Beseira did not know whether Korban Pesach overrides Shabbos when Erev Pesach is on Shabbos. We must say that for many years, Erev Pesach was not on Shabbos, and they forgot, even though it was a public matter. All the more so we can say that a private matter (Rebbi's fasts) was forgotten, for also in his days, for many years Erev Pesach was not on Shabbos!</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 470:1):</span> Bechoros from the father or mother fast on Erev Pesach.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH Garsinan):</span> The Mordechai permits a Bechor to eat Targima (Mezonos, meat and fish, or Peros). This is not the custom.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Magen Avraham:</span> A baby born after a Nefel (stillborn baby) must fast, for he is a Bechor for inheritance. Olas Tamid (1) permits Bechoros to eat at a Seudas Bris Milah. One who is stringent will be blessed. In our lands, the custom is to be stringent.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</span> Some say that even a female Bechor fasts.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rema:</span> This is not the custom.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH v'Chasav):</span> Avi ha'Ezri and Hagahos Maimoniyos say that also a paternal Bechor fasts. Maharik says that a female Bechorah fasts. The Agudah brings a proof from Bas Paro.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Gra (1):</span> A paternal Bechor is Kodesh for inheritance. A maternal Bechor has Kedushah regarding Pidyon ha'Ben. The Medrash says that if a Mitzris had children from 10 single men, or if a Mitzri had children from 10 women, all of them died. R. Avin says that Bas Paro was a Bechorah,and she was saved through Moshe's Tefilah. The custom is that women do not fast, for the Torah did not give Kedushah to female Bechoros.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (1):</span> The fast commemorates the miracle of being saved from Makos Bechoros.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (2):</span> Even though the oldest of the house died in Makos Bechoros, Chachamim did not obligate him to fast. One born after a Vadai Nefel must fast, but not one born after a Safek Nefel (it had a full term pregnancy, but died within 30 days). A Bechor Kohen or Levi must fast, even if he is only a maternal Bechor, even though he is not a Bechor for inheritance or redemption, still he is called a Bechor. Maharil says that one (who did not fast) must compensate afterwards, for it is a Ta'anis Tzibur. If one's head or eyes hurt, he need not fast. If the fast is difficult for someone, and afterwards he can eat only light things and a small amount, and it is likely that he will not properly fulfill eating Matzah and Maror and the four cups, it is better that he not fast, so he can fulfill the Mitzvos of the night properly. It is best that he eat only Targima. Bechoros who fast say Aneinu in Minchah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (4):</span> If the oldest of the house wants to fast, this is a (proper) custom.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (3):</span> It is a mere Safek if one born through Caesarean section must fast, so he may be lenient.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (5):</span> If we do not know which of two twins was born first, this is a Safek mid'Rabanan so we are lenient.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>viii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (8):</span> They must complete the fast until night. Others say that one should not be stringent about matter without a source in the Bavli, especially if it could hinder the Torah Mitzvah to eat Matzah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (2):</span> If Erev Pesach is on Shabbos, some say that Bechoros fast on Thursday, and some say that they do not fast at all.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH v'Chasuv):</span> The Terumas ha'Deshen and Roke'ach say that they fast, and ahe Agur citing Mahari Molin, but he says that his father did not fast, since it was pushed off and it is only a custom.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Gra:</span> We say in Megilah (4b) that since it (Kri'as ha'Megilah) was pushed off (from Shabbos), it is ii. pushed off (back to Thursday). Parents fast for the Bechor, because the Bechoros died due to the sins of their parents - 'Hinei Anochi Horeg Es Bechorecha.'</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (1):</span> If the fast is difficult, they may eat before checking for Chametz at night, or they can make a Shali'ach to check.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rema:</span> One should follow the first opinion. The custom is that if the father is a Bechor, the mother fasts for her firstborn son while he is a minor. If the father is not a Bechor, he fasts for his Bechor until his Bechor matures.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (9):</span> Some say that the mother need not fast, for the father's fast counts for himself and also for his son. One may be lenient if it is painful, and all the more so if she is pregnant or nursing and the fast pains her. She may be lenient even if she has no husband to fast for her son. One who gave birth in the last 30 days should not fast in any case. However, if she fasted once this is like a vow, and she must permit it.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (10):</span> One need not fast for a Bechor less than 30 days old. Bechoros may eat at a Seudas Mitzvah where this is the custom. Where they are stringent, one who wants to eat at a Seudas Pidyon ha'Ben or Bris Milah needs a Heter (an important custom is like a vow). The Mohel, Sandek and baby's father need no Heter, for it is Yom Tov for them, but they must compensate after Pesach. In many places Bechoros are lenient to eat even at a Seudas Siyum, even if they did not learn it, since it is a Seudas Mitzvah for the one who learned.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (10):</span> A Bechor who understands what is said at a Siyum may eat there.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (23):</span> One who fasts for his son may be lenient when Erev Pesach is on Shabbos.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Yabi'a Omer (OC 1:25:1):</span> In our text of the Yerushalmi, R. Yonah says that his father was a Bechor, and he *ate* on Erev Pesach. Based on this, Bechoros need not fast on Erev Pesach. However, in the text of the Ramban and Ran, R. Yonah holds that they must fast. The Bavli says that Rav Sheshes did not eat due to his nature. It did not say so about Rebbi. This connotes that it holds that Rebbi did not eat because he was a Bechor.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl3'>	Note:</span> Perhaps the Bavli was unaware that Rebbi did not eat on Erev Pesach! The Gemara retracted about why Rav Sheshes did not eat. It never suggested that he fasted because he was a Bechor!</p>
<p class='otherhalachos'>Other Halachos relevant to this Daf:</p>
<p class='otherhalachostext'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) SLAUGHTERING THE KORBAN PESACH IN THE MORNING OF EREV PESACH</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Mishnah at the beginning of Zevachim (2a) teaches that a Korban Pesach slaughtered on any day during the year other than Erev Pesach, with specific intent that it be a different Korban, is valid. If it is slaughtered on Erev Pesach with such intent, however, then it is Pasul. (The proper time to slaughter the Korban Pesach is Erev Pesach after Chatzos. The verse says that the Korban Pesach must be slaughtered 'Bein ha'Arbayim' (Shemos 12:6; see also Vayikra 23:6).)
</p><p>
The Mishnah here records a dispute among the Tana'im regarding a Korban Pesach that was slaughtered on the <i>morning</i> of Erev Pesach, with intent to be a different Korban. Is the morning of Erev Pesach considered the time for slaughtering the Korban Pesach? Rebbi Yehoshua says that slaughtering the Korban Pesach in the morning of Erev Pesach is considered like slaughtering it on the day before, the thirteenth of Nisan, which is <i>not</i> a valid time to slaughter the Korban. Therefore, a Korban Pesach slaughtered 'she'Lo Lishmah' at that time remains a valid Korban. Ben Beseira disagrees and says that the Korban is Pasul, as though it was slaughter later, during the afternoon of Erev Pesach.
</p><p>
In the Gemara, Rebbi Elazar in the name of Rebbi Oshiya adds that Ben Beseira also maintains that a Korban Pesach that was slaughtered in the morning of Erev Pesach with the <i>proper</i> intent for a Korban Pesach is a valid Korban Pesach. This follows his logic that the morning of Erev Pesach is considered the appropriate time of the Korban Pesach. (<b>TOSFOS</b> in Pesachim (108a, DH Neima) says that Ben Beseira's ruling applies only b'Di'eved. Ben Beseira agrees that l'Chatchilah the morning is not the proper time for slaughtering the Korban Pesach. See, however, the <b>MITZPEH EISAN</b> (12a) and <b>KEREN ORAH</b> here.)
</p><p>
Does the Halachah follow the view of Rebbi Yehoshua or the view of Ben Beseira?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>ME'IRI</b> in Pesachim (108a) writes that the Halachah follows the view of Rebbi Yehoshua, who says that a Korban Pesach slaughtered with the intent of a different Korban in the morning of Erev Pesach is a valid Korban (and may be offered as a Shelamim). Similarly, if it is slaughtered with intent to be a Korban Pesach, it is Pasul, like any Korban Pesach that is slaughtered in the wrong time. This is also the opinion of the <b>RA'AVAD</b> (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 15:11).
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 15:11) disagrees. He writes that if the Korban Pesach was slaughtered on Erev Pesach in its proper time, '*even in the morning*,' with intent to be a different Korban, it is Pasul. This implies that the Rambam rules like Ben Beseira and maintains that the morning of Erev Pesach is a valid time for the Shechitah of the Korban Pesach.
</p><p>
In the following Halachah, however, the Rambam writes that a Korban Pesach slaughtered in the morning of Erev Pesach with intent to be a Korban Pesach is <i>Pasul</i>. This implies that the Rambam maintains that the morning of Erev Pesach is <i>not</i> a valid time for the Shechitah of the Korban Pesach. The Rambam clearly contradicts himself. How are these two rulings of the Rambam to be reconciled?
</p><p>
The <b>KESEF MISHNEH</b> explains that the Rambam rules like Rebbi Yochanan's understanding of Ben Beseira (12a), because Rebbi Elazar's explanation was refuted. The Rambam chose not to rule in accordance with the view of Rebbi Yehoshua (whose opinion normally carries more weight), because the Gemara itself deals extensively with Ben Beseira's opinion, implying that his opinion is more relevant in practice.
</p><p>
The text of the <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> (12a, #5) explains Rebbi Yochanan's reasoning. That text reads that Rebbi Yochanan explains that a Korban slaughtered in the morning of Erev Pesach with intent that it should be a Korban Pesach is Pasul, because the Torah says that the Korban must be brought 'Bein ha'Arbayim' and the morning is not 'Bein ha'Arbayim.' However, the Korban is also Pasul if it is slaughtered with intent to be a different Korban, because <i>some</i> of that day is fit to bring the Korban Pesach. Although the morning itself is not fit, it is as if the morning is already included in the correct time to bring the Korban Pesach (with regard to slaughtering it with intent to be a different Korban). This is why Ben Beseira maintains that in either case, the Korban is Pasul. This also seems to be the understanding and text of the <b>KESEF MISHNEH</b>. (Y. Montrose)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) THE NECESSITY TO TEACH BOTH 'DACHUY ME'IKARA' AND 'DICHUY B'DAMIM'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: Rebbi Yochanan states that if one of the partners of a jointly-owned animal designates his half of the animal as a Korban and then he purchases the other half from his partner and designates that half as a Korban as well, the animal has the Kedushah of a Korban but is unfit to be offered as a Korban. Rebbi Yochanan reasons that when the partner sanctified the first half of the animal he did not have the ability to sanctify the second half, and thus the animal was considered 'pushed away' ('Dachuy') from being brought as a Korban.
</p><p>
The Gemara infers three things from the statement of Rebbi Yochanan. It infers that even <i>live</i> animals can be permanently disqualified from being brought as Korbanos. It also infers that a Korban that initially was unfit to be offered but then became fit to be offered remains disqualified even though the invalidating element has been rectified ('Dachuy me'Ikara Havah Dachuy'). Finally, it infers from Rebbi Yochanan's statement that there is a concept of 'Dichuy b'Damim.' <b>RASHI</b> (12b, DH Yesh Dichuy) explains that this means that even when an animal is sanctified with only Kedushas Damim (its value, but not its actual body, is sanctified), such as when one partner sanctified his half of the animal for its value, it still can affect the animal and make it ineligible from becoming sanctified later with a more significant Kedushah, Kedushas ha'Guf. (See other explanations for 'Dichuy b'Damim' cited by Rashi in his following comments, and in <b>TOSFOS</b> DH u'Shema Minah in the name of <b>RABEINU CHAIM</b>, and in <b>RABEINU CHANANEL</b> (see Insights to 12b).)
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b>, the <b>RAMBAN</b> (in Kidushin 7a), and others ask variations of a simple question on this explanation. Why does the Gemara infer that Rebbi Yochanan holds of both concepts, 'Dachuy me'Ikara' and 'Dichuy b'Damim'? Once he says that an animal that was 'Dachuy me'Ikara' remains disqualified, it is obvious that there is 'Dichuy b'Damim,' since the Kedushah of an animal that was unfit to be offered as a Korban can be only Kedushas Damim! Why does the Gemara need to list 'Dachuy me'Ikara' and 'Dichuy b'Damim' as two separate concepts learned from Rebbi Yochanan's statement?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (according to the text of the <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b>) answers that there are cases in which the initial Kedushah of the animal or other item is a Kedushas ha'Guf, and, therefore, it is necessary to infer the two concepts ('Dachuy me'Ikara' and 'Dichuy b'Damim') independently. An example of such a case is when a Kohen received the blood (Kabalas ha'Dam) of a Korban in a vessel which contained water. The blood -- which is Kadosh with Kedushas ha'Guf -- that falls into the water loses its status of blood, because the first drop of blood which enters the water is considered 'Dachuy' -- pushed away -- from being blood and it becomes water. Even though enough blood later falls into the vessel to make the mixture look like blood, the concept of 'Dachuy me'Ikara' applies and thus the mixture remains disqualified for Zerikah. In that case, 'Dachuy b'Damim' would not apply, because the blood is Kadosh with Kedushas ha'Guf and not with Kedushas Damim. (Tosfos notes that there still would be an obligation to perform the Mitzvah of 'Kisuy ha'Dam,' covering the blood of birds and undomesticated animals, for blood that fell into water and eventually gave the water the appearance of blood, because there is no concept of Dichuy for Mitzvos.)
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RITVA</b> in Kidushin (7b) answers that even though 'Dichuy b'Damim' includes cases of 'Dachuy me'Ikara,' the concept of 'Dachuy me'Ikara' can apply to something that involves no degree of Kedushah and where 'Dichuy b'Damim' (which applies to cases of Kedushas Damim) would not apply. An example of such a case is mentioned in the Gemara in Kidushin (47b). If a person appoints a Shali'ach to bring his fruits of Bikurim to Yerushalayim and the Shali'ach dies on the way, the owner does not read the Parshas Bikurim, even if he personally brings the fruits to Yerushalayim. The Ritva explains that this is because a Shali'ach who brings fruits of Bikurim does not read the Parshas Bikurim. Hence, once the Shali'ach took the fruits, the fruits become 'Dachuy' -- pushed away -- from ever having the Parshas Bikurim read for them. Another example is a case in which a Nochri plants a tree in order to worship it as an Asheirah. Even if he later nullifies that tree from being an Avodah Zarah, a Jew may not use a branch from that tree for the Mitzvah of Lulav. (See Avodah Zarah 47a. Even though the Gemara there is in doubt about this Halachah, its doubt is based only on the fact that 'Dichuy' might not affect Mitzvos. The Gemara takes it for granted, though, that 'Dichuy' does apply even to a non-Kadosh object.)
</p><p>
(c) The <b>RASHBA</b>, <b>SHITAH KADMONIS</b> in the name of the <b>RA'AVAD</b> (in Kidushin 7b), and others explain that there are cases of 'Dichuy b'Damim' in which 'Dachuy me'Ikara' does not apply. For example, if a person was obligated to bring a Korban Chatas, and he designated money for that purpose, and then he became an idol-worshipper, his Chatas is no longer accepted (see 12b, and Chulin 5a). Even if he repents, the money that he designated may no longer be used to purchase the Korban, since it was 'pushed away' from being accepted.
</p><p>
This explanation seems problematic. How can these Rishonim say that money designated to be used for a Korban is not considered 'Dachuy me'Ikara' if the money could have been used, originally, to purchase a Korban? The money itself cannot be offered upon the Mizbe'ach, and thus it should be considered 'Dachuy me'Ikara,' as it was never fit to be offered!
</p><p>
Apparently, these Rishonim maintain that as long as there is no invalidating factor (Pesul) causing the money to be unfit for the purchase of a Korban, the money is considered 'fit' for a Korban and not Dachuy. Money, or an animal, is considered Dachuy only when it has an invalidating factor that makes it unfit to be offered. The fact that money itself cannot be offered on the Mizbe'ach but must be used to purchase an animal is not considered an invalidating factor.
