# dafyomi

lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) HANDS TOUCHING THE FEET DURING 'KIDUSH YADAYIM V'RAGLAYIM'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara teaches that a Kohen performs Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim by putting his right hand on his right foot and putting his left hand on his left foot, and washing the hands and feet together. <b>RASHI</b> (DH Meni'ach) explains that this is derived from the verse 'Yirchatzu' -- 'they will wash' (Shemos 40:32; see <b>HAGAHOS HA'BACH</b>), which implies that the hands and feet should be washed together.
</p><p>
However, the <b>SHALOM RAV</b> has difficulty understanding the Gemara literally. If one touches his bare foot, he must wash his hands, just as he must do if he touches any part of his body that is normally covered. Indeed, the <b>SHULCHAN ARUCH</b> (OC 4:18) mentions touching one's feet as something which requires one to wash Netilas Yadayim. Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim has even more stringent laws than Netilas Yadayim. Certainly, then, if a Kohen touches his foot he should have to perform Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim again. How can it be that the Kohanim touch their feet when washing their hands?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>SHALOM RAV</b> suggests, with hesitation, that it seems that the Gemara does not mean literally that the Kohen should touch his feet, but rather it means that he should put his hands near his feet.
</p><p>
However, the <b>YAD BINYAMIN</b> points out that the Shalom Rav apparently did not see the Rambam's comments in Perush ha'Mishnayos. The Rambam there comments that when the Kohen performs Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim, 'he should rub his foot with his hand when he is washing.' If the Kohen touches his foot during the actual Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim, what is the answer to the question of the Shalom Rav?
</p><p>
(b) The Yad Binyamin suggests in the name of the <b>SEFAS EMES</b> that because it is normal for Kohanim to walk barefoot in the Beis ha'Mikdash, their feet do not have the status of a part of the body that is normally covered.
</p><p>
(c) Alternatively, the Yad Binyamin suggests that the reason why touching one's feet necessitates washing the hands is that the feet are a covered part of the body which is usually sweaty. Accordingly, if one has just washed his feet and then he touches them, he does not need to wash his hands. (Y. Montrose)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) THE STATUS OF THE BEIS HA'MIKDASH WITHOUT A 'KIYOR'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara explains that the Kiyor would be lowered down into a pit of water at night so that its waters not become Pasul through Linah (being left out overnight; see <b>RASHI</b> DH Muchni).
</p><p>
The <b>CHIDUSHEI HA'GRIZ</b> asks an interesting question on this Gemara. There is a Mitzvah for the Jewish people to build a Beis ha'Mikdash. How can they fulfill this Mitzvah when the Kiyor is sunk into a pit at night, and there is no complete Beis ha'Mikdash at that time?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>EIZEHU MEKOMAN</b> writes that this question is valid only according to the opinion of the <b>RAMBAM</b> in <b>SEFER HA'MITZVOS</b> (Mitzvah #20), who implies that the Mitzvah to build a Beis ha'Mikdash includes building the vessels of the Beis ha'Mikdash. However, according to the <b>RAMBAN</b> (Mitzvah #33), the Mitzvah to make the vessels of the Beis ha'Mikdash is a separate Mitzvah, unrelated to the fulfillment of the Mitzvah to build a Beis ha'Mikdash.
</p><p>
(b) The Eizehu Mekoman writes further that it is not clear that lowering the Kiyor into a pit at night would take away the Kiyor's status as a Kli in the Beis ha'Mikdash. The Gemara later (24a) says that the depths under the area of the Beis ha'Mikdash were sanctified with the Kedushah of the Beis ha'Mikdash. Accordingly, the Kiyor submerged in a pit still would be considered a Kli in the Beis ha'Mikdash.
</p><p>
(c) The Eizehu Mekoman adds that the <b>GEVURAS YITZCHAK</b> (#107) questions whether, according to the Rambam, the Kiyor in fact is considered a Kli of the Beis ha'Mikdash at all. The Torah does not list the Kiyor in the Parshah of the Kelim of the Beis ha'Mikdash (but rather in Parshas Ki Sisa). Similarly, the <b>SEFORNO</b> (Shemos 30:18) says that the purpose of the other Kelim was to make the Shechinah rest on the Jewish people, while the purpose of the Kiyor was to ready the Kohanim for their Avodah. Moreover, when the Rambam lists the Kelim in the Beis ha'Mikdash, he does not include the Kiyor, which implies that he maintains that the Kiyor is not considered a Kli. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> MUST ONE WASH IN THE MORNING IF HE DID NOT SLEEP AT NIGHT? <span class='indexentry'>[Netilas Yadayim: morning: without sleeping]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	19b (Beraisa #1 - Rebbi):</span> If a Kohen was Mekadesh at night, he must be Mekadesh again when day comes, for the old Kidush is no longer valid after Linah (passing of the night).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span>	R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon says, the old Kidush remains valid.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Beraisa #2 - Rebbi):</span> If a Kohen was offering Korbanos all night, he must be Mekadesh again when day comes;</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span>	R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon says, the old Kidush remains valid, even if he serves for 10 days.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	20a (R. Yochanan):</span> If a Kohen was Mekadesh to do Terumas ha'Deshen (taking ashes off the Mizbe'ach), he need not be Mekadesh again after dawn, because Terumas ha'Deshen is the beginning of the Avodah of the coming day.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Abaye):</span> This is like Rebbi. He says that Linah disqualifies Kidush only mid'Rabanan. From the time for Terumas ha'Deshen (shortly before dawn) and onwards, it appears like the coming day, so Chachamim did not decree that Linah disqualifies.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Rava):</span> Really, it is like R. Elazar. R. Yochanan rules like R. Elazar regarding beginning the coming day's Avodah (that one Kidush suffices for all Avodos, even after dawn), and like Rebbi regarding the previous day's Avodah (that a new Kidush is needed).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span>	A Mishnah says that when the other Kohanim saw the Kohen descend from Terumas ha'Deshen, they ran to be Mekadesh. We must say that they were not doing Avodah from the night before.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	Berachos 15a (R. Yochanan):</span> To accept Ol Malchus Shamayim to the fullest extent, one should relieve himself, wash his hands, put on Tefilin, say Keri'as Shema and pray.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'>	Ravina:</span> A Chacham from Eretz Yisrael said that one who does not have water should clean his hands in dirt, pebbles or chips of wood!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span><span class='desl2'>	Support (Rava):</span> It does not say 'I will wash in water,' rather, 'b'Nikayon' -- in anything that cleanses!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>12.</span><span class='desl2'>	60b (Beraisa):</span> When one rises, he says 'Elokai Neshamah...' When he hears a rooster he blesses 'He who gave understanding...' Upon opening his eyes he blesses 'He who gives sight... When washing his hands, he blesses, 'Asher Kidshanu... Al Netilas Yadayim.'</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Berachos 9:23):</span> When one washes his hands he blesses Al Netilas Yadayim, for hands touch things. Surely they touched filthy flesh at night. A Berachah was enacted for washing before Kri'as Shema and Tefilah. We should bless 'on cleanliness of hands.' We bless Al Netilas Yadayim, for this was enacted for a meal, since one must wash from a Keli, and the Gemara calls a Keli 'Natla.' One must clean his hands before prayer - 'Erchatz b'Nikayon Kapai.' The same applies to Minchah and Ma'ariv. If one did his needs and cleaned himself, or urinated and wiped (the drops off his shoes), and wants to pray, they enacted that he wash and bless. If one did his needs and washes his hands, he blesses Al Netilas Yadayim. This was enacted only for a meal and Tefilah. Nowadays the custom is to bless Birkos ha'Shachar only after washing. The order of the Berachos in the Gemara connotes that they may be said before Netilas Yadayim. This supports the opinion that Netilas Yadayim was enacted only for Kri'as Shema and Tefilah (but not for Stam Berachos).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH u'Mashma):</span> The Tur connotes that if one was awake the entire night, he need not wash in order to pray, according to the opinion (the Rosh) that Stam hands are Kosher for Tefilah. During the day there is no Chazakah that they touched something filthy, the same applies at night if he did not sleep. Also Teshuvas ha'Rosh connotes that the enactment to wash in the morning is only if they are filthy, but not if he did not sleep. Even if he slept Arai, the Rosh exempts! The Rashba holds that we wash because he is a new creation. This applies only if he slept at night. The Medrash contrasts to one who gives a deposit to a person. He gets it back worn and ruined. One who did not sleep did not deposit (his Neshamah) with Hash-m! However, if he slept Arai, we can say that he deposited with Hash-m, and received it back new. Perhaps even if he did not sleep at all, he must wash according to this reason, for Chachamim did not distinguish. The Rosh said that he need not. However, it seems that the Rosh would agree that even if he was awake the entire night, he must wash due to Ru'ach Ra'ah that dwells on the hands at night. It seems that it does not depend on sleeping at all. However, the Zohar connotes that it dwells only at the time of sleep, when the Neshamah leaves.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Taz (OC 4:9):</span> Perhaps also the Rosh does not distinguish? I answer that the Rashba holds that the enactment was to praise Hash-m. We find that even one who did not benefit praises, e.g. he did not hear a rooster. The Rosh holds that the enactment was to save people from Aveirah, i.e. praying with filthy hands. We do not obligate one whose hands are clean. It is a Safek (whom we follow), so one washes without a Berachah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Teshuvas ha'Rashba (1:153):</span> The Gemara connotes that one blesses several Berachos in the morning before washing his hands. Stam hands are Kosher for Berachos. We say that one who washes his hands before eating (dry) Peros is haughty. Netilas Yadayim was enacted only for a (bread) meal, and washing and cleanliness for Tefilah and Kri'as Shema. In any case, presumably if one slept naked on a bed, hands move about, so they are worse than Stam hands. We assume that they are dirty from touching covered places. One may not mention Hashem's name, but Netilas Yadayim is not needed. One may clean his hands through water, pebbles, or anything that cleans. Thenm he does the activities listed (and blesses on them), and in the end he washes his hands. Ri Barceloni says that the Gemara does not mean that one blesses when he does these things, rather, when people normally do them. Even if he does not benefit from them now, others do. One may not bless before washing his hands - 'Hikon Likros Elokecha Yisrael.'</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 4:13):</span> If one was awake the entire night, it is a Safek whether he must wash in the morning to pray and to remove Ru'ach Ra'ah from his hands.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (11):</span> If he did not sleep, there is no concern lest he touched a filthy place, and he is not a new creation.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (27):</span> If he slept Keva on a bed, all agree that he must wash, for hands touch things. If he slept only Arai, the Rosh exempts.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rema:</span> He washes without a Berachah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (12):</span> The Bach learns from Teshuvas ha'Rosh that we bless. This is no proof. The Rosh holds that we bless for every Tefilah! If so, one may bless now, even though it is not yet time for Shacharis, for later he will pray! We hold that the primary reason is because he is a new creation.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (28):</span> It is a Safek if Ru'ach Ra'ah depends on sleeping, and if so even one who sleeps during the day must wash. Or, it depends on night, and even if he did not sleep.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (29):</span> He washes three times.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (30):</span> If one was awake the entire night and did his needs in the morning, the Acharonim conclude that he blesses Al Netilas Yadayim. L'Chatchilah, one who was awake the entire night should did his needs, or urinate and wipe the drops, and then all obligate Al Netilas Yadayim.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (47):</span> Some say in the name of the Ari Zal that he need not wash. Others say in his name that one must wash. The Birkei Yosef (Shiyurei Berachah 4:1, brought in Sha'arei Teshuvah 13) says so, for Linah disqualifies Netilas Yadayim, just like it disqualifies Kidush. In pressed circumstances one may be lenient.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (48):</span> If one learned from until after midnight, some say that due to his Torah and Berachos (Birkos ha'Shachar after midnight), he need not wash. One should be stringent, but if he does not have a Keli to wash into, he may wash onto the ground.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (49):</span> Some say that if he dirtied his hands at night, he blesses. Others disagree. One should not bless.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>viii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (50):</span> Eliyahu Rabah says that if one slept Arai, he blesses. This is like the Rashba, but the Beis Yosef favors the Rosh! Some say that if he blesses, it is due to Ru'ach Ra'ah. If so, it is only if he slept 60 breaths (Meforshim argue about whether this is about three minutes, a half hour, or two or three hours). Further, if so it is due to danger, and we do not bless on matters due to danger! Kitzur Shulchan Aruch says that he blesses. One should not, for it is a Safek.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ix.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (52):</span> Divrei Shalom (48) says that if one rose at midnight and was not asleep at the time, he need not wash his hands alternating, for Ru'ach Ra'ah does not dwell on him. However, he must wash his hands for cleanliness, like we wash before eating. He blesses. Ben Ish Chai says that he must wash properly. Even though Rabbeinu Zalman, Misgeret ha'Shulchan and Amudei ha'Shulchan say that one blesses only after midnight, surely the custom is like the Ben Ish Chai says. Safek Berachos Lehakel does not override a custom. However, if one woke up before midnight to drink water or use the bathroom and he will go back to sleep, he washes properly without a Berachah. However, if he woke close to midnight in order to bless Birkos ha'Shachar and say Tikun Chatzos (lamentations over the Churban), then he blesses before midnight.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>x.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (53):</span> If one partied or worked until after midnight and did not sleep until afterwards, he must wash properly and bless in the morning. The Rashash (R. Shalom  Shar'abi) says that there is no Ru'ach of Tum'ah after midnight and he need not wash, he wrote that this is because he woke at midnight and drew the Mochin (powers of intellect) through Berachos. Also his grandson (Divrei Shalom 48) relied on the Berachos and Divrei Torah (to say that there is no Tum'ah). Therefore, if one was awake until after midnight and did not bless Berachos and then slept, even the Rashash would obligate Netilas Yadayim in the morning with a Berachah. Only if he said Birkos ha'Shachar, Tikun Chatzos and engaged in Torah, then when he wakes in the morning he washes three times without a Berachah. If he only engaged in Torah but did not say Birkos ha'Shachar, I am unsure if he should bless Al Netilas Yadayim. The custom is to bless.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>xi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishpatei Uzi'el (3 OC 1):</span> R. David Shapiro proved from Zevachim that there is no Ru'ach Ra'ah on one who is awake at night. If one was offering Korbanos the entire night, he is Mekadesh in the morning. He washes his hands and feet together, without a separation between him and the floor. If there is Ru'ach Ra'ah on one's hands, he may not spill the water used to wash them in a place where people walk! This is unlike the Birkei Yosef (Shiyurei Berachah 4:1, who says that Linah disqualifies Netilas Yadayim, just like it disqualifies Kidush). R. Yitzchak Nisim Rachamim said that surely there is no Ru'ach Ra'ah in the Mikdash, so we cannot learn to outside the Mikdash. Also, even if there were Ru'ach Ra'ah there, there is no alternative, and nothing bad will result from a Mitzvah. I reject the proof from Zimun. Perhaps the Kohanim washed into a Keli before Kidush over the floor! Also, perhaps engaging in Avodah prevents Ru'ach Ra'ah from dwelling on the hands. To resolve the Ari Zal's opinion about whether Ru'ach Ra'ah dwells on one who did not sleep at night, we can say that it dwells, unless he was engaged in Torah or Avodah.</p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) WHY EXITING THE BEIS HA'MIKDASH REQUIRES ONE TO PERFORM 'KIDUSH YADAYIM V'RAGLAYIM' AGAIN</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Gemara asks, when a Kohen leaves the Azarah of the Beis ha'Mikdash after Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim, must he perform Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim again if he wants to perform the Avodah?
</p><p>
What exactly is the Gemara's doubt?
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI</b> (DH Yetzi'ah) explains that whenever one leaves the confines of the Azarah with an object that had been made Kadosh by being placed in a Kli Shares, the object becomes Pasul because of Yotzei. The Gemara is asking whether this is the law with regard to one's hands and feet when they leave the Azarah after Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim.
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Yetzi'ah) asks that the Gemara itself seems to give a different reasoning for its doubt. Is there a problem of Hesech ha'Da'as when a Kohen leaves the Azarah, or is there no Hesech ha'Da'as since the Kohen can return to the Avodah immediately? Tosfos cites a number of proofs that only when an Avodah was already done with an object does that object become Pasul when it leaves the Azarah after being sanctified in a Kli Shares. For example, the Gemara in Menachos (9a) discusses the Halachah regarding a Minchah that was mixed (Belilah) outside of the Azarah. Reish Lakish says that it is Kosher, and Rebbi Yochanan says that it is Pasul. Tosfos explains that even Rebbi Yochanan says that it is Pasul only because he considers the mixing of the Minchah something that must be done inside the Azarah, and not because the Minchah specifically went outside the Azarah.
</p><p>
Tosfos' argument is very strong. What is the explanation of Rashi?
</p><p>
The <b>TZON KODASHIM</b> answers that Rashi understands that the Gemara is asking two questions, and the reasoning which the Gemara expresses for its doubt applies only to the second question. The Gemara earlier (19b) records a dispute between Rebbi and Rebbi Elazar regarding whether or not a Kohen who did Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim at night must do Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim again in the morning. Rebbi says that he must do Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim again, and Rebbi Elazar says that he does not need to do it again. According to Rebbi, the water of the Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim used at night is considered to make the hands and feet of the Kohen unclean at dawn, since the water on his hands has stayed overnight and has become Pasul with Linah. This is true even if the Kohen dried his hands and feet well. The Gemara therefore first asks its question according to Rebbi: If the Kohen exits the Azarah, does the water with which he washed his hands become Pasul because of Yotzei, just as the passage of the night renders the water Pasul because of Linah and requires that the Kohen do Kidush Yadayim again at dawn, or since Linah is a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv (or possibly only a decree of the Rabanan, see <b>YAD BINYAMIN</b>), other Halachos such as Yotzei cannot be learned from it? Only after the Gemara asks this question does it ask the question according to Rebbi Elazar. Even according to Rebbi Elazar, who says that Linah is not a problem, it is possible that Yotzei is a problem since the Kohen may have been had a Hesech ha'Da'as.
</p><p>
Many commentaries (including the <b>TAHARAS HA'KODESH</b> and <b>KEREN ORAH</b>) have great difficulty with Tosfos. Tosfos understands, as mentioned above, that the question of the Gemara is whether or not exiting the Azarah creates a Hesech ha'Da'as, which necessitates another Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim. One of the proofs of the Gemara involves the Kohen who performs the Avodah with the Parah Adumah, which is sacrificed on Har ha'Mishchah (well outside the Azarah). The Beraisa quotes Rebbi Chiya bar Yosef who says that the Kohen first performs Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim inside the Azarah, and then he goes out to do the Avodah. The Gemara infers from there that Yotzei is not a problem for the water of Kidush Yadayim. The Gemara responds that the Avodah of the Parah Adumah is different, since all of its Avodah is done outside the Azarah. However, according to Tosfos, the entire question is one of Hesech ha'Da'as -- the Kohen who exits the Azarah will not think about doing Avodah outside the Azarah. In the case of Parah Adumah, the Kohen exits the Azarah specifically <i>to do</i> Avodah. Obviously, when the Kohen leaves the Azarah in order to do Avodah, there is no Hesech ha'Da'as! Why does the Gemara even ask this question?
</p><p>
The Yad Binyamin answers that Tosfos must understand that the answer of the Gemara is indeed that there is no Hesech ha'Da'as in the case of Parah Adumah. The other Acharonim, however, maintain that there was no reason for the Gemara to ask this question in the first place, according to Tosfos, and they do not answer this difficulty on Tosfos. (Y. Montrose)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) 'KIDUSH YADAYIM V'RAGLAYIM' AT NIGHT</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: Rebbi Yochanan says that when the Kiyor is submerged in the cistern at sundown, it is not brought up until the following morning. The Gemara assumes that Rebbi Yochanan maintains that if the Kiyor is brought up at night, it may not be used even for Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim for an Avodah of the nighttime, such as placing the Evarim of the previous day's Korbanos on the Mizbe'ach. The Gemara later shows that this assumption is incorrect, because Rebbi Yochanan himself says that Kohanim <i>may</i> do Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim at night, for the Avodah of the night, if the Kiyor is not submerged.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Kiyor) asks that the Gemara's initial assumption, that Rebbi Yochanan maintains that Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim may not be done at night because the water is Pasul for all Avodos, is difficult to understand. Many Mishnayos explicitly state that the Kohanim may do Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim at night. For example, the Mishnah in Tamid (28a) mentions that the Kohen who performs the Terumas ha'Deshen (before dawn) first does Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim. Why does the Gemara even entertain the possibility that Rebbi Yochanan would have ruled contrary to all of these Mishnayos?
</p><p>
Perhaps, Tosfos says, those Mishnayos follow the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer b'Rebbi Shimon (19b, according to Ilfa's understanding on 20a), who maintains that water does not become Pasul for Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim merely as a result of being left overnight. However, according to Rebbi Yochanan, how does the Kohen do Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim in order to do the Terumas ha'Deshen before dawn?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> answers that at this point the Gemara assumes that Rebbi Yochanan maintains that only Kohanim who did Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim during the previous day and remained awake the entire night may perform the Terumas ha'Deshen. When the Mishnah in Yoma (37a) says that new Kohanim (who did not perform Avodah the previous day) also may perform the Terumas ha'Deshen, it must be following the view of Rebbi Eliezer b'Rebbi Shimon.
</p><p>
(b) Alternatively, Tosfos answers that there was a different Kli Shares into which water was set aside for the nighttime Kidush Yadayim.
</p><p>
Many Acharonim (see <b>MAHARAM SHIF</b> and <b>PANIM ME'IROS</b>) challenge this answer of Tosfos. If Rebbi Yochanan maintains that the water of the Kiyor becomes Pasul when left out at night, how does it help to have the water in a separate Kli? That water also should be Pasul!
</p><p>
1. The <b>TZON KODASHIM</b> answers that although the Gemara later (22a) derives from a verse that a Kli Shares is able to be Mekadesh water so that it may be used for Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim, it is not Mekadesh the water to the extent that it can become Pasul through Linah, in contrast to water in the Kiyor.
</p><p>
The <b>YAD BINYAMIN</b> does not accept the Tzon Kodashim's distinction between the level of Kidush accomplished by a Kli Shares and the level of Kidush accomplished by the Kiyor. If a different Kli Shares is able to be Mekadesh the water so that it can be used for Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim, it should also be Mekadesh the water so that it can become Pasul through Linah.
</p><p>
2. The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> explains that at this point, the Gemara understands that Rebbi Yochanan maintains that the water of the Kiyor which was left out at night is Pasul only mid'Rabanan due to a Gezeirah (see following Insights). Accordingly, it is possible that the water in a Kli Shares would not be Pasul because of Linah, since the Rabanan did not apply their Gezeirah to such water. This is because whenever the Rabanan enact a Gezeirah, they enact the Gezeirah only in common cases ('Milsa d'Shechicha'), as opposed to uncommon cases ('Milsa d'Lo Shechicha'). Since it is unusual that a Kohen would set aside water for Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim in a separate Kli Shares, such a situation is a 'Milsa d'Lo Shechicha,' and thus the Gezeirah of Linah does not apply to such a case. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> MAY ONE IMMERSE HIS HANDS IN A KELI? <span class='indexentry'>[Netilas Yadayim :Tevilah ]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question:</span> May a Kohen be Mekadesh *in* the Kiyor?</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span>	The Torah said that he washes 'Mimenu (from it)', not 'b'Socho (in it).' Or, perhaps this includes even in it?</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak - Beraisa):</span> If he immersed his hands in water in a cave, he is Mechalel Avodah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Inference:</span> If he immersed his hands in the Kiyor, his Avodah is Kosher!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rejection:</span> The Beraisa taught about a cave for a Chidush (but not for the inference). One might have thought that since he can immerse his entire body in it, all the more so he can be Mekadesh his hands and feet in it!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Chulin 107a	(Rav Papa):</span> One may not wash in an irrigation pipe (they pour water from the river into the pipe, and from which it flows to the field), since the water does not come to his hands from Ko'ach Adam (human impetus, rather, due to gravity).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span>	One may wash (in the pipe) near the place into which water is poured, since the Ko'ach of the water is primarily from the man who poured it.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Berachos 6:5):</span> Anyone who needs Netilas Yadayim, if he immersed his hands in a Mikveh, he does not need anything else. If he immersed them in water without the Shi'ur for a Mikveh, or in Mayim She'uvim (water that was in a Keli) in the ground, he did nothing. Mayim She'uvim are Metaher hands only through Netilah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Hagahos Maimoniyos (6):</span> This is unlike Bahag, who allows Tevilas Yadayim in a Keli.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Chulin 8:13):</span> Bahag permits immersing the hands in a Keli. Our Sugya requires Ko'ach Adam! However, we can say that we require Netilah from a Keli, whether he immerses his hands in it or pours from it. Here, his hands are outside the Keli, and the Keli's Ko'ach ended when the water comes on his hands. The Gemara does not really mean that Ko'ach Adam is required. The problem is that it is not from Ko'ach Keli. Alternatively, a Mishnah (Yadayim 1:5) says that anyone can pour the water, even a Cheresh, lunatic or minor, or he puts the Keli between his knees and washes, or tilts it on its side and washes, or a monkey pours. R. Yosi disqualifies the last two. He requires Ko'ach Adam; the first Tana requires only Ko'ach Keli. Our Sugya is like R. Yosi. Bahag is like Chachamim. One must be stringent, for the Sugya is like R. Yosi.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Teshuvah 48:6):</span> The pipe is not a Keli. If there is a spout on a barrel, one removes the spout between every pouring, then it is Ko'ach Adam, since the water comes due to removing the spout. If he would not remove the spout each time, then it would be like a barrel that one tilted on its side.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Talmidei R. Yonah (Berachos 42a DH v'Chasav):</span> Rav Yehudai Ga'on says that one can put his hands in a Keli of water for Netilas Yadayim. He brings a proof from Kidush in the MikdashThe Torah said that he washes 'from it', not 'in it.' Since we disqualify regarding Kidush, this implies that this is permitted for Netilas Yadayim for Chulin. It seems that he does not require that the water come from Ko'ach Adam. Even though the Sugya proves that we require Ko'ach Adam, since a Mishnah holds that we do not require Ko'ach Adam (it is Machshir through a monkey or tilting the Keli), the Sugya here is rejected.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Note:</span> Surely, he does not mean that the Mishnah refutes the Sugya. The Amora'im knew all the Mishnayos! He must mean that we rely on the Stam Tana of the Mishnah, and reject our Sugya, which is like R. Yosi.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rebuttal (R. Yonah):</span> There is an argument in the Mishnah. The Sugya shows that we rule like R. Yosi, who requires Ko'ach Adam. Also the Ra'avad says so. Perhaps the Gemara knew that the Stam Mishnah is really an individual's opinion.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mordechai (Berachos 200):</span> We require Ko'ach Adam when he washes outside the Keli, e.g. the water is poured on his hands. When he sticks out his hands and washes in a Keli, this is Ko'ach Adam, and it is Kosher. Even though the first water that one puts on his hands is Tamei, and the water in a Keli mixes, there is no concern. We can say that Chachamim made a Ma'alah for (immersing in) a Keli (and there is no concern for Tamei water). Kohanim used to wash from the Kiyor. They pulled the lever and the water flowed onto the hands. This is Ko'ach Adam. We refer to the first flow, which was great, and it is the primary Ko'ach. Alternatively, they closed the spout each time and pulled it again, so it was always Ko'ach Adam.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Hagahos Ashri (Berachos 2:11):</span> If one wants to eat, and there is 40 Sa'im of water in a basin, it suffices to wash his hands in it.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 159:8):</span> If one put his hands in a Keli of water and shook them, if the Keli is connected to the ground, it is not considered Netilah. If the Keli is not connected to the ground, some say that it is considered Netilah, and some say that it is not. In pressed circumstances one may rely on the lenient opinion. If later he is able to wash normally, he washes without a Berachah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH u'Svaras):</span> The Rashba says that the Ramban answered for Bahag that in Chulin, since the water is in the ground, it is like Tevilah, and there is no Tevilah in Mayim She'uvim. To wash the hands in a Keli is Netilah. He added that even Bahag forbids shaking the hands in a Keli attached to the ground, for it is Mayim She'uvim, like the irrigation pipe. In Toras ha'Bayis, he brought Bahag Stam to be the Halachah. Hagahos Maimoniyos says in the name of Semag that the Halachah does not follow Bahag. (Note: this is not in our text of Hagahos Maimoniyos.) Also Bedek ha'Bayis and the Rambam (Hilchos Mikva'os 11:1) rule unlike Bahag. Mahari Ben Chaviv says that one may rely on Bahag in pressed circumstances or b'Di'eved, e.g. he washed his hands in a Keli and blessed Al Netilas Yadayim. It is good to be stringent and wash again from a Keli, but not to bless, for he was already Yotzei according to some opinions.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bach (9 DH Mihu):</span> Hagahos Ashri says that Bahag permits only when the Keli has 40 Sa'im of water. Even in pressed circumstances one may be lenient only in such a case. The Shulchan Aruch holds that if the Keli was attached, he washes again with a Berachah. I say that if there were 40 Sa'im inside, he washes again without a Berachah. Those who disagree with Bahag explain that when we first asked about Kidush mid'Oraisa, we also asked about Netilas Yadayim. We conclude that one may not be Mekadesh in the Kiyor, and also Netilas Yadayim in a Keli is invalid.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Taz (10):</span> All the Poskim who bring Bahag do not require 40 Sa'im in the Keli, for he is Machshir due to Netilah. The Bach brings Hagahos Ashri, who requires 40 Sa'im. I say that surely the correct text should say 'even if there is *not* 40 Sa'im of water inside.'  If not, why did we need a verse to teach that one may not immerse hands in the Kiyor? It did not hold 40 Sa'im. The Rambam (Hilchos Bi'as Mikdash 5:13) says that it suffices if it has enough to wash four Kohanim. We do not find anyone who says that it must hold 40 Sa'im, which is a much greater Shi'ur.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (60):</span> If there 40 Sa'im inside, he washes again without a Berachah, like the Bach, for we are lenient about Safek Berachos.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Taz (11):</span> The Yam Shel Shlomo (Chulin 8:73) says that since Rav Papa explicitly requires Ko'ach Adam, and all the Acharonim hold like this, even in pressed circumstances one may not wash in a Keli, and if he did he washes again with a Berachah, unlike the Shulchan Aruch.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (15):</span> Since there is an argument, he does not bless the first time. If so, he should bless the second time. He blesses for the first Netilah that was valid, whichever it was! Perhaps since one may wash in a Keli in pressed circumstances, he blesses on it, for it is considered Heter. If not, how could he eat without Netilas Yadayim?! The Beis Yosef connotes like this.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	Gra:</span> Almost all Poskim require Ko'ach Adam. Those who defend Bahag say that we require Ko'ach Keli, and the irrigation pipe is not a Keli, for it is attached. Washing in it is Tevilah, and it is Pasul in Mayim She'uvim. The Rashba says that the same applies to a Keli attached to the ground if it was attached and then carved out, like the irrigation pipe.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (52 and Bi'ur Halachah (DH Im):</span> Even those who say that Tevilah in a Keli is like Netilah, it is worse when the Keli is attached, for then it looks like Tevilah, which does not apply in She'uvim. Olas Tamid and the Drishah say so, and the Shulchan Aruch's words connote like them. However, this is from the Ramban and Rashba, who do not say that we decree because it looks like Tevilah. Rather, since it was attached and then carved out, it was never a Keli. The Gra and Ritva explicitly explain this way.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (53):</span> Those who say that it is valid require only a Revi'is in the Keli, for they consider it like actual Netilah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (54):</span> The latter opinion disqualifies even if there are 40 Sa'im, for it requires Ko'ach Adam. Also, it must be like Kidush in the Mikdash. Tevilah in the Kiyor is invalid.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>12.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (56):</span> The Maharshal says that one may not rely on the first opinion, and it seems that the Gra agrees. Even one who wants to rely on the first opinion does not bless. The Graz and Chayei Adam say that he should wrap his hands in a cloth and eat.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>13.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (57 and Bi'ur Halachah DH Notel):</span> He does not bless when washing again, for perhaps he was already Yotzei the first time. Some say that he was Yotzei the first time because shaking his hands in the Keli is like Ko'ach Adam.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>14.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (63):</span> He should scratch his head or touch a covered part of the body to obligate himself to wash again, and bless. If he blessed the first time, he washes again without a Berachah.</p>
<p class='normal'></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) 'GEZEIRAS SHIKU'A'</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Gemara records a dispute about when the water of the Kiyor becomes Pasul. Rebbi Chiya bar Yosef says that the water of the Kiyor has a different status for different Avodos. For Avodos that are 'Matirim' -- they normally permit Korbanos to be eaten (by either the Mizbe'ach or by people) -- the water of the Kiyor becomes Pasul if it is not submerged before Sheki'ah, sunset. For Avodos of 'Evarim' -- burning the limbs and fats of the Korban on the Mizbe'ach, which is normally done at night -- the Kiyor water must be submerged at Alos ha'Shachar (dawn) in order not to become Pasul. Rav Chisda disagrees and says that even for Avodos of 'Matirim,' the water merely must be submerged by Alos ha'Shachar, not by Sheki'ah. Rebbi Yochanan says that a Kiyor which is submerged at Sheki'ah is not brought up until the following morning. He also states that a Kiyor which was not submerged at night may be used for Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim of the Avodos of the night, but may not be used for the Avodos of the next day.
</p><p>
The Gemara asks, what is the difference between the opinion of Rebbi Yochanan and that of Rebbi Chiya bar Yosef? The Gemara answers that the difference is 'Gezeiras Shiku'a.' What is Gezeiras Shiku'a?
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI</b> (DH Ika Beinaihu) explains that according to Rebbi Yochanan, a Gezeirah was made that the Kiyor should always be submerged at night, in order to insure that it would be submerged the next day at dawn. Rebbi Yochanan maintains that the water of the Kiyor does <i>not</i> become Pasul at Sheki'ah, or if the Kiyor is out at any time during the night, for Avodos of the day (even after this Gezeirah was made). This is why he says that once the Kiyor is submerged at Sheki'ah, it 'should not be brought up' again, instead of saying that if the water is brought up after Sheki'ah it 'becomes Pasul.' Rebbi Chiya bar Yosef, on the other hand, maintains that the water becomes Pasul for the Avodos of the day if it is brought up at any time of the night. This is why Rebbi Chiya states that the water of the Kiyor 'becomes Pasul'; he maintains that there was no need for a Gezeiras Shiku'a, since once the water comes out at night it automatically becomes Pasul for the Avodos of the day.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Hagah) asks that instead of saying that 'Gezeiras Shiku'a' is the difference between Rebbi Yochanan and Rebbi Chiya, the Gemara should have said that the difference between them is whether or not the water of the Kiyor becomes Pasul for the Avodah of the day when it is left out at night. Moreover, the Gemara should have asked immediately (and not left the question until later) that the opinion of Rebbi Yochanan is identical to the opinion of Rav Chisda, who also maintains that the water of the Kiyor becomes Pasul only when it is left out at Alos ha'Shachar.
</p><p>
(b) Tosfos therefore explains that 'Gezeiras Shiku'a' means not only that the Kiyor should always be submerged at night, in order to ensure that it be submerged the next day at Alos ha'Shachar, but also that if the water of the Kiyor was not submerged at Sheki'ah, it becomes Pasul mid'Rabanan for the Avodos of the day. According to Rebbi Chiya, the water is Pasul mid'Oraisa for the Avodos of the day.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> first suggests that Rebbi Yochanan is more stringent than Rebbi Chiya. He agrees with Rebbi Chiya that the water of the Kiyor has a different status for different Avodos, and that it becomes Pasul for Avodos of 'Matirim' when it was not submerged before Sheki'ah, and for Avodos of 'Evarim' when it was not submerged before Alos ha'Shachar. However, Rebbi Yochanan maintains that there is an additional Gezeirah d'Rabanan. Even if one wants to do an Avodah of Evarim at night, he should not raise the Kiyor in order to do Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim. Since other Kohanim might not be aware that the Kiyor was raised at night, they might end up using water which is unfit for Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim for the Avodos of the next day. In this respect Rebbi Yochanan differs with Rebbi Chiya, since Rebbi Chiya maintains that the Kiyor may be used for the Avodah of the night, while Rebbi Yochanan maintains that l'Chatchilah it cannot be used for the Avodah of the night without becoming Pasul for the Avodos of the coming day. (Y. Montrose)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) THE CASE OF 'KODE'ACH MI'TOCHO'</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Gemara quotes Rebbi Yosi who says that when the Kiyor does not contain enough water to be Mekadesh Yadayim v'Raglayim for four Kohanim, it may not be used for Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim. (See <b>ZEVACH TODAH</b> for what constitutes enough water to be Mekadesh Yadayim v'Raglayim for four Kohanim.) The Gemara questions this ruling from a Beraisa which states that any Kli may be used for Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim, even one that does not contain a Revi'is, as long as the Kli is a Kli Shares. Rav Ada bar Ahavah answers that Rebbi Yosi's ruling applies to a case of 'Kode'ach mi'Tocho.' What is Rav Ada's answer?
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI</b> (DH b'Kode'ach) explains that 'Kode'ach mi'Tocho' refers to one who chisels a hole into the side of the Kiyor and places a small vessel in the hole, from which he draws water through the Kiyor into the vessel to do Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim. In this case, the Beraisa says that one may use a small Kli for Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim.
</p><p>
The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> questions Rashi's explanation. Using such a vessel for Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim is exactly the same as using the Kiyor itself. If this is the intention of Rav Ada, then the Gemara's question on his answer does not make sense. The Gemara asks that the verse, 'Mimenu' -- 'from it' (Shemos 40:31), teaches that one may not do Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim from anything other the Kiyor. Using a vessel inside of a hole in the Kiyor, however, is exactly like using the Kiyor!
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Kode'ach) explains that 'Kode'ach' merely means that the Kohen scoops some water from the Kiyor into a smaller Kli Shares.
</p><p>
The <b>YAD BINYAMIN</b> quotes the <b>CHEIL HA'MIKDASH</b> who explains that the argument between Rashi and Tosfos is based on their respective ways of understanding the Halachah that there must be enough water in the Kiyor to do Kidush Yadayim for four Kohanim. Does the Halachah require that Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim be from a <i>Kli</i> which contains enough water for four Kohanim, or does the Halachah require that the <i>water</i> must have once been in a Kli which contained enough water for four Kohanim? Rashi understands that the Kli must contain water for four Kohanim, and thus he understands that the Gemara refers to a small Kli attached to the Kiyor. Tosfos understands that the water must have once been in a Kli which contained enough water for four Kohanim, and therefore he learns that the Gemara refers to water taken from the Kiyor and placed into a smaller Kli.
