# dafyomi

lvr: 48
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) THE JUDGMENT OF THE NATIONS</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara relates that in the future, when Hash-m will judge the nations of the world, He will grasp a Sefer Torah and say, 'They who busied themselves in this (the Torah) shall come forward and receive reward.'
</p><p>
Why will Hash-m hold a Sefer Torah for this judgment? Normally, a judgment is passed based simply on Hashem's knowledge of the person's righteous or wrongful deeds. How will holding a Sefer Torah add to the judgment of the nations?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>MAHARSHA</b> explains that until the final Day of Judgment, even those nations that accept Hash-m as the only G-d still believe that He gave a different set of laws to follow. Idolaters, while they believe that Hash-m is above all of the idols, believe that He wants them to serve their idols. Others believe that Hash-m commanded them to follow other books written by self-professed prophets. Hash-m will grasp the Sefer Torah as a means of identification, saying that this is His word that He gave to the Jewish people, and it is the only authentic record of His will that He expects the world to follow.
</p><p>
In a similar vein, the <b>RASHBA</b> in <b>CHIDUSHEI AGADOS</b> (cited by 'ha'Kosev' in the <b>EIN YAKOV</b>) explains that the nations of the world think that the greatest pursuit that man can follow in this world is the pursuit of knowledge and philosophy. Hash-m will hold the Sefer Torah in order to show that this, the Torah, is the pursuit that He desires the most.
</p><p>
(b) The members of the various nations of the world come to the final Day of Judgment thinking that they will earn their portion in the World to Come by fulfilling their seven Mitzvos of Bnei Noach. They think that this is all that is expected of them. However, the truth is that this is not their only purpose in the world. Rather, the purpose of the world is for the Jewish people to observe and study the Mitzvos of the Torah. The other nations of the world exist to help the Jewish people achieve that goal. (See, for example, the Gemara in Berachos 6b (and Insights there) which says that the entire world was created to serve the one who fears Hash-m.)
</p><p>
This explains why Yitzchak originally wanted to give the blessings of success in this world to Esav; he wanted Esav to have the means to provide the Jewish people with all of the material benefits they need to carry out their mission. Rivka saw that Esav would not use the material wealth for the proper purpose, and therefore she advised Yakov to take the blessing meant for Esav. This is why Hash-m will hold the Sefer Torah at the time of judgment. Hash-m will tell the nations that anyone who busied himself with supporting those who study the Torah, enabling them to accomplish their mission, will achieve a portion in Olam ha'Ba. This is why the nations present arguments to show that they indeed helped the Jewish people accomplish their mission. (Based on <b>CHIDUSHEI GE'ONIM</b> in the <b>EIN YAKOV</b>.)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> BUSINESS WITH NOCHRIM BEFORE THEIR FESTIVALS [idolatry: festival: business]</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span> Gemara</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> (Mishnah):</span> The following are forbidden three days before idolatrous festivals of idolators: to buy from or sell to them, to lend to them or borrow from them objects or money, and to pay up or collect loans;</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span> R. Yehudah permits collecting loans from them, for this pains them.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Chachamim:</span> Even though it pains them now, it gladdens them later.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'> 5b - Question:</span> Are we really concerned lest one prepares for the festival so far in advance?!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> (Mishnah):</span> On four days in the year, one who sells an animal must tell the buyer if he already sold the mother or child that same day (lest both will be slaughtered that day, and the buyer transgress), i.e. the days before Shemini Atzeres, Pesach, Shavu'os, and Rosh ha'Shanah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'> Answer:</span> One day suffices to buy an animal to be eaten. Three days are needed to prepare a Korban.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'> 6a - Question:</span> Is it forbidden to do business with them due to Harvachah (profit, or having more from which he can offer), or due to 'v'Lifnei Iver Lo Siten Michshol' (enabling him to sin)?</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'> Question:</span> What difference does it make?</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'> Answer:</span> If the Nochri already has an animal, 'Lifnei Iver' does not apply, but Harvachah does.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'> 6b (Reish Lakish):</span> If one (bought or) sold to Nochrim before the festival, he may benefit from the (item or) money.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'> Support (Beraisa):</span> The Isur (prohibition) to (buy and) sell pertains only to things that will last (until the festival), but not to perishables. Even things that will last, if one (bought or) sold, it is permitted.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span><span class='desl2'> (Rav Zvid - Beraisa):</span> Something that will not last we may sell to Nochrim. We may not buy it (Rashi; R. Tam - accept such a gift) from them.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>12.</span><span class='desl2'> 12b (Mishnah):</span> There was an idolatrous festival in Beis Shan. Some stores were crowned with adornments of the idolatry (they pay taxes to the idolatry). Chachamim ruled that one may not buy from those stores.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>13.</span><span class='desl2'> 13b:</span> R. Yirmeyah bought bread (at a Nochri bazaar).</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span> Rishonim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> Rambam (Hilchos Avodah Zarah 9:1):</span> Three days before the festival of idolaters, one may not buy from them, or sell to them something that lasts. One may not lend to them or borrow from them, or pay a debt to them or collect from them a loan with a document or security. One may collect from them a Milveh Al Peh, for this is like saving his money from them. One may sell something that will not last until the day of their festival, such as vegetables or a cooked food. This is in Eretz Yisrael.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Rosh (1:1):</span> Rashi says that the Mishnah forbids buying and selling. He explains later that the concern is lest the Nochri thank his idolatry. It is forbidden due to 'Lo Yishama Al Picha' - due to the Yisrael, the Nochri mentions the name of idolatry. R. Tam challenged this, for the Gemara proves that we do not forbid all buying and selling, rather, only what is appropriate to offer to idolatry. The Gemara asked why for selling animals for slaughter, we are concerned only for the day people slaughter, and here we forbid three days in advance. It answered that more time is needed for offering. However, one could say that as long as he is engaged in (preparing to) offer to idolatry, he thanks for every benefit that comes to him. He thnks that his idolatry helped him, since he was engaged in its needs. R. Tam also asked from the question whether we forbid due to Harvachah or Lifnei Iver. Rashi explained that he will than the idolatry for his profit. The question was not resolved. Also, we asked what is the difference, and answered that they argue about one who has his own animal. Why didn't it say that they argue about selling something that is not offered? If the concern is Harvachah, it is forbidden, but if the concern is Lifnei Iver, it is permitted! R. Tam explains that thanking applies only to lending and paying them, for then they profit, and borrowing from them. This is important to them, that Yisre'elim need them. They do not consider business such a profit, for the Yisrael profits like he does. Also, when he buys he is unsure if he will profit, and when he sells he worries lest he spend the money before he buys other merchandise. The Rambam forbids buying anything, for he will still have the money (on the festival). R. Tam explains that the Mishnah forbids selling to them things that they might offer. The Gemara asked if it depends on Harvachah (having extra). If so, we forbid even if he already has what to offer, for when he has more, he offers more and higher quality Korbanos and thanks his idolatry. If it depends on Lifnei Iver, it is permitted if he already has what to offer. Rav Zvid's Beraisa does not forbid buying from them things that do not last, rather, accepting them for a gift. Rashi holds that the Mishnah forbids selling to them, but we permit buying from them, for a seller is usually sad, unless he sold something that does not last. The Beraisa that supports Reish Lakish permits (selling) something that does not last. According to Rashi, it should also permit (buying) something that lasts! We can say that the Beraisa explains the Mishnah, which discusses only selling. R. Tam holds that the Mishnah forbids only selling things that can be offered, or accepting a gift. He could admit that one may not buy something that will not last. Since he longed to sell it, he rejoices when the Yisrael buys it. It is difficult to say that the Mishnah discuss selling and accepting gifts. Rather, it discusses selling and its opposite, i.e. buying.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Beis Yosef (YD 148 DH Tanya):</span> The Beraisa is difficult for R. Tam. The Rosh said that he must explain that it discusses accepting a gift. However, this is difficult. Rather, R. Tam admits that one may not buy something that will not last. For this, he would thank his idolatry.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Ran (1b DH Dinra):</span> We are not concerned lest a Nochri thank his idolatry for getting a loan on Ribis, for this pains him.</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span> Poskim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> Shulchan Aruch (YD 148:1):</span> Three days before the festival of idolaters, one may not buy from them, or sell to them something that lasts. One may sell something that will not last until the day of their festival, such as vegetables or a cooked food. One may not lend to them or borrow from them objects, or lend money (Rema - without Ribis) or borrow money from them, or pay a debt to them or collect from them a loan with a document or security. One may collect from them a Milveh Al Peh, for this is like saving his money from them. When they have the upper hand, even a loan with a document is like saving from them. If it was a loan with Ribis, even if he had a security this is like saving from them.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Beis Yosef (DH Shloshah):</span> We conclude that the three days is excluding the day of the festival.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Beis Yosef (DH v'Da):</span> A Mishnah forbids buying from crowned stores. Rashi explains that it is not a problem of buying on the day of the festival, for a seller is sad. Tosfos explains that R. Yirmeyah bought bread because there is great demand for it, so it is like something that lasts. The Rambam holds that the Beraisa teaches that only something that lasts is totally forbidden (both buying and selling), but one may sell something that will not last. This is because nothing will remain from it for the Nochri on the day of the festival. When one buys anything, he will have the money on the day of the festival. The Ra'avad says so; the Ran says so in the name of Ge'onim, and says that this is primary.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'> Taz (1):</span> Even though he is sad to sell, he will still have the money on the day of the festival.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'> Taz (3):</span> The Shulchan Aruch is like Rashi and the Rambam. According to them, the Gemara could have given another difference between whether the Isur is due to Harvachah or Lifnei Iver. If it is the latter, one may sell things not offered! This is why R. Tam explained differently. Rashi and the Rambam must say that the Gemara taught another difference, that we distinguish even regarding animals that are offered. The question was whether there is concern lest he thank his idolatry for any sale, or not, like R. Tam. The question was not settled, so we are stringent.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'> Gra (1):</span> All the Poskim who rule like R. Tam permit buying and selling. According to the Rosh, R. Tam is lenient (more than Rashi) only about selling. R. Tam's proof was that the Gemara did not say that matters not offered are permitted. We can say that Chachamim forbade buying and selling everything (that he does not have) due to things that are offered.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'> Bach (7):</span> Also if the Nochri thanks his idolatry, the Yisrael transgresses Lifnei Iver! Rather, thanking is no worse than hugging and kissing it. A Nochri is not commanded about this, for a Yisrael is not killed for it.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl2'> Question (Taz 3):</span> A Yisrael is killed for accepting an idolatry to be his god (and this is included in thanking it)! Rather, Lifnei Iver is only when he could not transgress without the Yisrael, similar to passing wine to a Nazir on the other side of the river. If he could transgress by himself, and the Yisrael merely helps him, this is not Lifnei Iver, like the Mordechai says. The Rema (151:1) brings an opinion that forbids. This is only mid'Rabanan. The only Torah Isur is Lo Yishama Al Picha.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>viii.</span><span class='desl2'> Shach (3):</span> Nowadays Nochrim has the upper hand, and they find excuses to deny loans. In any case nowadays all is permitted (Sa'if 12).</p>
<p class='normal'></p>


lvr: 48
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) JUDGING KINGS FIRST</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara says that when Hash-m judges nations, the kings (referring to the more important nations) are judged before the others, for two reasons. The first reason is that because of their honor, they should not be required to wait to be judged. The second reason is that they should not be judged after Hash-m has reviewed the sins of all the others, because then Hashem's wrath is kindled and the judgment will be more severe.
</p><p>
The Gemara implies that when Hash-m judges the nations, He judges one nation after the other, and He does not judge them all at the same moment. This is also evident from the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah (18a) that explains that when Hash-m judges the world on Rosh Hashanah, everyone passes before Hash-m to be judged one at a time.
</p><p>
How are these statements of the Gemara to be understood in light of the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah (18a) that says that the deeds of the entire world are scrutinized in a single act of scrutiny ('v'Chulan Niskarin b'Sekirah Achas')? (See <b>MAHARSHA</b> to Rosh Hashanah 18a, and <b>MAHARAL</b> in Chidushei Agados to Rosh Hashanah 8a. See also <b>BEN YEHOYADA</b> to Rosh Hashanah 16a.)
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>CHIDA</b> (in <b>PESACH EINAYIM</b> to Rosh Hashanah 16a) answers in the name of <b>RAV YOSEF KARO</b> (the Beis Yosef) that although everyone else is judged at the same time, the king is an exception. The king is judged separately.
</p><p>
The Chida points out, however, that this answer is not consistent with the Gemara's explanation that it is not proper for the king to wait while the others are being judged. If the king could have been judged at the same time as the others, then he would not have to wait!
</p><p>
(b) The Chida answers further in the name of the Beis Yosef that Hash-m reviews everyone's actions at the same moment. However, he passes judgment for each person individually.
</p><p>
The Chida asks that this answer is not consistent with the other explanation that the Gemara gives for giving precedence in judgment to a king. The Gemara says that the king is judged first in order that he be judged before Hashem's anger is aroused upon reviewing the deeds of all the other people. However, if Hash-m has already reviewed the deeds of all of the other people and is now judging each one individually, then His anger is already aroused, and it will not help to judge the king first!
</p><p>
The answer to this question depends on the reason <i>why</i> Hash-m does not pass judgment on the others at the moment that He reviews their deeds. The reason may be that Hash-m allows them to have time to defend themselves, as the Gemara here mentions. If, during that time, they repent or accept upon themselves His justice, then their punishment will be mitigated. Accordingly, Hashem's anger is aroused only at the time that the sentence is passed, when He sees that the people have not repented or accepted His justice.
</p><p>
(c) Why is it necessary for Hash-m to review the actions of the entire world in a single moment? Perhaps the reason is, as the <b>RAMBAM</b> writes (in Hilchos Teshuvah 3:2), that justice is passed not only on individuals but also on entire nations, and also on the entire world as a single entity. If the sins of the world outweigh the Mitzvos of the world, then the world will be destroyed, as occurred in the times of Noach (as the verse states, 'Ki Rabah Ra'as ha'Adam ba'Aretz,' which can be translated as, 'The evil of mankind has become the majority (outnumbering the good deeds of mankind)' (Bereishis 6:5)). In order to judge the world as a whole, Hash-m must review the actions of the entire world at the same moment, as a single entity.
</p><p>
According to this explanation, perhaps the Gemara is referring to two different judgments. The judgment in which people pass before Hash-m one at a time is the judgment of the individual. The judgment for which the king is not made to wait outside is his judgment as an individual. Similarly, when Hash-m judges nations, the nation that is most honorable is judged first, before the others. When the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah says that Hash-m reviews the actions of the entire world at one moment, it is referring to the judgment that Hash-m passes upon the entire world as a whole. (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>


<font><b>3) THE ARGUMENT OF THE NATIONS AT THE FINAL JUDGMENT</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara relates that the Romans will come forth on the final Day of Judgment and claim that they deserve to be rewarded for building so many markets and bathhouses and amassing a large amount of gold and silver, all for the sake of providing the Jewish people with the ability to learn the Torah unhindered. Hash-m will reply to them, 'Foolish ones! You did everything for your own benefit! You made markets to house prostitutes, bathhouses for personal indulgence, and the gold and silver that you amassed is Mine!' A similar dialogue will take place between Hash-m and the nation of Paras (Persia).
</p><p>
How, on the final Day of Judgment, will these nations have the audacity to blatantly lie before Hash-m and claim that all that they did was for the sake of the Jewish people? Will they not realize that the One Who knows all sees that their words are all lies?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>TORAS CHAIM</b> explains that the nations will not say that what they did was <i>only</i> for the sake of the Jewish people, but rather that the Jewish people were also beneficiaries of their deeds. The Romans will claim that their markets were constructed for all of the members of the nation to use, including the Jews, and therefore they deserve to be rewarded for building markets from which the Jews benefited. The bathhouses, and the gold and silver, were also used to benefit the entire nation, including the Jews.
</p><p>
Hash-m will respond to them that their intentions were not to build markets to benefit the nation by providing them with an easy source of food and income, but rather they built them in order to provide a gathering place for prostitutes, a purpose which in no way benefited those who observed the Torah. The bathhouses were constructed not in order to make it easier to clean oneself, but in order to provide a means of self-indulgence. This, too, is not something that benefited the Jews who observed the Torah.
</p><p>
The gold and silver, Hash-m will point out, was not amassed by their efforts. All of the efforts that one puts into amassing wealth are of no value if Hash-m does not grant him the wealth (as is evident from the fact that sometimes a minor act may result in tremendous profit, and great effort may result in tremendous loss).
</p><p>
Therefore, they do not deserve reward for supporting the study of Torah.
</p><p>
The <b>BEN YEHOYADA</b> adds that even if the Romans will not try to claim that they built markets to provide support for the kingdom but rather to provide a gathering place for prostitutes, they still will be able to claim that this benefited those who studied the Torah. The Gemara in Makos (24b) relates that when Rebbi Akiva heard the loud merry-making and revelry of a Roman party, he laughed and said, 'If Hash-m provides such indulgence in this world to those who transgress His word, then all the more so will He provide reward to those who observe His word!' The Romans, on the final Day of Judgment, will claim that their over-indulgent practices provided an incentive for the Jews to study the Torah, based on Rebbi Akiva's logic. Hashem's response will be that this was not their true intention, and therefore they will not be rewarded for it.
</p><p>
According to these explanations, the Romans will try to 'fool' Hash-m, as it were, by claiming that their intentions were more well-meaning than they actually were, even though they do not say blatant lies.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>BRISKER RAV</b> (end of <b>CHIDUSHEI HA'GRIZ <b><b>AL</b></b> HA'TORAH</b>), in the name of his father, <b>RAV CHAIM</b>, cites the <b>RAMBAM</b> (in the introduction to Perush ha'Mishnayos) who asks that if Hashem's greatest desire is for people to serve Him, then why are most of the people in the world involved in the pursuit of personal desires? How could Hash-m have created so many 'unsuccessful' creations relative to the number of 'successful' ones?
</p><p>
The Rambam explains that even those who do not busy themselves with understanding the ways of Hash-m are also accomplishing an important purpose in the world. Whether or not they realize it, they are in the world in order to provide for the others who are trying to follow the ways of Hash-m and who do not have time to involve themselves in all of the mundane activities necessary to live in the world. For example, if a very wealthy and lazy person commands his servants to build for him a beautiful palace and plant for him beautiful trees, it is possible that Hash-m willed this to happen just so that when one righteous person comes to that place many years later, he will be able to rest in the shade of the walls of that palace and protect himself from the heat of the sun. (See Insights to Berachos 6b.)
</p><p>
Although a person normally does not realize that this is the purpose of the great wealth of the wicked, Hash-m sees all of this from the start. On the final Day of Judgment this will become revealed to the nations of the world as well. This is why they will claim that all of the markets and bathhouses that they built were built for the Jews who study the Torah. They do not mean to say that this was their conscious intention. Rather, they mean that this was the reason that Hash-m enabled them to build them. Hash-m will reply to them that while this is true, nevertheless -- since their conscious intention was for personal gain -- they do not deserve to be rewarded for the benefit that the Jews received from them.
</p><p>
(The Brisker Rav there gives an example of this that occurred in his time. The Russian government commissioned the construction of the massive Trans-Siberian Railway, spanning from Moscow to Vladivostok, and which was completed in the early 1900's. The Brisker Rav states that, in hindsight, the Divine purpose of that massive undertaking became evident; it was to save the lives of a large group of Yeshiva students who managed to flee from Poland and Lithuania to Japan and escape the Nazi death sentence.)
</p><p>


<font><b>4) MODERN WORLD POWERS</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Beraisa presents the arguments of the Roman and Persian nations at the time of their final judgment. The Beraisa does not mention the arguments of the other nations. The Gemara explains that the Beraisa mentions only the arguments of Rome and Persia because those two nations are the most esteemed, since their dominion will last until Mashi'ach comes.
</p><p>
Modern western civilization is, to a great degree, based upon the foundations of ancient Rome and the Holy Roman Empire, and thus the nation of Rome is considered to still retain power today. However, what dominion does Paras (Persia) still have today? The modern nation of Persia (now known as Iran) is a single nation like any other and is not a world power. Moreover, the Chachamim teach that the nation of Yavan (Greece) took control of the world from Persia. It seems clear that Persia will <i>not</i> remain in power until the arrival of Mashi'ach. (<b>TOSFOS RID</b>, Mahadura Kama)
</p><p>
ANSWER: The <b>IBN EZRA</b> in Daniel (7:14) discusses Daniel's dream of four powerful animals, an allusion to the four powerful nations that will rule the world. The Chachamim (in Vayikra Rabah 13:5) explain that the animals allude to the nations of Bavel (Babylon), Paras (Persia), Yavan (Greece), and Romi (Rome). The Ibn Ezra wonders why the Chachamim do not identify one of the powerful nations as the nation of Yishmael, since the descendants of Yishmael were a world power from about six hundred years after the Churban (they conquered Yerushalayim in the year 638 C.E.).
</p><p>
The <b>RAMBAN</b> (in Bamidbar 24:20, Chavel edition) answers that perhaps the dominion of Yishmael will end before Mashi'ach comes. Moreover, the Romans were the ones who exiled the Jews in the present Galus; the nation of Yishmael added no new element of exile, nor did they take over all of the countries into which the Jews were exiled.
</p><p>
Others, however, give a different answer to the question of the Ibn Ezra. The <b>TOSFOS RID</b> (Avodah Zarah 2b, Mahadura Tinyana) explains that that the kingdom of Yishmael is included in what the Chachamim describe as the kingdom of Persia. Regarding the question of how Persia still may be considered a world power if Yavan conquered it, the Tosfos Rid answers that Yavan conquered the portion of Persia which was subjugating the Jews in Eretz Yisrael at the time. However, the kingdom of Persia remained in control of all of the other North African and Middle Eastern countries. The nations of Rome and Persia will remain in control of their respective areas in which Jews live until the coming of Mashi'ach. (The <b>MAHARAL</b> has a similar approach.)
</p><p>
According to this approach, the two nations whose dominion will last until Mashi'ach are the two other descendants of Avraham and Yitzchak -- Yishmael and Esav. They are considered the leaders of all of the other nations (see Insights to Sukah 55:2, Sotah 13:1:c). This is why Hash-m offered the Torah specifically to those two nations before He gave it to the Jewish people (see <b>RASHI</b> to Devarim 33:2).
</p><p>
As the <b>CHIDA</b> writes (in <b>NACHAL KEDUMIM</b>), the Jewish people responded to Hashem's offer with the words 'Na'aseh v'Nishma' to counter those two nations. They said 'Na'aseh' to counter Esav, and 'Nishma' to counter Yishmael. 
</p><p>


lvr: 48
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) THE REVOCATION OF THE SEVEN MITZVOS OF BNEI NOACH</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara relates that when Hash-m saw that the Bnei Noach did not observe the seven Mitzvos that were given to them, He 'permitted' those acts to them at the time He gave the Torah to the Jewish people. The Gemara asks why Hash-m would make it easier for them as a result of their lack of compliance. The Gemara answers that Hash-m did not make it easier for them; rather, Hash-m decreed that even if they observe those Mitzvos, they will not receive reward in the same way that one who is commanded to fulfill a Mitzvah receives reward. Instead, they will receive reward as one who is not commanded to fulfill a Mitzvah.
</p><p>
Why should they not receive reward as one who is commanded? The Gemara implies that Bnei Noach are <i>not</i> permitted to do whatever they want, and that they <i>will</i> be punished for violating the seven Mitzvos. Why, then, will they not receive reward for their fulfillment of their Mitzvos as one who is commanded receives reward?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>NACHALAS MOSHE</b> in Bava Kama (38a) explains that the reason why a person receives greater reward for fulfilling Mitzvos which he is commanded to fulfill is that a person who is not commanded to fulfill a Mitzvah does not put as much effort into its fulfillment; he knows that if he has difficulty fulfilling it, he can stop his efforts and abandon it at any time. In contrast, when a person is commanded to fulfill a Mitzvah, his knowledge that he is obligated to fulfill it creates a greater burden upon him.
</p><p>
Accordingly, since the Bnei Noach demonstrated that the Mitzvos did <i>not</i> create any burden on them, they are not entitled to the reward of one who is commanded, even though they indeed are commanded. (This might be the reason why <b>TOSFOS</b> here and in Kidushin (31a, DH Gadol) explains the logic for why a greater reward is given to one who fulfills a Mitzvah which he is commanded to do.)
</p><p>
However, this does not seem to be the intention of <b>RASHI</b> here. Rashi (DH Lomar) writes that Bnei Noach are <i>not</i> commanded to fulfill their Mitzvos. In Bava Kama (38a), Rashi adds that they do not receive the reward of one who is commanded, since they are <i>not</i> commanded, but they also are not exempt from punishment for failure to fulfill their Mitzvos. Rashi makes a similar comment later in Avodah Zarah (6a, DH Mishum Harvachah). It seems clear from the words of Rashi that although Bnei Noach are <i>not</i> commanded to observe their Mitzvos such that one might have thought that they are not punished for violating them, Hash-m <i>will</i> punish them for violating their Mitzvos. (See also <b>RAMBAM</b> in Perush ha'Mishnayos to Chulin, ch. 7.)
</p><p>
What is the logic behind this? Why should Bnei Noach be punished for failing to fulfill Mitzvos that they are no longer obligated to fulfill? (See <b>TESHUVOS PNEI YEHOSHUA</b> YD 1:3 and EH 2:43, who proposes that Bnei Noach have no obligation today to fulfill the seven Mitzvos. He suggests that the Gemara here means that for the Bnei Noach, the loss of reward for fulfillment of their Mitzvos outweighs the gain of not being commanded, and that is why Hash-m revoked their Mitzvos. However, this explanation contradicts the words of all of the Rishonim who write that a Ben Noach is punished for violating any of the seven Mitzvos, even today, as the Gemara itself implies in many places.)
</p><p>
(b) There are two logical reasons for observing the Mitzvos. The first reason is that the observance of the Mitzvos brings positive benefit to the person and to the world around him. The second reason is that Hash-m commanded man to observe the Mitzvos, and by observing them one shows his deference and submission to Hash-m. (See <b>CHIDUSHEI AGADOS</b> of <b>RAV ELCHANAN WASSERMAN</b> zt'l Hy'd, in the end of <b>KOVETZ HE'OROS</b>.)
</p><p>
Similarly, a Ben Noach must observe the seven Mitzvos because of two reasons. The first is the strong logical basis for observing those Mitzvos: they preserve the peace and welfare of society, and thus he should be motivated to observe them for this reason. The second is that the Torah commands him to observe those Mitzvos. When Hash-m saw that the Bnei Noach were not observing the seven Mitzvos, He removed the second reason for fulfilling them. Bnei Noach now must fulfill their Mitzvos because of the necessity for universal laws of peace and order, but not because Hash-m specifically commanded them to fulfill those Mitzvos. Therefore, when they observe their Mitzvos, they will not be rewarded for fulfilling the second obligating factor (that Hash-m commanded them to observe those Mitzvos). Rather, they will be rewarded only because they are obligated by logic to observe those Mitzvos. If they violate the seven Mitzvos, then they will be punished because of this obligating factor. (The <b>NETZIV</b> in <b>MEROMEI SADEH</b> to Bava Kama 38a offers a similar answer.)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> DOES BAL TOSIF APPLY TO MITZVOS FROM WHICH ONE IS EXEMPT? [Bal Tosif :Zeman Gerama]</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span> Gemara</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> (R. Chanina):</span> One who is commanded and observes is greater than one who is not commanded and observes.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Eruvin 96a (Beraisa):</span> Michal (Sha'ul's daughter, David's wife) used to wear Tefilin, and the wife of Yonah ha'Navi was Olah l'Regel (came to Yerushalayim for the festivals). Chachamim did not protest against either of them.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span> The Tana holds like R. Yosi, who says that Nashim Somchos Reshus (women *may* lean on a Korban before Shechitah, or do other Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zman Gerama (Mitzvos that apply only at certain times).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'> Rosh Hashanah 33a (Mishnah):</span> We do not stop children from blowing a Shofar on Rosh Hashanah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'> Inference:</span> We stop women from blowing.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'> Contradiction (Beraisa):</span> We do not stop women or children from blowing on Yom Tov.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'> Answer (Abaye):</span> Our Mishnah is like R. Yehudah. The Beraisa is like R. Yosi and R. Shimon;</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> (Beraisa - R. Yehudah):</span> 'Benei Yisrael' do Semichah, but Benos Yisrael do not;</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span> R. Yosi and R. Shimon say, Semichah is optional for women.</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span> Rishonim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> Rambam (Hilchos Tzitzis 3:9):</span> A woman is exempt from Tzitzis. If she wants to wear Tzitzis without a Berachah, she may. Similarly, if she performs any Mitzvah from which she is exempt without a Berachah, we do not protest.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Hagahos Maimoniyos (30):</span> Chachamim did not object to women who fulfilled Mitzvos from which they are exempt (Eruvin 96a). Michal wore Tefilin and Yonah's wife was Olah l'Regel. The Yerushalmi says that Chachamim objected. I heard from a Gadol that we protest only where there is concern for transgression, e.g. Chulin ba'Azarah, Ervah (her hair might show), or blowing a Shofar on Rosh Hashanah, which is Shevus (if it is not a Mitzvah). Where there is no concern, such as Sukah and Lulav, we do not protest.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Ran (Rosh Hashanah 9b DH ul'Inyan Halachah):</span> Even though the Stam Mishnah forbids women to blow (or do Semichah), we find that Chachamim did not object to Michal and Yonah's wife. We rely on what was done in practice. Women may blow a Shofar; we are not concerned for Shevus or Bal Tosif</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'> Shiltei ha'Giborim (Rosh Hashanah 9b 3):</span> We stop women from blowing the Shofar, even on Yom Tov. Mori says that this is only if they bless, for then they intend for the Mitzvah and transgress Bal Tosif. The same applies to Tefilin and every Mitzvah they are exempt from. I proved that they do not transgress, for a man does not transgress (Bal Tosif) for putting them on in the wrong place, and a Yisrael does not transgress for giving Birkas Kohanim, since he is not commanded. Women may not blow on Rosh Hashanah, just like men may not blow on any other Shabbos or Yom Tov, or even move a Shofar. Women may not wear Tefilin even without a Berachah, for this is like deviators who expound verses unlike Chachamim do.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Rashi (Rosh Hashanah 33a DH Ha):</span> The Gemara says that we stop women from blowing the Shofar. They are exempt from Mitzvas Aseh sheha'Zman Gerama. If they blow, Bal Tosif applies.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Question (Maharsha):</span> Bal Tosif applies only to doing a Mitzvah, and adding! Rashi should have said that mid'Rabanan, women may not blow not for the sake of a Mitzvah. R. Yehudah says that women may not do Semichah, for this is using Kodshim not for the sake of a Mitzvah. He did not say that it is Bal Tosif!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Tosfos (Eruvin 96a DH Michal):</span> The Ri disagrees. R. Yehudah agrees that Hilni sat in a Sukah (Sukah 2b)! However, perhaps she sat to be with her children, so it does not look like Bal Tosif. Alternatively, Rava taught that not at the time of the Mitzvah, one transgresses Bal Tosif only with intent. A woman is exempt, so it is as if it is not the time for the Mitzvah. This is difficult. Rather, the one who forbids women holds that Tefilin requires a clean body, and they are not zealous enough. If a woman would bring Olas Re'iyah (the obligatory Korban for Olei Regalim), it would look like Chulin b'Azarah. Alternatively, women may enter the Azarah only for a need. Blowing a Shofar is a Melachah mid'Rabanan. Semichah looks like unnecessary use of a Korban, even if it is done lightly.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'> Rashba (Eruvin 96a DH mide'Lo):</span> If Bal Tosif applies to Semichah and Tefilin, it should apply also to Sukah! Rather, since men are commanded about Mitzvos, it is not Bal Tosif for women. It is a leniency to exempt them, just like (R. Yehudah holds that) a blind person is exempt from all Mitzvos, but he does not transgress Bal Tosif.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Ohr Some'ach (Hilchos Sukah 2:1 DH Hinei):</span> Regarding Semichah, we cannot say that it is time for the Mitzvah. It is not a bodily obligation. Rather, when a man brings a Korban, he must do Semichah. Also for women it is not the time. They may not do Semichah, for it is Avodah with Kodshim. We compare this to other Mitzvos from which they are exempt, which they may not do for another reason, i.e. Bal Tosif. Rashi did not mention Bal Tosif regarding Semichah. If for women it is as if it is not the time of the Mitzvah, so Bal Tosif applies only with intent, what was the Gemara's proof from Tefilin to Semichah (which is not due to Bal Tosif)? Rather, Sukah is not a bodily Chiyuv. (After the first night.) if one does not eat a fixed meal, he need not eat in the Sukah. Tefilin is a bodily obligation, so it is the time also for women. Do not say that Michal did not intend for the Mitzvah of Tefilin, for in any case it looks like she adds. For what does she wear them?! Regarding Sukah, it looks like she is there for her children.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Pri Megadim (Petichah Koleles to Shulchan Aruch, 1:40):</span> Rashi and Tosfos hold that when woman do an Aseh sheha'Zman Gerama and bless, they intend for a Mitzvah mid'Rabanan, not for a Torah Mitzvah. Or, Bal Tosif applies only to adding part to a Torah Mitzvah. One should tell women that they are exempt.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'> Tosfos Rid (Avodah Zarah 3a DH Lomar):</span> Our Gemara teaches that one who is exempt and fulfills gets some reward. Why do we say that a Chasan who is exempt from Shma should not read? Why does it say that Chachamim did not protest against Michal for wearing Tefilin? Why should they protest?! She gets reward! A Chasan should not read, for it looks like haughtiness. There is room to protest against Michal due to Bal Tosif, i.e. like the Tana'im who forbid women to do Semichah. The Tana'im who permit them to do Semichah hold that Bal Tosif does not apply. They argue about every Mitzvas Aseh sheha'Zman Gerama from which women are exempt. Bal Tosif does not apply to Nochrim.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'> Me'iri (Eruvin 96a DH Kevar):</span> Women may do any Mitzvah from which they are exempt. Likewise, Bal Tosif does not apply to anyone exempt, such as smelters and people who gather dung, who are exempt from Olas Re'iyah (for others cannot bear their smell), and one engaged in another Mitzvah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Ohr Some'ach (DH Lachen):</span> Even if Bal Tosif applies to women doing Mitzvos from which they are exempt, this does not apply to Talmud Torah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Shevet ha'Levi (8:1):</span> Sefer ha'Machri'a says that the Halachah follows R. Yosi, and he agrees that if women intend for the Mitzvah, Bal Tosif applies. If so, why did Abaye answer that our Stam Mishnah is R. Yehudah? He should have said that it is like R. Yosi, whom the Halachah follows, and it forbids when they intend for the Mitzvah!</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span> Poskim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> Shulchan Aruch (OC 589:6):</span> Even though women are exempt, they may blow the Shofar.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Rema:</span></p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Beis Yosef (589 DH v'Af and DH v'Chosav ha'Rav):</span> The Ran and Rosh say that just like women may do Semichah, without concern for Avodah with Kodshim, they may do any Aseh sheha'Zman Gerama, without concern for Bal Tosif or Shevus of Teki'ah. R. Yeshayah says that if a woman blesses, she shows that it is a Chiyuv, and she transgresses Bal Tosif and a Berachah l'Vatalah. Regarding Bal Tosif, this is not true.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Birkei Yosef (OC 589:2):</span> Bal Tosif does not apply to Semichah, for even R. Yosi permits women to do Semichah only loosely. It is not proper Semichah. However, Korban Aharon says that R. Yosi permits women to do proper Semichah, so Bal Tosif could apply. The Gemara mentioned Avodah with Kodshim regarding Semichah on another's Korban in the Ezras Nashim, which was not real Semichah.</p>
<p class='seealso'>See also:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>MAY WOMEN FULFILL MITZVOS ASEH SHEHA'ZMAN GERAMA? (Kidushin 29)</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>WOMEN ARE EXEMPT FROM MITZVOS ASEH SHEHA'ZMAN GERAMA (Kidushin 35)</p>
<p class='otherhalachos'>Other Halachos relevant to this Daf:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>PAIN EXEMPTS FROM SUKAH (Sukah 25)</p>
<p class='normal'></p>


