# dafyomi

lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) WITNESSES WHO CONTRADICT EACH OTHER</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Question (Rav Huna bar Yehudah - Beraisa):</font></b> Two witnesses
          saw the new moon;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   If to one it appeared two plowshares above the
               horizon, and to the other, three plowshares, we
               accept their testimony (we attribute the difference
               to inaccuracy, the testimonies concur);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   If to one it appeared three plowshares above, and to
               the other, five, we reject their testimony (we do
               not attribute the difference to inaccuracy. this is
               contradictory testimony);
             </font></b></font></b>  i.   The witnesses can join for other testimony.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Suggestion:</font></b> This means that either witness can
                    testify with someone else in a monetary case
                    (he is a valid witness, like Rav Huna and
                    unlike Rav Chisda)!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Answer (Rava):</font></b> The Beraisa means that if someone else
          agrees with one of them about the moon, they join and we
          accept their testimony to sanctify the new month;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   We ignore the other witness, for two witnesses
               disagree with him.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b>
<br><b><font color='blue'>2) SWEARING ABOUT WHETHER MONEY WAS GIVEN</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> Reuven asked Shimon (a grocer) for a Dinar's
          worth of Peros... (Reuven swears that he paid a Dinar,
          and keeps the Peros.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  (Beraisa - R. Yehudah):</font></b> This is when the Peros are in
          front of them and they are fighting over them, but if
          Reuven put them in his bag and slung them over his
          shoulder, Shimon can only take them if he brings a proof.
          (If he does not, Reuven need not swear.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  (Mishnah):</font></b> Reuven asked Shimon (a moneychanger) for a
          Dinar's worth of smaller coins... (Reuven swears that he
          gave to him and keeps the coins.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b>  We needed to teach both cases.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Had we taught only about a grocer, one might have
               thought that Chachamim believe a grocer (when the
               buyer holds the Peros), because fruit rots (so he
               gives the Peros before receiving the money, lest the
               buyer retract), but they admit about a moneychanger;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Had we taught only about a moneychanger, one might
               have thought that R. Yehudah holds that a
               moneychanger is never believed, for he never gives
               change before receiving the money, but he admits
               about a grocer (because fruit rots, like we said
               above).
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></font></b>
<br><b><font color='blue'>3) INHERITING MONEY WHICH CAN BE COLLECTED WITH AN OATH</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> Just like a woman who wants to collect the
          rest of a Kesuvah that was already partially paid... must
          swear, also orphans must swear to collect.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question:</font></b> From whom do they (need to swear in order to)
          collect?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Suggestion:</font></b> It is from (Shimon,) the one who
               borrowed from their father (Reuven).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rejection:</font></b> Reuven could have collected without
               swearing. Why must his orphans swear?!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer:</font></b> Rather, they must swear in order to collect from
          Shimon's orphans.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  (Rav and Shmuel):</font></b> This is only if Reuven died before
          Shimon;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   However, if Shimon died first, Reuven could not have
               collected from the orphans without swearing that he
               was not paid;
             </font></b>  i.   One does not inherit (a claim to) money that
                    his father could collect only through swearing.
                    (Rashi - since the orphans do not know whether
                    the loan was paid, they cannot swear.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Question:</font></b> Why doesn't it suffice for them to take the
          oath of orphans ('our father did not tell us that this
          document was paid, nor did we find a receipt saying that
          the document was paid')?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Answer #1 (R. Elazar):</font></b> Indeed, they can swear this way
          and collect! (He argues with Rav and Shmuel.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Answer #2 (R. Ami):</font></b> If Reuven tried collecting in Beis
          Din from Shimon's orphans, and Beis Din ruled that he
          must swear first, and he died before swearing, his heirs
          do not inherit the right to collect through swearing;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   If Reuven never tried to collect and he died, his
               heirs inherit the money owed to him. They take the
               oath of orphans and collect.
 </font></b>    (h)  Objection (Rav Nachman): The law does not depend on
          whether or not he tried collecting in Beis Din. The
          moment Shimon died, the law is that Reuven can collect
          only if he swears!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  (Rav Nachman):</font></b> Rather, if the Halachah follows Rav and
          Shmuel, they cannot collect even if Reuven never tried
          collecting. If the Halachah is not like Rav and Shmuel,
          they can collect even if Reuven tried collecting in Beis
          Din.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  Question:</font></b> Rav Nachman is unsure whether the Halachah
          follows Rav and Shmuel;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   However, Rav Yosef bar Minyomi said that a case
               occurred, and Rav Nachman ruled that they collect
               half!
 </font></b>    (k)  Answer: Rav Nachman meant that if Rav and Shmuel's
          explanation of R. Meir is correct, we do not distinguish
          whether Reuven tried collecting;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rav Nachman himself holds that the Halachah follows
               R. Yosi (45a).
 </font></b>    (l)  (The following questions are against Rav and Shmuel, for
          they show that heirs can inherit money that could have
          been collected only through swearing to orphans.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)  Question #1 (Rav Oshaya - Mishnah):</font></b> If a widow died
          without collecting her Kesuvah, her heirs must express,
          within 25 years, their intent to collect it. (If they do
          not, this shows that they waived their right to collect
          from the other orphans.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)  Answer:</font></b> The case is, she swore that she did not collect
          any part of her Kesuvah, but died before collecting it.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)  Question #2 (Mishnah):</font></b> Reuven married Leah, and she died.
          He married Rachel, and he died. Rachel or (if she died)
          her heirs have precedence (to collect her Kesuvah) before
          Leah's sons collect (Kesuvas Benin Dichrin, the right to
          collect the dowry she brought into the marriage).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)  Answer:</font></b> Here also, Rachel swore and died before
          collecting.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)  Question #3 (Mishnah):</font></b> (Even if Reuven wrote in Leah's
          Kesuvah that he waives the right to make her or her heirs
          swear that she did not receive part of her Kesuvah, if
          Reuven died before it was collected, his heirs can demand
          an oath before paying her, her heirs, or anyone who
          acquired the rights to her Kesuvah. (Since his heirs can
          make her swear, the case is that she did not swear
          already!)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)  Answer (Rav Shemayah):</font></b> The Mishnah puts together the laws
          of two different cases:
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   His heirs can make her swear whether she was widowed
               or divorced;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   They can make her heirs swear (the oath of orphans)
               if she was divorced (a divorcee need not swear to
               collect; but a widow must swear to collect, so her
               heirs do not inherit her Kesuvah).
 </font></b></font></b>    (s)  Question #4 (Rav Noson bar Hoshaya - Beraisa): A son has
          greater ability to collect (debts owed to his father,
          after the father died) than his father:
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) MULTI-GENERATIONAL INHERITANCE OF A DEBT</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Mishnah (45a) teaches that the orphans of a creditor to whom a debt is owed may collect the debt owed to their father only by taking an oath. The Gemara explains that the Mishnah refers to a case in which the orphans of a lender are trying to collect money from the orphans of a borrower. In such a case, the orphans may collect (when they have a Shtar or witnesses attesting to the debt) by making a Shevu'ah that their father never told them that the debt was paid, and that they never saw a document stating that the debt was paid.
</p><p>
Rav and Shmuel rule that this is the law in a case in which the lender died first. When the borrower died before the lender, the loan is no longer collectable. The Halachah states that a person does not bequeath to his heirs the rights to collect a debt which he could collect only by taking an oath. Since a person may collect a debt from orphans only by taking an oath, he cannot bequeath the collection of that debt to his children. In contrast, when the lender died first, his heirs do not need to take an oath in order to collect directly from the borrower, and therefore even when the borrower dies they retain the ability to collect the debt from his heirs.
</p><p>
What is the Halachah in a case in which the orphans of the lender themselves die before they collect the debt from the orphans of the borrower? Do <i>their</i> heirs have the right to collect the debt that their fathers (the first generation of heirs) could have collected, or, since their fathers could have collected the debt only by taking an oath, they cannot collect the debt?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>RAMBAN</b> quotes <b>RAV AL'BARGILONI</b> who rules that the third generation of creditors may not collect the debt. This is understandable, since they cannot take the oath that their fathers needed to take in order to collect. Their fathers needed to swear that the original lender (their grandfather) never indicated in any way that this debt was paid back to him. As mentioned above, a person cannot bequeath a debt which is collectable only with an oath. Rav Al'bargiloni says that all of the Chachamim of his time agreed that this was the Halachah. Indeed, the <b>RIF</b> and <b>RA'AVAD</b> both rule this way in their responsa.
</p><p>
The <b>SEFER HA'TERUMOS</b> explains the logic of this opinion further. Why does a person not bequeath such a debt to his children? It is reasonable to assume that a person bequeaths to his children only that which he has in his possession, or that which is going to come into his possession by itself. Money which can be collected only by taking an oath is not considered <i>his</i> money until he swears. Consequently, the third generation of heirs cannot inherit the collection of a debt for which their fathers had to swear in order to collect. This also appears to be the <b>RAN's</b> understanding of the ruling of Rav Al'bargiloni.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAMBAN</b> writes that if the other Rishonim indeed agreed with the ruling of Rav Al'bargiloni, then we must accept this ruling. The Ramban says, however, that there is reason to question this ruling. There is a different logic for why a person cannot bequeath such a debt to his children. While the creditor himself can swear with certainty that he is owed the money, his children cannot swear with certainty that their father was owed the money. In a case in which the lender died first, the children do not have to take an oath in order to collect directly from the borrower, and therefore they retain the ability to collect that debt even when the borrower dies. However, in a case in which the son of the creditor (the first generation of heirs) was able to swear only that he <i>does not recall</i> his father saying that the debt was paid back, why can he not bequeath that oath to his son? The oath that he needed to take would be the same oath that his son would need to take! The Ramban therefore states that, theoretically, the third-generation heirs also have the right to collect their grandfather's debt with an oath.
</p><p>
The <b>RITVA</b> writes that his Rebbi, the <b>RE'AH</b>, ruled in accordance with the reasoning of the Ramban. Moreover, he ruled that even though Rav Al'bargiloni said that the Chachamim of his time agreed with him, the Halachah is that the third generation of heirs may take the same oath as their fathers would have taken and they may collect from the second generation of debtors. The Re'ah said that this is the proper way to rule, and the Ritva adds that he indeed saw that the Re'ah ruled this way in practice. This is also the opinion of the <b>BA'AL HA'ITUR</b>.
</p><p>
(See, however, the <b>ROSH</b> here (7:16), who refutes the ruling of Rav Al'bargiloni ('ha'Rav ha'Barceloni') and sides with the reasoning of the Ramban, and the Rosh in Teshuvos (86:4), who explains the logic of not bequeathing a debt that requires an oath in the same manner as the Sefer ha'Terumos.) (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>19) KEEPING A PARTIALLY OR FULLY PAID DOCUMENT</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>     </font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Mishnah):</font></b> Just like a woman must swear to collect
               the rest of a Kesuvah that was already partially
               paid... also orphans must swear to collect.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   (Rav Papa):</font></b> If Reuven lent money with a document and
               partially collected the loan, even though Reuven
               would need to swear to collect the rest, his heirs
               inherit the (right to collect) the money.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Kesuvos 19a (Rav Kahana):</font></b> One may not keep a
               document of Amanah (for a loan that was not given) -
               'do not let Avlah (fraud) dwell in your home'.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   19b (R. Yehoshua ben Levi):</font></b> One may not keep in his
               house a document for a loan that was paid - 'do not
               let Avlah well in your home'.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b> Rav Kahana permits keeping a paid document.
               Sometimes the lender keeps it until the borrower
               pays the cost of the document.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Bava Metzia 16b (Rava):</font></b> One who finds a (regular)
               loan document, does not return it, for perhaps the
               borrower paid, and he is not at fault. Perhaps the
               lender was holding the document until the borrower
               paid the scribe's wage!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   18a:</font></b> Where people do not write Kesuvos, the Get is
               the Kesuvah. One cannot claim that he paid his wife,
               for then he should have torn the Get!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.   Rejection:</font></b> He cannot tear it, for she needs it to
               remarry!
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rif (Kesuvos 6b):</font></b> One may not keep a paid document
               in his house.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Ran (DH Asur):</font></b> R. Yehoshua forbids keeping a
                    paid document, even to be paid the scribe's
                    wage, even though the borrower must pay it.
                    This is clear from the Gemara.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Ran (DH Tanai):</font></b> If a document is on condition,
                    one may keep it, for some lien begins now.This
                    is no worse than keeping a document for 100
                    even though only 50 is owed. One opinion in the
                    Gemara allows even to keep a paid document in
                    order to be paid the scribe's wage.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rosh (Kesuvos 2:11):</font></b> Rav Kahana holds that the verse
               would not call keeping a paid document Avlah, for
               sometimes one may keep it, i.e. until the borrower
               pays the cost of the document. R. Yehoshuah holds
               that one should be careful not to keep it after the
               scribe's wage was paid, and if he was not, this is
               called Avlah Keeping it to be paid the scribe's wage
               is not called Avlah. This is not improper.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (CM 57:1):</font></b> One may not keep in his
               house a paid document (Rema - the same applies if
               its lien was pardoned).
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   SMA (2):</font></b> The Rema includes when he pardoned
                    only the lien on land, but the debt is still
                    owed. Alternatively, he includes a document
                    that was paid, and used again for another loan
                    (it is invalid)
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Rebuttal (Shach 2):</font></b> If only the lien on land
                    was pardoned, one may keep the document to
                    collect from property the borrower still owns.
                    The Rema teaches that even if the document was
                    not paid, just the lender pardoned it, he may
                    not keep it.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Gra (1):</font></b> It is Avlah, for it can be used to
                    collect improperly from buyers.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</font></b> If a lender refuses to return
               a paid document, it is proper to excommunicate him
               until he returns it.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Rashbatz (1:24, cited in Beis Yosef DH Asur):
                    This is because he transgresses a Lav from
                    Nevi'im.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Gra (2):</font></b> We excommunicate for transgressing
                    mid'Rabanan laws.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Shach (61:16):</font></b> Even if the borrower is silent
                    and does not demand the document, or if the
                    lender consents to return it but stalls from
                    day to day, we excommunicate him immediately.
                    If the borrower demands the document, even
                    without a Lav from Nevi'im, we would force the
                    lender to return it, lest he claim payment
                    another time! We must say that no receipt was
                    given, for if there was a receipt, one may keep
                    the document, like I proved (below, 6). Or,
                    perhaps the Heter is only when the receipt is
                    written on the document itself, or when the
                    lender needs to keep the document because part
                    is still owed. Here it is forbidden, for there
                    is no reason to keep the document.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</font></b> One may not keep a (paid)
               document if the borrower owes (only) the scribe's
               wage.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Question (Shach 4):</font></b> Tosfos, the Rosh Answer
                    Ritva hold that one may keep a paid document in
                    order to collect the scribe's wage. Why did the
                    Shulchan Aruch rule like the Ran against them?
                    Surely one may keep it if he tears it or writes
                    on it 'this was paid.'
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Drishah (1):</font></b> Bava Metzia 16b supports Tosfos
                    and the Rosh. Why the Beis Yosef (on the Tur
                    and in the Shulchan Aruch) brought only the
                    Ran's opinion? What is the Ran's proof, and why
                    didn't he mention that Tosfos disagrees? It
                    seems that he holds that surely no one would
                    permit keeping a document after it and the
                    scribe's wage were paid. Rather, the Amora'im
                    argue about before the scribe's wage was paid.