</p><p>
The Zevach Todah has difficulty with the explanations of both Rashi and Tosfos. When the Kohen performs Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim, he must wash both of his hands and his feet. In order for the Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim to be valid, he certainly needs a Revi'is of water! The Zevach Todah answers that, of course, more water was needed to complete the Kidush Yadayim v'Raglayim. The Beraisa is merely saying that the water in this Kli may be used as part of the water for the Kidush Yadayim. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafbbb'><span class='numt'>1)</span> WHICH AVEIROS DISQUALIFY FROM BIRKAS KOHANIM? <span class='indexentry'>[Birkas Kohanim :Aveirah]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Mishnah):</span> An Arel is Mechalel Avodah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Ta'anis 26b (R. Yehoshua ben Levi):</span> Parshas Nazir is next to Birkas Kohanim, to forbid a Kohen who will Duchan to drink wine, just like a Nazir.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question (R. Zeira's father):</span> If so, one who ate Chartzan (grape peels) should be forbidden to Duchan!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Yitzchak):</span> 'Lesharso u'Levarech bi'Shmo' - just like Sherus (Avodah) is permitted after one ate Chartzan, also Berachah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Suggestion:</span> Just like a Ba'al Mum cannot serve, he cannot Duchan!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rejection:</span> The Hekesh to Nazir shows that he may. These Hekeshim are mid'Rabanan, so we are lenient.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Tefilah 15:3):</span> If a Kohen murdered, even if he did Teshuvah, he does not Duchan. If he served idolatry, whether b'Ones or Shogeg, even if he repented, he never Duchans. Other Aveiros do not disqualify.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (6):</span> If a Kohen did not have one of these disqualifications that inhibits Birkas Kohanim, even if he is not a Chacham and is not meticulous about Mitzvos, or everyone murmurs about him, or his business dealings were not just, he gives Birkas Kohanim and we do not stop him. This is a Mitzvas Aseh for every Kohen qualified for Birkas Kohanim. We do not tell a Rasha to be a bigger Rasha and refrain from Mitzvos.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 128:37):</span> A Mumar to idolatry does not Duchan. Some say that if he repented, he Duchans (Rema - this is primary). If he was forced, all agree that he Duchans.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (134):</span> We learn from Avodah; he is Pasul for Avodah. A Mumar to be Mechalel Shabbos in public is like a Nochri, and he does not Duchan.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (217):</span> A Mechalel Shabbos is Pasul to Duchan only if he transgressed mid'Oraisa, and in front of 10 people.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tzitz Eliezer (13:14):</span> In Likutim Halachos, the Chafetz Chayim was in Safek whether a Mechalel Shabbos in public is a Ben Nechar who is Mechalel Avodah, since he is like a Nochri in every way. Seemingly, we can resolve this from what he himself wrote in Mishnah Berurah (134), that a Mumar to be Mechalel Shabbos in public is like a Nochri, and he does not Duchan. We learn the Isur to Duchan from Chilul Avodah. We are much more lenient about Birkas Kohanim. If so, since one who is Mechalel Shabbos in public may not Duchan, all the more so he is Mechalel Avodah. The Pri Chodosh, Pri Megadim and the Aderes (at the end of Orchos Chayim) say that it is obvious that one who is Mechalel Shabbos may not Duchan. We should be stringent like them until the Kohen repents. If there are different opinions in the Beis ha'Keneses and not all will heed the Rav and strife will result, one should do like Rav Levitan says, and be silent. If they go to Duchan by themselves, he does not tell them to descend. There must be at least one Kosher Kohen at the Duchan with the Mechalelei Shabbos. If there is concern that if they do not come to Duchan in the Beis ha'Keneses on Yomim Nora'im and festivals, they and their children will forget that they are Kohanim, and they will become Tamei Mes and marry divorcees (which they avoided until now), one can permit them to Duchan and rely on reasons to be lenient in time of need.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bach (23):</span> If one's brothers died due to Bris Milah, and therefore, he is an Arel (uncircumcised), he is Pasul for Avodah. A Hekesh equates Birkas Kohanim to Avodah. Why didn't the Poskim say that he is Pasul for Birkas Kohanim? Perhaps this is because in Sanhedrin (83b), we say that an Arel is not Chayav Misah for Avodah. He transgressed only a Lav. Anyone who is exempt for entering the Mikdash may Duchan, like I explained about one who drank. This requires investigation.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (54):</span> We say in Ta'anis that the Hekesh is only to be lenient, to permit Chartzan, but not to be stringent. A Ba'al Mum and many others Pasul for Avodah taught in the second Perek of Zevachim are Kosher for Birkas Kohanim. Semag (Mitzvah 20) says that a Mumar is Kosher for Birkas Kohanim. The Hekesh is only for standing. Even the Rambam and those with him, who disqualify a Mumar, say that this is a fine regarding Avodah, and similarly for Birkas Kohanim. Where there is no fine, they agree that he can Duchan. The Rambam says that one who is drunk is Pasul due to the Hekesh of Berachah to Avodah, to teach that just like if he paused while drinking or mixed in any water he is exempt, the same applies to Birkas Kohanim. Had we learned from Nazir, we would have forbidden one who drank any amount, even if it was diluted. Even if he did not circumcise himself b'Mezid, he is Kosher, like the Rema (Sa'if 39).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bi'ur Halachah (DH v'Im):</span> The Magen Avraham says that if an Arel's brothers died due to Bris Milah, he gives Birkas Kohanim, even according to the first opinion in this Sa'if, like the Rema says in Sa'if 39. This is from the Rambam, who is the first opinion here. The Bach was unsure whether the Hekesh of Berachah to Avodah disqualifies him according to the Rambam. The Chemed Moshe, Eliyahu Rabah and Pri Chodosh explain the Rambam like the Bach. Eliyahu Rabah connotes that even the second opinion, which does not make the Hekesh, disqualifies an Arel. Perhaps this is like one who sits (while blessing) or marries forbidden women, which all disqualify. I say that if the Arel did not circumcise due to Ones, i.e. his brothers died due to Milah, surely we can be lenient, for we allow a Mumar to idolatry who repented to Duchan, for we do not make the Hekesh. Or Zaru'a and Shibolei ha'Leket explain that since he did not lose his Kedushah, and a divorcee is forbidden to him, he is also Kadosh for Birkas Kohanim. No one would think to permit an Arel Kohen to marry a divorcee! Pri Chodosh's proof from one who marries forbidden women is invalid. There he transgresses, so we fined him and do not give to him attributes of Kehunah as long as he profanes himself. (Once he divorces her and vows Al Da'as Rabim not to benefit from her, he gets back his Kedushah.) Here, this is total Ones. He is no worse than one who became a Mumar and repented, whom we allow to Duchan. Eliyahu Rabah was stringent, because he cannot eat Kodshim, so he is worse than a Ba'al Mum. This is wrong. A Tamei Kohen cannot eat Kodshim, yet he Duchans, like the Pri Megadim says. R. Tam says that an Arel is Pasul for Avodah only if he does not circumcise b'Mezid. If his brothers died, he is Kosher. Even though many disagree, we can join his opinion for Birkas Kohanim, since most hold that the Hekesh of Berachah to Avodah is only mid'Rabanan. If he did not circumcise b'Mezid, one should be stringent like the Pri Chodosh. He is like one who marries forbidden women.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (222):</span> Several say that an Arel does not Duchan. Mishbetzos Zahav (39 DH v'Hinei) says that even if he ascended to Duchan, he goes down.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (39):</span> If there was nothing about a Kohen that disqualifies from Birkas Kohanim, even if he is not meticulous about Mitzvos and everyone murmurs about him, he gives Birkas Kohanim.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH Lo):</span> This is the Perush of the Yerushalmi, which says 'do not say that Ploni transgresses Arayos and spills blood. Will he bless me?!'</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (143):</span> This is even if he transgressed severe Aveiros such as Arayos.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (144):</span> This is even if what they say is true, i.e. his evil is public knowledge.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rema:</span> Other Aveiros do not inhibit Birkas Kohanim.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (56):</span> Ra'anach (Mayim Amukim 2:42) says that this is if he repented. In any case, we do not disqualify a Kohen due to bad repute.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Gra:</span> This is even if we know about the Aveiros, since we say (Sa'if 35) that if he murdered, he does not Duchan. This is if he did not repent, like it says in Sa'if 35. Even the Rambam agrees to this.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (145):</span> Only idolatry and murder disqualify.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (146):</span> This is even if he did not repent.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishbetzos Zahav (39 DH Kol):</span> One who transgresses to anger Hash-m is like a Nochri, so he does not Duchan.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Igros Moshe (OC 2:33:2):</span> Even though the Rema (YD 264:1) says that a Mumar to Orlah is like a Nochri, the Shach (5) says that this is only to disqualify him from circumcising others. For everything else, he is not a Mumar.</p>
<p class='seealso'>See also:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) ONE WHO IS 'TAMEI MES' WHO SENDS HIS KORBANOS TO THE BEIS HA'MIKDASH</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Mishnah (15b) teaches that when a Kohen who is Tamei is Mekabel the blood of a Korban, the Avodah is Pasul. The Gemara quotes the Ziknei Darom who explain that this refers only to a Kohen who is Tamei with Tum'as Sheretz. If, however, a Kohen touched a corpse and became Tamei with Tum'as Mes, b'Di'eved his Avodah is valid. Since a public Korban may be brought in a state of Tum'ah when most of the people are Tamei with Tum'as Mes, even a private Korban does not become Pasul when the Avodah is done by a Kohen who is Tamei Mes.
</p><p>
The reason why the Ziknei Darom maintain that when the Kohen is Tamei with Tum'as Sheretz the Avodah is <i>not</i> valid b'Di'eved is that they compare the Kohen to the owner of the Korban who receives atonement. Just as the owner may bring his Korban when he is Tamei only when he is Tamei with Tum'as Mes but not when he is Tamei with Tum'as Sheretz, the Avodah of the Kohen is valid only when the Kohen is Tamei with Tum'as Mes and not with Tum'as Sheretz.
</p><p>
Reish Lakish disagrees with the Ziknei Darom. He says that the owner of a Korban has the ability to send his Korban to the Beis ha'Mikdash when he is Tamei with Tum'as Sheretz. However, the law is that a Kohen cannot perform the Avodah when he is Tamei with Tum'as Sheretz. Accordingly, the Tum'ah of the owner of a Korban is easier to circumvent than the Tum'ah a Kohen. Accordingly, since an ordinary person cannot have a Korban brought for him under normal circumstances when he is Tamei with Tum'as Mes, a Kohen who performs the Avodah when he is Tamei with Tum'as Mes should invalidate the Avodah, just as he does when he is Tamei with Tum'as Sheretz!
</p><p>
The Gemara concludes that the Ziknei Darom maintain that when one is Tamei with Tum'as Mes, he <i>is</i> permitted to send Korbanos to the Beis ha'Mikdash according to the letter of the law.
</p><p>
The Gemara proceeds to ask numerous questions on this opinion of the Ziknei Darom. The questions center around the Korban Pesach and Pesach Sheni. Apparently, the Torah instituted Pesach Sheni for the people who were Tamei on Pesach and who could not bring their Korbanos to the Beis ha'Mikdash then. According to the Ziknei Darom, why were the Tamei people unable to send their Korbanos on Pesach despite the fact that they were Tamei? The Gemara answers that there is a Mitzvah that those who send their Korban Pesach should not be Tamei Mes, even though the letter of the law is that they could send their Korban anyway.
</p><p>
Does the argument between Reish Lakish and the Ziknei Darom apply only to the Korban Pesach or to all other Korbanos as well?
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI</b> throughout the Gemara (see, for example, DH Tamei Mes Nami) implies that the questions asked on the Ziknei Darom involve only Korban Pesach, and that the question is relevant only to whether or not a Tamei Mes may send his Korban Pesach to the Beis ha'Mikdash. The question does not apply to other Korbanos.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Bi'as ha'Mikdash 2:12) writes that one who is Tamei with Tum'as Mes cannot send any of his Korbanos to the Beis ha'Mikdash until he becomes Tahor. The <b>KESEF MISHNEH</b> explains that the Rambam reaches this conclusion because he rules like Reish Lakish in the Gemara here, and not like the Ziknei Darom.
</p><p>
The Acharonim grapple the opinion of the Rambam. Not only does the Gemara not mention that this dispute applies to other Korbanos, but the Beraisa in Pesachim (62a) says explicitly that one who is Tamei may send his Korbanos to the Beis ha'Mikdash. Why does the Rambam rule that one who is Tamei may not send his Korbanos to the Beis ha'Mikdash?
</p><p>
1. The <b>MINCHAS BARUCH</b> (23:2) cites the Gemara in Moed Katan (15b) which implies that a Tamei Mes may not send his Korbanos to the Beis ha'Mikdash. Accordingly, the Rambam is ruling in like the Gemara in Moed Katan, and not like the Beraisa in Pesachim. The <b>YAD BINYAMIN</b> also gives this answer. These Acharonim apparently disagree with the Kesef Mishneh regarding the Rambam's source for this ruling.
</p><p>
2. The Minchas Baruch (22:2) answers further that the Rambam rules in accordance with the view of Rebbi Yitzchak in Pesachim (90b). Rebbi Yitzchak understands that when the verses mention people who were Tamei Mes and could not bring their Korban Pesach, it refers to people who were about to become Tahor on the night of Pesach, when the Korban Pesach is eaten. Although they technically would have been able to eat the Pesach b'Taharah on Pesach night, they were not allowed to send their Korban Pesach on Erev Pesach when they were Tamei. Rebbi Yitzchak does not agree with the logic of the Gemara here, that a Tamei Mes is forbidden only from sending a Korban Pesach since he will not be able to eat the Korban that he sends. Other Korbanos, in contrast, do not have to be eaten, and thus a Tamei Mes may send them to the Beis ha'Mikdash. Since Rebbi Yitzchak maintains that even when one is able to eat the Korban Pesach he may not send his Korban Pesach to the Beis ha'Mikdash, it must be that he understands that a Tamei Mes may never send any Korban, because the <i>sending</i> is prohibited by the Torah, not the fact that he cannot eat the Korban b'Taharah. (Y. Montrose)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) WERE THE 'ZIKNEI DAROM' TANA'IM OR AMORA'IM?</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Gemara records the novel opinion of the Ziknei Darom, who rule that when one is Tamei Mes he is permitted to send all types of Korbanos to the Beis ha'Mikdash, including the Korban Pesach, according to the letter of the law.
</p><p>
The Gemara asks numerous questions on their opinion. One of its questions is from a Beraisa which derives from the verse, 'b'Michsas Nefashos' -- 'for specifically designated individuals' (Shemos 12:4), that the Korban Pesach may be slaughtered only for a person who is included in the designated group which is bringing the Korban Pesach. If it is slaughtered for someone who is not part of the group, it is Pasul. This is the case not only with regard to slaughtering the Korban for a person who is not part of the group, but even for a person who is Tamei Mes. The Beraisa explicitly compares the law of slaughtering for a person who is not part of the group to the law of slaughtering for a person who is Tamei Mes. How do the Ziknei Darom understand this Beraisa? The Gemara answers that they simply do not compare the two laws, and therefore they understand that a Tamei Mes may send his Korban Pesach according to the letter of the law.
</p><p>
How can the Ziknei Darom argue with the Beraisa? Are they Tana'im? The Gemara earlier (22b) implies that they are not Tana'im, because it quotes them in the context of a dispute with Reish Lakish, an Amora.
</p><p>
(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Ziknei Darom) explains that the Ziknei Darom indeed are Tana'im, and they may argue with the Beraisa. This also explains why they may argue with an explicit Mishnah in Pesachim (61a) which says that when one slaughters a Korban for people who are Tamei Mes, the Korban is Pasul.
</p><p>
If the Ziknei Darom are Tana'im, then how can Reish Lakish argue with them? Perhaps Tosfos had the text of the <b>HAGAHOS HA'BACH</b> (22b) which replaces 'Reish Lakish' with 'Reish Galusa.' Alternatively, perhaps Reish Lakish relies on the Beraisa quoted by the Gemara here which clearly argues with the Ziknei Darom.
</p><p>
(b) Alternatively, Tosfos says the Ziknei Darom follow one version of the opinion of the Tana, Rebbi Nasan (Pesachim 78b), who says that one does not have to eat the Korban Pesach in order to be able to send a Korban Pesach. Tosfos apparently means that the Ziknei Darom were Amora'im, but since they have a Tana on whom to rely, they are able to argue with the Beraisa.
</p><p>
The <b>MAGINEI SHLOMO</b> in Pesachim (69b) proves from the fact that Reish Lakish argues with the Ziknei Darom that they must be Amora'im. Although he agrees that one could refute this proof by saying that Reish Lakish lived during the era of the last Tana'im, he concludes that this is not a good answer in the case of the Ziknei Darom. Tosfos himself states that the Ziknei Darom clearly argue with an explicit Mishnah. If they are Tana'im, why does the Gemara ask numerous questions on them from Beraisos, when it is clear that they argue on an explicit Mishnah? It must be that they are Amora'im who were able to learn the Mishnah in Pesachim differently. (See the Maginei Shlomo, who says that the Ziknei Darom follow the view of Rebbi Eliezer in Pesachim 69b, and not that of Rebbi Nasan.) (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafbbb'><span class='numt'>1)</span> STANDING SUPPORTED IS NOT LIKE STANDING <span class='indexentry'>[standing: with support]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	19b (Beraisa):</span> The Kohen puts each hand on the corresponding foot, and is Mekadesh (pours water on them);</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span>	R. Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah says, he puts one hand on the other, and puts them on his feet, which were one on the other, and is Mekadesh.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Chachamim:</span> One cannot stand this way!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Rav Yosef):</span> R. Yosi holds that another Kohen supports him.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Abaye):</span> R. Yosi and Chachamim argue about whether standing Min ha'Tzad (with support) is considered standing.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question (Rav Sama brei d'Rav Ashi):</span> Why can't the Kohen sit?</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer (Ravina):</span> Kidush is called 'Leshares', and Avodah must be standing.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	23b (Beraisa):</span> 'La'amod Leshares' teaches that l'Chatchilah, Avodah must be standing. 'Ha'Omedim' - the repetition teaches that it is Me'akev.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	Megilah 21a (Beraisa):</span> (One may read the Megilah standing or sitting.) This does not apply to Kri'as ha'Torah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Avahu):</span> We learn from 'Stand here with me'.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span><span class='desl2'>	Contradiction:</span> It says 'va'Eshev (I sat) on the mountain', and it says, 'I stood on the mountain'!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>12.</span><span class='desl2'>	Resolution (R. Chanina):</span> Moshe neither sat nor stood. Rather, he was bent over.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>13.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shevuos 30b:</span> Rav Huna's widow came for judgment in front of Rav Nachman. He could not sit, for a Chacham's wife is like a Chacham.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>14.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question:</span> The judge must sit at the time of the final verdict!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>15.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer:</span> He sat half-way, like one untying his shoe, at the time.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Tefilah 5:7):</span> One stands in fear (during Shemoneh Esre).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Hagahos Maimoniyos (7):</span> One may not stand supported. This is a Kal va'Chomer from one who translates the Torah (see 12:11).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (12:11):</span> The one who translates the Torah (during the Kri'ah) may not lean.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Hagahos Maimoniyos (9):</span> This is from the Yerushalmi. All the more so, the one who reads may not lean.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Megilah 3:1):</span> One who reads from the Torah must stand. He may not even support himself, like it says in the Yerushalmi.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tosfos (19b DH Amidah):</span> Chachamim say that Min ha'Tzad is not called standing. It seems that when one reads from the Torah, he may not stand supported, for in Megilah we say that one must stand. Also the Yerushalmi says that just like Torah was given with fear, we must conduct with it with fear.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tosfos (19b DH v'Leisev):</span> Rav Sama did not suggest truly sitting, for one may not sit in the Azarah. Rather, he suggested standing supported.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rivash (266 DH v'Chen):</span> Once, a Beis Din accepted testimony while standing, leaning on a pillar. Perhaps this is considered sitting. If he would fall if it were removed, this is not standing. We hold (Zevachim 19b) like the first Tana of R. Yosi, that standing Min ha'Tzad, i.e. he cannot stand without support, is not called standing. This is like bowing. It is called sitting, for it is not full standing, and is called standing, for it is not full sitting. All the more so standing supported, which is not standing, is called sitting. Also, the law that judges must sit is only an Asmachta mid'Rabanan. If so, l'Chatchilah one may stand supported.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 94:8):</span> One must be careful not to support himself or someone else at the time of Tefilah (Shemoneh Esre).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (10):</span> The Beis Yosef says that this is not called standing. Hagahos Maimoniyos holds that it is not standing in fear.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (22):</span> According to the first reason, one may lean a little, so that if the support would be removed, he would not fall. According to the second reason, one may not lean at all. In pressed circumstances, one may rely on the first opinion.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (23):</span> One must be careful not to support himself on a Stender. The same applies whenever one must stand, e.g.when he sees a Sefer Torah pass by.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (24):</span> If a sick person knows that he can have intent standing supported, he should do so. If not, he should sit.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (32):</span> When praying sitting, one may not lean back or to the side, stretch his legs or cross one over the other, for this is haughtiness. Rather, he sits with his head bent down.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (33):</span> Presumably, an obese person may lean.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (141:1):</span> One who reads from the Torah must stand. He may not support himself on the wall or pillar, unless he is obese.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH v'Tzarich):</span> In the Yerushalmi, one was rebuked for reading while supported. One must be careful not to do so, for Chachamim (Zevachim 19b) hold that this is not called standing. Tosfos and the Rosh say that one must be careful about Kri'as ha'Torah. However, the Mordechai brings from the Yerushalmi that permits if he is obese.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (1):</span> The Bach says that if he read sitting, he was not Yotzei. The Tur and Hagahos Maimoniyos connote like this. However, the Beis Yosef connotes that it is only l'Chatchilah. Also in Sotah (41a) we say that the king reads (Hakhel) sitting. If b'Di'eved he was not Yotzei, we would not permit l'Chatchilah due to the king's honor! We make a similar inference in CM 28 regarding testimony (if it were Pasul b'Di'eved sitting, we would not permit a Chacham to testify sitting). One can distinguish.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (2 and 426:11):</span> If he leans so much that if the support would be removed he would fall, this is not called standing, so it is forbidden even if he is obese. In CM (17:1), the Rema says that standing supported is called standing. Here, the Tur and Tosfos (Sotah 40b DH veha'Amar) prove from Zevachim that it is not. The Rema saw the Beis Yosef (CM Sof Siman 28) say in the name of the Rivash that if testimony was accepted standing, b'Di'eved it is Kosher. If they stood supported, it is l'Chatchilah, for this is not sitting. The Rema understood that this refers to the witnesses. This is wrong. The Beis Yosef began discussing the judges! Rather, it is a printing mistake. It should say like he wrote in the Shulchan Aruch, that standing supported *is like* sitting. It refers to the judges. Shevuos 30b connotes like this. Even though there it is also like standing, there we require only Hidur (showing honor). When one must stand, one may not stand supported (Tosfos 19b DH Amidah).Tosfos (19b DH v'Leisev) wrote that even though one may not sit in the Azarah, one may stand supported. This shows that it is not like sitting. We can say that the Isur is only to truly sit, due to honor of the Mikdash. Regarding judges, standing supported is called sitting. Perhaps testimony is more lenient, but there is no necessity to say so. Also regarding Kri'as ha'Torah, one is Yotzei b'Di'eved sitting!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (2):</span> One may not lean even a little, that if the support would be removed he would not fall (unless he is obese).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (4):</span> Also a sick or very old person may lean if it is hard to stand without leaning. He may not lean so much that if the support would be removed he would fall. If he cannot stand without leaning so much, he may. However, he may not lean on the cloth on which we read the Torah, for it is Kodesh. Rather, he leans on the Bimah itself.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rema:</span> Also the Ba'al Korei who reads must stand with him.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (5):</span> Also the Segan who stands by the Sefer Torah must stand. Sometimes, if the Sefer Torah is long and the Ba'al Korei and the Oleh must read from the top of the column, they need to bow, and they come to lean on the Bimah. This is permitted, for clearly it is not the way of haughtiness. However, after reading the top lines, when he is near the middle of the column and he can read without support, he must erect himself so he will not need to lean at all.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 422:7):</span> The Mitzvah is to read Hallel standing.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (11):</span> We say Hallel standing, except for Pesach night (at the Seder). One may not support himself on a beam or wall, for standing supported is not standing, like the Tur (141) and Tosfos say.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bi'ur Halachah (DH Me'umad):</span> Beis Meir argues with the Magen Avraham, and says that for mid'Rabanan laws we are not stringent about standing supported, just like one may stand supported in the Azarah. I agree with him, at least for Hallel. Even if we will say like the Magen Avraham that we do not learn testimony from sitting in the Azarah, we need not be more stringent about Hallel than sitting in the Azarah, for the source to stand for Hallel is from Shibolei ha'Leket 173, who says that it is like testimony. He concludes 'they used to say Hallel standing while slaughtering Korban Pesach, for one may not sit in the Azarah.' He supports his ruling from sitting in the Azarah. Tosfos proves that standing supported suffices for this. All the more so it suffices for Hallel outside the Mikdash! However, there is a hint from the verse '(Hallelu Es Hash-m) ha'Omdim b'Veis Hash-m', so perhaps l'Chatchilah one should be stringent. Surely one may stand slightly supported, that if the support would be removed he would not fall.</p>
<p class='seealso'>See also:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) IS A KOHEN WHO SITS WHILE PERFORMING THE AVODAH 'CHAYAV MISAH'?</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Mishnah (15b) states that when a Kohen is Mekabel the blood of a Korban while seated, the Avodah is Pasul. Rava derives this from the verse, 'la'Amod l'Shares' -- 'to stand to serve' (Devarim 18:5). Rava explains that the verse teaches that when the Kohen is standing, he is considered 'chosen for Kehunah.' When he is sitting, he is not considered 'chosen for Kehunah.'
</p><p>
After Rava derives this law from the verse, he asks Rav Nachman why the Halachah is that a Kohen who sits while he performs the Avodah is not Chayav Misah. Just as a Zar who performs the Avodah is Chayav Misah, a Kohen who sits while he performs the Avodah should be Chayav Misah.
</p><p>
Why does Rava consider the possibility that a Kohen who sits while performing the Avodah is Chayav Misah? On what basis does he compare a Kohen who is sitting to a Zar?
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI</b> (DH Eima Mah Zar) says that Rava asks that perhaps a Meh Matzinu teaches that just as the Avodah performed by a Zar is Pasul and the Zar is Chayav Misah, the Avodah performed by a Kohen while he sits is Pasul and the Kohen is Chayav Misah.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Eima) questions this explanation. The Mishnah also states that any Avodah performed by a Kohen who does not have a Bris Milah, or by a Kohen who is an Onen, is Pasul. Rava, however, does not ask whether those Kohanim are also Chayav Misah, as he asks in the case of a Kohen who sits while he performs Avodah. According to Rashi's explanation, the same question should apply in those cases.
</p><p>
(b) Tosfos explains that Rava's question is based on the fact that a Kohen who performs the Avodah while he sitting is like a Zar. Accordingly, he should receive the same punishment as a Zar. This question does not apply to a Kohen who does not have a Bris Milah or to an Onen, because the reason why their Avodah is Pasul is not because they have the status of a Zar.
</p><p>
How, though, does Rashi answer the question of Tosfos?
</p><p>
The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> answers that Rava indeed could have asked his question in the case of a Kohen who does not have a Bris Milah, and in the case of an Onen, but he chose to ask his question in only one of the cases (a Kohen who performs the Avodah while sitting). (The <b>SEFER EIZEHU MEKOMAN</b> quotes other texts of Rashi, which read that the law that a Kohen who sits while he performs the Avodah makes the Avodah Pasul is an independent law and is not due to the Kohen having the status of a Zar. Based on those texts, Rashi could not have learned the Gemara like Tosfos.) (Y. Montrose)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) WHEN THE STONE BECOMES DISLODGED</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: Rebbi Ami asks what happens when one of the stones lining the floor of the Beis ha'Mikdash becomes dislodged. The Gemara earlier teaches that when the Kohen performs the Avodah, he Kohen must stand on the floor of the Beis ha'Mikdash with nothing between his feet and the floor. When a stone becomes dislodged, is it considered a separation (Chatzitzah) between the Kohen who stands on top of it and the Beis ha'Mikdash, or is the stone still considered part of the floor itself?
</p><p>
The Gemara says that when the Kohanim do not intend to re-attach the stone to the floor, it definitely is considered a Chatzitzah between the Kohen and the floor of the Beis ha'Mikdash. Rebbi Ami's question applies when the Kohanim do plan to re-attach the stone but have not yet re-attached it. Is it considered as though it has been re-attached, or since it still is physically dislodged, is it considered a Chatzitzah? The Gemara does not answer this question.
</p><p>
The Gemara quotes Rabah Zuti who asks a related question. If a stone is dislodged completely, may the Kohen stand in the hole in the floor where the stone used to be and perform the Avodah? Is this called 'Derech Sherus,' 'a [normal] way of service'? The Gemara also does not answer this question.
</p><p>
The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Beis ha'Bechirah 1:10) rules that a Kohen may not stand on a stone which has become dislodged from the floor, even if it is still in its place. The Rambam repeats this Halachah elsewhere (Hilchos Bi'as ha'Mikdash 5:19), and concludes that even though the Kohen is forbidden from performing the Avodah while he stands on such a stone, if a Kohen did perform the Avodah while standing on top of a dislodged stone, the Avodah is valid. The <b>KESEF MISHNEH</b> notes that it is odd that the Rambam makes no mention of the difference between a stone which is not going to be re-attached to the floor, which the Gemara says <i>definitely</i> is not considered part of the floor, and a stone which is going to be re-attached to the floor, which is the unresolved question of the Gemara. Why does the Rambam not explain this difference? Also, why does the Rambam not mention the case of the question of Rabah Zuti?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>KESEF MISHNEH</b> answers that the Rambam understands the flow of the Gemara differently. When the Gemara says that when the Kohanim do not intend to re-attach the stone, the stone may be considered a Chatzitzah between the Kohen and the floor of the Beis ha'Mikdash, the Gemara means that it certainly would be forbidden <i>l'Chatchilah</i> for a Kohen to stand on the stone and perform the Avodah. The Gemara never entertains the possibility that the Avodah would be <i>Pasul</i> in such a case. The Gemara then asks whether there is a problem to perform the Avodah l'Chatchilah while one stands on a dislodged stone of the Beis ha'Mikdash which is going to be re-attached. Since the Gemara does not answer its question, the Rambam rules stringently that l'Chatchilah one should not stand on the stone while he performs the Avodah. The Kesef Mishneh explains further that the Rambam understands that the doubt of Rabah Zuti was only a question to him, not to the Gemara in general. The Gemara itself maintains that a Kohen certainly may stand in this hole in the floor and perform the Avodah, even l'Chatchilah.
</p><p>
The <b>MISHNEH L'MELECH</b> is perplexed by the Kesef Mishneh's explanation of the Rambam. When the Gemara says that the stone is considered a Chatzitzah when the Kohanim do not intend to re-attach it, it clearly implies that in such a case the Avodah is Pasul. How can the Kesef Mishneh suggest otherwise? Moreover, the unsubstantiated assertion that the Gemara was never in doubt about the question of Rabah Zuti 'is words that we have never heard anything like it before.' That is, there is no plausible reason for why the Gemara would quote the question of an Amora and not give an answer to it, when the Gemara clearly knows the answer. The Mishneh l'Melech concludes that this matter needs further elucidation, and he does not give an answer.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>CHAZON ISH</b> in Zevachim (5:2) answers the Rambam's omission of Rabah Zuti's case in the following manner. Rebbi Ami maintains that the Kohen certainly must stand on the floor of the Beis ha'Mikdash when he performs the Avodah, because he understands that there is a requirement that there must be a floor in the Azarah. Rebbi Ami's question is merely whether or not this dislodged stone is considered the floor of the Beis ha'Mikdash when it is going to be re-attached. When the Gemara says that the stone is a Chatzitzah when it is not going to be re-attached, the Gemara does not mean that the stone is considered a Chatzitzah between the Kohen and the floor, but rather that <i>the stone itself cannot be considered the floor</i>. Since Rebbi Ami requires one to stand on the floor of the Beis ha'Mikdash while he performs the Avodah and the Kohen is not doing so, his Avodah obviously is Pasul.
</p><p>
Rabah Zuti's question, however, was based on the assumption that one <i>does not need a floor</i> in the Azarah of the Beis ha'Mikdash. As long as the Kohen is on the <i>ground</i> of the Beis ha'Mikdash, as opposed to standing on a stone which is merely resting on top of the ground (and which the Kohen does not plan on making part of the floor of the Beis ha'Mikdash), the Avodah is valid. Rabah Zuti's only question is whether it is Derech Sherus for a Kohen to perform the Avodah while standing in a hole in the floor of the Beis ha'Mikdash.
</p><p>
The Rambam rules like Rebbi Ami, that there must be a Halachic floor in the Beis ha'Mikdash. It therefore is obvious that according to Rebbi Ami, Rabah Zuti's case is Pasul, as the Kohen is standing only on the ground of the Beis ha'Mikdash but not on the floor of the Beis ha'Mikdash. (The Chazon Ish calls this a 'Pesul Binyan' -- a disqualifying factor due to a lack in the actual construction of the Beis ha'Mikdash.) Once the Rambam already records the requirement that there be a floor in the Azarah, he does not need to mention that the Avodah in Rabah Zuti's case is Pasul. (The Chazon Ish does not seem to explain the reason for why the Rambam does not differentiate between a stone that will be re-attached and a stone that will not be re-attached.) (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> CONCERN FOR CHATZIZOS REGARDING TEFILIN STRAPS <span class='indexentry'>[Tefilin: Chatzitzah :straps]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	19a:</span> Surely, a dead louse is a Chatzitzah (between the Kohen and Bigdei Kehunah).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question:</span> Is a live louse a Chatzitzah? Since it comes and goes by itself, it is like his skin. Or, since he does not want it there, it is a Chatzitzah?</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span>	Surely, dirt is a Chatzitzah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question (Mar bar Rav Ashi):</span> Is hair (of his head) under a garment (other than the hat) a Chatzitzah? Is his hair like his body, or not?</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	 (R. Ami):</span> Tefilin are a Chatzitzah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question (Beraisa):</span> If they wore Tefilin, it is not a Chatzitzah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer:</span> That applies to the Shel Rosh (head Tefilin). R. Ami discusses the Shel Yad (Tefilin on the arm).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question:</span> What is the difference between them?</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span>	Regarding the Kesones (tunic), it says 'Yilbash *Al* Besaro.' Also regarding the Mitznefes, it says 'v'Samta ha'Mitznefes *Al* Rosho'!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer (Beraisa):</span> The Kohen Gadol's hair was seen between the Tzitz and the Mitznefes. There he wore Tefilin. (The Shel Rosh is not a place of Bigdei Kehunah, but the Shel Yad is where the Kesones is worn.)</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'>	24a  (Mishnah):</span> If a Kohen was standing on top of an animal or another person's feet, his Avodah is Pasul.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Tana d'Vei R. Yishmael):</span> The floor of the Azarah is Kodesh, and Klei Shares are Kodesh. Just like a Chatzitzah between the Kohen and the Klei Shares disqualifies, also between him and the floor.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>12.</span>	Had the Mishnah taught only standing on animals, one might have thought that this is Chotzetz, for it is not the same Min (species) as people, but standing on a person is not Chotzetz.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>13.</span><span class='desl2'>	Menachos 37b (Beraisa - R. Eliezer):</span> 'V'Hayah *Lecha* l'Os' teaches that Tefilin is a sign to you (the wearer), not to others (for it is covered by clothing).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>14.</span>	Ameimar had a wound. His shirt was torn (to avoid aggravating the wound). His Tefilin could be seen through it.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>15.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rav Ashi:</span> Don't you agree that 'v'Hayah Lecha l'Os' teaches that it must be visible to you, but not to others?!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>16.</span><span class='desl2'>	Ameimar:</span> No. The verse teaches that Tefilin Shel Yad (of the hand) is worn in a place on the arm normally covered (not the palm).</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Hilchos Tefilin Sof Siman 18):</span> Zevachim 19a says that the Kohen Gadol's hair was seen between the Tzitz and the Mitznefes, and there he wore Tefilin. This shows that one may not wear them on the Mitznefes.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Teshuvah 3:4):</span> 'L'Os Al Yadecha' teaches that nothing may interrupt between Tefilin and his skin. This is like we expound about Bigdei Kehunah 'Yilbash Al Besaro.' L'Totafos Bein Einecha' teaches that nothing may interrupt between Shel Rosh and his (forehead) between his eyes.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rashi (19a DH Yatza):</span> The Gemara asked about hair of the head that extends to the Kesones.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rashba (827):</span> Presumably, one may wind the strap on one's garment. We say that nothing may interrupt between Tefilin and his skin regarding the Batim, which have the law of Tefilin. Rav Ashi asked Ameimar why his Bayis (of the hand Tefilin) was visible. The strap is wound on the finger. Rav Ashi would not expect that it should be (totally) covered! I say so l'Halachah, but in practice, 'when the Halachah is shaky (unclear), follow what people do.'</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 27:4):</span> Nothing may interrupt between his skin and Tefilin, both of the head and of the arm.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (4):</span> Zevachim 19a asked whether a live louse or hair is a Chatzitzah for Bigdei Kehunah. It seems that this is why the Roke'ach says that one should shave the hair on the neck, lest it be a Chatzitzah. The Agur (55) says that this is not the custom. One must be careful about a dead louse or dirt, for this was not a question (surely it is a Chatzitzah). The Shlah says that one should wash the place of Tefilin.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Machatzis ha'Shekel (DH v'Lo):</span> Perhaps the custom is not to shave the hair on the neck because the Gemara did not resolve whether hair is a problem, therefore, we rely on the Rashba who says that Chatzitzah does not apply to the head, even though he did not say to rely on this in practice.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Eshel Avraham (4):</span> The Magen Avraham is difficult. Rashi explained that we asked if hair is a Chatzitzah when it is not in its place. If it is in its place between the eyes or on the back of the neck, it is not a Chatzitzah!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl3'>	Machatzis ha'Shekel:</span> Rashi explains that the Gemara asked about hair of the head that extends to the Kesones. The Gemara did not resolve the question. The Rambam is stringent. Perhaps one may be lenient about short hairs on the face, for this is normal. This is why the Gemara did not ask about hair of the underarm. Also, the Kohen Gadol used to cut his hair once a week, and he did not totally shave it, and it was not a Chatzitzah between his head and the Tefilin or Mitznefes (his turban). However, on the back of the neck the hairs are long and extend past their place (from where they sprout). There, they are a Chatzitzah. I vehemently disapprove of those who grow long hair. Aside from haughtiness (see YD 178), it is a Chatzitzah regarding Tefilin. Since they grow it long, we cannot say that it is (a normal) part of the person. The Rashba says that Chatzitzah does not apply to the head, but in such a case perhaps he would agree that it does. He forbids putting Tefilin on a thick cap, for it must be where a baby's head is soft. Long hair is like a thick cap.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (15):</span> Even without the problem of Chatzitzah, since the hairs are long, one cannot make the Tefilin taut and in the proper place.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (14):</span> Sometimes the strap interrupts between the Tefilin and his skin. This is Min b'Mino (the same kind), which is not a Chatzitzah. The Levushei Serad holds that l'Chatchilah one should be stringent about this.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (19):</span> The Ari Zal says that the strap may not interrupt between the Tefilin (Bayis) and his skin, for it is a different level from the Tefilin.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rema:</span> This refers only to the Tefilin (Batim). We are not particular about the straps.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Taz (4):</span> The Rashba concluded 'when the Halachah is shaky, follow what people do.' Why is the Rema lenient? The Levush says that the custom is to be stringent about the part of the strap needed to tie the Tefilin on the arm and head. This is proper.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (5):</span> The Rashba concluded 'follow what people do' regarding wrapping the straps over a garment. However, one need not be concerned for a small Chatzitzah between his skin and the straps. Perhaps this comment of the Rema belongs in Sa'if 5, which permits one prone to get sick to put Tefilin on a thin cap.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (16):</span> Acharonim wrote that one may be lenient only in the windings, but one must be stringent even about the straps where they tie the Tefilin to him, both regarding the head and hand. This is an open rebuke to those who put Tefilin over a toupee, even if only the strap is on it. However, the Magen Avraham and Chayei Adam connote that if one has a wound on his head, one may not put the Bayis on a cloth over the wound, but the straps may be on the cloth, or on a thin cap. He may bless, since the Chatzitzah is not in the place of the Bayis. The same applies to a wound on the arm, even in the place (on the circumference of the arm, even with the Tefilin) where the strap ties the Tefilin on the arm. However, he should be careful to cover it above to fulfill 'Lecha l'Os Al Yadecha', and not a sign for others.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (20):</span> Mishbetzos Zahav (4) says that one should be careful about the windings, but he need not be careful about what hangs from the Shel Rosh on his garment. Yad Eliyahu (3) says that surely one should not have a Chatzitzah without need even regarding the straps, but if there is a reason one should not be concerned about the straps.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Teshuvos v'Hanhagos (2:26):</span> It is good (but not a real obligation) to remove one's watch from the arm on which he wears Tefilin.</p>
<p class='normal'></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) WHAT IS A 'DAVAR HA'ME'AKEV KAPARAH'?</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: Rava puts forth a rule that whenever the verse mentions either the word 'Etzba' <i>or</i> 'Kohen' when discussing an Avodah done in the Beis ha'Mikdash, the verse is teaching that the Avodah must be done with the Kohen's right hand.
</p><p>
Abaye asks that this seems problematic from the verse which discusses the Avodah of the bringing of the limbs to the Mizbe'ach after the Korban is slaughtered. The verse states, 'And the Kohen will bring all of it close, and he will burn it on the Mizbe'ach' (Vayikra 1:13). According to Rava's rule, the bringing of the limbs to the Mizbe'ach should have to be done with the right hand of the Kohen. However, the Gemara in Tamid (31b) teaches that the Kohen brings the right foot of the animal to the Mizbe'ach in his <i>left</i> hand. Rava answers that the 'Etzba-Kohen' rule applies only to something which is 'Me'akev Kaparah,' as mentioned earlier in the Gemara with regard to the Kohen's act of sprinkling the blood on the Metzora. What exactly is a Davar ha'Me'akev Kaparah?
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI</b> (DH ha'Me'akev) explains that bringing the limbs of the Korban to be burned on the Mizbe'ach is not something in which the validity of Korban depends. It therefore is not included in the requirement that it must be done with the right hand.
</p><p>
(b) Rashi in Menachos (10a, DH v'Ha; see also Rashi to 14b, DH Holeches) implies that a 'Davar ha'Me'akev Kaparah' is something that is indispensable to the process of bringing the Korban. Since one technically can slaughter the Korban next to the Mizbe'ach and therefore not have to walk to the Mizbe'ach in order to bring the limbs to the Mizbe'ach, bringing the limbs is not a 'Davar ha'Me'akev Kaparah.'
</p><p>
Why does Rashi give different explanations for 'Davar ha'Me'akev Kaparah' in these two different places?
</p><p>
The <b>TZON KODASHIM</b> explains that there is a dispute between Rebbi Shimon and the Rabanan in Menachos (10a) about whether or not it is possible to invalidate a Korban through Pigul when one brings its limbs to the Mizbe'ach. Rebbi Shimon says that it is not possible to invalidate the Korban, since the Avodah is not indispensable. The Rabanan say that a thought of Pigul can invalidate the Korban Pasul even during the act of bringing the limbs to the Mizbe'ach. Rashi here wants to show that the Gemara may even follow the strict opinion of the Rabanan. Although one can invalidate the Korban by having a thought of Pigul when he brings the limbs to the Mizbe'ach, bringing the limbs is still not included in the rule of 'Etzba-Kohen,' since it is not an indispensable Avodah. Rashi understands that the discussion in Menachos follows the view of Rebbi Shimon, and therefore Rashi mentions Rebbi Shimon's definition of 'Davar ha'Me'akev Kaparah' there. (Y. Montrose)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF BLOOD FOR 'KABALAS HA'DAM'</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Beraisa states that when the Kohen performs the Avodah of Kabalas ha'Dam, he must receive the blood directly from the animal. This is derived from the verse, 'v'Lakach ha'Kohen ha'Mashi'ach mi'Dam ha'Par' -- 'and the Kohen ha'Mashi'ach shall take from the blood of the animal' (Vayikra 4:5), which must be read as 'Dam meha'Par' -- '[the Kohen ha'Mashi'ach shall take] the blood <i>from</i> the animal,' and not from any other surface onto which it might fall. It is necessary to read the words 'mi'Dam ha'Par' as 'Dam meha'Par,' because the words 'mi'Dam ha'Par' imply that the Kohen may take a portion of the blood and does not need to take all of the blood, but the Halachah is, as Rav states, that he must take all of the blood. Hence, the words 'mi'Dam ha'Par' must mean that he is to take the blood directly from the animal, 'Dam meha'Par.'
</p><p>
Rav's teaching -- that the Kohen must receive all of the blood during Kabalas ha'Dam -- is derived from the verse, 'v'Es Kol Damo Yishpoch' -- 'and all of the blood he will pour' (Vayikra 4:18). The word 'Kol' ('all') is unnecessary, since the verse is discussing the pouring of the <i>remainder</i> of the blood, <i>after</i> the Zerikah was performed. It must be that the word 'Kol' refers to another stage in the Avodah which must be done with all of the blood, and that must be the Kabalas ha'Dam.
</p><p>
The <b>CHAFETZ CHAIM</b> in <b>LIKUTEI HALACHOS</b> explains that the requirement to receive all of the blood of the animal when performing Kabalas ha'Dam is only l'Chatchilah. If the Kohen received less than all of the blood, the Korban is still valid b'Di'eved. This is apparent from the Gemara in Menachos (7b), which explicitly discusses receiving a minimal amount of blood during Kabalas ha'Dam. What is the minimum amount of blood required in order for the Kabalas ha'Dam to be valid?
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI</b> in Menachos (7b, DH b'Dam Mai) and <b>TOSFOS</b> there (DH v'Im Isa) imply that the minimum amount of blood necessary for Kabalas ha'Dam is the amount which is supposed to be sprinkled during the Zerikah for that particular Korban. The Gemara there asks whether or not the Kabalah is valid when the minimum amount of blood of Parim ha'Nisrafim was received in two different vessels. Rashi explains that three sprinkles of blood fell into one vessel, and four fell into the other vessel. Tosfos also mentions that the minimum amount of blood necessary for Kabalas ha'Dam is seven sprinkles of blood.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 4:8) states that in order for the Kabalah to be valid, the Kohen must receive only a single sprinkle of blood in the vessel. He does not differentiate between the different types of Korbanos.