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> ONE WHO MUST PRAY MINCHAH AND MUSAF <span class='indexentry'>[Tefilah :precedence]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Yochanan):</span> If Minchah and Musaf were in front of him (the time for Minchah arrived, and he did not yet pray either), he prays Minchah first.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Berachos 27a (Mishnah):</span> The time for Musaf is the entire day;</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span>	R. Yehudah says, it is until seven hours of the day.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Beraisa):</span> If on Minchah and Musaf were in front of him, he prays Minchah first, for it is more frequent;</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span>	R. Yehudah says, he prays Musaf first, for its time will expire soon, but Minchah's time will not.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Tefilah 3:11):</span> If one needed to pray Minchah and Musaf, he prays Minchah first, and afterwards Musaf. Some say that we do not pray Minchah first b'Tzibur, lest they err.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	R. Mano'ach:</span> The concern is lest they not pray Musaf afterwards. Alternatively, next year they will pray Minchah before Musaf, even if it is before the time for Minchah. The Gemara discusses an individual ('if Minchah and Musaf were in front of *him*'... *he* prays...')</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	R. Yonah (Berachos 19a DH Rebbi and d v'Yesh):</span> On Yom Kipur, we pray Musaf after six and a half hours. We should pray Minchah first! Tosfos says that our Gemara discusses Minchah Ketanah, which is after nine a half hours of the day. In the time of Minchah Gedolah, since there is still much time in the day, he prays Musaf and afterwards Minchah. They support this from the Yerushalmi. This is wrong. We must say that our Gemara discusses Minchah Gedolah, for R. Yehudah says that one prays Musaf first, and he holds that Musaf is only until seven hours! How could he say that after nine and a half hours, he prays Musaf first? Its time passed! Rather, they discuss Minchah Gedolah. R. Yehudah says that Musaf is first, for its time will pass. My Rebbi explains the custom regarding Yom Kipur. Our Gemara discusses only one who wants to pray both Tefilos now. Therefore, he prays Minchah first. If he wants to pray only Musaf now, and to pray Minchah an hour or two later, he may pray Musaf first, even if the time for Minchah Gedolah came. On Yom Kipur, we do not intend to pray Minchah and Musaf next to each other. Since we intend to pray Minchah afterwards, we may pray Musaf first. However, once the time for Minchah Ketanah came, he prays Minchah first, like the Yerushalmi.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Berachos 4:8):</span> The text says that one prays Minchah first, like it says in Zevachim. Therefore, if Shacharis extends past seven hours on Yom Kipur, Minchah must come before Musaf. The Yerushalmi says that Minchah comes first only even if there is not time for both of them. Minchah is first only if the primary time for Minchah, i.e. Minchah Ketanah came. We are not concerned (lest he miss Minchah) if it is only time for Minchah Gedolah, i.e. seven hours of the day. However, the Bavli disagrees. Even regarding seven hours, it rules like Chachamim. Some say that 'there were two Tefilos in front of him' means that he needs to pray both now, e.g. he wants to start a big meal. He must pray Minchah before eating, so he prays Minchah first, for it is Tadir (more frequent) and this is its primary time. If he need not pray Minchah now, he may pray Musaf first, and delay Minchah until close to twilight.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rashba (28a DH Tanu):</span> Presumably, if he prayed Musaf first, he was Yotzei, even if he was obligated to pray Minchah first. He need not pray Musaf again, for its time is the entire day. Just l'Chatchilah, one must pray Minchah first.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 286:4):</span> If one needed to pray Minchah and Musaf, e.g. he delayed praying Musaf until after six (Rema - and a half) hours, which is the time for Minchah, he must pray Minchah first, and afterwards Musaf.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (1):</span> Even though the Shulchan Aruch (233:1) says that l'Chatchilah one must pray Minchah Ketanah, since now he must pray Musaf, he must pray Minchah first, for it is the time. This is like one who wants to eat (once Minchah Gedolah came; he must pray first, so he may pray Minchah Gedolah). Nowadays we rely on people who call out when it is time to pray in the Beis ha'Keneses, so he need not pray Minchah now.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Bi'ur Halachah:</span> If one delayed until almost seven hours, the Pri Megadim was unsure if all would agree that it is better to pray Musaf first, lest he transgress praying Musaf in the proper time.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (3):</span> It seems that if it is close to evening and there is not enough time to pray both, he prays Musaf, for there is compensation for Minchah at Ma'ariv.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rebuttal (Beis Meir and Dagul me'Revavah):</span> This is logical. However, the Rosh brought the v. Yerushalmi, which says oppositely!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Defense (R. Akiva Eiger):</span> Perhaps the Yerushalmi discusses when compensation is impossible, e.g. his relative died, and after Shabbos he will be an Onen (who does not pray), for compensation is only during the next time for one of the three daily Tefilos. Alternatively, it discusses one who intentionally delayed praying until there is no time for both. There is no compensation, for he is considered Mezid. The Magen Avraham did not discuss such a case.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rema:</span> If he prayed Musaf first, he was Yotzei.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Gra:</span> What is Tadir comes first, i.e. l'Chatchilah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</span> Some say that this is only if he needs to pray both now, e.g. he wants to eat, and one may not eat before Minchah. However, if he need not pray Minchah now, he may pray Musaf first.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (12):</span> The Rema (232:2) concluded that only a big meal is forbidden before Minchah Gedolah, and a Shabbos Seudah is not called a big meal. (Only Seudas Bris Milah or Nisu'in is called big.) Therefore, we are not concerned lest he not pray, especially nowadays that people call out when it is time to pray in the Beis ha'Keneses, so he need not pray Minchah first.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (34):</span> Even according to the opinion that permits a big meal before Minchah Gedolah, here we discuss one who does not want to be lenient (to eat before Minchah). Alternatively, since he needs to pray Minchah *and* Musaf, all forbid a big meal beforehand, for there is more reason to be concerned lest the meal get drawn out.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (35):</span> The first opinion (Tosfos) does not rely on this, for he requires praying Minchah first even on Yom Kipur.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl3'>	Tur:</span> My father (the Rosh) used to pray Musaf alone on Yom Kipur, in order to pray in time.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (620 DH v'Tov):</span> Hagahos Maimoniyos (Sof Shevisas Asor) says that the Shali'ach Tzibur must ensure that Shacharis not extend until six and a half hours, for then some rule that one must pray Minchah before Musaf. For this reason, Maharam used to rush Shacharis greatly, and sometimes skip Avinu Malkeinu when needed.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bach (3):</span> Surely, every Rav must warn people to finish Shacharis and not delay with Nigunim, so Musaf will begin before six and a half hours, to avoid the Machlokes. If six and a half hours already came, we rely on this opinion and pray Musaf first, since on Yom Kipur one need not pray Minchah (right away). Also, we rely on the Rambam, who says that we do not pray Minchah first b'Tzibur, lest they err. This is even if the time for Minchah Ketanah came.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rema:</span> However, if the time for Minchah Ketanah came, he prays Minchah first.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</span> Some say that we do not pray Minchah first b'Tzibur, lest they err.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (14):</span> The concern is lest they pray Minchah before Musaf even before midday.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (36):</span> This opinion, of the Kesef Mishneh, holds that an individual must always pray Minchah first. The Ari Zal says that Musaf says that based on Kabalah, Musaf must be before Minchah, even for an individual, unless he wants to eat before Musaf. (I.e. since it is already the time for Minchah, to eat before Musaf he must pray Minchah first - PF.)</p>
<p class='normal'></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) 'DICHUY B'DAMIM' AND 'DACHUY ME'IKARA' -- WHICH CONCEPT IS MORE NOVEL?</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: Rebbi Yochanan states that if one of the partners of a jointly-owned animal designates his half of the animal as a Korban and then he purchases the other half from his partner and designates that half as a Korban as well, the animal has the Kedushah of a Korban but is unfit to be offered as a Korban. Rebbi Yochanan reasons that when the partner sanctified the first half of the animal he did not have the ability to sanctify the second half, and thus the animal was considered 'pushed away' ('Dachuy') from being brought as a Korban.
</p><p>
The Gemara infers three things from the statement of Rebbi Yochanan. It infers that even <i>live</i> animals can be permanently disqualified from being brought as Korbanos. It also infers that a Korban that initially was unfit to be offered but then became fit to be offered remains disqualified even though the invalidating element has been rectified ('Dachuy me'Ikara Havah Dachuy'). Finally, it infers from Rebbi Yochanan's statement that there is a concept of 'Dichuy b'Damim.'
</p><p>
Which of these two principles, 'Dachuy me'Ikara' or 'Dichuy b'Damim,' is a more novel concept?
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI'S</b> opinion is apparent from his explanation of 'Dichuy b'Damim' (12b, DH Yesh Dichuy). He explains that 'Dichuy b'Damim' means that even when an animal is Kadosh with only Kedushas Damim, 'even when there is no Kedushas ha'Guf' (its value, but not its actual body, is sanctified), the Dichuy still can affect the rest of the animal and disqualify it from being offered later as a Korban. He concludes that the Gemara is teaching that Kedushas Damim <i>is</i> strong enough to 'push away' the Kedushas ha'Guf. It is apparent from Rashi's words that it is much more fitting to apply Dichuy in a case of Kedushas ha'Guf, and 'Dichuy b'Damim' is the more novel concept.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 15:4) apparently disagrees. When he rules contrary to the view of Rebbi Yochanan, he states that in this case 'the [Korban which is] Dachuy me'Ikara is not Dachuy. Even though the animal had Kedushas Damim, because it is a living animal we say that living animals cannot be pushed away (Dachuy).' From the wording of the Rambam -- who rejects the concept of 'Dachuy me'Ikara' but entertains the possibility of 'Dichuy b'Damim' -- it is evident that the Rambam maintains that 'Dichuy b'Damim' is a stronger reason to apply Dichuy (and that Dichuy of Kedushas ha'Guf is a greater Chidush). The <b>KESEF MISHNEH</b> quotes the <b>ME'IRI</b> (who agrees with Rashi) who is unclear about the Rambam's intention. 'Dachuy me'Ikara,' as stated by Rashi, is obviously more of a reason to apply 'Dichuy' than something which can never have any Kedushas ha'Guf at all. What does the Rambam mean?
</p><p>
The <b>KEHILOS YAKOV</b> (#11) explains that the Rambam agrees with the opinion of <b>RABEINU CHANANEL</b> cited by <b>TOSFOS</b> (12a, DH u'Shema Minah). Rabeinu Chananel learns that 'Dichuy b'Damim' means that even the Kedushah of the <i>monetary value</i> of the animal is pushed away. The text of Rabeinu Chananel in Pesachim (98a) clearly shows that such monetary value which is pushed away (in that case, it is the value of a potential Korban Pesach) can no longer be channeled into the Korban of original intent, but rather it can be used only as a Nedavah.
</p><p>
According to Rabeinu Chananel's definition of 'Dichuy b'Damim', there is a much greater Chidush in the concept of 'Dichuy b'Damim' than in the concept of 'Dachuy me'Ikara': 'Dichuy b'Damim' teaches that the monetary value can no longer be used to purchase the same Korban. This is also the opinion of the Rambam.
</p><p>
The Kehilos Yakov is bothered by this explanation. Although Rabeinu Chananel's explanation is consistent with other Gemaras (such as the one in Pesachim 98a), it is difficult to understand his explanation in the context of the Gemara here. Where does the Gemara see in Rebbi Yochanan's statement that the monetary value of the animal is no longer valid to be used for offering a Korban? He notes that this question was addressed by the <b>RITVA</b> in Kidushin (7b). The Ritva explains that the words of Rebbi Yochanan, who says that the Korban is 'Kedushah v'Einah Kereivah' (it is sanctified as a Korban, but cannot be offered), imply that the intended Korban can never be offered in any way from this animal, not even from its monetary value. (Y. Montrose)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) THE DEFINITION OF 'KLEI SHARES'</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Beraisa records a dispute between the Tana Kama and Rebbi Akiva regarding the source in the Torah which teaches that the Avodah of Kabalas ha'Dam must be performed by an eligible Kohen and with 'Klei Shares.' To what does 'Klei Shares' refer?
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI</b> (DH uv'Klei Shares) explains that 'Klei Shares' in this context refers to the Bigdei Kehunah, the priestly garments, that the Kohanim must wear when they perform the Avodah of Kabalas ha'Dam. Rashi comments that whenever the phrase 'Kohen Kasher uv'Klei Shares' appears, the words 'Klei Shares' refer to the Bigdei Kehunah. In this sense, the words are translated as 'the garments (Kelim) which are worn when performing the service (Shares).' This is also the understanding of the <b>RITVA</b> and <b>ME'IRI</b> in Yoma (24b), where the Gemara teaches that lighting the fire of the Mizbe'ach with twigs must be done 'b'Kohen Kasher uv'Klei Shares.' This is also the opinion of the <b>RASH</b> in Toras Kohanim (4:4).
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (DH b'Kohen Kasher) questions Rashi's explanation. The Gemara later (17b) discusses the source for the law that Kohanim must wear the Bigdei Kehunah while they perform the Avodah, and if they perform the Avodah without wearing the Bigdei Kehunah (Mechusar Begadim), the Avodah is Pasul. The verses (Shemos 29:5-9) describe the Bigdei Kehunah and conclude (29:9), '... and the office of Kehunah shall be theirs for an everlasting statute.' The Gemara understands from this verse that the status of Kehunah and the Bigdei Kehunah are interconnected; without the Bigdei Kehunah, the Kohanim are considered lacking their Kehunah, and they have the status of a Zar (a non-Kohen). This is the source for the law that a Kohen must wear the Bigdei Kehunah when he performs the Avodah, and without the Bigdei Kehunah the Avodah is Pasul. Moreover, the Gemara there teaches that the Bigdei Kehunah are necessary even for an Avodah which does not provide atonement. It is obvious from there that Kabalas ha'Dam, which involves the attainment of atonement, is not valid without the Bigdei Kehunah. Why, then, do the Tana Kama and Rebbi Akiva, according to Rashi's explanation that 'Klei Shares' refers to the Bigdei Kehunah, need different sources to teach that the Avodah of Kabalas ha'Dam requires Bigdei Kehunah?
</p><p>
Tosfos answers that another source is needed to teach that the lack of Bigdei Kehunah invalidates the Kabalah. One would not have known it from the source taught later (17b), because he might have thought that only where the verse mentions 'Begadim' with regard to the Kohen's Avodah is the Avodah invalid without the Bigdei Kehunah. With regard to Kabalas ha'Dam, or with regard to lighting the fire on the Mizbe'ach (as mentioned in Yoma 24b; see Rashi there, DH uv'Klei Shares)), the Torah does not mention the 'Begadim' of the Kohen. The law that the Bigdei Kehunah are necessary for all other Avodos is known only from the Gezeirah Shavah according to Rebbi Akiva, or from the extra word 'Kohen' according to the Tana Kama. (See also <b>CHAZON ISH</b>, Kodshim 1:14.)
</p><p>
The <b>TZON KODASHIM</b> rejects the question of Tosfos in the first place. He explains that the Gemara later says that a Kohen must wear the Bigdei Kehunah only for an Avodah that can be done by a Kohen. Without the Bigdei Kehunah, the Gemara says, the Kohen is considered a Zar and the Avodah is considered as though it was performed by a Zar and is Pasul. Since the Avodah of Kabalas ha'Dam is <i>valid</i> when performed by a Zar, one would not have known that it cannot be done by a Kohen who is not wearing the Bigdei Kehunah! Therefore, a different source (that of the Tana Kama, or of Rebbi Akiva) is needed to teach that a Kohen must wear the Bigdei Kehunah when he performs the Kabalah.
</p><p>
The <b>CHOK NASAN</b> and <b>KEREN ORAH</b> are perplexed by this assertion of the Tzon Kodashim. While it is true that if a Zar performs the Kabalah, he is not punished with death, the Kabalah itself is Pasul unless it is performed by a Kohen! This is stated clearly by the <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Bi'as ha'Mikdash 9:5).
</p><p>
(b) <b>RABEINU HILLEL</b>, in his commentary to Toras Kohanim (4:4), says that 'Klei Shares' refers to the sanctified vessels of the Beis ha'Mikdash, which is the normal meaning of the words 'Klei Shares.' The Beraisa is teaching that when performing the Avodah of Kabalah, the blood must be received in a sanctified vessel. Similarly, the <b>TOSFOS RID</b> and <b>RABEINU ELYAKIM</b> in Yoma explain that the vessel with which one lights the fire on the Mizbe'ach must be a Kli Shares. The <b>CHOK NASAN</b> infers from the words of the <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 5:1) that he also understands 'Klei Shares' in this way, since he writes that 'all of the Korbanos must have their blood accepted in a Kli Shares <i>in the hand</i> of the Kohen.' (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> DOES UNNECESSARY HOLACHAH DISQUALIFY? <span class='indexentry'>[Avodah :Holachah: unnecessary]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Mishnah):</span> Shechitah, Kabalah, Holachah or Zerikah can disqualify a Korban (i.e. if it was done with improper intent);</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span>	R. Shimon says, Holachah cannot disqualify, for it is not always necessary (e.g. if the Shechitah was next to the Mizbeach);</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span>	R. Elazar says, Holachah where it is necessary can disqualify a Korban. Holachah where it is unnecessary cannot.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	14b - Question:</span> Is Holachah without walking considered Holachah?</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer (Mishnah):</span> If a Kosher Kohen did Kabalah and gave it to a Pasul (Kohen, or a Zar) he returns it to the Kosher Kohen.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rejection:</span> No, the Kosher Kohen takes it back.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	15a (Mishnah):</span> If a Kosher Kohen did Kabalah and gave it to a Pasul, he returns it to the Kosher Kohen. This shows that the Holachah can be fixed!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rejection:</span> Perhaps the Pasul was outside (further from the Mizbeach, so giving it to him was not Holachah at all)!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Benei R. Chiya or R. Yanai):</span> If a Zar did Holachah and a Kohen took it back and repeated the Holachah, it is Kosher;</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'>	(The other of Benei R. Chiya and R. Yanai):</span> It is Pasul.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span>	They argue about whether Holachah of a Zar can be fixed.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>12.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Rav Simi bar Ashi):</span> If a Kohen did Holachah and a Zar took it back and repeated the Holachah, the first opinion above disqualifies (the last Holachah is primary), and the latter opinion is Machshir (the first Holachah is primary).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>13.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Rava):</span> No, all agree that this is Pasul. Once the blood was taken back, now it is necessary to do Holachah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>14.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Yirmeyah):</span> R. Eliezer and Chachamim argued about necessary Holachah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Mishnah - R. Eliezer):</span> Holachah where it is necessary disqualifies a Korban. Holachah where it is unnecessary does not.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>15.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Rava):</span> All agree that Holachah *inside* (towards the Mizbeach) is considered necessary, and Holachah outside is considered unnecessary. They argue about when it was brought inside, and then outside. Chachamim call bringing it close again necessary Holachah, and R. Eliezer calls it unnecessary.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>16.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question (Abaye - Beraisa - R. Eliezer):</span> Holachah where it is necessary disqualifies a Korban. Holachah towards the Mizbeach is considered necessary. Holachah away from the Mizbeach is considered unnecessary.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span>	If it was brought towards the Mizbeach and taken away, this (bringing it close again) is considered necessary.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>17.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rava:</span> The Beraisa refutes me.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashim 13:9):</span> Holachah without the feet is not Holachah. Therefore, (improper) intent during it does not disqualify. Holachah where this is not needed is Holachah, so it disqualifies. If one stood in one place and extended his hand to do Zerikah and while extending his hand he had improper intent, it does not disqualify. However, if he did Kabalah inside, and went outside, and had improper intent, e.g. Chutz li'Mkomo, while going outside, it is Pasul.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rebuttal (Ra'avad):</span> The entire Sugya is like R. Elazar, who says that Holachah where this is not needed is not Holachah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Kesef Mishneh:</span> The Rambam holds that even though Abaye and Rava argue about the argument of R. Elazar and Chachamim, this is because through this we understand Chachamim. He explains, unlike Rashi, that Rava retracted to say that Holachah disqualifies in every case, even when it is not needed.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Mishneh l'Melech:</span> I say that there is a mistake in our texts of the Gemara. Really, Rava says that they argue about when it was distanced from the Mizbeach, and then brought close. Abaye says that all say that this is Holachah. Rather, they argue about intent when it was being distanced. R. Elazar says that it is not Holachah, and Chachamim say that it is. The Rambam rules like Chachamim, according to Abaye. The Ra'avad says that the Halachah follows R. Elazar, for Abaye and Rava argue about his opinion. This is astounding. On 15a, Rava said that even the opinion that disqualifies (when a Zar did Holachah and a Kohen took it back and repeated the Holachah) disqualifies when a Kohen did Holachah and a Zar took it back and repeated the Holachah, for now (after it was distanced) it must be brought close again. I.e., Rava holds like Chachamim! Rava's Perush of R. Elazar was rejected, but not his ruling that the Halachah follows Chachamim! Perhaps the Ra'avad holds that Rava's teaching on 15a was after he heard Abaye's Beraisa and retracted. I say that the Ra'avad does not rule like R. Elazar because Abaye and Rava argue about his opinion. Rather, he holds that if going outside (distancing from the Mizbe'ach) is called Holachah and intent disqualifies in it, also a Zar disqualifies if he goes outside, just like he disqualifies Holachah. Similarly, the one who holds that Holachah without the feet cannot be fixed, if he went outside without the feet, the Korban is Pasul. Since it is Holachah regarding intent, it is Holachah in every way. The Gemara challenged the opinion that Holachah without the feet cannot be fixed from the Mishnah of a Kohen who gave to a Zar and took it back. We answered that the Zar was further from the Mizbe'ach. This implies that distancing without the feet is not Holachah. If so, also regarding intent distancing is not Holachah. If so, the Sugya is like R. Elazar. The Gemara connotes that intent, a Zar, and Holachah without the feet have the same law. They depend on each other. At the beginning of the Sugya Rava and Rav Yosef said that R. Shimon and Chachamim argue about a Zar, and then it brings that R. Shimon and Chachamim argue about Holachah without the feet. The Rambam did not reveal whether he disqualifies when a Zar distanced with his feet. This requires investigation. Rashi holds that Abaye holds that R. Elazar and Chachamim do not argue. R. Elazar addresses R. Shimon's words, and argues with him.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl3'>	R. Chayim ha'Levi Al ha'Rambam:</span> The Gemara concluded that Holachah without the feet can be fixed. The Rambam rules Stam that if a Kosher Kohen did Kabalah and gave it to a Pasul, he returns it to the Kosher (1:27), i.e. even if the Pasul was closer to the Mizbe'ach. The Gemara refuted the opinion that it cannot be fixed, but it did not refute regarding a Zar (the opinion that Holachah of a Zar cannot be fixed). I.e. it is possible that even though Holachah without the feet can be fixed, Holachah of a Zar cannot be fixed. This is reasonable, for the latter is Avodah, but the former is not Avodah at all. We hold that a Zar is Mechalel Avodah, i.e. it cannot be fixed. The Yerushalmi explicitly says so. The Rambam holds that Holachah away from the Mizbe'ach is called Holachah. The Gemara answered 'perhaps the Pasul was further from the Mizbeach.' There it is not Holachah, for it was without the feet. The one who says that such Holachah cannot be fixed holds that since the blood came to the Mizbe'ach, the Avodah of Holachah is Batel. If it distanced from the Mizbe'ach, there is no Bitul Avodah. The Rambam discusses Holachah with the feet. Even if it distances from the Mizbe'ach, this is Avodah to enable improper intent to disqualify the Korban.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl3'>	Ohr Some'ach:</span> R. Elazar holds that distancing from the Mizbe'ach is not Holachah. Chachamim say that it is, and improper intent disqualifies. All the more so Holachah (outside) of a Zar disqualifies, for R. Shimon holds that intent does not disqualify necessary Holachah, but a Zar does. Amora'im argue about a Kohen who did Holachah, returned, and a Zar did the Holachah again, i.e. towards the Mizbe'ach. If the Zar distanced from the Mizbe'ach, all agree that it is Kosher. This is why the Ra'avad says that the Sugya is like R. Elazar. Chachamim say that Holachas Zar outside disqualifies only by foot. Even though it is unnecessary, it is Holachah. R. Yochanan says that Holachah without the feet cannot be fixed when it was inside, for Holachah was needed and now the blood reached near the Mizbe'ach without Holachah. Holachas Zar outside not by foot can surely be fixed. This is not Holachah b'Zar (unlike the Mishneh l'Melech). Above (14b) we said that if a Kosher Kohen did Kabalah and gave it to a Pasul, he returns it to the Kosher Kohen. To reject this, we said that the Kosher Kohen takes it back where the Pasul stands. (The Pasul did not move it at all.) We then challenged the opinion that it cannot be fixed, and answered that the Zar is outside. This Sugya is like Chachamim (it can be fixed because Holachah without the feet is not called Holachah. If it were Holachah, it would disqualify!) Therefore, the Rambam rules like Chachamim.</p>
<p class='normal'></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) THE AVODAH OF 'TEVILAS ETZBA' OF A KORBAN CHATAS</b></font>
<br>QUESTIONS: Rav Mari suggests a proof from the Mishnah in Menachos (12a) that the laws of Pigul apply during the stage of the Avodah of Tevilas Etzba, dipping one's finger into the blood of a Chatas in order to perform the Zerikah. The Mishnah there states that Pigul applies at any time the Kohen performs the Avodos of the Minchah offering -- Kometz, Nosen b'Kli, Molich, and Maktir. The Gemara shows how each of these stages of offering a Minchah corresponded to a parallel stage of the offering of a regular Korban. The Kometz of a Minchah parallels the Shechitah of a Korban. Molich, bringing the Minchah to the Mizbe'ach, parallels Holachah. Maktir, burning the Minchah, parallels the Zerikah of the Dam of a Korban. What, though, is the counterpart for Nosen b'Kli, placing the Minchah offering into a vessel?