                    Tosfos and the Rosh agree. They merely mean
                    that all agree that keeping it to be paid the
                    scribe's wage is not called Avlah (but R.
                    Yehoshua forbids, lest he forget to return it
                    later).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Rema:</font></b> In a place where the borrower does not pay the
               scribe's wage, he need not return it, but he must
               tear it.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Gra (4):</font></b> Bava Metzia 18a suggested that one who
                    paid his wife should have torn the Get. It did
                    not suggest that he should have taken the Get,
                    because she pays for it, so surely she keeps
                    it.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  SMA (5):</font></b> Even in such a place, if the borrower
                    paid the wage, the lender must return the
                    document.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Shach (5):</font></b> The Rema understands that the
                    Shulchan Aruch forbids even if he tears the
                    document, for it belongs to the borrower. This
                    is wrong. The Isur is due to 'do not keep
                    Avlah'!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</font></b> However, one may keep a
               document for 100 even if only 50 is owed, if he
               writes a receipt on the back of the document, or he
               writes a separate receipt and gives it to the
               borrower.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Rebuttal (Shach 6):</font></b> The Shulchan Aruch and the
                    Bach explain that the Ran permits to keep such
                    a document only when he wrote a receipt. This
                    is wrong. The Ran learns that one may keep a
                    document on condition from the Heter to keep a
                    document for 100 even though only 50 is owed.
                    He does not mention a receipt. If the latter
                    were forbidden without a receipt, how could he
                    learn to a document on condition, in which
                    there is no receipt? And if he learns from when
                    there is a receipt, he should have brought his
                    proof from the many places in Shas where it is
                    clear that we write receipts without concern
                    for Avlah. If the Ran discusses when there is a
                    receipt, also keeping a document to be paid the
                    scribe's wage is when a receipt is written on
                    it. If so, why does anyone forbid?! The
                    Shulchan Aruch holds that a receipt permits
                    keeping a document for 100 even though only 50
                    is owed, but not keeping a document just for
                    the scribe's wage. This is unclear. Whenever
                    David holds Levi's property, he may retain it
                    for a debt that Levi owes him for an unrelated
                    reason. The Gemara compares keeping Amanah, in
                    which there is no receipt, to keeping a
                    document. One may keep a document for 100 even
                    if only 50 is owed, even without a receipt.
                    Avlah is only when one keeps a document for no
                    proper reason. Not writing a receipt is not
                    Avlah. Many people trust each other!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Conclusion (Shach):</font></b> Even the Ran permits
                    keeping a document for 100 even if only 50 is
                    owed, even without a receipt. All the more so,
                    those who permit keeping a document to be paid
                    the scribe's wage (Tosfos, the Rosh,...) permit
                    this!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Rebuttal (Korban Nesan'el (on Rosh, 4):</font></b> Perhaps
                    the lender will die, and his heirs will collect
                    with the document! We are concerned for this in
                    Bava Metzi'a (68a), and the same applies here!
                    It seems that the Heter to keep the document
                    for the sake of its cost is when he gives to
                    the borrower a receipt, but deducts the cost of
                    the document. Alternatively, he writes on the
                    document that it was paid, or tears it, unknown
                    to the borrower (so the borrower will feel
                    pressured to pay). It seems that the Rosh and
                    Ran do not argue. The Ran forbids keeping a
                    paid document without tearing it or writing a
                    receipt, and the Rosh permits when one tears it
                    or writes a receipt. 
<br>


lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Sometimes a son collects through swearing, and
               sometimes he collects without swearing (this will be 
               explained shortly);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   A father collects only through swearing.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Question:</font></b> What is the case?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Answer:</font></b> The borrower died before the father
               (therefore, the father could collect only through
               swearing).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Summation of question:</font></b> A son collects without
               swearing, when his father told witnesses just before
               dying that he was not paid. This is like R. Shimon
               ben Gamliel;
             </font></b></font></b>  i.   All other times, he collects through swearing
                    the oath of orphans (even though his father
                    would have had to swear that he was not paid)!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(t)  Answer:</font></b> The Beraisa is Beis Shamai, who say that a
          document is considered to be paid. (Even though the
          father must swear to collect, it is as if he bequeaths
          money to his son.)
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>4) THE FINAL RULING</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Suggestion (Rav Chisda and Rabah bar Rav Huna):</font></b> Let us
          overturn the ruling of Rav and Shmuel!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Rejection (Rav Nachman):</font></b> No, but let us ensure that
          judges (who rule like Rav and Shmuel) not extend the law
          to other cases.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Question:</font></b> What other cases might one have thought to
          extend it to?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Answer:</font></b> One might have thought to extend it to Rav Papa's
          case;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Rav Papa):</font></b> If Reuven lent money with a document and
               partially collected the loan, even though Reuven
               must swear to collect the rest, his heirs inherit
               the (right to collect) the money.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  (Rav Papa):</font></b> If Shimon lent money to Levi, and Yehudah was
          an Arev, and Levi died, (even though Shimon must swear in
          order to collect from Yehudah,) Shimon's heirs inherit
          the money.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Rejection (Rav Huna brei d'Rav Yehoshua):</font></b> No. Since
          Yehudah can collect what he pays from Levi's heirs, this
          is precisely the law of Rav and Shmuel (the heirs do not
          inherit it).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  (Rami bar Chama):</font></b> If Shimon lent money to Levi, and Levi
          died, then Shimon died, and his brother inherited him, we
          do not extend Rav and Shmuel's law to say that the
          brother cannot collect.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Rejection (Rava):</font></b> We do extend it. There is no difference
          between 'our father did not tell us... ' and 'our brother
          did not tell us... '
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  (Rav Chama):</font></b> Since the Halachah was not decided to be
          like Rav and Shmuel, nor like R. Elazar, whichever way a
          judge rules, the ruling stands.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  (Rav Papa):</font></b> If orphans have a loan document that they
          want to collect from the orphans of the borrower, we do
          not tear up the document, nor do we collect the debt for
          them;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   We do not collect the debt for them, for perhaps the
               Halachah follows Rav and Shmuel. (Because we are in
               doubt, it is better not to act);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   We do not tear up the document, for perhaps they
               will find a judge who rules like R. Elazar.
 </font></b></font></b>    (k)  A judge ruled like R. Elazar. A Chacham told him 'I will
          bring a letter from Eretz Yisrael saying that the
          Halachah does not follow R. Elazar.'
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   The judge:</font></b> Until you bring the letter, my ruling
               stands.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   The Chacham told this to Rav Chama.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rav Chama:</font></b> Whichever way a judge rules, the ruling
               stands.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b>
<br><b><font color='blue'>5) SWEARING ABOUT AN UNCERTAIN CLAIM</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> The following swear even when there is no
          claim...
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Objection:</font></b> If there is no claim, there is no reason to
          swear!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer:</font></b> The Mishnah means that the following swear even
          when the claim against them is uncertain: partners,
          sharecroppers...
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  (Beraisa):</font></b> When the Mishnah says 'a member of the
          household who goes in and out... ', this does not mean
          that he walks in and out. Rather, he conducts business
          with workers and Peros.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Question:</font></b> Why must the people listed swear even when
          there is no (definite) claim?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Answer:</font></b> Because they toil, they think they are entitled
          to take (extra) compensation for themselves.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  (Rav Yosef bar Minyomi):</font></b> They are obligated to swear only
          if there is a claim of (perhaps you took) at least two
          Ma'os (for then this resembles a mid'Oraisa oath).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Question:</font></b> This is like Shmuel, who says that the claim
          must be at least two Ma'os;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   However, R. Chiya's teaching supports Rav (who says
               that the denial must be at least two Ma'os)!
 </font></b>    (i)  Answer: Rav Yosef means, there must be a denial of a
          claim of at least two Ma'os.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  (Mishnah):</font></b> After the partners split up (or the others
          desist their positions)...
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)  Question:</font></b> If a defendant must take a mid'Rabanan oath,
          can the claimant be Megalgel (force him to swear about
          other matters)?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)  Answer (Beraisa):</font></b> If Reuven borrowed from Shimon before
          Shemitah, and became his partner (or sharecropper) after
          Shemitah, Shimon (can make Reuven swear about the
          partnership, but he) cannot be Megalgel (force him to
          swear about the loan);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Inference:</font></b> This is because Shemitah cancels the
               loan. If not for this (e.g. if he borrowed after
               Shemitah), he could be Megalgel, even though the
               oath of partners is mid'Rabanan!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)  Question:</font></b> Perhaps the inference is that if Reuven became
          Shimon's partner before Shemitah, and borrowed from him
          after Shemitah (and admitted to part of the loan), Shimon
          could (make Reuven swear mid'Oraisa about the loan, and)
          be Megalgel (an oath about the partnership)!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)  Answer:</font></b> That cannot be, for the Seifa explicitly teaches
          this.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Seifa):</font></b> If Reuven became Shimon's partner before
               Shemitah, and borrowed from him after Shemitah,
               Shimon can be Megalgel.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)  Conclusion:</font></b> One can be Megalgel, even from a mid'Rabanan
          oath. 
<br>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) HALACHAH: ORPHANS WHO CLAIM A LOAN WHEN THE BORROWER DIED BEFORE THE LENDER</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Mishnah (45a) teaches that the heirs of a lender may collect money from the heirs of the borrower (with witnesses or with a Shtar) only by taking an oath that their father never told them that the debt was paid. Rav and Shmuel rule that this is the law in a case in which the lender died first. When the borrower died before the lender, the loan is no longer collectable (see previous Insight). Rebbi Elazar argues that even when the borrower died first, the heirs of the lender may collect with the oath mentioned in the Mishnah.
</p><p>
Rav Chama says that since the Rabanan did not state that the Halachah follows either the view of Rav and Shmuel or the view of Rebbi Elazar, a Dayan who conducts himself in accordance with the view of Rav and Shmuel is acting appropriately, and a Dayan who conducts himself in accordance with the view of Rebbi Elazar is also acting accordingly. Rav Papa adds that in practice, the heirs of the lender may not collect with their Shtar, because perhaps the Halachah follows the view of Rav and Shmuel. On the other hand, the Shtar that the heirs of the lender are holding is not torn up or discarded, because the heirs might find a Dayan who rules like Rebbi Elazar.
</p><p>
What, according to Rav Papa, are the heirs supposed to do with the Shtar? How should the managers of the estate of the orphans pursue the case? Should they try to find a Dayan who rules like Rebbi Elazar?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>ROSH</b> writes that despite the statements of Rav Chama and Rav Papa, the Halachah follows the view of Rav and Shmuel, and, therefore, if such a Shtar is brought before a Dayan, he should tear it up. This is evident from the words of the Amora'im in the Gemara who state that Rav and Shmuel's ruling is not applied to other, similar cases. The words of these Amora'im imply that in the specific case which Rav and Shmuel discuss, the Halachah <i>does</i> follow their opinion. Rav Chama's statement is relevant only when a Dayan happens to rule like Rebbi Elazar; b'Di'eved, his ruling is binding. L'Chatchilah, however, every Dayan should judge the case like Rav and Shmuel. This is the Halachah as recorded by the <b>TUR</b> and <b>SHULCHAN ARUCH</b> (CM 108:11).
</p><p>
The <b>AYELES HA'SHACHAR</b> questions the explanation of the Rosh. <b>TOSFOS</b> in Bava Basra (62b) writes that if a Dayan reasons that the Halachah should follow one of the opinions, he may follow that opinion and rule accordingly. The Rosh in Sanhedrin (4:6) also states that when there are two viable opinions in a Halachic argument, a Dayan may not choose to do whatever he wants (for if he does so, his ruling is a 'Din Sheker,' a dishonest ruling). Only when the Dayan states that according to his understanding, one of the opinions is more logical and correct, may he rule in accordance with that opinion. If, however, he is unsure, then he may not take money away from the party holding it. If, however, the Dayan rules without knowing about the dispute at all, then his ruling is valid and we may rely on the opinion that his ruling followed.
</p><p>
These guidelines seem applicable only when there is an argument among the Rabanan concerning the Halachah. A Talmid Chacham may assert that he is certain that one of the opinions is correct. However, if the <i>Gemara itself</i> expresses a doubt about which opinion to follow, it seems that a later Dayan is <i>not</i> entitled to say that he <i>does</i> know how to rule. Accordingly, how can any Dayan rule like Rebbi Elazar (and take money away from someone) when the Gemara itself expresses a doubt about which opinion to follow?
</p><p>
The Ayeles ha'Shachar answers that it must be that the Rosh's ruling that a Dayan may rule like Rebbi Elazar is pertinent only in the other case which the Rosh mentions in Sanhedrin, the case in which the judge is unaware of the dispute. In such a case, the Dayan indeed may rule as he sees fit.
</p><p>
However, the Ayeles ha'Shachar is not satisfied with this answer. The Rosh's ruling there applies only when a Dayan is unaware of a dispute among earlier authorities who preceded him. However, the Rosh's ruling certainly should <i>not</i> apply to a Dayan who does not know the explicit Gemara here which states that 'we do not collect with this Shtar,' for such a Dayan is simply an ignoramus whose judgment should have no validity! The Ayeles ha'Shachar leaves this question unanswered.
</p><p>
(b) <b>RABEINU YEHOSEF HA'LEVI</b> writes in the name of <b>RAV HAI GA'ON</b> that the custom of the 'Rishonim' (the generations before him) was to rule like Rav and Shmuel. In contrast to the view of the Rosh, he adds that if a Dayan rules like Rebbi Elazar, his ruling is not valid at all.
</p><p>
The <b>RAN</b> expresses uncertainty about why such a Dayan's ruling should be totally disregarded. His question may be answered with the words of the Ayeles ha'Shachar. The Ayeles ha'Shachar asked (on the opinion of the Rosh) that the ruling of a Dayan who rules like Rebbi Elazar should not be accepted, because the Gemara itself expresses a doubt about how to rule. This seems to be the reasoning behind the ruling of Rav Hai Ga'on (and the answer to the Ran's question), who says that if a Dayan rules like Rebbi Elazar, his ruling is not accepted.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>RITVA</b> and the <b>RAN</b> (in the name of 'Ketzas me'Raboseinu ha'Tzarfasim') state that a Dayan should not tear up the Shtar, because it is serves a purpose. If the orphans seize the money which they claim is owed to them, Beis Din may not take it away from them out of doubt because perhaps the Halachah follows the view of Rebbi Elazar.
</p><p>
The Ayeles ha'Shachar questions this view from the Gemara itself. Rav Papa states that Beis Din does not tear up the Shtar since the orphans might find a Dayan who rules in accordance with the view of Rebbi Elazar. If Rav Papa maintains that the orphans may keep the money if they seize it, then why does he not give that as the reason for why Beis Din does not tear up the Shtar? (That is, in the event that the orphans seize the money, they will need the Shtar as proof that they may keep the money.)
</p><p>
The Ayeles ha'Shachar answers this question based on the Rosh's explanation of the principle of 'Avid Inish Dina l'Nafshei' in Bava Kama (1:20) -- a person may make a judgment for himself (in certain situations) and seize money that is owed to him without a ruling of Beis Din. The Rosh explains that in such a situation the person essentially becomes a Dayan himself. According to this explanation, when the Gemara says that Beis Din does not tear up the Shtar because the heirs might find a Dayan who rules like Rebbi Elazar, it refers to a case in which the orphans seize the money that is owed to them by choosing to become their own 'Dayan' through the principle of 'Avid Inish Dina l'Nafshei'!