</p><p>
This opinion is difficult to understand. If the Kohen receives only one sprinkle for a Korban that needs more than one sprinkle of Zerikah, then the Korban will be Pasul because the Zerikah will not be done properly! The <b>BIRKAS HA'ZEVACH</b> explains that the Rambam's ruling is relevant in a case in which the Kohen received a single sprinkle of blood, performed Zerikah, and then received another sprinkle of blood and performed Zerikah, and so on until he completed a proper Zerikah.
</p><p>
The <b>MISHNEH L'MELECH</b> understands the opinions of Rashi (and Tosfos) and the Rambam in the way explained above. However, the Birkas ha'Zevach learns that this explanation does not properly represent the opinion of Rashi. Rashi requires the amount of seven sprinkles only in a case of Parim ha'Nisrafim, because all seven are necessary for the Korban to be valid even b'Di'eved. With regard to other Korbanos -- which require multiple sprinkles but are valid b'Di'eved even if only one is done -- Rashi would agree that the minimum amount for Kabalah is the same as the minimum amount for Zerikah (see Rashi to Zevachim 38b, DH Shirayim). According to the Birkas ha'Zevach, the only point of dispute between Rashi and the Rambam is in a case such as Parim ha'Nisrafim in which the minimum amount of blood needed for Zerikah is more than one sprinkle. (See <b>KEREN ORAH</b> to Menachos 7b for additional commentary on the opinion of Rashi there.)
</p><p>
It is important to note that there are various texts in the Gemara in Menachos, which support both opinions. One text in the Gemara says specifically that the minimum amount is seven sprinklings, the amount of the Korbanos discussed in that Gemara. The Mishneh l'Melech points out that the Rambam had a different text which omits this number. (See Mishneh l'Melech at length for his explanation of the reasoning of the Rambam.) (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafbbb'><span class='numt'>1)</span> THE YEAR OF KODSHIM <span class='indexentry'>[Kodshim: years]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Beraisa):</span> 'Seh Samim Zachar Ben Shanah Yihyeh' - a Pesach must be Tam (unblemished) and (at most) one year old at the time of Shechitah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span>	'Yihyeh' teaches that all its Avodos must be when it is one year old.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question:</span> If it was one year old at the time of Shechitah, how could it be two years old at the time of Zerikah?</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer (Rava):</span> This teaches that we calculate the age of Korbanos from hour to hour.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	26a - Question (Abaye - Beraisa - R. Yehoshua):</span> If a k'Zayis of the meat remains, we may throw the blood (even though this is the ultimate blemish)!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer:</span> Rather, 'Yihyeh' teaches only that it must be one year old at the time of all its Avodos (but it may be blemished).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	Erchin 18b (Beraisa):</span> All of the following are full years me'Es l'Es - the years for Korbanos, the year for Bayis Ir Chomah, the two years before redeeming a field, the six years of an Eved Ivri, and the years of a boy or girl.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question:</span> What is the source of this regarding Korbanos?</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer (Rav Acha bar Yakov):</span> 'Keves Ben Shenaso' - it must be in its first year (it need not be in the same calendar year, from Tishrei to Tishrei).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bechoros 27b:</span> The Mishnah says 'if a Bechor developed a Mum within *its* year...' This implies that we count a year from its birth.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Rav):</span> We learn from 'Lifnei Hash-m Elokecha Sochalenu *Shanah v'Shanah*.' The year from its birth enters the next calendar year.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>12.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Rav Acha bar Yakov):</span> Bei Rav learns Bechor from other Kodshim, and other Kodshim from 'Keves ben *Shenaso*.'</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>13.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh Hashanah 6b (Beraisa):</span> Regarding Bechor and all Kodshim, Bal Te'acher applies after a year without (three) Regalim.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>14.</span>	According to the opinion that the Regalim need not be in order, Rebbi can say that animal was Hukdsh after Pesach, and it was a leap year. Rabanan say that a leap year is 13 months (for Bal Te'acher). They must say that this year Sivan 6 was (a day) after Shavuos, and next year it was before Shavuos.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>15.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Abaye):</span> We count the year of Bechor from the day of birth.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>16.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Rav Acha bar Yakov):</span> We count from when it could be offered.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>17.</span>	They do not argue. Abaye discusses a Bechor born with a Mum, and Rav Acha discusses a Tam (an animal without a Mum).</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 1:11):</span> Small animals (e.g. Kevasim Benei Shanah) are from eight days until a full year from day to day. If it was a leap year, the extra month is included in the year. We offer cattle until three full years from day to day, and Tzon (sheep and goats) until two full years. More than this is old, we do not offer it.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Avi Ezri (Ishus 2:21 DH v'Nir'eh):</span> The Rambam holds that everything in the Beraisa (Erchin 18b) has the same law. Letter of the law, the year extends me'Es l'Es of hours. However, part of the day is like the entire day, therefore it is as if the year finished from the start of the day, but the new year does not start until me'Es l'Es of hours.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (13):</span> We count hours regarding Kodshim. If it is an hour too young or too old it is Pasul. Even if a Korban (that must be Ben Shanah) was (within) one year old at the time of Shechitah but more than a year at the time of Zerikah, it is Pasul.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Bechoros 1:8):</span> A Bechor must be eaten within its year, whether it is Tam or Ba'al Mum - 'Lifnei Hash-m Elokecha Sochalenu Shanah v'Shanah.' If it is Tam we count the year from day eight, when it was fitting to be offered. If it was born with a Mum, and Kalu Chadashav (it was born after a full term pregnancy), we count the year from its birth, for it was permitted immediately. If we do not know that Kalu Chadashav, we count the year from day eight.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (12):</span> The year for a Bechor is a full lunar year of 12 months from day to day. If it was a leap year, it is 13 months.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question:</span> In Erchin we expound 'Shenaso' (its year) to teach that we do not follow the calendar year. We could deduce this without the verse! Temidim and (most) Musafim of Rosh Hashanah are Kevasim Benei Shanah. If we increment an animal's age every Rosh Hashanah, any animal is at least two years old on Rosh Hashanah, unless it was born that day. A Korban must be at least eight days old!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer #1 (cited in Tosfos Erchin 18b DH Shenaso):</span> We count an animal's year starting from when it may be offered, i.e. from the eighth day, just like regarding Bechor (Rosh Hashanah 6b). Without 'Shenaso' we would say that the 'Kevasim Benei Shanah' of Rosh Hashanah must be exactly eight days old.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rejection (Tosfos ibid.):</span> We count from the day it may be offered regarding 'Bal Te'acher' (delaying bringing Korbanos), but not regarding its age. Zevachim 25b says that an animal can be one year old at the time of Shechitah, and two years old at the time of Zerikah, because we calculate the age of Korbanos from hour to hour. If the age is counted from when it may be offered, i.e. dawn of its eighth day, Shechitah and Zerikah cannot be in different years, for both must be the same day!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer #2 (Tosfos ibid.):</span> Without 'Shenaso' we would not know that we calculate the age of Korbanos from hour to hour (just like regarding Bayis Ir Chomah - Erchin 31b).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Turei Even (Rosh Hashanah 9b DH Pachos):</span> In Bechoros, we learn from 'Shanah Shanah' that Bechor is eaten in its year. Normally, when we count calendar years, Tishrei begins the next year only if at least 30 days passed. If this applied to Bechor, even if we counted calendar years, one year could enter the next (if it was born less than 30 days before Rosh Hashanah)! However, if we count its years, this occurs more frequently, so presumably this is the Torah's intent. However, why do we need Shanah Shanah to teach that we follow its year? If we would not say so, hours could not disqualify Kodshim! We must say that without Shanah Shanah, we would have expounded 'Yihyeh' to teach that the Korban must be Tam until Zerikah, and not that it must be a yearling until Zerikah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Aruch ha'Shulchan ha'Asid (Kodshim 63:26):</span> Tosfos' proof is not a proof. However, Rashi (Shabbos 136 DH Havah Achlinan) also does not require me'Es l'Es. It appears that we count hours only at the end of the year, but not at the beginning, for then part of a day is like the entire day.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (YD 15:2):</span> If we know that an animal had a full gestation, i.e. nine months for a big (work) animal or five months for a small animal, it is permitted the day it was born. If we are unsure, it is a Safek Nefel until the eighth night begins.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	R. Akiva Eiger:</span> The Taz (2, b'Sof) connotes that we need seven 24-hour periods. We do not say that part of the day of birth is like the entire day. The Pri Megadim agrees. Tevu'os Shor is lenient. I agree. R. Shimon ben Gamliel supported himself from the verse 'Shiv'as Yamim Yihyeh Im Imo.' Tosfos (Erchin 18b DH mi'Shenaso) proves that we do not need seven 24-hour periods. They proves that the year to offer a Korban (that must be offered within the year) is from the day of birth, and not from the day when it could be offered, since we say that hours disqualify Kodshim. I.e. it is possible to enter its second year between Shechitah and Zerikah. If we count from when it could be offered, this law could not apply! (It would enter its second year exactly one year from the eighth day, at the earliest time of the day to offer a Korban. This cannot be between Shechitah and Zerikah.) If we required seven 24-hour periods, the second year could begin in the middle of the day (at the time it was born), which could be between Shechitah and Zerikah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span>	Noda bi'Yehudah (2:YD 7, from his son) brings R. Akiva Eiger's proof, but concludes that if a case occurred, he would not be lenient against great Poskim (the Taz and Pri Megadim). However, one who is lenient does not lose.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (306:7):</span> A Bechor, even a Ba'al Mum, must be eaten within its year.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Taz (6):</span> This is so one will not transgress shearing it or working with it (these are forbidden even if it has a Mum).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	R. Akiva Eiger (DH b'Gizah):</span> This is like the Yere'im and Levush, who say that the verse ('Lifnei Hash-m Elokecha Sochalenu Shanah v'Shanah') applies to a Tam, but the Isur regarding a Ba'al Mum is mid'Rabanan. The Rambam and Semag explicitly say that it is mid'Oraisa even regarding a Ba'al Mum.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rashash (Bechoros 28a DH Aval):</span> Teshuvas Shivas Tziyon (24) proves that the Mitzvah to eat a Ba'al Mum within the year is mid'Rabanan. We said (Bechoros 28a) that we always allow 30 days from when the Mum came, even if this extends past the year, due to Hashavas Aveidah. This is not a proof. The Rambam holds that mid'Oraisa one has a year from when the Mum came, just like one has a year for a Tam from when it could be offered. Mid'Rabanan, one has only until a year from birth; because of Hashavas Aveidah, one always gets at least 30 days.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Turei Even (6b DH Mishkachas):</span> Rebbi holds that 365 days after Pesach (in a leap year) is a year without Regalim. Tosfos says that Rabanan hold that if one was Makdish during (e.g.) Sukos, the start of Sukos next year joins with the end of this Sukos to comprise one Regel. I infer that the years of Bal Te'acher are from day to day and from hour to hour. If one vowed during the Regel at six hours of the day, he transgresses Bal Te'acher at six hours of that day the next year. If it did not depend on the hour, he would transgress once the previous night begins, and we could find a year without Regalim if one vowed during a Regel during the night or day. The year ends when that night begins the next year, but three Regalim are not completed until the same time of the day. Surely, for Regalim we require from hour to hour. The Gemara says that Regalim do not begin from night. If one vowed during the first night of Yom Tov, when the Regel finishes the first Regel was not yet finished, like Tosfos said. What is the source to require from hour to hour for Bal Te'acher? Often, years of the Torah are from day to day, but not from hour to hour! We can say that we learn from a Ribuy regarding Bechor (the Sifri learns from 'Kol ha'Bechor'). We say below that the year of Bechor begins from when it was ready to be offered, i.e. the beginning of the eighth night. Its year is always from hour to hour, since it always begins at the beginning of the night, even if it was born during the day. Likewise, we require from hour to hour for all Kodshim, even though they could have a year not from hour to hour, e.g. he vowed in the middle of the day. This is unlike judging what is possible from what is impossible, for the Torah revealed about Bal Te'acher regarding Bechor, so surely Bal Te'acher for all Korbanos must resemble Bechor. Do not say that the Gemara could have said that a year without Regalim applies only to Bechor, for it says that Bechor and all Kodshim are the same.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (8):</span> If the Mum came during the year, one may keep it all 12 months.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shach (14):</span> The Tur says that when the Mum came later, one may keep it 12 months from its birth. The Beis Yosef explains that this is if Kalu Chadashav. Otherwise, we count the year from day eight. This is unlike Rashi and Tosfos, who explicitly say that we count from birth only if Kalu Chadashav *and* it was born with a Mum. It seems that the Rambam and Semag agree. The Gemara supports them, for it asked why we count a Ba'al Mum's year from its birth, before it may be eaten. To answer this we must say that Kalu Chadashav *and* it was born with a Mum! It seems that our text of the Tur is mistaken. It should say 'one may keep it 12 months from the eighth day from its birth.' The previous words of the Tur prove that he holds like this; Kalu Chadashav does not help, since it was born Tam and could not be eaten immediately anyway.</p>
<p class='normal'></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) 'TARDA'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: Rebbi Zeira questioned an explanation of Rebbi Chiya bar Aba, to which Rebbi Chiya bar Aba exclaimed, 'Tarda!' and refuted his question. <b>RASHI</b> writes that the word 'Tarda' means a 'Shoteh Bahul,' a 'baffled fool.' Rashi in Kerisus (18b) writes that another interpretation is 'lazy one.' The <b>ARUCH</b> (Erech Tarir) has a different Girsa, according to which the word is 'Terura,' which means a fool from whose mouth saliva ('Ror') constantly drips.
</p><p>
What does the Gemara mean when it says that Rebbi Chiya bar Aba referred to Rebbi Zeira in such a way? Certainly the holy Amora'im would not insult each other! How is this remark to be understood?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>CHAVOS YA'IR</b> (#152) explains that it was customary that when a Torah teacher noticed his student being lazy in his thinking, he would sometimes call him a derogatory name as a form of rebuke in order to ensure that the student would no longer be lazy in his thinking. Rebbi was the paragon of humility (see Sotah 49b), and yet Rebbi responded to a question posed by his student, Levi, that 'it seems to me that he has no brain in his head.' Rebbi said this because he saw that Levi needed to be rebuked for not fulfilling his potential in Torah study.
</p><p>
Similarly, in the Gemara here (and in other places where the term 'Tarda' is used), the Amora who made this remark was talking to a younger Amora. The younger Amora did not mind receiving this instruction from his senior colleague.
</p><p>
The Chavos Ya'ir, in an earlier responsum (#65), adds that the word 'Tarda' is an example of an expression which people in general do not consider offensive. (See Insights to Bava Kama 65a.)
</p><p>
The <b>SEFER L'RE'ACHA KAMOCHA</b> (vol. 3, Kuntrus ha'Bi'urim, ch. 6) adds that it is common that when two good friends are learning together, they use an interchange of words that would not be appropriate for strangers. Such an instance is recorded in Bava Metzia (83b), where the Gemara relates that Rebbi Yehoshua ben Karcha sent a message to Rebbi Eliezer ben Shimon addressing him as 'Chametz ben Yayin' -- 'vinegar, the son of wine.' Rebbi Eliezer ben Shimon was not offended. However, when a common launderer said the same thing to him, he deemed it inappropriate and considered it grounds for punishment.
</p><p>
(b) The Mashgi'ach of the Mirrer Yeshiva, <b>RAV YERUCHAM LEVOVITZ</b> zt'l, writes in <b>DA'AS CHOCHMAH U'MUSAR</b> (2:10) that everything that the holy Amora'im did they did with the utmost purity and holiness. We, who do not live on such a lofty level of holiness, would be guilty of insulting and degrading our fellow man were we to call him by a derogatory name, and it indeed would be a severe transgression, for we cannot be confident that no impure motive was mixed with our words or actions. The holy Amora'im, on the other hand, spoke only with absolute purity of intention. Hence, even words that might seem to us to be words of derision were spoken -- and understood -- by the Amora'im with the 'fire of Torah' burning in them, with only the purest intentions.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>BEN YEHOYADA</b> in Bava Metzia (20b) gives alternate explanations for the word 'Tarda.' He explains that the word is actually made up of two other words, 'Tor' and 'Da.' 'Tor' is an expression of alertness. The Gemara in Megilah (18b) describes someone in a semi-sleeping state as 'Tir v'Lo Tir' ('alert and not alert'). 'Da' means 'this' or 'here.' Thus, 'Tarda' means 'be alert to this matter.'
</p><p>
Alternatively, 'Tor' means 'carry,' as in the expression 'Tir Minach Sha'atach,' or 'your time should carry you' (see Avodah Zarah 34b; <b>ARUCH</b>, Erech Tor). Accordingly, 'Tarda' means 'carry this with you' and is not an insulting remark. (Y. Montrose)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) IS BLOOD CONSIDERED MEAT?</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: Rebbi Eliezer discusses a case in which a Kohen performs Kabalas ha'Dam for an animal which is standing mostly inside the Azarah, with its hind legs standing outside of the Azarah. If the Kohen had cut off the circulation of the blood of the part of the animal that was outside of the Azarah before Kabalas ha'Dam, the Korban would be valid. If, on the other hand, the Kohen cut off the circulation <i>after</i> the Kabalah, the Korban is Pasul, because the blood in the legs that are outside of the Azarah is considered part of the blood that the Kohen receives during the Kabalah (since all of the blood is connected), and thus the Korban is Pasul. The Gemara learns from this ruling that blood absorbed in the limbs of an animal is considered blood according to Halachah. The Gemara responds that this is inconclusive, since it is possible that some fat of the animal which was outside the Azarah entered the bloodstream, and this is what invalidates the Kabalah. The fat is considered like meat of the Korban, which is definitely Pasul if it leaves the Azarah.
</p><p>
The Gemara seems to distinguish between blood and meat. If the blood absorbed in the animal's limbs outside the Azarah does not invalidate the Korban when it is received during the Kabalah since it is not considered <i>blood</i>, this implies that the absorbed blood is also not considered <i>meat</i>. Does this distinction apply in all cases?
</p><p>
(a) The Gemara's implication that blood is not considered meat is supported by the alternate text of <b>RASHI</b> (DH Shema Minah), according to which the Gemara explicitly says that the blood in this case 'is not meat' that can be called Pasul if it leaves the Azarah.
</p><p>
This is also the opinion of <b>TOSFOS</b> in Pesachim (22a, DH v'Harei). Tosfos deduces from the Gemara there that blood is not considered part of the animal. Tosfos questions this from the Gemara in Shabbos (77a) which says that Beis Hillel maintains that a Revi'is of blood of a Neveilah is Tamei because it can harden and turn into a k'Zayis. This implies that it is Tamei because it is considered like a k'Zayis of meat, the minimum amount of Neveilah subject to Tum'ah. The <b><b><b>RI</b></b></b> answers that the Gemara does not mean that blood is Tamei because it is like the meat of a Neveilah which is Tamei. Rather, a specific verse teaches that the blood of a Neveilah is Tamei. Logic dictates that if the Torah does not specify the amount of blood which creates this Tum'ah, the amount should be inferred by comparing the blood to meat. Therefore, this is no proof that blood in general is considered meat.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RIVASH</b> (#373) quotes <b>RABEINU YITZCHAK HA'LEVI</b> who points out that the Gemara in Kesuvos (60a) teaches that the Torah prohibits the consumption of human flesh, but permits the consumption of blood. He asks that if blood is considered meat, then how can the Gemara say that human blood is permitted? Even if the Torah does not intend to include human blood in the prohibition against drinking animal blood, it should at least fall into the category of human flesh! He answers that a verse teaches that blood is not included in the prohibition against eating human flesh. It is clear that he understands that blood is normally considered meat. How does this opinion understand the Gemara here in Zevachim? The Gemara says that blood which is absorbed in the limbs of the animal is considered blood. Even if it would not be considered blood, according to this opinion it would still invalidate the Korban because it is considered meat!
</p><p>
To understand this opinion, it is necessary to analyze the law of Yotzei. A Korban, or part thereof, that is taken out of its designated area becomes Pasul because of Yotzei. The Gemara later (82b) derives the Pesul of Yotzei from the verse, 'u'Vasar ba'Sadeh Tereifah Lo Socheilu' -- 'You shall not eat any meat that is torn by the beasts in the field' (Shemos 22:30), which refers to outside the area of the Azarah. The <b>KEHILOS YAKOV</b> (#20) explains that the Pesul of Yotzei applies to anything that must be eaten in a designated area or offered upon the Mizbe'ach in a designated area. If the item is not limited to being eaten or offered in a designated area, then there is no prohibition against taking it outside. The blood of a Korban is never supposed to be eaten; all of the blood is supposed to be received by the Kohen during Kabalas ha'Dam. Accordingly, even if blood normally is included in the category of meat, blood from the limbs cannot invalidate the Kabalah like meat (in the case of the Gemara here), because there is no Pesul when this type of meat -- inedible blood -- is taken out of the Azarah. The Gemara, therefore, discusses only the second possibility -- that perhaps the blood absorbed in the limbs is Halachically considered blood that is fit to be sprinkled on the Mizbe'ach. If blood absorbed in the limbs of the animal is not fit to be used for Zerikah, then there is no Pesul of Yotzei, since the blood is never brought to the Mizbe'ach. Even though it may be placed on the Mizbe'ach, there certainly is not obligation to place it there or to do Zerikah with it. Rebbi Eliezer's statement is understandable only if he maintains that this blood can be used for Zerikah. This is why the Gemara deduces that, according to Rebbi Eliezer, the blood in the animal's legs must be blood that is fit for Zerikah in order to invalidate the Korban if it was received during the Kabalah (because the blood was outside the Azarah). (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafbbb'><span class='numt'>1)</span> SLAUGHTERING AN ANIMAL SUSPENDED IN THE AIR <span class='indexentry'>[Shechitah: hanging]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Abaye and Rava):</span> If one slaughtered Kodshim Kalim while they were hanging (in the air), it is Kosher.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shabbos 128b (Abaye):</span> If one slaughters a hen, he should bend its feet against the ground or lift it totally off the ground.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Chulin 16b (Beraisa):</span> If one stuck a knife in the wall and slaughtered, it is Kosher.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Rav Anan):</span> This is only if the knife was above the neck. If the knife was below the neck, we are concerned lest the neck will press on the knife, and the Shechitah is invalid (this is Drasah).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question:</span> The Beraisa (15b) permits whether the knife is attached or detached, whether it is above or below!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer #1 (Rav Zvid):</span> If the knife is below and the neck is above, the knife must be detached. If the knife is above, the knife can even be attached.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer #2 (Rav Papa):</span> The Beraisa discusses a bird, which is light. There is no concern lest its neck press.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Shechitah 2:7):</span> How does one slaughter? He stretches the neck, and moves the knife back and forth until he slaughters. The animal crouches, or stands and he holds the back of the neck and the knife is in his hand below. This is Kosher.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Chulin 1:23):</span> Rav Anan did not say 'lest the neck pressed on the knife.' Rather, he used the future tense 'lest the neck *will* press', to teach that even if he says 'I am sure that I did not press', it is Pasul, lest another time he will press. Therefore, if it was a bird, whether the neck was above or below the inserted knife, the Shechitah is Kosher.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Ran (Chulin 4b DH li'Tzdadin):</span> Rav Zvid answered that when the knife is below, it must be detached. He moves the knife back and forth. Rav Papa holds that this is a poor answer. Rather, the Beraisa discusses a bird. It is light, so there is no concern lest its neck press.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (YD 6:4):</span>  If a knife was inserted in the wall (Rema - or in something detached) and one passed the neck along it until he slaughtered, it is Kosher. This is when the neck is below and the knife is above. If the neck was above, perhaps the animal would descend due to its body weight and cut without going back and forth, and this is not Shechitah. Even if he is sure that he did not press, it is Pasul. Therefore, if it was a bird, whether the neck was above or below the inserted knife, the Shechitah is Kosher.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH v'Ha):</span> Rav Zvid and Rav Papa do not argue about the Halachah. They argue only about how to establish the Beraisa. This is why the Rif, Rambam and Rosh rule like both of them.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shach (8):</span> Why did the Rema need to say 'or in something detached'? All the more so it is Kosher! The Chidush is in the Seifa. When the neck is above, it is Pasul even if the knife was inserted in something detached. Alternatively, he teaches that when the neck is below, it is b'Di'eved even if the knife was inserted in something detached. It is clear from the Gemara that when the knife is detached, when the neck is above it is Kosher b'Di'eved. Even for a bird, l'Chatchilah the neck may not be on top.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rebuttal (Pri Chodosh 11):</span> The Gemara proves unlike the Shach's latter answer. When there is no concern for Drasah, it is l'Chatchilah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl3'>	Meshiv Davar:</span> A Tosefta (Chulin 1:2) explicitly permits Shechitah with a detached or attached knife, whether the neck is above or below. The Shach holds that just like this is not the Halachah regarding an attached knife, also regarding when the neck is above. This is wrong.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl3'>	Gra:</span> The Rema teaches that when the neck of the animal is above, it is Pasul even if the knife was inserted in something detached. When the neck of an animal or bird is below, it is l'Chatchilah even if the knife was inserted in something detached.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH u'Mah she'Chosav Rabeinu):</span> The Rashba says that presumably we are not lenient about all birds, rather, only for light birds such as chickens or lighter. For a goose or heavier, we are concerned lest they weigh down like an animal. The Tur says that since the Gemara did not distinguish between different birds, all are permitted. We can say that since birds are permitted because they are light, it is understood that if it is heavy we are concerned. Also, perhaps 'Ohf d'Kalil' means 'a bird that is light', and it excludes heavy birds. The simple reading of the Gemara is 'a bird, which is light', like the Tur.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH v'Chasuv):</span> The Kolbo says that some say that the neck of lambs is light, like of birds, so they are similarly permitted. There is no source for this. The Rashba wanted to forbid heavy birds such as geese, and all the more so lambs! The Tur equates all birds to permit them, and similarly equates all animals to forbid them.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>viii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Tosefes Merubah (in Otzar Meforshim in Shulchan Aruch ha'Shalem, citing Simlah Chadashah 9 and Tevu'os Shor 16):</span> Chayah is included in Behemah, even though some of them are naturally light. (Note: there are seven Kosher Chayos (Devarim 14:5). Amora'im were unsure about the identity of some of them (Chulin 80a). Among those known (deer, hart) and what I have seen suggested (wild ox, giraffe...), none of them are lighter than geese.)</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (24:20):</span> One who slaughters a chicken must be careful to press its legs into the ground or hold it up, lest it insert its feet in the ground and the Simanim will be uprooted.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tosefes Merubah (in Otzar Meforshim in Shulchan Aruch ha'Shalem):</span> Tevu'os Shor (36) says that the Shulchan Aruch refers only to a rooster, but Yam Shel Shlomo (2:16) connotes that the text is hen, and this is the text in Shabbos.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Aruch ha'Shulchan (49):</span> When a chicken is stood up on the ground or against a wall with room, and one wants to slaughter it, its nature is to dig its nails into the ground and uproot the Simanim. If one presses the legs into the ground or wall or suspends it in the air, it is unlikely that they will be uprooted. Therefore, Chachamim commanded to do so.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Har Tzvi (YD 11):</span> In a certain city they used to hang the animal from its legs above with the neck below, and slaughter from the side. The society for prevention of cruelty to animals says that this is painful. They want the animal to hang on ropes under its stomach in an upright standing position with the neck up, and the Shochet will slaughter from below. The Rambam (2:7) said 'how does one slaughter?' This connotes that this is l'Chatchilah if it stands and the knife is under the neck. However, the Shach says that it is clear from the Gemara and Poskim than l'Chatchilah one may not slaughter when the knife is below. The Pri Chodosh said that this is unlike the Gemara. The Pleisi says that only when one moves the neck along the knife there is concern for Drasah, but when one moves the knife this is called that the knife is above and even the Shach permits in every case. If so, why did the Pri Chodosh argue with the Shach? Rashi explains that he moves the knife, in which case also the Shach permits! Tevu'os Shor says that Rashi permits a suspended animal only if the neck is tied so it cannot weigh down. Simlah Chadashah (8) permits when the neck is above only if the head is tied.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl3'>	Note:</span> The end of the Teshuvah was lost. Igros Moshe holds like the Pleisi, and says that therefore there is no question against the Shach.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Har Tzvi (YD 14):</span> In Argentina, they slaughter big bulls when the neck is pressed against a beam and the body is suspended in the air. This is Pasul. Perhaps the body will weigh down and uproot the Simanim. There is no proof from Zevachim to permit. Perhaps the animal is suspended by its legs, or rests on something hanging in the air. Minchas ha'Zevach forbids those who slaughter geese while holding it only by the neck and the body hangs down. This is Pasul, for it weighs down and the Simanim tear. Simlah Chadashah (24:25) requires someone else to hold the Simanim with the Shochet, lest they move.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Si'ach Yitzchak (390):</span> Pekudas Eliezer (66) says that the animal must lie on the ground, tied, and the Shochet holds it and the knife, so it cannot lift its neck and weigh down on the knife. If it hangs on wood, even if people hold the head, perhaps it will overpower them for a moment and press down. When it is hanging and the knife is above, it must be tied so it cannot lift its neck. In the Mikdash, there were rings in which the animal's neck was inserted (Rashi Sukah 56a DH v'Tabasah), so it not move at the time of Shechitah (Tiferes Yisrael 75).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Igros Moshe (YD 2:13):</span> Rashi (Chulin 16b DH Sachin) explicitly says that it is l'Chatchilah to slaughter through moving a detached knife when the animal is suspended and the neck is above. The Shulchan Aruch forbids with a detached knife, and the Shach forbids l'Chatchilah when he moves the animal's neck along the knife. He learned from Rashi, who permits l'Chatchilah when one moves the knife back and forth. B'Di'eved it is Kosher even if he moved the neck. This is unlike Simlah Chadashah, who forbids even b'Di'eved. We do not find anyone who disagrees with Rashi. Nekudas ha'Kesef says that Tosfos agrees. Rashi connotes that the head need not be tied, for he did not mention this. When it stands normally on the ground it has power to press down its neck, but not when it is hanging. Perhaps this is a Heter for the practice in Argentina, but l'Ma'aseh I do not permit, for it seems that Simlah Chadashah forbids even when it is hanging. It is permitted only if the head is tied above, like Tevu'os Shor permits.</p>
<p class='normal'></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) WHEN DOES A MISPLACED 'ZERIKAH' ATONE FOR THE OWNER?</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Mishnah (26a) discusses cases of a Kohen performing Zerikah in the wrong place. The Kohen sprinkles the blood on the ramp of the Mizbe'ach or on a place that is not opposite the Yesod (the foundation) of the Mizbe'ach (such as the south-east corner), or he sprinkles the blood above the Chut ha'Sikra when the Zerikah of this particular Korban must be done below the Chut ha'Sikra (or vice versa), or he sprinkles the blood in the inner area when it is supposed to be done in the Azarah (or vice versa). The Mishnah states that the Korban is Pasul, but those who eat it are not punished with Kares.
</p><p>
In the Gemara (26b), Shmuel explains that when the Mishnah says that these Korbanos are Pasul, it merely means that one cannot eat the meat. The owner, however, has achieved atonement through the Korban despite the misplaced Zerikah. Does Shmuel refer to all of the cases in the Mishnah, or to only some of them?
</p><p>
(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Amar Shmuel) says that Shmuel does not refer to the case of a Kohen who does Zerikah on the ramp of the Mizbe'ach. Although the Gemara later (87a) considers the ramp like the Mizbe'ach with regard to the consecration of parts of Korbanos brought there for burning, it is not considered like the Mizbe'ach with regard to Zerikah. This is apparent from the Gemara later (64b) which derives from the verse, 'Kir ha'Mizbe'ach' -- 'the wall of the Mizbe'ach' (Vayikra 5:9), that the Zerikah cannot be done on the wall of the ramp. Tosfos also says this with regard to a Kohen who does Zerikah in the inner area of the Mikdash for a Korban which is supposed to have Zerikah done in the Azarah, or the opposite case. This is apparent from the Gemara (36a) which implies that everyone agrees that such a place is not acceptable for Zerikah. However, Tosfos then doubts these exceptions, and he suggests that perhaps they should be considered like the Mizbe'ach.
</p><p>
The <b>SEFAS EMES</b> has difficulty with Tosfos' suggestion that the fact that the ramp is like the Mizbe'ach regarding the limbs of Korbanos makes it like the Mizbe'ach also with regard to Zerikah. The reason why the ramp is like the Mizbe'ach for limbs of Korbanos is that the limbs are brought to the Mizbe'ach via the ramp. Hence, it is understandable that the Mizbe'ach should already start at the ramp. In contrast, the Zerikah has absolutely nothing at all to do with the ramp!
</p><p>
The Sefas Emes answers that the Zerikah is, in some way, related to the ramp. The Mishnah (53a) says that the Kohen goes up the ramp when he offers a Korban Chatas. <b>RASHI</b> (DH Ula) explains that for a Chatas, the Kohen must go onto the ramp because he must do the Zerikah at the corners of the Mizbe'ach. This would be a reason for why the ramp would be included in Shmuel's list as a place which is related to Zerikah and therefore causes atonement when the Zerikah is performed there.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>BIRKAS HA'ZEVACH</b> points out that the <b>RAMBAM</b> does not make this distinction. The Rambam (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 2:10) seems to exclude none of the cases of the Mishnah from Shmuel's statement. He lists these cases together and then states that they are all Pasul but, nevertheless, the owners have achieved atonement.
</p><p>
There is an argument about what the Rambam considers to be included in 'the inner area' of the Mikdash. The <b>MIKDASH DAVID</b> understands that according to the Rambam, any Zerikah which is supposed to be done in the inner areas of the Beis ha'Mikdash, even those supposed to be done on the Paroches and in the Kodesh ha'Kodashim, atone for the owner if done on the Mizbe'ach ha'Chitzon.
</p><p>
However, the <b>ZEVACH TODAH</b>, <b>RABEINU CHAIM HA'LEVI</b> (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 2:16), and the <b>CHAZON ISH</b> (Kodshim 7:2) argue that the only mistake the Gemara is discussing is a mix-up between the Mizbe'ach ha'Chitzon and the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi. This is apparent from the source of Shmuel's ruling, the verse of 'va'Ani Nesativ Lachem Al ha'Mizbe'ach l'Chaper' -- 'and I gave it to you to be [placed] on the Mizbe'ach to atone [for your lives]' (Vayikra 17:11). Shmuel learns from this verse that once the blood reaches the Mizbe'ach, it atones for the owner. This means that blood which is designated for a Mizbe'ach can serve its purpose of attaining atonement on any Mizbe'ach. Blood which was never designated for a Mizbe'ach is not included in this verse. (Y. Montrose)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) THE MISHNAH ACCORDING TO REISH LAKISH</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Mishnah (26a) lists several cases in which the Zerikas ha'Dam of a Korban was not done properly. It states that in all of these cases, the Korban is Pasul, but one is not punished with Kares for eating the meat of the Korban. Shmuel (26b) explains that when the Mishnah says that the Korban is Pasul, it means only that its meat may not be eaten. The Korban, however, <i>does</i> atone for its owner. Shmuel derives this from the verse, 'va'Ani Nesativ Lachem Al ha'Mizbe'ach l'Chaper' -- 'and I gave it to you to be [placed] on the Mizbe'ach to atone [for your lives]' (Vayikra 17:11). This verse teaches that once the blood reaches the Mizbe'ach or any part of the Mizbe'ach, it atones. However, it <i>only</i> atones; it does not permit the flesh of the Korban to be eaten.
</p><p>
Reish Lakish (27a) agrees with Shmuel that the Zerikah in each case of the Mishnah is effective b'Di'eved and atones, even though the meat cannot be eaten. He argues, however, that when the Mishnah says that the Korban is Pasul, it means that the Korban is entirely Pasul and it does not even atone for the owner. The Mishnah, Reish Lakish explains, is discussing a case in which the Kohen performed the Zerikah 'b'Amirah' -- 'with a statement.' <b>RASHI</b> (DH Kan) explains that this means that the Kohen performed the Zerikah with specific intent ('Amirah') to eat the meat of the Korban 'Chutz l'Zemano.' The Mishnah is teaching that because these types of Zerikah are considered valid Zerikos b'Di'eved, having a thought of Pigul during Zerikah can invalidate the Korban. However, one who eats the meat of the Korban is not punished with Kares, because having a thought of Pigul during a Zerikah which cannot permit the meat to be eaten does not create an Isur of Pigul which is punishable with Kares.
</p><p>
The Gemara asks that if it is true that a Korban cannot become Pigul during a Zerikah which does not permit the meat to be eaten, then the same should apply if, during the Shechitah, the Kohen thinks to perform the Zerikah at the wrong place on the Mizbe'ach 'Chutz l'Zemano.' It should be considered as though the Kohen thought during the Shechitah that he would not perform Zerikah at all (and such a thought is not an invalidating thought)! The Gemara answers that Reish Lakish follows the view of Rebbi Yehudah (35b), who maintains that such a thought <i>is</i> an invalidating thought; if a person has in mind during Shechitah to leave over some of the blood of the Zerikah until the next day ('Machsheves Hinu'ach,' a thought of 'leaving over'), then the Korban is Pasul according to Rebbi Yehudah.
</p><p>
The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> (#3), <b>TOSFOS REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b> (on the Mishnah), and others have difficulty with Rashi's explanation of Reish Lakish. According to Rashi, Reish Lakish is saying that the reason why the Korban is Pasul is that the Kohen has a thought to eat the Korban 'Chutz l'Zemano' while he does the Zerikah in the wrong place. However, in such a case, why is the Korban invalid at all? If the Torah teaches that a thought during a misplaced Zerikah cannot create Pigul, then a thought during a misplaced Zerikah should be disregarded altogether, and the Korban should be valid!
</p><p>
Indeed, the Gemara itself mentions Rebbi Yehudah's case of 'Machsheves Hinu'ach' because without his opinion there is no reason why the Korban should become Pasul due to a thought of doing Zerikah in the wrong place 'Chutz l'Zemano,' since such a Zerikah does not enable the meat to be eaten. However, in the case where the Machshavah was a normal Machshavah of Pigul, and the reason it does not create Pigul is because the Avodah was not a proper Avodah (since the Zerikah was in the wrong place), the case cannot be compared to a case of 'Machsheves Hinu'ach,' and the Korban should be valid, just like a case of a thought of Pigul that the Kohen has in mind at a time when he is not performing any Avodah. Why, then, is the Korban Pasul?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>ACHI'EZER</b> (2:30) answers that while Reish Lakish understands that Shechitah (and Kabalah) performed with a thought of doing Zerikah in the wrong place is Pasul (in accordance with the view of Rebbi Yehudah), this is not the reason why Reish Lakish understands that doing Zerikah in the wrong place with a normal thought of Pigul ('Chutz l'Zemano') is Pasul. Reish Lakish understands that there is a fundamental difference between these two cases. In the first case, when one performs Shechitah with a thought to perform Zerikah in the wrong place 'Chutz l'Zemano,' the Korban is not considered Pigul because the thought was not a normal thought of Pigul (since he had in mind to do an improper Zerikah outside of the proper time). The verse teaches that having a thought to perform a Zerikah that does not allow the Korban to be eaten (such as Zerikah in the wrong place) is equivalent to having a thought to <i>not</i> perform Zerikah (in which case there is no reason for the Korban to be Pasul). This is why the Gemara asks that the Korban should not be Pasul at all with such a thought. The Gemara answers that it must be that the Korban is Pasul because of the thought of leaving over the blood, according to Rebbi Yehudah, and not because of the thought of doing Zerikah in the wrong place.
</p><p>
In the second case, when one performs the Zerikah in the wrong place with a thought to eat the Korban 'Chutz l'Zemano,' the Korban does not become Pigul because the Avodah during which the person had a thought of Pigul was not a properly-performed Avodah. The verse (mentioned earlier in the Gemara) -- which excludes such a case from the laws of Pigul -- teaches only that it does not have the same stringency as a normal case of Pigul. One cannot deduce from the verse that the Korban should be valid. (See also <b>KEHILOS YAKOV</b> #21, <b>CHAZON ISH</b> Kodashim 7:5, and <b><b><b>OR</b></b> SAME'ACH</b>, Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 2:12.)