lvr: 48
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) THE LAUGHTER OF HASH-M</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara relates that the only time Hash-m laughs, as it were, at his creations is on the final Day of Judgment when the nations of the world reject the Mitzvah of Sukah or throw off their Tefilin, Tzitzis, and Mezuzos to go and join the war of Gog u'Magog.
</p><p>
What is the meaning of Hashem's laughter, and what exactly provokes His laughter at these times?
</p><p>
ANSWER: Laughter occurs when a person is faced with a sudden revelation of the truth which he realizes is the opposite of what he had expected. When Sarah was informed that she would bear a child, she laughed, saying, 'After I have become aged, I am becoming young again' (Bereishis 18:12). The reversal of the aging process and her ability to bear a child provoked laughter.
</p><p>
This is what brings about Hashem's laughter on the Day of Judgment. The evildoers of the nations who attempted to prevent the Jewish people from fulfilling the Mitzvos will display themselves as righteous in their own eyes and in the eyes of others. The nations of the world torment the Jewish people by saying that Hash-m rejected them and they deserve whatever punishment they receive. The nations claim that they are just and G-d-fearing, and that is why they have been given dominion in this world. The epitome of their audacity will occur on the final Day of Judgment when the nations will feign wholehearted acceptance of the Mitzvos of Hash-m. When it becomes too difficult for them and they eagerly reject the Mitzvos, their true intentions will be revealed. When the truth is revealed and the nations are suddenly shown -- to the eyes of all -- to shun the Mitzvos of Hash-m, Hash-m will laugh, as it were.
</p><p>
In this world, the evildoer is often granted all of his worldly needs, which conceals Hashem's disapproval of his ways. The evildoer's downfall and defeat in this world is an exception to the normal way in which Hash-m conducts this world. That is why Hash-m does not express His laughter until the end of days.
</p><p>
The laughter and rejoicing of Purim is based on a similar concept. Until the very end of the story of Purim, Hash-m concealed His presence. It seemed as though He had abandoned His people. Suddenly, the truth became revealed and it became obvious to all that Hash-m still watches and protects His people, even in times of exile. The downfall of Haman and Amalek was felt throughout the entire world, and it provided a spark of the revelation of the ultimate fall of evil that will occur at the end of days.
</p><p>
The <b>SEFER YETZIRAH</b> writes that the month of Adar corresponds to the spleen ('Techol') in the body. This is because the spleen is connected to laughter (Berachos 61b). Moreover, the month of Adar corresponds to the letter 'Kuf,' which means 'monkey,' an animal that provokes laughter by doing acts that seem humanlike. In this sense, the monkey represents the wicked who make themselves appear to be equal to the righteous in this world, but who actually will be revealed to be no better than animals.
</p><p>
The author of the Gemara's statement here is Rebbi Yitzchak, who, in the spirit of his own name, discusses the laughter of Hash-m. The name of Yitzchak Avinu reflects his attributes as well. The attribute of Yitzchak is Din, strict justice. It is when the full and complete justice of Hash-m is revealed that Hash-m laughs at the downfall of the wicked.
</p><p>
The Gemara in Megilah (15b) relates that Haman had 208 children. This number corresponds to the Gematriya of 'Yitzchak,' since Haman attempted to destroy the Jewish nation and prevent true justice from being realized. He thought that his power would remain eternally. When, in the end, Hash-m brought about Haman's downfall with a sudden turn of events and the true justice of Hash-m was revealed, the Jews had the 'last laugh.' (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>


<font><b>3) AGADAH: LAUGHING WITH THE LEVIATHAN, LEARNING WITH THE CHILDREN, AND RIDING THE CHERUB</b></font>
<br>QUESTIONS: Rebbi Yitzchak states that Hash-m expresses laughter, as it were, only on the final Day of Judgment (see previous Insight). The Gemara questions this statement from the words of Rav Yehudah in the name of Rav, who says that during the last three hours of the day, Hash-m 'laughs with the Livyasan (Leviathan),' as the verse says (Tehilim 104:26). The Gemara answers that 'with His creations (Im Beriyosav) He laughs,' while 'on His creations (Al Beriyosav) He does not laugh' until the final Day of Judgment.
</p><p>
The Gemara continues and says that from the time of the destruction of the Beis ha'Mikdash, Hash-m does not laugh with the Livyasan during the last four hours of the day, but rather during that time He learns Torah with the children ('Tinokos Shel Beis Raban').
</p><p>
The Gemara then asks what Hash-m does during the night hours. One opinion says that He performs activities similar to those that He does during the day. A second opinion says that He 'rides His light-footed Cherub' ('Keruv Kal') and flies through 18,000 worlds. The third opinion says that He sits and listens to the Shirah emanating from the Chayos.
</p><p>
This series of Agadic statements is one of the most perplexing in all of the Gemara. Some of the more basic questions that must be addressed are:
</p><p>
(a) If Hash-m does not approve of laughter in this world, then why does He laugh with the Beriyos?
</p><p>
(b) In what way does teaching the Tinokos Shel Beis Raban provide a replacement for the Sechok, the laughter, with the Livyasan?
</p><p>
(c) What does the Gemara mean when it says that Hash-m 'rides his Keruv Kal' through 18,000 worlds? What source is there for the existence of many worlds, and what is their significance?
</p><p>
(d) What is Hashem's purpose in listening to the Shirah from the Chayos at night?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The first step in understanding the Gemara is clarifying the difference between laughter 'with His creations' and laughter 'on His creations.' The Sechok of Hash-m (as explained in the previous Insight) refers to the revelation of the complete truth, which will occur at the moment the world will behold the destruction of all evil. This laughter is the 'Sechok Al Beriyosav,' Hashem's laughter <i>at</i> His creations. The Sechok comes about as a result of the downfall and destruction of the Resha'im.
</p><p>
'Sechok Im Beriyosav' involves a similar concept but works in a slightly different way. This expression refers to when Hash-m brings salvation <i>not</i> in order to destroy the wicked, but in order to protect the righteous. The Gemara (Megilah 10b) relates that Hash-m does not rejoice when the Resha'im are vanquished. When the verse (Devarim 28:63) says that Hash-m will rejoice, it specifically uses the word 'Yasis' and not 'Sas,' emphasizing that Hash-m will cause <i>others</i> to rejoice at the downfall of the wicked, but He himself will not rejoice. This means that He will bring the downfall of the wicked in order to protect the righteous, but not for the inherent purpose of destroying the wicked themselves. This is the meaning of the expression of 'Sechok Im Beriyosav' -- the destruction of the wicked that comes about <i>for</i> the sake of the righteous, rather than for the purpose of destroying the wicked.
</p><p>
Why will Hash-m rejoice in the destruction of the wicked in the World to Come, but he does not rejoice in their destruction in this world?
</p><p>
The answer to this question is that even what seems evil in this world is not entirely evil. Something entirely evil, with absolutely no positive quality, could not exist in the world. The reason why Hash-m does not rejoice in the downfall of the evil in this world is that the hidden good that is latent in the evil is also being destroyed when the evil is obliterated, and the evildoers no longer have the ability to exercise that positive quality. Their destruction is not an entirely good thing because this element of potential good is also being destroyed. The evildoers are destroyed only to protect the righteous who will suffer at their hands if Hash-m does not remove them from the world.
</p><p>
The Gemara in Sukah (52a) teaches that in the World to Come, Hash-m will slaughter the Yetzer ha'Ra. This means that in the World to Come, all of the good will be separated from the evil, and the pure evil that remains will have no more place in this world and will be destroyed. The world will return to the state it was in before the sin of Adam ha'Rishon. In that state, the Nachash was the embodiment of evil as an external force that was not part of the person himself. At that point in the future, evil will have no more purpose in the world and Hash-m will rejoice at its destruction. (See Insights to Megilah 10:2.)
</p><p>
Hash-m interacted with the world in this manner until the Beis ha'Mikdash was destroyed. There were times when Hash-m brought about a miraculous salvation to the Jews in a way in which the miracle was evident to all, and in a way which showed that Hash-m protects the Tzadikim. This is the laughter that was produced through the salvation, as explained earlier. However, when the Beis ha'Mikdash was destroyed, Hash-m no longer provided open miracles, even when He showed His salvation to the Jews (as is evident in the miracle of Purim, which was accomplished through 'Hester Panim'). Hence, even when Hash-m saves the Tzadikim, the salvation no longer produces the same laughter. That is what the Gemara means when it says that Hash-m has no laughter, even with His creations, after the Churban.
</p><p>
In what way is Hashem's cessation from laughter after the Churban related to Hashem's laughing with the Livyasan? The <b>RASHBA</b> (in Chidushei Agados to Bava Basra 74b) discusses the deeper meaning of the allusion of the Livyasan. He explains that the Livyasan refers to a person who uses his mind properly to discriminate between good and evil. When the Sechel, the discriminating element of the mind, combines with the Nefesh -- the person's ability to think -- in such a manner, he is referred to as 'Livyasan.' The word 'Livyasan' implies a bond (or 'Chibur'), as in the verse, 'ha'Pa'am <i>Yilaveh</i> Ishi Elai' -- 'Now my husband will become <i>attached</i> to me' (Bereishis 29:34). It also means an adornment worn upon the head, as in the verse, 'Ki Livyas Chen Hem l'Roshecha' -- 'for they shall be an adornment of grace for your head' (Mishlei 1:9). The Livyasan is an allusion to the Tzadikim with whom Hash-m laughs when he destroys the Resha'im in order to provide the Tzadikim with salvation.
</p><p>
(b) After the Churban of the Beis ha'Mikdash, Hash-m does not reveal His presence openly, as He did when the Beis ha'Mikdash was standing, as explained earlier. His presence is revealed through the Torah, through the secrets of Torah she'Ba'al Peh, which He reveals only to the Jewish people and which no other nation is able to understand, as the verse says, 'He did not do this for any other nation, and such laws they cannot understand' (Tehilim 147:20). This is what the Gemara means when it says that instead of laughing with the Livyasan, Hash-m now teaches Torah to the children; He gives them special assistance to understand the Torah. This may also explain why Hashem's salvation comes about through the Tinokos Shel Beis Raban who are studying Torah, as occurred in the times of Mordechai and Esther, as the Midrash teaches (Esther Rabah 7:13, 9:3-4; see Insights to Megilah 16:1 and 16:3).
</p><p>
The <b>BEIS YOSEF</b> (end of OC 560) records an argument between the <b>RAMBAN</b> and <b>RABEINU YONAH</b> regarding whether the prohibition of filling one's mouth with laughter until the final redemption (Berachos 31a) applies even when the Beis ha'Mikdash is standing, or only after the Churban of the Beis ha'Mikdash. It appears that the Rishonim argue about the definition of filling one's mouth with laughter. According to Rabeinu Yonah, who maintains that even in the times of the Beis ha'Mikdash one is prohibited to fill his mouth with laughter, 'filling one's mouth with laughter' refers to laughter 'Al ha'Beriyos,' at the creations. Such laughter will occur only in the future, after the final Day of Judgment. According to the Ramban, who maintains that this prohibition applies only after the Churban but not while the Beis ha'Mikdash is standing, 'filling one's mouth with laughter' refers to laughter 'Im ha'Beriyos,' with the creations. Such laughter <i>does</i> have a place in this world, when the Beis ha'Mikdash is standing. Laughter is permitted as long as Hash-m is revealing Himself at least in the minor way of laughing <i>with</i> the Beriyos (i.e. destroying the Resha'im in order to save the Tzadikim).
</p><p>
(c) What does the Gemara mean when it says that Hash-m rides the 'Keruv Kal' through 18,000 worlds? The <b>IYUN YAKOV</b> points out that the source for the existence of 18,000 worlds is undoubtedly the last verse in Sefer Yechezkel (48:35) which states that 'there are 18,000 surrounding [Hash-m],' which the Gemara (Sanhedrin 97b) explains is a reference to 18,000 Tzadikim who have a place in the innermost circle around Hash-m, even closer to Hash-m than the Mal'achei ha'Shares. The Gemara here refers to these Tzadikim by calling them 'worlds,' because the Tzadik is the foundation of the world, which enables the world to endure, as the verse says, 'Tzadik Yesod Olam' (Mishlei 10:25).
</p><p>
The 'Keruv' alludes to Keneses Yisrael, the love shown to Hash-m by the Jewish people as a whole, just as the two Keruvim in the Beis ha'Mikdash represent the relationship between Hash-m and the Jewish people (see Bava Basra 99a). 'Kal' means light-footed, as in Yehudah ben Teima's statement in Avos (5:20/23), 'Be as light as an eagle (Kal ka'Nesher)' to do the will of Hash-m. The Gemara is teaching that Hashem's bond with, and protection of, the Jewish people is maintained at night, when the people are sleeping and not involved in Mitzvos, because Hash-m remembers the 18,000 Tzadikim in His inner circle, who lived throughout the generations of the history of the Jewish people and who were 'Kal ka'Nesher' to give up their lives for their love of Hash-m.
</p><p>
(d) The other opinion states that at night, during the time when people are not involved in Mitzvos, what preserves the bond between Hash-m and the Jewish people is that Hash-m listens to the songs of praise emanating from the Chayos. The fiery Chayos also represent the Mesirus Nefesh of the Jewish people for Hash-m, for the Jewish people 'burn' with an intense love for Hash-m. Their Shirah, song, is one that rises to Shamayim even while the Jewish people are sleeping. The Gemara (Chagigah 13b) teaches that the Chayos are 'Chayos Esh Memalelos,' which 'are sometimes silent, and sometimes speaking.' The song of the Chayos in Shamayim is aroused by the deeds of the Jewish people below. The praise of the Jewish people for Hash-m is sometimes vocalized, out loud, when they sing praises to Hash-m for His salvation, while sometimes their Shirah arises from their silence, when they are silent in acceptance of Hashem's decrees, such as Aharon's silent acceptance of Hashem's decree when his two sons were killed: 'va'Yidom Aharon' (Vayikra 10:3). Silent acceptance of Hashem's decrees is just as beloved to Hash-m as the songs of praise that are expressed at the time of a salvation. Together, these forms of song comprise the Shirah of the Chayos.
</p><p>
According to this opinion, the bond between Hash-m and His people is preserved at night through the Tzadikim of this world who silently endure their fate, trusting totally in Hash-m. This is especially evident during the night, as the verse says, 'To relate Your kindness in the morning (i.e. the praises of Hash-m for His salvations), and Your trust in the nights (i.e. the expression of our trust in Hash-m during times of darkness)' (Tehilim 92:3). This is the song of the Chayos that Hash-m listens to throughout the night. 
</p><p>


lvr: 48
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) AGADAH: TZADIKIM AND THE SUN</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: Reish Lakish (end of 3b) states that 'in the World to Come, there will be no Gehinom. Rather, Hash-m will remove the sun from its sheath, and the wicked will be scorched by it and the righteous will be healed by it, as it says (Malachi 3:19), 'A sun will come which will burn like a furnace; all the wicked and all the evildoers will be like straw, and the sun will incinerate them.... But a sun of kindness will shine for those who fear Me, with healing in its rays.' Moreover, the righteous will derive pleasure from the sun, as it says (ibid.), '... and you will become sated, as fattened calves entering their pen to feed.''
</p><p>
According to this account, the righteous will not need to be sheltered from the burning sun on the final Day of Judgment. On the contrary, the warmth of that day's sun will be beneficial to them rather than harmful. This, however, seems to contradict Reish Lakish's own description of the events which will take place in the future. In the Midrash (Yalkut Shimoni, Emor #653), Reish Lakish says that 'at that time (in the World to Come) Hash-m will make a Sukah (a shading shelter) for the righteous to protect them from the sun, as it says (Tehilim 27:5), 'He will conceal me in His Sukah on the day of evil; He will hide me in the seclusion of His tent'.' Reish Lakish implies that the sun <i>will</i> be harmful to the Tzadikim, and thus they will need Hash-m to shelter them from it!
</p><p>
How can these two contradictory statements of Reish Lakish be reconciled? Why will the righteous both benefit from the sun and also require shelter from it?
</p><p>
ANSWER: To answer this question, it is necessary to explain why the <i>sun</i> in particular was chosen to be the agent through which Hash-m will administer punishment for the wicked and reward for the righteous. What is meant by the sun's 'sheath,' and why is it normally encased in this sheath? What is represented by the Sukah that Hash-m will construct for the righteous?
</p><p>
The Gemara (Sotah 10a) relates that the word 'Shemesh' ('protector,' as Rashi there explains) may be used as an appellation for Hash-m, as it says, 'Hash-m is a Shemesh and a shield' (Tehilim 84:12). However, the common usage of the word 'Shemesh' is a reference to the 'sun.' Why should the sun be referred to by the same word that denotes its Creator?
</p><p>
The verse states, 'The heavens proclaim the glory of Hash-m... He made a tent in [the heavens] for the sun. The sun appears like a groom coming out of his bridal canopy; it rejoices like an athlete running his course. It emerges from one edge of the sky and it goes around to the other; no one can escape its heat' (Tehilim 19:2-7). In what way do 'the heavens proclaim the glory of Hash-m'? The verse explains that it is through the sun's great might that Hashem's power is demonstrated. This colossal nuclear furnace, which radiates more energy every second than mankind has consumed in history, is the source of all life on earth. Holding in tow the entire solar system through its gravitational pull, the sun's light, heat, and 'wind' of ionized particles affect planets and other bodies billions of miles away. The sun, mankind's only directly observable star, is the greatest public demonstration of the awesome might and glory of Hash-m.
</p><p>
In fact, it was this very display of power that brought ancient civilizations to worship the sun. The Torah, however, teaches that the sun itself can do nothing to change its predetermined, natural course. It persistently 'emerges from one edge of the sky and it goes around to the other.' Instead of worshipping it, The Jew marvels at the great Power Who endows the sun with such tremendous might.
</p><p>
This is why the word 'Shemesh,' which is used to describe Hash-m, was borrowed as a name for the sun, Hashem's great emissary in this world. An emissary is entitled to go by the name of his dispatcher.
</p><p>
In this world, however, the 'sun' -- the demonstration of Hashem's glory to man that the sun represents -- is 'sheathed.' It is still possible to make the mistake of thinking that the sun operates on its own, or that the sun acts according to natural principles that developed spontaneously and randomly. The 'brilliance' of the sun is thus covered up in this world.
</p><p>
In the World to Come, however, Hash-m will take the sun out of its 'sheath.' As the Gemara (Berachos 17a) says, 'In the world to come there will be no eating or drinking; rather, the righteous will sit and delight in the radiance of Hashem's presence.' For the righteous, the experience of closeness to Hash-m will take the place of physical pleasure. They will be able to perceive Hash-m in a way that was not possible in this world. Hence, the sun will be 'taken out of its sheath.' This is the reward for those who have sought throughout their lives to know Hash-m and His ways. Hash-m will reveal His glory to each one of the righteous in the World to Come in accordance with the amount of effort he invested in knowing and understanding Hash-m during his life in this world.
</p><p>
The wicked, on the other hand, will endure disgrace at that time. It will become abundantly clear just how much they distanced themselves from the source of eternal life during their sojourn in this world. On the final Day of Judgment, their disgrace will be revealed to all, and any existence that they merit will be granted to them only through the righteous men whom they despised during their lives. The revelation of Hashem's presence in the World to Come will 'burn' them, due to the their distance from Him.
</p><p>
The reward of the righteous is granted based on an evaluation of how close they were to their Creator during their lives. It therefore stands to reason that even among the righteous, each person's experience in the World to Come will be different. One will be closer to Hash-m than others in certain aspects, while another will be closer in other aspects. The righteous therefore will both 'derive pleasure from the sun (the revelation of the Divine Presence)' for their accomplishments, and 'be burned by the sun' for their failings. Since they are righteous, however, and they at least worked towards 'knowing Hash-m,' He will make them a Sukah to protect them from being scorched for their failings. Thus, Reish Lakish's two statements actually complement each other. The righteous will both be rewarded by the sun, and yet they will need protection from it.
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> PAYING BACK PIECEMEAL [loans: payment: partial]</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span> Gemara</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> Question:</span> 'Rak Eschem Yodati... Al Ken Efkod Aleichem Es Kol Avonoseichem' - one does not afflict his beloved!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Answer (R. Avahu):</span> I explain through a parable. A man lent to someone he loves and to someone he hates. He collects from his friend bit by bit, and he collects from the other all at once.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Bava Basra 102b (Mishnah):</span> If one was Makdish his field at a time when Yovel applies, the redemption price is 50 Shekalim for a Beis Kor. Ditches or rocks in it are redeemed like a field only if they are less than 10 Tefachim deep or tall.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'> Question:</span> (When they are 10, granted they are judged separately from the field, but still) they should be redeemed according to the fixed price!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'> Answer (Rav Ukva bar Chama):</span> The case is, the ditches are full of water, and cannot be sown. (Therefore, they are not redeemed like fields.)</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'> 172a (Rava):</span> If one has two loan documents for 50 each, and wants to convert them to one document of 100, we do not do so. This helps the lender, for (if the borrower pays half,) it pressures the borrower to finish paying (lest the lender claim the entire 100 from him). It helps the borrower, for (if he pays half,) the lender's document will be blemished (and he must swear to collect the rest).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'> Bava Metzia 77b (Rava):</span> If one paid a debt of 100 Zuz, one Zuz at a time, the debt is paid, but the lender may bear a grudge, for he loses this way.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'> Kidushin 20b - Question (Rav Huna bar Chinena):</span> If one sold Bayis Ir Chomah (a house in a walled city), can he partially redeem it? Do we learn 'Ge'ulaso-Ge'ulaso' from a Sedei Achuzah (a field that one inherited from his ancestors) that was sold, which cannot be partially redeemed? Or, perhaps there the Torah said that partial redemption does not work, but here it did not say so?</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'> Answer (Rav Sheshes - Beraisa):</span> The repetition 'v'Im Pado Yifdeh' teaches that one may partially redeem his Sedei Achuzah from Hekdesh;</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span> R. Shimon says, if one sold his field and did not redeem it before Yovel, it reverts to him in Yovel. Therefore, he may not partially redeem it. If one was Makdish his field and does not redeem it before Yovel, it is given to the Kohanim. Therefore, he may partially redeem it.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> (Culmination of answer):</span> Similarly, one may partially redeem Bayis Ir Chomah, for after one year, he cannot redeem it.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'> Erchin 21b:</span> Some prefer to buy orphans' property sold to pay a (Kesuvah of a) woman, for she prefers to receive the money little by little.</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span> Rishonim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> Rambam (Hilchos Malveh 23:17):</span> If David had two loan documents of 50 each, and asked to convert them to one document for 100, we do not do so. It is the borrower's privilege that there are two documents, so David cannot force him in Din to pay all at once.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Rambam (Hilchos Mechirah 8:6):</span> If one bought something and paid and erred about the amount, and later the seller says 'you gave to me 90, not 100', the sale is valid, and he pays the remaining 10 even after many years.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Rosh (Bava Metzia 6:8):</span> Rava teaches that the lender cannot demand to be paid at once. We also learn from above; we said that one can pay half the price now, and the rest after several years.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'> Mordechai (Bava Metzia 352):</span> Some learn from Rava that one can pay a debt one Zuz at a time. Others learn from Avodah Zarah that one cannot. This is not a proof. We can say that he lent to him for a set time. He collects from his friend before the time, bit by bit, and does not collect from the other until it is due, and then he collects all at once. In Erchin we say that a woman prefers to be paid little by little. This connotes that normal creditors do not take a little at a time.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'> Ran (Kidushin 7b DH Garsinan Taught, and Teshuvas Rashba):</span> If there is no source to say otherwise, we say that one can partially redeem Bayis Ir Chomah. Some derive that one who gave his field for collateral can pay half at a time. However, some say that even regarding Sedei Achuzah, he does not get back half now. It is half redeemed only to ensure that half will not go to Kohanim in Yovel. The Rashbam (103a DH Likadshu) agrees. He explains that we asked 'we should be able to redeem the rocks by themselves, for they are like a separate field!' Even if it is all one field, one can partially redeem it! We must say that one who redeems part of one field receives nothing now. Also the Ramban says so. Surely one may partially redeem without getting back half, for Rava taught that piecemeal payment is payment.</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span> Poskim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> Rema (YD 172:3):</span> Any Mashkanta cannot be partially redeemed. If the borrower paid part, the lender eats the Peros until he is fully paid.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Shach (22):</span> 'Cannot' is a textual error. It should say *can* be redeemed, like Teshuvas ha'Rashba and Shulchan Aruch (CM 74:4).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Gra (15):</span> The text is correct. In this sense (to get back half the Mashkanta), it cannot be partially redeemed. According to the Shach, it should say '*in any case*, if he partially redeemed...'</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Shulchan Aruch (CM 74:4):</span> If David lent to Levi for a set time, and within the time Levi wanted to repay bit by bit, some say that David cannot demand to be paid only at once. Piecemeal payment is payment, just David has a grievance against him.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> SMA (10):</span> David's grievance is 'had you paid me at once, I would have spent the money profitably to buy merchandise.'</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Beis Yosef (DH v'Im):</span> The Rif did not bring Rava's teaching. Perhaps he holds that Rava discusses one who accepted piecemeal payment, but one need not accept it. The Rosh says that he must accept payment. Also Ba'al ha'Itur says so. If not, why does he have complaints? If he wants, he need not accept the money! In Kidushin, we say that one may partially redeem Bayis Ir Chomah, unless we learn from Sedei Achuzah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'> Shach (17):</span> The Rif explains that Rava teaches that piecemeal payment is valid b'Di'eved, i.e. if David accepted partial payment, he cannot say 'take it back, and you are liable (for any loss) until you pay all of it at once.' The Rambam and Semag rule that if David wants to convert two loan documents of 50 to one document for 100', we do not, for now David cannot force Levi to pay all at once. Sefer ha'Terumos explains that (even with one document) David cannot force Levi to pay all at once. Rather, Levi fears to pay part at a time, lest David deny the partial payment. The Rambam and Semag hold that David can force him to pay at once. We must say that Levi wants to pay partially within the time, and David demands payment all at once. If the loan was already due, even if there are two documents David can force him to pay at once. (The Bach (53:1) understood that the Rambam discusses after payment is due, therefore, he found the Rambam difficult.) The Rambam did not need to bring Rava's law, for Rava discusses b'Di'eved, and it follows from what the Rambam wrote in Hilchos Mechirah. I say that also the Rosh can agree with the Rif. The Rosh says that Rava's law follows from above, that one can pay half the price now, and the rest after several years. This does not show that a lender must accept partial payment l'Chatchilah! However, if so, why did the Tur rule like Ba'al ha'Itur, unlike the Rosh? One can resolve this with difficulty.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'> Beis Yosef (DH Kosav):</span> The Rashba (3:37) says that if Reuven owed Shimon in currency A, and paid part in another currency B, and now Shimon wants to consider what was paid based on the current value of currency B, and Reuven wants to consider it based on its value at the time he paid, Reuven is correct. What he paid was payment, not a deposit.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</span> However, if Levi gave a field or two for collateral, he cannot force David to return half the collateral for half the money.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Beis Yosef (DH u'Mah she'Chosav):</span> Sefer ha'Terumos says so in the name of the Ramban, and that Bava Basra 107a proves this. In Kidushin, we say that one may partially redeem, i.e. pay half the money, but the buyer keeps the field until it is fully redeemed. The Rashbam (DH Likadshu) agrees. Another version of Sefer ha'Terumos says that some disagree. He equates securities of Metaltelim and land.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'> Taz:</span> In a Stam loan, David eats the Peros and deducts them from the loan. He can say that he prefers to work and eat the Peros of the entire field. If Levi gave a security of Metaltelim, David must return half due to Midas Sedom.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'> Shach (18):</span> David does not eat the Peros, yet he may keep the field to pressure Levi to pay fully. If David eats the Peros, even after full payment he keeps the field until the set time (Sa'if 3), unless the custom in this place is that the borrower can redeem it early.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'> Rema:</span> Likewise, if the time for payment came, David need not accept piecemeal payment.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Source (Gra 16):</span> We learn from Avodah Zarah and Erchin.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> SMA (11):</span> It is not really likewise! Before payment was due, David must accept piecemeal payment (but he keeps the entire Mashkanta)! The Rema means, just like David has the upper hand before the loan is due regarding the security (he keeps all of it), he has the upper hand after it is due and need not accept piecemeal payment! The Mordechai proves this.</p>
<p class='seealso'>See also:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>PARTIAL REDEMPTION (Kidushin 20)</p>
<p class='otherhalachos'>Other Halachos relevant to this Daf:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>FINISHING TEFILAH AFTER THE TIME (Sanhedrin 105)</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>ASKING HASH-M TO HELP OR PUNISH RESHA'IM (Ta'anis 23)</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>WHEN MAY ONE BE MOSER? (Gitin 7)</p>
<p class='normal'></p>