</p><p>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) THE EXCEPTION</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Rav Huna):</font></b> We are Megalgel from any mid'Rabanan oath,
          except that of a worker.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  (Rav Chisda):</font></b> For any mid'Rabanan oath, we are not
          lenient (for the defendant; rather, one can Megalgel),
          except for a worker's oath.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Question:</font></b> What is the difference between these opinions?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Answer:</font></b> Rav Huna holds that we suggest to the claimant to
          be Megalgel. Rav Chisda disagrees.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  (Mishnah):</font></b> Shemitah cancels the obligation to swear
          (about a claim of money owed from before Shemitah).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Question:</font></b> What is the source of this?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Answer (Rav Gidal):</font></b> 'V'Zeh Devar ha'Shemitah' - even
          Dibur (an obligation to swear) is cancelled.

<br><center><font color='ff0000' size='+1'><b>*****<b>PEREK ARBA'AH SHOMERIM</b>*****</b></font></center><p>
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>2) SHOMERIM WHO SWORE FALSELY</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> There are four watchmen: a Shomer Chinam, a
          borrower, a Shomer Sachar, and a renter;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   A Shomer Chinam swears about any Ones (the deposit
               was broken, captured, died; lost or stolen), and he 
               is exempt;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   A borrower pays for any Ones to the deposit (except
               if it died while working, for which he is exempt);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   A Shomer Sachar or a renter swears (and is exempt)
               if the deposit was broken, captured, or died; he
               must pay if it was lost or stolen.
 </font></b></font></b></font></b>    (b)  Reuven claimed his deposit from Shimon, a Shomer Chinam.
          Shimon said that it died (or that any other Ones
          happened). Really, a different Ones occurred. Reuven
          imposed this oath on him, and he answered Amen. Shimon is
          exempt (from the Korban for Shevu'as ha'Pikadon, for he
          did not deny money, since he is exempt for any Ones);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   If Shimon denied having ever received the deposit,
               and really he had received it but an Ones occurred,
               and he accepted an oath to back up his claim; Shimon
               is exempt (he did not deny money, for he was exempt
               anyway);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   If Shimon claimed that it was lost, and accepted an
               oath; and witnesses testify that Shimon really ate
               it, he pays only principal;
             </font></b></font></b>  i.   If Shimon confesses on his own, he pays
                    principal, adds a Chomesh (a quarter of the
                    principal), and brings an Asham.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   If Shimon claimed that it was stolen, and accepted
               an oath; and witnesses testify that Shimon really
               ate it, he pays double;
             </font></b>  i.   If Shimon confesses on his own, he pays
                    principal, a Chomesh, and brings an Asham.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b>  If Yehudah charged Levi 'you stole my ox!', Shimon denied
          this, and witnesses testify that Shimon stole it, he pays
          double;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   If witnesses further testify that he slaughtered or
               sold it, he pays four or five;
             </font></b>  i.   If Levi saw witnesses coming to Beis Din, and
                    (therefore) admitted to stealing it but denied
                    slaughtering or selling it, (even so) he only
                    pays principal.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b>  If Reuven claimed his deposit from Shimon (a borrower),
          and Shimon said that it died (or that any other Ones
          happened), and really, a different Ones occurred, and
          Shimon accepted an oath, he is exempt (for in any case he
          is liable);
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) 'GILGUL SHEVU'AH' FOR SHEVU'OS D'RABANAN</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Gemara (end of 48b) concludes that the principle of 'Gilgul Shevu'ah' applies to a Shevu'ah d'Rabanan, an oath mandated by the Rabanan, just as it applies to an oath mandated by the Torah. When a person is required to take an oath mid'Rabanan, he can be made to take other oaths that are relevant (which, without taking the first oath, he could not be made to take).
</p><p>
The Gemara then discusses when this applies. Rav Huna says that 'Gilgul Shevu'ah' applies to all cases of a Shevu'ah d'Rabanan with the exception of the case of a worker who must take an oath that he was not paid (see Rashi). Rav Chisda says that 'we are not lenient' with regard to anyone except for a worker who claims he was not paid. Rav Chisda apparently means that instead of being lenient and not requiring that the additional Shevu'os be made, we apply 'Gilgul Shevu'ah' and require that the additional Shevu'os be made, except in the case of a worker who claims that he was not paid. The Gemara inquires what the difference is between these two opinions, and it answers that the difference is whether we may 'open for him' or not. What does the Gemara's answer mean?
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI</b> explains that the difference between Rav Huna and Rav Chisda is whether or not the Beis Din makes a claim of 'Gilgul Shevu'ah' for the claimant. That is, according to Rav Huna (who says 'la'Kol Megalgelin'), if the claimant does not know that he can make the defendant take additional oaths through 'Gilgul Shevu'ah,' then Beis Din makes that claim for him. Rav Chisda argues and says that when the claimant does not demand additional oaths, Beis Din may not suggest it for him.
</p><p>
It seems that according to Rashi, both Rav Huna and Rav Chisda agree that there is no 'Gilgul Shevu'ah' in the case of a worker who makes a Shevu'ah that he was not paid (for, otherwise, Rashi would have specified this difference).
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RITVA</b> agrees with Rashi's understanding of the difference between Rav Huna and Rav Chisda. However, the Ritva adds that they also argue about a case of a worker. Rav Huna maintains that in the case of a worker, the employer has the right to make the worker take additional oaths through 'Gilgul Shevu'ah,' although Beis Din may not suggest that he make that claim, as Beis Din may do in other cases. Rav Chisda maintains that in other cases, the claimant may request that additional oaths be taken through 'Gilgul Shevu'ah,' but Beis Din may not make that claim for him. In the case of a worker, the employer's request that the worker take additional oaths is rejected.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Sechirus 11:9) has an entirely different approach. He states that when a worker says that he was not paid and thus he must swear in order to collect his money, we are not stringent with him and do not add any oaths at all; he makes the single Shevu'ah that he is required to make and no more. In all other cases, we are stringent and require the defendant to make additional oaths through 'Gilgul Shevu'ah.'
</p><p>
The <b>MAGID MISHNEH</b> explains that the Rambam understands Rav Huna as saying that it is the worker's <i>right</i> to refuse to take additional oaths. If, however, he does not exercise that right, Beis Din does not do it for him, and thus the employer can make the worker take additional oaths. Rav Chisda argues and maintains that Beis Din tells the worker outright that he does not have to take any additional oaths. The Rambam rules like Rav Chisda.
</p><p>
It is interesting to note that the Ritva writes that 'there are some who give this explanation' (he does not mention the Rambam), and he concludes by saying that it is more preferable than his own explanation. However, he states clearly that the Halachah follows the view of Rav Huna, in contrast to the Magid Mishneh's explanation of the Rambam.
</p><p>
The <b>KESEF MISHNEH</b> questions this explanation. Rav Chisda was a student of Rav Huna. Why would the Rambam rule like the student against the Rebbi? Moreover, why does the Rambam go out of his way to use the language of both Rav Chisda ('Mekilim') and Rav Huna ('Megalgelim')?
</p><p>
The Kesef Mishneh therefore prefers the <b>RAN's</b> explanation. The Ran writes that the Rambam learns that Rav Huna and Rav Chisda are not arguing. Rav Huna states that a worker <i>never</i> has to take another oath through 'Gilgul Shevu'ah.' Rav Chisda agrees, and he <i>adds</i> another Halachah. Even though Beis Din never gives advice or favors one side, in this case Beis Din is allowed to comfort the worker and say that he should not worry, since he can just take an oath and receive his money without having to worry that he will be forced to take additional oaths.
</p><p>
This explanation, however, seems very difficult to understand. How can the Rambam say that Rav Huna and Rav Chisda are not arguing when the Gemara itself says, 'What is the difference between them? The difference is 'to open for him''? The Kesef Mishneh answers that the Amora who asked the question, 'What is the difference between them,' misunderstood the opinions of Rav Huna and Rav Chisda. The Gemara responded that the difference between them is merely that Rav Chisda adds an additional point to the law that the worker does not have to take additional oaths.
</p><p>
(d) The <b>RITVA</b> in Kidushin (27b) gives another explanation. The Ritva there says that Rav Huna maintains that anyone is able to make his disputant take additional oaths through 'Gilgul Shevu'ah,' but Beis Din may not suggest it, while in the case of a worker, the worker can <i>never</i> be forced to take additional oaths. Rav Chisda is stringent and says that 'we are not lenient' on the defendant in most cases, but rather Beis Din informs the claimant right away of any possible oaths that he can add to the oath already being taken by the defendant. However, we <i>are</i> 'lenient' in the case of a worker, and we do not divulge these additional oaths unless the employer requests them. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>20) ON WHICH SHEVUOS MAY ONE BE MEGALGEL?</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>     </font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   48b - Question:</font></b> If a defendant must take a
               mid'Rabanan oath, can the claimant be Megalgel
               (force him to swear about other matters)?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer (Beraisa):</font></b> If Levi borrowed from Shimon
               before Shemitah, and became his partner after
               Shemitah, Shimon cannot be Megalgel;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Inference:</font></b> This is because Shemitah cancels the
                    loan. If not for this (e.g. if he borrowed
                    after Shemitah), he could be Megalgel, even
                    though the oath of partners is mid'Rabanan!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Question:</font></b> Perhaps we infer that if they became
               partners before Shemitah, and Levi borrowed after
               Shemitah (and partially admitted), Shimon could
               Megalgel (about the partnership on the Torah oath
               about the loan)!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Answer:</font></b> That cannot be, for the Seifa explicitly
               teaches this. Rather, one can be Megalgel, even from
               a mid'Rabanan oath.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   (Rav Huna):</font></b> We are Megalgel from any mid'Rabanan
               oath, except that of a worker.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   (Rav Chisda):</font></b> For any mid'Rabanan oath, we are not
               lenient, except for a worker's oath.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b> Rav Huna holds that we suggest to him. Rav Chisda
               disagrees.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.   Kidushin 27b (Ula):</font></b> We learn an oath of Gilgul from
               Sotah:
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (Mishnah):</font></b> 'She will answer 'Amen Amen'' - she
                    swears that she was not Mezanah with this man
                    or any other man, not during Eirusin or
                    Nisu'in, not while a Shomeres Yavam or after
                    Nisu'in.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b> He warned her during Nisu'in. He makes her
                    swear about Eirusin through Gilgul.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.   Question:</font></b> This teaches about a Gilgul oath about
               Isurim. What is the source for a Gilgul oath in
               monetary cases?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>10.  Answer (Tana d'Vei R. Yishmael):</font></b> We learn a Kal
               va'Chomer. One witness cannot make a Sotah swear,
               yet when she swears, Gilgul applies. One witness can
               force one to swear about money. All the more so,
               Gilgul applies!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>11.  Question:</font></b> This teaches about monetary oaths when the
               initial claim was Vadai. What is the source when the
               initial claim was Safek?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>12.  Answer (Beraisa - R. Shimon):</font></b> The Torah discusses
               oaths outside (the Mikdash, i.e. monetary oaths in
               Beis Din) and oaths inside (the Mikdash, i.e.
               Sotah). Just like definite and Safek claims are the
               same inside, also outside.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rif:</font></b> The Yerushalmi brings a case in which Levi was
               obligated to swear about two Dinarim. He said 'I
               will pay.' His opponent (David) was Megalgel. Ze'ira
               told Levi that he must pay every claim or swear
               about it.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rosh (Shevuos 7:19):</font></b> The case is, David claimed the
               other matters before Levi agreed to pay. If he
               agreed to pay before he knew about David's intent to
               be Megalgel, Gilgul would not apply. If one agreed
               to pay the two Dinarim, and after he was told to pay
               everything or swear about everything, I am unsure
               whether he can retract from paying the two Dinarim.
               He agreed to pay in order to be exempt from
               swearing. Perhaps even if he left Beis Din, he can
               retract. Or, once he admitted, he admitted. It seems
               that he can retract.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rif:</font></b> Some ask from the Yerushalmi (Reish Perek
               ha'Mafkid) that says that if Levi accepted to swear,
               and saw that David was going to be Megalgel on him,
               R. Yosi said that he can decide to pay instead.
               Swearing is a leniency for the defendant. He can
               swear to be exempt if he wants. They answer that R.
               Yosi discusses a Shevu'ah mid'Oraisa, but not a
               Shevu'ah mid'Rabanan. I disagree. Gilgul Shevu'ah is
               mid'Oraisa, and Chachamim enacted all mid'Rabanan
               laws like Torah law! If the Torah allowed one to
               retract, also Chachamim would! Rather, Zeira holds
               like the first Tana of R. Yosi, who argues with R.
               Yosi.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Rebuttal (Rosh ibid):</font></b> This Yerushalmi discusses
               something else! If a deposit was stolen and the
               Shomer decides to pay and not swear, the owner gives
               to him rights to collect Kefel (double payment, if
               the thief will be caught). If he wanted to swear,
               and saw that the owner wanted to be Megalgel, and he
               agreed to pay, we are concerned. I.e. perhaps he
               agreed to pay to avoid the Gilgul, and not to please
               the owner (so the owner does not cede Kefel). R.
               Yosi says that Shevu'ah is a leniency. Once he
               agreed to pay, it is as if he said so from the
               beginning, and the owner cedes Kefel. This Perush is
               better, for it equates the Yerushalmi with the
               Bavli, i.e. that we are Megalgel on mid'Rabanan
               oaths. Even one who pays must swear that the animal
               is not in his Reshus (so paying would not exempt
               from Gilgul), like the Yerushalmi explicitly said
               there.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  Rambam (Hilchos To'en 1:12):</font></b> Anyone who must swear,
               mid'Oraisa or mid'Rabanan, his opponent may be
               Megalgel on him anything that if he would admit to
               it, he would need to pay. We do not Megalgel on a
               worker's oath.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Terumas ha'Deshen (327):</font></b> If Levi claimed from David,
               and David reversed the Shevu'ah onto Levi, it seems
               that David cannot be Megalgel on Levi. Reversing an
               oath is an enactment, and we do not impose another
               enactment (Gilgul on a Shevu'ah mid'Rabanan) on an
               enactment.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Hagahah:</font></b> Also the Mordechai says that reversing
                    an oath is an enactment, so we do not put an
                    enactment on it, but Semag says in the name of
                    the Rashbam that since the defendant consented,
                    we do impose another enactment.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Terumas ha'Deshen:</font></b> We conclude that Gilgul
                    applies to everything except for a worker. The
                    Rivan says that the exclusion of a worker
                    includes all who swear and collect, for the
                    oath is for their benefit. All the more so we
                    are not Megalgel when a Shevu'ah was reversed,
                    for there was no enactment that he swear, and
                    he benefits through swearing. The Ri excludes
                    only a worker, for letter of the law he should
                    not need to swear (for we assume that the
                    employer was distracted and forgot). He swears
                    only to placate the employer. Also the Ri would
                    hold that a reversed oath is not letter of the
                    law, for really the defendant should swear or
                    pay. This is why Rabanan say that we do not
                    reverse a Torah oath, unlike Rav Hai Gaon and
                    R. Gershom who rule that we do. I heard from
                    one of the Gedolim that the Halachah does not
                    follow them, even though Or Zaru'a says that we
                    hold like them. Therefore, one does not
                    Megalgel on a reversed oath.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (CM 94:1):</font></b> If David was obligated to
               swear in Beis Din, even Heses, his opponent may be
               Megalgel on him anything that if he would admit to
               it, he would need to pay.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   SMA (1):</font></b> We learn from Sotah. Her husband
                    suspected her only of this man, but the Torah
                    commands Beis Din to be Megalgel from Safek,
                    i.e. for there are grounds (her immodest
                    actions) to be concerned.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rema:</font></b> Some say that if Levi claimed from David, and
               David reversed the Shevu'ah onto Levi, David cannot
               be Megalgel on Levi.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Shach (2):</font></b> This is from the Mordechai. I
                    disagree. This is not an enactment on an
                    enactment. Letter of the law, the defendant is
                    exempt. Rav Nachman enacted Heses, and that he
                    can reverse the oath onto the claimant.