</p><p>
(b) The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> cites <b>RABEINU PERETZ</b> who explains the Gemara differently from Rashi. He explains that Reish Lakish is discussing a case in which the Kohen thought, during Zerikah, to pour the blood leftover after Zerikah ('Shirayim') in the wrong place at the wrong time ('Chutz l'Zemano'). Just as a thought, during Shechitah, to do Zerikah in the wrong place and at the wrong time is considered a 'Machsheves Hinu'ach,' so, too, a thought <i>during</i> the performance of Zerikah in the wrong place to perform another action 'Chutz l'Zemano' is comparable to a 'Machsheves Hinu'ach' of that action. Therefore, the case that Rabeinu Peretz discusses is comparable to a case of a thought during Shechitah to leave the Shirayim alone (and not pour them). Reish Lakish maintains that the Korban in such a case is Pasul mid'Rabanan. Although the Shirayim is not a necessary procedure of the Korban, the Rabanan invalidated the Korban in such a case because such a thought can be confused with a thought during the Shechitah (or Kabalah) not to perform Zerikah at all. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> IS IT ENOUGH TO THINK THAT ONE DOES LISHMAH? <span class='indexentry'>[Lishmah: intent]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Reish Lakish):</span> The Beraisa is Machshir when he was silent. The Mishnah discusses when he said that he intends Chutz li'Zmano.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bava Metzia 44a (Beraisa - Beis Shamai):</span> 'Al Kol Devar Pesha' obligates for intent (for Shlichus Yad, i.e. unauthorized use of acquire deposit) like for action;</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span>	Beis Hillel say, he is liable only if he actually took it - 'Im Lo Shalach Yado.'</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Gitin 45b:</span> There was a Nochri in Tzidan who used to write Sefarim. R. Shimon ben Gamliel permitted buying from him.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question:</span> R. Shimon requires tanning the hide l'Shem Sefarim. Surely the writing must be Lishmah!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer (Rabah bar Shmuel and Rav Ashi):</span> R. Shimon permitted buying from a convert who reverted to being a Nochri because he feared for his life.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Menachos 42b (Rav):</span> If Tzitzis were made from Sisin (a certain plant), they are Kosher (even though they were not spun Lishmah);</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Shmuel):</span> They are Pasul. Tzitzis must be spun Lishmah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span>	Rav and Shmuel argue like the following Tana'im;</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Beraisa):</span> If Tefilin were covered with hide of a Tahor animal, they are Kosher, even if it was not tanned Lishmah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span>	R. Shimon ben Gamliel says, they are Pasul. The leather must be tanned Lishmah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kidushin 41b:</span> Terumah can be separated through thought alone.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Hilchos Sefer Torah (after Menachos) 3,4):</span> R. Baruch was unsure whether one must say with his lips that he tans the leather l'Shem Sefer Torah or Tefilin, or if intent suffices. Regarding Pigul it says 'Lo Yeratzeh', and speech is required (Zevachim 27a). Terumah is taken without speech, through mere intent. Regarding Shlichus Yad, it says 'Al Kol Devar Pesha', and one who intends to make unauthorized use of the deposit is liable. Therefore, it is good to say at the beginning that he tans Lishmah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Drishah (YD 271 DH veha'Rav):</span>  How can R. Baruch bring a proof from Shlichus Yad? Beis Hillel do not obligate until he does an action! Also, Beis Shamai obligate only when he said (that he will be Shole'ach Yad), like Rashi and Tosfos explain! I saw inside (Sefer ha'Terumah 192) that R. Baruch merely was unsure if Shlichus Yad is like Pigul or like Terumah. Perhaps one may prove oppositely, that the Mishnah was able to say 'thought', when it really means speech, because one cannot err about this. It is clear that mere thought is nothing! It is better to say that the Rosh holds that Beis Shamai obligate for mere thought, unlike Rashi and Tosfos, and Beis Hillel disagree only because they expound 'Im Lo Shalach'. If not, they would agree that thought that is like speech, and he is liable for it. Really, I think that R. Baruch and the Rosh did not write this. A Talmid wrote it in the margin, and it became incorporated in the text.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mordechai (Hilchos Tzitzis 949):</span> When something is not Stam (automatically) Lishmah, such as a Get, one must say with his lips that he does it Lishmah. One must say at the beginning of spinning threads for Tzitzis that he does so Lishmah. Alternatively, he tells a woman 'spin for me Tzitzis for a Talis', even though Stam it is not Lishmah.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (YD 271:1):</span> When one begins to tan leather for a Sefer Torah, he must say when putting the hides in the lime 'I tan these hides l'Shem Sefer Torah.'</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH u'Mah she'Chosav b'Shem):</span> R. Baruch was unsure whether one must say this. The Rosh and Tur say that he should, and Hagahos Maimoniyos says in the name of Semag that he must.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Taz (3):</span> We can say that R. Baruch disagrees with Rashi and Tosfos. He is unsure whether we learn from Pigul or from Shole'ach Yad.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Pischei Teshuvah (6):</span> A case occurred in which a scribe said that he tans l'Shem Sefer Torah, and later he intended to write a Sefer Pasul. In the end, he wrote a Sefer Torah. The Noda b'Yehudah (2 YD 168) says that his (second) intent does nothing. However, if he said that he will write a Sefer Pasul, these words nullify his initial words. The tanning itself is not considered an action, for in any case (no matter what kind of Sefer he will write) one must tan the hide. However, if he gave the hide to a Nochri to tan and the Yisrael helped, this is an action that proves that it is l'Shem Sefer Torah. Later, he wrote that even if he tanned it himself, even if he explicitly said that he will write a Sefer Pasul, it is Kosher, for he did not say that he tans it for a Pasul Sefer Torah, so he did not nullify his initial words.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Pischei Teshuvah (7):</span> The Beis Yosef brings from Rama mi'Pi'ano that b'Di'eved, intent suffices.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 11:1):</span> When one begins to spin threads for Tzitzis, he must say that he does so l'Shem Tzitzis, or he tells a woman 'spin for me Tzitzis for a Talis.'</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Gra:</span> Even though intent suffices for Terumah (Kidushin 41b) and Shlichus Yad, even though it says 'Devar', we find that Pigul requires speech, even though it says 'Yechashev'. One must say at the beginning, for it is a Safek whether the end proves about the beginning (Chulin 39b). When he says 'spin for me Tzitzis for a Talis', Stam it is l'Shem Tzitzis.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	R. Akiva Eiger (citing Devar Shmuel or Divrei Shalom):</span> The verse hints that it suffices to tell a woman - '*Daber* El Bnei Yisrael v'*Amarta* Lahem v'Asu Lahem Tzitzis.' Dibur is harsh; it applies to men. Amirah is soft; it applies to women (Rashi Shemos 19:3). The Mitzvah is primarily for *Bnei* Yisrael, and not women, but the Asiyah (doing), i.e. the spinning, which is the normal Melachah of women, one may tell a woman to do it.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (4):</span> If he only thought that he spins Lishmah, this requires investigation whether this suffices b'Di'eved.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (2):</span> If he only thought that he spins Lishmah, b'Di'eved this is Kosher, for Menachos 42b equates this to tanning for a Sefer Torah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (3):</span> Some say that b'Di'eved is if the strings were already spun. Some say that b'Di'eved is if the strings were already attached to the Talis. Therefore, one who is careful will take such strings only in pressed circumstances.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 32:8):</span> One must tan leather for the parchments of Tefilin Lishmah. It is good to say with his lips at the beginning of the tanning that he tans l'Shem Tefilin or l'Shem Sefer Torah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH v'Da):</span> The Tur did not say here that one should say with his lips at the beginning of the tanning that he tans l'Shem Tefilin. He relied on what he wrote in Hilchos Sefer Torah (YD 271).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'>	R. Akiva Eiger:</span> The Shulchan Aruch connotes that l'Chatchilah one should be concerned for the Safek or R. Baruch, but b'Di'eved not. In Sa'if 19, the Rema brings an opinion that it suffices to intend that he writes names of Hash-m Lishmah, since he said with his lips at the beginning that he writes l'Shem Kedushas Tefilin. If not, intent would not suffice! Also in YD (271:1, 274:1) the Shulchan Aruch says that one must say with his lips, and does not say that it is only l'Chatchilah! This requires investigation.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (24):</span> B'Di'eved, it suffices if he intended.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (25):</span> It suffices to say so at the beginning even if the tanning extended over several days. Everything he does is according to his initial intent.</p>
<p class='seealso'>See also:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) HOW THE 'MIZBE'ACH HA'PENIMI' CONSECRATES WHATEVER IS PLACED UPON IT</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara discusses the Halachah in the case of a privately-donated Ketores ('Ketores Zarah') which was placed upon the Mizbe'ach. Such a Ketores is an invalid offering, since the Torah sanctions bringing Ketores only from the public, communal funds. The Beraisa says that if such Ketores was placed upon the Mizbe'ach ha'Chitzon, it must be removed. The Ketores is not allowed to remain on the Mizbe'ach ha'Chitzon, since the Mizbe'ach ha'Chitzon is Mekadesh only things that are supposed to be placed on it. If, on the other hand, the Ketores was placed upon the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi, then it is allowed to remain there, since the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi is Mekadesh whatever is placed on it. The Gemara seems to be saying that the Ketores stays on the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi and is not removed.
</p><p>
The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> quotes <b>RABEINU SHMUEL</b> of Evreux who has difficulty with this Gemara. The Torah states with regard to the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi, 'Minchah v'Nesech Lo Sischu Alav' -- 'a Minchah and a Nesech do not put upon it' (Shemos 30:9). This teaches that the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi is <i>not</i> Mekadesh even ordinary Korbanos! How, then, can the Gemara say that the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi is empowered to be Mekadesh Korbanos which are Pasul in the first place?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>RABEINU SHMUEL</b> of Evreux answers that the verse is discussing the proper conduct that must be followed, l'Chatchilah, for the Mizbe'ach. That is, the verse is teaching what items l'Chatchilah should be brought, and should not be brought, upon the Mizbe'ach. The verse does not address what should be done if, b'Di'eved, something improper is brought upon the Mizbe'ach. The Gemara teaches that in such a case, the Korban becomes Kadosh and must be left on the Mizbe'ach. Accordingly, the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi indeed is Mekadesh anything that is offered upon it, even that which is unfit to be brought as a Korban.
</p><p>
What exactly does the Torah prohibit, according to this explanation? Does the Torah prohibit <i>placing</i> an improper Korban on the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi, or does the Torah prohibit <i>burning</i> it on the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi?
</p><p>
If the Torah prohibits burning these things on the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi, then why, b'Di'eved, should they be permitted to remain there and be burned? The answer cannot be that once they are placed there, the prohibition no longer applies and they may be burned, because <i>everything</i> that is placed on the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi becomes Kadosh and may be burned, and thus the prohibition effectively would be cancelled! It must be that the Torah prohibits <i>placing</i> the Korbanos onto the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi. Once the prohibition has been transgressed and they have been placed there, they may be left there and burned.
</p><p>
There is a similar prohibition in Vayikra (2:11-12) that prohibits bringing improper things on the Mizbe'ach <i>ha'Chitzon</i> (such as bread and fruit). However, the verse there implies that it is prohibited to <i>burn</i> them on the Mizbe'ach, because the verse concludes, 'They shall not provide on the Mizbe'ach a pleasing offering.' According to Rabeinu Shmuel of Evreux, it must be that there is a difference between the prohibition of offering Korbanos on the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi, which prohibits placing them on the Mizbe'ach, and the prohibition of offering improper things on the Mizbe'ach ha'Chitzon, which prohibits <i>burning</i> them as well. (See <b>CHAZON ISH</b> on the <b>RAMBAM</b>, Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 3:18.)
</p><p>
The <b>MIKDASH DAVID</b> (5:2) indeed suggests that the prohibition involves bringing things onto the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi, not burning them there. The <b>MINCHAS AVRAHAM</b> cites support for this explanation from the words of <b>RABEINU GERSHOM</b> in Menachos (57b). The Gemara there discusses 'one who brings up' ('ha'Ma'aleh'), onto the ramp of the Mizbe'ach, Korbanos which do not belong on the Mizbe'ach, thereby transgressing the prohibition. Rabeinu Gershom comments that this refers to one who brings them onto the ramp <i>without</i> burning them.
</p><p>
(b) <b>RAV SHACH</b> zt'l in <b>AVI EZRI</b> (Telisa'a, Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 3:5) explains that Rabeinu Shmuel of Evreux is <i>not</i> saying that the verse is teaching what the law is l'Chatchilah, while the Gemara is teaching what the law is b'Di'eved. Rather, when Rabeinu Shmuel of Evreux says that the verse is 'l'Chatchilah,' it means that the verse prohibits placing a Korban on the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi with specific intent to attain atonement, or to serve another purpose of a Korban (such as to fulfill one's Neder). The word 'b'Di'eved' is used in this context to refer to placing something on the Mizbe'ach with no intent or purpose in mind, but rather merely to burn it there (like firewood). This act is not prohibited by the Torah.
</p><p>
(According to this explanation, the prohibition against placing things on the Mizbe'ach ha'Chitzon and the prohibition against placing things on the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi refer to the same action.)
</p><p>
(c) Rabeinu Shmuel of Evreux gives another answer to his question. When the Gemara says that 'if they were brought up, then they should not be taken down,' it does not mean that the Korban is to remain on the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi. Rather, it means that after it is removed from the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi, if it is then placed on the Mizbe'ach ha'Chitzon, it should not be removed, because it became Kadosh by being placed, originally, on the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi. The Mizbe'ach ha'Chitzon itself cannot be Mekadesh this Korban, since it can be Mekadesh only something that was already made Kadosh in a Kli Shares. The Gemara is teaching that this step -- making something Kadosh in a Kli Shares -- can be accomplished by placing the item on the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi, which is considered like a Kli Shares. In practice, this is relevant only for something which is not otherwise made Kadosh in a Kli Shares, such as the Kometz of a Korban Minchah. (See <b>YAD BINYAMIN</b> who quotes a lengthy discussion between <b>RAV MICHAL YEHUDAH LEFKOWITZ</b> and <b>RAV ISSER ZALMAN MELTZER</b> regarding the explanation of this answer of Rabeinu Shmuel of Evreux). (Y. Montrose)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) THE MEANING OF 'OR HA'ALYAH K'ALYAH DAMI'</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Mishnah discusses the types of thoughts that constitute a transgression of the prohibition of Pigul (having in mind a thought of 'Chutz l'Zemano' or 'Chutz l'Mekomo' while offering a Korban). One of these thoughts entails thinking about eating a k'Zayis of the 'Or ha'Alyah,' the hide of the animal's tail, either Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo. The Gemara records three opinions regarding whether or not the 'Or ha'Alyah' is considered like the Alyah, the tail, itself. With regard to what law is this question relevant?
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI</b> (DH k'Alyah Dami) explains that the question is relevant to the laws of Haktarah, burning the parts of the Korban on the Mizbe'ach. Just as the Alyah itself is supposed to be burned on the Mizbe'ach, so, too, perhaps the skin of the Alyah is supposed to be burned on the Mizbe'ach.
</p><p>
The Gemara asks that if the Or ha'Alyah is like the Alyah, then how can having a thought of <i>eating</i> the Or ha'Alyah in the wrong time or place be considered an invalidating thought of Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo? The Rabanan maintain that only a wrongful thought about eating something that is normally eaten can invalidate the Korban as Pigul, and the skin of the tail is not normally eaten!
</p><p>
Shmuel answers that the Mishnah follows the view of Rebbi Eliezer who argues that even thinking about something which is burned on the Mizbe'ach (and not eaten) can create a problem of Pigul. (See Gemara later on 35a, and Menachos 17a, for the reasons behind the argument.)
</p><p>
Rav Huna answers that the Or ha'Alyah indeed is <i>not</i> like the Alyah, and therefore thinking about eating it in the wrong time or place constitutes a Pigul-thought of Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo even according to the Rabanan.
</p><p>
Rav Chisda answers that although the Or ha'Alyah <i>is</i> like the Alyah, the Mishnah is discussing the hide of the tail of a <i>goat</i>. The tail of a goat is not burned on the Mizbe'ach, and therefore thinking about eating it (or the Or ha'Alyah) constitutes Pigul.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>TZON KODASHIM</b> explains that the question whether or not the Or ha'Alyah is like the Alyah pertains to a thought of Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo. Although the Or ha'Alyah is considered like the tail itself with regard to the laws of Tum'as Basar, as the Gemara says when it discusses the answer of Rav Chisda, it is not considered like the tail with regard to Chutz l'Zemano and Chutz l'Mekomo.
</p><p>
The <b>MITZPEH EISAN</b> and <b>RASHASH</b> challenge the explanation of the Tzon Kodashim. (The Rashash calls his explanation a 'Shegagah Gedolah.') All of the opinions in the Gemara are explaining the Mishnah, which says that Pigul occurs when one thinks about eating the Or ha'Alyah. If Rav Huna is explaining how the Mishnah can be understood even according to the Rabanan, then how can he say that the Or ha'Alyah cannot cause Pigul? The Mishnah itself says that it <i>can</i> cause Pigul!
</p><p>
The <b>YAD BINYAMIN</b> explains that this cannot be the intent of the Tzon Kodashim. He explains that the Tzon Kodashim understands the Gemara like Rashi (DH k'Alyah Dami). When the Tzon Kodashim writes that the Or ha'Alyah is not like the Alyah with regard to Pigul, he means that since the Or ha'Alyah is not burned like the tail itself, the Mishnah says that a thought about eating the Or ha'Alyah can cause Pigul.
</p><p>
The Tzon Kodashim addresses a question with this explanation. Why should the hide of the tail not be burned along with the tail? With regard to Tum'ah, the hide is considered an inseparable part of the tail! He answers that the hide is considered part of the tail only for the laws of Tum'ah, because the hide of the tail is soft and chewable, like meat, and thus it is considered like meat with regard to Tum'as Basar. In contrast, the fact that it is meaty is not a reason to burn the hide of the tail on the Mizbe'ach. The Tzon Kodashim learns that the verse (Bamidbar 18:8) mentioned by the Gemara, which is written with regard to the Kohen's eating of the meat of the Korban, also applies to the Mizbe'ach's 'eating,' or consumption, of the Korban. The verse teaches that the Mizbe'ach may consume only parts of the Korban that are fit for royalty. Accordingly, it is not logical that the hide of the tail is placed on the Mizbe'ach (since it is not fit for royalty), unless the Torah explicitly commands to do so (as it does with regard to a Korban Olah). The Mishnah, which discusses only the Korbanos that are partially eaten (see <b>RASHI</b> to 27b, DH Es ha'Zevach), does not consider the Or ha'Alyah to be something which is burned on the Mizbe'ach. Even though it is not burned because of the verse (Bamidbar 18:8), it nevertheless is considered food which can cause Pigul.
</p><p>
The Gemara here continues and says that Rav Chisda understands that the fact that the Or ha'Alyah causes Pigul despite the verse that requires that the meat be fit for royalty is the novel idea advanced by the Mishnah. Rav Huna agrees with this approach. (The Yad Binyamin acknowledges that to say that all of this is the intention of the Tzon Kodashim is somewhat forced.) (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> MATANOS MUST BE EATEN IN GRANDEUR <span class='indexentry'>[Matanos Kehunah :eating]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span>	Even though another Mishnah teaches that the skin under the tail is like the flesh regarding Tum'ah, Rav Chisda holds that our Mishnah needed to teach this, for one might have thought that intent for eating it is different;</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span>	One must eat Kodshim 'l'Mashchah' (in grandeur), like kings eat. Kings do not normally eat skin of the tail.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	55a (Mishnah):</span> One may eat the meat of Todah and Eil Nazir (cooked) in any way. The same applies to the parts given to Kohanim.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	75b - Question (Rami bar Chama):</span> A Bechor may not be redeemed. Can Temuras Bechor be redeemed?</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	90b (Mishnah):</span> Kohanim may eat any Kodshim any way they want, roasted, overcooked or cooked.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	91a:</span> We learn from 'l'Mashchah', the way kings eat.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Chulin 132b (Rav Chisda):</span> Matanos must be eaten roasted and with mustard. (Stam 'Matanos' refers to the foreleg, jaw and stomach of a slaughtered Chulin animal. One must give them to a Kohen.) We learn from 'l'Mashchah'.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Rav Chisda):</span> There are 24 Matnos Kehunah. We do not give to a Kohen who is not fluent in their laws.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rejection (Beraisa - R. Shimon):</span> If a Kohen denies that Hash-m commanded about the Avodah, he gets no share in Kodshim.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Inference:</span> A Kohen who admits to all the Avodos has a share of Kodshim, even if he is not fluent in them.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bechoros 26b (Mishnah):</span> A Yisrael must take care of a Bechor Seh (kid or lamb) for 30 days, and a calf for 50 days, before giving it to a Kohen;</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span>	R. Yosi says, he must take care of a Seh for three months.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Beraisa):</span> Regarding all Matanos Kehunah, the giver has Tovas Hana'ah. If a Yisrael separated Terumah, another Yisrael (Reuven) may pay him in order that he give the Terumah to a particular Kohen, e.g. Reuven's grandson.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>12.</span>	The Tana illustrates only Terumah, for it has Kedushas ha'Guf. The Kohen will not err to think that this 'sale' redeemed it, and now it is Chulin.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span>	Bechor (Ba'al Mum) and Matanos are Kedushas Damim. Reuven may not pay the owner to give them to a particular Kohen, lest the Kohen think that they became Chulin through this.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Bikurim 9:20):</span> Matanos have no Kedushah. A Kohen may sell or give them for a gift even to a Nochri, or feed them to dogs.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Yam Shel Shlomo (Chulin 10:11):</span> Since one must eat them in grandeur, why may he feed them to a dog?! This is permitted only when they are not proper to be eaten, e.g. they spoiled, or it is bad meat from a lean animal. Then one may feed them to dogs, or sell or give them to Nochrim, like Yisre'elim do with Neveilos and Treifos.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (22):</span> Matanos are eaten only roasted and with mustard, for it says 'l'Mashchah', the way kings eat.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Kesef Mishneh:</span> Tosfos says that if the Kohen prefers it cooked more than roasted, we do not force him to eat it roasted, for the way of kings is to eat what they enjoy most.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Radvaz:</span> This is when the Kohen himself eats them. If he gave them or sold them to a Yisrael, he eats them as he desires. A proof of this is that he may feed them to Nochrim or dogs.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 10:10):</span> One may eat Kodshim (cooked) any way. Even Kohanim may eat their portion, whether of Kodshim Kalim or Kodshei Kodshim, any way. They may eat them differently, e.g. roasted, overcooked or cooked, and add Chulin spices.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Kesef Mishneh:</span> The Rambam says '*even* Kohanim', for one might have thought that they must eat only l'Shem Shamayim, but not like delicacies for enjoyment. 'L'Mashchah' teaches that this is not so.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tosfos (75b DH Bechor):</span> What was the question about redemption of Temuras Bechor? Surely, redemption would not permit shearing or working with it, just like it does not permit this for other Kodshim. 'L'Mashchah' does not apply, for it is not Matanos Kehunah. He asked whether the money gets Kedushah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Mishneh l'Melech:</span> In Hilchos Bikurim, the Rambam rules that Matanos are eaten only roasted and with mustard. Tosfos says that l'Mashchah applies only to Matanos Kehunah. Perhaps the Rambam says 'even Kohanim' because clearly 'l'Mashchah' does not apply to Zarim, and he teaches that it does not apply even to the portion that Kohanim receive.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch ha'Rav (OC 476:1):</span> Korban Pesach is eaten at the end of the meal, when one is satiated, for all Korbanos are eaten 'l'Mashchah'.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Chulin 10:6):</span> Rav Chisda does not require eating Matanos only roasted. 'L'Mashchah' teaches that Kohanim may eat any Kodshim any way they want. Rather, the Kohen eats it however he prefers, so it will be eaten with appetite. If all ways are the same for him, he should eat them roasted, like kings.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rashi (Bechoros 27a DH Aval and DH Tischal):</span> When a Kohen sells Matanos to a Yisrael, the buyer need not eat them in grandeur. If Reuven paid Ploni to give Matanos to a Kohen, perhaps the Kohen will think that also in this case he need not eat them in grandeur.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	R. Gershom (27a DH Amar):</span> The Kohen might think that the Matanos were redeemed, and he will feed them to dogs, which is a disgrace.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tosfos (27a DH v'Asi):</span> 'L'Mashchah' applies to all Matanos Kehunah, even to foreleg, jaw and stomach. We do not find that Terumah must be eaten in grandeur. Perhaps grandeur applies only to meat.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rashi (132b DH she'Eino Baki):</span> Rav Chisda requires that the Kohen know the laws, e.g. that Matanos must be eaten in grandeur.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (YD 61:12):</span> A Kohen may eat Matanos how he enjoys them most. If all ways are the same for him, he should eat them roasted with mustard.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Levush (3):</span> Even where the custom is to flay the head, one may not flay the jaw and give it and the skin to the Kohen, for Matanos are l'Mashchah, and perhaps the Kohen wants Meligah (to scald it in hot water), for this is common for the head. One may flay the foreleg, for it is uncommon to eat it b'Meligah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (13):</span> He may feed them to dogs, or sell or give them to Nochrim.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Gra:</span> This is from the Tosefta (Chulin 9:2).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shach (5):</span> This is if they spoiled, or are from a lean animal.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Pri Megadim:</span> There is no problem of Mitzvos being disgraceful in his eyes, for Matanos have no Kedushah. It is the Kohen's portion and income. However, giving to a dog is not grandeur, therefore it is permitted only if they are spoiled or from a lean animal.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl3'>	Kreisi 14:</span> One may feed them to dogs if they spoiled, or if he sold them to a Yisrael, for then there is no Mitzvah to eat them roasted. It seems that 'l'Mashchah' is an Asmachta mid'Rabanan. It was not written regarding Matanos. The Ramban (Devarim 18:3) says that Matanos were not listed with the other Matanos Kehunah, for they are totally Chulin. However, Tosfos (Bechoros 27a) says that 'l'Mashchah' applies even to Matanos. What is the Chidush? The Gemara explicitly says so! Rather, he teaches that this is mid'Oraisa. The proof is that we decree lest he not eat them in grandeur. If the law were mid'Rabanan, we would not decree about it.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (52):</span> Also if a Kohen sold them to another Kohen, the latter need not eat them in grandeur, for he does not eat them due to his Kehunah. If a Kohen gives them to another Kohen to honor him, the latter should be careful to eat them in grandeur (Aruch ha'Shulchan 27).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Aruch ha'Shulchan (8):</span> One may not give them to a dog if they are not spoiled, for this disgraces the Mitzvah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (66):</span> If a Kohen normally feeds his dog or Nochri (e.g. a slave) food that costs more than the Matanos, presumably he may feed them even good Matanos, for this benefits the Yisrael (who gave them to him) more.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>viii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (306:2):</span> We do not give a Bechor to a Kohen when it is born, for this is not dignified for the Kohen. Rather, the Yisrael cares for a small animal (a Seh) for 30 days, and a large animal (i.e. a calf) for 50 days, before giving it to a Kohen.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ix.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bach (4):</span> This is because it says l'Mashchah. All Matanos Kehunah must be given in grandeur, the way people give to the kingdom. One may not give a newborn Bechor, for it entails great toil (to raise it).</p>
<p class='normal'></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) EATING A KORBAN WHICH BECAME 'PIGUL' BEFORE THE 'ZERIKAH'</b></font>
<br><b>OPINION</b>: Rava derives the Halachos of Nosar, Chutz l'Zemano, and Chutz l'Mekomo from the verse, 'If [the person offering the sacrifice plans] to eat it on the third day, [the sacrifice] will not be accepted. It is considered Pigul and it will not be counted in his favor' (Vayikra 7:18). Rava learns from the words, 'Lo Yeratzeh' ('it will not be accepted'), that the final status of Pigul of a Korban is determined after the Zerikah, the time at which the final atonement is attained in the case of a Korban that was offered properly.
</p><p>
What is the law in the case of one who had a Pigul-thought about his Korban before the Zerikah? Is the thought entirely ineffective and the Korban valid, or is the thought still able to invalidate the Korban, making it Pasul but not Pigul? Although Rava says that one who eats from the Korban before Zerikah is not punished with Kares, does Rava maintain that one who eats from the Korban before Zerikah receives Malkus? (See <b>RAMBAM</b>, Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 18:3.)
</p><p>
(a) The <b>MISHNEH L'MELECH</b> (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 18:7) considers both possibilities. On one hand, the Gemara in Me'ilah (2a) says that one can transgress the prohibition of Me'ilah with a Korban that was slaughtered with thoughts of Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo. The Gemara asks why the prohibition of Me'ilah still applies if the Korban is no longer valid for any purpose. The Gemara answers that the Korban is still valid for one purpose -- the Zerikah is needed to finalize the status of Pigul (see <b>RASHI</b> 2b, DH u'Meshani). This implies that the Korban is a valid Korban until the Zerikah, despite the thoughts the person had while slaughtering it. On the other hand, in the Gemara (14a) Rebbi Shimon -- who maintains that a Korban which is not supposed to be offered on the Mizbe'ach ha'Chitzon cannot become Pigul -- agrees that the Chatas Penimis can become Pasul with such thoughts. Accordingly, perhaps everyone agrees that the fact that a Korban is not invalidated as Pigul does not necessarily mean that it is not yet Pasul; that is, it indeed could be Pasul. The Mishneh l'Melech remains in doubt about this.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>CHAZON ISH</b> (end of Kodshim) says that a person who eats a Korban that became Pasul in this manner certainly receives Malkus. Just as a live animal which cannot be a Korban (such as a Ba'al Mum) does not need Zerikah to make people violate the prohibitions associated with it (see Temurah 6b), so, too, this Korban -- which has no valid future to it, so to speak -- is already considered Pesulei ha'Mukdashin. The Torah requires the disposal of invalid Korbanos, both those which are alive and those which are dead. The Halachah stated by the Gemara merely excludes the person who eats it from receiving Kares.
</p><p>
The <b>ACHI'EZER</b> (2:27) proves that the Korban is Pasul before Zerikah from the Gemara later (42a-b). The Gemara cites a Beraisa in Menachos (16b) which discusses the Pigul of Korbanos for which Zerikah is done in several places. Rebbi Meir says that having a thought which creates Pigul during one of these Zerikos invalidates the Korban as Pigul, and one who eats it is Chayav Kares. The Chachamim disagree and say that the punishment of Kares applies only if the wrongful thought was present for all of the Zerikos. The Gemara questions the view of Rebbi Meir. Once the first Zerikah is performed with a wrongful intention that causes Pigul, the rest of the blood is like water and has no Halachic significance. Rava's statement here (28b) teaches that the Korban becomes Pigul only at the end of the Zerikah. Is Rebbi Meir's ruling consistent with Rava's guidelines for Pigul? The Achi'ezer points out that the Gemara explicitly says that after the first Zerikah, the blood becomes <i>like water</i>. This indicates that the Korban is Pasul already, even before the conclusion of the Zerikah. If the Korban is still valid to some degree, then why does the Gemara call the blood 'water'? This proves that the Gemara maintains that a Korban that becomes Pigul before Zerikah is still considered Pesulei ha'Mukdashin, and one who eats it is Chayav Malkus. (Y. Montrose)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) THE DEFINITION OF A 'MAKOM MESHULASH'</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: Rav Papa asks what law Rava derives from the word 'Shelishi' (Vayikra 19:7) in the 'short' verse that discusses Nosar and Pigul. The Gemara answers that Rava learns from this word the requirement of 'Makom Meshulash' -- 'the place must be valid for three things: blood, flesh, and limbs.' To what law does this 'Makom Meshulash' refer?
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI</b> (DH she'Yehei Meshulash, DH b'Dam) explains that 'Makom Meshulash' is a requirement in the laws of an invalidating thought of Chutz l'Mekomo. A thought of Chutz l'Mekomo is effective only when one thinks about eating the Korban in a place which -- during the times when Bamos were permitted -- was fit for performing the Zerikah of the Dam, eating the meat of the Korban, and burning the limbs of the Korban (see Insights to 14:2 regarding the laws of Chutz l'Mekomo in the case of a Bamah). This excludes the Heichal, since the Heichal is not a place where the limbs of Korbanos are burned or the meat of Korbanos are eaten. One who slaughters the Korban with intention to eat the meat in the Heichal has not had a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo and the Korban is not Pasul.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (DH l'Makom) asks a number of questions on Rashi's explanation. The Gemara later (63a) explicitly states that if Nochri attackers surround the Azarah and make it inaccessible, the Kohanim may enter the Heichal and eat Kodshei Kodashim there. That Gemara clearly shows that the Heichal <i>is</i> a place that is fit for eating the meat of Korbanos, unlike Rashi's assertion.
</p><p>
Moreover, how can Rashi explain that this Halachah applies strictly to Chutz l'Mekomo? The Gemara questions this teaching and asks why Rava does not learn this law from the earlier verse (Vayikra 7:18), which also states 'Shelishi.' According to Rashi's explanation, the Gemara's question is not a question at all. The verse there (7:18) is discussing Chutz l'Zemano, and not Chutz l'Mekomo! (It seems that Rashi anticipates this question, and therefore he explains (DH Teipuk) that the Gemara's question is that Chutz l'Mekomo is also mentioned in that verse. Tosfos apparently maintains that the mention of Chutz l'Mekomo in a verse that deals primarily with Chutz l'Zemano is not grounds for asking that the verse should be the source for a law which is relevant exclusively to Chutz l'Mekomo.)
</p><p>
(b) Tosfos quotes others who suggest a different explanation. Any thought -- a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo <i>and</i> a thought of Chutz l'Zemano -- can make a Korban Pasul only if it is relevant to the Mizbe'ach ha'Chitzon (and the thought itself occurs in the vicinity of the Mizbe'ach ha'Chitzon; see <b>CHOK NASAN</b> based on Tosfos 26b, DH Amar Shmuel), which is a place fit for all of these things: blood, meat, and limbs. This excludes the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi, which is fit only for the sprinkling of blood. In such a place, a wrongful thought will not invalidate the Korban.
</p><p>
Tosfos challenges this explanation as well. A number of types of Korban offered in the Heichal, on the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi, can become Pasul because of a thought of Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo (see 13b, 42b). The verse of 'Shelishi' cannot be teaching that the Korban is only Pasul -- but does not become Pigul -- with a thought of Chutz l'Zemano, in a place that is not fit for all three things, because the Gemara later (36a) clearly uses the requirement of 'Makom Meshulash' as a reason to consider the Korban <i>valid</i>!
</p><p>
(c) Tosfos quotes a third explanation. 'Makom Meshulash' means that the <i>person</i> who has the thought of Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo must be standing in an area where all three things -- blood, meat, and limbs -- may be offered (see <b>YAD BINYAMIN</b>). This excludes a person who is standing outside the Azarah who slaughters (with a long knife) an animal that is standing inside the Azarah. His thought of Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo is ineffective.
</p><p>
Why does this explanation not have the same problem as the previous explanation? According to this explanation as well, the Heichal should not be a place fit for a thought of Pigul, but this contradicts a number of Gemaras. Tosfos explains that this explanation simply means to say that these three things are valid if brought there, but not that their procedures are normally done there. Blood and limbs which are taken outside of the Azarah become Pasul. As mentioned earlier, the Gemara (63a) says that meat of Korbanos technically may be eaten in the Heichal. There are also certain types of Korbanos which have their blood brought into the Heichal. Limbs of Korbanos do not become Pasul when brought into the Heichal. To summarize, all of these things remain valid in the Heichal, while blood and limbs become Pasul if they are brought out of the Azarah.
</p><p>
Tosfos, however, remains with a question on this explanation. The Gemara later (36a) says that according to Rebbi Yehudah, if an animal which was supposed to be brought to the Mizbe'ach ha'Chitzon was slaughtered with intent that its blood be placed on the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi, the Korban is valid. The reason given by the Gemara is that the Heichal is not a 'Makom Meshulash.' This contradicts this explanation cited by Tosfos, which seems to maintain that the Heichal <i>is</i> a 'Makom Meshulash.'
</p><p>
(d) <b>RABEINU YOM TOV</b> says that 'Makom Meshulash' means that the thought invalidates the Korban only when it involves doing something in a place where blood, meat, and limbs are all <i>Pasul</i>. An example of such an invalidating thought would be a thought to perform the Zerikas ha'Dam of Kodshim Kalim outside of Yerushalayim. Even though one is not supposed to do the Zerikah outside the Azarah even inside Yerushalayim, having a thought to do the Zerikah there (outside the Azarah, but inside Yerushalayim) is not a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo, because Yerushalayim is not a 'Makom Meshulash.' This is because one is allowed to eat the meat of Kodshim Kalim in Yerushalayim.
</p><p>
Tosfos questions this explanation as well. (According to Tosfos' understanding of Rabeinu Yom Tov, the second question that Tosfos asks on Rashi's explanation would apply to this explanation as well.)
</p><p>
(It must be noted that there are different versions of this explanation. The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> (#20) understands that this explanation also maintains that the law of 'Makom Meshulash' applies to Chutz l'Zemano, unlike the simple reading of Tosfos. The <b>KEREN ORAH</b> concludes that the most preferable understanding of 'Makom Meshulash' is a variation of this explanation.) (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafbbb'><span class='numt'>1)</span> WHAT IS CONSIDERED LAV SHE'EIN BO MA'ASEH? <span class='indexentry'>[lashes: Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rav Mari - (R. Yanai):</span> One who offers Kodshim with improper intent is lashed - 'Lo Yechashev'.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question (Rav Ashi):</span> One is not lashed for a Lav without an action!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer (Rav Mari):</span> He holds like R. Yehudah, who says that one is lashed for such a Lav.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Makos 4b:</span> R. Yehudah holds that one is lashed for Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh. He learns from the Tzad ha'Shavah of (what is common to) Motzi Shem Ra and Edim Zomemim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	16a (Beraisa - R. Yehudah):</span> 'Lo Sosiru (do not leave over from the Korban Pesach until morning)... veha'Nosar... ba'Esh Tisrofu (burn what is left over)' - the Lav is Nitak l'Aseh (an Aseh fixes it), therefore one is not lashed for it.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span>	Reish Lakish infers that had the Torah not given an Aseh, one would be lashed for it, even though Ein Bo Ma'aseh.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	 (R. Yochanan citing R. Yehudah citing R. Yosi ha'Galili):</span> The only Lavim without an action for which one is lashed are swearing (falsely), Temurah and cursing a person with Hashem's name.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	Temurah 3b - R. Yochanan (to a reciter of Beraisos):</span> Do not include Temurah, for his words do an action (they are Makdish an animal).</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Sechirus 13:2):</span> One is lashed for muzzling, even if he muzzled it verbally (shouted at it when it was about to eat).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Magid Mishneh:</span> The Meforshim ask that the only Lavim without an action for which one is lashed are swearing, Temurah and cursing with Hashem's name. (One is exempt for all other Aveiros of speech. This shows that bending one's lips is not an action! The Rambam (Hilchos Sanhedrin 18:2) also rules like this, which contradicts his ruling here! Bending the lips is an action regarding muzzling because it produces an action. Through his voice, the animal is muzzled. If speech does not produce an action, it is not considered an action. Temurah is like muzzling, for through it an animal become Kodesh. This is why R. Yochanan told the Tana 'do not list muzzling'. The Rambam cited the teaching, which lists muzzling, even though in the conclusion it was not necessary, since it produces an action. I could say that every Lav that cannot be through an action, only through speech, is not called an action. Since muzzling is a full action, even if it is done through voice it is like an action. Even though the Gemara brought a proof for R. Yochanan from Temurah, this is a Kal va'Chomer (all the more so one is lashed for muzzling, which is a full action).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Lechem Mishneh:</span> The Magid Mishneh holds that the Rambam considers Temurah a Lav with an action, for his voice does an action. This is wrong. The Rambam explicitly writes in Hilchos Temurah (1:1) that Temurah has no action. It is difficult to say that one is lashed for muzzling because it can be done through an action. Sanhedrin 65b tried to prove from muzzling that R. Yochanan holds that voice is considered an action. Other Meforshim explain like Tosfos, that we asked about Edim Zomemim. Also, why does the Rambam say that Temurah is not an action? R. Yochanan said that it is! Also, why did the Rambam ask that there should not be lashes because it is Nitak l'Aseh? If it is a Gezeras ha'Kasuv that one is lashed even though it has no action, this also answers the question from Nitak l'Aseh! Rav Dimi answered that even though it is Nitak l'Aseh, one is lashed because there are two Lavim. He holds that it has an action, through his words; it is not a Gezeras ha'Kasuv. However, this is unlike the Rambam. How can the Magid Mishneh say that the proof for R. Yochanan was based on a Kal va'Chomer? R. Yochanan says that Temurah is an action! Even if he retracted, also he must explain why he is lashed! If he must say that it is a Gezeras ha'Kasuv, also Reish Lakish can say so! Rather, the Rambam rules unlike R. Yochanan, for the Gemara calls Temurah Ein Bo Ma'aseh. Muzzling is an action, like the Magid Mishneh said. The Gemara asked from Edim Zomemim, because they can write their testimony.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Sefer ha'Chinuch (345,346):</span> It seems that one is not lashed for selling an Eved Ivri on a selling block (or overworking him), because it is possible to transgress (verbally,) without an action.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Minchas Chinuch (DH v'Hinei and DH v'Eino):</span> The Rambam does not list these among Aveiros for which one is lashed. The Magid Mishneh says that one is lashed for a Lav that can be transgressed through an action. He can explain that one is not lashed for selling an Eved Ivri, since Beis Din kills for this (if he kidnapped and sold him). He can explain that one is not lashed for overworking him, for it is never through an action. The Sefer ha'Chinuch disagrees (and needed to exempt for a different reason).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishneh l'Melech (Hilchos Malveh 4:6 DH Hinei):</span> The Nimukei Yosef says that witnesses who signed a loan document for Ribis are disqualified, for anyone who is lashed is disqualified. From the time they set the Ribis, the entire Isur was done. Bnei Shmuel rejected this, for they did not do an action. I say that signing a document is an action. Also the Arev (guarantor) can transgress through an action, e.g. he took the money and gave it to the borrower, or he signed on the document. Sefer ha'Chinuch says that the witnesses are not lashed, for it is unreasonable to punish them more than the lender, who is not lashed (since he can correct his Lav through returning the Ribis). He did not exempt due to Ein Bo Ma'aseh. I say that even if they did not sign the document, since they can transgress through an action, they are lashed even without an action. A proof is from the Rambam in Hilchos Sechirus, like the Magid Mishneh explained. It is not clear if witnesses on a loan with Ribis without a document are lashed.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tosfos (Shevuos 21a DH Chutz (1)):</span> In Bava Metzia 90b, R. Yochanan says that muzzling through voice is an action. We must say that there, his voice does an action (stops the animal from eating), so it is like Temurah, which R. Yochanan calls Yesh Bo Ma'aseh. If so, in Sanhedrin (65b), why did we ask a contradiction in R. Yochanan from muzzling? We must say that we asked from muzzling to Edim Zomemim, who obligate the litigant through their speech.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tosfos (Shevuos 21a DH Chutz (2)):</span> Why don't we say that also Motzi Shem Ra and Edim Zomemim are Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh for which one is lashed? Even though Bava Kama 5a calls Edim Zomemim an action, and R. Yehudah obligates Motzi Shem Ra only if he hired false witnesses, they are called Ein Bo Ma'aseh in Makos. We must say that since the Torah explicitly obligated lashes for them, we did not need to list them. Alternatively, we do not learn from a general rule, even if it lists the exceptions.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Ritva (Makos 4b DH uv'Kulah):</span> Our Sugya holds that Lav she'Yesh Bo Ma'aseh is only when the Lav itself has an action, but not when through his words an action results, e.g. Temurah. Even though Motzi Shem Ra and Edim Zomemim have an action through Beis Din, they are considered Ein Bo Ma'aseh. However, in Bava Kama some consider Motzi Shem Ra to be Yesh Bo Ma'aseh because it comes to an action through Beis Din. This is unlike our Sugya.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Aruch l'Ner (Makos 4b DH v'Ayen):</span> According to the Magid Mishneh, why is Motzi Shem Ra considered a Lav without an action for which one is lashed? One can do it through an action, i.e. he wrote that she was Mezanah! The Sha'ar ha'Melech (Hilchos Chametz u'Matzah 1:3) challenged the Magid Mishneh, from the Rambam obligates lashes for one who bought Chametz during Pesach (but not for one who owned it from before Pesach). The Acharonim misunderstood the Magid Mishneh. There is no source to lash for a Lav that can be done through an action if one did not do an action. He said so only regarding muzzling, since the Torah expressed the Lav like a Ma'aseh. When it is written like a Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh, e.g. 'Chametz will not be seen (in your domain during Pesach)', we do not say that one is liable because he could transgress through an action. Therefore, we cannot challenge the Rambam from Chametz or Motzi Shem Ra.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Aruch l'Ner (DH bi'Gemara):</span> Here we say that Motzi Shem Ra and Edim Zomemim are Ein Bo Ma'aseh. In Bava Kama (5a) we say that Motzi Shem Ra is speech that has an action, and it is called an action! Tosfos (Bava Kama 5a DH Dibura) says that this is like R. Eliezer ben Yakov, who obligates Motzi Shem Ra only if he had Bi'ah. Do not answer that in Makos, R. Yehudah holds like Chachamim, who obligate without Bi'ah. R. Yehudah obligates only if he hired false witnesses, and Tosfos says that also this is an action! Tosfos (Shevuos 21a) says that even so, it is considered Ein Bo Ma'aseh. The Ritva says that the Sugyos argue with each other. This explains why here, R. Yehudah learns lashes for Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh from a Tzad ha'Shaveh, and on 16a he infers from Nosar (it is Nitak l'Aseh to exempt from lashes). That Sugya holds that R. Yehudah does not learn from a Tzad ha'Shaveh, for he considers Edim Zomemim and Motzi Shem Ra to have an action. Tosfos and the Ritva argue about whether a Chiyuv due to an action and something without an action, is considered Ein Bo Ma'aseh. Their argument depends on Zevachim 29b, in which R. Yanai obligates lashes for offering Kodshim with improper intent. He holds like R. Yehudah, who lashes for Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh. There, he transgresses through an action and intent at the time. If Motzi Shem Ra is considered Yesh Bo Ma'aseh because he needed to do an action first, all the more so Mefagel is an action, for he must do an action at the same time as the intent. The Gemara calls this Ein Bo Ma'aseh. This is a proof for Tosfos that any Lav that is not finished through an action alone is called Ein Bo Ma'aseh. The Ritva must say that this is unlike the Sugya in Bava Kama.</p>
<p class='normal'></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) ONE'S WIFE DIES BECAUSE HE HAS NO MONEY TO GIVE TO THOSE WHO ASK</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Gemara explains that Ben Azai understands that the verse, 'v'Hayah Becha Chet' -- 'It shall be a sin for you' (Devarim 23:22), teaches that the Isur of Bal Te'acher, the prohibition against delaying the fulfillment of a vow, affects only the person who transgresses it, and it does not affect his wife. The Gemara asks that this should be obvious; there should be no need for a verse to teach this. The Gemara answers that since Rebbi Eliezer says that a person's wife dies when people ask him for money and he does not have any (as he derives from a verse in Mishlei), one might have thought that a wife also dies from her husband's sin of Bal Te'acher. Therefore, the verse of 'v'Hayah Becha Chet' is needed to teach that a wife does not die because of her husband's violation of Bal Te'acher.