lvr: 48
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) HASHEM'S ANGER</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara relates that Hashem's anger lasts for an extremely short moment of time (at most, the length of time needed to pronounce two syllables). Bil'am wanted to curse the Jewish people during that inauspicious moment of Hashem's wrath. What curse could Bil'am possibly utter in such a short amount of time? (See also Insights to Berachos 7:1.)
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Rega k'Meimra), in the name of Rebbi Eliyahu, says that as long as Bil'am's curse would begin during the time of Hashem's anger, the rest of the curse would also be effective.
</p><p>
(b) Tosfos here and in Berachos (7a, DH she'Ilmalei) gives another answer. Bil'am could have said the word, 'Kalem' -- 'Destroy them!' in that short amount of time. Tosfos adds that according to this explanation, Hash-m not only 'reversed the curse' (Devarim 23:6) in the figurative sense, but he literally reversed it. Instead of saying 'Kalem' ('destroy them'), Bil'am said, 'Melech' (Bamidbar 23:21). (The Hebrew letters of 'Kalem,' when reversed, spell 'Melech'.)
</p><p>
This approach explains the Gemara in Horayos (10b). The Gemara there teaches that a person should engage himself in the study and practice of the Torah even if his motives are insincere, for he will eventually develop a sincere motivation. The Gemara demonstrates the value of even the insincere service of Hash-m with the fact that as a result of the 42 sacrifices that Balak offered to Hash-m, he merited to have Ruth among his descendants. Rashi explains that the significance of this statement is that David ha'Melech, Ruth's great-grandson, descended from Balak. (See Insights to Nazir 23:3-4.)
</p><p>
This may be the deeper meaning behind Tosfos' statement here that Bil'am's curse of 'Kalem' was reversed and became a blessing, 'Melech.' The very sacrifices which Bil'am had advised Balak to bring in the hope that they would lead to Moav's victory over the Jewish people (represented by the word 'Kalem') achieved the opposite result. They led to the birth of David ha'Melech who would later lead the Jewish people in the defeat of their enemies, including Moav! (M. Kornfeld) 
</p><p>


lvr: 48
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) AGADAH: 'ULAH/OLAH SHEL TESHUVAH'</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Gemara quotes the verse, '[These are the last words of David,] the word of David, son of Yishai, and the word the man who was set up on high (Al)' (Shmuel II 23:1). The Gemara reads the word 'Al' ('on high') as 'Ol,' and it derives from the verse that David ha'Melech raised the 'Ol' of Teshuvah. What exactly does the Gemara mean?
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI</b> in the Ein Yakov (Moed Katan 16b) explains that 'Ol' means purpose. The <b>RIF</b> in the Ein Yakov there explains that David ha'Melech established Teshuvah as a goal among the Jewish people. The Gemara here earlier explains that David's repentance showed that even when one is not part of a Tzibur (on whom Hash-m has more mercy) his Teshuvah still is accepted. This 'raised' the 'purpose' of Teshuvah among the Jewish people and showed them that even an individual's repentance is accepted by Hash-m.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>TORAS CHAIM</b> explains that raising the 'Ol' means that David ha'Melech accepted upon himself the yoke ('Ol'), or burden, of having to do Teshuvah for his sins. The <b>IYUN YAKOV</b> gives a similar explanation and notes that David accepted upon himself six months of affliction in order to atone for his sins (see Sanhedrin 107a).
</p><p>
<b>RAV YITZCHAK HUTNER</b> zt'l (in <b>PACHAD YITZCHAK</b>, Yom ha'Kipurim 11:6) gives a similar explanation. He adds that the acceptance of the yoke of Teshuvah is not merely a personal matter. Rather, it is a communal matter, because the coming of Mashi'ach depends on whether the people are righteous or not. David ha'Melech realized that he had to accept the yoke of Teshuvah not just for himself but for the benefit of the entire nation.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>MAHARSHA</b> explains that there is another meaning to the word 'Ol.' The word 'Ol' refers to a Korban Olah, which atones for sinful thoughts. The Gemara teaches that David ha'Melech did not actually sin when he married Bas Sheva, since her husband, Uriyah, had given her a conditional Get (see Shabbos 56a). However, if Uriyah would not have come back it seems that he would have transgressed this prohibition. Since David put himself in a situation in which he might become guilty of committing a sin, he needed to repent, the type of repentance attained by offering a Korban Olah which atones for sinful thoughts.
</p><p>
(d) Rav Hutner (Pachad Yitzchak, Yom ha'Kipurim 11:3) quotes the <b>VILNA GA'ON</b> who relates the word 'Ol' to the word 'Aliyah.' Rav Hutner explains that the Vilna Ga'on means that although David ha'Melech experienced a decline in his spirituality as a result of the incident with Bas Sheva, he accomplished an 'Aliyah Shel Teshuvah,' raising himself through Teshuvah to his previous status. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafbbb'><span class='numt'>1)</span> CAN A TEREIFAH LIVE 12 MONTHS OR GIVE BIRTH? [Tereifos: birth: living 12 months]</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span> Gemara</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span> 'Lechayos Zera' excludes Tereifos (from animals in No'ach's ark).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span> This is like the opinion that a Treifah cannot have children. The opposing opinion learns from 'Itach' - the animals should resemble you (Noach).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Chulin 57b (Rav Huna):</span> If an injured animal survives 12 months, this shows that it was not Tereifah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'> (Beraisa):</span> A sign of Tereifos is that the animal cannot bear children;</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'> (Rav Acha bar Yakov):</span> The Halachah is, a Tereifah can give birth.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'> Version #1 - Rav Acha - Ameimar):</span> If a female bird became a Tereifah, eggs that were inside at the time are forbidden. Eggs that formed later are permitted, for Zeh v'Zeh Gorem (if something comes from two sources, and one of them (in this case, the father) is permitted, it) is permitted.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'> Question (Rav Ashi - Mishnah #1):</span> All agree that eggs of a Tereifah are forbidden, for they grew inside a forbidden bird.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'> Answer (Ameimar):</span> That refers to eggs that developed without a male (the hen warmed itself in the earth).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'> Version #2 - Ravina - (Ameimar):</span> If a female bird became a Safek Tereifah, and later it forms more eggs, all the eggs (including what was already inside) are permitted. If it does not form more eggs, the (first) eggs are forbidden.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span> Mishnah #1 forbids eggs *completed* inside a forbidden bird.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span> The Halachah is, a Safek Tereifah male (is Kosher if it lives) 12 months. A female that does not give birth (is forbidden).</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span> Rishonim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> Rif (Chulin 19a):</span> If a Safek Tereifah lives 12 months, it is Kosher. If a Safek Tereifah female give birth, it is permitted immediately.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Rosh (3:52):</span> If a Safek Tereifah lives 12 months, it is Kosher. A female that does not give birth (is forbidden).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Ma'adanei Yom Tov (3):</span> Many Kosher animals cease to give birth, yet we do not assume that they are Tereifos! Rather, if an animal gives birth, we know that it is not Tereifah (Tosfos).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Rif and Rosh (ibid.):</span> If a female bird became a Safek Tereifah, we hold onto the eggs that are already inside. If it forms more eggs, (all) the eggs are permitted. If not, they are forbidden.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'> Rambam (Hilchos Shechitah 11:1):</span> Any animal or bird with one of these Safek Tereifos, e.g. an animal fell and did not walk, or a Drusah, i.e. it was scratched by a (venomous) Chayah and we do not know whether the flesh near the intestines reddened, if it is a male and it lived for 12 months, it is Muchzak to be intact, like all other animals. If it is a female, (it is a Safek) until it gives birth. A male bird (is a Safek) until 12 months, and a female until it lays all the eggs it was carrying, and bears more eggs and lays them.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'> Rashba (Teshuvah 1:98):</span> If an animal has an extra limb, it is considered as if it is missing that limb, so if loss of that limb would make the animal Tereifah, it is Tereifah. Even if it lived 12 months, do not heed one who is Machshir it, or any other Tereifah. He slanders Divrei Chachamim. Living 12 months or giving birth helps only for Safek Tereifos. Watever Chachamim called a Vadai Tereifah can never be permitted. The Gemara asked about cases in which Tereifos were cured and lived, and it answered that they did not live 12 months. Even if many will say that it lived longer, we contradict them, to preserve Divrei Chachamim. Do not say that Chachamim merely discussed the majority, but perhaps a minority can live. This contradicts the Mishnah which says 'any (injury) in which nothing with the same injury lives, it is Tereifah.' If one lives, this proves that the injury is not a Tereifah, or it was a miracle.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Shach (YD 57:48):</span> The Rashba holds that if it lived 12 months, it was a miracle, but it is Tereifah. However, the Maharshal says that a tiny minority can live more than 12 months. If Poskim argue about whether or not something is a Tereifah, if it lives 12 months, it is Kosher. This is correct. The Rashba holds that living 12 months does not Machshir any Vadai Tereifah. The Levush says so only about an extra limb. This is wrong.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'> Pri Megadim:</span> If a slaughtered animal was found to have two livers, if it was at least 12 months old it is Kosher, for surely the extra liver was there from birth. The fact that it lived 12 months would resolve the argument of Rashi and the Ramban about this, like the Maharshal said. However, if most Poskim say that it is Tereifah, I am unsure if we rely on 12 months to resolve that it is Kosher. Perhaps the Torah says that we follow such a majority, especially if the Poskim saw each other. If an animal swallowed a needle, and later it emerged from the animal's back, and it lived 12 months, do we say that this is from the tiny minority of Tereifos that live more than 12 months? Or, perhaps the needle did not go through the Veshet (foodpipe), unlike the majority of what is swallowed. I do not know the law.</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>  Poskim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> Shulchan Aruch (YD 57:18):</span> Some say that whenever Chachamim mentioned checking an animal, e.g. it was Drusah, fell or broke (its ribs or the spine), nowadays we are not proficient to check, so the only way to permit is to leave it for 12 months, or if a female becomes pregnant and gives birth.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Shach (42):</span> Delaying 12 months or giving birth helps even if it Vadai was Drusah, since there is a test (to see if a Drusah is Kosher). The Rema says that living 12 months does not help for a truly Vadai Tereifah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Shach (43):</span> In a leap year, 13 months are required.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'> Shach (44):</span> Surely, 12 months help also for a female.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'> Shach (45):</span> The Maharshal says that it must give birth. Pregnancy is not enough. Perhaps it became pregnant but will not give birth!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'> Pischei Teshuvah (17):</span> The Shulchan Aruch connotes that even if we know that a male fathered a child, it Churban Tereifah. See Mayim Chayim (from the Pri Chodosh, Siman 2) Orach Mishor and Be'er Yakov.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl3'> Note:</span> They say that a Tereifah cannot father. Mayim Chayim brings a marginal note that Tosfos Shantz was unsure about this.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</span> Similarly, if a bird laid all the eggs it was carrying, delayed 21 days and laid more eggs, it is Kosher. Similarly, if it never laid eggs, and 21 days after it became Safek Tereifah it began to lay eggs, it is Kosher.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Beis Yosef (DH v'Chasuv, citing Orchos Chayim):</span> Laying a new brood permits when it delayed 21 days in between, for this is the gestation (term of pregnancy - Bechoros 8a). If it laid more eggs within 21 days, we say that they are from the first brood, and all are forbidden.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Rema:</span> Some are stringent to forbid leaving a Safek Tereifah for 12 months, lest Takalah result (one will eat it beforehand).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Shach (47 and Taz 86:16):</span> When we must live a bird for 21 days, we are not concerned for Takalah in such a short time.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'> Rema:</span> Any Vadai Tereifah, even if it lived 12 months, is forbidden.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Pischei Teshuvah (24):</span> Be'er Heitev of the Maharit (37) says that 12 months helps for Drusah and an animal that fell, but not if a bird's wing was broken, for we are concerned lest the lung was punctured in the last 12 months. Even if it gave birth we are concerned lest the lung was punctured after it became full of eggs, so the eggs are forbidden. However, if the wing came off it is Kosher, for we are concerned for a puncture in the lungs only at the time the wing comes off. Many erred about this. Bnei Chiya says that likewise, 12 months does not help for a broken bone where this makes it a Tereifah, lest the bone left (the skin). However, if it was tied, we rely on 12 months or birth; we are not concerned lest it was not tied well and left.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'> Shulchan Aruch (86:9):</span> A Tereifah does not give birth. Therefore, if a bird was Safek Tereifah and it laid eggs, we wait until it lays all the eggs it was carrying, and if it bears more eggs, it is Kosher. We know this if it delayed 21 days between the end of the first brood and the start of the second, for this is the gestation. Similarly, if a hen never laid eggs, and it became Safek Tereifah, if it laid eggs 21 days later, it and the eggs are Kosher.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Beis Yosef (DH Tereifah):</span> It seems that the Halachah follows Version #2 in the Gemara. All Poskim rule like it.</p>
<p class='otherhalachos'>Other Halachos relevant to this Daf:</p>
<p class='otherhalachostext'>LEARNING THE HALACHOS OF YOM TOV BEFOREHAND (Sanhedrin 12)</p>
<p class='normal'></p>


lvr: 48
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) AGADAH: MAN AND TORAH: LIKE AN OX TO HIS YOKE, LIKE A DONKEY TO HIS LOAD</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Gemara teaches that a person should always fasten himself to words of Torah like an ox is fastened to his yoke and like a donkey to his load. Why does Gemara compare a person's acceptance of the yoke of Torah specifically to the yoke of oxen and donkeys?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>BEN YEHOYADA</b> explains that the Gemara is teaching that a person must learn Torah whenever possible. Those who do not learn Torah will meet one of two fates. One is that of an ox that always carries its yoke, and one day acts sick and stops carrying its yoke. The owner will slaughter the ox in order to at least benefit from the meat. Similarly, a person who stops learning Torah altogether separates himself from his source of life, the Torah. The second fate is that of a person who learns Torah, but does so lazily, without exerting sufficient effort. His fate is that of a donkey. A donkey is not in danger of being eaten, since its meat is not kosher. However, if a donkey acts lazily, its owner will hit it to make it move faster. Similarly, a person who learns Torah lazily will suffer from Yisurim (afflictions).
</p><p>
(b) The <b>SHEM MI'SHMUEL</b> (Tzav u'Parah 5679) explains that an ox and donkey have two distinctly different traits. Although an ox appears to be a proud animal and is adorned with horns, it still accepts a yoke upon itself and goes to work. A donkey is a lowly animal, but it, too, accepts its work happily. Similarly, a person should realize that he must have these two traits when he learns Torah. These animals are examples of the work ethic which a person should apply to his learning.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>CHAFETZ CHAIM</b> (in <b>SHEM OLAM</b> #10) explains that an ox and a donkey perform two different types of work. An ox plows a field and prepares it for planting. A donkey carries the grain once it is harvested. Similarly, a person who learns Torah must have both the ability to analyze a Sugya and prepare the material in a way in which it will produce 'fruit' -- a clear understanding of Torah. Once he has attained this understanding, he must do the work of the donkey; he must constantly carry his Torah with him by reviewing what he has learned. The Chafetz Chaim points out that the Gemara uses the word 'always' in order to emphasize that this is the method which one should use in every Sugya that he learns. A person should not think that people from previous generations have already done all of the work in the 'field,' leaving no potentially new crops. A person always has the ability to reveal new insights in Torah, even in Sugyas which have been learned by great Talmidei Chachamim throughout the generations. (Y. Montrose) 
</p><p>


lvr: 48
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) THE NATURE OF THE PROHIBITION OF 'LIFNEI IVER'</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Mishnah (2a) teaches that a Jew may not conduct a transaction with a Nochri three days before his holiday of Avodah Zarah. The Gemara asks whether such a transaction is forbidden because of 'Harvachah' (causing the Nochri to profit and, as a result, give thanks to his god) or because of 'Lifnei Iver Lo Siten Michshol' (causing the Nochri to sin).
</p><p>
What is the difference between the reason of 'Harvachah' and the reason of 'Lifnei Iver'?
</p><p>
The Gemara explains that the difference exists in a case of 'Is Lei,' in which the Nochri already has another animal to slaughter as a sacrifice for his Avodah Zarah. If the reason for the prohibition is 'Harvachah,' then dealing with the Nochri still should be forbidden, since he still will give thanks to his god. If the reason is 'Lifnei Iver,' then the Jew should be permitted to sell him the animal, since he has the ability to sin even before the transaction. The Gemara compares this case to one who helps a Nazir take a cup of wine when the Nazir is on the same side of the river as the wine. The one who helps the Nazir is not enabling him to transgress, since he already has the ability to do the sin without the other person's help. The prohibition of 'Lifnei Iver' applies only when the Nazir cannot easily reach the wine by himself, such as when he is on the other side of the river. One who gives him the wine in such a case transgresses 'Lifnei Iver.'
</p><p>
The Gemara implies that the prohibition of 'Lifnei Iver' is defined as enabling a person to commit a sin which he otherwise would not have been able to commit. Is this indeed the meaning of 'Lifnei Iver'?
</p><p>
(a) This is the way <b>TOSFOS</b> in Chagigah (13a, DH Ein) understands the prohibition of 'Lifnei Iver.' Tosfos there asks why the Gemara needs to cite a verse to teach that one may not teach Torah to a Nochri. Since a Nochri is forbidden from learning any part of Torah other than what he needs to know in order to fulfill the seven Mitzvos of Bnei Noach, the prohibition of 'Lifnei Iver' should suffice to prohibit a Jew from teaching Torah to a Nochri. Tosfos answers that if another Nochri is willing to teach him, then the prohibition of 'Lifnei Iver' does not apply and, if not for the special verse, the Jew would be permitted to teach him.
</p><p>
This is also the view of the <b>MORDECHAI</b> here (6b). The Mordechai writes in the name of the <b>BEHAG</b> that a Jew may lend money to Nochrim nowadays, and 'even though they give some of that money to the caretaker of their shrine on their holiday, they do not give so much money to the caretaker that they could not borrow that amount of money from a different source.'
</p><p>
This explanation of the prohibition of 'Lifnei Iver' is also endorsed by the <b>ME'IRI</b>, who writes that a Jew may sell to Nochrim forbidden food items since they can buy the same items elsewhere.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>BI'UR HA'GRA</b> (YD 151:8) disagrees with this definition of 'Lifnei Iver.' He cites the Gemara in Nedarim (62b) which relates that Rav Ashi sold a forest to the servants of a fire-god, who worshipped their god by burning wood to it. When Ravina asked him why such a sale does not constitute 'Lifnei Iver,' Rav Ashi replied that 'most firewood is used for heating.' The Bi'ur ha'Gra asks that according to the Mordechai, Ravina's question does not make sense. Why would Rav Ashi transgress 'Lifnei Iver' by selling wood to the servants of a fire-god? Since they could have bought wood from someone else, the prohibition of 'Lifnei Iver' did not apply! It must be that the prohibition of 'Lifnei Iver' applies even when the person can find another way to sin. What, then, does the Gemara mean when it answers that the difference between the reason of 'Harvachah' and the reason of 'Lifnei Iver' is a case of 'Is Lei'?
</p><p>
The Bi'ur ha'Gra explains that 'Is Lei' means that the Nochri actually has <i>in his possession</i> the item with which to do the sin. However, if the potential sinner does not own the item, then even if it can be found in stores and can be acquired from others, the first person to sell it to him transgresses 'Lifnei Iver.'
</p><p>
This is also the view of the <b>EMUNAS SHMUEL</b> (#14, quoted by the <b>PISCHEI TESHUVAH</b>, YD 151:2). The Emunas Shmuel points out that the Gemara says merely 'Is Lei' -- 'he has the object,' and not that he has the ability to acquire it from another source. Moreover, if the Gemara means that he does not have the object but that he has the ability to acquire it from another source, then the prohibition against selling an animal to a Nochri three days before his holiday, according to the reason of 'Lifnei Iver,' would apply only in a very rare case in which no other animals are available to buy.
</p><p>

HALACHAH: Most Poskim (see end of <b>REMA</b> YD 151:1, <b>SHACH</b> YD 151:6, <b>IGROS MOSHE</b> YD 1:72) rule like the opinion of the Rishonim (in (a) above). How do they answer the questions of the Emunas Shmuel and the Bi'ur ha'Gra? The Emunas Shmuel's questions are not problematic, since one may answer that 'Is Lei' may mean not only that he has another animal, but that he has the ability to acquire another animal. The second question is not problematic, because the Gemara's case does not always have to be a common one. Moreover, it indeed is a common case in places such as small villages or where there is a shortage of animals and none are for sale. How, though, do the Poskim refute the Bi'ur ha'Gra's proof from the Gemara in Nedarim (62b)?
</p><p>
Perhaps Ravina there refers to a different prohibition which is similar to 'Lifnei Iver,' the prohibition of 'Mesayei'a Ovrei Aveirah,' assisting transgressors (some even refer to this prohibition as 'Lifnei Iver d'Rabanan'). The <b>RAN</b> (1b of the pages of the Rif) writes that even when the wine is on the same side of the river as the Nazir, one is prohibited mid'Rabanan from giving it to the Nazir, since 'he is obligated to stop him from sinning, and how can he help him sin!' Although the Gemara does not explicitly mention this prohibition, many Rishonim mention it, and they maintain that it also applies to helping a Nochri sin (see following Insight). Perhaps Ravina maintains that the prohibition of 'Mesayei'a Ovrei Aveirah' applies to helping a Nochri sin, and thus he question why Rav Ashi permitted himself to sell a forest to the servants of a fire-god. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> MAY ONE HELP A NOCHRI TRANSGRESS IF HE COULD DO SO HIMSELF? [Lifnei Iver]</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span> Gemara</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span> Perhaps the Isur to do business with Nochrim (before their festivals) is lest a Yisrael sell something that the Nochri will offer to idolatry, and the Yisrael transgresses 'v'Lifnei Iver Lo Siten Michshol' (by enabling him to sin). If the Nochri already has an animal, 'Lifnei Iver' does not apply.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Question:</span> 'Lifnei Iver' applies even when he has his own animal!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> (Beraisa - R. Noson):</span> 'V'Lifnei Iver Lo Siten Michshol' forbids extending wine to a Nazir or a limb from a living animal to a Nochri.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span> Even though he could take it himself, one who gives to him transgresses!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Answer:</span> The case is, he is on the other side of a river, and he cannot reach it himself.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'> Support:</span> The Beraisa mentions extending it to him, and not 'giving' it.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'> 15b:</span> Rabah sold a donkey to a Yisrael suspected of selling to Nochrim. Abaye questioned this, for perhaps the buyer will sell to a Nochri!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'> Rabah:</span> He might, but also he might sell to a Yisrael. Therefore, I may assume the latter.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'> Nedarim 62b:</span> Rav Ashi sold a forest to priests who served fire.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'> Question (Ravina):</span> You transgress 'v'Lifnei Iver'!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'> Answer (Rav Ashi):</span> Most wood is burned (not for idolatry).</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span> Rishonim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> Rif (1b):</span> Lifnei Iver applies only when the sinner could not do so himself.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Rambam (Hilchos Shemitah 8:8):</span> We encourage Nochrim working in Shemitah, for they are not commanded to let the land rest.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Rosh (1:2):</span> One may not give Isur to a Mumar, even if it is the Mumar's, if he is on the other side of the river.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'> Rosh (15):</span> Rav Ashi sold a forest to priests of idolatry. It was not Lifnei Iver because most wood is burned not for idolatry. If not for this, it would be forbidden. Also Re'em explained like this.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'> Rosh and Ran (Shabbos 1:1 and 1a DH u'Makshu):</span> If Ploni could take an Isur by himself, and David gave it to him, David transgresses Lifnei Iver mid'Rabanan. Even when a minor eats Neveilah, Beis Din must stop him, all the more so one may not help an adult to sin!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Ran (Avodah Zarah 1a DH Lifnei):</span> Some say that the Isur to do business with Nochrim before their festival is due to Lifnei Iver, lest they buy something and offer it to idolatry. If the Nochri already has his own animal that he could offer, Lifnei Iver does not apply.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Ran (1b DH Deika):</span> The Gemara connotes that there is no Isur Torah (to give an Isur to one who could take it himself), but in any case it is forbidden mid'Rabanan. One is commanded to stop others from transgressing. How can one help them transgress?!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'> Ran (7a DH Garsinan, citing the Ramban):</span> Lifnei Iver, even mid'Rabanan, applies only to what he could not do without the Yisrael, e.g. giving wine to a Nazir.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'> Mordechai (795):</span> (Lifnei Iver does not apply when the Nochri could take it himself). Bahag learns from here that nowadays we may lend to Nochrim, even though they use the money to give to the priest, for they give only a small amount that they could borrow from other Nochrim even if we did not lend to them. Avi ha'Ezri permits selling to a Nochri priests' garments in which they sing to idolatry as long as the priests have other garments, even though they surely buy for idolatry.</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span>  Poskim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> Rema (YD 151:1):</span> Some say that the Isur to sell to Nochrim things for their Avodah is only if they do not have others like them, or they cannot buy them elsewhere, but if they can, one may sell them anything. Some are stringent. The custom is to be lenient like the first opinion. A Ba'al Nefesh should be stringent for himself.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Shach (6):</span> The Rema holds that the lenient opinion equates this to passing wine to a Nazir. It is permitted if he could take it himself. The stringent opinion says that even then it is forbidden mid'Rabanan. I say that all agree with the Mordechai and Tosfos who permit regarding a Nochri or Mumar. The Rishonim who forbid discuss a Yisrael. One must separate a Yisrael from Isur, even a child, and all the more so an adult. If we will not say so, the Rosh and R. Yerucham contradict themselves (for in one place they forbid, and elsewhere they permit).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Gra (8):</span> Tosfos (6b DH Minayin) says that the Isur is only if he cannot get it himself. The Ran, and Tosfos and the Rosh in Shabbos say that in any case it is forbidden mid'Rabanan. The Gemara in Avodah Zarah connotes that it is permitted even mid'Rabanan. The Isur (of business with Nochrim before their festivals) in the Mishnah (2a), which we suggest is due to Lifnei Iver, is only mid'Rabanan. Therefore, when we say that there is no Lifnei Iver when the Nochri already has what to offer, this must mean even mid'Rabanan it is permitted. To answer the Ran's question, we can say that helping transgressors is forbidden only regarding Yisrael. The Mordechai's law is wrong. We say that one does not transgress Lifnei Iver only when he already has the item, but not just because he could get it elsewhere. If not, why is it forbidden to sell wood to priests? There is wood elsewhere! Or, we could say that there is Lifnei Iver mid'Rabanan even when the Nochri already has what to offer. The Mishnah is only mid'Rabanan because we do not know that he buys for idolatry. In such a case it is permitted if the Nochri has his own. The Gemara in Nedarim shows that the latter opinion is correct. It is very difficult to say that the entire Mishnah, and the case of Rabah who sold a donkey, all discuss when the Nochri could not buy them elsewhere.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'> Birkei Yosef (1):</span> Nedarim 62 shows that mid'Rabanan one may not give to a Nochri (even if he could get himself). Surely anyone can buy wood, and even so Ravina thought to forbid! How can the Mordechai answer? It is difficult to say that other wood was not available. The Rambam says that we encourage Nochrim working in Shemitah only because they are permitted. If they were forbidden, it would be Asur to encourage them even verbally! The Ran (1b) forbids mid'Rabanan when the person could take it himself. It seems that he refers to both giving wine to a Nazir or Ever Min ha'Chai to a Nochri. However, Piskei Tosfos (Shabbos 1) says that one must separate *Chavero* (a Yisrael) from an Aveirah. This is like the Shach.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'> Emunas Shmuel (14, cited in Pischei Teshuvah 2):</span> The Mordechai's Heter is not clear. The Gemara said that if business is Asur due to Lifnei Iver, it is permitted when the Nochri has an animal. It did not permit when he could buy one! The Mordechai's Heter would annul the Isur of business. Surely Nochrim can buy animals and frankincense elsewhere!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl3'> Pischei Teshuvah:</span> Perhaps we can answer based on what I wrote below (160:1) from the Mishneh l'Melech (Hilchos Malveh 4:2. If a Nazir could take wine by himself, if no one gives it to him, even if he takes it, no Isur of Lifnei Iver is done. If one wants to borrow from a Yisrael with Ribis (interest), and sees that the lender is ready to lend to another Yisrael with Ribis, in either case there is Lifnei Iver, so the borrower transgresses Lifnei Iver even though the sinner would have sinned even without him.)</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl3'> (Note:</span> Pischei Teshuvah's answer is that here, the Nochri could buy from another Nochri, who is not commanded about Lifnei Iver, so even a Yisrael who sells to him does not transgress Lifnei Iver. - PF)</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl2'> Ha'aros on Birkei Yosef (1):</span> The other Acharonim hold that Lifnei Iver does not apply even when the sinner could buy it elsewhere. We can say that the Nochri could not have bought another animal or frankincense that day, therefore, it is like two sides of the river.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>viii.</span><span class='desl2'> Eshel Avraham (OC 163:2):</span> Lifnei Iver is a Lav, and helping transgressor is mid'Rabanan. This is why the Gemara connotes that there is no decree regarding Nochrim.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ix.</span><span class='desl2'> Mishnah Berurah (347:7):</span> Most Poskim say that helping transgressors does not apply to Nochrim, unless the Nochri could not have done so himself, for then Lifnei Iver applies. The Gra forbids even when the Nochri could get the Isur elsewhere.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>x.</span><span class='desl2'> Pri Megadim (Petichah Koleles 5:8):</span> If Lifnei d'Lifnei (causing one to cause another to sin) is mid'Oraisa, how can we distinguish Yisrael from Nochrim? This requires investigation.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>xi.</span><span class='desl3'> Note:</span> Only Yisrael are commanded about Lifnei Iver, so Lifnei d'Lifnei is forbidden, for he causes the Yisrael to transgress Lifnei Iver!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>xii.</span> See Chavos Ya'ir 185 (Shlichus Nochri l;chum)</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Rema (EH 5:14):</span> One may sell animals and roosters to a Nochri, even though the Nochri will castrate them. Some forbid.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Beis Shmuel (17):</span> Normally, Lifnei Iver does not apply if the receiver could buy the Isur elsewhere. That is when he is limited (how much he will drink or offer to idolatry). Here, he will castrate all animals he gets!</p>
<p class='seealso'>See also:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>MAY ONE HELP NOCHRIM TRANSGRESS? (Avodah Zarah 13)</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>HELPING TRANSGRESSORS (Avodah Zarah 55)</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>ACCEPTING OATHS FROM IDOLATERS (Sanhedrin 63)</p>
<p class='normal'></p>