</p><p>
The Gemara initially says that the corresponding Avodah cannot be the Kabalah, because receiving the blood of a Korban in a vessel is a passive act, while placing the Minchah into a vessel is done actively. The Gemara suggests that the act of Nosen b'Kli must correspond to the act of dipping one's finger into the blood, Tevilas Etzba, prior to the Zerikah (this act is termed Holachah, since it brings the blood closer to the Mizbe'ach; see <b>RASHI</b> DH Ela), whereby the blood is brought towards the Mizbe'ach in an active manner. Since the Kohen must put the blood onto the Mizbe'ach, this is an important, indispensable Avodah which should be subject to the laws of Pigul. The Gemara concludes that the Mishnah in Menachos might mean that Nosen b'Kli corresponds to Kabalah, and the fact that Kabalah is done passively is not relevant.
</p><p>
The Gemara here (and later, 14a) clearly maintains that according to both Rebbi Shimon and the Rabanan, the stage of dipping one's finger into the blood of a Chatas Chitzonah in order to do Zerikah is <i>not</i> a time during which Pigul can occur. Reish Lakish (14a) states that Rebbi Shimon agrees that wrongful thoughts at this stage of a Chatas Penimis <i>does</i> make it Pasul (although not Pigul, because it is not brought on the Mizbe'ach ha'Chitzon), since it is impossible to bring the Korban without this stage of the Avodah.
</p><p>
The Gemara (13b) entertains the possibility that Rebbi Shimon -- who maintains that the Avodah of Holachah is subject to Pigul -- also maintains that during this stage of the Avodah, a Chatas cannot become Pigul. How, though, can the Gemara entertain this possibility when Reish Lakish (14a) clearly states that Rebbi Shimon agrees that Pigul can occur during an important, indispensable Avodah?
</p><p>
Moreover, the <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> asks that these conclusions seem contradictory. If the Gemara states that the stage of Tevilas Etzba is an important Avodah (which is the definition of an Avodah which is subject to Pigul), and Rebbi Shimon himself agrees that any necessary Avodah is subject to Pigul if the Korban is one that is brought on the Mizbe'ach ha'Chitzon), then how can the Gemara conclude that this stage of a Chatas Chitzonah is <i>not</i> subject to Pigul?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> (#10) quotes <b>RABEINU MEIR</b> who answers based on the verses in the Torah which discuss the Chatas Chitzonah. The verses which discuss the Chata'os Penimiyos (such as the Par Kohen Mashi'ach and the Par He'elem Davar, in Vayikra 4:6 and 4:17, respectively) include the word 'v'Taval' ('and he will dip') when they describe how the Kohen is to dip his finger into the blood and then sprinkle it. In contrast, the verses which discuss the Chatas Chitzonah (Vayikra 4:30) omit the word 'v'Taval' and use only the word 'v'Lakach' ('and the Kohen <i>will take</i> from its blood with his finger...'). This change of wording, with the omission of 'v'Taval,' teaches that the dipping of the finger is not considered an imperative Avodah of an ordinary Chatas (even though the Korban cannot be offered without it), and it is not included in the law that an indispensable Avodah is subject to Pigul. This explanation is similar to <b>RASHI's</b> understanding of the Rabanan (14a, DH b'Chata'os ha'Chitzonos), and it explains the view of Rebbi Shimon as well.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>PANIM ME'IROS</b> explains that the answer of the Gemara -- that Rebbi Shimon maintains that the Chatas does not become Pigul -- refers back to the earlier premise of the Gemara. The Gemara derived the stages of the Korban at which Pigul can affect the Korban from the stages stated with regard to a Korban Shelamim. If, according to Rebbi Shimon, the Avodah of Holachah is not subject to the effects of Pigul, then there is no source that teaches that any act that constitutes Holachah is subject to Pigul, even if it is an important Avodah. This part of the Gemara argues with Reish Lakish.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>CHOK NASAN</b>, <b>TZON KODASHIM</b>, and others give a simple answer to the first question. When the Gemara (13b) assumes that Rebbi Shimon maintains that the Chatas cannot become Pigul, its assumption was correct. This is because the Gemara was referring only to a Chatas Penimis (as indicated by the question of 'Mai Irya') which Rebbi Shimon admits becomes Pasul through a Machshavah of Pigul (or Lo Lishmah). The Beraisa which is now being attributed to Rebbi Shimon says only that the Korban <i>cannot become Pigul,</i> and not that it cannot become <i>Pasul</i>. (Y. Montrose)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) PERFORMING 'LEKICHAH' WITH ONE'S HAND</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Gemara earlier (13b) cites two apparently contradictory Beraisos. The first Beraisa states that Pigul can take effect during Tevilas Etzba (dipping the finger into the blood before Zerikah) of a Korban Chatas. The second Beraisa states that Pigul cannot take effect during Tevilas Etzba. The Gemara (14a) concludes that the Tana of both Beraisos is the Rabanan, and the first Beraisa is discussing a Chatas Penimis, while the second Beraisa is discussing a Chatas Chitzonah.
</p><p>
The Gemara asks why the Rabanan need to teach that Tevilas Etzba of a Chatas Chitzonah is not subject to Pigul. It obviously is not subject to Pigul, because the Torah does not write the word 'v'Taval' with regard to Chatas Chitzonah, showing that Tevilas Etzba is not an essential part of the Avodah. The Gemara answers that one might have thought that Tevilas Etzba of a Chatas Chitzonah <i>is</i> subject to Pigul, because the verse says, 'v'Lakach' (Vayikra 4:30), teaching that the Kohen must take the blood himself, as opposed to having a monkey take the blood from the vessel and place it on the Kohen's hand. Since the Torah says that the Kohen must take the blood himself, one might have thought that Pigul will take effect during the procedure (see Insights to 13b). Therefore, the Rabanan teach that a Chatas Chitzonah is not subject to Pigul during this stage of the Avodah.
</p><p>
The Gemara seems to derive from the word 'v'Lakach' that one must take the object himself and not be given the object by someone else. Does this also apply to other Mitzvos for which the Torah uses the word 'v'Lakach'? For example, the Torah says with regard to the Mitzvah of the Arba'as ha'Minim, 'u'Lekachtem' (Vayikra 23:40). Does this mean that one must pick up the Lulav and Esrog himself in order to fulfill the Mitzvah, and if someone else places it in his hands he does not fulfill the Mitzvah?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>MEROMEI SADEH</b> writes that some authorities learn from this Gemara that a person should pick up the Lulav from the surface on which it is resting and not have it handed to him by someone else, in order to fulfill the Mitzvah of 'u'Lekachtem.' The <b>CHAZON ISH</b> (OC 149:3) quotes this view in the name of the <b>BINYAN SHLOMO</b> (#48, and Hashmatos), who quotes it in the name of the 'Gedolei Acharonim.'
</p><p>
(b) The Meromei Sadeh himself asserts that this is a mistaken conclusion. He proves that <b>TOSFOS</b> in Pesachim (7b, DH la'Tzes) clearly does not learn this way. Tosfos says that one may hold an object of Mitzvah and have in mind not to fulfill the Mitzvah until after some time has passed, such as until he is ready to make the blessing. If the main part of the Mitzvah is picking up the Lulav with one's hand, then how can one have in mind to delay the fulfillment of the Mitzvah when one picks it up? When one later has in mind to fulfill the Mitzvah, he is already holding the Lulav and is no longer actively picking it up.
</p><p>
The Meromei Sadeh explains that there is a significant logical difference between the case of the Gemara here (the Kohen's act of taking the blood in his hand) and the case of Lulav. In the case of the Gemara here, when the monkey places the blood on the Kohen's fingers, the Kohen exerts none of his own effort to get the blood on his fingers, and thus he does not fulfill the requirement of 'v'Lakach.' In contrast, the very act of holding a Lulav requires that the person use his strength in order to continue holding it and not let it slip out of his hand. This act of holding the Lulav (and not merely the act of picking it up in the first place) is what the Torah calls 'u'Lekachtem.'
</p><p>
The Chazon Ish comes to the same conclusion. He discusses the case of a person who takes hold of a Lulav before the time of the Mitzvah arrives (that is, before Alos ha'Shachar) and holds it in his hand until the time of the Mitzvah arrives. Does he need to put it down and pick it up again, since his initial act of picking up the Lulav was done before the Mitzvah could be fulfilled? The Chazon Ish writes that this is not necessary, and the case of the Gemara here does not conflict with this ruling. There is a Mitzvah for the Kohen to take the blood specifically from the vessel. Accordingly, even if he actively takes the blood from the monkey who took it from the vessel, he does not fulfill the requirement to take it directly from the vessel. In contrast, in the case of Lulav, holding onto the Lulav is called 'u'Lekachtem.' (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>


<font><b>2) OFFERING THE KORBAN PESACH ON A 'BAMAH'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara discusses how Rebbi Shimon learns that a thought of 'Chutz l'Mekomo' invalidates a Chatas Penimis. The Gemara explains that he cannot learn it from the fact that a thought of she'Lo Lishmah invalidates a Korban, because the Pesul of a Machshavah of she'Lo Lishmah applies to a Korban brought upon a Bamah, while a Machshavah of Chutz l'Mekomo does not apply (since there is no limited Makom for the Korban when it is offered on a Bamah). The Gemara answers that the Pesul of Chutz l'Mekomo indeed may be learned from Lo Lishmah because, in truth, the Pesul of Lo Lishmah also does not exist on a Bamah. The only Korbanos that become Pasul with a thought of she'Lo Lishmah is the Korban Pesach and Korban Chatas (all other Korbanos remain valid when offered she'Lo Lishmah). Those two Korbanos, however, cannot be offered on a Bamah, and therefore there is no situation in which a Machshavah of she'Lo Lishmah will invalidate a Korban offered on a Bamah. Therefore, Rebbi Shimon can learn from the Pesul of she'Lo Lishmah that Chutz l'Mekomo is also Pasul.
</p><p>
The <b>TZON KODASHIM</b> asks that this Gemara does not seem to take into account the fact that it is dealing specifically with the view of Rebbi Shimon. The Gemara later (114b) quotes Rebbi Shimon as saying that a Korban Pesach <i>may</i> be offered on a Bamah -- on a Bamas Tzibur (public Bamah), but not on a Bamas Yachid (private Bamah). Why, then, does the Gemara here, in its explanation of the view of Rebbi Shimon, say that a Korban Pesach is not offered on a Bamah?