</p><p>
To what situation does Rebbi Eliezer refer when he says that a man's wife dies when he has no money to give to those who ask?
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI</b> (DH Mevakshin) explains that Rebbi Eliezer refers to one who stole money or other property. When the owner comes to claim his money, the thief has no money to pay back.
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Ela) says that Rebbi Eliezer refers to a man who pledged to give a donation to charity and failed to fulfill his pledge. Rebbi Eliezer's statement is consistent with the Gemara in Shabbos (32b) which says that a man's wife dies as a result of his violation of his vows. This seems problematic, though, because Rebbi Eliezer says that a woman dies as a result of her husband's failure to uphold his vows, while Ben Azai says that a woman does <i>not</i> die as a result of her husband's failure to uphold his vows. The answer, as Tosfos points out, is simply that Ben Azai refers to a sin of Bal Te'acher; the man delayed, but eventually fulfilled, his Neder. Ben Azai's teaching complements Rebbi Eliezer's; he is saying that Rebbi Eliezer's statement applies only when the man does not pay at all, but not when he is late in paying. (See <b>MARGOLIYOS HA'YAM</b>, Sanhedrin 22a, #20.)
</p><p>
According to the explanations of both Rashi and Tosfos, the Gemara needs clarification. Why should a woman die because of her husband's sin?
</p><p>
<b>RAV CHAIM SHMUELEVITZ</b> zt'l in <b>SICHOS MUSAR</b> (5732, #32, and 5733, #1) explains that the woman is punished only when she <i>also</i> has sins for which she deserves to die. Why, then, is her punishment related to her husband?
</p><p>
We know that Hash-m does not punish an individual if the punishment will significantly affect those who are close to him when those others are not deserving of such punishment. Hash-m would not punish the man by making his wife die as punishment for her sins unless he was also guilty of a severe sin. Rebbi Eliezer derives from the verse in Mishlei that this sin -- of violating one's vow -- is enough to make a man deserve the suffering of his wife's demise.
</p><p>
Rav Chaim Shmuelevitz continues to explain why the punishment is fitting in this case. He explains that there never really exists a situation in which a person 'does not have the money to pay.' When a person recognizes his debt, he will always find a way to pay. If he does not acknowledge his debt, then it is a sign that he does not feel that he is a 'Ba'al Chov' -- one who is indebted. The punishment for this is that his wife is then punished for her sins and he has to suffer the consequences. This is because the most important person to whom a person is indebted is his wife, because it is she who constantly and ceaselessly stands by his side, serving as his devoted helpmate in life. A man who demonstrates a lack of a sense of indebtedness to others who help him is also most likely to lack Hakaras ha'Tov towards his wife as well. Hash-m therefore does not prevent his wife from being punished and taken away from him.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> suggests another explanation. He says that Rebbi Eliezer is discussing a man who owes money, who tells his creditors that he cannot pay them back with the property that he has because the property is already a lien towards the payment of his wife's Kesuvah. The man's wife supports his claim, and for her involvement in preventing the creditors to collect what they are entitled to collect, she is punished. (See also <b>BEN YEHOYADA</b> to Sanhedrin 22a, and Insights to Rosh Hashanah 6:1.) (Y. Montrose)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) REBBI YOSI'S OPINION IN THE CASE OF 'TEMURAH'</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Gemara quotes the Mishnah in Temurah (25b) that discusses a case in which the owner of two Korbanos of different types declares that a third animal is Temurah for the two different Korbanos. When the owner says that the animal should become 'a Temurah for the Olah, a Temurah for the Shelamim,' Rebbi Meir rules that we follow his first statement, and the animal becomes the Temurah of an Olah. Rebbi Yosi says that we assume that the owner had in mind to make the animal a blend of two Korbanos, and he merely was unable to say both at once. As a result, he must keep the animal until it becomes unfit to be a Korban, sell it, and use half of the money to buy an animal that he must offer as an Olah and half to buy an animal that he must offer as a Shelamim. Rebbi Yosi adds that if the reason for his double statement of Temurah was that after he said that he wanted the animal to be a Temurah for the Olah he changed his mind and decided that it should be a Shelamim, he agrees with Rebbi Meir that the animal is an Olah.
</p><p>
According to Rebbi Yosi, how are we to know what the person's intention was? Moreover, why do we not apply the rule of 'Toch Kedei Dibur k'Dibur Dami' and allow the person to change his mind and make the animal a Temuras Shelamim, even though he originally pronounced it a Temuras Olah?
</p><p>
(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Amar Rebbi Yosi) quotes the Gemara in Bava Kama (73b) which implies that Rebbi Yosi maintains that a person's intention cannot be determined by examining the time frame of his words.
</p><p>
The Gemara there states that Rebbi Yosi agrees with the concept of 'Toch Kedei Dibur k'Dibur Dami' -- within the small amount of time of 'Toch Kedei Dibur' an act or speech is not considered complete and still continues. The Gemara challenges this from the Mishnah in Temurah; Rav Papa learns that the case in which Rebbi Yosi agrees that the Temurah is only an Olah refers to a case of Toch Kedei Dibur. If Rebbi Yosi maintains that 'Toch Kedei Dibur k'Dibur Dami,' then why does the owner's second statement, which was made within Toch Kedei Dibur of the first, not take effect as well, making the animal a blend of Temuras Olah and Temuras Shelamim? The Gemara there answers that the time period of Toch Kedei Dibur can be one of two amounts. It can be the length of time that it takes for a student to say a greeting to his teacher ('Shalom Alecha Rebbi u'Mori'), or it can be the amount of time that it takes a Rebbi to greet his student ('Shalom Alecha'). Rebbi Yosi maintains that 'Toch Kedei Dibur k'Dibur Dami' applies only when the two statements are made within the <i>shorter</i> span of time ('Shalom Alecha'), and not the longer span of time.
</p><p>
Tosfos deduces from the Gemara that Rebbi Yosi maintains as follows. When the owner says 'Temuras Olah and Temuras Shelamim' within the shorter time frame of Toch Kedei Dibur, it is apparent that his original intention was to state the two together. Even if, afterwards, he insists that this was not his intention, we assume from the proximity of his words that this was his intention. If, on the other hand, he paused more than the shorter Toch Kedei Dibur ('Shalom Alecha') but <i>less</i> than the longer Toch Kedei Dibur ('Shalom Alecha Rebbi u'Mori'), then this shows a break in his intent, and we assume that his second statement reflects a change of mind. Even if, afterwards, he insists that his intention from the beginning was to state both phrases together, we assume that he wanted to change his mind.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Temurah 2:4) seems to disagree with Tosfos and maintains that the person's intention is determined based entirely on his claimed intent, and not on how much time passed between each statement. The Rambam writes that 'if there was intent to say both phrases, then both are binding. If he originally intended only to make a Temuras Olah and then he said 'Temuras Shelamim,' then even if he stated ['Temuras Shelamim'] within a period of Toch Kedei Dibur [of his original statement of 'Temuras Olah'], we accept only the first statement and it is only a Temuras Olah.'
</p><p>
It is apparent from the Rambam's wording that the second ruling of Rebbi Yosi is applicable only when the person admits that he intended to say just 'Temuras Olah,' but then he changed his mind and added 'Temuras Shelamim.' This is unlike Tosfos, who says that even if he insists that his intention was also to make a Temuras Shelamim, as long as his second statement was said more than the short Toch Kedei Dibur after his first statement, we ignore his attempt to clarify what he intended.
</p><p>
The Gemara in Bava Kama that Tosfos cites seems to disprove the view of the Rambam. How does the Rambam understand that Gemara?
</p><p>
The <b>MISHNEH L'MELECH</b> (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 15:1) answers that the Rambam was bothered by a question which Tosfos asks in Bava Kama there. The Gemara in Makos (6a) quotes Rav Acha mi'Difti as saying that the rule of 'Toch Kedei Dibur k'Dibur Dami' applies even to the <i>longer</i> period of Toch Kedei Dibur. How can that be? The Gemara in Bava Kama states that the Rabanan do not agree with the concept of 'Toch Kedei Dibur k'Dibur Dami' at all, and Rebbi Yosi maintains that it applies only to the shorter period of Toch Kedei Dibur. What Tana supports the statement of Rav Acha mi'Difti?
</p><p>
The Rambam learns that according to Rav Acha mi'Difti, the Gemara's answer in Bava Kama is not the Halachic conclusion. Rather, Rav Acha mi'Difti maintains that Rebbi Yosi indeed rules that 'Toch Kedei Dibur k'Dibur Dami' applies even to the <i>longer</i> period of Toch Kedei Dibur. Why can the person not change his mind and make the animal a Temuras Shelamim if it is still Toch Kedei Dibur of his original statement, in which he pronounced it a Temuras Olah? The answer is that, according to the Rambam, the rule of 'Toch Kedei Dibur k'Dibur Dami' never applies in cases of Hekdesh. (See Rambam in Perush ha'Mishnayos to Temurah 5:2, where he states this explicitly.)
</p><p>
(The <b>NESIVOS HA'MISHPAT</b> (CM 255:3) concurs with this explanation of the Rambam. See also <b>KETZOS HA'CHOSHEN</b> CM 255:2, and <b>PNEI YEHOSHUA</b> to Bava Kama 73b.) (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> DO WE FOLLOW THE FIRST WORDS OR THE LAST WORDS? <span class='indexentry'>[Leshon Bnei Adam: Kinyan]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Mishnah - R. Meir):</span> If Reuven said 'this (Chulin) animal is Temuras (in place of an) Olah, Temuras Shelamim', it is Temuras Olah (i.e. it is an Olah);</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span>	R. Yosi says, if from the start he meant to say both, they both take effect. Since he cannot say them simultaneously, there is no reason to favor his first words.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	30b (Abaye):</span> Rabah bar bar Chanah cited R. Yochanan to say that R. Meir and R. Yosi do not argue about whether we follow the first thing said.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Rav Dimi):</span> I say that they argue (about whether we follow the first thing said).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bava Basra 86b (Rav and Shmuel):</span> If Reuven sold to Shimon 'a Kor (30 Sa'im, of grain) for 30 (Sela'im)', either can retract until all is measured out;</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span>	If he said 'a Kor for 30, each Se'ah for a Sela', after each Se'ah is measured out, neither can retract (the sale of that Se'ah).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	105b Rav Yehudah citing Shmuel):</span> Ben Nanas holds that we follow one's final words. Chachamim disagree. (We are unsure which phrase overrides the other.)</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rif (Bava Basra 43a):</span> The teaching of Rav and Shmuel applies only in a Simta (a shoulder of Reshus ha'Rabim), or in the buyer's Reshus with the seller's Kelim. It cannot be Reshus ha'Rabim or the seller's Reshus, for (even) the buyer's Kelim do not acquire there. If it is in the buyer's Reshus, (even) if it is in the seller's Kelim, he acquires once the seller agreed to sell, even without measuring.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Mechirah 4:7):</span> If Peros were in a Simta or a joint Chatzer (of the buyer and seller), or even if they are in the buyer's Reshus in the seller's Kli, if the seller agreed to sell and started measuring into his own Kli, if he said 'I sell to you a Kor for 30', he can retract even while measuring out the last Se'ah, since the Peros are still in his Keli and the measure was not completed. The seller's Kli does not acquire for the buyer, even in the buyer's Reshus. If he said '(I sell to you) a Kor for 30, each Se'ah for a Sela', he acquires each Se'ah after it is measured out. Since they set a price for each Se'ah, each Se'ah that the seller lifts and pours completes the sale (of that Se'ah), since the Peros are not in the seller's Reshus or the buyer's Reshus (Magihah - perhaps this should say 'Reshus ha'Rabim'). If the Peros were not in the seller's Keli, since they are in the buyer's Reshus, he acquires from when they set the price, even before measuring, like we explained.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Magid Mishneh:</span> The Rambam's law is clearly true, that he can retract. The Meforshim added that Rav and Shmuel's law applies only in the buyer's Kelim in a Simta, or in their joint Chatzer, and all the more so in his (the buyer's) Reshus. In the seller's Keli he does not acquire. Rather, it is the buyer's Keli. When he said 'a Kor for 30', the buyer does not acquire each Se'ah measured, for the seller is adamant not to sell less (than a full Kor). He does not want a partial sale. Before measuring, the Peros were in the seller's Keli (if they are in the buyer's Reshus), or on the ground if they are in a Simta. Rashi, the Rashba, R. Yonah and the Ra'avad hold like this. It seems that the Rif holds like the Rambam, for he says that Rav and Shmuel's law is only when the seller's Keli is in a Simta or a joint Chatzer. If it is in the buyer's Reshus, in the seller's Kelim, he acquires once the seller agreed to sell, even without measuring. However, perhaps he means (that the Peros were in the seller's Keli) before measuring (but the seller measures into the buyer's Kelim, like the other Meforshim who say that the seller's Kelim do not acquire for the buyer). The latter opinion is primary.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Bava Basra 5:17):</span> Even though our Mishnah says that he acquires through Meshichah without measuring, here it is different because he specified that he sells a Kor. He revealed that he wanted to conclude the sale only at once, for he needed the money for a full Kor.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Bechoros 1:15):</span> If he said 'a Kor for 30, each Se'ah for a Sela', he acquires each Se'ah after it is measured out, for we are unsure which words we follow. Since he is holding the Peros, he acquires.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (CM 200:7):</span> If Peros were in a Simta or a joint Chatzer (of the buyer and seller), or even if they are in the buyer's Reshus in the seller's Kli, if the seller agreed to sell and started measuring into his own Kli, if he said 'I sell to you a Kor for 30', he can retract even while measuring out the last Se'ah, since the Peros are still in his Keli and the measure was not completed. The seller's Kli does not acquire for the buyer, even in the buyer's Reshus.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	SMA (15):</span> The Rif, Rambam and Ramah hold that if he poured into the buyer's Kelim in the buyer's Reshus, since both of these favor him, neither can retract even if he said only 'a Kor for 30', even before the measure is filled. He intended that the buyer acquire each amount measured out. This is why the Shulchan Aruch specified 'the seller's Kelim.'</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rema:</span> If he said '(I sell to you) a Kor for 30, each Se'ah for a Sela', he acquires each Se'ah after it is measured out. Since they set a price for each Se'ah, each Se'ah that the seller lifts and pours completes the sale (of that Se'ah), since the Peros are not in the seller's Reshus or Reshus ha'Rabim. If the Peros were not in the seller's Keli, since they are in the buyer's Reshus, he acquires from when they set the price, even before measuring, like we said in Sa'if 3.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH ba'Meh):</span> The Rashbam explains that when he said 'a Kor for 30', he needed the money for the entire Kor. He intended to sell exactly a Kor, not more or less. Therefore, if he did Meshichah, even if he set a price, and even in the buyer's Reshus and in the buyer's Kelim, he does not acquire until the Kor is totally measured out. Measuring is Me'akev because he was adamant not to sell more or less. Therefore, he can retract even after measuring 29 Sa'im, until measuring the last Se'ah. Even if he did Meshichah on the 29 Sa'im, this is not a proper Meshichah, for it is one sale of a Kor, and he does not acquire until he is Moshech all of it. Our Mishnah says that he acquires through Meshichah without measuring. This is when he sold to him the bundle like it is, and measuring is merely to reveal how much he sold. If he was Moshech all 30 Kor before measuring, the Rosh did not say whether or not he acquires. The Tur says that the Rosh holds that he does not acquire. Perhaps he inferred from the fact that the Rosh did not bring the Rif's words.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (ibid.):</span> The Tur says in the name of the Ramah and the Rif that Rav and Shmuel discuss a Simta, but if he did Hagbahah or is in the buyer's Reshus, he acquired. 'Simta' excludes Reshus ha'Rabim and the seller's Reshus, but the seller's Kelim in the buyer's Reshus is like a Simta. 'In the buyer's Reshus' refers to his total Reshus, i.e. the buyer's Kelim in the buyer's Reshus. The Rambam wrote like the Rif. He explains that both the case of 'a Kor for 30', and 'a Kor for 30, each Se'ah for a Sela' are when he agreed to sell and began measuring into his own Kelim. Even though the Magid Mishneh said that the opinion of Rashi and those like him is primary, we rule like the Rambam, especially since the simple reading of the Rif is like him.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH Kasav Rabbeinu):</span> The Rashba says that if he gave all the money, even if he said 'a Kor for 30', he acquires each amount measured out, up to the money he paid.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rema:</span> Some say that he acquires each Se'ah after it is measured out only because he is Muchzak. Therefore, if the buyer did not give the money, the buyer can retract.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH v'Ta'ama):</span> We are unsure whether we follow the initial words or the final words. If so, the same applies if he said 'a Se'ah for a Sela, a Kor for 30.' Each Se'ah measured out is acquired; the seller cannot retract, since it is in the buyer's Reshus. Since it is a Safek, we do not take from him. However, the buyer can retract. 'Each Se'ah measured out is acquired' connotes that this favors the buyer. It did not say 'either can retract.' This is why the Ramah says that if he did not pay, he can retract even from what he is holding.' The Rambam holds that the seller's Kelim do not acquire for the buyer in the buyer's Reshus. Why can't the seller retract? We must say that since he measured, it is as if he said 'go acquire', and this helps even in the seller's Kelim in the buyer's Reshus, unlike R. Yonah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	SMA (23):</span> If the buyer did not pay yet, he can retract because he is Muchzak in his money.</p>
<p class='normal'></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) 'TEMURAS OLAH, TEMURAS SHELAMIM'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: Rav Dimi (30a) states that Rebbi Meir's opinion in the Mishnah in Temurah (28b) is consistent with Rebbi Yehudah's opinion in the Mishnah here (29b). Rebbi Meir rules that when the owner of two Korbanos (an Olah and a Shelamim) designates a third animal as a 'Temuras Olah, Temuras Shelamim,' the animal acquires the Kedushah of an Olah, in accordance with the first statement the owner made. Rebbi Yehudah in the Mishnah here maintains that when one has several wrongful thoughts (Chutz l'Zemano, Chutz l'Mekomo) about a Korban, the animal is considered invalidated with the first thought that the person had. Abaye questions Rav Dimi's assertion from the teaching of Rabah bar bar Chanah, who says that Rebbi Meir rules like Rebbi Yosi and does not follow the first words in a statement containing several parts. Rebbi Meir merely argues with regard to how to determine the intention of the owner of the Korbanos.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Amar Lei Abaye) asks that Abaye's statement is difficult to reconcile with Abaye's opinion in the previous Gemara (30a).
</p><p>
The Gemara earlier discusses an argument between Abaye and Rava. Abaye says that although Rebbi Meir argues in the case of 'Temuras Olah, Temuras Shelamim' that the animal has the Kedushah of an Olah, his reasoning is that the owner said the word 'Temuras' twice. If he would say only that this animal should be 'Temuras Olah u'Shelamim,' or that it should be 'half Olah and half Shelamim,' Rebbi Meir would agree that the animal becomes a blend of both an Olah and a Shelamim (see Tosfos to 30a, DH Lachtzos). Rava argues that in this case, too, Rebbi Meir maintains that the animal has only the Kedushah of an Olah. Rava proceeds to ask a question on Abaye's opinion. A case in which a person slaughtering a Korban has two consecutive thoughts to eat a k'Zayis of the meat Chutz l'Zemano and to eat a k'Zayis of the meat Chutz l'Mekomo seems identical to a case in which the owner of two Korbanos says that this animal should be 'half Olah and half Shelamim.' However, in the first case, Rebbi Yehudah argues with the Rabanan in the Mishnah and says that we follow the first thought. This implies that Rebbi Meir would also argue with Rebbi Yosi in the case of Temurah.
</p><p>
Tosfos is perplexed by the question on Abaye. Abaye explicitly maintains that Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Meir do <i>not</i> agree about the logic. How, then, can Rava ask that if Rebbi Yehudah argues in the Mishnah, then Rebbi Meir should argue with Rebbi Yosi?
</p><p>
Moreover, why does Abaye not simply answer Rava's question by quoting Rabah bar bar Chanah, as he does in the Gemara here, and state that the two arguments have nothing to do with each other? (See <b>TZON KODASHIM</b> for the reason why Tosfos does not ask this question.)
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> (Hashmatos, #4) quotes the <b>RIVA</b> who answers that Rava asks his question based on the following understanding of Abaye's statement. Although Abaye himself maintains that Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Meir disagree, he asserts that <i>whether or not</i> one maintains that they disagree, both Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yosi will admit that in a case in which the owner says that the animal should be Temurah of 'half Olah and half Shelamim,' the animal has the Kedushah of both. Rava's question on Abaye is that those who maintain that Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Meir agree would <i>not</i> be able to accept Abaye's statement. This explanation is also given by the <b>KEREN ORAH</b>.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>SEFAS EMES</b> and <b>CHAZON ISH</b> have difficulty with the question. They understand that Abaye's statement that Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yosi are not arguing does not mean that either of them argues with Rebbi Yehudah. When Abaye responds to Rav Dimi, who says that Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah both say that a status is determined by the first part of one's statement, Abaye wants to show him a different perspective on the argument between Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yosi. Abaye tells him the view of Rabah bar bar Chanah, whose view has nothing to do with following the first part of one's statement. Abaye explains that in the case of 'Temuras Olah and Temuras Shelamim,' there is an argument about how to determine the intention of the person who makes a statement with two opposing parts. Rebbi Yehudah himself may agree with both of these opinions. Abaye earlier (30a) explains that the argument in the Mishnah applies to a case in which one Siman was slaughtered with intent of Chutz l'Zemano, and the second Siman was slaughtered with intent of Chutz l'Mekomo. In that case, Rebbi Yosi himself may agree that the first thought is the main one, since those two thoughts do not contradict each other. If this is what Abaye means, then there is no question as to why Rava challenges the view of Abaye that Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah should agree with each other. (Y. Montrose)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) HAVING IN MIND TO FEED THE MEAT OF A KORBAN TO DOGS</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: Rebbi Yanai states that when a person has intention, when offering a Korban, to feed a k'Zayis of the meat to dogs Chutz l'Zemano, the Korban becomes Pigul.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Chishev) asks that this seems to contradict the conclusion of the Gemara later (36b). The Gemara there concludes that when a person has intention to feed the meat of a Korban to people who are Tamei, Chutz l'Zemano, such a thought does <i>not</i> render the Korban invalid as Pigul. This is because the people who are Tamei are not fit to eat the Korban, and one must have a thought of an acceptable act of eating Chutz l'Zemano in order to invalidate the Korban. Why, then, does the Korban become Pigul when one has in mind to feed the meat to dogs? Dogs are no better than people who are Tamei, and the Korban should remain valid!
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (36b, DH she'Yochluhu) answers that having a thought of a Tamei person eating is not considered having a thought of a proper eating, because as soon as the Tamei person touches the meat it becomes Tamei, and thus the person is not eating permissible meat. Even if someone else places the meat in the mouth of the Tamei person without him touching it with his hands, the fact that he could make the meat Tamei before he eats it makes the thought ineffective with regard to Pigul. In contrast, when dogs eat the meat, they do not make it Tamei. A similar answer is cited in the <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> (31a).
</p><p>
(See <b>SEFAS EMES</b>, who asks why the prohibition against giving food of Kodshim to dogs is not equivalent to making the food become Tamei.)
</p><p>
(b) The Shitah Mekubetzes quotes the <b>RIVA</b> (in his second answer) who answers that since it is not within the person's power to actualize his intention of having Tamei people eat the Korban (since perhaps they will refuse when he offers it to them or insists that they eat it), his thought is unable to make the Korban Pigul. A thought of Pigul is ineffective only when it is within the power of the person to carry out his thought. In contrast, it is considered within his power to feed the meat to the dogs.
</p><p>
The <b>MIKDASH DAVID</b> (33:1) has difficulty with the answer of the Riva. If the reason why a thought that Tamei people will eat the Korban does not create Pigul is that he cannot make them eat it, then having a thought that <i>Tahor</i> people will eat the Korban also should not cause Pigul, because it is not in one's power to make them eat the meat of the Korban (and it is very likely that they will agree to do so, since it is Chutz l'Zemano). (See <b>EIZEHU MEKOMAN</b>.)
</p><p>
(c) The <b>RIVA</b> (in his first answer) says that the question does not begin. The Gemara later (36b) quotes Rav Chisda who says that the thought of giving a k'Zayis to a Tamei person to eat Chutz l'Zemano <i>does</i> create Pigul. Rava supports this ruling by comparing the case to an ordinary case of Pigul before Zerikah. When the person thinks his Pigul thought, the meat is not yet fit to be eaten and, nevertheless, the thought to eat that meat at a later time, Chutz l'Zemano, makes the Korban Pigul. Accordingly, having a thought to feed the meat to Tamei people (even though the meat is not fit to be eaten by them, since they make it Tamei) should also render it Pigul! The Gemara says that Rava's proof is not valid, because in an ordinary case of Pigul, the meat would have become fit (were it not for the Pigul thought) after the Zerikah, and thus the person indeed had a thought to eat meat that was fit. In the case of Tamei people, the meat would become Pasul as soon as the Tamei people would touch it.
</p><p>
The Riva understands (unlike the other explanations above) that the Gemara's response is addressing Rava's proof, and not Rav Chisda's ruling. Accordingly, the Halachah remains that both thoughts -- feeding the meat to dogs and feeding the meat to Tamei people -- can create Pigul. The <b>KESEF MISHNEH</b> (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 14:9) and <b>LIKUTEI HALACHOS</b> explain that this is also the understanding of the <b>RAMBAM</b>, who rules like Rav Chisda.
</p><p>
(d) The <b>TZON KODASHIM</b> follows the approach of the first two explanations mentioned above, but he suggests a different way to differentiate between Tamei people and dogs. Since Tamei people are forbidden from eating the Korban because they are Tamei, it is not deemed a thought of 'eating.' In contrast, a dog is not forbidden from eating the Korban. Even though one is not supposed to feed Kodshim to a dog, from the dog's perspective there is no reason why his eating of Kodshim should not be called eating. (See a similar explanation in <b>PANIM ME'IROS</b> 31b, DH she'Ein). (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafbbb'><span class='numt'>1)</span> MAY WOMEN SLAUGHTER? <span class='indexentry'>[Shechitah: women]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Mishnah):</span> If any of the following Pesulim slaughtered, it is Kosher, even for Kodshei Kodoshim - a Zar, woman, slave or Tamei.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Daf 32a - Contradiction (Beraisa):</span> 'V'Shachat' - a Zar, woman, slave or Tamei may slaughter even Kodshei Kodoshim (l'Chatchilah).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer:</span> Pesulim may slaughter l'Chatchilah.	The Mishnah says that it is b'Di'eved because one of the Pesulim, a Tamei, may not slaughter l'Chatchilah, lest he touch the meat.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Shechitah 4:4):</span> Anyone who knows the laws of Shechitah and slaughtered in front of a Chacham until he is used to it, he is called an expert. Any expert may slaughter l'Chatchilah by himself, even women and slaves.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Hagahos Maimoniyos (2):</span> This is like the Ri and our other Rebbeyim, and unlike Hilchos Eretz Yisrael, who wrote that women do not slaughter lest they become faint, for Da'atan Kalos (they are light-minded). This is a mere stringency; it is that Chacham's own idea.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Aruch ha'Shulchan (YD 1:37):</span> Da'atan Kalos means that they faint easily.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Magid Mishneh:</span> All Poskim agree that women may slaughter l'Chatchilah. This is clear from Zevachim 31b. The Mishnah does not say that it is b'Di'eved due to women, rather, due to Temei'im, who may not slaughter l'Chatchilah. This is unlike Hilchos Eretz Yisrael. We rely on the Gemara, which permits women l'Chatchilah even for Kodshim.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Chulin 1:1):</span> Our Mishnah says that anyone may slaughter. It does not say 'men and women', like it says in Temurah. There, one might have thought that only men make Temurah, for the entire Parshah is in the masculine. Here, a woman is no greater Chidush (that she may slaughter) than a man. In Zevachim, we needed to teach that they may slaughter, because women, even Kohanos, are Pasul for other Avodos. Hilchos Eretz Yisrael says that they may not slaughter l'Chatchilah. Our Gemara is unlike this. If so, we should have said that the Mishnah is Machshir Shechitah of Pesulim only b'Di'eved due to women, which were taught earlier in the Mishnah, and they are b'Di'eved even for Chulin!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tosfos (Kidushin 76b DH Ein):</span> Slaughtering in the Mikdash is a proof of proper lineage: Women and slaves are Kosher for Shechitah of Kodshim, i.e. b'Di'eved. L'Chatchilah, only people of proper lineage slaughter.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Taz (YD 1:1):</span> The Gemara connotes that only Temei'im are b'Di'eved! Tosfos agrees that letter of the law, Pesulim are permitted l'Chatchilah. Pesulim refrained by themselves. Alternatively, it is an excessive stringency to allow l'Chatchilah only people of proper lineage.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Gra (YD 1:1):</span> Tosfos holds that l'Chatchilah we do not let women slaughter Kodshim. The same applies to Chulin, lest they be negligent.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tosfos (Pesachim 4b DH Himnuhu):</span> We believe women about Torah laws that they themselves can fulfill, e.g. Shechitah and Nikur (removing Chelev or the Gid ha'Nasheh from beef). Even though they could do Bedikas Chametz, if it were mid'Oraisa we would not believe them, for it is a great exertion that requires great precision. The Yerushalmi says that women are lazy.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Yam Shel Shlomo (Chulin 1:1):</span> Tosfos says that women are believed about Shechitah. This is not because they themselves are believed to slaughter properly. Rather, they are believed to say that it was slaughtered properly, like they are believed about Bedikas Chametz, according to the Yerushalmi that they themselves do not check properly. It is known that Da'atan Kalos, and due to fear of their husbands if they disqualified Shechitah they would hide the matter. Also, perhaps Shechitah was a smaller exertion in those days. Nowadays we have many stringencies, e.g. a pause of any size disqualifies. Tosfos says that they are not believed about any matter of exertion. Or Zaru'a says that we rely on a Shochet to overturn the Isur because most who slaughter are established to be experts. This does not apply to most women, all the more so nowadays after the generations declined. I saw Rabanan refuse to certify youths for Shechitah below the age of 18, based on Hilchos Eretz Yisrael.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishbetzos Zahav (YD 1:1):</span> Tosfos says that women are believed about slaughter because they themselves could slaughter! Tosfos Gitin (2b DH Ed (1)) says so even if she does not know how to slaughter, because she could learn. Tevu'os Shor says that she is believed because if she slaughtered, b'Di'eved it is Kosher. This is wrong. If she is not believed mid'Oraisa, even b'Di'eved we do not rely on her Shechitah!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Note:</span> It seems that Tevu'os Shor shows why it is considered that she can fix the matter herself, and therefore she is believed!</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (YD 1:1):</span> L'Chatchilah, anyone may slaughter, even women.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rema:</span> Some say that we should not allow women to slaughter, for their custom is not to slaughter, and this is the custom.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH u'Mah she'Chosav Nashim, citing the Agur):</span> Even though the Poskim hold that women may slaughter l'Chatchilah, the custom in all of Chutz la'Aretz is that they do not. I never saw a custom that they slaughter. One should not start such a custom, for custom overrides Halachah. The custom of our ancestors is Halachah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rebuttal (Beis Yosef, ibid.):</span> If they wanted to slaughter and people did not let them, this could be called a proof. Not seeing it not a proof!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Defense (Shach 1):</span> The Agur holds like Maharik (172, brought in Rema CM 37:22), that regarding a custom, if something was not seen, this is a proof.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (ibid.):</span> Kol Bo says 'Semak says that women slaughter for themselves. This implies that they may not slaughter for men.' This is astounding. What is Kosher for one is Kosher for all! Rather, Semak means that women slaughter *by* themselves, i.e. without supervision.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Yam Shel Shlomo (Chulin 1:1):</span> I say that 'they slaughter for themselves' means that others may not rely on them.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Aruch ha'Shulchan (37):</span> The Mishnah is Machshir women whom we know do not faint. If one oversees such a woman, surely she may slaughter! In Kodshim, a Kohen is there to receive the blood. Knives in the Mikdash were checked. It is a great exertion to supervise Shechitah of others. Surely, a woman may not be appointed over this! Perhaps this is the Kol Bo's intent.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishbetzos Zahav (1):</span> The Rema has two reasons to disqualify women l'Chatchilah. They are suspected of Lifnei Iver (causing others to transgressed), and they often faint. The first reason is dubious, for below (127:3) he rules that women are believed about Nikur beef. One could say that there he refers to Nikur Panim (removing Chelev from the front), which is not a toil. It is better to say that the concern is lest they faint. L'Chatchilah, only someone Muchzak not to faint may slaughter. If women slaughtered, Simlah Chadashah 1:13 says that in a place where they normally do not, we cannot say that most slaughter properly. Where they normally do slaughter, we may let them continue. I say that checking a knife is a great exertion, like Bedikas Chametz, so if we did not check the knife, we do not rely on them. The Rema (Toras Chatas 46:9, and below 127:3) says that if the Isur was established, it is forbidden. Likewise, if she often faints, and says that she did not, she is not believed. Since it is a Safek, she is lenient even if it is not an exertion. We permit her Shechitah b'Di'eved only if she is established not to faint and men checked the knife. One who wants to be lenient may not believe her if she often faints.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>viii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (8):</span> The Levush says that most women are fearful and faint when they see blood.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ix.</span><span class='desl2'>	Birkei Yosef (4):</span> Most Acharonim say that we do not allow women to slaughter. The Pri Chodosh and Gur Aryeh say that they saw women receive permission to slaughter. Every place follows its custom.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>x.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (11,12):</span> Our custom is not to certify women to slaughter, even if they are expert and established to slaughter properly. This is in Eretz Yisrael, Surya, Bavel, India, and Persia.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>xi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (13):</span> If a woman slaughtered, we check if she is expert and says that she did not faint. If she is not here it is Pasul. Because she deviated from the norm, we do not apply 'most slaughterers are experts.'</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>xii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (15):</span> Even where women slaughter, they may not check the knife, for this requires a greatly settled mind and Yir'as Shamayim, more than Shechitah itself.</p>
<p class='otherhalachos'>Other Halachos relevant to this Daf:</p>
<p class='otherhalachostext'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) HAVING IN MIND TO EAT THE MEAT OF A KORBAN WITHIN 'KEDEI ACHILAS PERAS'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: Rav Ashi asks whether or not having a thought that two people will each eat half of a k'Zayis of the Korban Chutz l'Zemano creates Pigul. Abaye infers the answer to this question from the Mishnah. The Mishnah (29b) states that if a person thinks about <i>eating</i> half of a k'Zayis and <i>burning</i> half of a k'Zayis, the two intentions do not combine to invalidate the Korban, because the act of eating and the act of burning are not compatible. This implies that in a case where both intentions are of a similar nature, even if the intended actions are done separately they invalidate the Korban. This shows that even if the thought was that two separate people should eat a total of a k'Zayis, it can make a Korban Pasul.
</p><p>
Based on the above logic, the Acharonim have difficulty understanding the Gemara's next question. Rava asks: Does having a thought to eat, Chutz l'Zemano, a k'Zayis in more time than 'Kedei Achilas Peras' (the amount of time which constitutes one act of eating) invalidate a Korban? Is a thought to eat a Korban Chutz l'Zemano comparable to the Mizbe'ach's 'eating' of the Korban, for which this time period does <i>not</i> apply, or is it comparable to an ordinary person's act of eating, for which this time period <i>does</i> apply? Abaye answers this question as well from the Mishnah (29b). The Mishnah says that a thought of eating is incompatible with a thought of burning. This implies that if they <i>were</i> compatible, they would make the Korban Pigul -- even though the burning on the Mizbe'ach usually takes longer than Kedei Achilas Peras! The Gemara responds that this proof is inconclusive, because the Mishnah might be referring to a case in which there is a large fire on the Mizbe'ach, and the meat is totally burned within the time period of Kedei Achilas Peras.
</p><p>
What is Rava's doubt? The Gemara already accepted Abaye's proof that a thought of two different people eating a total of a k'Zayis can invalidate the Korban. He makes no mention of any need for the two people to eat a k'Zayis within a time period of Kedei Achilas Peras of each other's eating; the issue of Kedei Achilas Peras is not relevant to two different people, and yet the Korban is still Pasul! Why, then, does Rava entertain the possibility that one must have a thought to eat the k'Zayis of meat within the time period of Kedei Achilas Peras in order to invalidate the Korban?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>SEFAS EMES</b> answers that Abaye is simply repeating the proof he gave to Rava in response to the first question.
</p><p>
The Sefas Emes uses this explanation to clarify the words of the <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 14:10). The Rambam rules that when one has a thought to eat the k'Zayis in more time than Kedei Achilas Peras, the Korban still becomes Pasul. If the Gemara does not conclusively answer the question, then how does the Rambam know this Halachah? The <b>KESEF MISHNEH</b> explains that the Rambam maintains that the answer of the Gemara to Abaye's proof -- that the Mishnah is talking about a large fire on the Mizbe'ach which consumes the Korban within a period of Kedei Achilas Peras -- is an attempt to reject the proof with a weak suggestion, and not with a strong rebuttal. Accordingly, the Rambam follows the stronger logic of Abaye's proof.
</p><p>
Alternatively, the Kesef Mishneh suggests that the Rambam might have had a different Girsa in the Gemara. His Girsa did not include the Gemara's rebuttal at all.
</p><p>
The Sefas Emes disagrees with the Kesef Mishneh's first suggestion. The fact that the fire on the Mizbe'ach could consume a k'Zayis of meat within Kedei Achilas Peras was probably the normal way that the fire burned. This would mean that the Gemara's answer to Abaye's proof is very strong, because it is very probable that the Mishnah refers to when there is a large fire on the Mizbe'ach which burns a k'Zayis quickly. He therefore states that Abaye's proof was the same proof he gave to Rav Ashi. The question of 'v'Ha Haktarah...,' and the answer that the Mishnah refers to a large fire on the Mizbe'ach, was not in the text of the Rambam. The Sefas Emes implies that the Rambam's text is indeed the correct text of the Gemara. (See <b>TOSFOS YOM TOV</b> 3:3 for a different explanation of the Rambam's source.)
</p><p>
(b) The <b>PANIM ME'IROS</b> explains that Rava's question is a continuation of the previous question. Rava asks that if having a thought that two people will eat a total of a k'Zayis does <i>not</i> create Pigul, then what is the Halachah when one has a thought of eating a k'Zayis in more than Kedei Achilas Peras? (The Panim Me'iros admits that this explanation seems to be refuted by <b>TOSFOS</b> here who apparently learns that these are two independent questions.)
</p><p>
(c) The <b>KEHILOS YAKOV</b> (23:2) answers that there are two ways in which one can eat a k'Zayis in more time than Kedei Achilas Peras. One way is when the person eats a half of a k'Zayis in a normal amount of time, pauses for a while, and then eats the second half as he ate the first. Having a thought to eat a Korban Chutz l'Zemano in this manner may cause the Korban to become Pasul, just as a thought that two people will eat a k'Zayis renders the Korban Pasul. Rava's question, on the other hand, is of a different nature. He is asking about a person who has a thought to eat one morsel at a time, but continually, at a leisurely pace which would take longer than Kedei Achilas Peras. This is not a normal way to eat. Rava's question is whether one who thinks to eat 'she'Lo k'Derech Achilah' (in an abnormal manner) also creates Pigul. The law in this case cannot be inferred from the law regarding the normal eating of two people. Rava's question is whether the eating must be like the normal eating of a person (and thus such a thought would not invalidate the Korban), or whether it is comparable to the eating of the Mizbe'ach (which does not exclude this type of eating, and thus the Korban would become Pasul). (See also <b>TZON KODASHIM</b> and <b>YAD BINYAMIN</b>.) However, the Kehilos Yakov himself writes in a footnote that this explanation seems at odds with <b>RASHI's</b> understanding of the Gemara (DH Hachi Garsinan le'Echol), since Rashi says that the question involves eating half a k'Zayis and then eating the other half later. (Y. Montrose)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) AN AVODAH PERFORMED BY ONE WHO IS 'PASUL' FOR AVODAH</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Mishnah (31b) teaches that all of the types of people who are ineligible to perform the Avodah of offering a Korban are permitted to perform the Shechitah. Since their Shechitah is valid, if they have a thought of Pigul during the Shechitah they are able to disqualify the Korban. In contrast, they are not eligible to perform the Kabalas ha'Dam. Consequently, if they perform the Kabalah with a wrongful thought, they do not disqualify the Korban. Rather, if any blood remains in the neck of the animal, a valid Kohen should perform the Kabalas ha'Dam a second time.