lvr: 48
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) 'MESAYEI'A': IS ONE PERMITTED TO HELP SOMEONE COMMIT A SIN?</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Gemara teaches that one transgresses 'Lifnei Iver' when he helps a Nazir obtain a cup of wine that is not on the same side of the river as the Nazir, since he enables the Nazir to transgress his prohibition against drinking wine. If the wine and Nazir are on the same side of the river, one does not transgress 'Lifnei Iver,' since the Nazir already has the ability to sin, even though he helps him ('Mesayei'a') obtain the forbidden wine. Does this mean that one is <i>permitted</i> to give the Nazir wine in such a situation?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>RAN</b> (1b of the pages of the Rif) writes that when the wine is on the same side of the river as the Nazir, one is prohibited mid'Rabanan from giving it to the Nazir, since 'he is obligated to stop him from sinning, and how can he help him sin!' <b>RASHI</b> (55b, DH v'Yisrael) makes a similar statement, although with a slightly different logic. Rashi writes that 'we are forbidden to help a person who is sinning; rather, we stay away from him so that he should not be accustomed to sinning.' While the Ran's logic is that one is obligated to stop another Jew from sinning, Rashi seems to understand that one must not create an atmosphere where a person feels comfortable with his sinful ways. This prohibition is also mentioned by <b>TOSFOS</b> and the <b>ROSH</b> in Shabbos (3a).
</p><p>
(b) However, <b>TOSFOS</b> here (DH Minayin) apparently maintains that such an act is prohibited, and that there is no such prohibition as 'Mesayei'a.' Tosfos infers from the Gemara's conclusion that a person may not extend ('Moshit') a forbidden item (such as Neveilah) to a person who wants to sin with it, but he may extend such an item to a person who does not want to sin with it (but wants to throw it out, for example). Tosfos adds that this applies even to extending a forbidden item to a Yisrael Mumar l'Avodah Zarah (an apostate Jew who worships Avodah Zarah), since he still has the status of a Jew. Tosfos concludes, 'And this refers to a case in which he cannot obtain it himself if the other person does not extend it to him, as the Gemara here concludes that the case refers to two sides of the river.'
</p><p>
Tosfos makes no mention of 'Mesayei'a' at all, implying that when the sinner is able to obtain the object in some other way, there is no prohibition against giving it to him. This also seems to be the position of Tosfos in Chagigah (13a, DH Ein).
</p><p>
Tosfos there asks why the Gemara needs to cite a verse to teach that one may not teach Torah to a Nochri. Since a Nochri is forbidden from learning any part of Torah other than what he needs to know in order to fulfill the seven Mitzvos of Bnei Noach, the prohibition of 'Lifnei Iver' should suffice to prohibit a Jew from teaching Torah to a Nochri. Tosfos answers that if another Nochri is willing to teach him, then the prohibition of 'Lifnei Iver' does not apply and, if not for the special verse, the Jew would be permitted to teach him.
</p><p>
Similarly, the Mordechai here writes in the name of the <b>BEHAG</b> that a Jew may lend money to Nochrim nowadays, and 'even though they give some of that money to the caretaker of their shrine on their holiday, they do not give so much money to the caretaker that they could not borrow that amount of money from a different source.' The Mordechai implies that one is permitted, even mid'Rabanan, to help a person who anyway has access to the forbidden item. Do these Rishonim indeed maintain that there is no prohibition of 'Mesayei'a'?
</p><p>
1. The <b>REMA</b> (YD 151:2) seems to learn this way. He writes that 'there are some who say' that a Jew may not sell Avodah Zarah items to Nochrim if they do not have other similar items or are unable to buy them elsewhere. If they have such items or are able to buy them elsewhere, then the Jew may sell such items to the Nochrim. The Rema continues: 'Some are stringent, and the custom is to be lenient like the first opinion, but a Ba'al Nefesh should be stringent for himself.' The <b>DARCHEI MOSHE HA'ARUCH</b> (ibid.) explains that Tosfos here and other Rishonim maintain that there is no prohibition of 'Mesayei'a,' even to help a Jew sin, as long as it does not constitute the Torah prohibition of 'Lifnei Iver.' However, some say that the Rema's words, 'the custom is to be lenient,' refer only to selling Avodah Zarah items, and the leniency is based on the Rema's own opinion that Nochrim today are not really idolaters. (See <b>SHACH</b> YD 151:7, who writes that this is implied in the Darchei Moshe.)
</p><p>
2. The <b>SHACH</b> (YD 151:6) disagrees with the Rema and maintains that the Rishonim do not argue with each other at all. Rather, the Rishonim agree that there <i>is</i> an Isur d'Rabanan of 'Mesayei'a' which prohibits helping another Jew sin, and there is <i>no</i> such prohibition against helping a Nochri sin. The sources which are lenient refer specifically to helping a Nochri sin, while the sources which are stringent refer specifically to helping a Jew sin. Tosfos in Avodah Zarah (DH Minayin) adds merely that a Mumar l'Avodah Zarah is like a Jew with regard to the prohibition of 'Lifnei Iver,' implying that he is like a Nochri with regard to the prohibition of 'Mesayei'a.' The Shach asserts that everyone agrees with this.
</p><p>
The Shach proves his view from a contradiction in the words of the <b>ROSH</b> and in the words of <b>RABEINU YERUCHAM</b>. According to the Rema's understanding, the Rosh in Avodah Zarah says that there is no Isur of 'Mesayei'a.' However, in Shabbos (3a) the Rosh clearly says that there <i>is</i> such an Isur. Similarly, Rabeinu Yerucham (Nesiv 17:6) rules like Tosfos in Avodah Zarah, but elsewhere (Nesiv 12:3) he rules like the Rosh in Shabbos. The Shach concludes that the only way to reconcile these contradictions is to say that there is a difference between a Jew and a Nochri; when the Rosh and Rabeinu Yerucham rule that 'Mesayei'a' is forbidden, they refer to helping a Jew sin, and when they rule that it is not forbidden, they refer to helping a Nochri sin.
</p><p>
However, there seems to be an explicit opinion that maintains that the Isur of 'Mesayei'a' applies even to helping a Nochri sin. <b>RASHI</b> (55a, DH Dorchin) discusses the question of helping a Nochri be Metamei Chulin in Eretz Yisrael, an act which is forbidden for a Jew to do. Rashi writes that one is permitted to help a Nochri do such an act, since the Nochri 'is not commanded on this.' This implies that for a law which the Nochri <i>is</i> commanded to observe, one would <i>not</i> be permitted to help him transgress because of the Isur of 'Mesayei'a.' (See previous insight with regard to the opinion of the <b>BI'UR HA'GRA</b> and the <b>EMUNAS SHMUEL</b>.) (Y. Montrose) 
</p><p>


lvr: 48
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) HALACHAH: PREPARING WORKERS ON SHABBOS</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Beraisa says that on Shabbos, one may not ask his friend if he can stay with him until the night (Motza'i Shabbos), if his words hint to his friend that he wants to hire him for work after Shabbos. Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah permits such speech. Rebbi Yochanan says that the Halachah follows the view of Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah, and this is the Halachah as recorded by the <b>SHULCHAN ARUCH</b> (OC 307:7). The Shulchan Aruch adds, however, that such speech is permitted only when he asks his friend in the form of a question, but not if he makes a statement (such as, 'Be ready tonight!').
</p><p>
Does this allowance also apply to speaking to potential workers who are Nochrim, or does it apply only to Jews?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>HAGAHOS ASHIRI</b> rules that this allowance applies only to Jews. One is not permitted to ask a Nochri if he can stay until Motza'i Shabbos when he intends to hire him.
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> in Shabbos (150a, DH Omer) quotes the opinion expressed by the Hagahos Ashiri as 'some say,' but he rejects it. Tosfos explains that the reason why such speech is permitted when one speaks to a Jew is that it is not included in the category of forbidden speech on Shabbos. Speaking about waiting around until after Shabbos is permitted. The speaker's mental intention to do business after Shabbos is not forbidden on Shabbos. Therefore, it makes no difference whether the person who is going to be hired is a Jew or a Nochri.
</p><p>
What is the reasoning behind the opinion of the Hagahos Ashiri?
</p><p>
The <b>MAGEN AVRAHAM</b> (OC 307:10) explains that the reasoning of the Hagahos Ashiri is that 'he wants to know the work.' What does this mean? The <b>LEVUSHEI SERAD</b> explains that when the Nochri is asked to wait around until nightfall and he understands the hint that work is to be done after Shabbos, he decides at that moment that he will do the work. As far as he is concerned, he would start working immediately for his Jewish employer. Consequently, the Jew is considered to have actually hired the Nochri on Shabbos. In contrast, when a Jew asks another Jew to wait around until nightfall, the Jewish worker has no intention to desecrate Shabbos. Although he understands that there probably will be an opportunity to work after Shabbos, he has no intention to be hired now, on Shabbos.
</p><p>

HALACHAH: The <b>MISHNEH BERURAH</b> (307:28) rules leniently, like Tosfos, who permits one to ask both a Jew and a Nochri to wait around until after Shabbos. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafbbb'><span class='numt'>1)</span> WHERE ONE MAY ADD REQUESTS IN SHEMONEH ESRE [Tefilah :additions]</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span> Gemara</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> (Beraisa - R. Eliezer):</span> One should request his needs and then pray (Shemonah Esre) - 'Tefilah l'Oni Chi Ya'atof v'Lifnei Hash-m Yishpoch Sicho';</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span> R. Yehoshua says, one should pray and then request his needs;</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> 8a - Chachamim:</span> One should request his needs in 'Shome'a Tefilah.'</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'>  (Rav Yehudah):</span> The Halachah is, one may request his needs in 'Shome'a Tefilah.'</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'> (Rav Yehudah brei d'Rav Shmuel bar Shilas):</span> Even so, he may add requests in each of the (13 middle) blessings at the end.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'> (R. Chiya bar Ashi):</span> Even though one may request his needs in 'Shome'a Tefilah', if someone in his family was sick, he requests for him in Birkas Refa'enu. If he needs income, he requests in Birkas ha'Shanim (Barech Aleinu).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'> (R. Yehoshua ben Levi):</span> Even though one may request his needs in 'Shome'a Tefilah', he may request at length after Shemoneh Esre, even like the confession of Yom Kipur.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'> Berachos 34a (Rav Yehudah):</span> One may not request his needs in the first three or last three blessings, only in the middle blessings.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'> (R. Chanina):</span> In the first three blessings, one is like a slave recounting the praise of his Master. In the middle blessings, he is like a slave requesting remuneration from his Master. In the last three blessings, he is like a slave thanking his Master for giving to him, and he departs.</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span> Rishonim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span> The Rif (Berachos 22b) bring these Gemaros.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> R. Yonah (DH Af):</span> There are four distinctions. 1) One may request his needs in any way in Shome'a Tefilah, for it includes all needs and was enacted for this. 2) One may add at the end of each Berachah requests like the content of the Berachah, even if it is not his personal need, since he requests in the plural. He may not request in the singular, for it is not for all of Yisrael, and it is a Hefsek. He adds in the plural at the end of the Berachah. Since he finished what Chachamim obligated him, he may add. He may not ask in the middle requests for the Rabim, for it looks like he adds to the text that Chachamim enacted. 3) If he requests his own needs, e.g. there is a Choleh (sick person) in his house who needs Refu'ah, he can request in the singular, even in the middle of a Berachah. In Avodah Zarah, we say that he requests for a Choleh in Refa'enu. It did not specify at the end. This connotes that he may request in the middle, since he needs it now and he asks in the singular, so it does not look like he adds to the text that Chachamim enacted. 4) At the end of Tefilah, before or after Yihyu l'Ratzon, he may request in the singular or plural, whether for his own needs or for the Rabim.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Beis Yosef (OC 119 DH v'Chilukim):</span> It seems that R. Yonah learned from Avodah Zarah. It seems that Rav Yehudah (brei d'Rav Shmuel) and R. Chiya teach about the same thing, and so Rashi explains, but R. Yonah explains that Rav Yehudah teaches about adding at the end on behalf of the Rabim, and R. Chiya teaches about requesting one's own needs.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Rambam (Hilchos Tefilah 6:2):</span> One who prays with the Tzibur may not pray too long, but he may say (additions) after his Tefilah, even like the confession of Yom Kipur. Similarly, he may add in each of the middle Berachos similar to its content.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Rambam (3):</span> E.g. if someone was sick, he requests mercy for him in Refa'enu. If he needs income, he requests in Birkas ha'Shanim, and similarly for each Berachah. One may request all his needs in 'Shome'a Tefilah', but not in the first or last three Berachos.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Hagahos Maimoniyos (3):</span> Many permit requesting needs of the Rabim in the first or last three Berachos such as praise and Kavod ha'Yom, which we say in the last three Berachos. This is why we say Krovetz (a Piyut) in the first three Berachos. Ha'Kalir was a Tana, perhaps R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon, and he composed a Krovetz. We may rely on him. R. Chananel disapproved. Some forbid saying Zochreinu l'Chayim in Birkas Avos on Rosh Hashanah, for they hold that it is an individual need.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'> The Rosh (Berachos 5:</span>21) brings the Gemara in Berachos.</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span> Poskim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> Shulchan Aruch (OC 119:1):</span> One may add requests in each of the middle blessings. E.g. he requests mercy for a Choleh in Refa'enu. If he needs income, he requests in Birkas ha'Shanim. One may request all his needs in 'Shome'a Tefilah', for it includes all requests.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Kaf ha'Chayim (1):</span> Mahari Molko says that it is better to intend for a Choleh in Refa'enu, and to pray for him in Shome'a Tefilah. Birkei Yosef says that we pray for him in Refa'enu. If one does not want to interrupt his prayer, he intends for him when saying 'Rofei' at the end of the Berachah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Mishnah Berurah (1):</span> One may request only for present needs in the other Berachos, and in Shome'a Tefilah even for the future.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'> Mishnah Berurah (4):</span> In Shome'a Tefilah it is good to confess and request income, even if he is rich (Ari Zal and the Zohar). One who sinned should explicitly confess about it in the coming Tefilah, pray with humility and amidst crying, and accept never to willingly do so again. If he does not, this arouses prosecution from above.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'> Kaf ha'Chayim (5):</span> (Even in Shome'a Tefilah) one should not ask many things. Rather, he makes a general request, e.g. for 'Zera Anashim' (this can mean a male, a Chacham, or to an average child). The Taz (122:2) forbids adding to each Berachah on a fixed basis. This does not include confession and asking for income, which the Ari Zal and Zohar obligate.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Rema:</span> When he adds, he begins the Berachah and later adds, but he may not add and then begin the Berachah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Taz (1):</span> He must begin with the Berachah to make it primary, and his addition is secondary.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Mishnah Berurah (3):</span> The beginning must be a full matter, e.g. 'You give to people Da'as.' Just 'You' alone does not suffice.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</span> R. Yonah says that when he adds in a Berachah like its content, if it is for all of Yisrael, he must request in the plural, and only at the end of the Berachah. If he requests his own needs, e.g. there is a Choleh in his house, or he needs income, he can request even in the middle of a Berachah. , He asks only in the singular. In Shome'a Tefilah, and also at the end of Tefilah, before or after Yihyu l'Ratzon, he may request in the singular or plural, and for his own needs or for the Rabim.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Beis Yosef (DH v'Ha):</span> Our custom is to add in Selach Lanu on fast days, unlike R. Yonah. We can say that a Tzibur is different, just like we say Krovetz in the first three Berachos, even though the Gemara forbids this (i.e. for individuals).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Mishnah Berurah (8):</span> Likewise, the Tzibur says Selichos in the middle Berachah on Yom Kipur.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'> Beis Yosef (DH veha'Rosh):</span> The Rosh did not mention these distinctions. This implies that he does not distinguish between asking in the middle or the end, or between in the singular or plural. Shome'a Tefilah is like other Berachos, except that in it one may request anything, and in another Berachah one may request only like its content. Rav Yehudah mentioned adding at the end. He does not exclude the middle; he merely discusses a typical case. Alternatively, this is a bigger Chidush, that one need not say what Chachamim enacted just before the closing of the Berachah. All the more so, one may add in the middle. Alternatively, he excludes adding at the beginning. R. Yehoshua ben Levi teaches that after Shemoneh Esre, one may even begin with his additions. R. Chiya bar Ashi held that it is obvious that one must begin with the enacted text of each Berachah, so he did not need to mention 'at the end.'</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'> Kaf ha'Chayim (10):</span> Many rule like the Bach, that even in Shome'a Tefilah one may add only at the end of the Berachah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'> Gra (5):</span> We permit requesting at length at the end of Tefilah.  It is even more lenient than Shome'a Tefilah. Sa'if 2 forbids requesting at length in the Berachos. Tosfos (8a DH Im) says so.</p>
<p class='seealso'>See also:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>REQUESTS AFTER SHEMONEH ESRE (Avodah Zarah 8)</p>
<p class='normal'></p>


lvr: 48
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) PERSONAL REQUESTS DURING SHEMONEH ESREH</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: Nachum ha'Madi states that one may add personal requests to Hash-m in the blessing of 'Shome'a Tefilah' in the Shemoneh Esreh. The Gemara later (8a) quotes Rav Yehudah brei d'Rav Shmuel bar Shilas in the name of Rav who adds that if one wants to add a request that involves any of the other topics of the blessings in Shemoneh Esreh at the end of that particular blessing, he may do so. Rebbi Chiya bar Ashi in the name of Rav similarly says that even though one may make personal requests in the blessing of 'Shome'a Tefilah,' if he has a sick person in his home he may pray for that person in the blessing for sick people ('Refa'einu'), and if he needs Parnasah he may ask Hash-m for Parnasah in the blessing of 'Birkas ha'Shanim.' Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi says that a person may add any supplications that he wants, even as lengthy as the order of prayers of Yom Kippur, at the end of the Shemoneh Esreh.
</p><p>
Is there a difference between the rulings of Rav Yehudah brei d'Rav Shmuel and Rebbi Chiya bar Ashi, or are they saying the same thing?
</p><p>
(a) <b>RABEINU YONAH</b> in Berachos (22b of the pages of the Rif) explains that there are four different Halachos with regard to making personal requests in the Shemoneh Esreh:
</p><p>
1. A person may make any request he wants, in any manner, in the blessing of 'Shome'a Tefilah.'
</p><p>
2. At the end of any blessing (before the concluding Berachah), one may add only requests that involve problems facing the public, and such requests must be made in the plural form (Lashon Rabim) and be relevant to the topic of that blessing. A request in the singular form (Lashon Yachid) constitutes an interruption, Hefsek, between the beginning and end of the blessing.
</p><p>
3. In the middle of any blessing, a person may make requests pertaining to the subject of that blessing in the singular form (Lashon Yachid), but not in the plural form (Lashon Rabim). If he makes a request in the plural form it appears as though he is changing the basic textual structure of the Shemoneh Esreh.
</p><p>
4. Between the first recitation of the verse, 'Yiheyu l'Ratzon Imrei Fi' (after 'Birkas ha'Shalom') and the second (before 'Oseh Shalom'), one may ask for whatever he wants and in any manner he wants, just as he may ask in 'Shome'a Tefilah.'
</p><p>
What is Rabeinu Yonah's source for these distinctions?
</p><p>
The <b>BEIS YOSEF</b> (OC 119) explains that his source is the Gemara here. Rabeinu Yonah learns that Rav Yehudah brei d'Rav Shmuel and Rebbi Chiya bar Ashi must be saying different things. He understands that Rav Yehudah brei d'Rav Shmuel refers to requests for the general public, while Rebbi Chiya bar Ashi refers to requests for the individual. Rav Yehudah brei d'Rav Shmuel rules that one may add a request for the public in the blessing that deals with that subject (Rabeinu Yonah's second rule). Rebbi Chiya bar Ashi rules that one may insert a personal request in the middle of any blessing, but only in the singular form (Rabeinu Yonah's third rule). The Beis Yosef adds that Rabeinu Yonah's requirement that a person who prays for the public must phrase the request in the plural form at the end of the blessing is not derived from the words of the Gemara but is his own ruling.
</p><p>
(b) The Beis Yosef writes that <b>RASHI</b> apparently disagrees with Rabeinu Yonah's understanding of the Gemara. Rashi makes no comment on the statements of Rav Yehudah brei d'Rav Shmuel and Rebbi Chiya bar Ashi. This implies that Rashi understands that there is no difference between the two statements. The Beis Yosef points out that other Rishonim, including the <b>RAMBAM</b> and the <b>ROSH</b>, also make no mention of any difference between supplications for the individual and supplications for the public. Accordingly, there are three, and not four, guidelines that one should follow: the first and fourth guidelines of Rabeinu Yonah, and that he may add requests pertaining to any blessing in that particular blessing (with no need to distinguish between requests for the individual and requests for the public). The Beis Yosef rules like the other Rishonim, and not like Rabeinu Yonah. However, he concludes that it is preferable to be careful and abide by the guidelines of Rabeinu Yonah.
</p><p>

HALACHAH: The <b>SHULCHAN ARUCH</b> (OC 119:1) mentions the opinion of Rabeinu Yonah, which implies that one preferably should be careful to follow the guidelines of Rabeinu Yonah when one adds personal requests into the Shemoneh Esreh (as he writes in the Beis Yosef). The <b>MISHNEH BERURAH</b> (119:9) concurs with this ruling. (Y. Montrose) 
</p><p>


lvr: 48
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) AGADAH: WHY ADAM HA'RISHON WAS SCARED</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: Included in Rebbi Meir's list in the Mishnah of names of idolatrous holidays (for which the three preceding days are forbidden for a Jew to conduct business with a Nochri) are the holidays of Kalanda and Setaranura. The Gemara explains that Kalanda was the eight-day festival celebrated by idolaters after Tekufas Teves, the winter solstice (from December 25 to January 1). Setaranura was the eight-day festival celebrated before Tekufas Teves (from December 17 to 24).
</p><p>
A Beraisa records the source for these two festivals: As the first winter solstice in the history of the world approached, Adam ha'Rishon saw that the days were getting noticeably shorter, and the nights longer. He became concerned that, as a punishment for his sin, Hash-m was taking away the light from the world and was returning the world to nothingness. He spent eight days in fasting and prayer. When the winter solstice passed and he saw the days getting longer again, he celebrated for eight days. The following year, he observed both sets of eight days as a festival to give thanks to Hash-m. This practice continued with Adam's descendants until, generations later, they corrupted the original intent of the festival and celebrated those days as a festival to their idols.
</p><p>
The Gemara points out that the Beraisa's account makes sense according to the opinion that the world was created in Tishrei. Since Adam ha'Rishon came into the world in Tishrei, he had never experienced days becoming shorter and thus had no way to know that it was 'the way of the world.' However, according to the opinion that the world was created in Nisan, by the time Tekufas Teves arrived, Adam ha'Rishon had already seen shorter and longer days. Why, then, was he scared? The Gemara answers that he never saw days as short as the shortest days of the year, before Tekufas Teves.
</p><p>
The <b>RITVA</b> asks that this Gemara is perplexing. How could Adam ha'Rishon, who had the wisdom of a Mal'ach, make such a mistake?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>RITVA</b> suggests that perhaps because of Adam's sin and his affliction, he lost his ability to think logically. However, he concludes, 'Ein Meshivin b'Agadah.'
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RIF</b> seems to have no problem with Adam ha'Rishon's logic. He writes that although the nights were getting longer, Adam ha'Rishon thought that it was a bad sign because sleep is one sixtieth of death (Berachos 57b). If the world was changing to a place where more time was given for sleep, then that was a sign that he was going to die.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>AVODAH BERURAH</b> quotes the <b>YE'AROS DEVASH</b> who explains that Adam ha'Rishon did not make a logical mistake. The <b>ARIZAL</b> and others write that Gan Eden is on the equator, where the length of the day and the length of the night are always equal. After he sinned, he was banished to Eretz Yisrael and its surroundings (see Yalkut Shimoni, Bereishis #34). When the days began to get shorter and the nights longer there, he feared that Hash-m wanted to make him stay in an area where it is always dark, an insufferable way to live. However, if Adam knew how the world works, as the Ritva asserts, then why was he concerned? He certainly knew that the days of Eretz Yisrael would began to get longer again. The Ye'aros Devash explains that, indeed, Adam knew this. However, he was worried that Hash-m would banish him again, when the days began to get longer in Eretz Yisrael, to a place far south of the equator where there is mostly darkness in the summer. When the days started to get longer and he was not told to move, he celebrated.
</p><p>
The explanation of the Ye'aros Devash does not seem consistent with our text of the Gemara, which clearly states that Adam was concerned that the world would go back to nothingness. It seems that the Ye'aros Devash did not have the words 'v'Chozer l'Tohu va'Vohu' in his text of the Gemara. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> REQUESTS AFTER SHEMONEH ESRE [Tefilah :Elokai Netzor]</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span> Gemara</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> (Rav Yehudah):</span> The Halachah is, one may request his needs in 'Shome'a Tefilah.'</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> (R. Yehoshua ben Levi):</span> Even so, he may request at length after Shemoneh Esre, even like the confession of Yom Kipur.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Berachos 9b (R. Yochanan):</span>  Before Shemoneh Esre one must say, 'Hash-m Sefasai Tiftach...,' and afterwards one must say 'Yihyu l'Ratzon...'</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'> (R. Yehudah, son of R. Shimon ben Pazi):</span> 'Yihyu l'Ratzon Imrei Fi...' could refer to what was said, or to what will be said. Chachamim enacted to say it after Tefilah (18 Berachos), just like David said it after 18 Tehilim.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'> 17a:</span> At the end of Shemoneh Esre, Mar brei d'Ravina would request 'Elokai Netzor... Yihyu l'Ratzon...'</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'> 29b (Rav Papa brei d'Rav Acha):</span> If one forgot to say Ya'aleh v'Yavo on Rosh Chodesh, if he already finished his prayer and stepped back, he repeats Shemoneh Esre. If not, he goes back to Avodah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'> (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak):</span> This law (if he did not yet step back he goes back to Avodah), is only if he normally adds supplications after Shemoneh Esre. If not, he repeats Shemoneh Esre.</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span> Rishonim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> Rambam (Hilchos Tefilah 6:2):</span> One who prays with the Tzibur may not pray too long, but if he wants to say (additions) after his Tefilah, even like the confession of Yom Kipur, he may..</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Rambam (3):</span> One may request all his needs in 'Shome'a Tefilah.'</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> R. Yonah (Berachos 22b DH Af):</span> There are four distinctions. 1) In Shome'a Tefilah, one may request his needs in any way, for Shome'a Tefilah includes all needs and was enacted for this.... 4) At the end of Tefilah, before or after Yihyu l'Ratzon, he may request in the singular or plural, and for his own needs or for the Rabim.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Mordechai (Berachos 70, citing Avi ha'Ezri):</span> One who is in Elokai Netzor interrupts to answer to Kedushah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Hagahos Maimoniyos (Hilchos Tefilah 10:400):</span> Avi ha'Ezri says that after one finishes Oseh Shalom, he can answer.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Beis Yosef (OC 122 DH u'Le'acher):</span> It is no Chidush that one may answer after stepping back after saying Oseh Shalom. It seems that they used to say Oseh Shalom in place of Sim Shalom; Hagahos Maimoniyos permits answering once he finished the Berachah, even before saying Elokai Netzor. The Mordechai (Sukah 754, citing Re'em) says similarly.</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span> Poskim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> Shulchan Aruch (OC 119:1):</span> R. Yonah says that in Shome'a Tefilah, and also at the end of Tefilah, before or after Yihyu l'Ratzon, he may request in the singular or plural, and for his own needs or for the Rabim.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Taz (2):</span> The difference between Shome'a Tefilah and the end of Tefilah is that in Shome'a Tefilah one may pray for the Rabim only if also he needs it. We say 'one may request *his* needs in Shome'a Tefilah.' R. Yonah says that one may ask 'b'Chol Inyan', i.e. at any place in the Berachah (it does not permit what is not a personal need). Alternatively, one may not request at length in Shome'a Tefilah. The Shulchan Aruch equates Shome'a Tefilah and the end of Tefilah. If so, there are only three categories! My last distinction explains this. The Shulchan Aruch equates them, for he did not discuss requesting at length.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Magen Avraham (3):</span> R. Yonah permits requesting before or after Yihyu l'Ratzon, but the Beis Yosef disagrees, like he rules in 122:2.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'> Gra (5):</span> The Chidush that one may request at length at the end of Tefilah is to permit even before Yihyu l'Ratzon, even though it pertains to the Tefilah. It is even more lenient than Shome'a Tefilah. Sa'if 2 forbids requesting at length in the Berachos. Tosfos (8a DH Im) says so.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Shulchan Aruch (122:1):</span> One may not interrupt to answer to Kaddish or Kedushah between Shemoneh Esre and Yihyu l'Ratzon, for Yihyu l'Ratzon is part of Tefilah. One may interrupt between Yihyu l'Ratzon and other requests.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Beis Yosef (DH veha'Rashba):</span> The Rashba (7:405) requires saying Yihyu l'Ratzon immediately after Shemoneh Esre, like David did. It is part of Tefilah. He may not interrupt with supplications, nor to answer to Kaddish or Kedushah. After Yihyu l'Ratzon he may add as much as he wants. It is not part of Tefilah; he may cut it short and interrupt to answer. In Teshuvah 1:807 he says that if one sees that the Shali'ach Tzibur is nearing Kaddish or Kedushah, he should finish his supplications quickly in order to answer, for one need not add supplications each time. Even if he did not finish, he may answer like one does in Birkos Kri'as Shma.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Gra (1):</span> We say (Berachos 29b) that repeating Shemoneh Esre depends on whether he regularly adds supplications. This shows that one says Yihyu l'Ratzon immediately. If not, we would have distinguished between whether or not he said this!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'> Beis Yosef (DH v'Omer):</span> One may add supplications before or after Elokai Netzor.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Rema (1):</span> This is only where people say Yihyu l'Ratzon right after Shemoneh Esre. Where the custom is to request before Yihyu l'Ratzon, one may interrupt also to answer to Kaddish or Kedushah. Here the custom is to request before Yihyu l'Ratzon, so we interrupt also for Kaddish, Kedushah and Borchu.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Darchei Moshe (2):</span> The custom is to say Yihyu l'Ratzon only after the supplications, but not at the end of Shemoneh Esre, even though it is better to say it beforehand.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> (Gra 3):</span> Mar brei d'Ravina said Yihyu l'Ratzon after his supplications. One could say that he said it also before, but surely one may supplicate before Yihyu l'Ratzon. It is no more stringent than during Shemoneh Esre!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'> Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</span> If one regularly says supplications and the Shali'ach Tzibur is nearing Kaddish or Kedushah, he cuts short his supplications. If not, he one may answer like one does in Birkos Kri'as Shma (i.e. only the primary responses), even if he is in the middle (of his supplications).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Taz (1):</span> Initially, the Shulchan Aruch connotes that one may answer fully to Kedushah or Kedushah. He concludes that one may answer like one does in Birkos Kri'as Shma! I.e. one who only occasionally says supplications may answer fully. His requests are not like Shemoneh Esre at all, so he may interrupt as much as he wants. At the end he discusses one who regularly says them. It is a fixed matter for him, so it is like Shemoneh Esre, therefore, he answers like one in Birkos Kri'as Shma.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Kaf ha'Chayim (1):</span> Most do not distinguish. Whether or not he normally says supplications, he answers like during Birkos Kri'as Shma.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'> Mishnah Berurah (1):</span> Since we always say Elokai Netzor, one should not answer a Stam Amen before or during Elokai Netzor.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'> Mishnah Berurah (3):</span> It is good to say Yihyu l'Ratzon before and after supplications (Bach, Magen Avraham).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'> Mishnah Berurah (6):</span> 'He cuts short' means that he ceases his supplications and steps back. If there is no time for this, he says Yihyu l'Ratzon if he did not yet say it, and answers.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'> Kaf ha'Chayim (8):</span> One who cuts short should not skip 'Ase Lema'an Shmecha...', for through this one merits to behold the Shechinah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vii.</span><span class='desl2'> Kaf ha'Chayim (3):</span> One may not make his own requests on Shabbos, but one may say what Chachamim fixed, e.g. Elokai Netzor.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'> Shulchan Aruch (2):</span> It is improper to say supplications (after Tefilah) before Yihyu l'Ratzon. Rather, immediately after Shemoneh Esre one says Yihyu l'Ratzon. If he wants to say it again after the supplications, he may.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Beis Yosef (DH Garsinan):</span> The Rashba (Berachos 17a DH Mar, citing the Ra'avad) says that it is improper to say Yihyu l'Ratzon after his supplications. One says it at the end of 18 (Berachos), like David did. The Rashba (Teshuvah 1:807) also permits saying Yihyu l'Ratzon again after his supplications. Also R. Yonah (20a DH Lo) says so. Yihyu l'Ratzon is not more stringent than Berachos. One may add at the end of Berachos!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Taz (2):</span> Since Yihyu l'Ratzon is like part of Tefilah, why may one interrupt with supplications? Even though one may add his needs to the Berachos like its content, and in Shome'a Tefilah whatever he needs, this is only what he needs now. We have no source to permit adding to each Berachah on a fixed basis, and to add to the text that Chachamim fixed! Also Elokai Netzor should not precede Yihyu l'Ratzon! Therefore, it is best to say Yihyu l'Ratzon before Elokai Netzor, and again after it, since the Shulchan Aruch permits this, and we make Elokai Netzor fixed. The same applies to other supplications that he adds.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'>  Mishnah Berurah (8, Kaf ha'Chayim 12):</span> It is better to request at the end of Tefilah than in Shome'a Tefilah, so if necessary he will be able to answer to Kaddish or Kedushah, after saying Yihyu l'Ratzon.</p>
<p class='normal'></p>