                    Therefore, he can say 'I will pay only if you
                    swear about the Gilgul.' This is unlike a
                    worker, and according to the Rivan, all who
                    swear and collect based on the Mishnah. We hold
                    like the Ri, that we are Megalgel on others who
                    swear and collect, so all the more so we are
                    Megalgel on a reversed Shevu'as Heses. However,
                    the Ritva holds like the Terumas ha'Deshen.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</font></b> If admission would not force
               David to pay, just to swear, Levi cannot be Megalgel
               the claim. We do not Megalgel on the oath of a
               worker to collect. Even if Levi did not demand
               Gilgul, Beis Din themselves are Megalgel.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Beis Yosef (DH u'Mah she'Chosav Rabeinu Chutz):
                    Rashi explains that Rav Huna and Rav Chisda
                    argue about whether we suggest to the claimant
                    to be Megalgel. The Tur, Ran, Nimukei Yosef and
                    Tosfos rule like Rav Huna, for he was Rav
                    Chisda's Rebbi. The Rambam (Hilchos Sechirus
                    11:9) holds that they argue about encouraging
                    the claimant to swear and collect.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Beis Yosef (DH v'Chosav ha'Ri, citing the Ri N'
                    Yanir):</font></b> Some say that for other oaths, Beis Din
                    suggests Gilgul about matters that they know
                    about, but not for matters that they do not
                    know about, for that is like being a lawyer.
                    For a worker, they do not suggest even for
                    matters that they know about. Others say that
                    we do not suggest to a worker to tell the
                    employer not to be Megalgel, but if he says so,
                    we heed him. This is primary.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Beis Yosef (DH v'Chosav ha'Ran, citing the Ran
                    and Mordechai):</font></b> In Bava Metzia (3b), we
                    suggested that if two witnesses testify about
                    part of a claim, they obligate a Shevu'ah on
                    the rest, Kal va'Chomer from one witness (who
                    obligates through Gilgul). This shows that
                    regarding Modeh b'Miktzas, Beis Din is Megalgel
                    even if the claimant does not request. Also, we
                    learn from Sotah; we are Megalgel even if her
                    husband does not request. Rav Huna and Rav
                    Chisda argue about a mid'Rabanan oath.<p>


lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   If Shimon denied that he ever received the deposit,
               and really he had received it, but an Ones occurred,
               and he accepted an oath; Shimon is liable.
 </font></b>    (e)  In the following cases, a Shomer Sachar or renter
          (Shimon) who swore to the depositer, is exempt (for he
          did not try to deny money);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shimon said that it died (or another full Ones
               occurred, i.e. it was broken or captured, so he is
               exempt), and really, a different full Ones occurred;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Shimon claimed a semi-Ones (it was lost or stolen,
               for which he is liable), and really, the other semi-
               Ones occurred.
 </font></b></font></b>    (f)  If Shimon claimed a full Ones, (exempting himself), and
          really a semi-Ones occurred, and he accepted an oath, he
          is liable;
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b>  If Shimon claimed a semi-Ones, (obligating himself), and
          really a full Ones occurred, and he accepted an oath, he
          is exempt.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b>  The general rule is, if by lying he remained liable (as
          if he told the truth), or he remained exempt, or he
          obligated himself when he was really exempt, he is exempt
          for the oath;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   If by lying he exempted himself when he was really
               liable, he is liable.
 </font></b>    (i)  The general rule is, if lying decreased his liability, he
          is liable. If he increased his liability, he is exempt.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  (Gemara) Question:</font></b> Who is the Tana of the Mishnah, who
          says that there are four Shomerim?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)  Answer (Rav Nachman citing Rabah bar Avuha):</font></b> It is R.
          Meir.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)  Objection (Rava):</font></b> All agree that there are four Shomerim!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)  Answer (Rav Nachman):</font></b> I meant that R. Meir is the Tana
          who obligates a renter like a Shomer Sachar.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)  Question:</font></b> That is the opinion of R. Yehudah, and not R.
          Meir!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa - R. Meir):</font></b> A renter is liable like a
               Shomer Chinam;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   R. Yehudah says, he is liable like a Shomer Sachar.
 </font></b>    (o)  Answer: Rabah bar Avuha's text of that Beraisa switches
          the opinions.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)  Question:</font></b> Since a renter is liable like a Shomer Sachar,
          there are only three Shomerim!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)  Answer (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak):</font></b> There are four kinds
          of Shomerim, there are three laws of Shomerim.
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>3) IS HE LIABLE FOR SHEVU'AS BITUY?</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> Reuven claimed from a Shomer Chinam...
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  (Rav):</font></b> Whenever the Mishnah says 'exempt', he is exempt
          from Shevu'as ha'Shomerim, but he is liable for Shevu'as
          Bituy;
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  (Shmuel):</font></b> He is exempt even from Bituy.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Question:</font></b> What do they argue about?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Answer:</font></b> Shmuel holds that since the oath does not apply
          to the future (e.g. to swear that it will be stolen), he
          is exempt for Bituy;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rav holds that since the oath applies in the
               positive and negative (e.g. it was not stolen), he
               is liable.
 </font></b>    (f)  Question: They already argued about this elsewhere!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Rav):</font></b> If Reuven swore that Ploni threw (or did not
               throw) a stone into the river, he is liable, because
               the oath applies to the positive and negative;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   (Shmuel):</font></b> He is exempt, for it does not apply to the
               future (to swear that he will throw).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b>  They needed to argue in both cases;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Had they argued only there, one might have thought
               that Rav obligates because Reuven himself decided to
               swear, but he admits that he is exempt if Beis Din
               forced him to swear, like R. Ami taught;
             </font></b>  i.   (R. Ami): One is never liable for Bituy for an
                    oath that Beis Din forced him to take.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Had they argued only here, one might have thought
               that Shmuel exempts because Beis Din forced him to
               swear, but he admits that he is liable if he himself
               decided to swear.
 </font></b>    (h)  (R. Ami): One is never liable for Bituy for an oath Beis
          Din forced him to take. '<i>Ki</i> Sishava' connotes that he
          decided to do so.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Reish Lakish):</font></b> 'Ki' has four meanings: if, perhaps,
               rather, and because. (Here it means if, i.e. if he
               chooses to swear.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  (R. Elazar):</font></b> In all cases, he is liable for Shevu'as
          Bituy, except for when he is liable for Shevu'as
          ha'Shomerim, i.e. a borrower who denies that he received
          the deposit, or a Shomer Sachar or renter who (falsely)
<br><br>          claim that a full Ones occurred, for they denied money. <p>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) LIABILITY FOR MAKING A FALSE SHEVU'AS HA'PIKADON</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Mishnah in Shevuos concludes with two rules regarding the liability of a Shomer who makes a false Shevu'as ha'Pikadon (when his claim is found to be untrue). The first rule is that if, by lying, the Shomer either remains liable to pay for the object (as he would be if he told the truth), or he remains exempt, or he obligates himself when he is really exempt, he is not held accountable for making a false Shevu'as ha'Pikadon. He is held accountable for making a false Shevu'as ha'Pikadon only if, by lying, he exempts himself when he is really liable.
</p><p>
The second rule is that if, by lying, he decreases his liability, he is held accountable for making a false Shevu'as ha'Pikadon. If he makes a claim with a Shevu'ah which increases his liability, he is exempt.
</p><p>
These two rules seem to contradict each other. According to the first rule, a Shomer is guilty of making a false Shevu'ah only when he swears to a claim that would have exempted him from paying for the object when in truth he was obligated to pay for it. In any other case, he is exempt. According to the second rule, however, only a Shomer who makes a false Shevu'ah claiming that he is guilty, when in truth he is innocent, is exempt from liability for making a false Shevu'ah, which implies that a Shomer in either of the first two cases of the first rule (he claims he is liable when he really is liable, or he claims he is exempt when he really is exempt) is <i>Chayav</i> for his Shevu'as ha'Pikadon! How are these two rules to be reconciled?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The text of the Mishnah as it appears in the Yerushalmi indeed does not contain the first rule mentioned in the Mishnah. Moreover, the Yerushalmi's first words in the Gemara are that if the oath does not better or worsen his case, he still is liable for Shevu'as ha'Pikadon, which is consistent with the inference of the wording of that rule in our text of the Mishnah.
</p><p>
The <b>TOSFOS YOM TOV</b>, who is apparently bothered by this question, says that the <b>RAN</b> <i>does</i> have the first rule in his text of the Mishnah. He suggests that the Ran might not have had the second rule in his text. Indeed, the Tosefta does not have the second rule in its text, and that rule also does not appear in the text of the Mishnah in old manuscripts, as the <b>DIKDUKEI SOFRIM</b> points out.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>TOSFOS YOM TOV</b> suggests an answer to explain the Girsa as it appears in our text, which lists both rules. When the Mishnah says that a Shomer who does not change his degree of liability through his claim (the first two cases of the first rule) is exempt, it means that those cases are similar to a Shomer who swears and thereby makes his situation worse (he increases his liability), the case of the second rule, and that is why he is not held accountable for making a false Shevu'as ha'Pikadon.
</p><p>
The <b>MAREH HA'PANIM</b> on the Yerushalmi says that the text of the Yerushalmi in the Gemara is incorrect. It should read that one who does not change his situation is <i>not</i> liable. He explains that this is how the Yerushalmi understands the Mishnah, as the Tosfos Yom Tov explains.
</p><p>
The <b>TIFERES YISRAEL</b>, who also gives the explanation of the Tosfos Yom Tov, points out that he wrote in his <b>MEGILAS SETARIM</b> that there are three common ways to answer an implied contradiction, and this manner is one of them (that is, by showing that the intent of one statement is really the same as the inference of the other). He says that the Gemara itself gives a similar answer (in Pesachim 19b and Kidushin 5b) when it says that the implication of the first part of a certain statement was exact in its intention, while the second part of the statement was not exact in its intention.
</p><p>
The second manner of resolving an implied contradiction is by showing that one of the two contradictory statements is based on a textual error, which is the answer given above, according to the Girsa of the Yerushalmi and the Tosefta (see also Beitzah 24b and Gitin 73b). (The third manner, he says, is to show that the lines of reasoning behind the implied cases are not similar, as mentioned by <b>TOSFOS</b> to Chulin 15b.) (Y. Montrose) </p><p>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) TWO THAT ARE REALLY FOUR</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> There are two primary oaths of Bituy (that one
          will or will not do something). There are four in all;
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b>  There are two primary Yedi'os (awarenesses) of Tum'ah.
          There are four in all;
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b>  There are two primary forms of Yetzi'ah (taking things
          out) on Shabbos. There are four in all;
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b>  There are two primary appearances of Tzara'as. There are
          four in all.

<b><font color='blue'>2) ATONEMENTS FOR TUM'AH</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Continuation of Mishnah - R. Yehudah):</font></b> If one knew of
          the Tum'ah, and later forgot (and entered the Mikdash or
          ate Kodshim), and later remembered that he was Tamei, he
          brings an Oleh v'Yored Korban (i.e. a rich person brings
          an animal, a poor person brings birds, and a very poor
          person brings a flour offering);
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b>  If he knew of the Tum'ah, and forgot (and entered the
          Mikdash or ate Kodshim), and did not remember before Yom
          Kipur, the goat (whose blood is) offered inside (the
          Kodesh ha'Kodoshim on Yom Kipur) and Yom Kipur itself
          protect him from punishment;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> When he remembers, he must bring an Oleh v'Yored;
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b>  If he never knew of the Tum'ah (and entered the Mikdash
          or ate Kodshim), and later was told that he had was
          Tamei, the goat (whose blood is) offered outside (the
          Heichal) and Yom Kipur itself atone for him;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> (When the Torah commands about the outer goat on Yom
               Kipur, it says 'Milvad Chatas ha'Kipurim' to teach
               that it atones for the same things as the inner
               goat.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> Just like the inner goat atones for Tum'ah that was
               known at some time, also the outer goat.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b>  The goats of the Mo'adim and Rosh Chodesh atone for
          Tum'ah that was never known.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b>  R. Shimon says, the goats of the Mo'adim atone for this,
          but not those of Rosh Chodesh;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The goats of Rosh Chodesh atone for a Tahor person
               who ate Tamei Kodshim.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE ATONEMENT PROVIDED BY THE KORBAN MUSAF AND YOM KIPPUR</b></font>
<br>QUESTIONS: The Mishnah teaches that the 'Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh Bifnim' of Yom Kippur, and the day of Yom Kippur itself, provide temporary atonement for a person who sinned with 'Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav' -- by eating Kodshim while he was Tamei or by entering the Beis ha'Mikdash while he was Tamei -- in a case in which the person realized that he was Tamei but later forgot about the Tum'ah at the time that he ate the Kodshim or entered the Mikdash. If Yom Kippur comes before he remembers, then the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh Bifnim and Yom Kippur provide him with temporary atonement until he realizes his sin. If he realizes his sin after Yom Kippur passes, then he must bring a Korban Oleh v'Yored.
</p><p>
The Mishnah then teaches that the Sa'ir Musaf (the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh ba'Chutz) of Yom Kippur, together with the day of Yom Kippur, provides atonement for a person who became Tamei without realizing it and then entered the Mikdash, and later it was brought to his attention that he was Tamei when he entered the Mikdash.
</p><p>
In the third case, in which the person was not aware of the Tum'ah before or after the sin, Rebbi Yehudah says that the Se'irei Musaf of the festivals and Rosh Chodesh atone for his sin. Rebbi Shimon argues that only the Se'irei Musaf of the festivals atone for his sin, while the Se'irei Musaf of Rosh Chodesh provide a different atonement. They atone for one who sinned by eating Kodshim that was Tamei while he was Tahor.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> (DH Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh ba'Chutz) explains that when the Mishnah says that the Sa'ir and Yom Kippur atone for his sin, it means that the day itself provides Kaparah.
</p><p>
There are a number of questions on Rashi's comments.
</p><p>
(a) Why does Rashi wait until this point in the Mishnah to explain that Yom Kippur itself provides part of the Kaparah? He should explain this earlier, when the Mishnah first mentions Yom Kippur and says that the day of Yom Kippur provides atonement together with the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh Bifnim.
</p><p>
(b) Why does Rebbi Shimon (later in the Mishnah), whenever he mentions the Kaparah of the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh Bifnim, omit the fact that Yom Kippur also provides part of the Kaparah?