</p><p>
Although the Avodah of Kabalah was done by a person who is not qualified to perform the Avodah, the Korban does not become Pasul because of his action. Rather, a valid Kohen may continue the Avodah in the proper manner if there is more blood in the animal. The Gemara (34b) calls this principle, 'Ein Pasul Oseh Shirayim' (34b), which means that the Avodah performed by a Pasul (one who is ineligible to perform the Avodah) does not disqualify the rest of the blood from being used for the Avodah by a valid Kohen. (See <b>TOSFOS</b> to 34b, DH Pasul.) The Gemara there says that this applies whenever a Pasul performs the Avodah.
</p><p>
The Mishnah teaches that the same principle applies when a Pasul performs the Avodah with a thought of Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo. Even though he had a thought of Pigul, it is ineffective and a valid Kohen may redo the Avodah of Kabalas ha'Dam.
</p><p>
Presumably, the reason why the Pasul's thought of Pigul does not disqualify the Korban is that the act performed by the Pasul is not considered an Avodah, and thus his thought has not taken place during an Avodah. It is comparable to an outsider who has a thought of Pigul about a Korban while he is not involved in any way in the offering of the Korban. This indeed is the way the <b>KIRYAS SEFER</b> (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 14) explains the Mishnah. However, if this is true, then why does the Mishnah mention at all that the Pasul did Kabalas ha'Dam with a thought of Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo? If the Mishnah seeks to teach that a valid Kohen may redo the Avodah with the remaining blood even though a Pasul started the Avodah, then there is no point in mentioning the thought of Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo. The point of the Mishnah cannot be to teach that the Pasul's wrongful thought has no effect, because that is obvious. A thought during an Avodah of a Pasul cannot affect the Korban, just as the Avodah of a Pasul cannot affect the Korban. What, then, is the Mishnah adding when it says that if a Pasul performs an Avodah with a thought of Pigul, the Avodah should be performed again by a valid Kohen with the remaining blood?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>RASHI</b> (DH Im Yesh) seems to address this question. Rashi writes that it is not obvious that a Pasul's wrongful thought cannot disqualify the Korban. He explains that the fact that the Pasul's thought cannot affect the Korban is derived from the verse, 'ha'Makriv Oso' (Vayikra 7:18), which implies that a person who is fit to offer ('Makriv') the Korban is a person who is fit to disqualify a Korban through his thoughts. Rashi is explaining that the fact that the Avodah of a Pasul is ineffective does not exclude the possibility that a <i>thought</i> of a Pasul can disqualify the Korban. Even though a valid Kohen will redo the Avodah with different blood, and the blood that the Pasul received will not be used at all for the Avodah, since the Pasul attempted to perform a Kabalas ha'Dam before the Kabalah of the Kohen was completed his thought of Pigul is considered to have occurred during the Kabalah procedure. The Korban is valid only because of the verse that Rashi cites, which teaches that the thought of a Pasul does not disqualify a Korban. Accordingly, the Mishnah is teaching that not only can the valid Kohen perform the Kabalas ha'Dam after the Kabalah of a Pasul who did <i>not</i> have a thought of Pigul, a valid Kohen can perform the Kabalas ha'Dam even after the Pasul did Kabalah with a thought of Pigul.
</p><p>
The <b>RASHASH</b> points out that there seems to be no explicit source in the Gemara for the teaching that Rashi derives from the verse. It seems, however, that Rashi may have inferred from the Mishnah that there must be a source in the Torah for the Mishnah's Halachah, and it is not based solely on the logic of the Kiryas Sefer. Rashi may have found a source for this Derashah in the Gemara earlier (29a), which derives from this verse that the Kohen who performs an Avodah with Pigul does not become Pasul himself. If the verse teaches that the Kohen performing the Avodah with Pigul does not become Pasul, then, obviously, the Kohen was a valid Kohen performing the Avodah in the first place.
</p><p>
The <b>MIRKEVES HA'MISHNEH</b> (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 1:28) suggests that the verse that Rashi cites might refer only to a thought that <i>invalidates</i> the Avodah, such as a thought of Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo, or a thought of she'Lo Lishmah in the case of a Korban Chatas and Korban Pesach, since that is the type of thought that the verse is describing. In contrast, if a Pasul has in mind a thought of she'Lo Lishmah (for any Korban other than a Chatas and a Pesach), then the thought indeed may have an effect on the Korban, such that it will not fulfill the owner's obligation to offer that Korban, and it will not provide atonement for the owner. He suggests that this is the intention of the <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 14:2) who writes that a Pasul who has a thought of Pigul (or she'Lo Lishmah in the case of a Chatas or Pesach) does not disqualify the Korban, and a valid Kohen may perform a proper Kabalah with the remaining blood. However, a Pasul who has a thought of she'Lo Lishmah for any Korban other than a Chatas and a Pesach <i>does</i> disqualify the Korban. The Rambam's logic seems to be that even though the Pasul's thought should prevent the Korban from satisfying the owner's obligation (and it should not entirely invalidate the Korban), since the thought was cogitated by a person who is Pasul to perform the Avodah, as long as his thought is present in the Korban it is considered as though the Pasul performed part of the Avodah, and the Avodah of a Pasul disqualifies a Korban. The Mirkeves ha'Mishneh suggests a slightly different logic in order to explain the Rambam's ruling, but, as mentioned above, his words seem to be based on Rashi's explanation of the Mishnah that the thought of a Pasul is able to affect a Korban even after a Kohen redoes the Kabalah, if not for the Gezeiras ha'Kasuv.
</p><p>
(b) The <b><b><b>OR</b></b> SAME'ACH</b> (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 14:2) suggests that the Mishnah is to be understood in the opposite manner. The Mishnah is not teaching that even with a thought of Pigul the Avodah of a Pasul does not disqualify the Korban. Rather, the Mishnah is referring to the Avodah of a Tamei, which normally <i>does</i> disqualify a Korban, since, unlike other Pesulim, the Tamei's Avodah <i>does</i> make Shirayim; once the Tamei does part of the Avodah, the rest of the blood becomes disqualified (as the Gemara in Me'ilah 5b teaches). The Mishnah, therefore, cannot say that when any of the Pesulim (including one who is Tamei) performs the Kabalah, a valid Kohen must redo the Kabalah. On the contrary, it is impossible to redo the Kabalah after a Tamei has already done Kabalah. Rather, the Mishnah is teaching that if a Tamei performs the Avodah with a thought of Pigul, then -- due to the additional Pesul that is incurred as a result of the thought of Pigul -- the Tamei does <i>not</i> disqualify the rest of the blood for Kabalah.
</p><p>
The logic for this is as follows. The reason why a Tamei disqualifies the remaining blood is that he is not 'as Pasul' as a Zar or the other Pesulim, so to speak, since the Avodah of a Tamei is accepted b'Tzibur (see Insights to Zevachim 16:2). Since his Kabalah cannot be totally ignored, it is not possible for a valid Kohen to begin a new Kabalah. In contrast, the Avodah of a Tamei <i>with a thought of Pigul</i> is not acceptable at all, even b'Tzibur. Therefore, the Avodah of a Tamei with a thought of Pigul <i>can</i> be totally ignored, just like the Avodah of a Zar, and a valid Kohen may be Mekabel the remaining blood.
</p><p>
The Or Same'ach proposes that this is the intention of the Rambam cited above as well. The Rambam is not referring to a Zar who performs the Avodah with a thought of she'Lo Lishmah, but rather to a Kohen <i>Tamei</i> who performs the Avodah with a thought of she'Lo Lishmah. If the Kohen Tamei performs the Avodah with a thought of Pigul, the Kohen Tamei's Avodah may be ignored and a valid Kohen may take over and perform the Avodah, since such an Avodah is not accepted b'Tzibur. However, if a Kohen Tamei performs the Avodah with a thought of she'Lo Lishmah (for a Korban other than a Chatas or Pesach), then the Kohen Tamei's act cannot be disregarded since such an Avodah <i>is</i> accepted b'Tzibur, and it will be impossible for a valid Kohen to redo the Kabalah.
</p><p>
The <b>KEREN ORAH</b> (26a) suggests a similar explanation for the Rambam. However, the <b>MINCHAS CHINUCH</b> (138:5) presents strong arguments against such an interpretation of the Rambam's words. (See also Or Same'ach in <b>CHIDUSHEI RABEINU MEIR SIMCHAH</b> to Yevamos 33b, who proves from the Gemara there that Tum'ah is not Hutrah b'Tzibur when the Avodah of the Tamei is performed in a way in which l'Chatchilah it should not be performed.)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafbbb'><span class='numt'>1)</span> HETERIM TO LEAVE ERETZ YISRAEL <span class='indexentry'>[ERETZ YISRAEL: LEAVING]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Ula):</span> Since the Torah permits Bi'ah b'Miktzas of a Metzora (before his Taharah is complete), it permits Bi'ah b'Miktzas of a Tevul Yom.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rav Yosef:</span> Ula holds that if most of Bnei Yisrael were Tamei Mes, and they became Zavim, since Tum'as Mes is permitted for Korban Pesach, also Tum'as Zivah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question (Abaye):</span> These are different! A Metzora is Hutar (totally permitted to partially enter the Azarah, for it is needed for the Mitzvah. Therefore, also a Tevul Yom may partially enter.) Tum'as Mes is only Dechuyah (overridden to allow Korban Pesach. We have no source to override other Tum'os!)</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Rava):</span> Just the contrary! A Metzora is Hutar, but we have no source to permit partial entry of a Tevul Yom. The Torah was Docheh Tum'as Mes to allow Korban Pesach. Likewise, it is Docheh another Tum'ah (Zivah)!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Avodah Zarah 13a (Beraisa):</span> A Kohen may go to Chutz la'Aretz, even though this makes him Tamei mid'Rabanan, to plead his case, learn Torah, or marry a woman;</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span>	R. Yehudah says, if he can find a Rebbi here, he may not become Tamei to learn elsewhere;</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span>	R. Yosi permits this, for perhaps he will learn better from the Rebbi there.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span>	Yosef ha'Kohen followed his Rebbi to Tzidon to learn.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Yochanan):</span> The Halachah follows R. Yosi.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bava Basra 91a (Beraisa):</span> One may not leave Eretz Yisrael (due to inflated prices) until wheat sells for Sa'atayim for a Sela;</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span>	R. Shimon says, this is when he cannot afford to buy. If he can afford, even if a Se'ah sells for a Sela, he may not leave.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>12.</span><span class='desl2'>	R. Shimon:</span> Elimelech, Machlon and Chilyon were the leaders of their generation and the philanthropists of their generation; they were punished for leaving Eretz Yisrael - 'Va'Tehom Kol ha'Ir...ha'Zos No'omi'.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>13.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kesuvos 111a:</span> A Yavam asked if he should go to Chutz la'Aretz to do Yibum.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	R. Chanina:</span> His brother died for marrying a Nochris (i.e. a resident of Chutz la'Aretz). Blessed be Hash-m, Who killed him for that. Will the Yavam do the same?!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>14.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kidushin 31b:</span> Rav Asi's mother asked him to find a man as beautiful as himself for her to marry. He  fled to Eretz Yisrael. He heard that she was coming after him. He asked R. Yochanan if one may go to Chutz La'aretz. R. Yochanan forbade. He asked if he may go to Chutz La'aretz to greet her. R. Yochanan was unsure. When he saw that Rav Asi came to ask again, he gave him a Berachah (and permitted him to go).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>15.</span>	Before Rav Asi reached his mother, she died. She was being brought to Eretz Yisrael for burial. He said that had he known, he would not have left Eretz Yisrael.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Melachim 5:9):</span> One may leave Eretz Yisrael to go to Chutz la'Aretz only to learn Torah, marry a woman, or save from Nochrim and return to Eretz Yisrael. Similarly, one may leave for business. One may not dwell in Chutz la'Aretz unless the famine in Eretz Yisrael is so severe that wheat sells for twice its usual price. This is when prices are high and people have money. If prices are low but one has no money and no way to earn money, he may go anywhere that he can earn money. Even so, it is Midas Chasidus not to leave. Machlon and Chilyon (Elimelech's sons) were Gedolei ha'Dor, and they left due to a great affliction, and they were Chayav Misah to Hash-m.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Kesef Mishneh:</span> Saving from Nochrim is pleading his case, like it says in Avodah Zarah. The Rambam teaches that even for one of these Heterim, he may not leave permanently. He learns from Kesuvos. It connotes that one may not leave Eretz Yisrael even to marry a woman. In Avodah Zarah, we permit this! The Rambam, like Tosfos in Avodah Zarah, answers that it is permitted only if he intends to return. The Rambam holds that Sa'atayim for a Sela is twice the normal price of wheat.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Birkei Yosef (OC 568:1):</span> If one lives in Eretz Yisrael and desires to prostrate on graves of Tzadikim in Chutz la'Aretz, or he lives in Yerushalayim and desires to go to graves of Tzadikim (elsewhere) in Eretz Yisrael, he may go on condition to return (Pri ha'Aretz 3:6:14, in some editions 3:10:7).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Pischei Teshuvah (YD 372:2):</span> Batei Kehunah Beis Din (23) says that Kohanim who prostrate on the graves of Tzadikim have nothing to rely on. A Medrash says in the name of Eliyahu that graves of Chachamim have no Tum'ah. However, Tosfos says that really, Eliyahu's Heter was due to Mes Mitzvah. In Berachos (19b), we say that Kohanim used to jump over coffins in order to see kings, because it is a Mitzvah, and most coffins have an Ohel of a Tefach above the Mes, so the Tum'ah is only mid'Rabanan. We do not find that there is a Mitzvah or honor to Chachamim to prostrate on graves of Tzadikim. Also, perhaps they were not buried in coffins, or the coffin rotted, and now it is like a closed grave which is Tum'ah mid'Oraisa.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Sedei Chemed (1, Ma'areches Aleph):</span> One may leave Eretz Yisrael to prostrate on the graves of Tzadikim, for it is a great Mitzvah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishpat Kohen (Inyanei Eretz Yisrael 147:1):</span> This is difficult. Granted, we find that Kalev went to prostrate on the graves of the Avos. There are grounds to say that it is a Mitzvah to prostrate on the graves of all Tzadikim. If so, why may one leave Eretz Yisrael to go specifically to graves in Chutz la'Aretz?! One may leave Eretz Yisrael to learn Torah only if he cannot learn in Eretz Yisrael. We rule like R. Yosi who permits leaving only because sometimes one merits to learn only from certain Rebbeyim. This does not apply prostrating on graves of Tzadikim. There is no reason to distinguish between one Tzadik and another. All the more so one should not leave, for the Tzadikim in Eretz Yisrael are greatest. We find that there is a benefit to prostrate on graves of Tzadikim, but I have no source that it is a Mitzvah. Perhaps since Hash-m desires the Tefilos of Tzadikim, it is a Mitzvah to cause the (dead) Tzadikim to pray to arouse Hashem's desire. Tzadikim are even greater dead than alive! Perhaps one may leave to go to one's parents and Rebbeyim, even though they are not as great as the Tzadikim buried in Eretz Yisrael, since they feel closer to him. Once, a Chacham prostrated near the cave in which R. Chiya was buried, and mentioned that he learns the Tosefta of R. Chiya, so R. Chiya would be more inspired to pray for him (Bava Metzia 85b). However, I cannot fathom that the love of the Avos buried in Chevron would not suffice, to justify going to Chutz la'Aretz, especially if he is a Chacham who will be Batel from Torah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishpat Kohen (ibid., 2):</span> The Sugya connotes that there is no Isur to leave with intent to return. The Heter is needed only for a Kohen. A Yisrael may leave even for Reshus. However, without intent to return is forbidden even in order to marry. This is even if he cannot find a wife in Eretz Yisrael. Perhaps because one who lives in Chutz la'Aretz is like one without a G-d, even a great Mitzvah does not override the Isur to leave. The Rambam says that one may leave for the three Mitzvos, and he returns. This connotes there is no Heter to leave without intent to return. The Kesef Mishneh says that we learn from Avodah Zarah, but there it merely permits a Kohen. What is the source to forbid leaving for other matters with intent to return? Perhaps intent to return permits everything, just like for business! Perhaps the Rambam learns from Kidushin 31b. R. Yochanan did not permit Rav Asi Stam to go to Chutz La'aretz, and did not explicitly permit to go to greet his mother. However, perhaps this is because Rav Asi was a Kohen, but for a Yisrael it would be permitted. This is reasonable. Honoring parents should be no less than business, for which one may leave temporarily! Rather, we must say that also business is permitted only for a Yisrael. A Kohen may leave to save from Nochrim, but not for Stam business. However, Rav Asi asked 'may *one* leave', not 'may *I* leave.' This connotes that even a Yisrael may not. Avodah Zarah teaches that to save, even a Kohen is permitted. Perhaps we can prove that even a Yisrael may leave with intent to return only for a Mitzvah, and not for any Mitzvah. Rav Asi said that had he known (that his mother is being brought to Eretz Yisrael for burial), he would not have left. It seems that this is not due to Tum'ah, for a Kohen may become Tamei through other Mesim while engaging in burial of his relative (Nazir 42). The Rambam (Hilchos Evel 2:15) rules like those who forbid. However, the argument is only after he became Tamei, but beforehand, all agree that just like he may become Tamei for his Mes, he may become Tamei through other Mesim if needed in order to bury his Mes. Both are Nidchim (overridden). We do not distinguish Dichuy for one matter or for more, like we find in Zevachim. Tum'ah mid'Oraisa was permitted to Rav Asi, and all the more so Tum'as Chutz la'Aretz. Rather, he regretted Bitul of the Mitzvah of dwelling in Eretz Yisrael, for it takes precedence, since he would fulfill the Mitzvah to become Tamei for her when she arrived.</p>
<p class='normal'></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) 'HO'IL V'ISHTERI, ISHTERI'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Beraisa states that a Metzora is permitted to extend his hands and thumbs into the Azarah for the sprinkling of the Dam on the eighth day of his Tehorah process. If the eighth day falls on Erev Pesach, he is permitted to put his hands into the Azarah even if he is a Tevul Yom for Tum'as Keri, even though a Ba'al Keri is normally prohibited with an Isur Kares from entering the Azarah. Ula explains that even extending a part of his body into the Azarah is prohibited with an Isur Kares, because of the rule that 'Bi'ah b'Miktzas Shmah Bi'ah,' a partial entry is considered an entry into the Azarah. The Tevul Yom is permitted, nevertheless, to put his hands into the Azarah in this case, due to the principle of 'Ho'il v'Ishteri, Ishteri.' This principle teaches that once a person is permitted to enter the Azarah with Tum'as Metzora, he remains permitted to extend his hands into the Azarah even if he is Tamei with a second form of Tum'ah, since he was already permitted when he had only the first Tum'ah.
</p><p>
Abaye asserts that the same logic cannot be applied to the Halachah of 'Tum'ah Dechuyah Hi b'Tzibur.' When a majority of the Jewish people are Tamei Mes on Erev Pesach, the Torah permits them to bring the Korban in a state of Tum'ah, because of the principle of 'Tum'ah Dechuyah b'Tzibur.' If the Tzibur then became Tamei with Tum'as Zav -- a form of Tum'ah which is not permitted b'Tzibur, one might have thought that the principle of 'Ho'il v'Ishteri, Ishteri' teaches that if the Torah permits one form of Tum'ah in the Beis ha'Mikdash, then the second Tum'ah should be permitted as well. Abaye says that this is not the case. Tum'ah is not 'Hutrah,' permitted. Rather, it is 'Dechuyah,' pushed-off due to necessity. Therefore, although the Torah allows a Korban to be offered with Tum'as Mes, it does not allow the Avodah to be done with a second type of Tum'ah.
</p><p>
Rava argues and says that the opposite logic is true. It is logical to assume that the Torah does not prohibit the Metzora to put his hands in the Azarah, since the Torah never prohibited the Metzora from putting his hands into the Azarah. Therefore, no special dispensation is needed to allow him to put his hands into the Azarah. However, the Korban Pesach was not permitted l'Chatchilah to be brought in a state of Tum'ah, but was permitted only through Dechiyah. The Torah had to give a special dispensation to allow it to be brought b'Tum'ah. Once the dispensation was given, it makes no difference whether there was one Tum'ah or two Tum'os; the Torah permits bringing the Korban.
</p><p>
It seems from Rava's words that 'Ho'il v'Ishteri' applies only for something permitted through Dechiyah, but not for something that is permitted without Dechiyah. The <b>PRI MEGADIM</b> (in Shoshanas ha'Amakim #5) questions Rava's statement from the Gemara in Kidushin (21b). The Gemara there suggests that when the Torah permits a Jewish warrior to take a Yefas To'ar, a Nochri woman captured in war, it permits that act only to a Yisrael, who transgresses only one Isur by taking such a woman. Perhaps the Torah does not permit a warrior who is a Kohen to take a Yefas To'ar, because marrying her will involve a second Isur (the Isur of 'Zonah'). Rav rules that such a woman is permitted even to a Kohen, based on the logic of 'Ho'il v'Ishteri, Ishteri.' The Halachah follows his ruling.
</p><p>
Similarly, the Gemara teaches that when the Torah permits giving a Shifchah Kena'anis to an Eved Ivri, even though a Shifchah Kena'anis normally is prohibited to a Jew by a Isur Lav, the special dispensation of the Torah also applies to a Kohen who is an Eved Ivri, according to Rav, because of 'Ho'il v'Ishteri, Ishteri.'
</p><p>
According to Rava, how can the logic of 'Ho'il v'Ishteri' apply to such cases? Rava rules that 'Ho'il v'Ishteri' does not apply to a Heter that the Torah gives! The cases of Yefas To'ar and Eved Ivri are similar to the case of Heter, since the Torah never prohibited these women under such circumstances. Those cases are not like the case of Tum'ah which is <i>Dechuyah</i> b'Tzibur and permitted only out of necessity.
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> in Yevamos (8a, DH Rava) points out that in the Gemara there, Rava seems unwilling to accept the principle of 'Ho'il v'Ishteri, Ishteri.' The Gemara there says that since the Torah permits Yibum with an 'Eshes Ach' (the wife of one's deceased brother), if the Yevamah became an 'Achos Ishah' after her husband died (the surviving brother married the widow's sister), 'Ho'il v'Ishteri' should apply. Rava there argues and says that there is no logical reason to permit Yibum with 'Achos Ishah.' Tosfos asks why Rava does not accept the principle of 'Ho'il v'Ishteri.'
</p><p>
In his first answer, Tosfos suggests that Rava disagrees with the entire principle of 'Ho'il v'Ishteri, Ishteri,' and he does not permit a Tevul Yom for Keri who is a Metzora to extend his hands into the Azarah. The <b>TUREI EVEN</b> (Megilah 3b) comments that this seems to be consistent with Rava's statement in the Gemara here. However, Tosfos continues and says that perhaps Rava agrees with the principle of 'Ho'il v'Ishteri.' Nevertheless, he does not apply it for Yibum since the Isurim of 'Eshes Ach' and 'Achos Ishah' are completely different Isurim, as opposed to the Tum'ah of Keri and Metzora, both of which are types of Tum'ah and thus are related.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b> (Yevamos 1:3) explains that Tosfos, in his second answer, maintains that Rava does not disagree with the principle of 'Ho'il v'Ishteri.' Rather, Rava suggests that, if anything, it is more logical to say 'Ho'il v'Ishteri' in a case of Dechiyah than in a case of Heter. However, he agrees that in a case of Heter, 'Ho'il v'Ishteri' applies. (See also <b>KEREN ORAH</b> here.)
</p><p>
According to the second answer of Tosfos, the question of the Pri Megadim does not begin. Rava agrees with the principle of 'Ho'il v'Ishteri,' and, therefore, he agrees with the way that Rav applies that principle in Kidushin (in the cases of Yefas To'ar and Eved Ivri).
</p><p>
However, according to the first answer of Tosfos, the question remains.
</p><p>
(b) Another question may be asked on the Gemara in Kidushin. It is clear from the Gemara here that 'Ho'il v'Ishteri' applies only when there originally was a single Isur which the Torah permitted, and afterwards a second Isur took effect. Since the first Isur is permitted, the second one is permitted as well. (See <b>RASHI</b>, DH Tum'ah Ishtera'i.) In the cases of Yefas To'ar and Eved Ivri, Rav applies 'Ho'il v'Ishteri' to permit two Isurim that occur simultaneously.
</p><p>
One might argue that the Gemara does not mean that the Heter must precede the second Isur, but rather the opposite: the second Isur may not precede the Heter. If they occur simultaneously, then 'Ho'il v'Ishteri' <i>does</i> apply. However, it seems logical that the Sugya here and the Sugya in Kidushin apply 'Ho'il v'Ishteri' in two completely different ways, as will be explained below.
</p><p>
The Gemara here understands that the Torah clearly permits the Isur of Tum'ah in the Azarah only for a Metzora. The Torah does not permit this for a Ba'al Keri. Similarly, the Tum'ah which is Mutar b'Tzibur is only Tum'as Mes, and not Tum'as Zav. The Gemara's question is whether the Torah will allow the second Tum'ah in the Azarah because the first one already became permitted through the special dispensation of a Metzora. This is where Rava does not apply the rule of 'Ho'il v'Ishteri.'
</p><p>
In contrast, the Gemara in Kidushin is discussing the original Heter that the Torah gives for an Eved Ivri to marry a Shifchah Kena'anis or for a Jewish warrior to take a Yefas To'ar. The Torah does not say clearly what type of Eved Ivri, or what type of warrior, it is discussing. One can understand the Torah as referring only to a Yisrael, or as referring to both a Yisrael and a Kohen. There, in Kidushin, Rav says that it is logical to assume that the original Heter that the Torah gave was not only for a Yisrael but for a Kohen as well, since, in any case, the Torah is permitting an Isur, and thus it is probably permitting the double Isur of the Kohen just as it is permitting the single Isur of the Yisrael. Since the Torah does not clearly limit the Isur, even Rava would agree that 'Ho'il v'Ishteri' applies to permit even two Isurim that take effect simultaneously. (M. Kornfeld)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) PERFORMING 'SEMICHAH' FROM OUTSIDE OF THE AZARAH</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara attempts to prove from a Beraisa that Bi'ah b'Miktzas is considered Bi'ah -- a partial entry is considered an entry into the Azarah. The Beraisa teaches that it is impossible to fulfill the requirement of 'Tekef l'Semichah Shechitah' (Shechitah must be performed immediately after Semichah) in the case of a Metzora's Korban Asham. A Metzora, who is Tamei, must stand outside the Azarah, while the Shechitah of his Korban must be performed while the animal is inside the Azarah. Accordingly, the Beraisa says, it is impossible to do the Shechitah immediately after the Semichah, because the animal must first be moved from Sha'ar Nikanor -- where the Metzora does the Semichah -- to the Azarah, where the Korban will be slaughtered. The Gemara asks that if Bi'ah b'Miktzas is not considered an entry into the Azarah, then why does the Metzora not stand at Sha'ar Nikanor and extend his hands into the Azarah in order to perform Semichah on the animal while it is in the Azarah?
</p><p>


The Gemara suggests two answers in the name of Rav Yosef. The first answer is that the Beraisa follows the opinion of Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah, who maintains that the Shechitah must be performed not only in the Azarah, but directly north of the Mizbe'ach (and not between the Mizbe'ach and Sha'ar Nikanor). Accordingly, it is impossible for the Metzora to extend his hands to the area where the Shechitah must be performed (because that area is at least 22 Amos away). In his second answer, Rav Yosef says that even if Bi'ah b'Miktzas is not considered Bi'ah, it will not suffice for the Metzora to extend his hands into the Azarah and perform Semichah, because Semichah involves leaning most of one's weight on the animal. In order to lean most of his weight on the animal, the Metzora would need to bring his center of gravity to directly above the head of the animal, and by doing so he would be bringing most of his body into the Azarah, which certainly is considered Bi'ah.
</p><p>
Rav Yosef's second answer seems to contradict the second Beraisa cited earlier (32a). The Beraisa states that from the Torah it is not evident that one who is Tamei may not perform Semichah, since the Torah does not say 'Lifnei Hash-m' with regard to Semichah, requiring that it be done in the Azarah. It says 'Lifnei Hash-m' only with regard to Shechitah (Vayikra 1:5). The Gemara explains that although the Semichah must be performed immediately before Shechitah, this does not necessitate that the Metzora performing the Semichah must enter the Azarah, because he could extend his hands into the Azarah, since Bi'ah b'Miktzas is not considered Bi'ah. Accordingly, it is clear from the Beraisa that if Bi'ah b'Miktzas is not considered Bi'ah, then it is <i>not</i> necessary to enter the Azarah in order to put most of one's weight on the animal. Why, then, does Rav Yosef assert that it is impossible to perform Semichah without entering the Azarah? (<b>SEFAS EMES</b>)
</p><p>
ANSWER: The Gemara earlier (32a) records a dissenting Beraisa which states that it indeed is impossible for a Tamei to perform Semichah from outside of the Azarah because of the rule that Semichah must be performed immediately before Shechitah. What is the basis of the argument between the two Beraisos?
</p><p>
The Gemara there explains that the first Beraisa, which says that a Tamei may not perform Semichah while standing outside the Azarah, maintains that Bi'ah b'Miktzas is considered Bi'ah, and that a Tamei person cannot even extend his hands into the Azarah. The second Beraisa, on the other hand, permits a Tamei to extend his hands into the Azarah. In the Gemara here, however, Rav Yosef is supporting the opinion that Bi'ah b'Miktzas is not considered Bi'ah. He learns that even the first Beraisa permits a Tamei to extend his hands into the Azarah, since Bi'ah b'Miktzas is not considered Bi'ah. Why, then, does the first Beraisa state that a Tamei cannot perform Semichah from outside the Azarah? It must be because Semichah requires that one put most of his weight on the animal, and therefore the one who does Semichah must be standing inside the Azarah together with the animal. Hence, while it is true that Rav Yosef is contradicting the second Beraisa, he maintains that the first Beraisa argues with the second Beraisa about this point, and he is siding with the first Beraisa.
</p><p>


<font><b>2) RECITING THE BLESSING OF 'HA'MOTZI' IMMEDIATELY AFTER 'NETILAS YADAYIM'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara attempts to prove from a Beraisa that Bi'ah b'Miktzas is considered Bi'ah -- a partial entry is considered an entry into the Azarah. The Beraisa teaches that it is impossible to fulfill the requirement of 'Tekef l'Semichah Shechitah' (Shechitah must be performed immediately after Semichah) in the case of a Metzora's Korban Asham. A Metzora, who is Tamei, must stand outside the Azarah, while the Shechitah of his Korban must be performed while the animal is inside the Azarah. Accordingly, the Beraisa says, it is impossible to do the Shechitah immediately after the Semichah, because the animal must first be moved from Sha'ar Nikanor -- where the Metzora does the Semichah -- to the Azarah, where the Korban will be slaughtered. The Gemara asks that if Bi'ah b'Miktzas is not considered an entry into the Azarah, then why does the Metzora not stand at Sha'ar Nikanor and extend his hands into the Azarah in order to perform Semichah on the animal while it is in the Azarah?
</p><p>
The Gemara suggests two answers in the name of Rav Yosef. The first answer is that the Beraisa follows the opinion of Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah, who maintains that the Shechitah must be performed not only in the Azarah, but directly north of the Mizbe'ach (and not between the Mizbe'ach and Sha'ar Nikanor). Accordingly, it is impossible for the Metzora to extend his hands to the area where the Shechitah must be performed (because that area is at least 22 Amos away). In his second answer, Rav Yosef says that even if Bi'ah b'Miktzas is not considered Bi'ah, it will not suffice for the Metzora to extend his hands into the Azarah and perform Semichah, because Semichah involves leaning most of one's weight on the animal. In order to lean most of his weight on the animal, the Metzora would need to bring his center of gravity to directly above the head of the animal, and by doing so he would be bringing most of his body into the Azarah, which certainly is considered Bi'ah.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> in Sotah (39a, DH Kol) infers from the Gemara here an important Halachah pertaining to the laws of Netilas Yadayim, washing one's hands before eating bread.
</p><p>
The Gemara in Berachos (42a) states that Netilas Yadayim of Mayim Acharonim (washing the hands after the meal) must be followed immediately by the recitation of Birkas ha'Mazon -- 'Tekef l'Netilah, Berachah.' The Yerushalmi adds that the same requirement applies to the Netilas Yadayim before a meal -- it must be followed immediately ('Tekef') by the blessing of ha'Motzi (see Gilyon ha'Shas there).
</p><p>
How 'immediate' is 'Tekef'?
</p><p>
Tosfos attempts to answer this question from the Gemara here in Zevachim. The Gemara in Berachos mentions that another action which requires 'Tekef' is the Semichah done with a Korban, which must be followed immediately by Shechitah. In the Gemara here in Zevachim, Rav Yosef explains (in his first answer) that Shechitah cannot be performed immediately following the Semichah of the Korban Asham of a Metzora, even though the Metzora may extend his hands into the Azarah, because the Shechitah must be performed in the area that is due north of the Mizbe'ach. Tosfos points out that a distance of 22 Amos separates Sha'ar Nikanor -- where the Metzora stands -- from the Mizbe'ach (11 Amos of 'Derisas Raglei Yisrael,' and 11 Amos of 'Derisas Raglei Kohanim'). From the Gemara's statement that Semichah cannot be performed 'Tekef' to Shechitah because of this distance of 22 Amos, it is evident that the amount of time that it takes to walk the animal from the Sha'ar to the north side of the Mizbe'ach is too long to be considered 'Tekef.' Tosfos proves from here that an amount of time that is more than the time it takes to walk 22 Amos is certainly not considered 'Tekef.'
</p><p>
Tosfos' proof is very problematic. The Gemara initially proved that a Metzora cannot extend his hands into the Azarah from the fact that the Beraisa says that it is not possible for the Metzora to do Semichah immediately before Shechitah, even by extending his hands into the Azarah. At that stage, the Gemara assumed that the Shechitah of the Asham Metzora may be performed just inside Sha'ar Nikanor (and not directly north of the Mizbe'ach), but the Metzora, who needs to do the Semichah, must remain standing on the other side of the Sha'ar. Why do they not simply walk the animal <i>out</i> of the Azarah, to where the Metzora is standing, let the Metzora perform Semichah on the animal there, and then bring the animal back into the Azarah and perform the Shechitah inside of the Sha'ar? It is evident from the Gemara that moving the animal even one step -- from outside the Sha'ar to inside the Sha'ar -- is not considered 'Tekef'! If Semichah is performed outside of the Sha'ar and the animal is moved into the Azarah for Shechitah, the Shechitah is not considered 'Tekef.' Obviously, this amount of time is much less than the amount of time that Tosfos asserts is considered 'Tekef.'
</p><p>
This is also evident from Rav Yosef's second answer. Rav Yosef says that since the Metzora must place most of his weight on the animal when he does Semichah, the animal must be outside of the Azarah at the time of Semichah, and bringing the animal inside in order to do Shechitah will not be 'Tekef.'
</p><p>
Why, then, does Tosfos assert that this Gemara proves that only the time that it takes to walk 22 Amos is not 'Tekef'? Even the time it takes to walk a single step is not 'Tekef'! (<b>CHACHAM TZVI</b> #125, <b>CHAVOS YA'IR</b>, <b>MAGEN AVRAHAM</b> OC 166:2; see <b>TZON KODASHIM</b> and <b>CHESHEK SHLOMO</b>.)
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>VILNA GA'ON</b> in <b>BI'UR HA'GRA</b> (OC 166) suggests the following answer. There are two levels of 'Tekef l'Semichah Shechitah' -- l'Chatchilah and b'Di'eved. When the Gemara assumes that moving even one step constitutes a lack of 'Tekef l'Semichah Shechitah,' it refers to fulfilling the requirement in the best possible manner. Moving even a single step after the Semichah before doing the Shechitah is no longer the l'Chatchilah manner of 'Tekef.' However, moving that amount is still considered 'Tekef,' b'Di'eved. Tosfos is proving that moving 22 Amos is not considered Tekef <i>at all</i>, even b'Di'eved.
</p><p>
How does Tosfos prove this from the Gemara? The Vilna Ga'on suggests that the proof is from the next question that the Gemara asks. After the Gemara cites Rav Yosef's explanation for the Beraisa that says that the Shechitah of the Asham Metzora does not fulfill 'Tekef l'Semichah Shechitah,' the Gemara asks that if the Semichah of the Asham Metzora is mid'Oraisa and 'Tekef l'Semichah Shechitah' is mid'Oraisa, then the Metzora should be permitted to enter the Azarah to perform Semichah despite his Tum'ah.
</p><p>
Why does the Gemara ask this question now, after Rav Yosef's explanation of the Beraisa? The Gemara should ask this question immediately on the Beraisa itself! The answer is that the question could not have been asked on the Beraisa before Rav Yosef's explanation, since one may have read the Beraisa as saying that the Asham Metzora is not slaughtered with the <i>best</i> form of 'Tekef l'Semichah Shechitah,' which is what is normally required l'Chatchilah. The Beraisa is saying that some measure of 'Tekef' is fulfilled, because the animal must be brought only one step into the Azarah. Accordingly, there is no license to permit a Metzora to enter the Azarah merely in order to fulfill 'Tekef l'Semichah Shechitah' in a manner that is more l'Chatchilah.
</p><p>
However, now that Rav Yosef explains that the animal must be walked a distance of 22 Amos after the Semichah before it is slaughtered, the Gemara points out that that this does not fulfill the requirement of 'Tekef' to <i>any</i> degree. The Gemara therefore asks that if 'Tekef l'Semichah Shechitah' is mid'Oraisa, then the Metzora should be permitted to enter the Azarah despite his Tum'ah, because of the requirement of 'Tekef l'Semichah Shechitah.'
</p><p>
(b) The <b>CHASAM SOFER</b> (OC 166) suggests another answer. Tosfos in Sotah is trying to prove not what amount of walking between Netilas Yadayim and the blessing of ha'Motzi is not considered 'Tekef,' but rather what amount of <i>waiting</i> after Netilas Yadayim is not considered Tekef. He says that it is evident from the Gemara here that the amount of time that it takes to walk 22 Amos is not considered 'Tekef.'