lvr: 48
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) THE REASON FOR THE PROHIBITION AGAINST PARTAKING IN WEDDING MEALS OF NOCHRIM</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Gemara earlier (8a) says that the Jews outside of Eretz Yisrael are 'Ovdei Avodah Zarah b'Taharah' -- 'worshippers of Avodah Zarah in purity' (see <b>RASHI</b>, DH b'Taharah). Although they eat their own food and drink and even have their own waiters at the wedding parties of their Nochri friends, when they eat at those parties it is as if they are eating from sacrifices of Avodah Zarah, as the verse states, '[Lest you make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land, and they stray after their gods, and sacrifice to their gods,] and [one of them] calls you, and you eat of his sacrifice' (Shemos 34:15).
</p><p>
The Gemara here (8b) says that, therefore, a Jew is not allowed to accept an invitation to a meal with any Nochri who has just made a wedding until thirty days have passed. From thirty days until twelve months after the wedding, a Jew is not allowed to accept the invitation if he is told that the meal is in honor of the wedding of his son. After twelve months have passed, he is allowed to accept the invitation even if he is told that it is 'in honor of the wedding.' The Gemara asks that Rav Yitzchak brei d'Rav Mesharshiya went to a Nochri's meal after twelve months, and when he heard the Nochri thank his Avodah Zarah he refused to eat from the meal. The Gemara answers that Rav Yitzchak was different, since he was 'an important person.' <b>RASHI</b> (DH d'Adam Chashuv) explains that because he was very important, the Nochri was extremely happy that Rav Yitzchak attended.
</p><p>
These guidelines are recorded by the <b>SHULCHAN ARUCH</b> (YD 152:1). What is the reasoning behind these guidelines?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>TAZ</b> explains that these guidelines are intended to discourage intermingling that may lead to intermarriage ('Chasnus'). This is clear from the verse which the Gemara quotes with regard to eating the sacrifices of idolaters, which is immediately followed by the verse, 'And you will take from his daughters for your sons' (Shemos 34:16).
</p><p>
The Taz writes that he does not understand why the <b>DERISHAH</b> writes that he was unsure whether or not there is a leniency for the Jew to attend the Nochri's meal if not doing so will cause enmity (Eivah). If the prohibition itself is due to 'Chasnus,' then such a leniency clearly is <i>never applicable</i>. The very purpose of the Gezeirah is to prevent feelings of closeness between the Jew and the Nochri.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>SHACH</b> quotes the Derishah without making any comments, and in the <b>NEKUDAS HA'KESEF</b> he explains that he disagrees with the Taz. This prohibition is <i>not</i> due to 'Chasnus,' but rather it is due to the prohibition of 'Lo Yishama Al Picha' -- 'It should not be heard on your mouth' (Shemos 23:13). Although the literal meaning of the verse is that a Jew may not pronounce the name of foreign gods himself, the Gemara in Sanhedrin (63b) explains that it also means that a Jew should not <i>cause</i> someone else (even a Nochri) to mention such names. When the Nochri's Jewish friend comes to his wedding party, the Nochri is very happy and he thanks his Avodah Zarah. This was apparent from the incident with Rav Yitzchak, who did not participate further when he heard the Nochri thank his Avodah Zarah.
</p><p>
However, if the reason for the prohibition is not 'Chasnus,' then why does the Beraisa of Rebbi Yishmael quote the verse of sacrifices of idolaters which leads to intermarriage? The Shach explains that this verse is merely an Asmachta and is not the reason behind the prohibition. Accordingly, it is possible that there is a leniency in a case of Eivah, enmity (see Shulchan Aruch YD 148:12).
</p><p>
<b>RAV MOSHE FEINSTEIN</b> zt'l (in <b>IGROS MOSHE</b> YD 2:117, end of the first paragraph) implies that the Halachah is like the Shach, when he writes that there indeed may be room for leniency in a case of Eivah. (Y. Montrose) 
</p><p>


lvr: 48
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) DETERMINING THE YEAR OF THE 'CHURBAN' AND THE YEAR OF 'SHEMITAH'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara quotes Rav Huna brei d'Rav Yehoshua who teaches how to calculate the Shemitah based on the number of years that have passed since the destruction of the second Beis ha'Mikdash. As Rashi explains, the basis for the Gemara's calculation is the Gemara in Ta'anis (29a) which says that the year in which the Beis ha'Mikdash was destroyed was the year after Shemitah (that is, the first year of a new Shemitah cycle).
</p><p>
In what year was the second Beis ha'Mikdash destroyed? The <b>TUR</b> (CM 67) writes that according to the calculation of <b>RASHI</b> here, the year 5087 (1327 C.E.) was a Shemitah year. Extrapolating backwards, this means that the Beis ha'Mikdash was destroyed in the year 3828 (68 C.E.), and the preceding year was a Shemitah year. This is consistent with the dating of the Churban given by the Gemara here (see Chart).
</p><p>
This calculation is not unanimous, however. The Tur writes that according to the <b><b><b>RI</b></b></b> (see <b>TOSFOS</b> here), the Shemitah year occurred in the year 5088 (1328 C.E.). According to this figure, the Churban occurred in the year 3829 (69 C.E.), and the previous year (3828) was a Shemitah year.
</p><p>
The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Shemitah 10:6) cites the broadly accepted tradition of the Ge'onim, according to which the year 4935 (1175 C.E.) was a Shemitah year. This means that the year 5089 (1329 C.E.) was a Shemitah year. Extrapolating backwards, this means that the Beis ha'Mikdash was destroyed in the year 3830 (70 C.E.), and the preceding year was a Shemitah year. This opinion is consistent with the current system of counting the Shemitah cycle (the most recent Shemitah years were 5761 and 5768, or 2001 and 2008 C.E.).
</p><p>
Why do the opinions vary with regard to the year in which the Beis ha'Mikdash was destroyed? The Gemara says explicitly that the Beis ha'Mikdash was destroyed in the year 3828 (68 C.E.)!
</p><p>
Moreover, how could the Churban have occurred in the year following a Shemitah year? The Beis ha'Mikdash stood for 420 years (a number divisible by 7), and, according to Rebbi Yehudah (whose opinion is accepted by the Gemara here and by the Halachah), the Shemitah year occurs every seven years (even after a Yovel year). Accordingly, since the Shemitos were counted from the time that the Jews returned to the land and rebuilt the second Beis ha'Mikdash (because the Kedushah of the land was annulled when the first Beis ha'Mikdash was destroyed), the year in which the Beis ha'Mikdash was destroyed should have been a Shemitah year, and not the year after a Shemitah year.
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>RASHI</b> explains that the Churban occurred 3828 years after the creation of the world. In response to the second question, Rashi explains that the Shemitah count did not begin immediately when the second Beis ha'Mikdash was built. Ezra arrived only six years after the construction began, and he re-sanctified the land with regard to counting the years of Shemitah and with regard to the other laws that depend on the Kedushah of the land.
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> and the <b>RASHBAM</b> answer the second question by explaining that the Beis ha'Mikdash was destroyed 421 years, and not 420 years, after it was built. Accordingly, the year in which the Beis ha'Mikdash was destroyed indeed was the year that followed Shemitah (since, as mentioned above, the Shemitah count began when the Jews returned to the land and rebuilt the Beis ha'Mikdash, and 420 is divisible by seven).
</p><p>
Tosfos and the Rosh reject this approach because it cannot be reconciled with the Beraisa's calculation (beginning of 9a). The Beraisa states that the second Beis ha'Mikdash stood for 420 years.
</p><p>
The <b>DERISHAH</b> (CM 67:9) explains that the Beraisa earlier counts only <i>full</i> years when it says that the Beis ha'Mikdash stood for 420 years. The Beis ha'Mikdash continued to stand, however, for a number of months after 420 full years passed from the time it was rebuilt. The calculation that Rav Papa provides for determining how many years have passed since the Churban considers the year that the Beis ha'Mikdash was destroyed as being the year after the Churban, since 'one day out of a year is counted as a year' (Rosh Hashanah 2b). However, the calculation for determining the Shemitah year is based on the number of <i>full</i> years after the Churban (or 420 years).
</p><p>
Others, such as the <b>BA'AL HA'ME'OR</b>, do not have the words, 'add one year,' in the Gemara's calculation. Hence, the calculation of Shemitah may also be computed by counting the year in which the Churban occurred as year <i>one</i> after the Churban, because of the months that remained in the year in which the Churban occurred. Since that year was the first year of a Shemitah cycle, the seventh year of that cycle and every seventh year henceforth will be a Shemitah year.
</p><p>
The Ba'al ha'Me'or suggests further that the calculation of the Gemara here does not involve the number of years that have passed since the Churban, but rather it is based on the number of years from the creation of the world. Accordingly, the Girsa of 'add one year' is correct: if -- when one adds one to the number of years since creation passed -- that number is divisible by seven, then that year is a Shemitah year. Consequently, year 420 of the Beis ha'Mikdash (or 3828 from creation) was a Shemitah year, since adding one to that year equals a sum (3829) that is divisible by seven.
</p><p>
<b>RABEINU TAM</b> also dates the Churban at year 421 after the Beis ha'Mikdash was rebuilt. He reconciles the calculation of the Gemara based on another variant Girsa.
</p><p>
The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Shemitah v'Yovel 10:4) sets the date of the Churban at year 420, as Rashi does. However, he explains that the Gemara in Ta'anis does not mean that the year of the Churban was the year after Shemitah, but rather that the year that began <i>two months after</i> the Churban was a year after Shemitah.
</p><p>
According to all of these opinions, the year 3828 was a Shemitah year, in contrast to Rashi's opinion.
</p><p>
(c) If the Rambam agrees with the Ri who says that year 420 of the second Beis ha'Mikdash was a Shemitah year, then why does he calculate the Shemitah year as being 5089, one year later than the Shemitah year that the Ri calculates?
</p><p>
The <b>MAHARALBACH</b> (#142, section 5, cited by the <b>DERISHAH</b> CM 67:9) addresses this question. He points out that there are two ways to count the years from the creation of the world. The years can be counted either from the day that Adam ha'Rishon was created (which was Rosh Hashanah, according to Rebbi Eliezer, whose opinion the Halachah follows; see Rosh Hashanah 12a and Insights there), or from the year <i>before</i> Adam ha'Rishon was created, by adding an extra year to the count. The reason an extra year is added is that the creation of the world actually started five days before the creation of Adam ha'Rishon, and part of a year is considered a year ('one day out of a year is counted as a year,' Rosh Hashanah 2b). According to the opinion of Rebbi Yehoshua, Adam ha'Rishon was created in Nisan, which was a half a year before the first Rosh Hashanah, and thus there is even more of a reason to add one year to the count of years, rather than to begin the count at the first Rosh Hashanah. (For the purpose of calculating the Molad, it is also convenient to include the extra year.) This extra year is referred to as the 'Shenas Tohu,' the 'year of nothingness,' since the world -- for most of that year -- had not yet been created. It is also referred to as the year of 'BaHaRaD,' an acronym for the moment of the Molad of the Rosh Hashanah of the year prior to creation (based on extrapolating backwards in time) had the heavenly bodies been in existence at that time. ('BaHaRaD' stands for 'Monday' (day two, or 'Beis'), five hours ('Heh'), and 204 Chalakim ('Reish' and 'Dalet') into the day.) The Molad for the following Rosh Hashanah (the first Rosh Hashanah of the world) was 'V-Y-D' (this stands for Friday (day six, or 'Vav'), at the end of the fourteenth hour ('Yud' and 'Dalet') of the day; see <b>TOSFOS</b> to Rosh Hashanah 8a, DH li'Sekufos).
</p><p>
Our common count of years from creation includes the added year of 'BaHaRaD.' Does the Gemara's count of the years until the Churban of the Beis ha'Mikdash include that additional year? The Maharalbach asserts that it cannot include an extra year, since the Gemara's calculation is based directly on the number of years that Adam ha'Rishon and his descendants lived. Since Adam ha'Rishon was born on Rosh Hashanah of 'V-Y-D,' there is no reason to add an extra year to his age because of the year of 'BaHaRaD.' The Maharalbach points out that this is alluded to in the words of the Rambam (in Hilchos Shemitah v'Yovel 10:2), who contrasts the year of the creation of Adam ha'Rishon to the year from which the counting from creation begins. The Maharalbach proves that this is also the opinion of <b>RAV SA'ADYAH GA'ON</b> and <b>RAV HAI GA'ON</b>.
</p><p>
Accordingly, the Shemitah year which occurred 3828 years from the creation of Adam ha'Rishon actually occurred in the year 3829, according to our count of years. Even though the Rambam accepts the opinion of the Ri, nevertheless the correct date for the Shemitah year is 5089, and not 5088, because of the added year.
</p><p>
Does the Ri disagree with the calculation of the Rambam? The Maharalbach and the <b>TASHBATZ</b> (2:99) write that the Ri and the Rambam are in agreement. When the Tur writes that according to the Ri, Shemitah was in 5088 and, according to Rashi, it was in 5087, he is counting the number of years since the creation of Adam ha'Rishon, just like the count of the Gemara with regard to the Churban. (There indeed was a widely-held practice to count the year of creation in that manner among the Jews of Oriental countries, as the Maharalbach and the Ba'al ha'Me'or here mention. They would have counted the current year as 5769 and not 5770.) Therefore, the correct year of Shemitah according to our way of counting is 5089 according to the Ri, or 5088 according to Rashi. Consequently, the year given by the Ri is the same year as that given by the Rambam.
</p><p>
The <b>TESHUVOS KOL MEVASER</b> (1:60) does not accept the view of the Maharalbach. He asserts that according to Rashi and the Ri, the count of the Gemara which puts the year of the Churban at 3828 <i>already</i> includes the year of 'BaHaRaD,' since Adam ha'Rishon was created before the Molad of the Rosh Hashanah after creation (of 'V-Y-D'). Thus, there indeed are three opinions with regard to the correct calculation of the Shemitah year. According to Rashi, Shemitah was in the year 5087, according to the Ri in 5088, and according to the Rambam in 5089.
</p><p>

HALACHAH: The <b>ROSH</b> (1:7) and the <b>TUR</b> (CM 67) rule like Rashi. However, the <b>REMA</b> (CM 67:1) and most Rishonim rule like Tosfos, who says that the Shemitah year was year 420 of the years of the second Beis ha'Mikdash. The Rambam (Hilchos Shemitah v'Yovel 10:6) writes that 'it is well-known that in the times of the Ge'onim the people in Eretz Yisrael all observed the Shemitah year based on this calculation. This is the basis for current-day practice.' (The Maharalbach writes that the reason why we do not observe multiple years in the seven-year cycle as Shemitah in order to fulfill all of the opinions is that, at present, Shemitah is d'Rabanan, and thus we are not Machmir.) 
</p><p>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> DOES THE DEFINITION OF TREIFAH CHANGE? [Tereifah :definition]</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span> Gemara</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> (Tana d'Vei Eliyahu):</span> Six thousand years were decreed upon the world: 2000 years of emptiness (without Torah), 2000 years of Torah, and 2000 years for (the days of) Mashi'ach.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> (Rav Papa):</span> If a Chacham (knows the centuries, but) does not know the excess (how many years of Mashi'ach (i.e. after the year 4000) have passed), he should add 48 to the number of years written in Gitin.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Chulin 43a (Ula):</span> Eight kinds of Tereifos were taught to Moshe on Sinai - punctures, cuts, missing organs, deficient organs, tears, Drisah (being clawed by a venomous animal), animals that fell, and broken organs.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span> Ula excludes afflicted organs, i.e. Rachish bar Papa's teaching about an afflicted kidney.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'> 54a:</span> Certain hunters would kill animals by hitting them on the Gid ha'Nasheh, or on the kidney.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'> (R. Yehudah ben Beseira, and R. Aba):</span> This does not make an animal Tereifah. We cannot add to the Tereifos that Chachamim listed.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span> Even though we see that the animals die from this, we have a tradition that a salve could enable them to live.</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span> Rishonim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> Rambam (Hilchos Shechitah 10:12):</span> One may not add to the Tereifos. Anything that happened to an animal or bird other than what the early Chachamim listed and Batei Din of Yisrael agreed upon, it is possible that it will live, even if we know medically that it will not live.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'> Kesef Mishneh:</span> The Rambam learns from Chulin 54a. He explains that a tradition from Sinai teaches that a salve could enable them to live, even though our medical books say that there is no cure.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Darchei Teshuvah (29:3 DH uv'Inyan):</span> Tevu'os Shor 33:1 says that if an animal cannot eat, obviously it cannot live! Chachamim did not need to list it among the Tereifos, for they already taught that whatever cannot live is Tereifah. Kanfei Yonah rejected this. Will we say that an animal is Tereifah if it ate poision, or if it has a muzzle that cannot be removed?</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'> Igros Moshe (CM 2:73:4):</span> Natiure has changed in many ways, like Tosfos (Mo'ed Katan 11a DH Kavra) says. Also sicknesses and cures can change. Tereifos were fixed permanently at the time of the Mishnah, and perhaps also in the time of the Amora'im. Tereifah was whatever could not live. All the details were given to Moshe on Sinai. Hash-m did not rely on Da'as Chachamim, like He did for many other things, for then Tereifah would be only what cannot live at that period of time. The law would change when nature changed! The rule that what cannot live is Tereifah was true at the time of Matan Torah, and also at the time of the Mishnah and Gemara. The Rambam connotes that an injury is not Tereifah because Chachamim knew that it can live, even if now we do not know it. I explained that even if nature changed and now there is no cure, it is Kosher! This is like he wrote in Halachah 13, that what Chachamim declared Tereifah is Tereifah even if nowadays it can live. It seems that the text is it *was* able to live. Nowadays everyone knows that many Tereifos live long lives.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Rambam (13):</span> Everything that Chachamim listed is Tereifah, even if it seems from our medical knowledge that some are not mortal injuries and it can live. We follow only what Chachamim said - 'Al Pi ha'Torah Asher Yorucha.'</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Rambam (Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros 4:9):</span> If an animal is about to die due its wounds and it cannot live, it is forbidden. From here, Chachamim said that whenever an animal wounded like this cannot live, it is Tereifah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Ha'Emek She'elah (125 p.33):</span> Why didn't the Rambam bring Reish Lakish's verse 'Zos ha'Chayah'? The Rambam teaches that there are Tereifos that are known only because they do not live. The Mishnah's rule 'whatever cannot live...' does not teach about a Safek, like Reish Lakish said. Rather, it teaches about Tereifos that were not listed, e.g. the upper jaw was removed. We do not add a bruised kidney to the Tereifos, for it can be cured (Chulin 54a). If not, we would add it! However, it is not common and it is hard to say surely (that it cannot live). Even if we know medically that it cannot live, perhaps there is a cure of which we are unaware. We have a tradition about the 70 Tereifos that surely they cannot live. Even if doctors can cure it, it is Tereifah. The Shach (57:48) says that if it lives more than 12 months, this is a miracle. The Maharshal says that a tiny minority can live more than 12 months. Both of these are difficult. Rather, a Tereifah cannot live, i.e. by itself. It can live through slaves and cures. If a Safek Tereifah lives 12 months, we assume that it was not Tereifah, for it is very rare that it would chance upon something that heals it. If a Vadai Tereifah lived 12 months, we must say that this happened. This applies to Tereifos of tradition. If we have no tradition for it, it is Tereifah only if there is no cure and it is destined for dogs. We learn from 'la'Kelev Tashlichun Oso.' This is like the Rambam. The Ramban and Ran hold that wharever can heal was never Tereifah. The Rambam rules like Rachish bar Papa, that an afflicted kidney is Tereifah, and also like Ula, even though the Gemara said that he excludes Rachish's case! The Sugya is like Reish Lakish, who says that 'whatever does not live' explains (Safek) Tereifos of our Mishnah. The Gemara asked about the additions that the Amora'im added. They saw that they do not live, even with salves, so this clause includes them. We answered that Reish Lakish agrees that the clause includes them. Even so, Ula excludes Rachish's case (for there was no tradition for it). However, we hold like Rava, that the general rule of the Mishnah includes these other Tereifos, and they are like the 18 Tereifos of the Mishnah. No Heter for Tereifos can come through man, but b'Yedei Shamayim there is, according to Rashi and the Rosh, e.g. a puncture that became tangled with flesh, or a punctured kidney that was removed b'Yedei Shamayim. It is Tereifah as long as the problem is there.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'> Ra'avad (on Toras Kohanim Shmini, Sof Perek 3):</span> The Toras Kohanim gives many Drashos to exclude Tereifos. These are Asmachtos, for the 18 Tereifos are a tradition from Sinai.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Ha'Emek Davar (Shmos 22:30, footnote 1 DH v'Hinei):</span> What was the Hava Amina to expound to add to a tradition from Sinai? Rather, the Toras Kohanim first forbids a punctured Veshet or an uprooted Kaneh, for one cannot slaughter them. They are not Tereifos. Then it teaches that a cure does not permit a Tereifah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'> Rivash (447):</span> We do not judge Torah laws according to scientists and doctors. If we would, Torah would not be from Shamayim, Chalilah! They would change Tereifah animals to Kosher, and vice-versa. We say that if a k'Zayis remains of the liver, it is Kosher, and they say that it dies immediately. We forbid all lesions, and appearances that disqualify the lungs, and laws of Drisah. They mock us (for they say that it lives). May molten gold be poured in their mouths! The Rambam said that the juncture of sinews is in the lower bone in birds. Chachamim did not accept this, for the Gemara connotes that it is in the middle bone, and there is no distinction between birds and animals. Even though the Rambam was a Chacham in medicine and dissection, we do not rely on this. We rely on our Chachamim, even if they say that what is (apparently) right is really left, or vice-versa. They received the truth and passed it from generation to generation, from Moshe Rabbeinu. We do not rely on reasoning or experiments of Greeks or Yishmaelim, who were not mindful of Sefekos that can invalidate the experiment. 'I bring a proof from Torah, and you bring from fools!?' (Nidah 30b) They argue with Divrei Chazal in many ways. E.g. we say that a fetus is formed on day 40, and before this it is mere water. We say that the father supplies white semen, which forms the bones... and they say that everything is from the mother.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'> Me'iri (Chulin 54a DH Kol):</span> They thought to add to the list of Tereifos, until they heard that one may not add. Similarly, if something is called a Tereifah, and we see that such an animal lives, even if we see this constantly, we are not lenient. Even if doctors testify about it, what Chachamim listed are the Tereifos; we are not lenient or stringent unlike their words.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'> Tosfos (Chulin 47a DH Kol):</span> We cannot bring a proof from our animals. Perhaps they are different from those in the days of the Gemara. Bechoros 19b says that a calf born to a three year old cow is a Bechor (for cows do not give birth before this), and our cows give birth in the second year! To say that cows did not change, we would need to say that if it gives birth in the second year, it is weak and does not give birth again until the fourth year.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Chazon Ish (YD Tereifos 5:3 DH v'Af):</span> Hash-m created cures even for Tereifos. Not all cures were known in all generations. Some were revealed and forgotten. Hash-m entrusted Chachamim to fix the Tereifos according to the Ru'ach ha'Kodesh that He put on them. It had to be fixed in the 2000 years of Torah, like it says in Avodah Zarah. Ravina and Rav Ashi are Sof Hora'ah (Bava Metzia 86a). We cannot be Mechadesh Torah after them. Tereifos were determimed according to Hashem's providence at that time. The illnesses in the arsenal of the angel of death at that time, for which no cure was known, those are the Tereifos that the Torah forbade then and for all future generations. Also, nature has changed. E.g. bloodletting used to be medically beneficial. Nowadays, it is harmful. This is like the Bach and Taz on (EH 17:31), and unlike the Chelkas Mechokek and Beis Shmuel. The Ramban, Rashba, Ram, Ritva and Nimukei Yosef all say like I said; we do not find anyone who disagrees.</p>
<p class='otherhalachos'>Other Halachos relevant to this Daf:</p>
<p class='otherhalachostext'>COUNTING SHMITOS (Nedarim 61)</p>
<p class='normal'></p>