</p><p>
(c) Rebbi Meir, who maintains that all of the Musaf offerings provide the same Kaparah, asks Rebbi Shimon, who maintains that all of the Musaf offerings provide different Kaparos, how can a Korban that was designated for a festival, became lost, and then was found be brought on Rosh Chodesh or on Yom Kippur. Why does Rebbi Meir ask his question only on Rebbi Shimon? He should ask this question on Rebbi Yehudah as well! While it is true that Rebbi Yehudah maintains that the Kaparah of the Musafim of festivals and of Rosh Chodesh are the same, he agrees with Rebbi Shimon that the Kaparah of the Musaf of Yom Kippur is different from the other two, and yet he presumably agrees that the Musaf of Yom Kippur may be offered on a festival if it is lost and then found before the festival! (See <b>MAHARSHA</b>.)
</p><p>
ANSWER: The <b>CHASAM SOFER</b> suggests an approach which answers all three questions. His approach is as follows.
</p><p>
Why do some Musaf offerings provide a different Kaparah from others? One reason may be that the day itself plays a role in the Kaparah. A day which has more qualities of atonement enhances the effect of the Korban so that it provides a greater form of Kaparah. Another reason may be simply that a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv states that a Korban Chatas separated for a particular festival provides a particular form of Kaparah (that is, Hash-m wants the various Kaparos to be spread out during the various times of the year, and therefore the Kaparah of the Musaf changes based on the time of the year that it is brought).
</p><p>
The second reason has support from the fact that the festivals and Rosh Chodesh provide different Kaparos, according to Rebbi Shimon. The only day which plays a part in atonement is Yom Kippur. The festival (one of the three Regalim) never plays a part in Kaparah. Clearly, Rebbi Shimon must follow the second approach, according to which the different Kaparos depend on the time of year in which the Musaf is offered, and the quality of the particular day does not play a role in the Kaparah.
</p><p>
Based on this approach, the answers to the questions posed above are as follows.
</p><p>
(a) When the Mishnah states that the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh Bifnim atones with Yom Kippur, the intention is clear: Yom Kippur itself plays a role in the Kaparah. However, when the Mishnah teaches that the Sa'ir Musaf of Yom Kippur atones with Yom Kippur, one might have thought that the Mishnah does not mean that Yom Kippur actually plays a role in the Kaparah, since other Musafim -- those of the Regalim and Rosh Chodesh -- are also Mechaper even though the days on which they are offered do <i>not</i> play a part in the Kaparah. This is why Rashi emphasizes here that Yom Kippur <i>does</i> play a role in the Kaparah.
</p><p>
Apparently, Rebbi Yehudah disagrees with Rebbi Shimon and maintains that the reason why different Musafim provide different Kaparos is due to the qualities of the day. The qualities of the day of Yom Kippur enhance the Musaf of Yom Kippur. Rebbi Yehudah argues that the Musafim of both Rosh Chodesh and the Regalim provide an identical Kaparah, because the day does not contribute to the Musaf's Kaparah in those cases.
</p><p>
(b) This answers the second question as well. Rebbi Shimon conspicuously omits the fact that Yom Kippur provides part of the atonement. This is because he maintains that the difference in the Kaparah of the Musafim is not related to the ability of the day to provide atonement.
</p><p>
(c) This also explains why Rebbi Meir asks his question specifically on the view of Rebbi Shimon. According to Rebbi Shimon, the difference between the Musafim is that the Musaf designated for one part of the year provides a different atonement from the Musaf designated for another part of the year. Therefore, it follows logically that a Korban separated for one day cannot be offered on a different day. In contrast, according to Rebbi Yehudah, all of the Musafim provide the same measure of atonement. It is the ability of Yom Kippur to atone that enhances its Musaf so that it can provide a different Kaparah from the other Musafim. Consequently, the Musaf of Yom Kippur should be able to be offered as the Musaf for the Regel or Rosh Chodesh, since the Kaparah that the Musaf itself provides is the same regardless of when it is offered.
</p><p>
Perhaps this may also explain why the Mishnah does not mention that Yom Kippur atones together with the Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach (see Hagahos of <b>RAV ELAZAR MOSHE HA'LEVI HOROWITZ</b>). Perhaps Rebbi Yehudah infers that the ability of the day of Yom Kippur to atone plays a part in the atonement for sins of Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav from the fact that the Musaf of Yom Kippur provides a different atonement than the other Musafim, as the Chasam Sofer explains. For this reason, Rebbi Yehudah concludes that the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh Bifnim which is also Mechaper on Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav must be accompanied by the atonement provided by the day itself. Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav is the most difficult sin for a Korban to atone for (since it involves the desecration of the Mikdash and Korbanos themselves), as is evidenced from the fact that so many different Musafim are brought to atone for this category of sin, as the Tosefta (1:2) points out (see <b>MELECHES BETZALEL</b>). Accordingly, there is no basis to assume that all of the other sins for which the Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach atones also need Yom Kippur for their Kaparah.
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b>  R. Meir says, all the goats atone for the same things,
          i.e. Tum'ah of the Mikdash or Kodshim.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  (Recap):</font></b> R. Shimon says, the goats of Rosh Chodesh atone
          for a Tahor person who ate Tamei Kodshim;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The goats of the Mo'adim atone for Tum'ah that was
               never known;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> The outer goat of Yom Kipur atones for Tum'ah that
               was known only after he transgressed.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Question (Rabanan):</font></b> If a goat designated for one of these
          three atonements was lost, and it was found after a
          substitute was offered, may the found goat be used for
          another of the three atonements?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Answer (R. Shimon):</font></b> Yes.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  Question (Rabanan):</font></b> If it was originally designated for
          one atonement, how can it atone for something else?!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)  Answer (R. Shimon):</font></b> They all atone for (transgressions
          involving) Tum'ah in the Mikdash or with Kodshim. This is
          essentially what it was designated for!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)  (R. Shimon ben Yehudah citing R. Shimon):</font></b> The goats of
          Rosh Chodesh atone for a Tahor person who ate Tamei
          Kodshim;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The goats of the Mo'adim atone for this, and also
               for Tum'ah that was never known;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> The outer goat of Yom Kipur atones for both of
               these, and also for Tum'ah that was known only after
               he transgressed.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)  Question (Rabanan):</font></b> If a goat designated for one of these
          three atonements was lost, and it was found after a
          substitute was offered, may the found goat be used for
          another of the three atonements?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)  Answer (R. Shimon):</font></b> Yes.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)  Question (Rabanan):</font></b> Indeed, the outer goat of Yom Kipur
          may be used on Rosh Chodesh, since it was designated to
          atone for more;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> However, how can a goat designated for Rosh Chodesh
               be used on Yom Kipur? It was originally designated
               to atone for less!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)  Answer (R. Shimon):</font></b> They all atone for Tum'ah of the
          Mikdash or Kodshim. This is essentially what it was
          designated for!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b>  The inner goat and Yom Kipur atone for intentional Tum'ah
          in the Mikdash or with Kodshim;
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b>  The goat sent to Azazel (on Yom Kipur) atones for all
          other transgressions, light or severe, intentional or
          unintentional, whether or not the person knows he sinned,
          Lav or Aseh, even what is punishable by Kares or death;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> It atones for Yisraelim, Kohanim and a Kohen Gadol
               anointed (with Shemen ha'Mishchah, special oil from
               the days of Moshe) alike;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> The difference between them is that the bull (of Yom
               Kipur) atones for the Kohanim for Tum'ah in the
               Mikdash or with Kodshim (the Gemara will address the
               contradiction between this and the previous clause);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> R. Shimon says, just like blood of the inner goat
               atones for Yisrael, so the blood of the bull atones
               for Kohanim;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Just like the confession said over the goat
                    sent to Azazel atones for Yisrael, so the
                    confession said over the bull atones for
                    Kohanim. 
<br>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) OFFERING A 'KORBAN TZIBUR' ON A DAY OTHER THAN THE DAY FOR WHICH IT WAS DESIGNATED</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: Rebbi Shimon maintains that although the Musafim for Yom Kippur, the Regalim, and Rosh Chodesh atone for different forms of Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav, a Korban Musaf separated for one of those days may be brought on another of those days, since all of their Kaparos are in the same general category of Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav.
</p><p>
What difference does it make if the sins for which the Musafim atone are in the same general category? The Mishnah in Kerisus (27b) cited by the <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Shegagos 3:3) states that if a person separated a Korban Chatas as an atonement for his sin of eating Chelev on a certain day, he may not bring that Korban as an atonement for a different sin of eating Chelev on another day, since the verse says, 'Korbano... Al Chataso' (Vayikra 4:28) -- a Korban must be brought for the sin for which it was designated. It is likely that between the time that the Musaf was separated for Yom Kippur and the time that it was brought (on the following Regel, such as Pesach), more people sinned with Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav. Why may a Korban Musaf that was not designated for those sins be offered, even if it was separated for a similar category of sin? (<b>CHIDUSHEI RABEINU CHAIM HA'LEVI</b> to Kerisus 27b)
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>RABEINU CHAIM HA'LEVI</b> points out that the words of the Rambam (in Hilchos Shegagos ibid., and in Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 15:6) imply that although a person should not bring a Chatas, which he designated for one sin of eating Chelev, to atone for another sin of eating Chelev, the Korban is valid b'Di'eved. In contrast, if one designated a Korban for a sin of eating Chelev, he may not bring it for a sin of eating Dam, and if he does, it is <i>not</i> valid and does not atone for his sin.
</p><p>
Apparently, there are two different reasons for why a Korban Chatas cannot be brought for a different sin. The first reason is that since the person who designated the Korban had intention for a specific sin, it is improper to offer it to atone for a different sin. However, if he offers the Korban for the other sin, b'Di'eved the Korban is valid.
</p><p>
The second reason for why a Chatas may not be changed and brought for a different sin is that the sin for which the Chatas was designated becomes part and parcel of the essence of the Korban. The Korban becomes defined as a Korban Chatas <i>for that sin</i>. Just as a Korban Olah is inherently different than a Korban Chatas, a Chatas separated for one type of sin is inherently different than a Chatas separated for another type of sin, and they are not interchangeable. This, however, applies only to the <i>category</i> of sin. The specific act of sin does <i>not</i> become part of the essence of the Korban.
</p><p>
The words of Rebbi Shimon may be understood as follows. Although a Korban Yachid is separated for a specific sin, a Korban Tzibur is not separated for the purpose of achieving Kaparah for a sin at all. Rather, it is separated to be brought as the Korban of the festival, like all other Korbanos of the festival. The atonement that it provides is a secondary effect of the Korban. Therefore, it may be brought even l'Chatchilah for sins done at a later time.
</p><p>
However, although the Korban was not separated in order to provide atonement for Tum'as Mikdash, since it <i>does</i> provide such atonement, the atonement for that sin becomes part of the essence and description of the Korban. Therefore, if the sins for which the different Musafim atone are considered different categories of sin, then the category of sin for which the Korban was designated would become part of the essence and description of the Korban, and, consequently, a Korban Tzibur separated for one category of sin could not be brought for another category of sin. This is the intention of Rebbi Shimon when he says that all of the sins of Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav are one category of sin.
</p><p>
(The <b>KEHILOS YAKOV</b> #1, DH Od, suggests a similar answer.)
</p><p>
(b) The <b>KEHILOS YAKOV</b> cites the <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> in Zevachim (6b, #3) in the name of <b>TOSFOS RABEINU PERETZ</b> who discusses this point. The Shitah Mekubetzes explains that a Korban Chatas Tzibur differs from a Chatas Yachid because it is not separated for a particular sin. Rather, it is separated for the sins of the Tzibur in general. Since it is not separated for a particular sin, it does not have the limitations of a Chatas which must be brought for the sin for which it was separated. (The Korban <i>was</i> separated, though, for a specific <i>category</i> of sin, and therefore it may not be brought to atone for a sin of a different category.)
</p><p>


<font><b>3) THE ORDER OF MASECHTOS</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara asks why, in the order of Masechtos, Shevuos is placed after Makos. The Gemara asks a similar question with regard to the placement of Makos after Sanhedrin, Nazir after Nedarim, and Sotah after Nazir.
</p><p>
There is a rule (see Bava Kama 102a) that 'Ein Seder la'Mishnah,' there is no set order for the Masechtos. For this reason, the rule of 'Machlokes v'Achar Kach Stam, Halachah k'Stam' does not apply when the two Mishnayos are in two different Masechtos, since there is no way to determine which Mishnah preceded the other. Why, then, does the Gemara here assert that there is an order between the Masechtos, and that there is a reason for why Shevuos follows Makos? (<b><b><b>RI</b></b> MI'GASH</b>)
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b><b><b>RI</b></b> MI'GASH</b> (cited by the Rashba) explains that although we cannot be certain of the order of the Masechtos, if we can provide a reason for the sequence of the Masechtos as they appear in our texts, we should do so. (The Ri mi'Gash perhaps means that although Rebbi, who redacted the Mishnah, did not place the Masechtos in any particular sequence, a later authority might have made the sequence based on certain logical considerations.)
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> here and in a number of other places explains that the principle of 'Ein Seder la'Mishnah' applies only to the rule of 'Machlokes v'Achar Kach Stam, Halachah k'Stam.' The Masechtos certainly are organized in a certain order. The reason for this is that when Rebbi first taught the Mishnayos to his students, he did so according to the order of tractates that the students preferred (see Avodah Zarah 19a). It was at that time that Rebbi decided the Halachah by teaching a Mishnah anonymously without citing the name of its author. However, after Rebbi composed all of the Mishnayos, he placed them in a specific order. This is why the Gemara here assumes that Shevuos follows Makos. Nevertheless, Rebbi might have taught Shevuos before Makos, and he taught an anonymous Mishnah in Makos because he changed his mind regarding the Halachah and favored that opinion over the other opinion mentioned in the Mishnah in Shevuos. That is why we cannot determine whether the Mishnah that expresses the Machlokes came first, or whether the Mishnah containing the 'Stam' opinion came first, based on the order of Masechtos.
</p><p>
What, though, was Rebbi's point in making a set order for the Masechtos? Why should he not leave it to future teachers to teach the Mishnayos to their students in the order that their students prefer? Perhaps the order of the Mishnayos was used simply as a mnemonic device in order to remember all of the Masechtos, which at that time were transmitted orally. However, each teacher indeed should teach his students in accordance with the order that they prefer. (Not all Rishonim agree that the Mishnayos were committed to writing only after the time of Rebbi. See <b>RAMBAM</b> in his introduction to the Mishnah, <b>AGRA LA'YESHARIM</b>, and <b>RASHASH</b> to Shevuos 4a, on Rashi DH u'Mishnah.)
</p><p>
(c) The other Rishonim cite the Ri mi'Gash as suggesting that when the Gemara in Bava Kama (102a) mentions that according to one opinion, 'All of Nezikin is [following a specific order] like a single Masechta,' it does not refer to only the three Bavas, but to all of the Masechtos of Seder Nezikin. The Gemara here might be following that opinion. (See <b>RAMBAN</b> who rejects this approach.)
</p><p>
This does not explain why the Gemara in Nazir and Sotah assumes that those Masechtos are in a specific order. It is necessary to add to the words of the Ri mi'Gash the explanation of the <b>RITVA</b>, who says that although not <i>all</i> Masechtos were placed in a specific order, some of them <i>were</i> placed in a specific order. (Even those who maintain that the three Bavas do not follow a specific order might agree that Shevuos follows Makos.)