</p><p>
Perhaps the reason why Tosfos cannot prove from the Gemara's question that even waiting the amount of time that it takes to walk a single step is not considered 'Tekef' is that the single step is a step from the Ezras Nashim into the Azarah. It is not the time delay per se that interrupts between the Semichah and the Shechitah. Rather, it is the transporting of the animal from one domain to another, from a Reshus of Chol (an unsanctified area, such as outside of the Azarah) to a Reshus of Kodesh. However, when Rav Yosef answers that the interruption involves bringing the animal from Sha'ar Nikanor to the north of the Mizbe'ach, he is defending the opinion that Bi'ah b'Miktzas is not considered Bi'ah, and that the Metzora is permitted to extend his hands into the Azarah and perform Semichah. Consequently, the only interruption before the Shechitah is taking the animal from where it is standing <i>inside</i> the Azarah (near the Sha'ar) to the north side of the Mizbe'ach. Since the animal is not being transferred to a different Reshus, it is evident that the time delay is causing the interruption, and not the move from one Reshus to another. Therefore, Tosfos is correct when he concludes, based on the Gemara here, that a time-delay of walking 22 Amos is considered an interruption between Netilas Yadayim and the blessing of ha'Motzi. (See <b>SHULCHAN ARUCH</b> and <b>REMA</b> OC 166, and <b>MISHNAH BERURAH</b> there.)</p><p>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> WHEN KOHANIM WASH FOR BIRKAS KOHANIM <span class='indexentry'>[Birkas Kohanim:washing]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Beraisa):</span> Shechitah must always be Tekef to (immediately after) Semichah, except for Asham Metzora, for which Semichah is by Sha'ar Nikanor. The Metzora cannot enter the Azarah until the blood of the Asham is put on him and the blood of the Chatas is Nizrak.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Inference:</span> Bi'ah b'Miktzas is Bi'ah. If it were not, he could stick his hands in and do Semichah!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rejection (Rav Yosef):</span> The Tana is R. Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah, who says that Tzafon (the north part of the Azarah) is far from the end of Sha'ar Nikanor.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Sotah 38b (R. Yehoshua ben Levi):</span> Any Kohen who does not ascend (to the Duchan, where the Kohanim bless) during the Berachah of Retzeh (in the repetition of Shemoneh Esreh) may not bless - 'Aharon lifted his hands to the people and blessed them, and descended from offering...' Just like there he blessed amidst Avodas ha'Mikdash, also Kohanim must ascend to bless during the Berachah of Avodah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Objection:</span> R. Ami and R. Asi blessed, even though they did not ascend during Retzeh!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer:</span> They uprooted their feet (started walking) during Retzeh, just they did not arrive until after Retzeh.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	Support #1 (R. Oshaya):</span> The Kohen is forbidden to bless only if he did not uproot his feet during Retzeh.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	Support #2 (Mishnah):</span> If a Shali'ach Tzibur is the only Kohen in the Beis ha'Keneses, if he is sure that he can bless and resume the repetition of Shemoneh Esreh, he may bless.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question:</span> He does not do Akirah (uproot his feet during Retzeh)!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer:</span> It suffices that he moves his feet a drop towards the Duchan.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span>	The same applies to R. Ami and R. Asi.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>12.</span><span class='desl2'>	39a	(R. Yehoshua ben Levi):</span> A Kohen who did not wash his hands may not bless - 'lift your hands in Kedushah and bless Hash-m.'</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>13.</span><span class='desl2'>	Berachos 42a (R. Chiya bar Ashi):</span> Shechitah must be Tekef to Semichah, Tefilah (Shemoneh Esre) must be Tekef to Ge'ulah (Go'al Yisrael), and Berachah must be Tekef to washing.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Tefilah 15:1):</span> Tum'ah of the hands prevents a Kohen from giving Birkas Kohanim.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (5):</span> A Kohen who did not wash his hands may not Duchan. Rather, he washes his hands until the wrist, like Kohanim wash for Avodah, and then blesses.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rashi (33a DH Merchak):</span> Kodshei Kodoshim must be slaughtered in Tzafon. The Tana holds that Tzafon is only to the north of the Mizbe'ach, which is 22 Amos west of Sha'ar Nikanor. Therefore, it is impossible to do Semichah from the Ezras Nashim, and Tekef l'Semichah Shechitah in the north.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tosfos (Sotah 39a DH Kol):</span> Rashi wrote that his Rebbi said that he need not wash again. It seems that this was copied from a Talmid's comment, for Rashi connotes that he must wash just before ascending. Also, the Gemara learns from 'lift your hands in Kedushah and bless Hash-m' that one must wash right before Birkas Kohanim. Our Gemara says that the verse discusses Birkas Kohanim. The Yerushalmi holds that it discusses washing for Birkas ha'Mazon. Berachos 42a connotes similarly, but in any case it teaches that one must wash before the Berachah that the verse discusses, and our Gemara holds that it discusses Birkas Kohanim. Also, if we discuss one who did not wash (from when he woke up) in the morning, why do we discuss a Kohen giving Birkas Kohanim? One may not say Divrei Torah until washing his hands (Berachos 11b)! One must go up to a Mil (about a kilometer) for water to wash for Kri'as Shema. Why should Birkas Kohanim be any different? Rather, we require washing Tekef before blessing. We can learn the Shi'ur of Tekef from Shechitah, which must always be Tekef to Semichah, except for Asham Metzora, in which Semichah is by Sha'ar Nikanor. This shows that from Sha'ar Nikanor to where they slaughter in not considered Tekef. In Midos, it connotes that this is more than 22 Amos.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 128:8):</span> When the Shali'ach Tzibur begins Retzei, every Kohen in the Beis ha'Keneses uproots his feet to go to the Duchan. Even if he will not get there until the Shali'ach Tzibur finishes Retzei, this is fine. If he did not uproot his feet during Retzei, he may not go to Duchan.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH v'Yitol):</span> The Rambam connotes that if his hands were Tamei, e.g. he did not wash in the morning, he must wash now, but if he washed in the morning, and does not know that they became Tamei, he need not wash again. If not, he should have said 'even if his hands are not dirty and he does not know of any Tum'ah, he may not Duchan until he washes', like he wrote in Hilchos Berachos (6:1) about washing for eating. Also, he mentioned Tum'ah of the hands. This implies that if he washed in the morning, and he does not know of any Tum'ah, he need not wash again. Also for Avodah, a Kohen washes once in the morning for the entire day and night! The custom in Mitzrayim is not to wash at the time of Birkas Kohanim. They rely on Netilas Yadayim in the morning. However, Rashi explains that a Kohen who did not wash before ascending the Duchan may not Duchan. This connotes that even if he washed in the morning, and knows that his hands are Tahor, he must wash again shortly before ascending the Duchan. Orchos Chayim cites the Rambam's son to say that a Kohen may rely on Netilas Yadayim he did in the morning. The Tur holds like Tosfos. Since he must wash, he must bless on washing, just like we bless on washing for a meal. Tosfos asked that one may not say any Divrei Torah until washing in the morning! To defend the other opinion, I say that the Chidush of Birkas Kohanim pertains to one who washed and ceased to guard his hands. He need not wash for Divrei Torah or Kri'as Shema. Since he does not know that they are Tamei, we rely on the Chazakah that they are Tahor. He must wash for Birkas Kohanim. Alternatively, if one has no water, for Divrei Torah or Kri'as Shema, it suffices to clean his hands in any way. To Duchan, he must wash with water. This is the custom of the Ashkenazim, to wash even if he already washed. I heard that in Sefard the Leviyim wash the Kohanim's hands. I did not know the source until I found it in the Zohar.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (10):</span> Even if he was not Oker during Retzei due to Ones, e.g. he was praying (Shemoneh Esre), he does not Duchan. If he ascended to the Duchan, he does not descend. Starting to walk from his house to the Beis ha'Keneses is not called Akirah (Radvaz). I say that it is, if his house is next to the Beis ha'Keneses.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (53):</span> The Pri Chodosh says that if he was praying, this is not Ones. It would have sufficed to uproot his legs a little. In Sotah, we say that a Shali'ach Tzibur may Duchan if he is confident that he can resume praying afterwards. We asked that he does not do Akirah, and answered that he moves a drop towards the Duchan. Ginas Veradim (1:22) said that the Gemara connotes that if he did not do Akirah during Retzeh, even if he ascended, he descends. He concluded that the Radvaz says that he does not descend only if he was Shogeg, but not if he was warned not to ascend and disobeyed. Olas Tamid infers that the Radvaz says that he does not descend only if he was not Oker in Retzeh due to Ones. He was unsure what to do in practice. Magen Giborim says that if it was not Ones, he descends.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (25):</span> L'Chatchilah he must be Oker when the Shali'ach Tzibur begins Retzeh. If he did not, as long as the Shali'ach Tzibur did not finish Retzeh, it is fine.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (27):</span> It suffices to reach the Duchan before the Shali'ach Tzibur finishes Modim, as long as he was Oker during Retzeh. The Shulchan Aruch mentioned Retzeh, because the Reisha (when he starts) discussed Retzeh. The primary Akirah is after washing, for then he can go to the Duchan. Therefore, they should go to wash before Retzeh, and at Retzeh they start to walk to the Duchan. B'Di'eved, if he did not wash before Retzeh, and if he goes to wash the Shali'ach Tzibur will finish Retzeh, even so he should start to walk to the Duchan, and afterwards wash there (i.e. they will bring to him water near the Duchan).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (28):</span> Ateres Zekenim holds that even if he was Oker to go outside to wash, this is not called Akirah, even though washing enables Birkas Kohanim, for Akirah must be towards the Duchan, and his Akirah was to the outside. Therefore, the custom is that if the Shali'ach Tzibur reached Retzeh and the Kohanim still did not come to the Aron, he waits until they come. We are concerned lest they still did not start walking from where they washed towards the Duchan. The Poskim say that if he started to walk from his house to the Beis ha'Keneses and found (the Shali'ach Tzibur) after Retzeh, even though surely he started walking before Retzeh, this is not considered Akirah, since he did not uproot with intent for the Duchan. If he had this intent, it helps, and he blesses. Some say that even in this case he goes up only if his house is near the Beis ha'Keneses and he heard the Shali'ach Tzibur begin Retzeh.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (55):</span> Maharikash permits a Kohen who entered the Beis ha'Keneses during Retzeh to Duchan. The Pri Chodosh refutes this from the Radvaz. Ginas Veradim (22) suggests that the Radvaz discusses one who did not intend to Duchan in the Beis ha'Keneses, and Maharikash discusses one who came with intent to Duchan.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>viii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (48):</span> The Gemara and Rashi connote that Akirah may be any time during Retzeh. The Pri Chodosh says that the Shulchan Aruch and Tur connote that it must be at the beginning; this is wrong. The Birkei Yosef says that also the Shulchan Aruch and Tur permit any time during Retzeh, just l'Chatchilah it should be at the beginning.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ix.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (50):</span> Even a Kohen who prays where he gives Birkas Kohanim must uproot his feet during Retzeh.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>x.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (52):</span> Maharam Mintz was unsure if when others tell him to Duchan, if he goes up even if he did not do Akirah during Retzeh. Eliyahu Rabah leans to say that he must. If so, if a Kohen forgot to do Akirah during Retzeh, he should go outside, lest someone tell him to go up and he enter a Safek.</p>
<p class='normal'></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) OFFERING AN UNDOMESTICATED ANIMAL AS A KORBAN</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara records a dispute between Reish Lakish and Rebbi Yochanan with regard to one who brings as a Korban a type of animal that the Torah does not sanction as an eligible Korban. According to the first version of the Machlokes, Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about one who offers a Behemah Teme'ah (a non-Kosher animal) on the Mizbe'ach. The Torah says that a Behemah Tehorah may be offered as a Korban, which implies that a Behemah Teme'ah may not be offered. Rebbi Yochanan says that since this prohibition is merely inferred from the verse and is not written explicitly, one who offers a Behemah Teme'ah upon the Mizbe'ach is not punished with Malkus. Reish Lakish says that one <i>does</i> receive Malkus for offering a Behemah Teme'ah, because even an inferred prohibition is considered a Lo Sa'aseh for which one is punished with Malkus.
</p><p>
The Gemara rejects this version of the dispute. It proves from a Beraisa that an inferred prohibition is considered an Aseh and not a Lo Sa'aseh, and thus everyone agrees that one does not receive Malkus. The Gemara suggests that the Machlokes between Reish Lakish and Rebbi Yochanan involves a different issue. The issue they are discussing is whether or not one is permitted, l'Chatchilah, to offer a Chayah (an undomesticated animal, such as a deer) on the Mizbe'ach. The Gemara explains that Rebbi Yochanan prohibits offering a Chayah, because the verse specifies that a Korban is a <i>Behemah</i> (a domesticated animal, such as a cow or lamb), implying that a Chayah is prohibited. Reish Lakish permits offering a Chayah. He explains that the verse mentions a Behemah only because one is <i>obligated</i> to bring a Korban when he pledges to bring a Behemah, but he is not obligated to bring a Korban if he pledges to bring a Chayah. One is certainly permitted, however, to offer a Chayah if he wants to do so.
</p><p>
The opinion of Reish Lakish seems problematic. If Reish Lakish maintains that the type of animal which the Torah mentions as eligible for a Korban is not the only type that is eligible, then he also should permit a female animal to be offered as a Korban Olah! The Torah does not say explicitly that a female animal may not be offered as an Olah. The Torah says only that an Olah is offered from a male Behemah Tehorah. Just as the word Behemah, according to Reish Lakish, does not exclude a Chayah from eligibility as a Korban, the word 'Zachar' ('male') should not exclude a female animal from eligibility as a Korban Olah. The word 'Zachar' should teach only that one is not <i>obligated</i> to bring a female, but he may bring one if he wants. Why, then, according to Reish Lakish does the law prohibit offering a female animal as an Olah? (<b>OLAS SHLOMO</b>)
</p><p>
ANSWER: The <b>OLAS SHLOMO</b> answers that perhaps Reish Lakish does not infer from the verse that a Chayah is prohibited for the following reason. When the Torah says that a Behemah Tehorah may be offered as a Korban, it may mean simply to prohibit offering a Behemah Teme'ah. Therefore, one cannot infer from the verse that a Chayah is prohibited. However, when the verse says that a male animal, 'Zachar,' must be offered, the only possible inference is that a female animal is excluded. Therefore, one may infer from the verse that a female animal is prohibited to be offered as an Olah.
</p><p>
Perhaps a logical basis may be suggested to support this distinction between a Chayah (which is permitted) and a female animal (which is not permitted), according to Reish Lakish. The Midrash (Vayikra Rabah 27:6) teaches that Hash-m told the Jewish people, 'See how I tried not to overburden you: I told you to bring Korbanos only from the Kosher animals that are domesticated, and I did not require you to exert yourself to go find wild animals in the mountains to bring as Korbanos.' This might be the basis for the suggestion of Reish Lakish that Hash-m did not <i>require</i> that we bring a Chayah, but allowed us to bring it if we want. Reish Lakish understands that the Torah mentions Behemah only because it does not want to trouble us to have to find a Chayah. In contrast, when the Torah mentions that a male animal must be brought as an Olah, there is no logical reason to suggest that the Torah is merely not obligating us to bring a female animal, but we may bring one if we want. (Rav E. Chrysler)
</p><p>
The answer of the Olas Shlomo may be used to solve another pressing difficulty in the Gemara. The Gemara initially assumes that Reish Lakish rules stringently and maintains that one transgresses an Isur Lav (punishable with Malkus) when he offers a Behemah Teme'ah as a Korban. However, when the Gemara reinterprets the Machlokes, it says that Reish Lakish is <i>lenient</i> and maintains that there is no Isur, not even an Isur Aseh, against offering a Chayah. While it is true that the Gemara needs to reinterpret the argument, why does the Gemara need to reverse which Amora is saying the lenient opinion and which is saying the stringent opinion?
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> (DH Ki Pligi) explains that there actually is no basis to reverse the opinions. Rather, Rebbi Yakov, who presents the second interpretation of the argument, had a tradition that Reish Lakish indeed maintained the lenient opinion, and not the stringent opinion as originally assumed.
</p><p>
According to the approach of the Olas Shlomo, one may suggest another explanation for why the opinions are reversed. Perhaps the words that Reish Lakish and Rebbi Yochanan originally spoke in the study hall indeed addressed the issue of a Behemah Teme'ah. Reish Lakish said that when the Torah says that a Behemah Tehorah should be brought, it means that one should not bring a Behemah Teme'ah (i.e., it is prohibited with a Lav). Rebbi Yochanan said that the Torah means that one may bring only a Behemah Tehorah (and bringing a Behemah Teme'ah transgresses only an Aseh). Originally, the Gemara thought that Reish Lakish meant that there is a Lo Sa'aseh involved in bringing a Behemah Teme'ah, and that was the point of dispute with Rebbi Yochanan, who said that there is only an Aseh. When the Gemara rejects that interpretation, it suggests a new interpretation for the original words of Reish Lakish and Rebbi Yochanan. When Reish Lakish said that the Torah means that one may not bring a Behemah Teme'ah, he meant that one <i>may</i> bring any animal <i>other</i> than a Behemah Teme'ah -- meaning that one may bring a Chayah! The verse is excluding only a Behemah Teme'ah. Rebbi Yochanan argued that the verse is excluding <i>any</i> animal which is not a Behemah Tehorah, and therefore even a Chayah is prohibited with an Aseh. (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> DOES DICHUY APPLY TO DIVORCE? <span class='indexentry'>[Gerushin: Dichuy]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	32a (Mishnah):</span> If Kabalah was done properly, and then the blood was given to a Pasul (or put in the left hand or in a Chulin Keli), we return it to a Kosher Kohen (or the right hand or to a Keli Shares);</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	34b:</span> Had the Mishnah taught only putting into a Chulin Keli, one might have thought that this can be fixed because one could Makdish the Keli, but other Pesulim (which cannot be fixed) would disqualify the Korban.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question:</span> We should say that Dichuy applies! (The blood could not be offered while the Pasul, left hand or Chulin Keli was holding it.)</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer #1 (Ravina citing Rava):</span> Our Mishnah is like Chanan ha'Mitzri, who says that Dichuy does not apply even to a slaughtered animal;</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Beraisa - Chanan ha'Mitzri):</span> If the goat sent to Azazel (on Yom Kipur) died after slaughtering the goat selected for Hash-m, we find another goat to send to Azazel.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer #2 (Rav Ashi):</span> Whenever we can remedy the situation, all agree that Dichuy does not apply.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	Support (Rav Shiya):</span> R. Yehudah says that Dichuy applies, but not when it can be fixed!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Mishnah - R. Yehudah):</span> If the goat selected for Hash-m was slaughtered and the blood spilled, the goat Azazel must die. If the goat for Azazel died, we spill the blood of the slaughtered goat.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Beraisa - R. Yehudah):</span> They would gather a bucket from the blood of all the Pesachim on the floor, and throw it on the Mizbe'ach, to be Machshir a Korban (in case its blood spilled).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	Gitin 23a (Mishnah):</span> If a minor was appointed to be a Shali'ach to give a Get, and he matured (and gave it), or if a deaf, blind or insane person was appointed, and he became healthy, or if a Nochri was appointed and he converted, the Get is Pasul.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span>	If a healthy Shali'ach was made, and he became deaf, blind or insane, and he recovered (and then gave it), the Get is valid. If the Shali'ach had Da'as when appointed and when he gave it, it is valid.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	70b (Mishnah):</span> If a man appointed Sheluchim to write a Get for his wife, then was seized by Kordaikus (an evil spirit), then said that the Get should not be written, his latter words are void.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'>	Opinion #1 (Reish Lakish):</span> The Get may be given immediately.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span><span class='desl2'>	Opinion #2 (R. Yochanan):</span> The Get may be written only after he recovers.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>12.</span>	Reish Lakish learns from 'his latter words are void.' R. Yochanan holds that this means only that he need not command again to give the Get when he recovers, but we cannot write it while he is sick.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>13.</span>	Reish Lakish compares a seized man to a sleeping man. R. Yochanan disagrees, for he will not recover automatically. Rather, he is like an insane man.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span>	Reish Lakish disagrees, for we have a cure for Kordaikus, but not for insanity.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Gerushin 3:15):</span> Anyone can write a Get, except for... one who became an idolater...</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Magid Mishneh:</span> The Rambam holds that a Mumar to idolatry or to be Mechalel Shabbos in public is like a Nochri. In many places the Gemara says that he is like a Mumar to the entire Torah, and he is like a Nochri. However, if he was Mekadesh a Bas Yisrael, she is Mekudeshes and needs a Get. The Rambam means only that he cannot write a Get. Surely, even if he was Mekadesh when he was a (Kosher) Yisrael, he can divorce after becoming a Mumar. All Ge'onim say so. This is obvious. Since his Kidushin is valid, his Get is a proper Get.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Or Some'ach:</span> Even ha'Ozer asked from Kidushin 41b, which says that R. Shimon needs no verse to teach that a Nochri cannot be a Shali'ach for Terumah, for he holds that a Nochri cannot separate Terumah from his own produce. If a Mumar cannot be a Shali'ach, R. Shimon should need a verse for this, for a Mumar can separate Terumah from his own produce! However, Tosfos explains that R. Shimon discusses Peros from which Terumah must be taken, e.g. they grew a third in a Yisrael's ownership and the Yisrael did Miru'ach (final processing). R. Shimon holds that the Terumah is not truly Kodesh. He learns Terumah from a Gezeirah Shavah 'Chet-Chet' from Kodshim. There is no Me'ilah for Kodshim of Nochrim. R. Yochanan says that we cannot redeem Kodshim in an Ir ha'Nidachas. Even what would be bought with their redemption money cannot be offered, due to 'Zevach Resha'im To'evah.' the same applies to a Mumar to idolatry or Chilul Shabbos; his Terumah is not really Kodesh.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Or Some'ach:</span> In Sanhedrin 47a, the Gemara asked why Korbanos in Ir ha'Nidachas must die. Since the owners died, they got atonement (so the Korbanos are no longer 'Zevach Resha'im'). We should offer them! We must say that once they were Nidchim, they are permanently Nidchim. R. Shimon holds that living animals are not Nidchim. If so, if a Mumar repents, we can offer his Korban! If so, what is his source that his Terumah is not Terumah? In Me'ilah, we say that if a Tor (turtledove) is too young, there is no Me'ilah. The Gemara asked why this is different from Mechusar Zeman (a Korban that cannot be offered yet). It answered that an (animal) Mechusar Zeman is like a Ba'al Mum, which can be redeemed, but there is no redemption of birds. Even though later the bird can be offered, now it has no (intrinsic or monetary) Kedushah, and hence no Me'ilah. All the more so, a Mumar's Korban, even though it will be offered if he repents, now it has no Kedushah or Me'ilah. R. Shimon holds that young Turim have Kedushah. He expounds that Kodshim of Gilgal had Me'ilah, even though they were Mechusar Zeman. This is only when they were Hukdash to be offered in the proper time. A Mumar is not destined to repent, so his Korban is not destined to be offered. 'Dichuy does not apply to what is b'Yado' does not apply in such a case (Tosfos 34b DH Kol). Tosfos (12b DH u'Shma) says that Dichuy does not apply to a Mumar's Korban, but this is not necessary so. Also, I discuss one who was a Mumar from the time of Hekdesh until now. R. Shimon holds that there is no Isur to slaughter it outside the Mikdash, and therefore there is no Me'ilah. If one was Makdish a yearling animal for an Asham that requires a second year animal, he holds that it has no Kedushah. In the Yerushalmi, R. Yochanan says that Korbanos of a Mumar have no Me'ilah. Reish Lakish disagrees, for he holds (Sanhedrin 112b) that their value is offered (through redemption).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Or Some'ach (DH u'Mah):</span> Even ha'Ozer brings a proof from Gitin 23a, in which we say that if a sane Shali'ach became deaf and regained sanity, the Get is valid. The Mishnah did not discuss a Nochri returning to Kashrus. If a Mumar were not a Ben Bris, the Mishnah should have discussed a Yisrael who became a Mumar and repented! I answer based on the Mas'as Binyamin cited in Magen Avraham (448:4), that a Nochri can be a Shali'ach for a Nochri. If so, a Mumar can be a Shali'ach for a Mumar. The Mishnah omitted Mumar, for the Get can be Kosher even when the Shali'ach was Pasul at the beginning. According to this opinion, if a Mumar has no Shelichus, how can he divorce? We require Shelichus to write the Get, and according to Tosfos (Gitin 9b DH Af), to sign it! A Get in the husband's handwriting is Kosher mid'Oraisa. Witnesses are Shelichus to sign in place of him! The Rambam does not require Shelichus to write or sign the Get. The husband must command only to make it Lishmah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (2:15):</span> If a healthy man commanded to write and give a Get, and later he was dazed, we wait until he recovers before we write and give to her. After he recovered, we need not ask if he still wants the Get. If they wrote and gave before he recovered, it is Pasul.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Kesef Mishneh:</span> This is difficult. The Gemara says that it is Batel, for R. Yochanan equates this to a lunatic! All actions of a lunatic are void. Perhaps because Reish Lakish equates him to a sleeping man and says that we may give it, the Rambam minimizes the argument. However, the Gemara explains that Reish Lakish permits because we have a cure. This implies that when there is no cure, spirits other than Kordaikus, he is like a lunatic, and it is Batel! If so, the Rambam should have specified that we can cure it. We do not have a cure for most evil spirits!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Mishneh l'Melech:</span> Get Pashut answers that the Pesul is only mid'Rabanan. If not, since the Shelichus ended, the husband would need to authorize the Shali'ach again! Why is this different than a Shali'ach who became Pasul, and then Kosher again? If the Shali'ach gave it while he was deaf, it is Batel! This requires investigation.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Or Some'ach:</span> The Pri Chodosh says that since he was healthy when he made the Shali'ach, even if the Meshale'ach cannot make a Kinyan at the time the Shali'ach does so for him, the Torah says that it works. The only exception is if the Meshale'ach died, for then his marriage ended or his property passed to his heirs. Rashi explains that divorce or freedom after death does not work because the wife or slave is not in the Meshale'ach's Reshus (but not because the Shelichus ended). If a Shali'ach merely acts for the Meshale'ach, the Meshale'ach must still be sane. If the Meshale'ach makes the Shali'ach like himself, he need not be sane at the time of the Kinyan. Temurah 10a connotes like this. Rashi explains that when partners make a Shali'ach to make something Hekdesh, regarding Temurah it is like Hekdesh of one individual. The Yerushalmi equated Kordaikus to a lunatic, and says that R. Yochanan and Reish Lakish would argue also about whether one's Korban is Nidcheh if he becomes a lunatic, or if he gave a Get to take effect tomorrow, and he was seized by Kordaikus at the time it takes effect. This is unlike the Pri Chodosh, who says that they argue about Shelichus.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Gitin 6:1):</span> The Halachah follows R. Yochanan. The Ri says that when writing the command of someone about to die, we must ensure that the giver is sane at the time, for he is apt to become dazed. Even Reish Lakish permits only because we have a cure. Or, perhaps even R. Yochanan would compare him to someone sleeping, for he often recovers by himself.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (EH 121:2):</span> If a healthy man commanded to write and give a Get, and later he was seized by illness, we do not write it during his illness. If they wrote and gave it before he recovered, if we have a cure for the illness, it is Pasul. If not, it is not a Get.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Chelkas Mechokek (2, Beis Shmuel 3, and Gra 4):</span> The Bach says that since R. Yochanan does not distinguish whether or not we have a cure, also we do not. Since he was sane when he commanded, even Reish Lakish holds that mid'Oraisa it is valid. The Shulchan Aruch is like the Tur, unlike the Rambam. The Yerushalmi supports the Rambam. His opinion is primary.</p>
<p class='seealso'>See also:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) THE 'PESUL' CAUSED BY 'CHUTZ L'MEKOMO'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: Reish Lakish asks whether a Pasul (a person who is ineligible to perform the Avodah) who performs the Avodah causes the blood left in the animal to become Shirayim. (That is, after the Pasul performs the Avodah, is it possible for a valid Kohen to be Mekabel new blood from the animal and begin the Avodah anew?)
</p><p>
Rebbi Yochanan answers that a Pasul does not make Shirayim, with the exception of an Avodah performed with a thought of Pigul, of Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo. If a Kohen performs an Avodah with a thought of Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo, then the Korban becomes disqualified, and even if another Kohen is Mekabel more blood from the animal, he cannot perform the Avodah with that blood. The reason Rebbi Yochanan gives for differentiating between the Pesulim of Pigul and all others is 'Ho'il u'Meratzeh l'Figulo' -- this means that the Avodah of Chutz l'Zemano is considered a valid Avodah with regard to creating an Isur Kares of Pigul. The Gemara earlier (28b) says that a Korban does not acquire an Isur of Kares of Pigul when the Kohen thinks a thought of Pigul during the Avodah unless the rest of the Avodos of the Korban are performed in the proper manner. Pigul takes effect only on a Korban that is considered to have been properly offered in all other respects. Since every Pigul involves an Avodah that was done with a thought of Pigul, and yet the Torah says that one is Chayav Kares since the animal was otherwise offered properly, it is clear that a Korban offered with an Avodah of Pigul is, in some measure, considered a valid offering. (See <b>RASHI</b> to 42b, DH Ki Hadar.)
</p><p>
The Halachah that a Korban must be offered properly in order for it to be Pigul and to bear an Isur of Kares (for one who eats it) was stated with regard to the Isur of Chutz l'Zemano, eating a Korban outside of its prescribed time. However, eating a Korban that was offered Chutz l'Mekomo, outside of its prescribed place, is not punishable with Kares. Therefore, there is no reason for the Torah to state that the rest of the Avodos must be performed properly for the Isur to take effect. Whether or not the rest of the Avodos were done properly, the meat of the Korban is forbidden, either because of the Pesul of Chutz l'Mekomo, or because one or more of the other Avodos were not done properly! Why, then, should the Pesul of Chutz l'Mekomo make the blood Shirayim? A thought of Chutz l'Mekomo is not 'Meratzeh l'Figulo.'
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> in Menachos (79a, DH v'Hadar) writes that it is true that a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo is not Meratzeh. What the Gemara means is that Chutz l'Mekomo is learned from Chutz l'Zemano through a Hekesh (Vayikra 7:18).
</p><p>
(b) <b>RAV YOSEF ENGEL</b> in <b>GEVUROS SHEMONIM</b> (#34) points out that <b>RASHI</b> here seems to disagree with Tosfos. Rashi (DH Ho'il u'Meratzeh) writes that the Korban is accepted with regard to becoming Pigul <i>and Pasul</i>. Rashi clearly introduces the word 'Pasul' to account for Chutz l'Mekomo, which is not Pigul but only Pasul, and yet Rashi still says that the Korban must be offered in a way in which it becomes accepted in order for the Pesul of Chutz l'Mekomo to take effect! What does Rashi mean? Even if the other Avodos were <i>not</i> performed properly, the Korban becomes Pasul, not necessarily because of the thought of Chutz l'Mekomo, but simply because of the failure to perform those Avodos properly! In what regard can one say that Chutz l'Mekomo does not take effect to disqualify the Korban when the other Avodos were not performed properly?
</p><p>
1. The <b>MISHNEH L'MELECH</b> (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin, end of 18:7) also infers from the Gemara that the Pesul of a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo takes effect only when the rest of the Avodos were done properly (although he makes no mention of Rashi or Tosfos quoted above). He suggests that perhaps the Torah's prohibition against eating a Korban that is Pasul ('Lo Sochal Kol To'evah,' Devarim 14:3) does not apply to a Korban that became Pigul if the rest of the Avodos were not done properly. Although the animal may not be eaten, the Lo Sa'aseh does not apply (there is no punishment of Malkus). The same may be said about Chutz l'Mekomo. The Torah is teaching that there is no Malkus for eating a Korban which was offered with a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo if the other Avodos were not done properly.
</p><p>
2. The <b>BRISKER RAV</b> (Chidushei ha'Griz, 13b, DH Mah Shelamim) points out that the <b>RAMBAN</b>, in his additions to the list of Mitzvos Lo Sa'aseh of the Rambam (addition #5), writes that there is a separate Lo Sa'aseh in the Torah for eating a Korban that was offered Chutz l'Mekomo. (The <b>RAMBAM</b> in Lo Sa'aseh #32 ascribes a unique La Sa'aseh only to Chutz l'Zemano.) According to the Ramban, perhaps the second Lav of Chutz l'Mekomo will not apply if the other Avodos were not done properly. There will be only a single Lav of Pesulei ha'Mukdashin. (Perhaps the Machlokes between Rashi and Tosfos here parallels the Machlokes between the Rambam and Ramban in Sefer ha'Mitzvos, with regard to whether or not there is a separate Lav for Chutz l'Mekomo.)
</p><p>
Rashi's opinion may answer another question that is asked on the Halachos of Pigul. The Gemara earlier (28b) requires two verses to teach that a Korban does not become Pigul if the other Avodos were not done properly, and if the person offering the Korban had a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo during the other Avodos. Why is a second verse necessary to teach that a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo prevents the animal from becoming Pigul? Why should a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo be different from any other disqualifying factor (which also prevents the animal from becoming Pigul)? (See Chidushei ha'Griz, 26b, DH Ein Machshavah; see also <b>TOSEFES KEDUSHAH</b>, 29a.)
</p><p>
According to Rashi, the answer may be as follows. Just as Chutz l'Zemano is considered to be Meratzeh and therefore makes Shirayim, Chutz l'Mekomo is also Meratzeh in a certain sense and therefore makes Shirayim. Consequently, with regard to the laws of Pigul, one might have thought that although there was a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo, the Korban <i>is</i> considered to have been offered properly, and the Isur of Chutz l'Zemano will still apply. Therefore, the Torah must specifically teach that it does <i>not</i> apply.
</p><p>
This also answers a question that is asked on the Rambam's explanation of the Mishnah (32a). The Rambam writes that the reason why a thought of Chutz l'Zemano, or a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo, does not make Shirayim if it is thought by a Pasul is that a thought of Pigul cannot take effect if some other aspect of the Avodah was done improperly. The fact that a Pasul is performing the Avodah makes the Avodah improper, and it negates the thought of Chutz l'Zemano. How does this explain why the Pesul of Chutz <i>l'Mekomo</i> does not take effect when a Pasul performs the Avodah? The Rambam must understand that even Chutz l'Mekomo takes effect only when the rest of the Avodos were performed properly.</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) CAUSING 'PIGUL' BY COMBINING THE 'ACHILAH' AND 'HAKTARAH' OF A KORBAN</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Mishnah records a dispute between the Tana Kama and Rebbi Eliezer with regard to whether a Korban becomes Pigul when it is sacrificed with a thought to <i>eat</i>, Chutz l'Zemano, a part of the animal that is normally burned on the Mizbe'ach (the Eimurim), or to burn on the Mizbe'ach a part that is normally eaten (the meat). The Mishnah continues and says that the thought that creates Pigul must involve an amount of meat or Eimurim that is more than a k'Zayis. The Mishnah adds that if the person offering the Korban has in mind to eat half of a k'Zayis of meat Chutz l'Zemano, and to burn half of a k'Zayis of Eimurim Chutz l'Zemano, the Korban remains valid because a thought of eating (Achilah) and a thought of burning on the Mizbe'ach (Haktarah) do not combine.
</p><p>
Why does the Mishnah need to teach that Achilah and Haktarah do not combine, when the Mishnah earlier (29b) already teaches that? What does the Mishnah add by repeating this law here? (<b>TOSFOS YOM TOV</b>)
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>TOSFOS YOM TOV</b> suggests that the Mishnah is teaching that a thought to eat a k'Zayis of meat Chutz l'Zemano in an amount of time that is more than 'Kedei Achilas Peras' is able to create Pigul. The Gemara earlier (31b) attempts to prove this Halachah from the Mishnah there (29b), which says that a thought of eating half of a k'Zayis and burning half of a k'Zayis do not combine to make the Korban become Pigul. This implies that a thought of eating an entire k'Zayis in the same amount of time that it takes to eat half of a k'Zayis and to burn half of a k'Zayis (i.e., more than 'Kedei Achilas Peras,' since it takes much more time than 'Kedei Achilas Peras' to burn a k'Zayis of Eimurim on the Mizbe'ach) <i>does</i> cause the Korban to become Pigul. The Gemara refutes the proof by saying that when the Mishnah mentions a thought of burning half of a k'Zayis, it might be referring only to burning it in a very large fire, where the burning of a k'Zayis would take less time than 'Kedei Achilas Peras.'
</p><p>
The Tosfos Yom Tov suggests that the Mishnah here repeats the Halachah of having a thought to eat half of a k'Zayis and to burn half of a k'Zayis in order to show that it is <i>not</i> referring only to a thought to burn it in a large fire on the Mizbe'ach. Therefore, it <i>can</i> be inferred from the Mishnah that a thought to eat a k'Zayis in more time than 'Kedei Achilas Peras' creates Pigul.
</p><p>
The Tosfos Yom Tov adds that this might explain why the <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 14:10) rules that a thought of eating the meat in more time than 'Kedei Achilas Peras' <i>does</i> create Pigul, even though the Gemara (31b) does not reach a Halachic conclusion regarding the matter. The Rambam reached his conclusion based on an inference from the Mishnah, which repeats the Halachah of a thought to eat half of a k'Zayis and to burn half of a k'Zayis in order to allude to this Halachah.
</p><p>
However, this approach is somewhat forced. If this is the intent of the Mishnah, then why does the Gemara itself (on 31b) not prove the Halachah in the case of one who has a thought to eat a k'Zayis in more time than 'Kedei Achilas Peras' from the Mishnah?
</p><p>
(b) The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> (#6), <b>RASHASH</b>, and others point out that <b>RASHI</b> in Menachos (17a) asks this question. The Mishnayos there (12b and 17a) are identical to the Mishnayos here (Zevachim 29b and 35a), except that those Mishnayos discuss Menachos (flour offerings) while the Mishnayos here discuss Korbanos (animal offerings). Rashi there (17a, DH ha'Kometz) asks why the Mishnah repeats the Halachah of a thought of eating half a k'Zayis (of a Minchah) and burning half of a k'Zayis. Rashi answers that the Mishnah there, and the Mishnah here, cite the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer who rules that a thought to eat something that is normally offered on the Mizbe'ach, and vice versa, can create Pigul. The Mishnah therefore needs to teach that even according to Rebbi Eliezer, a thought to eat half of a k'Zayis and a thought to burn half of a k'Zayis do not combine.
</p><p>
In what way, though, is the Halachah of having a thought to eat half of a k'Zayis and to burn half of a k'Zayis related to the ruling of Rebbi Eliezer, who says that a thought to eat the Eimurim makes the Korban become Pigul? Why would one have thought that Rebbi Eliezer does not agree that thoughts of Achilah and Haktarah do not combine with each other?
</p><p>
1. Rashi there explains that Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies the Korban as Pigul through a thought to eat the Eimurim only mid'Rabanan, but not mid'Oraisa. Rebbi Eliezer maintains that the Rabanan enacted a Gezeirah that invalidates the Korban as Pigul when one has a thought to eat part of the Korban that is normally burned on the Mizbe'ach, lest a person has a thought to eat, Chutz l'Zemano, part of the Korban that is normally eaten. One might have thought that Rebbi Eliezer maintains that there is an additional Gezeirah that the Korban becomes Pigul when a person has a thought to eat only half of a k'Zayis Chutz l'Zemano, lest a person have a thought to eat a full k'Zayis Chutz l'Zemano. The Mishnah teaches, therefore, that even according to Rebbi Eliezer, the Korban is valid if the person thought only about half of a k'Zayis. Even if he thought to burn, Chutz l'Zemano, another half of a k'Zayis, the Korban remains valid, since thoughts of Achilah and Haktarah do not combine.
</p><p>
2. The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> there (#10) points out that the Gemara in Menachos seems to derive a source for Rebbi Eliezer's ruling from the words of the verse. Therefore, it is difficult to assert that Rebbi Eliezer's ruling is only a Gezeirah d'Rabanan. The Shitah Mekubetzes instead suggests that since Rebbi Eliezer maintains that a thought to eat a k'Zayis of Eimurim makes a Korban become Pasul, one might have thought that Rebbi Eliezer maintains that there is a Gezeirah d'Rabanan that disqualifies a Korban which a person offers with a thought to eat, Chutz l'Zemano, half of a k'Zayis of meat and to burn half of a k'Zayis of Eimurim, lest he offer it with a thought to eat half of a k'Zayis of meat and to <i>eat</i> half of a k'Zayis of Eimurim. Therefore, the Mishnah teaches that even Rebbi Eliezer maintains that the Korban is valid, and that thoughts of Achilah and Haktarah do not combine.
</p><p>
(c) However, the preceding answer is limited to only one opinion in the Gemara earlier (33b). The Amora'im argue about whether the Mishnah (29b) which teaches that thoughts of Achilah and Haktarah do not combine is following the opinion of the Rabanan or Rebbi Eliezer. According to Abaye, who maintains that the Mishnah there is following the opinion of the Rabanan, Rashi's answer that the Mishnah <i>here</i> teaches that even Rebbi Eliezer agrees with this Halachah makes sense. However, according to Rebbi Yirmeyah, even the Mishnah there (29b) is following the view of Rebbi Eliezer! Why, then, must the Mishnah here repeat that Rebbi Eliezer agrees with this view?
</p><p>
The Shitah Mekubetzes in Menachos answers as follows. According to Rebbi Yirmeyah -- who maintains that the Mishnah there, which says that thoughts of Achilah and Haktarah do not combine, is following the view of Rebbi Eliezer -- the Mishnah here repeats the Halachah for a different reason. Had the Tana taught this Halachah only in the earlier Mishnah, and then taught, in the following Mishnah, that Rebbi Eliezer and the Rabanan argue about whether or not a thought to eat Eimurim creates Pigul, the Halachah would have been decided <i>against</i> Rebbi Eliezer, because it would have been a situation of 'Stam v'Achar Kach Machlokes' -- the 'Stam Mishnah' (on 29b) would have been following the view of Rebbi Eliezer, and it would have been followed by a Machlokes in the Mishnah (35a) citing both opinions. In such a case, the Halachah does not follow the opinion expressed in the 'Stam Mishnah.' (Yevamos 42b, Avodah Zarah 7a; see Background there.) The Mishnah, therefore, repeats that thoughts of Achilah and Haktarah do not combine -- a statement which, according to Rebbi Yirmeyah, is necessary only according to Rebbi Eliezer, so that the Mishnayos will be in the order of 'Machlokes v'Achar Kach Stam' in order to teach that the Halachah follows the view of Rebbi Eliezer.
</p><p>
According to the Shitah Mekubetzes, why does the <i>first</i> Mishnah need to mention this Halachah, that Achilah and Haktarah do not combine? It should be recorded only in the Mishnah here, where it will be a 'Machlokes v'Achar Kach Stam,' and it is unnecessary to mention it in the earlier Mishnah. Apparently, it is mentioned in the earlier Mishnah only as an aside, 'Derech Agav,' since the Mishnah there discusses a case of a thought of half of a k'Zayis.