lvr: 48
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) 'KESAV V'LASHON' (THE REAL SOURCE OF THEIR BOOKS)</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The verse states 'Bazuy Atah Me'od' -- '[Behold, I will make you small among the nations;] you shall be greatly despised' (Ovadyah 1:2). Rav Yosef explains that this refers to the nation of Rome which does not possess its own Kesav (script) or Lashon (language). What does this mean? (See Background to the Daf.)
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI</b> (end of DH u'Mi Mukmi) explains that the script and language of the Romans came from a different nation, and he adds that 'others made all of their books for them.' The first part of Rashi's comment apparently means that they merely used the script and language of a different nation. The second part of Rashi's comment needs further explanation. What does he mean that 'others made all of their books'?
</p><p>
The <b>SEDER YAKOV</b> quotes two texts of Rashi (the <b>DIKDUKEI SOFRIM's</b> version of Rashi in the first edition of the <b>EIN YAKOV</b>) which elaborate. In those texts, Rashi adds that others made all of their <i>mistaken books.</i> Rashi continues that these people were 'Yochanan' (John?), 'Paulus' (Paul), and 'Pitros' (Peter), all of whom were Jewish. In his explanation of 'Lashon,' Rashi says that it refers to the language spoken by the priests, which the abovementioned persons corrupted (see <b>OTZAR LA'AZEI RASHI</b>) in order to isolate the priests and to prevent them from mixing with Yisrael, 'and these three were not heretics, because they had in mind the good of Yisrael, but because they saw Yisrael in difficulty... they made themselves as if they were with him (Oso ha'Ish)....' The Seder Yakov explains that when these emissaries of the Notzrim came to the Roman government with their 'holy books,' they brought them in a twisted form in order to prevent them from being mixed together as part of Judaism.
</p><p>
The notion that these emissaries had in mind the good of Yisrael is not unprecedented. It is mentioned by <b>RABEINU YERUCHAM</b> (Nesiv 17:5, as cited in short by the <b>SHACH</b> to YD 139:9). Rabeinu Yerucham rules that one may not sell a Nochri-translated Bible to a Nochri. He explains that it is clear that whoever originally translated the Tanach for the Nochrim changed the original text in order to lead them away from Judaism and to strengthen their beliefs and mistakes. He cites many examples of mistakes in the translation of the Bible. One such mistake is the translation of the verse, 'Ani Amis va'Achayeh' -- 'I will kill and I will give life' (Devarim 32:39). Their version reads, 'I will die and live,' a clear error which supports the Nochri's mistaken beliefs.
</p><p>
A third source that indicates that those emissaries had positive intentions for the sake of Yisrael is a rumor discounted by the early authorities. There was a mistaken rumor, quoted by a number of early Sefarim, that Shimon Peter Chamor authored the prayer of 'Nishmas Kol Chai.' The Rishonim point out that this is a flagrant mistake, and anyone who says such a thing will have to bring a Korban Chatas (see, for example, <b>MACHZOR VITRI</b>, Hilchos Pesach #66). Although the rumor certainly is untrue, the fact that there existed such a rumor, and that people mistakenly thought that the prayer was composed by him, provides evidence that his activities were conducted with positive intentions.
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH she'Ein Lahem) quotes the <b><b><b>RI</b></b></b> who explains that 'Kesav v'Lashon' refers to the custom of royalty to have a special script and language. The Roman royalty did not have its own royal script and language.
</p><p>
(c) Alternatively, Tosfos explains that each of the nations that arose after the Mabul, from Yishmael and the sons of Keturah, adopted a language from a nation that was destroyed prior to the Mabul. The Romans did not do this. Rather, they learned their language from a different nation. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafbbb'><span class='numt'>1)</span> A GIFT THAT SPECIFIES ONE OF THE RECIPIENTS [gift: division]</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span> Gemara</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span> Keti'a bar Shalom declared 'my property is given to R. Akiva and his colleagues.'</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl3'> R. Akiva:</span> 'V'Haysah l'Aharon ul'Vanav' teaches that Aharon gets half, (of the Lechem ha'Panim), and his sons (the other Kohanim) get half. (Here also, I get half, and my colleagues get half.)</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Bava Basra 142a (Rav Yosef):</span> If Yakov told his wife 'my property is to you and your sons', she gets half, and her sons get half. We learn from the following Beraisa.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> (Beraisa - Rebbi):</span> 'V'Haysah l'Aharon ul'Vanav' - Aharon gets half, and his sons get half.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Objection (Abaye):</span> There, had the verse not mentioned Aharon, he would have received a share. Surely, he is mentioned to teach that he gets half;</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span> Normally, a wife does not inherit. Yakov mentioned her to teach that she gets a share like her sons!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'> Question #1 (against Abaye):</span> Cases occurred, and Shmuel and R. Yochanan ruled that she gets half!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'> Question #2:</span> Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef taught that once, the king demanded that the rich people and the (less rich) nobles buy a crown for him. Rebbi ruled that the rich pay half, and the nobles pay half!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'> Answer (to Question #2):</span> Initially, the king wrote only that the rich must pay. The nobles used to help a small amount. When the king found out, he included the nobles to (increase the demand and) teach that each group pays half.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'> Question (against Rav Yosef - R. Zeira - Beraisa):</span> If one said 'it is upon me to bring a flour-offering of 100 Esronim in two Kelim', he brings 60 in one Keli, and 40 in another Keli. If he brought 50 in one Keli and 50 in another Keli, he fulfilled his obligation.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span> This is only b'Di'eved. According to Rav Yosef, l'Chatchilah he brings half in each!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'> Answer:</span> There, he clearly intends to bring a big Korban. He specified to bring in two Kelim, because he knows that he cannot bring it all in one Keli. He should bring as much as is possible (60) in one Keli.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span> The Halachah follows Rav Yosef.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'> 33a:</span> Rav Idi bar Avin's relative died, and left a date tree. Rav Idi and another relative (Reuven) each said 'I am the closer relative.'</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span> Rishonim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> Rambam (Hilchos Zechiyah 11:5):</span> If one said 'my property is to Ploni and my sons', Ploni gets half, and all his sons get half. A case occurred in which a man told his wife 'my property is to you and your sons', and Chachamim said that she gets half, and her sons get half.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Hagahos Maimoniyos (4):</span> A man and his wife stipulated that if one of them dies, the property will go to their relatives. My Rebbi ruled that the relatives of the deceased get half. Since the couple did not specify a person, his relatives acquired half and her relatives acquired half. They cannot change this, even to give from one Oni to another, and even if one has more relatives than the other.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Rambam (6):</span> If he said 'I give to Ploni, Almoni, and David's sons', David's sons get half, and Ploni and Almoni get half.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Rebuttal (Ra'avad):</span> If he said 'to Ploni and Almoni and David's sons', David's sons should get a third, just like if he said 'to Ploni and Almoni and David! The same applies if he said 'to Ploni and *to* Almoni and *to* David's sons.' However, if he said 'to Ploni and Almoni and *to* David's sons, then the Rambam's law is correct, for he made Ploni and Almoni one group, and David's sons are one group.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'> Magid Mishneh:</span> The Ramban holds that the group always gets half. The Ramban says that the group always gets like one of the individuals, for if not, sometimes people in the group get more than the individuals, e.g. if he said give to Reuven, Shimon, Levi and Yehudah's sons, and Yehudah has only two sons, the two sons get half. The Ra'avad's distinction (based on to whom he said 'to') is as fine as a hair's width.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Rosh (Bava Basra 9:7):</span> If the giver listed many people and a group, the group gets half, even if has less people than were listed. E.g. if one said 'I give to Ploni, Almoni, David, and Reuven's sons', even if Reuven has only two sons, the two sons get half.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Nimukei Yosef (Bava Basra 66b DH v'Im):</span> The Gemara connotes that there is importance to the individual. The Rashba and Ro'oh hold like the Ramban. The Ritva received from his Rebbi that this is not limited to gifts. It applies also to one who says 'lend to Ploni and Almoni and their children', and to any stipulation and agreement of an individual or Tzibur.</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span> Poskim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> Shulchan Aruch (CM 247:5:):</span> If one said 'my property is to Ploni and my sons', Ploni gets half, and all his sons get half. If he said 'I give to Ploni, Almoni, and David's sons, David's sons get half, and Ploni and Almoni get half. This is even if he listed more individuals than are in the group, e.g. he said 'I give to Ploni, Almoni, David, and Reuven's sons, and Reuven has only two sons.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Beis Yosef (DH u'Mah she'Chosav):</span> The Ran (143a DH ha'Hu) says that Rav Yosef does *not* say that the individual gets half due to his importance, i.e. since he was singled out, the giver esteems him as much as the group. If so, what was the question from a Minchah of 100 Esronim? There, he did not list the Kelim individually to show that he esteems them! Rather, Rav Yosef holds that one wants to divide his property according to his words. Since he made two divisions with his words, we give half to each division. Therefore, if he said 'my property is to Reuven, Shimon and Ploni's sons', Reuven and Shimon get half, and Ploni's sons get half. If he listed three individuals, and Ploni had only two sons, the individuals get less than the sons. This is because they do not get half due to their importance. This is like the Rambam; the Ramban says that the group always gets like one of the individuals. It seems that he holds that (when there is one individual,) he gets half due to his importance.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Rema:</span> The same applies to other matters. Therefore, if a man and wife stipulated that if one of them dies, the property will go to their relatives, his relatives get half and her relatives get half.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Ketzos ha'Choshen (2):</span> The Ritva (143b) says that 'my relatives' includes all relatives disqualified from testifying for him. Tosfos (Bava Basra 33a DH Krivei and DH Hachi) brings a text that connotes that Rav Idi's relative commanded to give the tree to 'Krivei' (his relative(s)), there was a dispute about who is closest. This shows that we do not give it to all the relatives, rather, to the closest one! He brings another text that does not say 'closer.' One text says that later, witnesses testified that Reuven was a relative, i.e. disqualified from testimony. Rav Idi could not prove that he himself was close enough to be disqualified. Reuven received the entire tree, for a Safek cannot take from a Vadai.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Nesivos ha'Mishpat (Urim 5):</span> The Beis Yosef says that all the relatives (that the Torah disqualifies for testimony) divide it equally.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl3'> R. Akiva Eiger:</span> Panim Yafos (Sefer ha'Makneh's Perush on the Torah) Parshas Emor was unsure whether this is only for gifts, or even for sales.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'> Terumas ha'Deshen (Pesakim 73):</span> Rava holds like R. Yonason, who normally expounds 'Vov' to mean 'or.' Presumably, the Halachah follows him against Abaye, who rules like R. Yoshiyah (who says that it means 'and'. Here, there was no Hava Amina that the Lechem ha'Panim goes to Aharon *or* his sons (e.g. they cast a lot to decide), for the verse concludes '*they* will eat it in a Kodesh place.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl3'> Chasam Sofer:</span> The Ritva (citing R. Pinchas ha'Levi, in Shitah Mekubetzes Bava Metzia Sof 94b) says that R. Yonason agrees (that 'Vov' means 'both) regarding a command to do or give. Yuma 57b refutes this (R. Yonason holds that the blood of the bull and goat are placed separately).</p>
<p class='doublespace'></p>


lvr: 48
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) KETI'A BAR SHALOM'S CONVERSION</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara relates the heroic story of Keti'a bar Shalom, a Nochri who successfully defended the Jews from the evil decree of the Roman Emperor by proving the Emperor wrong. Although the Emperor relented and admit that Keti'a was correct, he sentenced Keti'a to death because of the rule anyone who is victorious over the Emperor in a debate is liable for death. While Keti'a was being led away to be executed, he heard a Roman matron say, 'Woe to the ship that goes without paying a tax.' <b>RASHI</b> (DH b'Lo Michsa) explains that the matron was hinting that it is a shame that he sacrificed himself for the Jews and did not give himself the opportunity to be with them in their share in the World to Come. When he heard this, he threw himself upon the ground in a manner which gave himself a Bris Milah.
</p><p>
Although his act clearly was one of tremendous Mesirus Nefesh, it seems that the Bris Milah should not have been effective in making him a Jew. The Halachah is that only a Jew can perform Bris Milah (see 27a). Why did the matron tell him to do something which was seemingly ineffective?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>PORAS YOSEF</b> explains that Keti'a's Bris Milah indeed could have been effective. He suggests that the law that a Nochri's act of Milah is ineffective is true only when the Nochri is not trying to convert. If he is trying to convert, then his act of Milah is effective. This is based on the concept of 'Gito v'Yado Ba'im k'Echad' -- 'his Get and his hand come simultaneously.' The Gemara in Kidushin (23a) teaches that when a master gives his slave a Get Shichrur, the slave acquires the document only through the mechanism of 'Gito v'Yado Ba'im k'Echad.' Since a slave is unable to acquire anything (even his Get Shichrur) while he is a slave, the only way he can become free by receiving a Get Shichrur is if 'the Get Shichrur and his freedom (literally 'hand') come simultaneously.' Similarly, when a Nochri performs Milah to himself with intention to become Jewish, his 'Milah and conversion come simultaneously.' (See also <b>MINCHAS CHINUCH</b> #2).
</p><p>
(b) The <b>SEDER YAKOV</b> asks a number of questions on the view that Keti'a actually became a Jew. One of his questions is that even if Keti'a's Milah would have been a valid Milah, Keti'a did not immerse in a Mikvah in the presence of a Beis Din before his death. How, then, could he have been considered a Jew?
</p><p>
The Seder Yakov therefore explains that having a Bris Milah provides a benefit to a person even without making him Jewish. The <b>MAHARSHA</b> here quotes the Gemara in Eruvin (19a) which relates that Avraham Avinu takes Jewish sinners out of Gehinom, with the exception of a Jew who had relations with a Nochri woman. Although such a person physically has a Bris Milah, he is considered lacking in the spiritual aspect of Milah, and thus he does not deserve to be saved from Gehinom. Keti'a bar Shalom, who gave up his life for Hashem's people, wanted to establish his spiritual relationship with Hash-m before he died, symbolized by Bris Milah. The sign of Milah, performed with such intention, shows that the person is dedicated to Hash-m, even if he is not Jewish. Since Keti'a had a Bris Milah, he was entitled to be saved from Gehinom by Avraham Avinu, and thus he would receive his just reward in Olam ha'Ba. (Y. Montrose) 
</p><p>


lvr: 48
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) HALACHAH: THE CUSTOM TO TOUCH AND KISS THE MEZUZAH</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Gemara relates that Onkelus, hunted by the Caesar for converting to Judaism, confronted battalion after battalion of troops who came to his house and successfully convinced each battalion of the merits of Judaism. The Caesar finally instructed his troops not to talk to Onkelus at all, but just to arrest him. They arrived at Onkelus' home and ordered him to come with them. Upon leaving, he touched the Mezuzah on his door post and asked the Roman soldiers, 'What is this?' They replied, 'You tell us.' He explained to them that it is the manner of an earthly king to sit inside while his servants guard him from outside. Hash-m, however, is different. His servants sit inside and He guards them from the outside, as it says, 'Hashem will guard you as you leave and as you enter, from now and forever' (Tehilim 121:8). The soldiers were deeply moved by this lesson and they, too, converted. After this set of troops was defeated, the Caesar stopped sending more troops.
</p><p>
Many Poskim cite this Gemara as the source for the custom to touch and kiss the Mezuzah when one leaves or enters his home.
</p><p>
(a) The <b>DARCHEI MOSHE</b> (YD 285) quotes the <b>MAHARIL</b> who infers from the Gemara that one should place his hand on the Mezuzah when he leaves his home and say, 'Hash-m Yishmor Tzeisi u'Vo'i me'Atah v'Ad Olam' -- 'Hash-m should guard my leaving and coming from now and forever,' a paraphrase of the verse in Tehilim. This custom is recorded by the <b>REMA</b> (YD 285:2). However, the Rema does not write that one should recite the prayer both when he leaves and enters his home, but only when he leaves. The Rema writes that when one enters, 'he should place his hand on the Mezuzah.' Perhaps the Rema maintains that the prayer is not said when one enters his home, because the source for such a prayer is the incident with Onkelus, who said the verse only when he was leaving his home.
</p><p>
The <b>SHACH</b> quotes additional words of the Maharil, which the Rema does not cite (although the Rema does quote them in <b>DARCHEI MOSHE</b>): When one leaves his house in order to embark on a trip outside of his city, he should place his hand on the Mezuzah and say, 'b'Shimcha Tal Etleh.' The Shach explains that 'Tal' is the Gematriya of the Divine name written on the back of the Mezuzah, 'Kuzu.'
</p><p>
Although these sources do not mention that one should <i>kiss</i> the Mezuzah after he places his hand on it, other sources mention that it is praiseworthy to kiss objects of Mitzvos, and this certainly is true of something as holy as a Mezuzah. (See <b>PISCHEI TESHUVAH</b> YD 285:3, who writes in the name of <b>REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b> that one may touch the Mezuzah with his bare skin only when it is within an encasement.)
</p><p>
(b) The <b>KITZUR SHULCHAN ARUCH</b> (11:24) explicitly writes that one should <i>kiss</i> the Mezuzah when he leaves and enters his house. When he leaves his house he should say, 'Hash-m Shomri Hash-m Tzili Al Yad Yemini, Hash-m Yishmor Tzeisi u'Vo'i me'Atah v'Ad Olam' -- 'Hash-m is my Guard, Hash-m is my Shade at my right hand, Hash-m should guard my leaving and coming from now and forever.' The Kitzur Shulchan Aruch mentions this prayer only with regard to one who <i>leaves</i> his house, perhaps because Onkelus said this verse only when he left his house.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>BIRKEI YOSEF</b> quotes a different version of this custom in the name of the <b>ARIZAL</b>. He says that a person should place his middle finger on the name 'Shakai' of the Mezuzah, kiss his finger (see <b>ARUCH HA'SHULCHAN</b> YD 285:4), and pray to Hash-m that He guard him with the name Shakai, and that He save him from the Yetzer ha'Ra with the name of Hash-m formed with the letters that follow the letters of Shakai -- 'Tav (after Shin), Kaf (after Yud), Heh (after Dalet).'
</p><p>
It should be noted that none of Poskim mention that one must place his hand on or kiss any Mezuzah other than the one on the door of his home. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) DARCHEI HA'EMORI [Darchei ha'Emori]</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>     (a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Mishnah - R. Meir):</font></b> The day he (the king's father)
               died... (Chachamim forbid the day of death only if
               they burned his Kelim.)
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Inference:</font></b> R. Meir always forbids. He must say that
               burning is not a Nochri statute, and Chachamim say
               that it is a Nochri statute!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Question (Beraisa):</font></b> We burn after a king dies. This
               is not forbidden due to 'ways of the Emori (doing
               like Nochrim)';
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  If it is a Nochri statute, this is
                    'uv'Chukoseihem Lo Selechu'!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Answer:</font></b> All agree that it is not a statute. It just
               shows honor to the king. R. Meir holds that they
               serve idolatry in any case. Chachamim hold that they
               serve idolatry only if they burned, for then the
               death is meaningful to them.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   (Beraisa):</font></b> We may burn after a king dies. This is
               not forbidden due to Darchei ha'Emori - 'uv'Misrefos
               Avosecha ha'Melachim...'
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Sanhedrin 52b (Beraisa - R. Yehudah):</font></b> I agree that
               it is disgraceful (to rest the head on a block and
               cut it with a chopping knife), but we cannot execute
               by the sword like the kingdom - 'uv'Chukoseihem Lo
               Selechu'!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   Chachamim:</font></b> Since the Torah teaches that a sword
               should be used, we did not learn from the Nochrim.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.   74a (Rava bar Rav Yitzchak):</font></b> Wearing shoelaces like
               Yisraelim is a a light Mitzvah (which one may not
               transgress in public, even if he will be killed)..
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.   Shabbos 67a (Mishnah - R. Meir):</font></b> One may go out (on
               Shabbos) with a locust egg, the tooth of a fox, or a
               nail from a crucifix for the sake of a cure;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>10. </font></b> Chachamim forbid these at all times, due to Darchei
<br>               ha'Emori
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>11. </font></b> The locust egg is (hung in the ear) for an ear ache.
               A tooth from a live fox helps one who sleeps too
               much, and a tooth from a dead fox helps one to
               sleep. A nail from a crucifix helps for swelling
               (due to a blow from iron).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>12.  (Abaye and Rava):</font></b> Anything done to heal is not
               Darchei ha'Emori. If it does not (have a logical or
               medical reason for it to) heal, it is Darchei
               ha'Emori.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>13.  (R. Chiya bar Avin):</font></b> Everything in Perakim 7 and 8
               of the Tosefta of Shabbos is Darchei ha'Emori,
               except for two cures. If a bone is caught in one's
               throat, we put a similar bone on his forehead and
               say 'Chad Chad Nachis Bala Bala Nachis Chad Chad.'
               If a fishbone is stuck, we say 'Ninatzta
               k'Machat...'
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rif and Rosh (Sanhedrin 17b and 8:3):</font></b> Nochrim used
               to wear red shoelaces, and Yisraelim wore black, to
               avoid Bigdei Nochrim. If a Nochri tells a Yisrael
               'wear red shoelaces in public, or be killed', he may
               not wear them.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rambam (Hilchos Avodah Zarah 11:1):</font></b> One may not
               follow Chukos ha'Nochrim or resemble them in their
               dress or hairstyle - 'uv'Chukoseihem Lo Selechu.'
               Yisrael should be distinguished from them in
               clothing and other deeds. One may not wear clothing
               special to them.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rambam (15):</font></b> All matters (of witchcraft and Nichush)
               are false. Early idolaters tricked people into
               following them. One who thinks that it is true, but
               the Torah forbids it, is a fool. 'Ha'Goyim... El
               Me'onenim Yishme'u v'Atah Lo Ken...'
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Rambam (Hilchos Yesodei ha'Torah 5:2):</font></b> If a Nochri
               seeks to make a Yisrael transgress an Aveirah other
               than idolatry, Arayos or murder, if 10 Yisraelim are
               present, in which case he must submit to be killed.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Rashi (74b DH Arkesa):</font></b> If Yisrael tie their
               shoelaces differently, for they are more modest,
               even if it is not a Mitzvah, rather, a custom, he
               must be Mekadesh Hash-m in front of his colleagues.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Rashba (1:413):</font></b> The Rambam says that what the Torah
               forbade is folly. I disagree. Sanhedrin 101a permits
               asking Shedim via oil or egg shells, because they
               lie. Sha'ul used an Ov (to speak to Shmuel). The
               Torah testified that the Mitzriyim did things
               through Kishuf. A Rav derived from the Rambam that
               whatever works is permitted. He used this to permit
               a nail from a crucifix. This is unlike a fox' tooth,
               which works due to itself, like a magnet. The
               crucifix nail works not due to the iron or its
               shape, rather, from what is received from the
               crucifix. On Shabbos, one may go out with a special
               stone to prevent miscarriage, or something that
               weighed the same as such a stone (Shabbos 66b). The
               Mishnah permits a nail from a crucifix and a fox'
               tooth, for they were believed to heal. We may rely
               on what was once known to heal, or what we see
               nowadays that it heals. We may rely even on simple
               people, who are not Chachamim or doctors. However,
               in Moreh Nevuchim the Rambam forbids what we cannot
               explain why it should work, due to Darchei ha'Emori.
               We may rely on what Chachamim permitted. However,
               they permitted thngs that we cannot explain! R.
               Chiya bar Avin forbids almost everything, but even
               he permits, if one is choking on a bone, to put a
               similar bone on his forehead and say 'Chad Chad...'
               There is no logic for this action or these words.
               Presumably, he permits because experience shows that
               it works. The Gemara is full of such matters. It is
               very concerned for Zugos (even numbers of things),
               and asked why Chachamim enacted four cups of wine!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   Tosfos (Sanhedrin 52b DH Ela):</font></b> Here we permit a
               Nochri statute because it is written in the Torah.
               In Avodah Zarah, we say that burning after a king
               dies would be forbidden if it were a Nochri statute,
               even though there is a verse for it! There, we mean
               that it is not an idolatrous rite. If it were, it
               would be forbidden in spite of the verse. Here we
               discuss a Nochri rite not for idolatry.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.   Ran (2b DH Sorfin):</font></b> The Torah forbids (due to
               Darchei ha'Emori) only folly. All of it is for the
               sake of idolatry. What is done for a reason is
               permitted. We burn after a king dies for honor, to
               show that others may not use what he used.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Radvaz (2:740):</font></b> People slaughter chickens on
                    Erev Yom Kipur for Kaparah. I did not see any
                    Chacham protest. The Rashba forbids. I say that
                    if they give the chickens to the poor, it is
                    not Darchei ha'Emori, and even he would permit.
                    One may give Tzedakah 'in order that my son
                    will live'!
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (YD 178:1):</font></b> One may not follow Chukos
               ha'Nochrim (Rema - or resemble them), or wear dress
               special for them, or grow his hair the way they do...
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Gra (1):</font></b> Toras Kohanim forbids their Nimusim,
                    e.g. theaters, and circuses. R. Meir says that
                    this is Darchei ha'Emori.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rema:</font></b> One must differ from them in dress and
               actions. This refers to a Nochri custom for the sake
               of immodesty, e.g. to wear red clothing, which
               nobles wear, or something they made a custom and
               statute without reason. Then we are concerned for
               Darchei ha'Emori and affairs of idolatry.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Shach (3):</font></b> It is more modest to wear black.
                    This helps one who was seized by his Yetzer
                    ha'Ra. Our tradition is not to wear red.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Gra (6):</font></b> The Rif could agree with Rashi. What
                    is done for honor is permitted, even if Nochrim
                    originated it.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rema (ibid.):</font></b> If there is a reason for it, e.g.
               doctors wear special clothing, it is permitted. The
               same applies to clothing for honor or other reasons.
               This is why one may burn after the death of kings.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (DH v'Chen):</font></b> Maharik (88) says that
                    in two cases we forbid due to Chukos
                    ha'Nochrim. One is if there is no revealed
                    reason for it, like 'Chok' connotes. Since he
                    does a strange matter without a reason, it
                    looks like he is drawn after Nochrim and admits
                    to them (their creed). Semag (Lavin 50) says
                    that in Shabbos, Chachamim listed all
                    traditions they had for Nochri practices. Every
                    one in the Tosefta (Perakim 7,8) is bizarre; we
                    do not know any reasons for them, like those
                    listed in Shabbos 67a. Chukoseihem are what is
                    astounding. Darchei ha'Emori are Nichushim. We
                    also forbid due to Chukos ha'Nochrim a breach
                    of modesty and humility that Nochrim do, if the
                    Halachah follows the Tana (Sifri Re'eh 29)
                    'since they go out in purple, I will also.
                    Since they go out amidst praises, I will also.'
                    These are haughtiness. This is if he seeks to
                    be like them, without any other purpose. If the
                    Yisrael manner of dress is no more modest,
                    Rashi permits dressing like the Nochrim. The
                    Rambam says that Yisrael must be distinguished
                    from Nochrim. Maharik does not always require
                    this. He forbids a garment special for Nochrim,
                    but not what resembles their garments! Rather,
                    we forbid only what is special to them, and
                    Yisrael refrained from it due to modesty or
                    another reason. In this case, one who wears it
                    looks like he admits to them and is drawn after
                    them.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Gra (7):</font></b> The Ran says that Darchei ha'Emori
                    forbids only folly. It is all for the sake of
                    idolatry. What is done for a reason is
                    permitted. Sanhedrin 52b connotes oppositely!
                    There is reason to execute like the kingdom, to
                    minimize disgrace, yet Chachamim would forbid
                    due to Darchei ha'Emori had the Torah not
                    specified a sword! Tosfos explains that a verse
                    permits a Nochri rite unless it is for
                    idolatry. In Avodah Zarah we answered that
                    burning after a king dies is for honor, and not
                    for idolatry. Maharik must explain that there
                    is no reason to kill by the sword. This is
                    difficult! Rather, if not for the verse, we
                    would not kill by the sword at all. It is still
                    difficult, for the Torah did not specify to cut
                    off the head! The Ran and Rema are very
                    difficult. Rather, even if their rite came
                    first, it is permitted if we did not learn from
                    them, even without a verse, as long as we would
                    do so even without them. The Rif connotes like
                    this. Surely a shoelace is not immodest. This
                    is why it says <i>even</i> a shoelace. The Maharik's
                    proofs are invalid, for those clothes were not
                    special only for Nochrim.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Avnei Nezer (YD 128:4, 131:5):</font></b> The Rambam
                    explains that one must be Moser Nefesh even for
                    shoelaces, due to 'uv'Chukoseihem Lo Selechu.
                    The Maharik says that this Aveirah is only when
                    one wants to mimic Nochrim! We must say that
                    even though he does so only due to the
                    coercion, the Nochri will not think so. Even
                    though the Yisrael does not transgress, due to
                    his intent, Kidush Hash-m applies. 
<br>


lvr: 48
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) AGADAH: 'WOE TO THIS ONE WHEN THIS ONE RISES'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara relates that once every seventy years, a holiday would be celebrated in Rome, on which a healthy man would ride on the back of a cripple. The healthy man would wear the clothes of Adam ha'Rishon and the scalp of Rebbi Yishmael, and he would hold an expensive rod made of a type of gold. The people would decorate the marketplaces and proclaim in front of the pair of men: 'The officer's calculation is nonsense! The brother of our master is a forger! Whoever sees will see, and whoever does not see will not see! What does the liar gain with his trickery, and the forger with his forgery?' They would conclude, 'Woe to this one when this one rises!'
</p><p>
The commentaries explain that this ceremony was intended to demonstrate Esav's supposed triumph over Yakov, who gained nothing by stealing the birthright and blessings from Esav. However, the ceremony seems to end on an ominous note for Rome. The conclusion, 'Woe to this one when this one rises,' implies that Rome fears the rising of Yakov. Why would they add that ominous statement?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>KOS YESHU'OS</b> explains that the last statement was not part of their proclamation. Rather, it is the Gemara's response to their boasting. The Gemara responds by saying that although they are mightier now, woe to them when Hash-m will again elevate the status of the Jewish people.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>AVODAS AVODAH</b> and the <b>ETZ YOSEF</b> record testimony from a person who actually saw this ceremony, and who insisted that the Romans themselves made this last statement. However, it was the Roman elders who said it in Hebrew in order that the masses not understand that their triumph is only temporary.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>AVODAH BERURAH</b> explains that it is not unreasonable to say that the Romans themselves made this statement. It is the nature of evildoers to persist in their evil ways even when they know that they likely will be punished for their deeds after they die. Although the evildoers boast that they are triumphant in this world, they admit that if Hash-m elevates the Jewish people at the end of the days, they are going to face serious judgment. (Y. Montrose) 
</p><p>


lvr: 48
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) HALACHAH: DRINKING WATER FROM A WATER FOUNTAIN STATUE</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Gemara discusses actions that one is prohibited from doing because they resemble forms of idol-worship. One of these actions is drinking water that pours forth from the mouth of a statue. Idolaters would build water fountains in the shapes of statues, with water coming out of the mouths of the statues. The Gemara says that a person is not allowed to place his mouth on the mouth of the statues in the cities in order to drink the water, because it appears as though he is kissing the Avodah Zarah.
</p><p>
The Gemara does not specify whether this prohibition applies to statues which themselves are used for Avodah Zarah or whether it applies even to ordinary water fountain statues. What is the Halachah?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>RIF</b>, <b>ROSH</b>, and <b>TUR</b> (YD 150) record the Gemara's prohibition without specifying that the fountain itself is used for Avodah Zarah. They understand that one may not drink from such a fountain even if the statue is not worshipped as Avodah Zarah.
</p><p>
According to this opinion, however, why does the Gemara specifically state this Halachah with regard to statues in the cities? The <b>TAZ</b> answers that it seems that the Gemara intends to give a stringency by mentioning statues in the cities, for such statues were commonly built merely for beauty and not for Avodah Zarah. (In contrast, statues in villages were usually built for idol-worship; see <b>SHULCHAN ARUCH</b> YD 141:1, based on the Mishnah on 44b). The Gemara is teaching that one may not drink from statues even in the cities.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Avodas Kochavim 3:8), <b>SEMAG</b>, and <b>SHULCHAN ARUCH</b> (YD 150:3) specify that this prohibition applies only to fountains situated in front of an Avodah Zarah. (Obviously, it applies as well when the statue itself is worshipped as Avodah Zarah.)
</p><p>
The <b>BACH</b> cites a proof for this opinion. The Gemara discusses three other cases: crouching in front of an Avodah Zarah in order to remove a thorn, picking up money in front of an Avodah Zarah, and drinking from a stream which lies in front of an Avodah Zarah. After the Gemara explains the necessity to mention all three cases, the Gemara asks why is it necessary to mention the case of the water fountain. <b>RASHI</b> (12b, DH Partzufos) explains that the case of the stream already teaches that even when someone is very thirsty he is not allowed to drink from that water, and thus what more can the case of the water fountain be teaching? The Gemara answers that this case was said merely to introduce the next part of the Beraisa.
</p><p>
According to the opinion that the prohibition applies even when the statue is <i>not</i> in front of Avodah Zarah, why does the Gemara say that there is no intrinsic novelty in this case? This case <i>is</i> unique in that it forbids drinking from the fountain even when there is no Avodah Zarah present, unlike the other cases! It must be that this prohibition applies only when the fountain is in front of an Avodah Zarah.
</p><p>