</p><p>
ANSWER: The <b>KEREN ORAH</b> and <b>SEFAS EMES</b> answer that a Korban Pesach offered on a Bamas Tzibur is also subject to the Pesul of Chutz <i>l'Mekomo</i>, since the Korban would be limited to the area of the Bamas Tzibur. Hence, the Gemara does not ask that there is a Chumra which applies to she'Lo Lishmah that does not apply to Chutz l'Mekomo. The Gemara questions the Limud only from a Bamas Yachid, where Chutz l'Mekomo certainly does not apply. (This seems to be the intention of <b>RASHI</b> in DH she'Lo Lishmo.) (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafbbb'><span class='numt'>1)</span> B'RAV AM HADRAS MELECH <span class='indexentry'>[b'Rav Am Hadras Melech]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Mishnah):</span> The Yisrael would slaughter (his Pesach), a Kohen did Kabalah, and Kohanim passed the blood one to another until the Mizbeach...</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span>	We involve many Kohanim due to 'b'Rav Am Hadras Melech.'</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Berachos 8a (Rav Chisda):</span> 'Ohev Hash-m Sha'arei Tziyon mi'Kol Mishkenos Yakov' - Hash-m loves places where learning leads to definitive Halachah, more than all the Batei Kenesiyos and Batei Medrash.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span>	Even though there were 13 Batei Kenesiyos in Tzipori. R. Ami and R. Asi would pray only where they learned.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Megilah 3a (R. Yosi bar Chanina):</span> 'Mishpachah u' Mishpachah' teaches that Kohanim and Leviyim abandon Avodah to go to hear the Megilah:</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span>	In Rebbi's house they abandoned learning Torah to hear the Megilah. Since we abandon Avodah to hear the Megilah. all the more so we abandon Torah to hear the Megilah!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	5a (Rav):</span> When the Megilah is read in the proper time, an individual may read it. It may be read early only in a Minyan.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Tefilah 8:3):</span> A Beis Medrash is greater than a Beis ha'Keneses. Great Chachamim, even though they had many Batei Kenesiyos in their city, would pray only where they learned Torah, provided that there was Tefilah b'Tzibur there.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	R. Yonah (Berachos 4a DH Ela):</span> Tosfos says that it is better to pray in a Beis Medrash even without 10, than in a Beis ha'Keneses with the Tzibur. The Rambam says that the Beis Medrash is better only if there are 10 there. If so, what is the Chidush that the Beis Medrash is better? One might have thought that the Beis ha'Keneses is better because there are more people there, and b'Rav Am Hadras Melech. Even the Rambam requires 10 only for one who normally leaves his house to learn elsewhere. Since he is Batel from Torah to go to learn, he should pray with 10 or go to the Beis ha'Keneses.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Kesef Mishneh:</span> I say that the Chidush is that it is better to pray in a Beis Medrash with 10 than in a Beis ha'Keneses with 10.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (90:113):</span> According to R. Yonah, even if there are more in the Beis ha'Keneses, the Beis Medrash is better. The Kesef Mishneh holds that they are the same. If there are the same number in each, the Beis Medrash is better. Alternatively, they discuss different laws. For one who learns in the Beis Medrash, it is better than the Beis ha'Keneses even if there are more in the Beis ha'Keneses. If he does not learn there, they are the same. If there are the same number in each, the Beis Medrash is better.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Mo'ed Katan 3:85):</span> Rabbeinu Meir ruled that Avelus (mourning) applies on Purim in private, like on Shabbos. After the Avel prays in his house, he goes to the Beis ha'Keneses for Kri'as ha'Megilah. Kri'as ha'Megilah overrides even Avodas ha'Korbanos, which overrides Shabbos. All the more so it overrides Avelus mid'Rabanan!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (YD 401 DH u'Mah she'Chosav b'Shem):</span> Why must we permit the Avel to go to the Beis ha'Keneses? They could read the Megilah in his house! We must say that there is greater Pirsum ha'Nes (publicity of the miracle) in the Beis ha'Keneses, due to b'Rav Am Hadras Melech.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Ran (Megilah 3a DH Amar):</span> Even Rav agrees that the ideal Mitzvah is to hear the Megilah with the Tzibur, for Pirsum ha'Nes. Even if there are 100 in the Beis Medrash, it is better in the Beis ha'Keneses due to b'Rav Am Hadras Melech. However, Rav holds that one need not gather 10 to read it.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 8:5):</span> If two or three put on Talesim at once, all bless. If they want, one blesses and the others answer Amen.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Sha'arei Teshuvah (7):</span> Tevu'os Shor (19:7) says in the name of the Mabit that all may bless because they are not ready at the same time. Each would need to hold the Talis and wait. Likewise, regarding Tefilin they would need to wait with their arms exposed. The Mechaber holds like he wrote at the end of Siman 6 (regarding Birkos ha'Shachar) that everyone may bless for himself, just if they want one blesses for everyone.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (8:13):</span> The Shulchan Aruch connotes that it is better that everyone bless for himself. The truth is, it is best that one bless to exempt everyone, due to b'Rav Am Hadras Melech, like we say in 298:14. However, this is not the custom. Perhaps it is because not everyone is skilled to intend to be Yotzei and to be Motzi.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 90:18):</span> A fixed Beis Medrash has more Kedushah than a Beis ha'Keneses. It is a greater Mitzvah to pray in a Beis Medrash than in a Beis ha'Keneses, as long as he prays with 10.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (32):</span> Even if there are more people in the Beis ha'Keneses, it is better to pray in his Beis Medrash to avoid Bitul Torah. We find that Rebbi used to pray only once a month! However, in Siman 298:14 (regarding blessing on fire in Havdalah) we say that we are Batel from learning for 'b'Rav Am Hadras Melech'! We must say that there, it is only for a short time, so Chachamim were not concerned.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (28):</span> Acharonim say that if there is clamor in the Beis ha'Keneses with many people and one does not hear the Tefilah or Kri'as ha'Torah, it is better to pray in one's house with 10. If on Shabbos and Yom Tov one prays early with 10, because the Tzibur prays late, and there is time to go to pray Musaf in the Beis ha'Keneses with the large Tzibur, he should do so, due to b'Rav Am. This is if he normally prays in the Beis ha'Keneses. If not, he should pray the entire Tefilah in one place.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (134:2):</span> The one who lifts up the Torah shows it to people standing on the right and left, and in front and in back, for it is a Mitzvah for all men and women to see the writing, bow and say 'v'Zos ha'Torah...'</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (2):</span> The custom is that people run to the Beis ha'Keneses to see when they take out and return the Sefer Torah, even though for the rest of Tefilah they are outside, due to b'Rav Am.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (147:11):</span> One who sees a Mitzvah may leave to see another Mitzvah, even though it is a Mitzvah to see a (i.e. the first) Mitzvah due to b'Rav Am Hadras Melech.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (229:8):</span> It is good to say Birkas ha'Chamah amidst many people, due to 'b'Rav Am Hadras Melech.'</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (60:7):</span> One should not delay to say it amidst many people for this, for Zerizin Makdimim overrides 'b'Rav Am.'</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (426:2):</span> We say Kidush Levanah only on Motza'ei Shabbos when one is wearing nice clothing.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rema:</span> If Motza'ei Shabbos will be after the 10th of the month, we do not wait, lest there be three or four cloudy days and he wil lose the Mitzvah. We do not say Kidush Levanah before Tish'ah b'Av or Yom Kipur. We may be Mekadesh on Motza'ei Yom Kipur, but not after Tish'ah b'Av or other fasts.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (6):</span> Keneses ha'Gedolah says that the custom is to be Mekadesh after a fast. Therefore, if an individual fasts, he should be Mekadesh with the Tzibur, due to b'Rav Am Hadras Melech. We are Mevatel even Talmud Torah for b'Rav Am Hadras Melech.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bi'ur Halachah (DH Ela):</span> Letter of the law, one may be Mekadesh by himself. It is only l'Chatchilah to do so amidst 10, for b'Rav Am Hadras Melech. If one knows that he will be able to be Mekadesh later with 10 people, he should wait only if it will be before the 10th of the month. The Chayei Adam says that three is also called b'Rav Am Hadras Melech, so one need not wait for 10, especially in winter when it is cloudy.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (23):</span> If the time for Kidush Levanah came, one should not delay in order to be Mekadesh amidst many people, for Zerizin Makdimim l'Mitzvos overrides 'b'Rav Am' (Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 97:9).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (689:5):</span> Where there is not a Minyan, if only one knows how to read the Megilah, he exempts everyone. If all know, everyone reads for himself.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (10):</span> We must say that Kri'as ha'Megilah is like Tefilah, in which one needs a Minyan to be Motzi others. Some say that one may bless for everyone even without a Minyan, even if they know how to bless. If so, it is better to do so because of b'Rav Am.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (15):</span> Eliyahu Rabah, Mateh Yehudah and Derech ha'Chayim say like the Shulchan Aruch, that everyone reads for himself.</p>
<p class='normal'></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>3) THE ARGUMENT CONCERNING 'HOLACHAH' PERFORMED BY A 'ZAR'</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: Rabah and Rav Yosef state that the validity of Holachah performed by a Zar is subject to the dispute between Rebbi Shimon and the Rabanan in the Mishnah (13a). Rebbi Shimon maintains that a Zar's Holachah is valid, because he maintains that any Avodah which is not absolutely necessary is not called an Avodah which must be done by a Kohen. The Rabanan, who argue with Rebbi Shimon in the Mishnah, maintain that a Zar's Holachah is Pasul.
</p><p>
Abaye questions Rabah and Rav Yosef's assertion that Rebbi Shimon and the Rabanan argue about a Zar's Holachah. Abaye asks, 'Shechitah is an indispensable Avodah, and yet it is valid when done by a Zar!' They answer that Shechitah is not considered an Avodah (and that is why it is valid when done by a Zar).
</p><p>
How exactly does Abaye attempt to refute the assertion of Rabah and Rav Yosef from the law of Shechitah done by a Zar?
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI</b> (DH v'Ha Shechitah) explains that Abaye challenges Rabah and Rav Yosef's assertion by questioning their understanding of the Rabanan's position. Rabah and Rav Yosef say that Rebbi Shimon's reason for why a Holachah done by a Zar is valid is that Holachah is an Avodah which does not need to be done, which implies that the Rabanan maintain that Holachah <i>does</i> need to be done, and therefore a Zar may not perform it. Abaye questions this from Shechitah, which is valid when done by a Zar even though it certainly is a necessary Avodah. It must be that whether or not an Avodah is necessary does <i>not</i> affect whether or not it may be done by a Zar. Rabah and Rav Yosef answer that no proof can be brought from the laws of Shechitah, because Shechitah is not called an Avodah (since, as Rashi explains, it may be performed by those people who are unfit to perform any of the other Avodos of a Korban). Holachah, however, <i>is</i> called an Avodah, and since, according to the Rabanan, it is absolutely necessary, it is Pasul when done by a Zar.
</p><p>
The <b>KEREN ORAH</b> and <b>MEROMEI SADEH</b> have difficulty with Rashi's explanation of the answer. Rashi says that Shechitah is not called an Avodah, as indicated by the fact that all people who normally are unfit to perform other Avodos may perform the Shechitah. According to Rebbi Shimon, however, the same is true for Holachah; anyone may perform it! Why, then, does Rashi say that this is the factor that determines whether or not a certain procedure is considered an Avodah?
</p><p>
The Keren Orah answers that there is an exception with regard to Holachah. The dipping of the Kohen's finger in the blood of a Korban Chatas, which is called Holachah (see 13b, and Rashi there, DH Ela), cannot be done by a Zar. This shows that Holachah <i>is</i> an Avodah, unlike Shechitah. (See also Meromei Sadeh.)
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (DH v'Ha) argues with Rashi's approach. Abaye cannot be challenging Rabah and Rav Yosef's assertion from the opinion of the Rabanan. It is obvious that the Rabanan's reasoning has nothing to do with whether or not an Avodah is necessary. That factor -- whether or not an Avodah is necessary -- makes a difference only according to Rebbi Shimon. The Rabanan maintain simply that every procedure from the time of accepting the blood (Kabalah) and onward must be done by a Kohen, as the Gemara later (32a) states.
</p><p>
(b) Tosfos explains that Abaye challenges Rabah and Rav Yosef's assertion by questioning their understanding of <i>Rebbi Shimon's</i> position. How can Rabah and Rav Yosef say that the reasoning of Rebbi Shimon for permitting a Zar to perform Holachah is that Holachah is not necessary? That reasoning is illogical, since Shechitah -- which <i>is</i> necessary -- also may be done by a Zar! Rabah and Rav Yosef answer, as Rashi explains, that no proof can be brought from Shechitah, because Shechitah is not considered an Avodah.
</p><p>
The Meromei Sadeh explains that the argument between Rashi and Tosfos is based on whether or not everyone agrees that Holachah is unnecessary. Rashi learns like the Toras Kohanim (Parshas Tzav 8:5) which says that this is the argument between Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Shimon. Rebbi Meir says that a wrongful thought during the Holachah can invalidate a Korban, because it is impossible for a Korban to be offered without Holachah. Rebbi Shimon argues and says that a Korban cannot become Pasul as a result of a wrongful thought during Holachah, since it is unnecessary for a Korban to have Holachah.
</p><p>
According to the argument as recorded in the Toras Kohanim, one may suggest that the Rabanan maintain that a Zar's Holachah is Pasul for the same reason that Rebbi Meir maintains that a Korban can become Pasul during Holachah. Tosfos understands that everyone agrees at this point in the Gemara that Holachah is unnecessary (unlike Rashi's explanation of the question). (Y. Montrose)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) A 'HOLACHAH RABASI' AND A 'HOLACHAH ZUTRASI'</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Gemara says that the status of a 'Holachah she'Lo b'Regel,' carrying the blood of the Korban towards the Mizbe'ach without walking (rather, by stretching out the hand, for example) is subject to the argument between Rebbi Shimon and the Rabanan in the Mishnah (13a). Rebbi Shimon states that a wrongful thought during the Holachah cannot invalidate a Korban, because Holachah is not a necessary procedure for the Korban (since the animal could be slaughtered next to the Mizbe'ach, making Holachah unnecessary). The Rabanan argue and state that a wrongful thought during the Holachah can invalidate a Korban. The Gemara elaborates on this and says that both Rebbi Shimon and the Rabanan agree that a wrongful thought during a 'Holachah Rabasi' (a major Holachah) is problematic. Their argument involves a 'Holachah Zutrasi' (a minor Holachah).
</p><p>
In the Gemara later, Rav Papa and Rav Huna say the opposite. Both Rebbi Shimon and the Rabanan agree that a wrongful thought during a Holachah Zutrasi is problematic, while they argue about a case of a Holachah Rabasi.
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI</b> (DH b'Holachah Rabasi) defines a Holachah Rabasi as any Holachah that is done with one's feet, while Holachah Zutrasi refers to any Holachah that is not done with one's feet. The Gemara's first explanation of the argument between Rebbi Shimon and the Rabanan is that they both agree that when the Kohen is moving during the Holachah, his thoughts can invalidate the Korban. Their argument applies only when the Kohen is not moving. The Rabanan maintain that this is still considered Holachah, and, therefore, the Kohen's thoughts during the procedure can invalidate the Korban. Rebbi Shimon maintains that this is not considered an act of Holachah, and, therefore, the Kohen's thoughts during this procedure cannot invalidate the Korban.
</p><p>
Rav Papa and Rav Huna do not agree with this explanation, because Rebbi Shimon in the Mishnah explicitly states that his reasoning is 'because it is possible not to do Holachah.' This means that even when the Kohen must walk a long distance to transport the blood, the Kohen's thoughts during that act of Holachah cannot invalidate the Korban because it was not necessary to slaughter the Korban so far from the Mizbe'ach in the first place. When the Holachah is done while the Kohen remains standing in one place, and there are no unnecessary steps, even Rebbi Shimon agrees that the Kohen's thoughts can invalidate the Korban during the Holachah (see Rashi DH Ela).
</p><p>
The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> (Hashmatos #3) questions Rashi's explanation. How is it possible that the Gemara's initial explanation assumes that Rebbi Shimon in the Mishnah refers to a case in which the Kohen is not walking at all during the Holachah? Rebbi Shimon specifically says that his reasoning is 'because it is possible not to do Holachah.' Rebbi Shimon clearly refers to a case in which the Kohen is walking! Even though, according to Rashi, this is the question of Rav Papa and Rav Huna, it is such an obvious question that it is not reasonable to suggest that the Gemara even entertained such an explanation in the first place.
</p><p>
(b) The Shitah Mekubetzes explains that a Holachah Rabasi is when the Korban is slaughtered so far away that it is impossible to do the Zerikah without coming closer to the Mizbe'ach by walking. A Holachah Zutrasi is when it is possible to do the Zerikah without coming closer, but the Kohen nevertheless walks closer to the Mizbe'ach to facilitate the Zerikah. The Gemara initially assumes that Rebbi Shimon maintains that such a Holachah is not considered a Holachah because it is not necessary. The question of Rav Papa and Rav Huna is that Rebbi Shimon's statement in the Mishnah, 'because it is possible not to do Holachah,' implies that the case is when there is a lot of Holachah which can be avoided. This is why they explain that Rebbi Shimon argues only in a case of a Holachah Rabasi.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>MISHNEH L'MELECH</b> (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 1:23) records a third explanation, which involves an entirely different discussion. Both Holachah Rabasi and Holachah Zutrasi are procedures done without walking. The Gemara says that the status of a Holachah that is done without walking ('Holachah she'Lo b'Regel') depends on the argument between Rebbi Shimon and the Rabanan. Rebbi Shimon, who says that Holachah is not an Avodah, maintains that the Kohen does not have to move his feet for the Holachah, while the Rabanan maintain that if the Kohen does not move his feet, then the Holachah -- which, they maintain, <i>is</i> an Avodah -- was not done and the Korban is Pasul. The Gemara then says that in a case of Holachah Rabasi, in which the Kohen needs to walk in order to do the Zerikah, everyone agrees that if the Kohen does the Zerikah from where he is standing, without walking towards the Mizbe'ach (that is, without any Holachah), then the Korban is Pasul. This is because such a distance requires Holachah, and the Holachah was not done. In a case in which the Kohen is standing at a point from which he is able to do the Zerikah without walking towards the Mizbe'ach (Holachah Zutrasi), the Rabanan argue that since he does not need to walk, the Holachah is valid without him walking, and thus a wrongful thought during this time can invalidate the Korban. Rebbi Shimon maintains that Holachah always must involve walking, and therefore the Kohen who does not walk has not done an act of Holachah, invalidating the Korban due to the lack of the Avodah of Holachah.
</p><p>
The Mishneh l'Melech asks, however, that this explanation is not consistent with the next part of the Gemara. How can Rav Papa and Rav Huna say that it is clear from the Mishnah that the argument between Rebbi Shimon and the Rabanan applies in a case of Holachah Rabasi? The Mishnah obviously is discussing a case in which the Kohen did walk, as Rebbi Shimon says that the Korban is valid 'because it is possible not to do Holachah,' implying that Holachah <i>was</i> done. How, then, can one say that the Mishnah is discussing a case in which the Kohen did not move during the Holachah?