</p><p>
(d) <b>TOSFOS</b> cited by the Shitah Mekubetzes in Menachos writes the opposite of the explanation given above in the previous answer. The Mishnah earlier (29b) is where this Halachah actually belongs. In the Mishnah here, the Halachah that thoughts of Achilah and Haktarah do not combine was mentioned only as an aside, 'Derech Agav,' since the Mishnah mentions the Halachah of having a thought to eat part of the Korban which is normally offered on the Mizbe'ach. (Apparently, Tosfos means that after the Mishnah first mentions that even having a thought to burn, Chutz l'Zemano, something that is normally burned on the Mizbe'ach does not cause Pigul if it involves less than a k'Zayis, the Mishnah then mentions that a thought of half of a k'Zayis of Achilah cannot combine with a thought of Haktarah.)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> CHATZITZOS UNDER THE FINGERNAILS <span class='indexentry'>[Netilas Yadayim: Chatzitzah]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	35a (Beraisa):</span> The following are a Chatzitzah (separation) if they are dry, but not if they are wet - blood, ink, honey, and milk.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Chulin 106b (Beraisa):</span> Any Chatzitzah that disqualifies Tevilah (immersion) also disqualifies Netilas Yadayim (washing the hands) for Chulin or washing the hands and feet in the Mikdash.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Eruvin 4b (R. Yitzchak):</span> Chachamim decreed to disqualify a (Chatzitzah on the) majority when he is not Makpid (adamant), due to when he is Makpid, and a minority he is Makpid about due to a majority he is Makpid about.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rif, Rambam and Rosh (Berachos 41b, Hilchos Berachos 6:4, Chulin 8:15):</span> Any Chatzitzah that disqualifies Tevilah also disqualifies Netilas Yadayim.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Mikva'os 1:12):</span> If there was on his skin or the Keli a Chatzitzah such as dough, pitch or similar things, even a drop like a mustard seed, if he is Makpid about it, the Tevilah was invalid. If he is not Makpid about it, the Tevilah was valid, unless the Chatzitzah was on the majority.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rosh (Chulin 8:15):</span> The following disqualify Netilas Yadayim: filth under the fingernail not opposite the skin, or dough  under the fingernail even if it is opposite the skin, a bandage on his skin, Greek mud and potters' mud.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Hagahos Ashri (Berachos 2:11):</span> Or Zaru'a says that one must be careful about scab in a wound or a boil that healed and there is a scab over it.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tosfos (106b DH v'Chol):</span> A Tosefta teaches that what is a Chatzitzah for Tevilah is not a Chatzitzah for Chulin! We can say that our Gemara discusses washing for eating. Chachamim were stringent about this like Tevilah. The Tosefta discusses touching Chulin, and teaches about even Chulin made Al Taharas Terumah. Chachamim were not so stringent about it. For eating, one must be careful about everything that is a Chatzitzah for Tevilah, e.g. dough under the fingernail. A small amount that he is not Makpid about is not a Chatzitzah, just like for Tevilah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Sefer Chasidim (58):</span> One should not grow long fingernails, lest mud enter underneath. Mud and dough are a Chazakah even not opposite the skin. Also, perhaps Chelev or Isurim will get caught underneath (and end up in his food), and he will transgress.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 161:1):</span> One must beware of a Chatzitzah in Netilas Yadayim. Any Chatzitzah for Tevilah is a Chatzitzah for Netilas Yadayim, e.g. filth under the fingernail not opposite the skin, dough under the fingernail even if it is opposite the skin, a bandage on his skin, Greek mud and potters' mud. We are not concerned for a Chatzitzah on the minority that he is not Makpid about:</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH v'Chasav):</span> What is considered not opposite the skin? The Rashba says that it is if the fingernail was big and extended past the skin, and there was filth under that place past the skin. The Tur says that if he is not Makpid about, it is not a Chatzitzah. Surely he does not refer the last matter mentioned, i.e. filth opposite the skin. Rather, he refers to dough even not opposite the skin and filth not opposite the skin, which he said are a Chatzitzah. He teaches that this is only if he is Makpid about them. If not, since they are the minority of the hand, they are not a Chatzitzah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH Semak):</span> Hagahos Maimoniyos says that it is proper to clean under the fingernails at the time of Netilas Yadayim. Some are lenient, for they considered this a minority that he is not Makpid about. Orchos Chayim says so. Semag cites a Tosefta (Mikva'os 6:10) that filth under the fingernail not opposite the skin, or mud or dough under the fingernail even if it is opposite the skin, are a Chatzitzah. R. Tam explains that we discuss mud like dough, that it is very stuck, e.g. potters' mud. Mishnayos in Mikva'os (9:3-4) say that filth under the fingernail, and even mud or dough are not a Chatzitzah. This is if there is so little that he is not Makpid about it.  The Rashba says that some say that filth under the fingernail is a Chatzitzah for Tevilah and Netilas Yadayim. They bring a proof from the Tosefta. However, Tosfos says that they err. It is not a Chatzitzah for either, like the Mishnah says. This is because dough is very sticky. However, one always removes filth, for it decays and it does not stick; it cannot be a Chatzitzah. The Tosefta discusses potters' or builders' mud, which sticks like dough. Filth, which does not stick, is not a Chatzitzah. In Toras ha'Bayis, the Rashba says that Chatzitzos are things that stick very much to man and block water from coming (to his skin), e.g. Greek mud, potters' mud and mud with egg white mixed in, a scab, dry sap or dough under the fingernail are other things that stick greatly. He did not mention filth under the fingernail. However, in laws of Tevilah he said that filth under the fingernail not opposite the skin is a Chatzitzah. Perhaps we are lenient about Netilas Yadayim, which is mid'Rabanan, but not for Tevilah mid'Oraisa. In Toras ha'Bayis ha'Aruch he cites a Beraisa that filth under the fingernail not opposite the skin is a Chatzitzah, but in Hilchos Netilas Yadayim he says that it is not a Chatzitzah, for one is not Makpid about it and it does not stick so much, like the Mishnah says. We must say that this is when it is opposite the skin, but not opposite the skin it is a Chatzitzah, like for Tevilah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (4):</span> Below (162:9), we say that something on the hands is a problem (for the water on the Chatzitzah is Tamei, and it will return to the hands and be Metamei them)! We must say that here we discuss something stuck to the hand. It is Batel to the hand. Alternatively, we discuss one who pours a Revi'is each time (so the water remains Tahor).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (1):</span> If anything sticks to the body, water cannot get there, so it invalidates Tevilah. Mid'Oraisa, this is for a majority he is Makpid about. Chachamim decreed about a Chatzitzah on the minority only if people are Makpid that it remain like that, even if at the time of Tevilah they are not Makpid. Something people are not normally Makpid is a Chatzitzah only if it covers the majority of the body. Even though Netilas Yadayim is mid'Rabanan, Chachamim enacted like Torah law. A Chatzitzah on the majority of the place that must be washed is a Chatzitzah even if people are not Makpid about it. One must remove from his hands any Chatzitzah that people are normally Makpid about, even if it is a minority of the hand. If after washing one found a Chatzitzah, even on the majority, we attribute that it came afterwards. l'Chatchilah, one should check if there is a Chatzitzah before washing.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (2):</span> The Shulchan Aruch discusses Tzo'eh, i.e. filth that accumulates under the fingernail. Presumably, real Tzo'eh (excrement), even if it was found opposite the skin, disqualifies Netilas Yadayim.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (3):</span> This is because excrement is Metamei the hands.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (4):</span> Women cut their nails before immersing because they cannot distinguish what is considered opposite the skin. Some say that the nail itself is a Chatzitzah if it extends past the skin The Shach (YD 198:25) says so if it is long and one intends to cut it. One should let it grow past the skin only due to Ones, e.g. a Shochet needs a long nail to check the knife, or a Mohel needs it to pull back the skin. They must check it carefully before washing.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>viii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (6):</span> Greek mud is pit mud. It is like potters' mud. It sticks very much, and water does not get underneath even if it is wet. The same applies to other kinds of dry mud. They are a Chatzitzah on the hand and under the fingernail, even opposite the skin. However a tiny amount that people are not Makpid about it is not a Chatzitzah anywhere. If one works with mud, e.g. he makes bricks or pots, surely it is not a Chatzitzah anywhere, unless most of his hand is covered. Since this is his profession, he is not Makpid about it.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ix.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (7):</span> The Tur holds that if one is not Makpid about something, it is not a Chatzitzah even if most people are Makpid. The Magen Avraham and other Acharonim say that regarding what the Shulchan Aruch mentioned, we follow the majority of people, who are Makpid.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rema:</span> This is why the custom is not to dig out mud under the fingernails for Netilas Yadayim, for it is like a minority that he is not Makpid about, for we are not Makpid about this for Netilah. If he was Makpid, he must dig it out. This is primary. Perhaps we are lenient about Chatzitzah for Netilah because some say that Chatzitzah does not apply to it. The first opinion is primary.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Taz (YD 198:14):</span> Regarding Netilas Yadayim, we rely on R. Tam, who says that only potter's mud and similar things (that stick greatly) are a Chatzitzah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (5):</span> Even though mud is a Chatzitzah even opposite the skin, people are not Makpid about this (so it is not a Chatzitzah). Most people are Makpid if it is not opposite the skin, even for filth, so it is a Chazakah even for one who is not Makpid.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (9):</span> Some are lenient about filth and Stam mud.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (6):</span> The Rema connotes that is a Chatzitzah when he is Makpid about it, even if most people are not. Pnei Yitzchak says that the Rashba was unsure about this, so we are lenient.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (10):</span> If he is Makpid about it but most people are not, we are stringent. It seems that this is only for potters' mud or dry mud. One need not be stringent about wet mud or earth under the fingernail opposite the skin, which does not stick so much, especially if he is Makpid about it only for Netilas Yadayim, but not during the rest of the day.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Kaf ha'Chayim (14):</span> If the minority of a fingernail separated, one must cut it, for it is a Chatzitzah. If it is on Shabbos, he cannot cut it, so he does not bless Al Netilas Yadayim.</p>
<p class='seealso'>See also:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) HAVING A 'PIGUL' THOUGHT ABOUT THE 'SHELIL' OR 'SHILYA'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Mishnah teaches that a thought of Pigul affects the Korban only when the thought involves eating something that is completely edible. A thought to eat, Chutz l'Zemano, something that is barely edible does not make the Korban become Pigul. Therefore, a thought to eat the Shelil (fetus) or Shilya (placenta) Chutz l'Zemano does not make the Korban become Pigul. The Gemara questions whether the Shelil can become Pigul if the person offering the Korban has a thought to eat the edible meat of the animal Chutz l'Zemano. Perhaps just as a thought to eat the Shelil Chutz l'Zemano does not create Pigul, so, too, even when the Korban becomes Pigul because of a thought to eat the meat Chutz l'Zemano, the Shelil is not considered Pigul. On the other hand, perhaps once the Korban becomes Pigul through a thought to eat the meat Chutz l'Zemano, the Shelil becomes Pigul as well.
</p><p>
The Gemara attempts to answer this question from a Beraisa which says that if the Kohen thought to eat the meat of the Parim ha'Nisrafim, the Parim do not become Pigul (because his thought involved something that is supposed to be burned and not eaten; this follows the opinion of the Rabanan who argue with Rebbi Eliezer in the Mishnah). The Gemara infers from this statement that if the Kohen had in mind to offer the Eimurim of the Parim Chutz l'Zemano, then the meat of the Parim <i>does</i> become Pigul. This implies that even something that cannot <i>make</i> Pigul if one thinks to eat it Chutz l'Zemano nevertheless can <i>become</i> Pigul.
</p><p>
How can the Gemara prove this point from the fact that the meat of Parim can become Pigul? Rashi (DH v'Shavin) points out that if a Kohen has in mind to burn the meat of the Parim Chutz l'Zemano, and he expressed the thought by saying, 'I want the fire to <i>eat</i> these Parim tomorrow,' it will become Pigul, because there is no difference between his own eating and the Mizbe'ach's 'eating.' Accordingly, it certainly is possible for a thought about the meat of the Parim ha'Nisrafim to make the animal Pigul. Since it can create Pigul, it can become Pigul! It is not comparable to a thought about the Shelil which cannot make Pigul at all. (<b>TAHARAS HA'KODESH</b>, and the <b>BRISKER RAV</b> cited by the <b>MINCHAS AVRAHAM</b>)
</p><p>
ANSWER: A similar question may be asked about the Shelil and Shilya themselves. The Gemara (31a) teaches that if a Kohen has a thought to feed to dogs the meat of a Korban Chutz l'Zemano, the Korban becomes Pigul. This is because the dogs' eating is considered Achilah. It certainly is normal for a dog to eat a Shelil and Shilya. Therefore, it should be possible to make the Korban become Pigul by having a thought to feed the Shelil or Shilya to a dog! Just as they can make the Korban become Pigul, they should become Pigul themselves when one thinks about eating the meat of the Korban Chutz l'Zemano.
</p><p>
Furthermore, if the Kohen has a thought to 'feed' the Shelil or Shilya to a fire, that should also make the Korban become Pigul. Why, then, should there be any question regarding the status of the Shelil and Shilya when the meat becomes Pigul?
</p><p>
The verse states with regard to the prohibition against eating Pigul, 'veha'Nefesh <i>ha'Ocheles</i> Mimenu' (Vayikra 7:18). This implies that the Chiyuv Kares applies only to eating something in the normal manner, which the verse calls 'Achilah' ('ha'Ocheles'). When the Gemara suggests that the Shelil should not be prohibited with Kares if the Korban becomes Pigul because a thought for a person to eat the Shelil Chutz l'Zemano does not create Pigul, its intent is to prove that when a person eats a Shelil, it is not classified as a normal manner of Achilah. Therefore, such an Achilah cannot carry the Isur Kares of Pigul, since it will not satisfy the verse of 'veha'Nefesh ha'Ocheles.' It makes no difference that a thought to feed the Shelil to the dogs or to a fire Chutz l'Zemano will make the Korban become Pigul, because that does not prove that when a <i>man</i> eats a Shelil, it is classified as an act of Achilah. This appears to be the intention of Rashi (35b DH Eimurin) as well. (M. Kornfeld)</p><p>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) A THOUGHT TO PERFORM THE 'ZERIKAH' IN THE WRONG PLACE</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: Rebbi Yehudah in the Mishnah states that even a thought to <i>not</i> perform the Zerikas ha'Dam or Haktaras ha'Eimurim at all, or to take the blood or Eimurim outside of the Azarah, disqualifies the Korban. The Gemara explains that his ruling is based on logic. Rebbi Yehudah maintains that any act that disqualifies the Korban when it is actually done to the Korban also disqualifies the Korban when the Kohen who offers the Korban has a thought to do such an act. The Gemara asks that if this is true, why does Rebbi Yehudah not disqualify the Korban in a case in which the Kohen has a thought to perform Zerikah outside of the Heichal, when that Zerikah is supposed to be done inside the Heichal, or the Kohen has a thought to perform the Zerikah inside, when that Zerikah is supposed to be done outside (on the outer Mizbe'ach)?
</p><p>
The Gemara answers that Rebbi Yehudah maintains that a thought disqualifies a Korban only when it involves a 'Makom Meshulash,' as derived from the word 'Shelishi' in the verse that discusses Pigul (Vayikra 7:18). <b>RASHI</b> explains that a Makom Meshulash excludes the Heichal. Therefore, a thought to perform Zerikah in the Heichal cannot disqualify the Korban.
</p><p>
This answer seems to explain only one of the Gemara's questions on Rebbi Yehudah: why Rebbi Yehudah does not disqualify the Korban when the Kohen had a thought to perform the Zerikah in the Heichal, when that Zerikah is supposed to be performed outside of the Heichal. Why, though, does Rebbi Yehudah not disqualify the Korban when the Kohen has a thought to do Zerikah outside of the Heichal, when it was supposed to be performed inside the Heichal? The Gemara's answer does not seem to address this point at all. (<b>TOSFOS YOM TOV</b>)
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (26b, DH Amar) suggests two approaches. His first approach is as follows. The Gemara earlier asks why Rebbi Yehudah does not disqualify the Korban if the Kohen has a thought to perform Zerikas ha'Dam on the upper part of the Mizbe'ach when it is supposed to be performed on the lower part (or vice versa). The Gemara answers that Rebbi Yehudah maintains that 'she'Lo b'Mekomo k'Mekomo Dami'; this means that when the Zerikah is performed in the wrong place on the Mizbe'ach, the Korban is still accepted. Based on the same logic, it follows that if the Kohen has a thought to perform Zerikah outside of the Heichal when it was supposed to be performed inside the Heichal, it should not disqualify the animal, because even if the Kohen actually does the Zerikah outside the Korban remains valid due to Rebbi Yehudah's ruling that 'she'Lo b'Mekomo k'Mekomo Dami.'
</p><p>
The Gemara here addresses only the other case, the case in which the Kohen has in mind to do the Zerikah inside when it was supposed to be done outside. The Gemara is discussing a Korban Chatas, which becomes Pasul if its blood is brought into the Heichal. Since bringing the blood into the Heichal invalidates the Korban, merely <i>thinking</i> about bringing the blood into the Heichal should also disqualify the Korban, according to Rebbi Yehudah.
</p><p>
Tosfos points out that this is the intention of Rashi here (DH v'Liflog).
</p><p>
(b) In his second approach, Tosfos suggests that perhaps if the Kohen performs the Zerikas ha'Dam of a Chatas Penimis on the outer Mizbe'ach, the Korban indeed becomes disqualified. Although Zerikah performed 'she'Lo b'Mekomo,' in the wrong place, is considered to have been performed in the correct place, Zerikah on the wrong Mizbe'ach is worse than 'she'Lo b'Mekomo' and is disqualified. The Gemara's question indeed is from both of the cases that the Gemara mentions.
</p><p>
Tosfos explains that the Gemara's answer is that two things are derived from the word 'Shelishi' (the source for the necessity of 'Makom Meshulash'). It teaches that a thought to perform an Avodah in the Heichal does not disqualify the Korban. It also teaches that a thought to perform, outside of the Heichal, an Avodah which is <i>supposed</i> to be done in the Heichal does not disqualify the Korban.
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafbbb'><span class='numt'>1)</span> DOES A SMALL DEVIATION CANCEL SHLICHUS? <span class='indexentry'>[Shelichus: deviation]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Beraisa) Question:</span> What is the source that one Zerikah on the outer Mizbe'ach is Mechaper (even when two or four Zerikos should be done)?</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer:</span> 'V'Dam Zevachecha *Yis'hafech*' connotes one putting.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Gitin 10b (Rav Papa):</span> Witnesses on a Get must sign in front of each other.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	(Rav Ashi):</span> This is a decree due to when the husband says 'all of you sign this Get.'</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	29a (Mishnah):</span> If Reuven appointed Shimon to give a Get within Eretz Yisrael, and Shimon got sick, Shimon can appoint a Shali'ach to give the Get.	 If Reuven told Shimon to receive something from his wife when he gives the Get, Shimon may not make a Shali'ach. Reuven does not want his deposit to be in the hands of others.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	(R. Yochanan):</span> Sometimes, this disqualifies the Get (if Shimon makes another Shali'ach to give the Get and take the object). It is as if Reuven told Shimon 'divorce her only in the house', and Shimon divorced her in the attic, or 'divorce her only using the right hand', and he divorced her with the left hand.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span>	If she gave to him the object before he gave the Get, the Get is valid. It is Pasul when Shimon told his Shali'ach 'take the object, then give the Get', and the Shali'ach gave the Get first. Even if Shimon himself did this, the Get is Pasul.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	65a	(Mishnah):</span> If a man told a Shali'ach 'give this Get to my wife in Ploni (a certain place), and the Shali'ach gave it elsewhere, the Get is Pasul. If he told the Shali'ach 'give this Get to my wife. She is in Ploni', and the Shali'ach gave it somewhere else, it is valid.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span>	If a woman told a Shali'ach 'receive my Get in Ploni', and the Shali'ach received it elsewhere, the Get is Pasul;</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span>	R. Elazar says, it is valid. If she told the Shali'ach 'bring my Get from Ploni', and the Shali'ach brought it from elsewhere, it is valid.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span>	R. Elazar agrees in the Reisha, for a man decides whether he wants to divorce, so he can be particular about the place. A woman is divorced against her will. She cannot decide where the Get will be given. She merely suggests where she thinks that the Shali'ach can get the Get.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>12.</span><span class='desl2'>	Nedarim 36a - Question:</span> Granted, if a Kohen is a Shali'ach of Hash-m, his intent can make Pigul. (Hash-m made him a Shali'ach in every case.) However, if he is a Shali'ach of Yisrael, why is it Pigul? The owner made him a Shali'ach to help him, not to hurt him!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>13.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer:</span> Pigul is an exception. It says 'Lo Yechashev' - in any case.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Gerushin 1:24):</span> It was enacted that witnesses must sign the Get in front of each other. If they did not, it is Pasul.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Perush ha'Rosh (Nedarim 36a DH ha'Makriv):</span> The verse teaches that intent of the one who offers can disqualify, even though it is not his Korban.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Ran (Gitin 3b DH v'Hilchesa):</span> Rashi holds that witnesses must sign in front of each other, lest the husband say 'all of you.' In such a case, if they did not all sign, it is Pasul, even though only two are for testimony. The Ramban says that since all of them are witnesses, all must sign</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (EH 120:9):</span> If he says 'all of you sign a Get for my wife', the first two are witnesses, and the rest are to fulfill his Tanai. The rest may sign on a later day, but they must sign in front of all of them. Even if they sign the Get after the Get was given, (Rema - even after she remarried), it is Kosher.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>		Chelkas Mechokek (23):</span> The Ran holds that even if a witness died before the rest signed, it is Kosher, for only l'Chatchilah they must sign in front of each other. Tosfos holds that perhaps it is Pasul mid'Rabanan if they did not sign in front of each other.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (130:13):</span> Witnesses on a Get must sign in front of each other. If they signed not in front of each other, it is Pasul.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (141:45):</span> If a Shali'ach deviated from what the husband or wife told him, he did not do anything. If a man said 'give this Get to my wife in Ploni', and the Shali'ach gave it elsewhere, or 'give it to her only in the upper story', and he gave it in the house, or vice-versa, or 'give it to her only using the right hand', and he gave it with the left, he did not do anything.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Shmuel (62):</span> There is reason to say that he is particular about where he gives the Get, therefore deviation disqualifies even if he did not say 'give it only in Ploni.' Regarding giving it in the upper story or using the right hand, we say that he is particular only if said 'gave it only in this way.'</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Pischei Teshuvah (48):</span> Toras Gitin asks that regarding an Eruv, if he said to put in the upper story we say that he is particular, even if he did not say 'only'. Also, since there was no need to mention the upper story, this shows that he was particular about it!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Zayis Ra'anan (2:39):</span> If a Shali'ach did something that is not l'Chatchilah, but b'Di'eved the Get is Kosher, the Shlichus is not Batel. We learn from one who told 10 to sign a Get. Even though l'Chatchilah they must sign in front of each other, the Ran holds that the Get is Kosher (if they did not). Also when one told two to sign, if they signed not in front of each other, it is Pasul only mid'Rabanan.  According to the Rif, who holds that Edei Chasimah by themselves work according to R. Elazar, Shlichus is required. The entire Get should be Batel because there is no Shlichus! Even if according to the Ri, Shlichus is not required for signing, the Get should be Batel because they deviated from his command. Also, we find that a Shali'ach may make another Shali'ach to give the Get only if he became sick. However, b'Di'eved the Get is Kosher (even if he was not sick and made another Shali'ach), and it is not considered changing the Shlichus.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl3'>	(Note:</span> it seems that he learns from R. Yochanan, who disqualifies one who made another Shali'ach only when the husband was particular that the Shali'ach receive something from her.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl3'>	Zayis Ra'anan:</span> This is when they did not deviate from his words, just they did not complete the Shlichus regarding a matter of law. Therefore, there is no distinction between his Shali'ach and hers. If a Shali'ach deviated from the husband's words, if there is even if a remote chance that he is particular, the Get is totally Batel, like the Shulchan Aruch says. One can prove this from Yoma 19b, which asked whether Kohanim are Sheluchim of Yisrael or of Hash-m. Why didn't the Gemara learn from many Mishnayos in Zevachim which say that a deviation is Pasul only if there is a second verse for it? (If Kohanim are Yisrael's Sheluchim), the Korban should be Pasul because the Shlichus is Batel! Rather, a Shali'ach is no worse than the Meshale'ach. Just like a Kohen's own Korban would be Kosher b'Di'eved, the same applies to the Meshale'ach's Korban.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span>	The questioner brought a proof from Korbanos Lo Lishmah, which are Kosher, according to Rashi, who requires Shlichus for Shechitah. One can reject the proof. Nedarim 36a says that if Kohanim are Sheluchim of Yisrael, they can make Pigul due to 'Lo Yechashev.' The verse teaches that the Shlichus is not Batel. My proof is from a deviation through an action, e.g. four Zerikos of blood are required, and he did only one. 'Lo Yechashev' teaches only that deviation through thought does not cancel the Shlichus.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl3'>	Ha'arah 9:</span> The Rosh connotes that the verse teaches that intent of the one who offers can disqualify, even though his Shlichus is Batel. However, we can bring a proof from the Halachah that if Pigul was put on the Mizbe'ach, we do not take it down. If the Shlichus was Batel, we would take it down, for we require Shlichus for Shechitah! The proof from Korbanos that require four Zerikos is not so clear. There, his deviation was through inaction! Perhaps the proof is from the Halachah that if he did too many Zerikos, it is Kosher. This is deviation through action.</p>
<p class='normal'></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) A THOUGHT TO DO A DISQUALIFYING ACT THAT IS NOT IN ONE'S HANDS TO DO</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara (36a) explains that according to Rebbi Yehudah, when a Kohen has a thought, while offering a Korban, to do an act that will disqualify the Korban, the Korban becomes disqualified. The Gemara asks why Rebbi Yehudah does not disqualify the Korban when the Korban is offered with a thought that a person who is an Arel or a Tamei will offer the Eimurim on the Mizbe'ach or eat the meat of the Korban. The Gemara answers that even if an Arel or Tamei offers the Korban or eats its meat, it does not disqualify the Korban, and therefore having a thought that such a person will offer it does not disqualify the Korban (although having such a thought is a transgression). The Gemara adds a second point and says that it is not within the power ('b'Yado') of the person offering the Korban to arrange for an Arel or Tamei to eat the Korban; it requires the cooperation of the Arel or Tamei. Since it is not entirely in his hands, his thought cannot disqualify the Korban; his thought disqualifies the Korban only when he thinks about what <i>he</i> will do, and not when he thinks about what others will do.
</p><p>
The Gemara here cites Rav Chisda who says that if a person offers a Korban with intention that Teme'im will eat the Korban tomorrow, Chutz l'Zemano, the Korban becomes Pigul. The Gemara explains that even though the Teme'im are not fit to eat the Korban even during the proper time, having a thought that Teme'im will eat it during the wrong time disqualifies the Korban.
</p><p>
Why should a thought that Teme'im will eat the Korban disqualify the Korban? This thought involves the cooperation of someone else, the Tamei person. The Gemara (36a) says that a thought that involves an action which requires the cooperation of another person does not disqualify the Korban. (<b>TEVU'OS SHOR</b> 4:13; see also <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> 31a:6.)
</p><p>
Moreover, the Mishnah (31b) teaches that all of the Pesulim can make a Korban become Pigul if, while slaughtering the animal, they have a thought about eating the Korban, or doing Zerikas ha'Dam, Chutz l'Zemano. In the Mishnah's case, who is the subject of the Pasul's thought? Who does he have in mind will eat the Korban or offer it Chutz l'Zemano? If he has in mind that he will eat or offer it himself, then this clearly implies that if the Korban is brought with a thought that a Tamei, or any other Pasul, will eat the meat Chutz l'Zemano, the Korban is Pigul. Why, then, does the Gemara here not prove Rav Chisda's statement from the Mishnah? Rather, it must be that the Gemara understands that the Mishnah means that, during Shechitah, the Pasul had in mind that another person -- one who is eligible to eat or offer the Korban -- would eat or offer it Chutz l'Zemano, even though such an act is not within his power to carry out! (<b>ROSH HA'MIZBE'ACH</b>)
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>TEVU'OS SHOR</b> suggests that the Gemara earlier (36a) means that if a person performs the Avodah while he is Tahor and he plans on making himself Tamei and eating the meat of the Korban while he is Tamei, then his thought can make the Korban become Pigul. The Gemara earlier (36a) says that a thought that an <i>Arel</i> will eat the Korban does not take effect, because it is not in his hands to make himself an Arel.
</p><p>
The <b>MIKDASH DAVID</b> (33:1, DH Makshinan) points out that even a thought that an Arel will eat the Korban should be considered within a person's power, such as in a case in which an Arel performs Shechitah with intention to eat the Korban himself Chutz l'Zemano (since an Arel is permitted to perform the Shechitah (31b)). Apparently, when the Gemara (36a) says that it is not in his power, it refers to a case in which the person who is performing the Shechitah is not an Arel or Tamei himself, who has a thought that someone else who is an Arel or Tamei will eat or offer the Korban Chutz l'Zemano. However, if the person slaughtering the Korban is an Arel or Tamei himself, then the Gemara will need to rely on the first answer, that the Korban does not become disqualified with such a thought, since it does not become disqualified if an Arel or a Tamei actually eats it.
</p><p>
Why does the Gemara not prove the ruling of Rav Chisda from the Mishnah which says that a thought during Shechitah, performed by a person who is ineligible to perform the Avodah, can disqualify the Korban? Perhaps Rav Chisda's point is that even a thought that Teme'im will eat the Korban Chutz l'Zemano is the same as a thought that another Pasul will eat it Chutz l'Zemano. Without Rav Chisda's ruling, one would have thought that the Mishnah (31b) refers only to other Pesulim, other than one who is Tamei, who can disqualify the Korban with a thought that they will eat it Chutz l'Zemano. There is an additional Chidush to the fact that a thought that a Tamei person will eat the meat Chutz l'Zemano can disqualify the Korban, as <b>TOSFOS</b> points out (DH she'Yochluhu).
</p><p>
(b) Alternatively, the <b>TEVU'OS SHOR</b> suggests that the Gemara here is retracting the second answer that it gave earlier (36a). The Gemara maintains that even if it is not in his power to perform the action that he thought about, his thought still can disqualify the Korban. (See also <b>TAHARAS HA'KODESH</b>, 26b.)
</p><p>
(c) The <b>NETZIV</b> in <b>MEROMEI SADEH</b> (36a) and the <b>CHAFETZ CHAIM</b> in <b>ZEVACH TODAH</b> explain that the Gemara's statement earlier was made only with regard to the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah, who maintains that a thought to do an act disqualifies the Korban as if the act was actually performed. This Halachah is based on logic alone; in such a case, the Gemara says that if the person who had the thought could not have done the action himself, then such a thought cannot be compared to an actual act and it cannot disqualify the Korban.
</p><p>
The Gemara here, in contrast, is discussing the laws of Pigul. In the Gemara's case, a person has a thought that disqualifies the Korban because of the laws of Pigul. The verse which teaches the laws of Pigul does not limit a thought of Pigul to a thought that the person offering the Korban himself will do a certain act. Rather, even if he has in mind that someone else will do the Zerikah, or eat the Korban, Chutz l'Zemano, the Korban becomes disqualified and becomes Pigul.
</p><p>
Many later Acharonim accept the opinion of the Chafetz Chaim.</p><p></p><p align='right'>


lvr: 51
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN POURING AND SPRINKLING</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara (36b) derives from the verse, 'v'Dam Zevachecha Yishafech' (Devarim 12:27), that if the blood of a Korban which is normally brought on the outer Mizbe'ach is sprinkled only once (even though it is supposed to be sprinkled more), it is valid b'Di'eved.
</p><p>
The Gemara later here derives another law from the same verse. If the blood of a Korban which is supposed to be sprinkled on the Mizbe'ach instead is spilled (poured) onto the Mizbe'ach, it is valid b'Di'eved.
</p><p>
The Gemara asks, how can the same verse be used to teach two laws?
</p><p>
The Gemara's question is difficult to understand. <b>RASHI</b> (36b, DH Yishafech) explains that the verse's implication that one sprinkling suffices b'Di'eved is understood from the absence of the word 'Saviv' (which normally implies the requirement to perform 'two sprinklings which are four') in the verse. Accordingly, the derivation is not from 'Yishafech' but from the absence of 'Saviv.' Why, then, does the Gemara ask (in more than one place here) how can two laws be derived from one verse ('Yishafech')? Two laws are <i>not</i> being derived from one verse!
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>TAHARAS HA'KODESH</b> answers that the Gemara's question is as follows. The absence of the word 'Saviv' <i>and</i> the word 'Yishafech' together imply that only one pouring (and not sprinkling) is valid. However, one still might think that if a single sprinkling is done, the Korban is invalid (unlike the first teaching of the Gemara). Therefore, the Gemara asks that if the word 'Yishafech' (together with the absence of 'Saviv') is used already for this second derivation, then what is the source for the first derivation, that one sprinkling alone suffices for a Korban that requires sprinkling?
</p><p>
The Taharas ha'Kodesh explains that the Gemara at this point understands that it is logical to derive that one pouring is valid, while one sprinkling should not be valid. This is supported by the example of the Korban Pesach, for which pouring is preferable to sprinkling (see <b>TOSFOS YOM TOV</b> to Pesachim 10:9).
</p><p>
Another reason for why one pouring should be valid while one sprinkling should not be valid may be based on the words of the <b>CHIDUSHEI HA'GRIZ <b><b>AL</b></b> HA'RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 2:1-2). The Chidushei ha'Griz understands from the words of the Rambam that all Korbanos that must have sprinkling are valid only b'Di'eved when their blood is poured onto the Mizbe'ach.
</p><p>
However, if 'Zerikah bi'Chlal Shefichah' -- 'pouring is included in sprinkling,' as the Gemara here says, then what is wrong with pouring the blood even l'Chatchilah? Indeed, the requirement of sprinkling the blood of the Korban Pesach is derived from the laws of the Bechor, and yet the Rambam (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 5:17) rules that one may pour the blood of the Korban Pesach even l'Chatchilah. What is the difference between other Korbanos and the Korban Pesach?
</p><p>
The Chidushei ha'Griz answers in the name of <b>RAV CHAIM SOLOVEITCHIK</b> that an act of pouring cannot be divided into various pourings on the different corners of the Mizbe'ach. There can be only one act of pouring done for a Korban. In contrast, sprinkling can be divided into multiple acts of sprinkling.
</p><p>
The Rambam maintains that pouring is b'Di'eved when the Torah prescribes more than one sprinkling, since the multiple sprinklings cannot be done through pouring. The Korban Pesach, which needs only one sprinkling, is valid through pouring even l'Chatchilah, since one pouring is like one sprinkling. According to this logic, it is obvious that when the verse teaches that a Korban is valid when one pouring is done, there is no reason to assume that the Korban is valid when one sprinkling is done. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker, Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> THE COMPARTMENTS IN TEFILIN <span class='indexentry'>[Tefilin: Parshiyos]</span></p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span>	GEMARA</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span>	The Torah writes 'Keranos' two times without a 'Vov', and once with a Vov. The Mikra (the way words are pronounced) connotes six, and the Mesores (the way words are written) connotes four. Beis Hillel expound both, and consider it as if five were written.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question:</span> Beis Hillel should expound 'Totafos (Tefilin)' similarly. Two are written without a 'Vov', and one with a Vov. They should require five compartments in the head Tefilin!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer:</span> They hold like R. Akiva, who says that the word itself means four. 'Tat' means two in Katfi (a language). 'Fos' means two in Afriki.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Menachos 34b (Beraisa) Suggestion:</span> Perhaps the four Parshiyos should be written on four parchments, and each is put in its own Bayis (box) made from a separate piece of hide!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rejection:</span> 'Ul'Zikaron Bein Einecha' - it should be only one commemoration;</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span>	To fulfill both verses, the four Parshiyos are written on separate parchments, each is put in its own Bayis, and all four Batim are made from one piece of hide;</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span>	If the Parshiyos were written on one parchment and (the Klaf was folded like an accordion, so) each Parshah was in its own Bayis, this is Kosher.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span>	Rebbi says, there must be a space between them;</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span>	Chachamim say, there need not be.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span>	All agree that a string must separate the Batim (some say, only if the Parshiyos are on one parchment). If the separation between Batim is not recognizable (from the outside), it is Pasul.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'>	32a (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak):</span> L'Chatchilah, the Parshiyos in a Mezuzah should be closed. (We leave different amounts of empty spaces before open and closed Parshiyos.) R. Shimon ben Elazar teaches that even open Parshiyos are Kosher.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'>	Support (Beraisa):</span> If (parchments of) a Sefer Torah or Tefilin became worn, they may not be used for a Mezuzah, for we do not demote something to a lower Kedushah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Inference:</span> If it were permitted to demote to a lower Kedushah, they could be used for a Mezuzah, even though the (first) Parshah (in a Mezuzah, Shma Yisrael) is closed!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rejection:</span> The Beraisa teaches that one may not take from a Sefer Torah to complete a Mezuzah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'>	33a (Rav Yehudah):</span> If a Mezuzah was written in two Dapim, it is Pasul.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'>	Question (Beraisa):</span> If a Mezuzah was written in two Dapim and one was put on each doorpost, it is Pasul.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'>	Inference:</span> If both were put on the same doorpost, it would be Kosher!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span><span class='desl2'>	Answer:</span> It means that if it is possible to put one Parshah on each doorpost, it is Pasul.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>12.</span><span class='desl2'>	Sanhedrin 89a:</span> If one made four Batim for Tefilin and put a fifth next to them, it does not invalidate the Mitzvah. If he made five compartments from the beginning, it was invalid from the beginning!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>13.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah (Kelim 18:8):</span> Tefilin is four Kelim. If (it was Tamei Mes, and) he untied the first Bayis and fixed it, it (the Tefilin) is Tamei Mes. Likewise, if he (later) untied the second and third Bayis and fixed them, it is Tamei Mes. If he (later) untied the fourth Bayis and fixed it, it is not Tamei Mes, but it is Tamei like something that touched a Tamei Mes.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span>	RISHONIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rif and Rosh (Hilchos Tefilin 6b and Siman 2):</span> One puts the four parchments of the head Tefilin in four Batim in one hide. If he wrote them on one parchment and put them in four Batim in one hide, he was Yotzei.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rambam (Hilchos Tefilin 2:1):</span> One puts the four parchments of the head Tefilin in four Batim in one hide.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'>	Tosfos (32a DH Dilma):</span> Rashi explained that if not for the Isur to demote a Sefer Torah to a lower Kedushah, one could take a line from a Sefer Torah to complete a Mezuzah missing that line. The Yerushalmi says that Tefilin and Mezuzos may be written only on one parchment. It disqualifies two parchments only when they are not sewn together. Alternatively, our Gemara discusses taking a full Parshah (Shema or v'Hayah) from a Sefer Torah to complete a Mezuzah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>	Rashi (33a DH Re'uyah):</span> 'It is possible to put each Parshah on a different doorpost' means that there is space between the columns to cut the parchment.</p>
<p class='firstindenthalachah'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>	POSKIM</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'>	Shulchan Aruch (OC 32:38):</span> One makes four Batim from one piece of hide for the Shel Rosh, and one Bayis for the Shel Yad.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'>	Prishah (34):</span> My Rebbi (the Maharshal) explained that this is because there are four senses in the head (sight, hearing, smell and taste), and one in the hand (feeling), and one blesses his Creator for all of them.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Beis Yosef (DH v'Ya'aseh):</span> Sefer ha'Terumah says that the four Batim are connected, from one hide. Or, perhaps they may be from four hides, as long as they are sewn together. It is proper to make them from one hide.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Taz (32):</span> Regarding the Shel Yad it says 'Lecha l'Os' - just like they are one sign on the outside, they are one sign inside.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bach (21):</span> The Gemara connotes that they must be from one piece of hide, without sewing, unlike Sefer ha'Terumah. This is the custom throughout Yisrael.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'>	Magen Avraham (52):</span> The Agudah proved that they are like one hide (when they are sewn together). Also Tosfos (32a) says so (about the parchments).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl3'>	Gra:</span> Rashi, Shimusha Rabah and the other Poskim say that it must be from one hide. Even Tosfos said that when they are sewn they are like one parchment only according to one answer.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Chasam Sofer (OC 5):</span> Rashi (33a) explains that Rav Yehudah disqualified a Mezuzah in two columns, even if they are on one parchment. R. Elchanan (in Mordechai Hilchos Mezuzah 961) supported this from the Yerushalmi. R. Yehoshua ben Levi suggested that a difference between Seforim and Mezuzos is that Seforim may be written in two Dapim, but Mezuzos may not. The Yerushalmi asked, why didn't he suggest a greater difference, that Seforim may be written on two parchments, but Mezuzos may not? This shows that 'two Dapim' are on one parchment, and even so it is Pasul due to two Seforim. Regarding Sotah, it says (that the curses must be written) '*b*'Sefer', i.e. the most clear-cut Sefer, so it is Pasul even if it is on one parchment in two columns. Regarding Get, it says ('Sefer', but it does not say) '*b*'Sefer', so if it is in two columns on one parchment it is Kosher, but in two parchments sewn together it is Pasul. A Tosefta says that if a Get was torn, it does not help to sew it back. Regarding a Sefer Torah it says 'Al Sefer', and it is written on many parchments. They are sewn together, and they become one Sefer. Therefore, the Drasah 'one Sefer, and not two or three Seforim' disqualifies when the parchments are not tied together. It does not say 'Sefer' regarding Mezuzah, but it says 'u'Chsavtem', and we are stringent to learn from Sotah that it is Pasul in two columns.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>viii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Chasam Sofer (ibid.):</span>  It is clear from the Mishnah in Kelim that the custom used to be to make Tefilin from four pieces that could be tied together and untied. Also Sanhedrin 89a connotes like this. However, the Beraisa concludes 'if the grooves are not recognizable, they are Pasul.' Rashi explains that one may not make one Bayis with walls separating in between. Rather, the grooves must be recognizable from the outside. Why didn't Rashi say that the four Batim must be separated? Rashi hints that it is the custom of scribes to stick four Batim together with glue, lest they separate and the Tefilin will not be square. Even if one is skilled to make them square without glue, it would not remain square without glue. Sometimes, through glue it is not clear that they are four Batim and it is Pasul. This shows that sticking separate things together does not make them like one. If not, how does a recognizable groove help, if the four Batim are like one? Rather, they do not become like one. This is unlike the Mishnah in Kelim! We can say that sewing is better than gluing. Even though regarding Shabbos, gluing is a Toldah of sewing, to make one rememberance sewing is better. The Rosh (Hilchos Sefer Torah 14) says that one can sew a torn Sefer Torah with sinews, but he cannot glue it. In truth, some Poskim connotes that gluing is better than sewing. This is when the issue is not two Seforim, e.g. it tore within three. Then, gluing is better. For a connection, sewing is better.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ix.</span>	Magen Giborim (32:28) asked from Shabbos 28b, which says that only hide of Kosher animals may be used for Melachah of Shamayim. The Gemara asked that we already know that a Kosher hide is needed (for Tefilin) due to the Shin on the Tefilin (a letter of Hashem's name), which is a tradition from Sinai! If sewing helps, perhaps the Tefilin could be from a Tamei animal, and the Shin would be from a Tahor animal and sewn on! I say that surely this does not help, just like a woolen Talis with leather corners requires Tzitzis on the leather corners, for sewing makes it one. A leather Talis with woolen corners is exempt, for it is primarily leather. Also here, we follow what is primary. A Shin on Tahor hide on a Tamei Bayis is Pasul, as if it were written on Tamei hide.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>x.</span><span class='desl2'>	Chasam Sofer (ibid.):</span> Sewing does not help for a Get. Why does it help for Batim? Maharam Mintz says that the Beraisa does not require a Bayis from one hide. Rather, *even* if he made it from one hide, it is Kosher. One might have thought that four hides are needed, like we expounded 'Totafos.' This is unlike the Gemara, which says 'one rememberance, not two or three.' It did not say 'one suffices.' Also, it should have taught this together with 'if he wrote them on four parchments, or on one parchment and put it in four Batim in one hide, it is Kosher. Rather, the Reisha teaches that one must put them it in four Batim from one hide, and the Seifa teaches that one was Yotzei b'Di'eved (if they were on one parchment). It says regarding Tefilin 'Zikaron' and Kesivah, so we learn from 'Kesov Zos Zikaron b'Sefer', which refers to a Sefer Torah, which is written on parchments sewn, but not glued, together. Likewise, the Batim may be sewn, but not glued, and this does not make them one Bayis.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>xi.</span><span class='desl2'>	Mishnah Berurah (172):</span> The Chayei Adam and Or Zaru'a connote that even if they are glued together, it is Kosher. Nowadays, this is the custom in our lands. L'Chatchilah, it is proper to make them from one hide, for some hold that sewing or gluing does not help. Chayei Adam says that in any case the Batim must be separated. They cannot be stuck together, like scribes do. They glue them together, just above they make a groove for a mere Siman. It is not clear if this is Kosher b'Di'eved. If gluing makes them like one hide, there is only one Bayis.  If gluing does not make them like one hide, the Tefilin were made from multiple hides, and are Pasul! Even those who make Tefilin from one hide should separate them, for perhaps gluing makes them like one. The Gra's Tefilin were separated.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>xii.</span><span class='desl2'>	Bi'ur Halachah (DH Ya'aseh):</span> The Or Zaru'a and Machatzis ha'Shekel equate sewing and gluing. Ha'Gaon R. C. Tzanzer says that all agree that gluing help; it is better than sewing. The Chasam Sofer says that all agree that gluing does not help; it is worse than sewing. Machatzis ha'Shekel says that if it was from one hide, but it was cut into strips and left connected in the middle, and afterwards the strips are connected, according to the Bach it is Pasul (for he holds that sewing and gluing do not help). The Pri Megadim is Machshir b'Di'eved. I agree, for the stringent opinion compares Tefilin to a Get. Gluing does not help for a Get, but if a Get is barely connected, it is called one Sefer (Gitin 20b). In such a case with Tefilin, all agree that sewing or gluing helps.</p>
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