HALACHAH: The Bach concludes in accordance with the view of the Rambam, and as recorded by the Shulchan Aruch. However, he maintains that one who is stringent upon himself and does not drink from any water fountain statue will receive a blessing. This is also the opinion of the <b>SHACH</b>.
</p><p>
The <b>TAZ</b> also writes that one should be stringent and follow the opinion of the Tur. However, he implies that it is not merely a stringency, but that it is the Halachah, but he does not explain why. Perhaps his reasoning is that of the Bach in his Hagahos to the Rif, where the Bach points out that since many Rishonim prohibit drinking from such a fountain even when it is not used for Avodah Zarah, and since the Gemara does not mention that the statue must be in front of an Avodah Zarah, the Halachah seems to follow the view of the Tur. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>


<font><b>2) MUST ONE GIVE UP HIS LIFE FOR 'MAR'IS HA'AYIN' OF IDOLATRY?</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Beraisa lists several actions which one is prohibited from doing because those actions resemble forms of idol-worship. These actions are: crouching in front of an Avodah Zarah in order to remove a thorn, picking up money in front of an Avodah Zarah, and drinking from a stream which lies in front of an Avodah Zarah. The Gemara states that if the Beraisa had not taught the law in the case of the stream, one might have thought that he is permitted to drink from the stream in front of an Avodah Zarah when refraining from drinking would endanger his life. The Beraisa teaches that it is prohibited even in such a situation.
</p><p>
It is known that the sin of Avodah Zarah is one of three sins for which a Jew must die in order not to transgress. The Gemara here implies that one must die even in order to avoid transgressing 'Mar'is ha'Ayin' (doing a permitted action which appears to be an act of transgression) of Avodah Zarah. Is this true?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>RASHBA</b>, <b>TUR</b> (YD 150) and others write that the straightforward understanding of the Gemara is that indeed one must sacrifice his life in order to avoid even an act of 'Mar'is ha'Ayin' of Avodah Zarah. This also appears to be the intention of <b>RASHI</b> (DH Aval).
</p><p>
The <b>BI'UR HA'GRA</b> cites another proof for this opinion. The Gemara in Sanhedrin (75a) discusses a case in which a man became sick from his lust for a woman. The doctors said that he would recover even if she would consent merely to talk to him from behind a wall. The Rabanan ruled in such a case that it is better for the man to die than to have the woman talk with him. One opinion there says that the woman was married, while another opinion says that she was not married. The Gemara states that according to the opinion that she was married, the Rabanan's ruling makes sense; it is better that the man die than talk with the woman (since she is an Eshes Ish and falls into the category of the Isur of Arayos, one of the categories of transgression for which a person must die in order not to transgress). The Vilna Ga'on asks why is that opinion, that she was married, more reasonable than the opinion that she was not married? According to the Ramban and others, the prohibition there would have been only an Isur d'Rabanan! Why, then, should the man be left to die? It must be that even for an Isur d'Rabanan in one of the three categories of sins of 'Yehareg v'Al Ya'avor,' the rule that one must die and not transgress applies. Similarly, one must die and not transgress the Isur d'Rabanan of 'Mar'is ha'Ayin' of Avodah Zarah.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAN</b> also writes that this is the straightforward meaning of the Gemara, but he adds that the requirement to allow oneself to be killed in order not to transgress does not apply in all cases of 'Mar'is ha'Ayin' but only in certain cases. In the case of drinking from a stream, where the person looks as though he is bowing down to the Avodah Zarah, he is required to give up his life and not transgress 'Mar'is ha'Ayin' of Avodah Zarah. However, in cases of 'Mar'is ha'Ayin' where the person's act does not appear to be a blatant act of idol-worship (for example, traveling to a city which happens to be celebrating an idolatrous festival), a person is not required to give up his life.
</p><p>
(c) However, the Ran seems to conclude that even the case of drinking from a stream in front of an Avodah Zarah is not a case of 'Yehareg v'Al Ya'avor.' How, then, does he understand the Gemara? The Ran understands that the Gemara means that even though the person is very thirsty and <i>might</i> die before he finds water, he still is not allowed to drink the water. However, if he <i>knows</i> that he will not find any other water and that he <i>definitely</i> will die, he is allowed to drink the water. The Ran cites this opinion in the name of <b>RABEINU ASHER</b>. This opinion is also cited by the <b>REMA</b> (YD 150:3).
</p><p>
The <b>MEKOR MAYIM CHAYIM</b> explains how the Ran will answer the proof of the Vilna Ga'on. In the case in Sanhedrin, the person was interested in doing more than just talking to the woman. The Chachamim said that, in general, a man should not talk in such a context to a married woman since doing so might lead to an actual transgression of Giluy Arayos. Such a case is not comparable to the case of the Gemara here, in which the person involved has absolutely no interest in doing the actual sin of Avodah Zarah. Therefore, the Chachamim did not include this act in the category of 'Yehareg v'Al Ya'avor.' (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) CONCERN FOR SUSPICION [Mar'is Ayin]</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>     (a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa - R. Meir):</font></b> One may not enter a city in
               which they serve idolatry, or go from it to another
               city;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> Chachamim say, if the road also leads to another
               city, it is permitted.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> If one's coins fell and scattered in front of
               idolatry, he may not bend to pick them up, for it
               would look like he bows to the idolatry. One may not
               put his mouth next to the mouth of a fountain (made
               in the image of a person) to drink, for it would
               look like he kisses idolatry. If it will not be
               seen, these are permitted.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Suggestion:</font></b> 'It will not be seen' means that no one
               will see him.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Rejection:</font></b> Rav Yehudah taught in the name of Rav
               that anything forbidden due to suspicion, is
               forbidden even in private! Rather, it means that 
               that it will not seem like he bows or kisses.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Shabbos 146b (Mishnah):</font></b> If one's clothes became
               soaked on the road, when he reaches the outer gate
               (of the entrance to the city, a guarded place), he
               spreads them out to dry in the sun, but not in front
               of people.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   Question:</font></b> According to Rav, it should be forbidden
               even in private!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.   Answer:</font></b> Tana'im argue about this;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (Beraisa #1):</font></b> One may spread them to dry, but
                    not in public;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b> R. Eliezer and R. Shimon forbid.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.   64b - Question (Mishnah):</font></b> A donkey may not go out
               with a bell, even if the clapper is plugged (it
               looks like the owner takes it to sell it in the
               market);
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (Beraisa):</font></b> One may plug up the clapper and take
                    it in the Chatzer. (We are concerned for 
                    suspicion only in Reshus ha'Rabim.)
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>10.  Answer:</font></b> Tana'im argue about this (in Beraisa #1).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>11.  Kesuvos 60a (Beraisa - Nachum Ish Galya):</font></b> If a
               gutter pipe became clogged (on Shabbos and the water
               is dripping into the house), one may covertly squash
               the clogging matter with his foot, without concern.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  This is an unskillful way of fixing a Keli.
                    (Normally, Chachamim forbid.) Chachamim did not
                    decree when this will cause a loss.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>12.  (Rav Yosef):</font></b> The Halachah follows Nachum Ish Galya.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>13.  Chulin 41b (Rava):</font></b> The Mishnah permits to make a
               furrow near a pit and slaughter above the furrow,
               and the blood flows into the pit. One may not do so
               in the Reshus ha'Rabim, lest it encourage the
               Tzedukim.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>14. </font></b> A Beraisa says like Rava.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rif and Rosh (Shabbos 62a and 22:9):</font></b> Normally, we
               follow a Stam Mishnah against an argument in a
               Beraisa. However, in Avodah Zarah we asked from Rav
               (and answered). This shows that the Halachah follows
               Rav.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rosh:</font></b> Rav Nisim Gaon rules unlike Rav. A Beraisa
               (Chulin 41b) permits slaughtering above a furrow so
               the blood will flow into a pit, but not in Reshus
               ha'Rabim, lest he encourage the Tzedukim. This is no
               proof. Also here a Beraisa and Mishnah argue with
               Rav. Rav holds like the other Tana!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Note:</font></b> In Chulin, also Rava holds unlike Rav,
                    and he is Basra!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rosh:</font></b> We asked and answered similarly on 64b. Also,
               in Chulin one who sees will realize that he wants to
               clean his yard, so there is no suspicion at all.
               There is no proof from Nachum (Kesuvos 60a). There,
               there is no suspicion of an Isur mid'Oraisa, for
               people see that he unclogs it in an unskillful way.
               The Yerushalmi (Kilayim 40b) asks the Bavli's
               questions and other Mishnayos and Beraisos against
               Rav, and does not answer. If flax was dyed similarly
               to the color that wool is dyed, one may not make it
               a border for a wool garment (even if it is not
               connected in a way that the Isur of Shatnez applies)
               in a visible way, but one may do so for pillows and
               blankets. On Shabbos one may not pour into a sewage
               pipe that is covered for four Amos in Reshus
               ha'Rabim; a Beraisa permits pouring into a
               gutterpipe (that pours into the Chatzer), but not
               pipes that pour into Reshus ha'Rabim. It is
               permitted in winter, but Bar Kapara's Beraisa
               permits only in a covert place.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 22:20):</font></b> If one's clothes
               became soaked, he may not spread them out to dry,
               even in his house. This is a decree lest one say
               that he laundered on Shabbos, and now spreads the
               clothes to dry. Whatever Chachamim forbade due to
               suspicion is forbidden even in private.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Ran (Beitzah 4b DH mi'Chalon):</font></b> In one version in the
               Gemara, Beis Hillel permit moving a ladder to an
               opening of a dovecote in Reshus ha'Yachid, but not
               in Reshus ha'Rabim, due to suspicion. The Rif
               omitted this, for he rules like Rav, that anything
               forbidden due to suspicion, is forbidden even in
               private. Rav Nisim Gaon brought proofs against Rav.
               On Chol ha'Mo'ed, one may make a laundry ditch or a
               coffin with the Mes in the Chatzer, but not in
               Reshus ha'Rabim (Mo'ed Katan 8b). I say that if
               these were difficult for Rav, the Gemara would have
               asked them, like it asked about coins scattered in
               front of idolatry. When the Mes is there, there is
               no suspicion! This is why the Yerushalmi permits
               even in the market if the Mes was famous.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Question (Shiltei ha'Giborim 62a:1):</font></b> A Beraisa
                    permits an animal to go with a bell in the
                    Chatzer, but not in Reshus ha'Rabim. The
                    Gemara, Rashi and Tosfos connote that it is
                    like the Stam Tana who permits spreading
                    clothes to dry in private, but Rav forbids.
                    Hagahos Ashri explicitly says so. Why do the
                    Rif, Rambam, Rosh, Tur (and Shulchan Aruch)
                    rule like the Beraisa? They rule like Rav!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Answer (Magen Avraham 301:56):</font></b> The Beis Yosef
                    (336:9) says in the name of Tosfos that we
                    forbid in private only when there is suspicion
                    of a Torah Isur. However, why didn't the Gemara
                    give this answer for Rav? Perhaps Tosfos
                    rejects the Sugya in Shabbos and rules like the
                    Sugya in Kesuvos. (The latter Sugya did not
                    challenge Rav, for it holds that Rav's law is
                    only when there is concern for a Torah Isur -
                    Eshel Avraham.)
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (OC 301:45):</font></b> If one's clothes became
               soaked, he may wear them without concern lest he
               squeeze them. He may not spread them to dry, even in
               his house, lest people suspect that he laundered
               them on Shabbos.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Mishnah Berurah (161):</font></b> This is whether they
                    became wet through rain, or he fell in the
                    river.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Kaf ha'Chayim (254):</font></b> If the clothes fell in the
                    river before he wore them, the Bach, Me'iri and
                    Eshel Avraham permit to wear them. The Graz and
                    Chayei Adam permit only if they became wet
                    while he was wearing them.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</font></b> It is forbidden even in
               private where no one will see.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Mishnah Berurah (165):</font></b> It is forbidden even in
                    private when there could be suspicion for an
                    Isur mid'Oraisa, such as laundering.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Kaf ha'Chayim (261):</font></b> Even when there is no
                    suspicion of an Isur mid'Oraisa, one should not
                    be lenient in front of his household.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Magen Avraham (55):</font></b> The Shulchan Aruch connotes
                    that we forbid only if they became soaked, but
                    if a little water came on them one may spread
                    them to dry, for there is no suspicion lest he
                    laundered them. Some permit putting a little
                    water on a garment on Shabbos (in Rema 302:9).
                    However, the Shulchan Aruch (301:47) connotes
                    even if they are slightly wet one may not
                    spread them, for it forbids spreading even a
                    sweaty garment.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Mishnah Berurah (163):</font></b> Many Acharonim do not
                    distinguish (and forbid even if they are only
                    slightly wet).
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.   Mishnah Berurah (164):</font></b> One may hang up dirty
                    diapers in the house or Chatzer. Since there is
                    excrement on them, it is clear that he did not
                    launder them. Perhaps we permit even if there
                    is no excrement, if they are not totally soaked
                    with urine, for people know that babies urinate
                    in them. One may not spread them near an oven
                    where it is Yad Soledes Bo.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</font></b> It is forbidden only to
               spread them on Shabbos. If before Shabbos one spread
               laundry to dry, he need not remove it.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Mishnah Berurah (166):</font></b> One who bathed on Erev
                    Shabbos should spread the towel to dry before
                    sunset. If he needs it on Shabbos, he may be
                    lenient to spread it Bein ha'Shemashos.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Mishnah Berurah (167):</font></b> This is even if they are
                    spread where many see them. The primary
                    suspicion is when he spreads on Shabbos, for
                    there are grounds to believe that he lauddered
                    them on Shabbos. Had he laundered them before
                    Shabbos, he should have spread them to dry
                    before Shabbos! Not everyone knows that they
                    became soaked on Shabbos.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Kaf ha'Chayim (259):</font></b> One may hang to dry hand
                    towels or handkerchiefs if some filth is seen
                    on them.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Kaf ha'Chayim (260):</font></b> If he spread them on
                    Shabbos, he need not take them down. 
<br>


lvr: 48
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>3) THE SOURCE FOR THE PROHIBITION AGAINST BENEFITING FROM OBJECTS OFFERED TO AVODAH ZARAH</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Mishnah teaches that one should not do business in a city of Avodah Zarah with a store that is decorated in honor of the Avodah Zarah. The Gemara explains that the decorations to which the Mishnah refers are myrtle branches and roses which have a pleasant and enjoyable aroma. <b>RASHI</b> (DH d'Ka) explains that since the idol-worshippers normally spread these decorations in front of their Avodah Zarah, it is forbidden to derive any benefit from them. However, if the store is decorated only with fruit, then one may do business there. This is derived from the verse written with regard to the property of the inhabitants of an Ir ha'Nidachas, 'v'Lo Yidbak b'Yadcha Me'umah Min ha'Cherem' -- 'Nothing shall remain in your hand from the banned property' (Devarim 13:18), which teaches that only <i>deriving</i> benefit from an Avodah Zarah is forbidden, but not <i>giving</i> benefit (by doing business with an idolater).
</p><p>
The Gemara later (29b), however, says that the prohibition against deriving benefit from such items is derived from the verse, 'And they ate from the sacrifices of the dead (a reference to idols)' (Tehilim 106:28). Just as one is prohibited from deriving benefit from the corpse of a dead person, one is prohibited from deriving benefit from things brought to idols.
</p><p>
Which verse is the actual source for this prohibition?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Ela) maintains that the verse, 'v'Lo Yidbak,' is the source for the Torah prohibition against deriving benefit from objects offered to or used for Avodah Zarah. Tosfos explains that although an aroma is usually not considered a form of forbidden pleasure, it <i>is</i> forbidden when the primary purpose of the object is to provide a pleasurable smell. Even when the primary purpose of the object is not its smell, one still should be prohibited (on some level, either mid'Oraisa or mid'Rabanan) from smelling an object used for Avodah Zarah. This is because the Gemara in Pesachim (24b), which states that one does not receive Malkus for transgressing a prohibition in an abnormal manner (such as by smelling an object normally not used for its smell), does not say that the act is permitted. One merely does not receive Malkus; perhaps the act, however, is still prohibited.
</p><p>
Tosfos adds that Avodah Zarah might be like certain other prohibitions which are exceptions to the rule, and Malkus indeed is administered even when the act is transgressed in an abnormal manner. Tosfos explains that the Torah does not mention the act of eating with regard to Avodah Zarah; only the verse in Tehilim mentions eating with regard to Avodah Zarah. Since the Torah does not mention the specific act of eating with regard to the prohibition of Avodah Zarah, it is reasonable to suggest that any form of pleasure is prohibited.
</p><p>
Like Tosfos, the <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Avodah Zarah 7:2) writes that the verse, 'v'Lo Yidbak,' is the source for the prohibition, together with the verse, 'v'Lo Savi So'evah El Beisecha' -- 'You shall not bring an abomination into your house' (Devarim 7:26).
</p><p>
<b>REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b> (in <b>GILYON HA'SHAS</b>) asks a very strong question on the words of Tosfos. Tosfos writes that since the act of eating is not mentioned in the Torah with regard to the prohibition of Avodah Zarah, the prohibition of deriving benefit from objects used for Avodah Zarah might be an exception to the general rule that one transgresses a prohibition only when he performs the act in the normal manner. Rebbi Akiva Eiger asks that the words of Tosfos would make sense if the Isur of deriving benefit from objects used for Avodah Zarah would be written in the Torah with no mention of the act of eating. However, there is <i>no</i> mention of this Isur in the Torah! Although it indeed is a Torah prohibition, the only verse that teaches this Isur is in Tehilim.
</p><p>
What does Rebbi Akiva Eiger mean to ask? The Gemara itself states that this Isur is derived from the verse, 'v'Lo Yidbak,' which is in the Torah and not in Tehilim. Apparently, Rebbi Akiva Eiger understands that it is obvious that the source is the verse in Tehilim that the Gemara later cites and <i>not</i> the verse that the Gemara here cites. Rebbi Akiva Eiger (in Likutim, end of <b>DERUSH V'CHIDUSH</b>, vol. 2) also asks this question on the words of the Rambam.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAMBAN</b> (to <b>SEFER HA'MITZVOS</b> #194) argues that the verse of 'v'Lo Yidbak' cannot be prohibiting objects brought to Avodah Zarah. The verse says, 'Nothing shall remain in your hand from the banned property (Min ha'Cherem).' The 'Cherem' refers specifically to the Avodah Zarah itself (i.e., the actual idol), and not to objects offered to the Avodah Zarah.
</p><p>
This also seems to be the view of Rebbi Akiva Eiger, who rejects Tosfos' assertion that the Isur is written in a verse in the Torah, as mentioned above.
</p><p>
(The <b>CHAZON ISH</b> answers the difficulty regarding the word 'Cherem' according to the Rambam. He explains that while the word usually refers to the Avodah Zarah itself, it is also used to refer even to objects that are brought to Avodah Zarah, as is evident from the verses that the Gemara quotes later.)
</p><p>
If, however, the verse of 'v'Lo Yidbak' is not teaching the prohibition against deriving benefit from objects used for Avodah Zarah, then why does the Gemara here cite this verse at all?
</p><p>
The <b>KEHILOS YAKOV</b> (Avodah Zarah 6:2) answers that according to the Ramban and Rebbi Akiva Eiger, when the Gemara quotes the verse of 'v'Lo Yidbak' it does not intend to teach the source for the prohibition against benefiting from objects that were used for Avodah Zarah. Rather, the Gemara's intention is to show that one is <i>permitted</i> to shop in a store (decorated with fruit, as opposed to myrtle branches and roses) owned by an idolater, even though he thereby gives indirect support to Avodah Zarah. The verse that prohibits taking objects of Avodah Zarah discusses only <i>taking</i> such things, and it does not discuss indirectly supporting Avodah Zarah. (Y. Montrose) 
</p><p>


lvr: 48
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) TRANSGRESSING 'TUM'AH D'RABANAN' FOR THE SAKE OF FULFILLING A MITZVAH</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Gemara quotes a Beraisa which states that just as a Kohen is allowed to leave Eretz Yisrael in order to do business with Nochrim (even though the Rabanan gave Chutz la'Aretz a status of Tum'ah), he also may enter a cemetery for this purpose. The Gemara says that the Beraisa obviously does not mean that a Kohen may become Tamei merely in order to conduct business. Rather, the Beraisa must refer to a Beis ha'Peras, a field or area that the Rabanan decreed is to be treated as though it were Tamei.
</p><p>
The Beraisa continues and says that a Kohen is also permitted to walk through this area for the purpose of learning Torah or finding a wife.
</p><p>
Does the Beraisa mean that the Kohen may walk through the Beis ha'Peras only for these Mitzvos, or may he walk through the Beis ha'Peras to fulfill other Mitzvos as well?
</p><p>
(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Lilmod) writes that the Beraisa refers specifically to these two Mitzvos, which are especially important. The Mitzvah of learning Torah is especially important, because 'Talmud Torah k'Neged Kulam,' and it is the foundation of our lives. The Mitzvah of marrying is especially important, because procreation was one of the purposes for which Hash-m created man, as the verse states, 'He did not create it in vain, He formed it to be inhabited' (Yeshayah 45:18). The Rabanan suspended their prohibition against entering a Beis ha'Peras because of the importance of fulfilling these two Mitzvos.
</p><p>
This opinion seems to be supported by the Gemara in Megilah (27a), which says that one may sell a Sefer Torah <i>only</i> for the purpose of learning Torah or marrying. The Gemara there explicitly states that a Sefer Torah may be sold 'only' for these two Mitzvos, indicating their importance.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>SHE'ILTOS D'RAV ACHAI GA'ON</b> (Emor #103) argues that the Mitzvah of learning Torah and the Mitzvah of marrying a wife are <i>lesser</i> Mitzvos. He explains that in order to fulfill other Mitzvos, a Kohen certainly is permitted to walk through the Beis ha'Peras. He cites the Gemara in Berachos (19b) which states that a Kohen is permitted to step over a place which is Tamei mid'Rabanan in order to see a Jewish king, and even to see a foreign king (so that he will be able to discern the difference between a foreign king and a Jewish king). He quotes the Gemara here that says that a Kohen is permitted to walk through a Beis ha'Peras in order to learn Torah or to get married.
</p><p>
What does the She'iltos mean when he says that learning Torah and getting married are lesser Mitzvos? How does he understand the Gemara in Megilah that implies that these two Mitzvos are <i>greater</i> than other Mitzvos? (See <b>SHE'EILAS SHALOM</b> on the She'iltos, who notes that when Tosfos here quotes the She'iltos, he does not ask this question on the She'iltos.)
</p><p>
The <b>SHE'EILAS SHALOM</b> explains that the She'iltos certainly agrees that the Mitzvah of learning Torah and the Mitzvah of marrying are more important than going to see a foreign king. The She'iltos, however, is discussing the opinion of Rebbi Yosi, mentioned later in the Beraisa. Rebbi Yosi states that even when the Kohen is able to learn Torah without passing through the Beis ha'Peras, he nevertheless should pass through it in order to go to the teacher who will be able to teach him best. Accordingly, the words of the She'iltos are understood. Passing through a Beis ha'Peras in order to fulfill other Mitzvos (which certainly are less important than learning Torah or marrying) <i>is</i> more important than passing through a Beis ha'Peras in order to learn from a different teacher (since, if one does not pass through the Beis ha'Peras, he still will be able to learn Torah, but he will not be able to fulfill the other Mitzvos). The She'iltos is asking whether one may transgress an Isur d'Rabanan of Tum'ah in order to learn Torah or get married when he could do so without transgressing the Isur d'Rabanan. He answers this question with the opinion of Rebbi Yosi, who says that it is permitted.
</p><p>
The <b>NETZIV</b> in <b>HA'EMEK SHE'EILAH</b> points out an interesting argument between Tosfos and the She'iltos. He notes that the reason that Tosfos gives for the importance of marriage is the verse in Yeshayah. Similarly, the Gemara in Megilah quotes this verse as well when it gives the reason for why one may sell a Sefer Torah in order to get married. Why, though, does the Gemara there, and Tosfos here, not say that the reason why marriage is so important is because of the Torah's Mitzvah of 'Peru u'Revu'? It seems that the fact that 'Peru u'Revu' is a Mitzvah is not sufficient reason to permit transgressing an Isur d'Rabanan (and thus the verse in Yeshayah, which stresses that procreation is the purpose of Hashem's creation of the world, is necessary).
</p><p>
If, however, an ordinary Mitzvah does not override an Isur d'Rabanan of Tum'ah, then what is the reasoning of the Gemara in Berachos that says that a Kohen may pass through a cemetery in order to see a foreign king (or to do a Mitzvah of 'Kavod ha'Beriyos')? He answers that Tosfos understands that the Gemara in Berachos specifically refers to cases of 'Kavod ha'Beriyos,' the honor of man. The importance of 'Kavod ha'Beriyos' <i>does</i> override Tum'ah d'Rabanan. Why, though, does the principle of 'Kavod ha'Beriyos' override Tum'ah d'Rabanan, while the fulfillment of a Mitzvah d'Oraisa does not?
</p><p>
The Netziv explains as follows. It is true that a Mitzvas Aseh overrides a Lo Sa'aseh ('Aseh Docheh Lo Sa'aseh'), while a Mitzvah of 'Kavod ha'Beriyos' does not have that power. However, when the Rabanan instituted a prohibition, they did not apply that prohibition when its application would lead to a lack of 'Kavod ha'Beriyos,' but they <i>did</i> decree that it be in force in a situation in which fulfilling the Isur d'Rabanan would prevent the person from fulfilling a Torah Mitzvah. This is the view of Tosfos.
</p><p>
The She'iltos, in contrast, makes a Kal v'Chomer from the principle of 'Kavod ha'Beriyos' to other Mitzvos of the Torah. If, as the Gemara in Berachos says, 'Kavod ha'Beriyos' overrides Tum'ah d'Rabanan, then certainly Mitzvos d'Oraisa do the same. (Accordingly, the Netziv learns the She'iltos in a way similar to that of the She'eilas Shalom.) (See also <b>TOSFOS</b> to Bechoros 29a, <b>TUREI EVEN</b> (in <b>AVNEI MILU'IM</b>) to Chagigah 4a, and <b>ATZEI ARAZIM</b> 1:9.) (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) MAY ONE HELP NOCHRIM TRANSGRESS? [Lifnei Iver]</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>     (a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   6a (Beraisa - R. Noson):</font></b> 'V'Lifnei Iver Lo Siten
               Michshol' forbids extending wine to a Nazir or a
               limb from a living animal to a Nochri.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   13b (Mishnah):</font></b> One may not sell the following to
               Nochrim frankincense, white chickens...
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> All other things are permitted Stam, but forbidden
               if specified.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   14a (R. Yitzchak):</font></b> The Mishnah discusses clear
               frankincense (a specific kind of frankincense).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   (Beraisa):</font></b> Regarding all of these, one may sell a
               whole bundle.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   (R. Yehudah ben Beseira):</font></b> A bundle weighs at least
               three Manos.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   Question:</font></b> We should be concerned lest the Nochri
               sell to others, and they will offer it to idolatry!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.   Answer (Abaye):</font></b> We are commanded 'Lifnei Iver...',
               but not 'Lifnei d'Lifnei' (causing someone to cause
               someone else to sin).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.   Nedarim 62b:</font></b> Rav Ashi sold a forest to priests who
               served fire.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>10.  Question (Ravina):</font></b> You transgress 'v'Lifnei Iver'!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>11.  Answer (Rav Ashi):</font></b> Most wood is burned (not for
               idolatry).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>12.  Pesachim 40b:</font></b> A ship carrying wheat capsized in a
               river (before Pesach). Rava permitted to sell the
               wheat to Nochrim.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>13.  Question (Rabah bar Livai - Beraisa):</font></b> If Sha'atnez
               was lost in a garment, one may not sell it to a
               Nochri (lest the Nochri resell it to a Yisrael)!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>14. </font></b> Rava retracted and commanded to sell it to
               Yisraelim, a bit to each buyer, in order that it
               would be finished before Pesach.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rosh (1:2):</font></b> The Beraisa discusses giving Ever Min
               ha'Chai to a Nochri to teach that Lifnei Iver
               applies to even to Nochrim.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rosh (14):</font></b> Abaye taught that we are not commanded
               'Lifnei Lifnei', i.e. regarding Nochrim. Regarding
               Yisrael we are concerned for this, like we say in
               Pesachim, that one may not sell to Nochrim if they
               will sell to Yisrael (and cause Yisrael to
               transgress).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rosh (15):</font></b> One may not sell to a Nochri a book of
               his prayers (some texts - idolatry), due to Lifnei
               Iver. Rav Ashi sold a forest to priests of idolatry.
               It was not Lifnei Iver because most wood is burned
               not for idolatry. If not for this, it would be
               forbidden. Also Re'em explained like this.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Tosfos (14b DH Chatzav):</font></b> R. Baruch says that since
               we forbid everything else when specified, one may
               never sell frankincense to priests, for it is as if
               they specified. Surely they want it for idolatry!
               One who sells it transgresses Lifnei Iver. One may
               not sell wax to any Nochri on his festival. Surely
               it is permitted on other days. If a Yisrael bought
               Kelim of idolatry after a Nochri blemished and was
               Mevatel them, he may not sell them to a Nochri like
               they are, until he melts them down. A blemish would
               not stop a Nochri from putting wine in it to praise
               idolatry. One may not sell to priests Pasul Seforim
               that can be used for idolatrous rites due to Lifnei
               Iver. One may not sell them to any Nochri, for he
               will surely give or sell them to a priest.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (YD 151:1):</font></b> One may not sell things
               special for a kind of idolatry to its worshippers.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Taz (1):</font></b> If it is a Safek if it is needed for
                    idolatry, we are lenient.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Shach (2):</font></b> it is forbidden even not on the day
                    of his festival, even nowadays, even to a
                    Nochri who is not a priest.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</font></b> If he buys so much that
                    it is evident that he buys for business, it is
                    permitted.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Taz (3 and Shach 3):</font></b> We are not concerned lest
                    he resell it to others, for this is Lifnei
                    d'Lifnei. If there is concern lest a Yisrael
                    transgress, we are concerned even for this,
                    like we find in Pesachim.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.   Gra (2):</font></b> Why did the Rambam omit this Heter?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</font></b> Similarly, if he says that he
               needs it for other matters, and the Yisrael knows
               that this is true, it is permitted. One may sell
               things special for idolatry together with other
               things, e.g. clear frankincense amidst black
               frankincense, and we are not concerned lest he pick
               out the clear frankincense amidst the black.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rema:</font></b> This refers to a priest or idolater
               established to burn frankincense to idolatry. One
               may sell (even clear frankincense) to a Stam Nochri.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Beis Yosef (DH Kasvu b'Sefer) Sefer ha'Terumos
                    forbids selling Pasul Seforim even to a Nochri
                    who is not a priest, for he will surely sell it
                    or give it to a priest. This is like wood,
                    which one may not sell to priests to burn for
                    their sacrifices.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Note:</font></b> This is like Tosfos 14b. I do not
                    understand this, for we permit Lifnei d'Lifnei
                    regarding Nochrim! In Nedarim we said that
                    selling wood <i>to priests</i> would be Lifnei Iver
                    if not that most is burned not for idolatry.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Bedek ha'Bayis:</font></b> Terumas ha'Deshen (2:112)
                    forbids selling to priests parchment and ink,
                    and he was unsure about quills (for they do not
                    end up in the Sefer).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Rema:</font></b> One may not sell water to a Nochri if he knows
               that he wants it to immerse.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (DH Kasav Od):</font></b> R. Yerucham says that
                    if priests request water to immerse or to
                    sprinkle on people, one may not give to them.
                    If they request Stam, one may give to them.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Beis Yosef (DH uv'Kisvei):</font></b> The Terumas
                    ha'Deshen (27) says that one may not sell to
                    priests books of their songs to idolatry, but
                    if one does not know what is in the Sefer, it
                    is permitted, for most of their Seforim are
                    civil laws, medicine, astronomy, geometry, and
                    music. Perhaps one may sell even a religious
                    book to a Stam Nochri, for the Nochri is not
                    commanded about Lifnei Iver (he will sell it to
                    a priest). Orchos Chayim says that if clothes
                    were made for regular people, and the priests
                    want to use them for idolatry, some are
                    stringent and some permit. I apply the Mishnah
                    'other things are permitted Stam, but forbidden
                    if they specify.' Some are stringent because
                    there are garments that are known to be bought
                    for covering the altar. Garments that are just
                    for the priests are permitted (Stam).
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Gra (6):</font></b> Tosfos derives that the Reisha of the
                    Mishnah discusses a priest.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Gra (7):</font></b> R. Yerucham says that a Nochri
                    established to offer to idolatry is like a
                    priest.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.   Pischei Teshuvah (1):</font></b> Chavos Ya'ir (136) says
                    that since Nochrim are commanded about monetary
                    laws, a Yisrael who bribes a Nochri judge
                    transgresses Lifnei Iver. Based on this, one
                    may give to the judge's slave and tell him to
                    give it to the judge (unless this would cause a
                    perverted judgment and the giver will receive
                    more than he deserves), for this is Lifnei
                    d'Lifnei. It is not a probem of Shlichus, for a
                    Nochri cannot be a Shali'ach.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Rema (EH 5:14):</font></b> One may sell animals and roosters to
               a Nochri, even though the Nochri will castrate them.
               Some forbid. All agree that one may give an animal
               to a Nochri if he will not castrate it himself,
               rather, he will give it to another Nochri.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Shmuel (19 and Gra 39):</font></b> This is Lifnei
                    Lifnei, which is permitted. Even if he made him
                    a Shali'ach, Ein Shali'ach l'Devar Aveirah.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b> Yad Efrayim, citing Teshuvas Pnei Yehoshua (3):
                    Nowadays Lifnei Iver regarding Nochrim is
                    mid'Rabanan, because Hash-m permitted their
                    Mitzvos (Rashi 12). Therefore, one may follow
                    the lenient opinion in the Rema when needed.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Note:</font></b> Perhaps he learns from Rashi 6a DH
                    v'Lifnei. I find this very difficult. It seems
                    that the conclusion (3a) was that Hash-m did
                    not permit their Mitzvos, rather, He merely
                    diminished their reward for them!
<br><br><font color='blue'><i>See also:</i>
<b>MAY ONE HELP</b> A <b>NOCHRI TRANSGRESS <b><b>IF</b></b> <b><b>HE</b></b> COULD <b><b>DO</b></b> <b><b>SO</b></b> HIMSELF</b>? (Avodah Zarah 6</font><font color='blue'>)
<b>MAY ONE HELP NOCHRIM TRANSGRESS</b>? (Avodah Zarah 13)
<b>HELPING TRANSGRESSORS</b> (Avodah Zarah 55) 
<p>