</p><p>
According to this approach, if a Mishnah that expresses a Machlokes is found in Makos and a Mishnah that expresses a 'Stam' is found in Shevuos, we indeed will rule like the Stam even though the two Mishnayos are in two different Masechtos.
</p><p>
(d) The Ri mi'Gash writes further that even if the Amora'im were uncertain of the exact order of the sequence of the Masechtos, they <i>did</i> know which Masechtos were <i>adjacent</i> to which Masechtos. (Accordingly, our order of the Masechtos in each Seder might be the correct order or the exact opposite order. This will answer the question of the Ramban on this approach of the Ri mi'Gash.)
</p><p>
(e) The <b>RAMBAN</b> answers that the Amora'im knew to which Seder each Masechta belongs, and they therefore were certain that Shevuos is part of Seder Nezikin. The only reason for its placement in Seder Nezikin is that it discusses matters related to Makos, since both Masechtos discuss Isurei Lav which are punishable with Malkus. What, then, is the Gemara's question, why does Shevuos follow Makos?
</p><p>
The Gemara is asking that Shevuos should begin with a discussion of a Shevu'ah that one transgressed b'Mezid, which is punishable with Malkus, instead of discussing 'Shevuos Shtayim she'Hem Arba' which, according to the Gemara's conclusion (4a), relates to a person who transgresses unintentionally and is obligated to bring a Korban (similar to the punishment of 'Yedi'os ha'Tum'ah').
</p><p>
The Ramban cites proof for this from the Gemara in the beginning of Nazir, which begins by asking why Maseches Nazir is in Seder Nashim, rather than why it is in a specific order in Seder Nashim.
</p><p>
However, the Ramban seems to ignore the Gemara at the beginning of Sotah and Makos. The Gemara there asks why the Mishnah was placed after the preceding Masechta.
</p><p>
Apparently, the Ramban understands that there, too, the Gemara is asking why the Masechta starts with a discussion that is not related to the previous Masechta rather than with a discussion from a later Perek that is more clearly linked with the preceding Masechta. For example, Malkus should have started with 'Elu Hen ha'Lokin' (the third Perek), and Sotah should have started with the discussion of when the woman is permitted to her husband and when she is prohibited. 
</p><p>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) CUTTING THE SIDEBURNS</font></b>
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     </font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Mishnah):</font></b> One who is Makif Pe'os ha'Rosh (cuts the
               sidelocks) receives two sets of lashes, one for
               each. One who shaves the corners of the beard
               receives five sets of lashes, for two corners on
               each side and one below.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Makos 20b (Beraisa):</font></b> Pe'as ha'Rosh is the end of the
               head.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> This (Hakafas ha'Rosh) is making the sideburn even
               with the hairlines on the forehead and in back of
               the ears.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   20a (a reciter of Beraisos):</font></b> The one who cuts and
               the Nikaf (the one whose hair is cut) are both
               lashed.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Objection (Rav Chisda):</font></b> Why is the Nikaf lashed? He
               did not do anything! Your teaching is like R.
               Yehudah, who says that one is lashed for a Lav
               she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh (but the Halachah does not follow
               him)!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Answer #1 (Rava):</font></b> It is even like Chachamim. It
               teaches that one who cuts his own Pe'os is lashed
               twice (for each).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   Answer #2 (Rav Ashi):</font></b> It is even like Chachamim. The
               case is, he moves his head to help the one cutting.
               This is an action.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.   (Mishnah):</font></b> He is liable only if he used a razor;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.  </font></b> R. Eliezer obligates even if he used Melaket or
               Rehitani (a carpenter's plane or tweezers).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>10.  21a (Beraisa) Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps 'u'Fe'as Zekanam
               Lo Yegalechu' obligates for shaving with scissors!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>11.  Rejection:</font></b> One is liable for 'v'Lo Sashchis' only if
               the entire hair is removed.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>12.  Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps one is liable for removing the
               hair with Melaket or Rehitani!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>13.  Rejection:</font></b> 'Lo Yegalechu.' He is liable only for
               shaving that removes the entire hair, i.e. with a
               razor.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>14.  Question:</font></b> Why does R. Eliezer obligate for Melaket
               or Rehitani? If he learns the Gezerah Shavah 'Pe'as-
               Pe'as' (to equate 'v'Lo Sashchis' written about
               Yisraelim to 'Lo Yegalechu' written about Kohanim),
               he should obligate only for a razor. If he does not
               learn the Gezerah Shavah, he should obligate also
               for scissors!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>15.  Answer:</font></b> He learns the Gezerah Shavah. He holds that
               also Melaket and Rehitani shave.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>16. </font></b> Nazir 41a (Beraisa) 'Zekano' teaches that a Metzora
               shaves also his beard, even if he is a Kohen.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>17. </font></b> 'Rosho' teaches that an Aseh overrides a Lav, and
               that Hakafah applies when one cuts all his hair, but
               it does not teach that a Metzora must shave with a
               razor. Therefore, 'Zekano' is also needed.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rif and Rosh (Makos 4a and 3:2):</font></b> We answered that
               the Nikaf is lashed if he helped. This is an action.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Nimukei Yosef (DH Zeh ha'Meshaveh):</font></b> R. Yeshayah
                    says that one is liable only with a razor, like
                    the beard. We learn a Gezerah Shavah Pe'as-
                    Pe'as from the beard. Also the Rambam says so.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rambam (Hilchos Avodah Zarah 12:1):</font></b> One may not
               shave Pe'os ha'Rosh the way idolaters used to. One
               is liable for each Pe'ah. Therefore, if one shaves
               both temples even at once with one warning, he is
               lashed twice. This is whether he shaves only the
               Pe'os and leaves the hair of the head. He is lashed,
               because he shaved the Pe'os. One who is shaved is
               exempt, unless he helped.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Ra'avad:</font></b> Even if he did not help, since he was
                    willingly shaved, he transgresses a Lav.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rambam (6):</font></b> Chachamim did not give a Shi'ur how much
               must be left. We heard from our elders that he may
               not leave less than 40 hairs. One may cut them with
               a scissors. Only shaving with a razor is forbidden.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (YD 181 DH Kosav ha'Rambam):</font></b> Some
                    texts of the Rambam require leaving four hairs.
                    Semag questioned this from a Tosefta (Makos
                    4:4) which says that one is liable for
                    detaching two hairs. What is his question? The
                    Rambam discusses how much one must leave, and
                    the Tosefta discusses the Shi'ur to be liable!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Darchei Moshe (3):</font></b> The Tosefta connotes that
                    one is liable for two hairs even if he leaves
                    many. This is difficult for the Rambam! The
                    Beis Yosef must understand that it discusses
                    only when there are only four hairs.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Beis Yosef (DH Aval):</font></b> However, what is
                    difficult for the Rambam is the Beraisa that
                    says that Hakafah is cutting the sideburn even
                    with the hairlines on the forehead and in back
                    of the ears. This leaves much more than 40
                    hairs! Perhaps the Rambam teaches the width 
                    that one must leave. In any case one may shave
                    some of the width, for this does not even the
                    hairline.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Rosh (Makos 3:2):</font></b> R. Eliezer requires a razor to be
               liable only for the beard, but one is liable for the
               Pe'os even without a razor. The Gemara connotes like
               this. It said that Hakafas ha'Rosh is evening the
               sideburns with the hairlines on the forehead and in
               back of the ears. It did not mention shaving, like
               it did regarding the beard, for one is liable for
               any way he evens it. Nazir 41a supports this.
               'Zekano' permits a Nazir to shave his beard. We
               infer that a Metzora must shave with a razor. If he
               could shave with scissors, we would not need
               'Zekano'. The Gemara said that we cannot infer this
               from 'Rosho' (which permits Hakafah). This shows
               that Hakafas ha'Rosh is even with a scissors, so
               even if a Metzora could shave with scissors, we
               would need 'Rosho' to permit this. Only Zekano
               teaches that a Metzora must shave with a razor, for
               only the Isur to cut the beard is only with a razor.
               A Tosefta says that one is liable for Pe'os ha'Rosh
               only with a razor. It means (even) with scissors as
               close as a razor.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (YD 181:1):</font></b> There are two Pe'os. The
               end of the head is where it joins with the jaw, on
               the right and left.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (DH u'Pe'os):</font></b> Rashi explains that
                    there are two parts to the head: the place of
                    the hair, and the place of the face and beard.
                    They join in front of the ears on each side.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Shulchan Aruch (2):</font></b> One is liable whether he shaves
               only the Pe'os, or the entire head with the Pe'os.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (DH v'Ein Chiluk):</font></b> Nazir 58a
                    concludes that all agree that one is liable for
                    shaving the entire head.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Shulchan Aruch (3):</font></b> One is liable only if he shaves
               with a razor. Some forbid with scissors like a
               razor. One should be concerned for their opinion.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (DH v'Chosav):</font></b> Semag and the Nimukei
                    Yosef in the name of R. Yeshayah obligate only
                    with a razor. The Mishnah says so Stam; it
                    seems that this applies (not only to the beard,
                    rather,) also to Pe'os ha'Rosh. A Tosefta
                    explicitly says that one is liable for Pe'os
                    ha'Rosh only with a razor. It seems that
                    without a razor it is permitted l'Chatchilah.
                    Tosfos, R. Yerucham and Semak forbid with
                    scissors like a razor, like the Rosh.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  R. Akiva Eiger (Shevuos 2b DH v'Ayen):</font></b> If one
                    leaves the hairs long enough to bend the end
                    back to the root, this is not called Hakafah,
                    for he does not make the hairline even. Tosfos
                    (DH Chayav) forbids Hakafah using tweezers. Why
                    may one comb the Pe'os? It is a Pesik Reshei
                    (inevitable result) that this will uproot
                    hairs! This requires investigation.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b>Pe'as Zekanecha (p.19) cites ha'Gaon R. Y.S.
                    Elyashiv Shlita to say that surely it suffices
                    to leave five millimeters, so one may use a
                    shaver with a plastic attachment that ensures
                    that hair will not be cut shorter than this.
                    L'Shichno Sidreshu (1 p.300) says in the name
                    of 'the Poskim' that surely six millimeters
                    suffices.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Shulchan Aruch (4):</font></b> Also the one who is shaved is
               liable of he helped, i.e. he tilted his head towards
               him to cut the Pe'os. It is forbidden even if he
               does not help, therefore, one may not be Nikaf even
               through a Nochri.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (DH v'Chosav):</font></b> Sefer ha'Mitzvos and
                    Tosfos say so.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Shulchan Aruch (9):</font></b> The Shi'ur of the Pe'ah is even
               with the hair on the forehead, until below the ear,
               where the lower jaw goes out and separates. One
               should not touch (i.e. cut) any of the hair in this
               area.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (DH v'Nir'eh):</font></b> It is a Safek
                    mid'Oraisa, so one should not cut with a razor
                    or with scissors like a razor from the
                    forehead, until below the ear.
<br>
<font color='blue'><i>See also:</i>
<br><b>MAY ONE CUT THE BEARD OR SIDEBURNS WITHOUT A RAZOR? </b>(</font><font color='blue'>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) THE TWO THAT ARE FOUR</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Gemara) Question:</font></b> The previous tractate was Makos. Why
          is Shevu'os a proper continuation?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Answer:</font></b> A Mishnah in the last Perek of Makos teaches 'one
          who cuts the hair of (both) sidelocks receives two sets
          of lashes, one for each. One who shaves the (five)
          corners of the beard receives five sets of lashes, for
          the two corners on each side and the chin';
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Multiple lashes for one transgression is similar to
               two primary oaths of Bituy, and there are four in
               all.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Question:</font></b> In our Mishnah, after teaching that there are
          two primary oaths of Bituy and four in all, we taught
          everything that has two primary cases and four in all;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> In the Mishnayos of Shabbos and Tzara'as (that teach
               the two primary cases that are four in all), why
               didn't the Tana teach all such matters?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Answer:</font></b> Shevu'os and Tum'os are similar. They are written
          in the same verse, and the Korban for each is an Oleh
          v'Yored, so Tum'os were taught with Shevu'os;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Once the Tana taught these two, he taught all such
               matters.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Question:</font></b> The Tana mentioned Shevu'os first. Why does he
          explain Tum'os first? (He does not explain the oaths
          until the third Perek!)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Answer:</font></b> Since there are less laws of Tum'os to teach, he
          teaches them first, and then teaches Shevu'os.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b>  The two primary oaths (of Bituy) are 'I will eat' and 'I
          will not eat';
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The two secondary oaths are 'I ate' and 'I did not
               eat.'
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b>  The two primary Yedi'os of Tum'ah (that obligate one to
          bring a Korban) are when he knew (that he was Tamei) and
          forgot this when he ate Kodesh or entered the Mikdash;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The two secondary Yedi'os are (when he knew that he
               was Tamei, but) he forgot that meat was Kodesh and
               ate it, or forgot that this was the Mikdash and
               entered.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b>  There are two primary Yetzi'os of Shabbos. An Oni (poor
          person, in the Reshus ha'Rabim) sticks his hand in a
          house, takes a basket from the owner and takes it
          outside; or, the owner sticks out his hand (holding a
          basket) from his house, and puts in the Oni's hand.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> There are two secondary Yetzi'os of Shabbos. The Oni
               sticks his hand (holding a basket) into the house,
               and puts in the owner's hand; or, the owner sticks
               his hand out of the house, takes a basket from the
               Oni, and takes it inside.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b>  The two primary appearances of Tzara'as (on the skin) are
          Baheres (brightness, white as snow) and Se'es (like white
          wool);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The two secondary appearances are the offshoot of
               Baheres (like the plaster of the Heichal) and the
               offshoot of Se'es (like the inner membrane of an
               egg).
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>2) WHO IS THE TANA OF THE MISHNAH?</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Question:</font></b> Our Mishnah is not like R. Yishmael nor like R.
          Akiva!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> It is not like R. Yishmael. He obligates only for
               (false) oaths about the future, but not for the
               past!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> It is not like R. Akiva. He obligates only one who
               forgot that he was Tamei, but not one who forgot the
               place of the Mikdash!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Answer #1:</font></b> The Mishnah can be R. Yishmael. One is liable
          for some of the four oaths, and exempt for others;
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer #2:</font></b> The Mishnah can be R. Akiva. One is liable for
          some of the four Yedi'os, exempt for others.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) TWO WHICH ARE FOUR</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara explains that Shevuos follows Makos because the Mishnah in the end of Makos says that a person receives two sets of Malkus for transgressing the Isur of shaving his head, and five sets of Malkus for transgressing the Isur of shaving his entire beard. Just as that Mishnah mentions a single sin for which a person is punished twice, the Mishnah in Shevuos mentions two prohibitions that are written in the Torah, from which a Derashah derives another two prohibitions.
</p><p>
What is the comparison between the Mishnah in Makos and the Mishnah here? The Mishnah in Makos discusses one prohibition for which a person is Chayav two sets of Malkus, while the Mishnah here refers to two sins which are four. The Mishnah here is more comparable to the second part of the Mishnah in Makos that says that shaving the entire beard is a single sin for which five sets of Malkus can be given. In addition, the two sets of Malkus for cutting the Pe'os ha'Rosh are equally explicit in the verse, while only two of the four sins mentioned in the Mishnah here are written explicitly!