</p><p>
The <b>PANIM ME'IROS</b>, who gives an explanation similar to the one recorded by the Mishneh l'Melech, explains the question of the Gemara. It is true that the Mishnah is discussing a case in which the Kohen walked. Rebbi Shimon says that a wrongful thought does not invalidate the Korban at this point, because the Holachah was unnecessary. This shows that when the Kohen is not doing any unnecessary movement (Holachah Zutrasi), Rebbi Shimon would agree that a wrongful thought invalidates the Korban, even if no movement is done. This view is shared by the Rabanan, who say that a wrongful thought during Holachah always invalidates a Korban. Rav Papa and Rav Huna agree that the case of the Mishnah is one in which the Kohen needed to walk. They ask that since Rebbi Shimon is referring only to a case in which the Kohen needed to walk, it is evident that Rebbi Shimon agrees with the Rabanan that in a case where the Kohen does <i>not</i> need to walk (i.e. Holachah Zutrasi) that a wrongful thought can invalidate the Korban! This clearly shows that the act is considered Holachah according to everyone. Consequently, there is only one possible case in which Rebbi Shimon and the Rabanan argue about whether or not walking is necessary during Holachah, and that is the case of the Mishnah, a case of Holachah Rabasi. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafbbb'><span class='numt'>1)</span>  MAY WITNESSES STAND SUPPORTED? <span class='indexentry'>[testimony: standing]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Mishnah):</span> If one did Kabalah while sitting down, it is Pasul.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	19b (Beraisa):</span> The Kohen puts each hand on the corresponding foot, and is Mekadesh (pours water on them);</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span>	R. Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah says, he puts one hand on the other, and puts them on his feet, which were one on the other, and is Mekadesh.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Chachamim:</span> One cannot stand this way!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Rav Yosef):</span> R. Yosi holds that another Kohen supports him.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Abaye):</span> R. Yosi and Chachamim argue about whether standing Min ha'Tzad (with support) is considered standing.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question (Rav Sama brei d'Rav Ashi):</span> Why can't the Kohen sit?</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer (Ravina):</span> Kidush is called 'Leshares'; Avodah must be standing.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shevuos 30b:</span> Rav Huna's widow came for judgment in front of Rav Nachman. He could not sit, for a Chacham's wife is like a Chacham.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question:</span> The judge must sit at the time of the final verdict!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer:</span> He sat half-way, like one untying his shoe, at the time.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>12.</span><span class='desl2'>	Megilah 21a - Contradiction:</span> It says 'va'Eshev (I sat) on the mountain', and it says, 'I stood on the mountain'!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>13.</span><span class='desl2'>	Resolution (R. Chanina):</span> Moshe did not sit or stood. He was bent over.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Megilah 3:1):</span> One who reads from the Torah must stand. He may not even support himself, like it says in the Yerushalmi.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tosfos (19b DH Amidah):</span> Chachamim say that Min ha'Tzad is not called standing. It seems that when one reads from the Torah, he may not stand supported, for in Megilah we say that one must stand. Also the Yerushalmi says that just like Torah was given with fear, we must conduct with it with fear.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tosfos (19b DH v'Leisev):</span> The Gemara did not suggest truly sitting, for one may not sit in the Azarah. Rather, it suggested standing supported.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rivash (266 DH v'Chen):</span> A case occurred in which a Beis Din accepted testimony while standing, leaning on a pillar. The Acharonim agreed that if they stood, b'Di'eved the testimony is valid. It is only l'Chatchilah that the witnesses and litigants must stand, and the judges must sit. Also, perhaps leaning on a pillar is considered sitting. If he would fall if it were removed, this is not standing. We hold (Zevachim 19b) like the first Tana of R. Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah that standing Min ha'Tzad, i.e. he cannot stand without support, is not called standing. This is like bowing. It is called sitting, for it is not full standing, and is called standing, for it is not full sitting. All the more so standing supported, which is not standing, is called sitting. Also, the law that judges must sit is only an Asmachta mid'Rabanan. If so, l'Chatchilah one may stand supported.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (CM 17:1):</span> L'Chatchilah, the witnesses always stand.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rema:</span> For this, standing while supporting himself on something is called standing.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Source (Darchei Moshe 2):</span> The Rivash says so.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	SMA (6):</span> The Rivash says that it is called sitting regarding judges. We are lenient about both of these since it is only an Asmachta. However, the judges and witnesses may not stand supported at the same time, for in any case one of them does improperly.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bach (2):</span> Megilah 21a asked a contradiction, and answered that Moshe bowed. This is called standing and sitting. The same applies to standing with support. This does not suffice for Kohanim who must wash their hands and feet, for the Torah requires 'La'amod u'Leshares', i.e. standing without support. Here, one must stand only mid'Rabanan. For this it is called standing, and also sitting, unlike the SMA wrote.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bach (28:22):</span> Standing with support is called standing and it is called sitting, therefore, it is Kosher for witnesses and for judges. Rav Nachman sat half-way when giving the final verdict for Rav Huna's widow. This was considered standing with respect to her, and it was considered sitting regarding the final verdict.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl3'>	Taz:</span> I rejected the Bach's proof. Here, we learn from one verse that judges must sit and litigants must stand, and witnesses are no better than litigants, for it is only an Asmachta (Rivash). Surely, Chachamim enacted in one way for witnesses and litigants. Since it says that Moshe sat and the people stood, this implies that they were different. The honor shown to a Chacham (or his wife) is not related to the final verdict (so one does not depend on what fulfills the other). Also, there Rav Nachman had no alternative (how to fulfill both at the same time). The Rema says that this is called standing. I disagree. How did he learn from the Rivash to equate it to bowing? The Rivash said that bowing is called sitting, and all the more so standing supported, which is not standing at all! Also the Beis Yosef brought the Rivash only to teach that it is called sitting. Zevachim 19b says that it is not standing. The Bach answered me that Zevachim 19b discusses Kidush, which requires standing mid'Oraisa. Here, standing supported fulfills standing mid'Rabanan. I say that we cannot distinguish between kinds of standing. We learn standing of witnesses from standing of litigants. If we could distinguish, how could the Rivash learn from standing for Kidush?</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl3'>	Ha'Magiha:</span> The Rema learned from the final words of the Rivash 'also, since the law that judges must sit is only an Asmachta mid'Rabanan. If so, l'Chatchilah one may stand supported.' I.e. even without the above reason, here it is Kosher because it is only mid'Rabanan. Even though it is closer to standing than to sitting, for it is called standing supported, (and it is never called sitting through something else, yet it is valid for what requires sitting. All the more so it is valid for what requires standing!) Even though the Radvaz (1:1142, b'Sof) says that we may not rely on one reason that a Posek writes together with other reasons, here is mid'Rabanan, so we may rely on it.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (141:2 and 426:11):</span> The Rema saw the Beis Yosef (Sof Siman 28) say in the name of the Rivash that if testimony was accepted standing, b'Di'eved it is Kosher. If they stood supported, it is l'Chatchilah, for this is not sitting. The text should say 'this *is like* sitting', i.e. for judges. In Shevuos 30b it is also like standing, but there we require only Hidur. When one must stand, one may not stand supported (Tosfos). Perhaps testimony is more lenient, but there is no necessity to say so.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>viii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tumim (2):</span> Indeed, there is no proof from the Rivash. The Magen Avraham says that sitting in the Azarah it is only due to honor of the Shechinah, and it is no disgrace to stand supported. The same applies in Beis Din. Witnesses must stand because they are in front of Hash-m! If standing supported suffices where Kevod Hash-m was openly seen, all the more so it suffices in Beis Din, where we need not show such awe of Hash-m, especially according to the SMA, who says that it a mere Asmachta that witnesses must stand. Chachamim enacted not to judge kings of Yisrael due to a case in which Yanai refused to stand. They did not decree about kings from David, since they may sit in the Mikdash, and all the more so in Beis Din! Why did the Torah need to teach that Avodah must be standing? Kohanim may not sit in the Azarah! Rather, one may stand supported; the verse requires full standing for Avodah. This is why the Ri (Tosfos Sotah 40b Sof DH veha'Amar) asked, if a Kohen Gadol may sit in the Azarah, Zevachim 19b is difficult. The verse obligates even a Kohen Gadol to stand for Avodah, so there is no source to require full standing!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ix.</span><span class='desl2'>	Urim (7):</span> One should be stringent to require witnesses to stand without support, especially if the judges stand supported.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>x.</span><span class='desl2'>	Urim Gedolim (Drush l'Parshas Vayera, cited in R. Akiva Eiger):</span> One must stand for Torah, but a Melech Yisrael may sit (for Hakhel - Sotah 41a). Witnesses and litigants are more stringent; a Melech Yisrael must stand. One may not stand supported when reading the Torah. All the more so it is Pasul for testimony! Moshe bowed while learning from Hash-m. This shows that it is unlike standing supported. The Rivash did not learn from Megilah, for standing supported is unlike bowing.He needed to learn from Zevachim.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (28:26):</span> If testimony was accepted (while the judges were) standing, it was valid. If they were leaning on a beam, it is permitted even l'Chatchilah, for standing supported is like sitting.</p>
<p class='seealso'>See also:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) DERIVING THE LAW OF A 'ZAR' WHO PERFORMS AN AVODAH FROM THE LAW OF A 'BA'AL MUM' WHO PERFORMS AN AVODAH</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara discusses the source for the law that a Zar (non-Kohen) who performs an Avodah of a Korban (such as the Kabalah) invalidates the Korban. Tana d'Vei Rebbi Yishmael derives the source from a Kal va'Chomer. If the Avodah of a Kohen who is a Ba'al Mum is Pasul even though he is permitted to eat the meat of Korbanos, then certainly the Avodah of a Zar, who is not permitted to eat the meat of Korbanos, is Pasul.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b> (Mishnayos, #13) questions why the Gemara does not ask a serious question on this teaching. A Chalal, the child of a union between a Kohen and a divorcee, is not permitted to eat the meat of Korbanos, but nevertheless the Avodah that he performs is valid b'Di'eved. This clearly shows that the Kal va'Chomer of d'Vei Rebbi Yishmael is a fallacy. Instead of learning from a Ba'al Mum that a Zar's Avodah is Pasul, one can learn from a Chalal that a Zar's Avodah is valid!
</p><p>
In fact, <b>TOSFOS</b> in Ta'anis (17b, DH Davar) uses this very argument. Tosfos asks why we do not learn that a Kohen who is an Arel cannot perform the Avodah from the law of a Ba'al Mum. If a Ba'al Mum, who is permitted to eat Korbanos, invalidates the Korban if he does the Avodah, then certainly an Arel, who is not permitted to eat Korbanos, invalidates the Korban if he does the Avodah. Tosfos answers that we cannot learn the law of an Arel from the law of a Ba'al Mum, because we find that a <i>Chalal</i> cannot eat Korbanos and yet his Avodah is not invalid. Why does the Gemara here not use the law of a Chalal to refute the Kal va'Chomer of d'Vei Rebbi Yishmael?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>SHA'AR HA'MELECH</b> (Hilchos Bi'as ha'Mikdash 6:10) quotes the <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> in Sanhedrin (22b) who gives an answer to this question in the name of the grandson of the <b>RASH MI'SHANTZ</b>. There is a characteristic of a Chalal which makes it impossible to derive the law of a Zar from the law of a Chalal. A Chalal is a descendant of Aharon. By virtue of his ancestry, he does not invalidate a Korban when he performs the Avodah. Accordingly, it is obvious why the law of a Zar cannot be derived from that of a Chalal; a Chalal's Avodah is valid because he is descended from Aharon, while a Zar is not. Therefore, the law of a Zar can be derived only from a Ba'al Mum.
</p><p>
The Sha'ar ha'Melech is not satisfied with this answer. Although it explains why the law of a Zar is not derived from the law of a Chalal, and why Tosfos in Ta'anis <i>does</i> learn the law of a Kohen who is an Arel from the law of a Chalal, it does not explain the teaching of d'Vei Rebbi Yishmael later (16a-b), where he derives the law of a Kohen who is an Onen from the law of a Ba'al Mum. Tana d'Vei Rebbi Yishmael teaches that if the Avodah of a Kohen who is a Ba'al Mum is Pasul, even though he is permitted to eat the meat of Korbanos, then certainly the Avodah of an Onen, who is not permitted to eat the meat of Korbanos, is Pasul. Why does the Gemara there not point out the fallacy of learning the law of an Onen from the law of a Ba'al Mum? Instead of learning the law of an Onen from the law of a Ba'al Mum, we should learn from the law of a <i>Chalal</i> that an Onen's Avodah is valid. The answer of the Shitah Mekubetzes does not apply, since <i>both</i> an Onen and a Chalal are descendants of Aharon.
</p><p>
(b) In a preface to his answer, the <b>KEHILOS YAKOV</b> (#14) suggests that Tosfos in Ta'anis maintains that in contrast to the laws of an Onen and a Zar, there is no Isur of a Lo Sa'aseh against a Chalal doing the Avodah. The only reason why a Chalal may not do the Avodah is that he is not considered a fully qualified Kohen. By doing the Avodah, he negates the positive commandment that only fully qualified Kohanim must do the Avodah. Tosfos in Ta'anis explains that the law of an Arel cannot be derived from the law of a Ba'al Mum because an Arel can be learned from a Chalal. The logic of Tosfos is that since both the Arel and the Chalal are descendants of Aharon and are not called Zarim, the law of Arel can be learned from the law of Chalal to teach that an Arel's Avodah does not invalidate a Korban. However, a Zar and an Onen are different. The law of a Zar obviously is more stringent, since there is an Isur Lo Sa'aseh that prohibits him from performing Avodah: 'v'Zar Lo Yikrav Aleichem' (Bamidbar 18:4). An Onen also has a specific prohibition against doing the Avodah. This is why the Gemara does not refute d'Vei Rebbi Yishmael's teachings for Zar and Onen. Since those cases are more stringent than the case of a Chalal (because they have specific verses which prohibit them from performing Avodah), there is no basis to compare them to a Chalal instead of to a Ba'al Mum. (Y. Montrose)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TESTIMONY OF A TALMID CHACHAM AND A KING</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara teaches that a Talmid Chacham who serves as a witness is exempt from the requirement that witnesses in Beis Din must stand. This apparently is an honorary exemption made out of respect to the Talmid Chacham.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Meyushav) questions this ruling from the Gemara in Sanhedrin (19a). The Gemara there says that Shimon ben Shetach summoned King Yanai to Beis Din. Since one of King Yanai's servants had killed someone, the king was considered the defendant in the case. The Gemara in Shevuos (30a) teaches that a defendant (or the two parties in a monetary dispute) must stand in the presence of Beis Din, unless he is a Talmid Chacham. When Shimon ben Shetach saw that Yanai was sitting, he declared, 'King Yanai, stand on your feet!' The law is that the honor due to a king is even greater than the honor due to a Talmid Chacham, as a Talmid Chacham may forgo his honor while a king may not. Since a Talmid Chacham does not have to stand in Beis Din, why did Shimon ben Shetach command King Yanai to stand?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> answers that a Talmid Chacham may forgo his honor, since it was through his own effort that he acquired his scholarship in Torah. A king is different in that his honor bestowed was bestowed upon him in order that he be feared and revered. This Gemara in Kedushin (32b) derives this from the verse, 'Som Tasim <i>Alecha</i> Melech' -- 'Place <i>on yourself</i> a king' (Devarim 17:15). The word 'Alecha' teaches 'that his fear should be upon you,' 'she'Tehei Eimascha Alecha.' A king is not allowed to forgo his honor, since doing so will result in a lack of respect toward the king. However, if he forgoes his honor for the purpose of a Mitzvah, people will not fear and honor him less. Shimon ben Shetach knew that this would not result in a lack of respect for the king, and therefore he commanded the king to stand. The <b>OLAS SHLOMO</b> adds that Tosfos clearly means that a king <i>must</i> forgo his honor in such a situation, as is clear from Shimon ben Shetach's directive to Yanai that he should stand on his feet.
</p><p>
(b) In his second answer, Tosfos explains that the Gemara in Shevuos refers only to testifying about monetary matters, and not matters of life and death, such as was the case in the trial involving Yanai. In cases of life and death, even a Talmid Chacham must stand.
</p><p>
The <b>RASHASH</b> has difficulty with this answer of Tosfos. The Gemara attempts to prove that one who is sitting is always unfit for testimony, and the Gemara responds that this is not always the case, since a Talmid Chacham is an exception to this rule. If Tosfos' answer is correct, then there really is no one who is always exempt from standing during testimony. Why does the Gemara not respond that even a Talmid Chacham must stand when giving testimony of Dinei Nefashos? This would show that there is no absolute exemption from standing during testimony.
</p><p>
The Olas Shlomo answers that the Halachah that a Talmid Chacham must stand for testimony in Dinei Nefashos is only a stringency of the Rabanan. This is why the Gemara does not ask the question of the Rashash. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> ONE MUST STAND FOR TESTIMONY <span class='indexentry'>[testimony :standing]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span>	One who sits may not testify.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span>	A sitting Chacham may testify.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shevuos 30b:</span> Witnesses must stand. It says 'v'Omdu Shnei ha'Anashim.'</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span>	Rav Yeimar knew testimony for Mar Zutra. Ameimar told everyone to sit.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question (Rav Ashi):</span> Ula taught that R. Yehudah and Chachamim agree that the witnesses must stand!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer (Ameimar):</span> It is a Mitzvas Aseh for the witnesses to stand, and an Aseh to honor Chachamim. The Aseh to honor Chachamim takes precedence.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	Gitin 71a (Beraisa):</span> We test one who became mute (to see if he is alert enough to give a Get), and similarly regarding sales and gifts, for testimony, and for inheritances.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Sanhedrin 21:5):</span> The custom of all Batei Din after the Gemara, in all Yeshivos, is to seat the litigants and witnesses to avoid arguments. We are unable to practice all the laws properly.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Hagahos Maimoniyos (2):</span> One must be careful not to rule about a Get through testimony given sitting, for the Gemara says that sitting is Pasul for testimony. B'Di'eved it is Kosher, like the Yerushalmi says about judges who accepted testimony standing. Both of these are learned from the same verse.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Shevuos 4:5):</span> Some say that if witnesses testified sitting, b'Di'eved the testimony is invalid, for it says in Zevachim that sitting is Pasul for testimony. Pasul connotes b'Di'eved. Also, if judges stood while accepting the testimony, it is Pasul. This is wrong. The Yerushalmi says that the latter is Kosher.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Ran (Shevuos 14a DH Garsinan):</span> Some say that if witnesses testified sitting, b'Di'eved the testimony is invalid, for it says in Zevachim that sitting is Pasul for testimony. Pasul connotes b'Di'eved. This is wrong. The episode with Rav Yeimar proves that a Chacham testifies sitting, for the Aseh to honor Chachamim takes precedence. If even b'Di'eved the testimony is Batel, how can we seat a Chacham?! Are we Machshir Pasul testimony due to honor of Torah?! We should rather tell a Chacham not to testify at all, like we say about a king (Sanhedrin 18a)! Rather, b'Di'eved it is Kosher. The Rashba proved this from Gitin 71a, in which we say that we check one who became mute for sales, gifts, testimony, and inheritances. In the Yerushalmi, Reish Lakish learned from here that one may testify sitting. This shows that b'Di'eved it is Kosher.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rashba (6:208):</span> Witnesses must stand, i.e. l'Chatchilah. B'Di'eved, the testimony is valid even if they sat. The Yerushalmi says so. A Chacham testifies sitting l'Chatchilah.We say that sitting is Pasul for testimony l'Chatchilah. The Ge'onim agreed to this.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shiltei ha'Giborim (Sanhedrin 1b-2a):</span> We can be lenient to let witnesses sit only for monetary cases. Regarding Isur, e.g. witnesses testify to permit or forbid a woman to her husband, Chachamim do not have authority to be Machshir testimony given sitting. The witnesses could retract from it. Similar, witnesses who testified at night can retract, since investigating witnesses is like the beginning of judgment, which must be during the day.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (CM 17:1):</span> L'Chatchilah, the witnesses always stand.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH u'Mah she'Chosav v'Davka):</span> It seems that also the Rambam holds that if the witnesses testified sitting, it is Kosher. We would not be Machshir Pasul testimony to avoid arguments! R. Elazar b'R. Shimon says that the Chiyuv to stand is in front of expert judges - 'v'Omdu Shnei ha'Anashim Lifnei Hash-m.' Nowadays we do not have expert judges, so the custom is to sit.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	SMA (5 and Hagahos Drishah u'Prishah 2):</span> The verse 'v'Omdu...' is only an Asmachta, unlike Ir Shushan, who says that it was ppeven b'Di'eved when there were expert judges. The Mordechai said that R. Elazar b'R. Shimon permits l'Chatchilah nowadays, but he did not say that it was Me'akev when there were experts. Also, R. Elazar b'R. Shimon is a lone opinion. No Posek brings his opinion. The Rambam and Tur say that it is an enactment to let witnesses sit.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bach (5):</span> Even though early Chachamim were concerned and permitted them to stand to evade arguments, if the witnesses and litigants fear Hash-m, they will be concerned for the honor of Torah and Mitzvos, and stand, to fulfill 'v'Omdu Shnei ha'Anashim Lifnei Hash-m.' Even though the judges tell them to sit, they should reply 'we stand in front of Hash-m and in front of you, for judgment is to Hash-m.' What is the source that the verse is only l'Chatchilah? Perhaps it is even b'Di'eved, but only when there are expert judges. Chachamim enacted to stand even nowadays, but permitted sitting to avoid arguments. They did not enactwere it may lead to problems. It seems that all the Poskim hold like R. Elazar b'R. Shimon, unlike SMA says.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shach (28:11):</span> The Mabit (2:116) says that if judges accepted testimony standing in a place where they do not normally judge, e.g. in the market or on the road, even b'Di'eved it is invalid. There is no necessity to say so. Ben Lev brings in the name of the Rivash that it is Kosher b'Di'eved, and said that he did not see anyone who disagrees.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (3):</span> The custom of all Batei Din in Yisrael is to seat the litigants and witnesses to avoid arguments. We are unable to practice all the laws properly.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (28:5):</span> L'Chatchilah, the witnesses must testify standing. If the witness is a Chacham, we seat him.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH uv'Mordechai):</span> An old edition of the Mordechai says that the Mitzvah for litigants to stand is if they were already standing. If they were already sitting, they need not stand. (It says 'v'Amdu (they will stand).' It does not say va'Ya'amod (he will stand up)'! R. Yerucham says that regarding a Get, one must be careful that they stand. Hagahos Maimoniyos says that this is only l'Chatchilah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 268:7):</span> On Shabbos night, after Shemoneh Esre we say va'Ychulu aloud, and standing.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (19):</span> We stand because we testify that Hash-m created the world, and witnesses must stand. It is good to say it with the Tzibur; the entire Tzibur must testify for Hash-m. At least it should be said with two. Some say that an individual who prays does not say it, for one witness does not testify. Some say that he may say it, but he need not stand. It is good that he say it, without intent for testimony, rather, like one who reads in the Torah. If one forgot to say it in the Beis ha'Keneses, he is Yotzei through saying it standing in Kidush.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (271:10):</span> On Shabbos night, in Kidush we say va'Ychulu standing.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (271:45):</span> This is because it is testimony that Hash-m created the world. Even though he already said it, he repeats it to be Motzi his family. The Medrash says that it should be said three times - in Tefilah, after Tefilah and in Kidush.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (422:7):</span> The Mitzvah is to say Hallel standing</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (422:28):</span> Hallel is testimony to the miracles that Hash-m did for us. Also, it says 'Hallelu Es Hash-m ha'Omdim.' However, on Pesach night, since we do not say Hallel all at once, we do not obligate one to stand each time. Also, on Seder night we recline, to show freedom. If one read sitting, b'Di'eved he was Yotzei, even on days when we finish Hallel.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (53):</span> Also, since he is at the meal holding his cup, perhaps he will get confused and his cup will fall.</p>
<p class='seealso'>See also:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) WHEN IS SOMETHING 'HUTAR MI'CHLALO?'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara quotes the opinion of Tana d'Vei Rebbi Yishmael, who derives through a Tzad ha'Shaveh from Zar and Ba'al Mum the law that an Onen who performs Avodah invalidates the Korban. Just as a Zar and Ba'al Mum are prohibited from performing Avodah, and if they perform the Avodah they invalidate the Korban, an Onen -- who is also prohibited from performing Avodah -- invalidates the Korban if he performs the Avodah.