lvr: 48
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) THE SOURCE FOR WHY AN ANIMAL IS UNFIT TO BE OFFERED AS A KORBAN WHEN THERE IS NO BEIS HA'MIKDASH</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara states that, after the destruction of the Beis ha'Mikdash, if a person designates an animal as a Korban, the animal must be left to die. The Gemara says that the owner may not kill it through Shechitah, because if it is slaughtered properly someone might accidentally eat the meat of the Korban. The Gemara asks why the owner may not kill it in another way (such as by cutting it in half). Rava answers that if the owner cuts it in half 'it would appear as though he is creating a blemish (Mum) in an animal of Kodshim.'
</p><p>
The Gemara questions Rava's statement. A person who cuts an animal that was consecrated as a Korban does not merely 'appear' to create a blemish in the animal, he <i>does</i> create a blemish in the animal! The Gemara answers that when the Beis ha'Mikdash is not standing and no animal can be offered as a Korban, there is no Isur d'Oraisa against making a blemish in a consecrated animal. Only when the Beis ha'Mikdash is standing and the animal is fit to be offered as a Korban does the Torah forbid making a blemish in a consecrated animal.
</p><p>
What is the source for the Gemara's statement that an animal is not fit to be offered as a Korban when there is no Beis ha'Mikdash?
</p><p>
The <b>MAR'OS HA'TZOV'OS</b> points out that this question does not apply according to the view of the <b>RA'AVAD</b> (Hilchos Beis ha'Bechirah 6:16) and the other Rishonim who maintain that in the absence of the Beis ha'Mikdash, Yerushalayim and the place of the Beis ha'Mikdash have no Kedushah. Even according to the opinion in the Gemara that the Kedushah of Eretz Yisrael still exists after the Churban, that opinion refers only to the Kedushah of the rest of Eretz Yisrael but not to the Kedushah of Yerushalayim. According to this view, an animal is unfit to be offered as a Korban after the Churban because of the lack of the Kedushah that is required in order to bring Korbanos.
</p><p>
However, the <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Beis ha'Bechirah 6:16) maintains that the original Kedushah remains with regard to all Halachos that are associated with Yerushalayim and the Beis ha'Mikdash. According to the Rambam's view, why is an animal unfit to be offered as a Korban today? The answer cannot be that the Rambam understands that Rava here follows the other opinion (that maintains that Yerushalayim also lost its Kedushah), because the Rambam himself (in Hilchos Isurei Mizbe'ach 1:7) follows the view of Rava when he rules that in the times of the Beis ha'Mikdash, a person would be punished with Malkus for creating a blemish in a consecrated animal, while today, when the Beis ha'Mikdash is not standing, a person would <i>not</i> receive Malkus for creating a blemish.
</p><p>
Why, according to the Rambam, may a Korban not be offered even though the Beis ha'Mikdash is not standing?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>MINCHAS CHINUCH</b> (287:11) answers that the Rambam indeed maintains that Rava's statement was said according to the other opinion, which maintains that the Kedushah of Yerushalayim departed when the Beis ha'Mikdash was destroyed. When the Rambam rules that a person does not receive Malkus for making a blemish in a consecrated animal, he is not ruling like Rava. <b>RASHI</b> here (DH v'Nihavei) points out that the Tana'im in Bechoros (33b) disagree about whether one is forbidden to make a blemish in an animal that already has a blemish. Rashi explains that the Gemara here is asking its question according to the opinion that making a blemish in such an animal is forbidden, and Rava is answering that the Halachah does not follow that opinion.
</p><p>
The Minchas Chinuch explains that the Rambam had a difficulty with Rashi's explanation of the Gemara. Why would the Gemara ask a question based on an opinion that the Halachah does not follow? Although he does not explain Rava's answer, he says that the Rambam deduced from the Gemara's question that the Halachah is that even nowadays one is not allowed to make a blemish in an animal that is already unfit, because of the Torah prohibition against making a blemish.
</p><p>
Why, then, does the Rambam rule that a person does not receive Malkus for making a blemish in a consecrated animal when there is no Beis ha'Mikdash? The Minchas Chinuch answers that the source of the opinion (of Rebbi Meir) in Bechoros which the Rambam follows is the extra word 'Kol' in the verse, 'Kol Mum Lo Yiheyeh Bo' -- 'Any blemish shall not be [created] in it' (Vayikra 22:21). In <b>SEFER HA'MITZVOS</b> (Shoresh Beis), the Rambam expresses his opinion that prohibitions derived from inclusive words, such as from the word 'Kol' in the verse above, are <i>not</i> punishable with Malkus.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>KEHILOS YAKOV</b> (7:2) suggests that the Rambam may rule like Rava, that an animal today is unfit to be offered as a Korban, even though he maintains that the Kedushah of Yerushalayim still exists. The <b>SEFER HA'CHINUCH</b> (#440) discusses his view that the prohibition against slaughtering a Korban outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash is still applicable today, when the Beis ha'Mikdash is not standing. Even though one is prohibited to slaughter a Korban outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash, that does not mean that one is prohibited to bring a Korban today (see Insights to Shevuos 16:1). However, while one may be permitted to bring a Korban today, there is no <i>obligation</i> to bring a Korban today.
</p><p>
What is the reason behind the prohibition against making a blemish in an animal of Kodshim? The reason seems to be that by making a blemish in the animal, the person takes the Korban away from its purpose of being offered to Hash-m. If, however, there is no longer a Mitzvah to offer Korbanos today, then making a blemish in a Korban no longer constitutes a loss of what is supposed to be brought to the Mizbe'ach, because nothing is supposed to be brought. Accordingly, the Rambam rules like Rava, that there is no longer a Torah prohibition to cause a blemish to any animal, since all animals are already unfit to be offered and there is no loss of Korbanos for the Beis ha'Mikdash. This does not contradict the fact that the original Kedushah of Yerushalayim still remains. (Y. Montrose) 
</p><p>


lvr: 48
dfh: a
sjt:
<font><b>1) CAUSING A PERSON TO CAUSE ANOTHER PERSON TO SIN</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Mishnah (13b) states that one is forbidden to sell Levonah (frankincense) to an idol-worshipper, since it is likely that he will use the Levonah to serve his idol. The Gemara quotes a Tosefta which teaches that one <i>is</i> permitted to sell a large quantity, a 'bundle' (Chavilah), of Levonah to an idol-worshipper. <b>RASHI</b> explains that since he is buying a large bundle, he probably wants it for commercial purposes and not for idol-worship.
</p><p>
The Gemara asks that perhaps the idol-worshipper who is buying the bundle of Levonah will then go and sell some of it to others who will use it for Avodah Zarah, and, therefore, why is a Jew permitted to sell to an idol-worshipper even a large quantity? Abaye answers that the Torah forbids one from causing another person to sin -- 'v'Lifnei Iver Lo Siten Michshol' -- 'Do not place a stumbling block before the blind' (Vayikra 19:14), but it does not forbid one from causing another person <i>to cause another person</i> to sin ('Lifnei d'Lifnei').
</p><p>
What is the basis for the leniency of 'Lifnei d'Lifnei'? Is the reason for this leniency the fact that the idol-worshipper might not actually sell the Levonah to someone who needs it for Avodah Zarah? Perhaps even when the one who buys it from the idol-worshipper intends use it for Avodah Zarah, the Jew still is permitted to sell it to the first idol-worshipper because there is no indication in the verse to differentiate.
</p><p>
(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (14b, DH Chatzav) discusses selling books normally used for Avodah Zarah to ordinary Nochrim who are not priests. He says that selling such books to Nochrim is prohibited because the first Nochri buyer 'definitely' will give it or sell it to a priest. This is also the opinion of the <b>SEMAG</b> (Lo Ta'aseh 45) and the <b>HAGAHOS MAIMONIYOS</b> (Hilchos Avodas Kochavim 9:6). The <b>BACH</b> (YD 139) points out that these Rishonim maintain that the allowance of 'Lifnei d'Lifnei' applies only when the second person will not definitely transgress the prohibition.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>TERUMAS HA'DESHEN</b> (#299) apparently disagrees with the ruling of Tosfos. He discusses the following question. There is a dispute among the Rishonim with regard to whether Nochrim are prohibited from castrating animals. According to the opinion that they are prohibited, may one sell animals to Nochrim when he knows that they will castrate them? The Terumas ha'Deshen suggests that there is reason to permit it. Since the buyer himself does not castrate the animal but rather he gives the animal to his servants who perform the castration, it is a case of 'Lifnei d'Lifnei.' (One cannot ask that perhaps this case is not a case of 'Lifnei d'Lifnei' but a case of 'Lifnei' since the servant acts as the agent, Shali'ach, of the buyer, because according to the Halachah a person cannot designate a Shali'ach to perform a sin, and, furthermore, a Nochri cannot appoint a Shali'ach altogether.)
</p><p>
However, the Terumas ha'Deshen concludes by saying, 'Nevertheless, one may differentiate between this case and the case of Levonah (the case of the Gemara here).' What does the Terumas ha'Deshen mean by this statement? What is the difference between selling an animal to a Nochri who will give the animal to his servants to castrate, and selling Levonah to a Nochri who will sell it to an idolater who will use it for Avodah Zarah?
</p><p>
The Bach explains that the Terumah ha'Deshen refers to the difference that Tosfos says. In the case of selling an animal to a Nochri, the castration definitely will happen, and thus 'Lifnei d'Lifnei' does not permit it, while in the case of selling Levonah, there is no certainty that the Nochri buyer will sell the Levonah to someone who will use it for idolatry.
</p><p>
The <b>KESAV SOFER</b> argues with the Bach and says that this is not the intention of the Terumas ha'Deshen. The Terumas ha'Deshen (in Pesakim #27) explicitly argues with Tosfos with regard to selling books to an ordinary Nochri who will give them to a priest, and he writes that it is permitted because of 'Lifnei d'Lifnei'! It is clear that the Terumas ha'Deshen argues with the reasoning of Tosfos.
</p><p>
The Kesav Sofer explains instead that the difference between the case of selling an animal and the case of selling Levonah is that in the case of selling Levonah, the Nochri who buys the Levonah does not have intention to sin with the object; rather, he is simply buying merchandise in order to sell it to make a profit (the same applies in the case of selling books to a Nochri). Although it is almost certain that another Nochri will sin as a result of the object being sold to the first Nochri, that sin is too far removed from the original seller to make his act of selling prohibited. In the case of selling an animal, the Nochri buyer himself intends to do the sin of castrating the animal. Although he will not be the perpetrator of the act, selling the animal to him is akin to ensuring that his servant will castrate the animal. This is why the Terumas ha'Deshen asserts that this case is not similar to the case of Levonah. The <b>SEDEH CHEMED</b> (Ma'arachah 6, 26:24) has a similar understanding of the Terumas ha'Deshen.
</p><p>
The <b>REMA</b> (YD 139:15) understands that the Terumas ha'Deshen remains with his view that 'Lifnei d'Lifnei' is permitted even when the secondary party will definitely commit the sin. The <b>SHULCHAN ARUCH</b> there seems to rule in accordance with the minority opinion that there is no prohibition at all to sell books to <i>any</i> Nochri (seemingly even to priests; see <b>BI'UR HA'GRA</b> who is perplexed by the Shulchan Aruch's decision not to even mention the other opinions). The Rema there cites the opinion of Tosfos that one may not sell such books to <i>any</i> Nochri, and he then writes that the Terumas ha'Deshen says that selling them to an ordinary Nochri is permitted. The Rema concludes that one who is stringent and follows the view of Tosfos will be blessed. The Rema clearly understands that the Terumas ha'Deshen indeed argues with Tosfos, and that me'Ikar ha'Din the Halachah follows the view of the Terumas ha'Deshen.
</p><p>
However, the Rema elsewhere seems to contradict this ruling. With regard to the Halachah of selling animals to Nochrim, the Rema (EH 5:14) cites both opinions, and he writes that if the Nochri buyer will not do the castration himself, then 'everyone agrees that [selling the animal to him] is permitted.' How can the Rema say that this is permitted according to everyone? The Rema himself (in YD 139:15) cites opinions who argue and say that such an act does not qualify as 'Lifnei d'Lifnei'!
</p><p>
The Kesav Sofer answers that the Rema means that since most Poskim rule leniently with regard to whether the prohibition of castration of animals applies at all for Nochrim, and the Terumas ha'Deshen prefers to permit selling animals to a Nochri, there is no reason to be stringent in practice. The Kesav Sofer agrees that this is not an entirely satisfactory answer, because this is not the straightforward meaning of the words 'everyone agrees.' (Also, there are other opinions who rule stringently in both respects, such as the <b>SEMAG</b>, who rules that Nochrim may not castrate animals, and who rules like Tosfos that one may <i>not</i> sell an object to a Nochri which he definitely will give to another Nochri who will sin with it.) (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 48
dfh: b
sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) SELLING AN ANIMAL TO A NOCHRI</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Mishnah states that whether or not one may sell a Behemah Dakah (a small, domesticated animal, such as a sheep) to a Nochri depends on the custom of the place. Where the custom is to sell such an animal to a Nochri, one may follow the custom and sell it. Where the custom is not to sell such an animal to a Nochri, one may not sell it.
</p><p>
The Gemara (15a) concludes that everyone agrees that even in a place in which the Nochrim are suspected of bestiality when they are alone with an animal, one is permitted to sell an animal to a Nochri because a Nochri is careful not to have relations with his own animal, lest he weaken the animal.
</p><p>
If there is no concern that a Nochri will have relations with an animal he buys, then why are there places in which one is prohibited from selling an animal to a Nochri?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>RAN</b> here explains that the custom, in some places, not to sell a Behemah Dakah to a Nochri is based on a different reason. The Mishnah later (22a) states that a person is not allowed to leave his animals with a Nochri, because the Nochri is suspected of having relations with animals, and thus leaving one's animals with a Nochri constitutes 'Lifnei Iver Lo Siten Michshol.' In order to ensure that no Jew ever transgresses the Isur of 'Lifnei Iver,' the custom arose never to sell an animal to a Nochri, even when Nochrim became careful not to weaken their own animals by having relations with them.
</p><p>
The <b>SEDER YAKOV</b> questions the Ran's explanation. According to the Ran, the custom was established not to sell animals to Nochrim in order to ensure that no one transgresses the prohibition of 'Lifnei Iver.' However, the Gemara later (22b) states that Nochrim also have such a temptation with regard to <i>birds</i>. According to the Ran's understanding, a custom not to sell birds to Nochrim also should have developed!
</p><p>
The Seder Yakov answers that perhaps there indeed was such a custom not to sell birds to Nochrim. This custom is not mentioned in the Mishnah simply because it is not the manner of the Mishnah to include every possible case ('Tana v'Shiyer'). Alternatively, even though such a reason technically may exist to prohibit selling birds to Nochrim, since it is an uncommon form of transaction the Rabanan did not establish a custom not to sell birds to Nochrim.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RITVA</b> explains that although Rebbi Elazar states that Nochrim are careful not to have relations with their own animals lest the animals become weak, not everyone relied on this general assumption. In some places, the Jews still suspected that there was a problem of 'Lifnei Iver,' and therefore they did not sell any animals to the Nochrim. The Ritva adds that although Rebbi Elazar's reasoning is sound, the custom to be stringent falls in the category of 'things which are permitted but the custom is to be stringent.' Since the Halachah prohibits one from acting leniently in a place in which the custom is to be stringent, everyone in that place is bound by the custom. <b>TOSFOS</b> also seems to learn like the Ritva (see, however, <b>TOSFOS REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b> in Pesachim (4:3) for an alternative explanation of Tosfos).
</p><p>
(c) <b>RASHI</b> in the Mishnah (DH Makom) writes that the custom to sell a Behemah Dakah to a Nochri exists only in a place where there is no suspicion that the Nochri might have relations with the animal. The <b>MAGID MISHNEH</b> (Hilchos Shabbos 20:5) understands that Rashi explains as the Ritva does. The <b>LECHEM SESARIM</b> understands that Rashi follows the view of the Ran.
</p><p>
However, Rashi himself in Pesachim (53a) explicitly explains like <i>neither</i> of those Rishonim. He explains that the custom in some places not to sell a Behemah Dakah to a Nochri was instituted in order to prevent them from selling a Behemah Gasah to a Nochri. This opinion is also quoted by the <b>BARTENURA</b> in Pesachim (4:3), the <b>ESHKOL</b>, and the <b>ME'IRI</b>. (Y. Montrose) 
</p><p>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) WHICH ANIMALS MAY ONE SELL TO NOCHRIM? [Nochri: selling: animals]</font></b>
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Mishnah):</font></b> In all places one may not sell to Nochrim
               large (i.e. work) animals, calves and foals, healthy
               or lame;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> R. Yehudah permits selling a lame animal;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> Ben Beseira permits selling a horse.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   15a - Opinion #1:</font></b> The Isur to sell work animals is a
               decree, lest one rent or lend an animal to a Nochri.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Objection:</font></b> One who rents or borrows an animal
               acquires it (for the agreed period of time)!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Opinion #2 (Rami brei d'R. Yeva):</font></b> This is a decree,
               lest the Nochri want to test the animal;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Sometimes he buys an animal just before
                    Shabbos, and wants to see how it carries
                    burdens. The animal goes when it hears its
                    owner's voice. The owner transgresses Mechamer
                    (making an animal work on Shabbos) for which
                    (b'Shogeg) one brings a Chatas.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b> Rav Ada permitted selling a donkey through a Safsira
               (middleman, or a wholesaler who buys and sells
               animals).
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  We are not concerned lest the Nochri want to
                    test the animal, for it does not recognize the
                    Safsira's voice. The Safsira will not rent or
                    lend it out, for it is not his, and he fears
                    lest defects of the animal become known.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.   16a (Beraisa - Ben Beseira):</font></b> A horse is permitted,
               because its work (carrying people) is not a
               desecration of Shabbos that people are killed for.
               (ha'Chai Nosei Es Atzmo, i.e. living people carry
               themselves);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.  </font></b> Rebbi says, a horse is forbidden for two reasons. It
               is like a weapon, and it is a work animal.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>10. </font></b> It is like a weapon for it kills fallen soldiers
               with its forelegs.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>11.  (R. Yochanan):</font></b> It is considered a work animal, for
               when it grows old, people make it turn a millstone.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>12.  R. Yochanan:</font></b> The Halachah follows Ben Beseira.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 20:4):</font></b> One may sell a horse
               to Nochrim, for it is used solely to carry people,
               and ha'Chai Nosei Es Atzmo.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Magid Mishnah:</font></b> The Rambam rules like Ben
                    Beseira, for R. Yochanan taught that the
                    Halachah follows him.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Objection:</font></b> Pirush ha'Mishnayos says that the
                    Halachah does not follow Ben Beseira! Also, the
                    Mishnah Torah permits only a horse that people
                    ride on. This is like Chachamim, who say that
                    ha'Chai Nosei Es Atzmo applies only to people!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Answer #1 (Tosfos Yom Tov Pesachim 4:2):</font></b> The
                    text of the Rambam (and Bartenura, who
                    explicitly says that the Halachah does not
                    follow Ben Beseira) did not say that the
                    Halachah follows Ben Beseira.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Objection (Rashash Avodah Zarah 16a DH Omar R.
                    Yochanan):</font></b> Even if this is so, the Rambam
                    should rule like R. Noson (who says that
                    ha'Chai Nosei Es Atzmo, and holds like Ben
                    Beseira) because Rava (Shabbos 141b) holds like
                    R. Noson!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.   Answer #2 (Rashash ibid.):</font></b> R. Yochanan taught
                    that the Halachah follows Ben Beseira, i.e. and
                    not Rebbi, who forbids a horse because it is a
                    weapon and it pulls a millstone when it is old.
                    If R. Yochanan held that ha'Chai Nosei Es Atzmo
                    even for animals, he would have given his
                    ruling on the Mishnah. Rava holds like R. Noson
                    <i>and Chachamim</i>. The Gemara attributes Rava's
                    law to R. Noson, for R. Noson explicitly said
                    that ha'Chai Nosei Es Atzmo. The Rambam rules
                    like Chachamim, for they are the majority.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rambam (5):</font></b> In every place one may not sell large
               Chayos (wild animals) to Nochrim, just like one may
               not sell large Behemos, except through a middleman.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Question (Rosh 1:16):</font></b> A Safsira is a Yisrael who
               buys animals in order to sell them immediately.
               Since he buys in order to sell immediately, we are
               not concerned lest he lend or rent them. It is
               astounding why nowadays people sell to Nochrim
               calves, young donkeys and donkeys. Even Ben Beseira
               permitted horses only in those days, when they were
               only for riding. Nowadays that people use them to
               carry burdens and plow, even he would forbid.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (DH v'Chosav Od):</font></b> Sefer ha'Terumos
                    says that nowadays horses pull wagons, and
                    sometimes the buyer explicitly says that he
                    buys it for work.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Answer (Rosh):</font></b> R. Tam says that just like they
               permitted a Safsira, for he does not lend or rent
               and the animal does not recognize his voice,
               nowadays all are permitted, for we are not Mechamer
               and animals do not recognize our voices. Also,
               people do not normally lend or rent nowadays.
               Everyone buys an animal (only) for his own needs.
               The Ri says that in the days of the Gemara,
               Yisre'elim lived together, and they could sell to
               each other. Nowadays, a small number of Yisre'elim
               live together.If they cannot sell to Nochrim, they
               will lose. The Gemara said that we should forbid
               selling to them wheat and barley, but this is
               impossible. Likewise, it is impossible not to sell
               animals to them. The Yerushalmi gave a leniency to
               rent fields to Nochrim where Yisre'elim are not
               found.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Ran (6a DH V'Ha'idna):</font></b> According to R. Tam, it
                    should be permitted even to buy in order to
                    sell. A Ba'al Nefesh (spiritual person) should
                    avoid this. In any case lending and renting are
                    forbidden.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Ran (5a DH u'Makshu):</font></b> Some ask, why did the
                    Gemara need to mention Mechamer? Even without
                    this, it should be forbidden due Shevisas
                    Behemto (a Yisrael's animal must rest on
                    Shabbos)! Perhaps this is true; we mentioned
                    Mechamer because it is more stringent, for the
                    person himself does the Isur. However, if so we
                    should forbid through a Safsira. Even though
                    Mechamer does not apply, Shevisas Behemto does!
                    The Rashba answered that they test it only in
                    the Chatzer, and carrying there is not a
                    Melachah, but Mechamer applies to any labor. I
                    disagree. If a man would be exempt for a labor,
                    we cannot obligate him if his animal does it.
                    Shevisas Behemto is more lenient than his own
                    Melachah (Shabbos 153b)! Also, it says there
                    that one is liable for Mechamer only if the
                    animal did Akirah and Hanachah (uprooting from
                    rest and setting to rest, i.e. a full
                    Melachah). Akirah and Hanachah do not apply in
                    Reshus ha'Yachid (a Chatzer)! Some say that
                    since it is a remote chance that he will sell
                    just before Shabbos, we are stringent only for
                    a Lav that he himself does. It seems that this
                    is why Rashi said that some obligate a Chatas
                    for Mechamer. Perhaps the Rambam did not
                    mention making it work, for he explains that
                    that the Gemara was concerned for Mechamer and
                    not for Shevisas Behemto according to the
                    opinion that one is Chayav Chatas for Mechamer.
                    We exempt for Mechamer, so we are not concerned
                    for either of these. I say that Shevisas
                    Behemto does not apply, for people fix a price
                    before testing the animal. If it does not work,
                    it is a Mekach Ta'os and the sale is undone.
                    The animal belongs to the buyer. When one takes
                    Kelim to see if his father-in-law will want
                    them, they are considered his until he
                    retracts. (Bava Metzia 81a). He is not merely a
                    borrower, for the Gemara says that this is only
                    if they fixed a price. Surely Mechamer applies
                    even if it is not his animal. If not, since we
                    exempt Mechamer, why is there an Isur of
                    Mechamer? If it is his animal, in any case it
                    is forbidden due to Shevisas Behemto! The
                    Gemara always discusses Mechamer with <i>his</i>
                    animal; this is merely the normal case.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (YD 151:4):</font></b> In every place one may
               not sell large animals to Nochrim or to Yisre'elim
               suspected of selling to Nochrim, unless it is
               through a middleman, or he knows that he buys it to
               slaughter it. Nowadays, the custom is to permit
               everything.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (DH u'Mutar):</font></b> The Tur understands
                    that we permit to sell to a Yisrael wholesaler,
                    and he sells to a Nochri. One may not sell
                    through a middleman. This is why the Heter is
                    brought for a Safsira (wholesaler), and not for
                    a middleman. However, Rashi and the Rambam
                    explain that Safsira is a middleman.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Beis Yosef (DH u'Mah she'Chosav Rabeinu
                    b'Shem):</font></b> The Tur says that Sefer ha'Terumos
                    permits only when the situation arose. I.e. he
                    bought it for himself and reconsidered, and if
                    he does not sell it to a Nochri, he will lose.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Shach (12):</font></b> Some say that nowadays we permit
                    because a small number of Yisre'elim live
                    together, and if they cannot sell to Nochrim,
                    they will lose. Some say that it is because
                    nowadays animals do not recognize our voices,
                    and people do not normally lend or rent. This
                    is to permit Tamei animals. In any case Tahor
                    animals are permitted, for one may assume that
                    he buys it for slaughter.
<br><br><font color='blue'><i>See also:</i>
<br><b>HA'CHAI NOSEI ES ATZMO </b>(</font><font color='blue'>