</p><p>
ANSWER: The <b>CHASAM SOFER</b> (2b) and <b>CHIKREI LEV</b> answer that the Gemara in Makos (20b) teaches that we learn from 'Lo Sakifu' (Vayikra 19:27) that the person who is shaved also transgresses the Lav. Therefore, if a person moves his head while being shaved to facilitate the haircut, he is Chayav Malkus. If a person shaves his own hair, he is Chayav two sets of Malkus -- one for cutting it, and one for having it cut. According to this, the Isur of cutting the two Pe'os ha'Rosh is also an Isur that involves two explicit Isurim (the two Pe'os) which are four according to the Derashah (two for the Makif and two for the Nikaf), and it is identical to the other Isurim that are described as 'two which are four' in the Mishnah. (By placing Shevuos after Makos, the Mishnah hints to what the Beraisa teaches in Makos (20b); the Isur of cutting the Pe'os ha'Rosh is 'two Isurim which are really four,' since it includes the Isur of being Nikaf as well.)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) SHAVING THE BEARD</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>     </font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Mishnah):</font></b> One who shaves the corners of the beard
               receives five sets of lashes, for two corners on
               each side and one below.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Makos 20a (Mishnah):</font></b> He is liable only if he used a
               razor;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> R. Eliezer obligates even if he used Melaket or
               Rehitani (a carpenter's plane or tweezers).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   (Beraisa):</font></b> Pe'as ha'Zakan is the end of the beard,
               i.e. Shiboles ha'Zakan.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   (Mishnah):</font></b> He is liable only if he shaved with a
               razor.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   21a (Beraisa) Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps 'u'Fe'as Zekanam
               Lo Yegalechu' obligates for shaving with scissors!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   Rejection:</font></b> One is liable for 'v'Lo Sashchis' only if
               the entire hair is removed.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.   Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps one is liable for removing the
               hair with Melaket or Rehitani!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.   Rejection:</font></b> 'Lo Yegalechu.' He is liable only for
               shaving that removes the entire hair, i.e. with a
               razor.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>10.  Question:</font></b> Why does R. Eliezer obligate for Melaket
               or Rehitani? If he learns the Gezerah Shavah 'Pe'as-
               Pe'as' (to equate 'v'Lo Sashchis' written about
               Yisraelim to 'Lo Yegalechu' written about Kohanim),
               he should obligate only for a razor. If he does not
               learn the Gezerah Shavah, he should obligate also
               for scissors!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>11.  Answer:</font></b> He learns the Gezerah Shavah. He holds that
               also Melaket and Rehitani shave.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rambam (Hilchos Avodah Zarah 12:7):</font></b> The priests of
               idolatry used to shave their beards. Therefore, the
               Torah forbids shaving the beard. There are five
               corners: the upper and lower jaw on the right and
               left, and Shiboles Zaken. One is lashed for each. If
               one cut all of them once, he is lashed five times.
               He is liable only if he shave with a razor, for it
               says 'Lo Sashchis' - shaving that totally destroys
               the hair. Therefore, if he shaves with scissors he
               is exempt. One who is shaved is not lashed, unless
               he helped.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rambam (8):</font></b> One may shave the mustache, i.e. the
               hair on the upper lip, and also the hair that hangs
               from the bottom lip. Even though it is permitted,
               Yisrael do not totally remove it, rather, they shave
               it a little, so it will not interfere with eating
               and drinking.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (YD 181 DH Kosav ha'Rambam):</font></b> Perhaps
                    the custom is is due to R. Chananel, who
                    forbids the ends of the mustache. Surely the
                    custom is to refrain from shaving. One may cut
                    with scissors even the Pe'os of the beard, and
                    all the more so the mustache.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rosh (Makos 3:2):</font></b> R. Chananel holds that where the
               jaw joins the temples is one corner, and also on the
               other side, and the two ends of the lips, on the
               left and right, and Shiboles Zaken below. Rashi
               explains that it is where the chin joins the bone,
               and one to the right of the chin and one to the
               left, and with the chin in the middle this is three.
               The other two are where the temples join. Some say
               that the jaw connects to the temples over a wide
               area, and both ends of it (on both sides of the
               face) are corners. The fifth is Shiboles Zaken. A
               Mishnah in Nega'im (10:9) says that the beard is
               from the jaw until the Adam's apple. One who fears
               Shamayim will fulfill all opinions and not pass a
               razor over the entire beard, unlike those who leave
               a small amount in each corner, for sometimes it is
               not exactly where the corner is.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (YD 181 DH u'Mah she'Chosav v'Yesh,
                    and Gra 181:18):</font></b> The Tur (and also in his
                    Piskei ha'R. Oshaya) says that R. Chananel
                    holds that one corner is at the end of the
                    beard on the throat. R. Chananel said only that
                    it is Shiboles Zaken below. Rashi in Shevuos
                    says that it is the thin bone on the chin
                    below, for it sticks out like a Shiboles (ear
                    of grain) in people whose beard is not full.
                    Also Semak holds that under the chin is not a
                    Pe'ah. Perhaps the Tur understood that the Rosh
                    learns from Nega'im that the Adam's apple is a
                    Pe'ah, but he should not have said so in the
                    name of R. Chananel.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Bach (8):</font></b> The Rosh brought the Mishnah in
                    Nega'im to prove that R. Chananel refers to the
                    Adam's apple. All agree that there is no Isur
                    under the neck; just R. Chananel forbids the
                    Adam's apple.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Rebuttal (Taz 4):</font></b> The Tosefta forbids (on the
                    sides under the jaw, from the jaw joint) until
                    the Adam's apple, but not the throat.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (9):</font></b> The Shi'ur of the Pe'ah is even
               with the hair on the forehead, until below the ear,
               where the lower jaw goes out and separates. One
               should not touch (i.e. cut) any of the hair in this
               area.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Question (Tur):</font></b> Why did the Rambam need to say
                    that the Isur is due to pagan practices?
                    Mitzvos are Hashem's decrees. We need not seek
                    reasons for them!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Beis Yosef (DH u'Mah she'Omar):</font></b> The Rambam
                    (Temurah 4:13 and elsewhere) explicitly says
                    that Mitzvos are Hashem's decrees. However, it
                    is proper to seek reasons as much as we can for
                    them, like R. Shimon.What we cannot understand
                    is due to our limited understanding. Here, the
                    Rambam learned from the surrounding Mitzvos,
                    such as Nichush and tattooing, which are due to
                    Nochri practices.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Taz (1):</font></b> Since the Rambam holds that the
                    Mitzvah is due to pagan practices, sometimes it
                    is permitted, e.g. when needed for Shalom with
                    the kingdom (like wearing their style of
                    clothing - 178:2). The Tur holds that since it
                    is not explicitly due to idolatry, we cannot be
                    lenient. He did not suspect that the Rambam
                    holds that we need not fulfill what we cannot
                    explain, like the Beis Yosef thought!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Rebuttal (Panim Me'iros 2:79, cited by R. Akiva
                    Eiger):</font></b> The Rambam would not permit an
                    explicitly Isur Torah due to Shalom Malchus. In
                    Siman 178, the Torah did not specify an Isur.
                    It authorized Chachamim to decide, therefore,
                    they were able to permit where they saw fit! If
                    also Hakafah could be permitted for Shalom
                    Malchus, why did the Torah explicitly teach it?
                    It is already included in the Isur of Nochri
                    rites!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.   Note:</font></b> Yosef shaved before he was brought to
                    Paro, due to Kavod Malchus (Rashi Bereishis
                    41:14, from Bereishis Rabah). It seems that he
                    just shaved his hairm like the Targum (v'Sapar.
                    Elsewhere, the Targum of Yegale'ach is that
                    same root, i.e. shaving.) In any case, the
                    Chasam Sofer (Miketz , DH va'Ygalach) said that
                    <i>fear</i> of the king permitted an absolute Isur,
                    i.e. shaving <i>on Rosh Hashanah</i>.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Shulchan Aruch (10):</font></b> One is liable for shaving the
               beard only with a razor. It is permitted with
               scissors, even (close) like a razor.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (DH Eino):</font></b> Even Tosfos and the Rosh
                    forbid scissors like a razor only for Pe'os
                    ha'Rosh, but not for the beard. The Rambam says
                    that one is <i>liable</i> only with a razor, but
                    indeed without a razor it is permitted
                    l'Chatchilah.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rema:</font></b> In any case people are careful when cutting
               with scissors to cut with the top blade, and not
               with the bottom, lest he cut totally with the
               bottom, and this is like a razor. However, it seems
               that one need not be concerned for the bottom of the
               neck, for it is not a primary place of the Pe'os.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Source:</font></b> Piskei Tosfos (Makos 27,28), Terumas
                    ha'Deshen 295, cited in Beis Yosef DH va'Doni.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Shulchan Aruch (11):</font></b> There are five corners of the
               beard. There are many opinions about them.
               Therefore, one who fears Shamayim will fulfill all
               opinions and not pass a razor over the entire beard.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Rema:</font></b> He should be stringent even under the neck.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (DH v'Chosav Adoni):</font></b> The Rosh says
                    that one should be stringent for all the
                    opinions. R. Yonah adds that meticulous people
                    use only scissors even under the throat, even
                    though it is not mid'Oraisa, for Chachamim
                    forbade using a razor on the entire body, for
                    this is like women do. Semak says that R. Tam
                    forbids using a razor under the throat lest he
                    come to shave the Pe'ah, but he permits with
                    scissors.
<br>
<font color='blue'><i>See also:</i>
<br><b>MAY ONE CUT THE BEARD OR SIDEBURNS WITHOUT A RAZOR? </b>(</font><font color='blue'>


lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Rejection (of both answers):</font></b> Presumably, all the cases
          are similar to appearances of Tzara'as, i.e. one is
          liable for all four!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Answer #3:</font></b> Really, the Mishnah is R. Yishmael;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> R. Yishmael exempts from a Korban for a false oath
               about the past, but he obligates lashes, like Rava.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   (Rava):</font></b> The Torah explicitly teaches that one is
               lashed for a false oath like for a vain oath:
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Just like a vain oath is about the past (i.e.
                    it is not contingent on future events), one is
                    liable for a false oath about the past.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Question:</font></b> Why does R. Yishmael obligate lashes for all
          four oaths?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> We understand false oaths about the past, i.e. 'I
               ate' or 'I did not eat', like Rava taught;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> We also understand (one kind of) false oath about
               the future, i.e. 'I will not eat.' He transgresses
               by eating, an action;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> However, if he swears 'I will eat' and he does not,
               why is he lashed? He did not sin through an action!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Answer:</font></b> R. Yishmael holds that one is lashed even for a
          Lav without an action.
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>3) LASHES FOR A LAV WITHOUT AN ACTION</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Question:</font></b> If so, R. Yochanan contradicts himself!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (R. Yochanan):</font></b> The Halachah follows a Stam Mishnah
               (the beginning of our Mishnah is Stam);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   (R. Yochanan and Reish Lakish):</font></b> If Reuven swore 'I
               will eat this loaf today' and he did not eat it, he
               is not lashed;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (R. Yochanan):</font></b> He is not lashed because this
                    Lav does not involve an action;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  (Reish Lakish):</font></b> He is not lashed because he
                    cannot receive definite warning (perhaps he
                    will eat the loaf later), and doubtful warning
                    is invalid.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Answer:</font></b> R. Yochanan rules unlike our Stam Mishnah because
          another Stam Mishnah argues with it.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Question:</font></b> What is the other Mishnah?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Suggestion (Mishnah):</font></b> If one leaves over from a
               Tahor Pesach Korban or breaks a bone of a Tamei
               Pesach Korban, he is not lashed.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> We understand why he is exempt for breaking a bone
               of a Tamei Pesach. 'V'Etzem Lo Sishberu Vo' applies
               only to a Kosher Korban, and not a Pasul Korban;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Question:</font></b> Why is he exempt for leaving over?
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Suggestion:</font></b> He is not lashed because this Lav
                    does not involve an action. One is not lashed
                    for such a Lav.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rejection:</font></b> This is like R. Yakov, but one need not
               explain that Mishnah this way. It could be like R.
               Yehudah! (He is not lashed because there is an Aseh
               after the Lav.)
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (Beraisa - R. Yehudah):</font></b> 'You may not leave over
                    (from the Pesach Korban) until morning. You
                    will burn what is left over' - the Torah gives
                    a Mitzvas Aseh after the Lav, to exempt from
                    lashes.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  (R. Yakov):</font></b> No. One is not lashed because this
                    Lav is not transgressed through an action,
                    rather through inaction. 
<br>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) THE TANA OF THE MISHNAH</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara attempts to determine which Tana is the author of the Mishnah. It suggests that the Mishnah is the view of Rebbi Yishmael, who maintains that one is obligated to bring a Korban both for He'elem Tum'ah and for He'elem Mikdash, which is the view expressed in the Mishnah. However, Rebbi Yishmael does <i>not</i> obligate a person to bring a Korban for a Shevu'as Sheker when he swears falsely that an action occurred in the past. If Rebbi Yishmael is the author of the Mishnah, then why does the Mishnah say that there are four Shevu'os ('two which are four') for which one is Chayav, including two Shevu'os regarding the past?
</p><p>
The Gemara suggests that the Mishnah is discussing the liability for Malkus and not the obligation to bring a Korban, as Rava teaches. Rava says that just as the Torah obligates Malkus for a Shevu'as Shav (with the word 'Lo Yenakeh,' Shemos 20:7), it also obligates Malkus for a Shevu'as Sheker made for a past event. The Gemara challenges this answer, because even Rava agrees that Malkus is not given to a person who swears that he will do something in the future and he does not do that thing, since it is a Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh. The Gemara answers that Rebbi Yishmael maintains that Malkus <i>is</i> given for a Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh, and that is why he would obligate Malkus for a person who does not fulfill his Shevu'ah to perform an action in the future.
</p><p>
There are a number of difficulties with this Gemara.
</p><p>
1. Why does the Gemara cite Rava to prove that Malkus is given for a Shevu'as Sheker, a false oath? Rava's teaching is not the source for Malkus for a Shevu'as Sheker! Rather, it is learned from Rebbi Yochanan's Derashah: the Torah includes Shevu'as Sheker in the Aseres ha'Dibros by writing the word 'la'Shav' (Shemos 20:7) a second time. Therefore, the words 'Lo Yenakeh' in that verse teach that a Shevu'as Sheker is also punishable with Malkus. Rava's teaching is not cited as the source for Malkus for a Shevu'as Sheker, but rather his teaching <i>exempts</i> a person who makes a Shevu'as Sheker about the future from receiving Malkus (since a Shevu'as Sheker is not similar to a Shevu'as Shav, which involves only a matter of the past).
</p><p>
Rava's statement raises a difficulty with asserting that the Mishnah follows the view of Rebbi Yishmael, because Rava makes it clear that <i>not</i> every Shevu'ah is punished with Malkus. (<b>TOSFOS</b> DH veched'Rava)
</p><p>
2. According to the Gemara's conclusion that Rebbi Yishmael maintains that one receives Malkus for a Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh, the teaching of Rava is no longer needed as a source that one receives Malkus for a Shevu'as Sheker. Rather, Malkus will be given because it is a Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh. Why, then, does the Gemara not precede this answer with the word 'Ela' ('rather'), which denotes the beginning of a new answer? (See <b>MAHARSHA</b>.)