</p><p>
The Gemara asks that a Zar and Ba'al Mum are not 'Hutar mi'Chlalo' -- 'permitted from their general rule.' That is, there is no exception to the rule that prohibits a Zar or Ba'al Mum from performing Avodah. In contrast, there is an exception to the general rule that prohibits a Kohen from performing Avodah when he is an Onen: a Kohen Gadol who is an Onen is permitted to perform Avodah. Accordingly, the laws of an Onen should not be able to be derived from the laws of a Zar and Ba'al Mum.
</p><p>
The Gemara answers that the law that an Onen who performs the Avodah invalidates the Korban is derived through a Tzad ha'Shaveh from a Zar, Ba'al Mum, and a <i>Kohen Tamei</i>. Just as a Kohen who is Tamei may not perform Avodah, and if he does it is Pasul, so, too, an Onen who may not perform Avodah invalidates the Korban if he does perform the Avodah.
</p><p>
The Gemara asks that although the category of Tum'ah has an exception, it is not <i>as</i> exceptional as Onen. Tum'ah has an exception only in the case of a public Korban, when most of the public is Tamei (in which case the Kohen should do the Avodah because 'Tum'ah Hutrah b'Tzibur' or 'Tum'ah Dechuyah b'Tzibur'). In contrast, the law of an Onen has an exception even for individual (non-public) Korbanos, since the Kohen Gadol may offer private Korbanos when he is an Onen. Accordingly, the prohibition of an Onen may more be lenient than that of a Kohen who is Tamei, and therefore the law that an Onen renders the Korban Pasul cannot be derived from the law that a Kohen Tamei renders the Korban Pasul. The Gemara answers that the fact that both contain exceptions for Tum'ah suffices to enable us to derive Onen from Kohen Tamei, despite the fact that the law of an Onen has a slightly greater degree of leniency.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (DH she'Ken) asks that the Gemara says that the law of an Onen has an exception, while Zar and Ba'al Mum do not. However, the law of a Zar also has an exception, since he may perform the Avodah at a Bamah!
</p><p>
ANSWER: <b>TOSFOS</b> quotes <b>RASHI</b> who explains that the words 'Hutar mi'Chlalo' mean that there was a rule that was permitted in <i>one</i> category. Since a Zar was never prohibited from doing Avodah at a Bamah, he cannot be considered 'Hutar mi'Chlalo' in the Beis ha'Mikdash simply because he may do Avodah at a Bamah.
</p><p>
Tosfos quotes <b>RABEINU CHAIM</b> who questions this definition of 'Hutar mi'Chlalo.' The Gemara in Menachos (25a) teaches that the Pesul of Yotzei (when a Korban is taken out of its designated area, it becomes unfit) was 'Hutar mi'Chlalo' because there is no Pesul of Yotzei at a Bamah. If Rashi's assertion that a Zar is not called 'Hutar mi'Chlalo' at a Bamah, then why does the Gemara consider the Pesul of Yotzei to be 'Hutar mi'Chlalo' at a Bamah?
</p><p>
1. Rabeinu Chaim gives two answers to his question on Rashi. One answer is that the Gemara in Menachos (25a) means that the Tzitz atones for something which, at other times, is permitted. Tosfos later (23b, DH Ha Eino) points out that this is based on the verse which says the Tzitz is 'l'Ratzon Lahem' -- 'for appeasement for them' (Shemos 28:38), which implies that the Tzitz atones for a sin which, in other places, is not considered a sin. After the Gemara suggests that this refers to public Korbanos offered when the people are Tamei, Rebbi Zeira asks that this may also refer to the Pesul of Yotzei, since Yotzei is 'Hutar mi'Chlalo' at a Bamah. This does not mean that Yotzei is technically 'Hutar mi'Chlalo,' but rather that since Yotzei is permitted in a different situation (at a Bamah), it therefore fits the description of 'l'Ratzon Lahem.'
</p><p>
2. Alternatively, Rabeinu Chaim answers that the words 'Hutar mi'Chlalo' generally mean that there is an entire category where the law does not apply, such as the fact that a Zar may do Avodah at a Bamah, but not in the Beis ha'Mikdash. However, the Gemara here uses these words in a more specific context: 'Hutar mi'Chlalo' here means that there is an exemption even within one category. The Gemara differentiates between Zar and Onen because Onen has an exemption <i>within</i> a specific category.
</p><p>
3. The <b>MEKOR BARUCH</b> (1:2, DH v'Habet) answers that Rashi correctly states that the fact that a Zar may do Avodah at a Bamah is not called 'Hutar mi'Chlalo' because 'Hutar' means that there is a 'permission' to do something a certain way, as opposed to the regular way that it is done. Since there is no preference with regard to who performs the Avodah at a Bamah, the fact that a Zar may do it is not a 'permission,' but rather <i>the way</i> it is supposed to be done. This differs from the Pesul of Yotzei, since taking the meat out of the confines of the Bamah is not something that must be done with the meat. It happens to be that if one brought the meat out, the meat remains permitted. This can be called 'Hutar mi'Chlalo,' since it is a leniency which is not essential to the bringing of the Korban. This fits the description of a 'permission.' (Y. Montrose)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE THAT A 'TEVUL YOM' IS 'CHAYAV MISAH' FOR PERFORMING AVODAH?</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Mishnah earlier (15b) states that a Tevul Yom may not perform Avodah in the Beis ha'Mikdash. If he does, the Avodah is Pasul. The Gemara teaches that a Tevul Yom who performs Avodah is Chayav Misah. The verse states, 'v'Lo Yechalelu Shem Elokeihem' -- 'and they may not defile the name of their G-d' (Vayikra 21:6). This verse cannot be referring to a person who is Tamei who performs Avodah, since another verse already teaches that prohibition. Rather, this verse must be prohibited a Tevul Yom from performing Avodah. What indication is there in the verse that he is Chayav Misah? The Gemara explains that there is a Gezeirah Shavah ('Chilul, Chilul') from Terumah to Tevul Yom. Just as one who eats Terumah is punished with Misah b'Yedei Shamayim, a Tevul Yom who performs Avodah is punished with Misah b'Yedei Shamayim. The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Bi'as ha'Mikdash 4:4) indeed rules that a Tevul Yom who performs Avodah is Chayav Misah b'Yedei Shamayim.
</p><p>
The <b>RA'AVAD</b> questions why this information is relevant. A Tevul Yom who even <i>enters</i> the Beis ha'Mikdash is Chayav Kares. Why is another punishment of Misah b'Yedei Shamayim necessary to deter a Tevul from performing Avodah?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>RA'AVAD</b> answers that it is possible that this prohibition is needed to prevent a Tevul Yom from performing Avodah at a Bamah, where there is no prohibition against entering the area of the Bamah.
</p><p>
(b) Alternatively, the Ra'avad suggests that the additional prohibition is needed in the case of Tevul Yom who uses a long handle on a vessel to turn over the limbs of the Korbanos on the Mizbe'ach from outside the Azarah.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>KESEF MISHNEH</b> does not understand the question of the Ra'avad on the Rambam. The Rambam says nothing more than the Gemara's statement that a Tevul Yom who performs Avodah is Chayav Misah. Why does the Ra'avad ask his question specifically on the Rambam? It is a question on the Gemara itself!
</p><p>
The Kesef Mishneh explains that the Ra'avad asks his question specifically on the Rambam because the Rambam writes that a Tevul Yom who immersed in a Mikvah is Chayav Misah for merely entering the Mikdash. The Mishnah in Parah (11:4) states merely that whether or not the Tevul Yom was Tovel, he is Chayav if he enters the Beis ha'Mikdash. The Kesef Mishneh explains that the Ra'avad understands that the Mishnah means that whether or not the Tevul Yom was Tovel, he is Chayav Malkus for entering the Beis ha'Mikdash, but he is <i>not</i> Chayav <i>Kares</i> if he was already Tovel. The Rambam (3:14) rules that a Tevul Yom who was Tovel before he entered the Beis ha'Mikdash <i>is</i> Chayav Kares. Had the Rambam not ruled that such a Tevul Yom is Chayav Kares, the Ra'avad would have had no question. After all, a Tevul Yom who enters the Beis ha'Mikdash is only Chayav Malkus, while one who performs Avodah there is Chayav Misah. However, since the Rambam rules that the Tevul Yom is Chayav Kares merely for entering, why should there be another Chiyuv Misah b'Yedei Shamayim for performing Avodah there?
</p><p>
The Kesef Mishneh suggests numerous answers, all of which focus on the differences between Kares and Misah b'Yedei Shamayim. For example, the Gemara in Moed Katan (28a) says that Kares means that someone will not reach the age of sixty, while Misah b'Yedei Shamayim has no set time. In addition, there are types of Kares whereby the perpetrator and his children are 'cut off,' while Misah b'Yedei Shamayim affects only the perpetrator himself. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafbbb'><span class='numt'>1)</span> ONE WHO DRANK MAY NOT GIVE BIRKAS KOHANIM <span class='indexentry'>[Birkas Kohanim :wine]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Beraisa) Question:</span> What is the source that a Kohen who drank wine is Mechalel Avodah?</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer:</span> 'Yayin v'Shechar Al Tesht... u'Lehavdil Bein ha'Kodesh u'Vein ha'Chol.' (Avodah done while drunk is Chol (profane).)</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Ta'anis 26b:</span> All agree that a Shikur (one who is drunk) may not Duchan.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Yehoshua ben Levi):</span> Parshas Nazir is next to Birkas Kohanim, to forbid wine to a Kohen who will Duchan, just like a Nazir.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question (R. Zeira's father):</span> If so, one who ate Chartzan (grape peels) should be forbidden to Duchan!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Yitzchak):</span> 'Lesharso u'Levarech bi'Shmo' - just like Sherus (Avodah) is permitted after one ate Chartzan, also Berachah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	Suggestion:</span> Just like a Ba'al Mum cannot serve, he cannot Duchan!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rejection:</span> The Hekesh to Nazir shows that he may. These Hekeshim are mid'Rabanan, so we are lenient.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	Krisus 13b (Beraisa) Suggestion:</span> 'Yayin v'Shechar Al Tesht' - perhaps one is liable for entering the Mikdash after drinking any amount of wine, or wine mi'Gito (grape juice)!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rejection:</span> 'V'Shechar' refers to something that is Meshaker (intoxicates), i.e. a Revi'is of wine pressed at least 40 days ago.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span>	R. Elazar expounds (as if it said) 'Yayin Al Tesht; v'Shechar Al Tesht' - do not drink in an intoxicating way. If he paused while drinking, or added any amount of water, he is exempt.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>12.</span>	Rav Acha came to Rav Ashi (on Yom Tov) to permit a vow. Rav Ashi told him to return tomorrow, for he conducted like Rav, who would not expound on Yom Tov (after drinking) until the next day, lest he be drunk. Even though the Halachah follows R. Elazar, and Rav Ashi drank wine mixed with water, R. Elazar exempts only when he drank only a Revi'is (of diluted wine). Rav Ashi drank more than a Revi'is.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Tefilah 15:4):</span> One who drank a Revi'is of undiluted wine at once may not Duchan until the wine wears off, for Berachah is equated to Avodah. If one drank a Revi'is in two times (he paused in the middle), or a little water was added, he may Duchan. If one drank more than a Revi'is, even if it was diluted, even if he paused many times in the middle, he may not Duchan until the wine wears off.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Kesef Mishneh:</span> If one drank a Revi'is in two times, or it was diluted, he is exempt for entering the Mikdash. Therefore, he may Duchan, for the Hekesh is a mere Asmachta. It suffices to forbid Birkas Kohanim when one would be liable for entering the Mikdash.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tosfos (Ta'anis 17a DH v'Yode'a):</span> Wine that one drinks during a meal does not intoxicate. It does not forbid a Kohen to serve in the Mikdash.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 99:2):</span> Walking a Mil (about a kilometer) or any amount of sleep wear off the effect of wine. This is if he drank a Revi'is. If he drank more, sleep inebriates (even more) and walking disturbs him.Riding in a carriage wears off wine.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH u'Mah she'Chosav v'Derech):</span> This is from Eruvin 64a.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (128:38):</span> One who drank a Revi'is of wine at once may not Duchan. If one drank it in two times, or a little water was added, it is permitted.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH Shikur):</span> R. Yerucham says that a Shikur may not Duchan if he is as drunk as Lot, like we say in general. It seems that he holds that the Isur for a Shikur to Duchan is because it is like Tefilah. I disagree. It is because Birkas Kohanim is equated to Avodah, like the Rambam writes! Therefore, even if one drank a Revi'is he may not Duchan. This is the Halachah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (55):</span> R. Yerucham is correct. The Gemara learns Birkas Kohanim from Nazir. If so, other intoxicants are permitted. There is no Misah for other intoxicants, so they are permitted regarding Birkas Kohanim, unless he is as drunk as Lot, for then he is exempt from all Mitzvos. It seems that even if he cannot speak in front of the king, he may Duchan. This is unlike Tefilah. I do not understand why the Beis Yosef says that R. Yerucham equates it to Tefilah. It seems that if one drank grape juice he is Pasul (to Duchan), for it is forbidden for a Nazir. Therefore, the Rambam did not mention this.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (227):</span> Nishmas Adam (32:2) says that just like grape juice disqualifies, even though it does not intoxicate, the same applies to raisin wine, for we learn from Nazir. Pesach ha'Dvir says those who learn from Nazir would forbid also cooked wine. Eliyahu Rabah says that if one may Duchan after drinking other intoxicants, which obligate lashes for one who does Avodah, all the more so one may Duchan after drinking grape juice, for which there are no lashes for Avodah. According to those who forbid other intoxicants, also grape juice forbids l'Chatchilah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (141):</span> The Shulchan Aruch discusses wine. Regarding other intoxicants, the Magen Avraham permits even if he cannot speak in front of the king. Tefilah in such a state is an abomination, but Birkas Kohanim is permitted, unless he is as drunk as Lot, for then he is like a lunatic.Many Acharonim disagree and say that if he cannot speak in front of the king, he may not Duchan. If one drank grape juice, the Rema forbids to Duchan, but many Acharonim permit, for it does not intoxicate.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (225):</span> Since Acharonim argue about other intoxicants, l'Chatchilah a Kohen may not ascend to Duchan until they wear off; but if he ascended, he does not go down.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</span> If one drank more than a Revi'is, even if it was diluted, even if he drank it in many times, he may not Duchan until he the wine wears off.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH u'Mah):</span> The Rambam understands that just like one who drank more than a Revi'is is liable for Avodah even if it was diluted, the same applies if he drank it in many times. Therefore, he may not Duchan.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bach (23):</span> The Tur says that a Shikur may not Duchan. I.e. all agree about this. The Tur connotes that if he drank but is not Shikur, he may Duchan. The Rambam forbids due to the Hekesh of Birkas Kohanim to Avodah. Anyone who is liable for entering the Mikdash is forbidden mid'Rabanan to Duchan. Anyone who is exempt for entering the Mikdash may Duchan, for the Hekesh is a mere Asmachta.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Taz (35):</span> The Kesef Mishneh wrote (and the Beis Yosef connotes) that if one drank a Revi'is in two times, he may not serve, but he is exempt and the Avodah is Kosher. This is astounding. If so, what is the Rambam's source that for this, we do not equate Berachah to Avodah? One cannot say that the Hekesh is a mere Asmachta. Hekesh is one of the methods for expounding the Torah! There is no hint in the Gemara that this Drashah is only an Asmachta. Tosfos (Sotah 38a Sof DH Harei) says that if one gave Birkas Kohanim sitting, he must bless again, due to the Hekesh to Avodah! If it were only an Asmachta, Tosfos would not tell a Kohen to say Hashem's name Levatalah! (Note - Tosfos did not explicitly say that he repeats the Berachah 'Asher Kideshanu b'Mitzvosav...' To repeat the verses of Birkas Kohanim is not Shem Hash-m Levatalah.) Therefore, I say that if one drank a Revi'is in two times, he may serve. The Kesef Mishneh (Hilchos Bi'as Mikdash 1:2) says so in the name of the Rashba (363). Since the Halachah follows R. Elazar, there is no Misah or even a Lav even for wine unless he drank a Revi'is without pausing. The Rambam agrees. Therefore, he may Duchan. If he drank other intoxicants, even though there is no Chiyuv Misah for them, surely he may not Duchan, since the Torah forbids Avodah, even though it is only a Lav. Since there is no explicit Shi'ur for beer or mead (a drink made from fermented honey)  like there is for wine, a Kohen may not drink any amount of intoxicants before Birkas Kohanim, even though the Beis Yosef says that the Hekesh is only for matters for which one is liable regarding Avodah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Taz (26):</span> Any Kosher who does not Duchan must leave the Beis ha'Keneses at the time, lest people say that he is a Chalal (Pasul Kohen). The Mordechai says so about a Kohen Avel.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Taz (27):</span> We disqualify a Kohen with a Mum on his hands if people will look at it. He should be Pasul due to the Hekesh to Avodah! It seems that 'Daber El Aharon v'El Banav' includes Ba'alei Mumim, like Rashi (Parshas Emor) says. It does not include Pesulim that come due to man's actions. 'Banav' alludes to what is due to birth. The Hekesh teaches only about what man can fix, e.g. sitting or drinking.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (54):</span> We say in Ta'anis that the Hekesh is only to be lenient, to permit Chartzan, but not to be stringent. A Ba'al Mum and many others Pasul for Avodah taught in the second Perek of Zevachim are Kosher for Birkas Kohanim. The Hekesh is only for standing. The Rambam says that one who is drunk is Pasul due to the Hekesh of Berachah to Avodah, to teach that just like if he paused while drinking or mixed in any water he is exempt, likewise he may Duchan. Had we learned from Nazir, we would have forbidden one who drank any amount, even if it was diluted.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (226):</span> If he is as drunk as Lot, even if he ascended, he goes down. Mateh Yehudah and Eliyahu Rabah say that the Mechaber says so even if he drank a Revi'is. I say that one may rely on the lenient opinions b'Di'eved, to avoid embarrassing him.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>viii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (228):</span> Some Acharonim forbid even if he drank during his meal. Birkas Kohanim is more stringent than Tefilah. However, Tosfos (Ta'anis 17a) says that this does not forbid even Avodah! All the more so, he may Duchan! We rule like the Pri Megadim said about Tefilah. If one feels the influence of wine, he may not Duchan until the wine wears off.</p>
<p class='seealso'>See also:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) WHY IS A SPECIAL VERSE NEEDED TO TEACH THAT A KOHEN WHO IS 'MECHUSAR BEGADIM' IS 'CHAYAV MISAH'?</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Mishnah (16b) states that a Kohen who is not wearing the proper number of Bigdei Kehunah when he performs the Avodah invalidates the Korban. The Gemara derives this from the verse, 'And you shall gird them with belts, Aharon and his sons, and put the turbans on them; and the office of Kehunah shall be theirs for an everlasting statute' (Shemos 29:9). Rebbi Avuha says that the context of the verse teaches that only when the Kohanim wear their Bigdei Kehunah is their Kehunah upon them, but when they are not wearing their Bigdei Kehunah they are not considered to have their Kehunah upon them. <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Ein) quotes the Gemara in Sanhedrin (83b) which says that this verse teaches that a Kohen who is not wearing all of his Bigdei Kehunah is like a Zar, who is Chayav Misah if he performs Avodah in the Beis ha'Mikdash.
</p><p>
However, Tosfos quotes <b>RABEINU YAKOV</b> of Orleans who asks that this Limud seems unnecessary. The verse explicitly states, 'And they (the Bigdei Kehunah) will be on Aharon and his sons... and they will not bear the sin of the Kodesh and die' (Shemos 29:43). Why is a Limud necessary when the verse explicitly says that a Kohen who performs the Avodah without the Bigdei Kehunah is Chayav Misah?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>RABEINU YAKOV</b> of Orleans answers that this verse (Shemos 29:43) refers only to a Kohen who performs the Avodah while not wearing the Michnasayim (pants) of the Bigdei Kehunah, which are mentioned in the previous verse. A special Limud is needed to teach that if a Kohen is not wearing any of the other Bigdei Kehunah, he is Chayav Misah.
</p><p>
The <b>OLAS SHLOMO</b> asks an obvious question on this answer. If the Limud teaches that all Bigdei Kehunah are necessary, then why does the verse need to state explicitly that a Kohen is Chayav Misah if he performs the Avodah while not wearing the Michnasayim? The Olas Shlomo answers that had the verse not taught that a Kohen is Chayav Misah for performing the Avodah without the Michnasayim, the Gemara's Limud would have been different. Without the verse regarding the Michnasayim, the teaching of 'when they do not wear their Bigdei Kehunah they do not have their Kehunah upon them' would teach only that their Avodah is not valid. No one would have compared such a Kohen to a Zar to make him Chayav Misah. The fact that the verse says that a Kohen who performs the Avodah without the Michnasayim is Chayav Misah shows that a Kohen should be treated exactly like a Zar when he performs the Avodah without his Begadim.
</p><p>
(b) Alternatively, Tosfos states that the verse is needed to teach that the Avodah is not valid, since the Kohen is considered like a Zar. (Y. Montrose)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) WHY MAY A KOHEN GADOL NOT PERFORM AVODAH WITH THE 'BEGADIM' OF A KOHEN HEDYOT?</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara states that any Avodah done by a Kohen Gadol who is wearing the Begadim of a Kohen Hedyot is Pasul. This is derived from the verse, 'And the sons of Aharon ha'Kohen will place' (Vayikra 1:7). The word 'ha'Kohen' is extra, indicating that there is a certain aspect of Kehunah that applies specifically to Aharon. The Gemara understands that this teaches that the Kohen Gadol must perform Avodah only in his special Begadim, and not in the Begadim of a Kohen Hedyot.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Hagah) asks that this seems to contradict the Gemara in Yoma (12b). The Gemara there quotes Rebbi Yosi who says that a Kohen Gadol who served merely as a temporary replacement for the permanent Kohen Gadol may no longer serve in the Beis ha'Mikdash after the permanent Kohen Gadol returns. The reason why the temporary Kohen Gadol may no longer serve as a Kohen Gadol is that it would cause enmity between the two Kohanim Gedolim. He also may not serve as an ordinary Kohen Hedyot because of the rule of 'Ma'alin b'Kodesh v'Lo Moridin' -- once a person (or object) achieves a higher status of holiness, his status may not be lowered but only raised to a higher level.
</p><p>
If the temporary Kohen Gadol is really a Kohen Gadol, but he cannot serve in order to prevent enmity between the two Kohanim Gedolim, then there is a more basic reason than 'Ma'alin b'Kodesh' for why he cannot serve as a Kohen Hedyot. The Gemara explicitly states that he may not perform Avodah, because his Avodah would be Pasul since he is not wearing the Begadim of a Kohen Gadol. Why does Rebbi Yosi not give this reason? Does he disagree with the Gemara here?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> answers that Rebbi Yosi understands that the temporary Kohen Gadol may be removed from his position as Kohen Gadol by those who are empowered to appoint a person as Kohen Gadol -- the king of Yisrael and the other Kohanim. [The <b>RAMBAM</b> in Hilchos Klei ha'Mikdash (4:15) writes that Beis Din appoints the Kohen Gadol. This also seems to be the opinion of Tosfos in Megilah 9b, DH v'Lo l'Kohen Hedyot.) Once the king declares that this temporary Kohen Gadol is no longer the Kohen Gadol, the Kohen becomes a Kohen Hedyot and is able to serve in the Beis ha'Mikdash with the Bigdei Kehunah of the Kohen Hedyot, were it not for the law of 'Ma'alin b'Kodesh.'
</p><p>
(b) The <b>ITUREI MEGILAH</b> on Megilah (9b, note 4) explains that according to the Rambam, Rebbi Yosi means that the temporary Kohen Gadol is appointed only to be a temporary Kohen Gadol, and he is no longer a Kohen Gadol once the original Kohen Gadol returns. What does this mean? The Gemara says that the reason why the Kohen may not continue to serve as Kohen Gadol is due to enmity, which implies that he <i>does</i> have the status of a Kohen Gadol after the original Kohen Gadol returns. The Iturei Megilah explains that the intention of the Gemara is the opposite. The Gemara means that although this Kohen should become a Kohen Hedyot, he may not serve as a Kohen Hedyot because of 'Ma'alin b'Kodesh.' Why, though, does he not serve as a second Kohen Gadol? The Gemara answers this would cause enmity between the two Kohanim Gedolim.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>RITVA</b> in Yoma (12b) answers that when the Gemara explains that the temporary Kohen Gadol cannot serve as a Kohen Hedyot because of 'Ma'alin b'Kodesh,' it actually means because of 'Mechusar Begadim.' Since this Kohen no longer may serve as a Kohen Hedyot because of 'Ma'alin b'Kodesh,' he cannot perform any Avodah because of 'Mechusar Begadim.' The Ritva apparently does not agree with Tosfos' opinion that a Kohen can be demoted from his status as Kohen Gadol by a mere verbal statement.
</p><p>
Indeed, <b>RAV</b> Y. S. <b>ELYASHIV</b> shlit'a (in <b>HE'OROS B'MASECHES YOMA</b>) asks many questions on the opinion of Tosfos that a Kohen Gadol can be demoted to a Kohen Hedyot. Among his questions he asks that the Gemara in Horayos (12b) discusses whether or not a Kohen Gadol who has Tzara'as may marry an Almanah. If a Kohen Gadol can be demoted, then what is the Gemara's question? Let him be demoted so that he may marry an Almanah! He concludes that the words of Tosfos need further analysis. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafbbb'><span class='numt'>1)</span> FOUR CORNERED GARMENTS ARE OBLIGATED IN TZITZIS <span class='indexentry'>[Tzitzis: corners]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Yirmeyah mi'Difti):</span> Tana'im argue about Bigdei Kehunah that are too long and were not held up.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Beraisa #1):</span> 'Al Arba Kanfos Kesusecha' excludes a three-cornered garment from Tzitzis.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Suggestion:</span> Perhaps this excludes only a five-cornered garment!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Rejection:</span> 'Asher Techaseh Bah' includes a five-cornered garment. Therefore, 'Arba' excludes three (-cornered garments).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Question:</span> Why learn this way, and not oppositely?</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl3'>	Answer:</span> A five cornered garment has four corners. A three cornered garment does not.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Beraisa #2):</span> 'Al Arba Kanfos Kesusecha' excludes a three or five-cornered garment from Tzitzis.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Suggestion:</span> The Tana'im argue about whether we ignore something extra.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rejection:</span> No, all agree that we do not ignore it.	The first Tana expounds 'Asher Techaseh Bah' to obligate a five-cornered garment</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Menachos 28a (Mishnah):</span> The four Tzitzis (sets of strings on each of the four corners of a garment) are Me'akev each other, because they are all one Mitzvah;</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span>	R. Yishmael says, each of the four is a Mitzvah by itself.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	37b - Question:</span> What do they argue about?</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer #1 (Rav Yosef):</span> They argue about a linen garment. (If there are wool threads of Techeiles on only some of the corners, the first Tana says that one who wears it transgresses Kilayim.)</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer #2 (Rava bar Ahina):</span> They disagree about a garment with five (or more) corners.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer #3 (Ravina):</span> If there are threads on only some corners, they argue about whether one who wears it in Reshus ha'Rabim on Shabbos is liable.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>12.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Rav Shisha brei d'Rav Idi):</span> If one cut off (on a diagonal) one of the four corners of his garment (this makes it five-cornered), he did nothing.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>13.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Rav Yehudah):</span> The Halachah follows R. Yishmael.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>14.</span>	The Halachah does not follow him.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rif (Hilchos Tzitzis 11a):</span> Chachamim include a five-cornered garment from 'Asher Techaseh Bah.' R. Shimon learns from 'Asher'. 'Arba' excludes a three-cornered garment.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Tzitzis 3:3):</span> We include a five-cornered garment and exclude a three cornered garment because a five cornered garment has four corners. Therefore, on a garment of five or more corners, one puts Tzitziyos on the four corners furthest from each other, for it says 'Al Arba Kanfos Kesusecha.'</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Kesef Mishneh:</span> The Rambam reasons that one puts Tzitziyos on the corners furthest from each other.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rebuttal (Divrei Chamudos on Rosh Hilchos Tzitzis 3, Os 7):</span> The Rambam concludes 'because it says..'! This shows that he learns from the verse. Kenaf' connotes the furthest corner.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Ohr Some'ach:</span> We learn from Zevachim 18b. The Gemara suggested that the Tana'im who argue about a five cornered garment argue also about Bigdei Kehunah that are too long. In Sanhedrin (88b) we say that (if one put extra strings on a corner, if they need not be tied,) each stands by itself, and everyone can see that it is a separate matter. Regarding Bigdei Kehunah, what is past the proper length is clearly extra. R. Yirmeyah surely discusses a parallel case of Tzitzis, in which it is clear which is the extra corner, i.e. it is near another corner. If the corners were equal and it is not clear it is extra, this is unlike Bigdei Kehunah! Rather, he would say that it depends on whether we say that each stands by itself, or if they are considered together, for it is one garment.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Hilchos Tzitzis 3):</span> A Sifri learns from 'Arba' to exclude a garment of three, five, six, seven or eight corners. It means that had the Torah written only 'Al Kanfei Bigdeihem', we would have thought to make Tzitzis on all corners of the garment, no matter how many there are. 'Arba' disqualifies a garment of three corners, even if one attached four (sets of strings). It also teaches that if the garment has five or more corners, one attaches Tzitzis only on four of them.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 10:1):</span> A Talis that does not have four corners is exempt.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (1):</span> A garment without four corners is exempt whether it was initially like this, or if it had four and he rounded one of them.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (2):</span> If the garment had four corners, and one of the corners became rounded, it is still obligated. It depends on when the garment was made, like the Shulchan Aruch (11:10) says about Tzitzis put the right distance from the corner, and loater the garment frayed and they are too close.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</span> If it has more than four, it is obligated.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH Harei):</span> Chachamim and R. Shimon agree that a five-cornered garment is liable. They argue only about which verse teaches this. The Rif, Rambam, Rosh, Tosfos and Semag say so. Hagahos Maimoniyos (3:2) says that this is unlike the (second) Beraisa in Zevachim, which exempts a five-cornered garment. He says that Tosfos and Sefer ha'Terumah rule like this, and Menachos 37b connotes like this. Re'em and R. Simchah exempt, for they rule like the Sifri and Zevachim against the Gemara in Menachos. Maharik (149) says that this is an individual's opinion, and one may not rely on it at all. Rashi explains that the first Tana in Menachos holds that the four Tzitzis are all one Mitzvah, and the Torah includes a five cornered garment to put Tzitziyos on four corners. R. Yishmael holds that each of the four is a Mitzvah by itself. The Torah includes a five cornered garment to put Tzitziyos on all the corners, for each is a Mitzvah by itself. The Gemara explicitly rules like the first Tana. Also the Rambam rules like this.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH v'Chasuv):</span> The Mordechai (943) says in the name of Tosfos Shantz that since the Gemara mentioned only a garment of five corners, this connotes that a six cornered garment is exempt. However, we obligate a five-cornered garment because it has four corners. Also a garment with six or more corners has four corners! This is astounding. Even without the latter reason, how could we think to distinguish between five and six?! However, l'Halachah he agrees with the Sifri, Rambam, Rosh and Semag that it is obligated.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Taz (1):</span> Perhaps the Torah includes a five cornered garment to put Tzitziyos on all the corners! Also, why do we need 'Asher Techaseh Bah' to obligate it? We can learn from reasoning alone (a five-cornered garment has four corners)! The latter question answers the former.  'Asher Techaseh Bah' teaches *not* to say 'since we do not make more than four Tzitziyos, we do not make more than four corners, for corners and Tzitziyos are the same. The extra words include a garment with more corners than Tzitzis. This shows that if there are more than four Tzitziyos, they are Pesulim.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl3'>	Yad Efrayim:</span> 'Al Arba Kanfos Kesusecha' teaches that we put only four Tzitziyos.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (1):</span> Some exempt a garment with more than four corners, therefore, one should not make a five-cornered garment. Birkas ha'Zevach leans to say like this.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (2):</span> If one put on five Tzitziyos, he transgressed Bal Tosif (Rashi Devarim 4:2).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Gra (1):</span> The Shulchan Aruch rules unlike R. Simchah, who exempts due to the Beraisa in Zevachim. Also, Menachos 37b says that the Tana'im argue about a five-cornered garment. I.e. Chachamim exempt, and the Halachah follows Chachamim. One who cut his garment did nothing. I.e. he intended to put on Tzitzis, but it is exempt, for now it has five corners. Rashi explains Menachos 37b to obligate a five-cornered garment. Menachos 43b says that Chachamim and R. Shimon both obligate a five-cornered garment, and brings several Beraisos explaining how they could expound 'Asher Techaseh Bah.' I.e. all of these opinions oppose the Beraisa that exempts a five-cornered garment.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>viii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (3):</span> Some exempt a garment with more than four corners, so l'Chatchilah one should not make such a garment. We do not consider a square neck opening of a standard Talis Katan to be four additional (interior) corners, because the majority is closed. If the majority is open, one should make the opening round.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ix.</span>	Note - If the majority is open, it is likely that the garment is not considered to be big enough to be obligated, according to the Mishnah Berurah (16:4) who says that the neck opening does not count towards the minimal Shi'ur of an Amah wide and long (or at least three quarters of an Amah long) in front and in back.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>x.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (1):</span> If the garment has more than four corners, one should not bless on it, for we are lenient about Safek Berachos.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>xi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (7):</span> If the majority of the garment tore in the middle, it has six corners, and some say that it is exempt, so when one sews it back, he must untie the Tzitziyos and tie them again.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</span> One makes four Tzitziyos on the four corners furthest from each other.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Taz (2):</span> It is reasonable to put the Tzitziyos on the four corners furthest from each other, for they are most recognizable.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Gra (DH ha'Meruchakos):</span> The Gemara said 'one who cut his garment did nothing.' If we would not say that he puts the Tzitziyos on the corners furthest from each other, he did something, i.e. he enabled himself to put two of the four Tzitziyos near each other at the cut corner!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (5):</span> Some say that mid'Oraisa one must put on the corners furthest from each other, so one must be stringent about this if possible. If Tzitziyos were already put on a corner not among the furthest from each other and one cannot fix it, e.g. it is time for Tefilah, one may rely on the lenient opinion and bless on it.</p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) HALACHAH: 'KESUS LAILAH'</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Gemara quotes a Beraisa which states that the verse of 'u'Re'isem Oso,' 'and you will see it' (Bamidbar 15:39), excludes 'Kesus Lailah' from the obligation of Tzitzis. The Gemara in Menachos (43a) attributes this opinion to Rebbi Shimon. The Rishonim (see, for example, the <b>RIF</b> in Menachos) rule that the Halachah in this matter follows the view of Rebbi Shimon.
</p><p>
What exactly is 'Kesus Lailah'?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Tzitzis 3:7) writes that one should not put woolen Tzitzis on a linen garment, lest one come to wear that garment at night, when there is no Mitzvah of Tzitzis. Apparently, the Rambam means that although the Mitzvas Aseh of Tzitzis overrides the Mitzvas Lo Sa'aseh of Kil'ayim and, therefore, one should be able to wear Tzitzis that are Sha'atnez, one should not make such Tzitzis lest he come to wear them at night when there is no Mitzvah to override the Lo Sa'aseh of Kil'ayim. This statement, however, needs further explanation. If the Rambam maintains that 'Kesus Lailah' means clothing designated specifically as nightwear, then why does the Rambam not agree that one may put woolen Tzitzis on a linen garment if the garment is intended to be worn during the day? When one wears such a garment at night, he also fulfills the Mitzvah! Apparently, the Rambam maintains that <i>any</i> garment worn at night is exempt from Tzitzis because of the Halachah of 'Kesus Lailah.'
</p><p>
(b) The <b>ROSH</b> in Menachos (Hilchos Tzitzis #1) quotes <b>RABEINU TAM</b> who says that 'Kesus Lailah' refers to any garment which is designated to be worn at night. However, one fulfills the Mitzvah of Tzitzis at night by wearing regular clothes that one normally wears during the day (even if they are meant to be worn both during the day and at night). Rabeinu Tam disagrees with the Rambam's ruling regarding Kil'ayim, stating that one indeed would fulfill the Mitzvah of Tzitzis at night by wearing a garment that contains Kil'ayim, and thus he would not transgress the prohibition of Kil'ayim.
</p><p>
This argument has a practical application. Does one recite a blessing on a Talis (or Talis Katan) when he puts it on at night? According to Rabeinu Tam, one would recite a blessing in such a case. According to the Rambam, one would not recite a blessing when he puts on Tzitzis at night, since this is 'not the time of the Mitzvah,' as the Rambam explicitly rules (Hilchos Tzitzis 3:8). The <b>SEMAK</b> (#31) writes that the <b>RITZBA</b> used to put on his Talis on Yom Kippur night with a blessing, since he followed the opinion of Rabeinu Tam.
</p><p>

HALACHAH: The <b>SHULCHAN ARUCH</b> (OC 18:1) quotes both the opinion of the Rambam and the opinion of the Rosh (Rabeinu Tam). The <b>REMA</b> writes that 'Safek Berachos l'Hakel' -- in doubts regarding blessings the law is lenient, and therefore one would not recite a blessing for putting on Tzitzis at night. Similarly, one would not recite a blessing even during the day for putting on nightwear that has Tzitzis on it, since Rabeinu Tam rules that this type of clothing is exempt from the Mitzvah of Tzitzis. Accordingly, the Rema writes, on the eve of Yom Kippur one should put on his Talis before nightfall in order to be able to recite a blessing on his Talis according to all opinions.
</p><p>
The <b>MISHNAH BERURAH</b> (OC 18:2) points out that although the Rema focuses on the law of reciting the blessing for Tzitzis, one also must be stringent and not wear sleepwear without Tzitzis during the day (since, according to the Rambam, one is obligated to place Tzitzis on such a garment), and not wear at night clothing normally worn during the day without Tzitzis (since, according to Rabeinu Tam, one is obligated to place Tzitzis on such a garment). (Y. Montrose)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) A 'SAFEK CHATZITZAH' WITH THE 'BIGDEI KEHUNAH'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara quotes Rava who asks various practical questions regarding the verse of 'Al Besaro' -- 'on his flesh' (Vayikra 6:3). Does this verse teach that the Bigdei Kehunah must touch the skin of the Kohen? If a wind blows and causes the garments not to touch the skin while the Kohen is performing the Avodah, is the Kohen considered 'Mechusar Begadim' such that the Avodah is invalid? Are lice considered a Chatzitzah between the Bigdei Kehunah and the skin of a Kohen?
</p><p>
The Gemara does not answer these questions. The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Klei ha'Mikdash 10:7) rules that a Kohen should be careful to prevent his Begadim to be lifted from his skin by the wind, and he should not have lice between his skin and the Begadim. If, however, he performed the Avodah with such Chatzitzos between his skin and the Begadim, the Avodah is valid.
</p><p>
Why does the Rambam rule that the Avodah is valid? Since the Gemara does not conclude whether or not these situations constitute Chatzitzos, the rule of 'Safek d'Oraisa l'Chumra' should apply, and the Avodah should be considered invalid.
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>KESEF MISHNEH</b> answers that invalidating the Avodah in such cases would not be a stringency. If the Avodah would be rendered invalid, the owner of the Korban would have to bring another Korban. However, since the Avodah was rendered invalid only out of doubt, perhaps his original Korban indeed was valid. If he brings another animal because of the possibility that his original Korban was not valid, he may be bringing Chulin into the Azarah (a severe transgression). Even though the owner could stipulate that if his original Korban was not valid, then this animal should serve to fulfill his original obligation, and if his original Korban was valid, then this animal should be a Korban Nedavah, there are some Korbanos (such as a Chatas) which cannot be brought as Nedavos. The Rambam therefore rules that the Avodah is valid and one should not bring another Korban. This is also the answer given by the <b>MAHARI KURKUS</b>.
</p><p>
The <b>MIKDASH DAVID</b> (36:1) has difficulty with the answer of the Kesef Mishneh. The Gemara in Horayos (4a) teaches that if one brought a Chatas during Bein ha'Shemashos (a period of uncertainty whether it is night or day), he should bring an Asham Taluy, since he is unsure whether he has achieved atonement for his sin. Accordingly, when there is a doubt about whether a Korban Chatas is valid because of a Safek Chatzitzah, the owner should be required to bring an Asham Taluy.
</p><p>
(b) The Mikdash David explains instead that the Rambam rules like the Yerushalmi in Pesachim (8:2) which argues with the Gemara in Horayos and says that one who brought a Korban during Bein ha'Shemashos is considered to have achieved atonement and he does not need to bring another Korban. This is because a Safek which can be resolved only by making the person spend money on bringing another animal is called a Safek Mamon (a doubt in a monetary issue), and there is no obligation to pay money in such a case. The Mikdash David proves that this is the opinion of the Rambam from the law of a Safek Metzora. The Rambam (Hilchos Nezirus 10:8) states that a Safek Metzora brings a Chatas ha'Of, the only Korban which may be brought for a Safek, but he does not bring the usual Korban Olah of a Metzora (despite the fact that an Olah may be brought with the condition mentioned above).
</p><p>
The <b>KEHILOS YAKOV</b> (45:4) and <b>MINCHAS MORDECHAI</b> (on the Mikdash David) note that there is an apparent mistake in the text of the Mikdash David. The Gemara in Horayos (4a) actually states that if one brought a Chatas during Bein ha'Shemashos, he does <i>not</i> bring an Asham Taluy. In any event, the Gemara in Horayos rules that an Asham Taluy is not brought for reasons other than the principle set forth by the Mikdash David of 'Safek Kaparah Kiper' -- 'a doubt regarding atonement (of Korbanos) is ruled to have atoned.' The Kehilos Yakov agrees with the Mikdash David that the Rambam therefore may be ruling like the Yerushalmi. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafbbb'><span class='numt'>1)</span> MUST ONE WASH AGAIN AFTER DAWN? <span class='indexentry'>[Netilas Yadayim:morning]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Beraisa #1 - Rebbi):</span> If a Kohen was Mekadesh (washed his hands and feet from the Kiyor) at night, he must be Mekadesh again when day comes, for the old Kidush is no longer valid after Linah (passing of the night).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span>	R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon says, the old Kidush remains valid.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Beraisa #2 - Rebbi):</span> If a Kohen was offering Korbanos all night, he must be Mekadesh again when day comes;</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span>	R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon says, the old Kidush remains valid, even if he serves for 10 days.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Tefilah 4:3):</span> For other Tefilos, it suffices to wash the hands. For Shacharis, one must wash his face, hands and feet, and afterwards pray. If he is far from water, he merely cleans his hands and then prays.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Ra'avad:</span> I do not know why he must wash his feet.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Teshuvas ha'Rosh (4:1):</span> Chachamim enacted to bless on Netilas Yadayim in the morning, when one rises from his bed and his hands are filthy, for they touched filthy places. He must wash before praying. Similarly, if he did his needs and cleaned himself, or urinated and wiped (the drops off his shoes), and wants to pray, they enacted that he wash and bless. If one did his needs during the day and just wants to learn (but not pray), he does not bless Al Netilas Yadayim. The same applies if he wants to pray but he did not did his needs. It was enacted only in the morning, when his hands are filthy, and he did his needs. One who rises early to learn blesses Al Netilas Yadayim. If he goes to sleep again before day, and washes for Tefilah, he does not bless again unless he did his needs, for this is sleeping Arai (haphazard).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (OC 4 DH Kasav ha'Rosh):</span> The Rosh does not mean that if he goes to sleep again before day, he must wash, but he does not bless. Rather, he need not wash again. He explained that this is because the sleep was Arai, i.e. we are not concerned lest he touched a filthy place.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 4:14):</span> If one rose before dawn and washed his hands, it is a Safek whether he must wash again after dawn to remove the Ru'ach Ra'ah that dwells on his hands.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH v'Im):</span> If one rose early to learn and washed his hands and afterwards lied down to sleep before the day, it seems that he need not wash again even to to remove the Ru'ach Ra'ah. Since it went away once through washing three times, it does not dwell on his hands) again during that night. Or, perhaps it returns. The Zohar connotes like this. We say that David ha'Melech dozed like a horse (Sukah 26b). The Zohar says that the secret of this is 'David ha'Melech lives forever.' Sleep is a 60th part of death. David was always careful not to doze for more than 59 breaths, for past this, one tastes death, and the Ru'ach of Tum'ah rules over him.' This shows that whenever one sleeps 60 breaths, he must wash. This is the Shi'ur for Ru'ach ha'Tum'ah to rule over him, whether or not he slept earlier in the night. Since Ru'ach ha'Tum'ah rules over him, he must wash to remove it. Even though he washed to remove the first Ru'ach ha'Tum'ah, this does not help for Ru'ach ha'Tum'ah that comes later. Perhaps even one who sleeps during the day must wash, for it says Stam that when one sleeps 60 breaths, Ru'ach ha'Tum'ah rules over him. It did not distinguish between day and night. Even though the Zohar says that anyone who sleeps at night tastes death, perhaps this is not only for sleeping at night. It merely discusses what is normal, that people sleep at night. It also discusses sleeping on a bed. Surely it does not depend on this! The Tum'ah is because the Neshamah leaves, and the Ru'ach ha'Tum'ah dwells there. This is even if he sleeps not on a bed. Likewise, it does not depend on night. This is why Sukah 26b forbids sleeping more than 60 breaths during the day. However, one could say that the Tum'ah is only for one who sleeps at night, for this is the time of the Tum'ah. It has no power during the day to rule over man. The Isur to sleep more than 60 breaths during the day is lest one arouse the Sitra during the day, which is not its time. Still, we can say that even if it is aroused through sleep, it has no power to dwell on a person. This requires investigation. Later, I found that Orchos Chayim says that if one rose before dawn and washed his hands, some say that he must wash again after dawn, because Bas Melech (a powerful Tum'ah) dwells on the hands the entire night until the day. This is why one must pour water on them three times. It seems that he holds that even if one was awake until morning he must wash again due to Bas Melech.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rema:</span> He washes without a Berachah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (13):</span> The Shulchan Aruch did not say that he must wash for Tefilah, like he said in the previous Halachah. Surely, once he washed his hands once, he need not wash again, even if he slept again, for one becomes a new creation only once (a day). The Safek is due to Ru'ach Ra'ah. Therefore, even if he slept again he does not bless again, for we do not bless when washing due to Ru'ach Ra'ah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (31):</span> Some say that at dawn the Ru'ach Ra'ah dwells again on the hands.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (32):</span> Even if he slept again Keva (in a fixed way, i.e. on a bed), he cannot bless Al Netilas Yadayim, for we are concerned for the Rashba's opinion, that one washes because in the morning he becomes a new creation, and this is only once.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (33):</span> Even if he did not bless Al Netilas Yadayim when he washed the first time, he does not bless now. How can he say 'that you commanded us to wash the hands'? According to the Rosh, he already fulfilled his obligation (the first time)! It is proper to make himself obligated, e.g. to do his needs (use the bathroom) before Tefilah, which obligates Al Netilas Yadayim.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bi'ur Halachah (Sa'if 14 DH v'Yitlem):</span> In Sa'if Katan 33 I do not contradict what I wrote in 32, that one must be concerned for the Rashba's opinion regarding one who slept again, and the same applies to one who did his needs, for the same law applies to both. This is unlike what the Acharonim agreed about, brought in Sa'if Katan 30 (that if one was awake the entire night and did his needs in the morning, he blesses Al Netilas Yadayim). That is when he did not yet wash at all, unlike here. Really, it is no contradiction. Here (regarding one who did not sleep the entire night) we discuss when he did not bless the first time. One can say that even the Rashba would agree that he can bless now, like the Beis Yosef says in Siman 6. The Berachah applies to the first washing, like I explained in the Bi'ur Halachah (brought below). Here the Rema says not to bless. All agree to this. This is unlike Sa'if 13, in which he does not bless due to Safek.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span>	Note - In Siman 4, the Beis Yosef (DH u'Mashma) says 'perhaps even if he did not sleep at all, he must wash according to the Rashba's reason, for Chachamim did not distinguish.'</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bi'ur Halachah (Sa'if 13 DH Kol):</span> If he rose early and washed, the Rashba obligates washing again in the morning, for then he is a new creation - 'Chadashim la'Bekarim.' We are concerned for the Rosh, so he blesses only if he did his needs.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Chayei Adam (7:6):</span> It is proper to delay saying Al Netilas Yadayim until he cleans (the waste from inside) himself and wants to pray. Then he is Yotzei according to all opinions. If he blesses beforehand, later when he eliminates according to the Rosh he must bless again. Even though we do not follow the Rosh, it is proper to be careful about this. This is from the Magen Avraham.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>viii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bi'ur Halachah (Sa'if 1 DH v'Afilu):</span> He must have had a different text of the Magen Avraham. One cannot explain our text. The Chayei Adam connotes that even if one rose early and urinated, which is called 'doing one's needs', since presumably when Zman Tefilah comes in the morning he will go to the Beis ha'Kisei to clean himself (Note: in those days Beis ha'Kisei was a latrine. Normally it was far from one's house. One would not go so far merely to urinate - PF), he should not bless now, in order to fulfill the Rosh's opinion, that Netilas Yadayim was enacted primarily for Tefilah. Seemingly, his counsel is difficult. How is he Yotzei according to the Rashba? When he washed immediately upon rising, he fulfilled Netilas Yadayim. How can he say now on the second washing 'that you commanded us Al Netilas Yadayim'?! If this refers to the first washing, there was a big Hefsek (interruption) in the middle. L'Chatchilah one must be very careful to avoid this. However, we can resolve this. The Beis Yosef says in Siman 6 that since the Rashba holds that the washing is because one is like a new creation, one may delay the Berachah and say it with the other Berachos, even though there is a big Hefsek. However, if so one must immediately say afterwards the other Birkos ha'Shachar. The Sha'arei Teshuvah (6:5 (in many versions, 6:4 - PF)) connotes unlike the Chayei Adam. Rather, immediately after doing his needs he blesses Al Netilas Yadayim and Asher Yatzar. Also Derech ha'Chayim does not distinguish. Perhaps this is due to our question above. This is clear from Sha'arei Teshuvah. Later, I found in Ma'aseh Rav (in Sidur ha'Gra p.505, 3) like the Chayei Adam, that one should say Al Netilas Yadayim close to the time of Tefilah, and not immediately upon rising when he does not intend to pray yet. This is only if he will not forget later. One could say that Ma'aseh Rav says so because he holds like the Rosh, that one must bless for each Tefilah, but we do not. In any case, it is better to follow the Chayei Adam, for then according to the Rosh surely he is Yotzei, and perhaps also according to the Rashba, based on what the Beis Yosef wrote. If one does not do like the Chayei Adam, according to the Rosh surely he is not Yotzei. This is clear from Teshuvas ha'Rosh that the Beis Yosef brings. Also the Rambam connotes that he holds like the Rosh, that the primary enactment was for Tefilah, and not due to a new creation, since he obligates blessing for each Tefilah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ix.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (36):</span> He washes three times without a Berachah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>x.</span><span class='desl2'>	Birkei Yosef (Shiyurei Berachah 4:1):</span> Terumah Chadashah says that if one rose early, he must wash again before Tefilah or learning. Linah disqualifies Netilas Yadayim, just like it disqualifies Kidush.</p>
<p class='seealso'>See also:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>