</p><p>
3. According to the Gemara's conclusion, all punishments of Malkus given for all Shevu'os are based on the same principle -- that Malkus is administered for a Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh. Why, then, does the Mishnah group the Shevu'os as 'two which are four'? The punishments of Malkus for the first two Shevu'os (which are l'Haba, regarding the future) are just as explicit as those for the other two Shevu'os (regarding the past)!
</p><p>
With regard to the obligation to bring a Korban, the Mishnah has good reason to list the Shevu'os regarding the future separately, since the verse that discusses the obligation to bring a Korban (Vayikra 5:4) mentions only this type of Shevu'ah (Shevu'ah l'Haba). However, with regard to Malkus, there is a specific Lav for Shevu'ah leshe'Avar (regarding the past) in the verse, 'v'Lo Sishav'u' (Vayikra 19:12), and with regard to a Shevu'ah l'Haba there is an explicit Lav in the verse, 'Lo Yachel Devaro' (Bamidbar 30:3). All of the four Shevu'os, therefore, should be equal! (See <b>TOSFOS</b> DH Aval, <b>RITVA</b>, and <b>TOSFOS HA'ROSH</b>.)
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>RABEINU CHANANEL</b>, <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Aval), and the <b>RASHBA</b> explain that when the Gemara says that Rebbi Yishmael maintains that one receives Malkus for a Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh, it does not mean that Rebbi Yishmael <i>always</i> gives Malkus for a Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh (like the view of Rebbi Yehudah). Rather, Rebbi Yishmael administers Malkus only for the Isur of a Shevu'as Bituy, even when it does not involve a Ma'aseh (for example, he makes a Shevu'ah that he will eat, and then he does not eat). Rebbi Yishmael derives this from the extra word 'la'Shav' in the verse 'Lo Yenakeh' (Shemos 20:7), as Rebbi Yochanan teaches. (This approach avoids the contradiction between the Gemara here and the Gemara in Makos (13b) with regard to whether Rebbi Yishmael administers Malkus for a Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh. See Rashi, DH Kashya.) This approach answers the questions as follows:
</p><p>
1. There are two opinions that obligate Malkus for a Shevu'as Bituy, even though a Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh normally is not punishable with Malkus. The first opinion is expressed by Rava, who derives from 'la'Shav' that one is Chayav Malkus for a Shevu'as Bituy regarding the past. One who does not accept Rava's argument may follow the second opinion, according to the teaching of Rebbi Yochanan, that one can be Chayav Malkus for a Shevu'as Bituy regarding both the past and the future.
</p><p>
Rebbi Yishmael must follow one of these two opinions. However, each opinion has a disadvantage. Originally, the Gemara suggests that Rebbi Yishmael follows the view of Rava, because there is a disadvantage to saying that he maintains that all Shevu'os Bituy are punishable with Malkus, since there would be no reason for the Mishnah to divide the Shevu'os into two sets, 'two which are four' (as the third question above expresses). Later, the Gemara rejects this approach, because, according to Rava, Malkus is not given at all for a Shevu'ah l'Haba, a Shevu'ah regarding the future, and therefore the Gemara is left with the position that Rebbi Yishmael maintains that Malkus is given for all Shevu'os Bituy because of Rebbi Yochanan's teaching.
</p><p>
2. The Gemara should have used the word 'Ela' since it is changing its position entirely. Why does it not say 'Ela'? (See <b>MAHARSHA</b>.) The <b>RITVA</b> explains that the Gemara does not always use the word 'Ela' even when it starts a new answer. <b>TOSFOS</b> also uses this approach in many places where the original answer of the Gemara was not given in the name of any Amora (see Yevamos 27a, DH Shmuel, and Shabbos 105b, DH Havah Amina).
</p><p>
3. <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Aval) explains that the Mishnah divides the Shevu'os into two groups, because the Shevu'os l'Haba are written more explicitly with regard to the obligation to bring a Korban, even though it is mentioned in the Mishnah only in the context of Malkus (according the Gemara's initial assumption). Similar logic applies even if the Mishnah refers to the Korban that is brought for making such Shevu'os. Why should the Mishnah refer to the Shevu'os that one made with regard to having done or not done something in the past as two separate categories? In both cases, the Shevu'ah is false as soon as it leaves the person's mouth, because he did not actually do or not do what he said. The only reason the Mishnah distinguishes between the two is that the verse makes such a distinction regarding Shevu'ah l'Haba ('l'Ha'ra O l'Heitiv'). (See Tosfos there for another answer in the name of the <b>RITZBA</b>.)
</p><p>
According to Tosfos and Rabeinu Chananel, why does the Gemara later try to prove that Malkus is not given for a Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh from the Mishnah which says that Malkus is not given for the Isur of ha'Mosir, one who leaves over the Korban Pesach? Since that Mishnah is not discussing Shevu'ah, even Rebbi Yishmael agrees that Malkus is not given when there is no Ma'aseh! (<b>MAHARSHA</b>)
</p><p>
Apparently, Tosfos understands that the Gemara indeed could have pointed that out, but instead it chose to give another reason to reject the proof from the Mishnah regarding ha'Mosir.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RITVA</b> suggests another approach. Indeed, Rebbi Yishmael maintains that Malkus <i>is</i> given for every Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh. Why, then, does the Mishnah divide the Shevu'os into two groups, 'two which are four'? The reason is that Malkus for Shevu'os regarding the past is written explicitly in the verse that says 'Lo Yenakeh' which refers to Shevu'as Shav and Shevu'as Sheker leshe'Avar. The Malkus for a Shevu'ah Sheker l'Haba is not written explicitly, but rather is derived from the verse of 'Lo Sachsom' (Devarim 25:3-4; see Makos 13b) which teaches that Malkus is given for all Lavim, including the transgression of a Shevu'ah.
</p><p>
This answers the questions as follows:
</p><p>
1. The Gemara cites Rava in order to show that only with regard to a Shevu'ah about the past does the verse explicitly prescribe Malkus. That is why the Mishnah divides the Shevu'os into two groups, 'two which are four.'
</p><p>
2. The Gemara does not say 'Ela' when it proposes that Rebbi Yishmael gives Malkus for every Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh, because the teaching of Rava is still needed to teach that the Malkus for a Shevu'ah about the past is written more explicitly that the Malkus for a Shevu'ah about the future.
</p><p>
3. The reason why the Mishnah divides the Shevu'os into two groups is that the Malkus for Shevu'os about the past is written explicitly.
</p><p>
The problem with this approach is that the Mishnah later (19b) explains that the phrase 'two Shevu'os which are four' refers first to the two Shevu'os regarding the future, and then to the additional two Shevu'os regarding the past. The sequence of the Mishnah implies that the 'two' of the Mishnah are the Shevu'os regarding the future, and not the Shevu'os regarding the past. The Ritva writes that according to this approach, although the Mishnah here refers to Malkus, the Mishnah later (19b) refers to 'two Shevu'os which are four' with regard to Korban, and it is following the opinion of Rebbi Akiva.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>TOSFOS HA'ROSH</b> and the <b>RAV ABAD</b> (cited by the <b>RAN</b>) explain that since the Torah specifies with regard to Korban that a Korban is brought only for a Shevu'ah about the future, one would have concluded that even with regard to Malkus the Torah prohibits a Shevu'as Sheker only when it is about the future, since the Torah does not mention a Shevu'ah about the past explicitly. It is only from the verse of 'la'Shav' that one learns that the Isur of Shevu'as Sheker applies also to the past.
</p><p>
The Gemara is forced to take this approach since, otherwise, there would be no reason for the Mishnah to divide the Shevu'os into two groups. The <b>RITVA</b> also offers this as an alternate solution.
</p><p>
This answers the questions as follows:
</p><p>
1. The Gemara cites Rava to show that the verse of 'la'Shav' specifically refers to a Shevu'ah about the past since, without that verse, one would not know that a Shevu'ah about the past is included in the Isur of Shevu'as Sheker.
</p><p>
2. The Gemara does not say 'Ela' when it concludes that Rebbi Yishmael administers Malkus for every Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh, since the teaching of Rava is still needed to show that the Isur of Shevu'as Sheker also includes swearing falsely about the past.
</p><p>
3. The reason why the Mishnah divides the Shevu'os into two groups, 'two which are four,' is that the Shevu'ah l'Haba is written explicitly in the verse. However, the fact that a Shevu'ah about the past is prohibited is known only from the Derashah of the extra word 'la'Shav.' 
</p><p>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) LASHES FOR A LAV WITHOUT AN ACTION (cont.)</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Answer (Mishnah (in the third Perek)):</font></b> If Reuven swore 'I
          will not eat this loaf', and again swore 'I will not eat
          this loaf'' (and he ate it), he is lashed only once (i.e.
          one set of 39 lashes);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> This is the oath of Bituy for which one is lashed
               (for Mezid, i.e. he intentionally transgressed) or
               brings an Oleh v'Yored (for Shogeg, i.e. he forgot).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Inference:</font></b> For this oath of Bituy he is lashed (if
               he was Mezid), but not for 'I will eat' (and he did
               not eat).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question:</font></b> The two Stam Mishnayos contradict each other.
          Why does R. Yochanan rule like this one?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Counter-question:</font></b> How do you understand why Rebbi
               codified Stam Mishnayos that contradict each other?!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer:</font></b> You must say that originally Rebbi held that
               one is lashed even for a Lav that does not involve
               an action, and he taught our Mishnah (that obligates
               for all four kinds of oaths);
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Later, he retracted, and taught the Mishnah of
                    the third Perek.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b> Since the first Mishnah was already ingrained
                    in the Talmidim, it was left in the Mishnayos.
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>2) WHO IS THE TANA OF THE MISHNAH?</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Question:</font></b> How can we establish the Mishnah according to
          R. Yishmael, and it counts the number regarding lashes?
          Lashes do not apply to appearances of Tzara'as!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Answer:</font></b> Lashes apply to one who cuts off the plagued skin
          (or a Siman of absolute Tzara'as), according to R. Avin.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (R. Avin):</font></b> Whenever the Torah says 'Hishamer', 'Pen'
               or 'Al', this is a Lav.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Question:</font></b> Lashes do not apply to Shabbos, for desecration
          of Shabbos is punishable by death (administered by Beis
          Din);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> One is not lashed for a Lav that is punishable by
               death.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Answer:</font></b> We established the Mishnah to be R. Yishmael, for
          he holds that one is lashed for a Lav that is punishable
          by death.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Inference:</font></b> If not for this, we would have established it
          to be R. Akiva.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Question:</font></b> We could not establish it to be R. Akiva, for
          he holds that there are only two Yedi'os of Tum'ah for
          which one must bring a Korban!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Answer:</font></b> Just like we established it like R. Yishmael,
          regarding lashes, we can establish it like R. Akiva,
          regarding lashes!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Question:</font></b> Lashes only apply to an intentional sinner. If
          so, it should not say 'Yedi'os' of Tum'ah, rather
          'warnings'!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Answer:</font></b> The Mishnah means Yedi'os of warnings.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  Objection #1:</font></b> Why does it say 'two primary kinds, there
          are four in all'? Since he sins b'Mezid, there are only
          two kinds (a Tamei who enters the Mikdash or eats
          Kodshim)!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)  Objection #2:</font></b> Why does it say 'if one knew that he became
          Tamei, and later forgot, and later remembered'?
          Forgetting is not a factor to obligate someone to be
          lashed!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)  Objection #3:</font></b> The Mishnah continues 'he brings an Oleh
          v'Yored'!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)  Answer #4 (to Question 4:a, (Daf 4b) - Rav Yosef):</font></b> The
          Mishnah is Rebbi. Regarding Tum'ah, he teaches according
          to R. Yishmael. Regarding oaths, he teaches according to
          R. Akiva.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)  (Rav Kahana):</font></b> Rebbi did not teach just according to other
          Tana'im. He himself holds this way!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> (Regarding Tum'ah) - (Beraisa - R. Akiva):
               'V'Ne'elam... v'Ne'elam' teaches that one brings a
               Korban only if he knew at the beginning and at the
               end, and forgot in between (when he transgressed);
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE MISHNAH REFERS TO 'MALKUS'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara rejects its earlier suggestion that the Mishnah refers to Isurim which are punishable with Malkus, because the Mishnah clearly states that, in the case of Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav, if there is a 'Yedi'ah b'Techilah' and a Yedi'ah b'Sof,' a Korban Oleh v'Yored is brought.
</p><p>
What was the Gemara's original reasoning when it suggested that the Mishnah refers to Malkus, if the wording of the Mishnah clearly contradicts that suggestion?
</p><p>
ANSWER: The <b>RITVA</b> explains that the Gemara originally thought that the list of 'two which are four' refers to Malkus, while the next part of the Mishnah (beginning with the Yedi'os) teaches a new Halachah about the obligation to bring a Korban.
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> Rebbi says, one 'v'Ne'elam' and 'v'Hu Yada' connotes
               two times that he knew (at the beginning and at the
               end);
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  The extra 'v'Ne'elam' obligates him, whether he
                    forgot the Tum'ah or the Mikdash (or Kodshim).
                    This is like R. Yishmael.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> Regarding oaths, R. Akiva obligates for an oath of
               the past because he expounds using the method of
               Ribuy u'Mi'ut (inclusions and exclusions);
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Also Rebbi expounds using the method of Ribuy
                    and Mi'ut. Surely he holds like R. Akiva!
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>3) INCLUSIONS AND EXCLUSIONS</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Beraisa - Rebbi):</font></b> One may use anything (worth five
          Shekalim) to redeem a firstborn son, except for
          documents;
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b>  Chachamim say, one may use anything except for slaves,
          documents and land.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Rebbi expounds Ribuy and Mi'ut. 'U'Fduyav mi'Ben
               Chodesh' is a Ribuy. 'Kesef Chameshes Shekalim' is a
               Mi'ut. 'Tifdeh' is another Ribuy;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  From a Ribuy, Mi'ut, Ribuy we include 
                    everything except for one thing (that is very
                    different than the Mi'ut), in this case
                    documents.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> Chachamim expound Klal u'Frat (general and specific
               terms). 'U'Fduyav mi'Ben Chodesh' is a Klal. 'Kesef
               Chameshes Shekalim' is a Prat. 'Tifdeh' is another
               Klal;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  From a Klal u'Frat u'Chlal we include things
                    that are similar to the Prat, i.e. Metaltelim
                    that have intrinsic value;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b> This excludes land, slaves (since they are
                    equated to land) and documents (since documents
                    have no intrinsic value).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Question (Ravina):</font></b> Elsewhere Rebbi expounds Klal u'Frat!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa - R. Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah) Question:</font></b> The
               Torah says to bore through the ear of a slave (who
               does not want to go free) with a 'Martze'a (an
               awl).' What is the source to allow using a sharp
               wooden tool, a thorn, a needle, a drill, or a
               writing tool?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer:</font></b> 'V'Lakachta' includes anything that may be
               taken in the hand.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> Rebbi says, just like an awl is made of metal, also
               any metal tool may be used.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Question:</font></b> What do they argue about?
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Answer:</font></b> Rebbi expounds Klal u'Frat, and R. Yosi
                    b'Rebbi Yehudah expounds Ribuy and Mi'ut. 
<br>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) THE SOURCE FOR THE 'YEDI'OS'</b></font>
<br>QUESTIONS: The verse repeats the word 'v'Ne'elam' when it discusses Yedi'os ha'Tum'ah. The verse first says, 'v'Ne'elam v'Hu Tamei' (Vayikra 5:2), and then it says again, 'v'Ne'elam v'Hu Yada' (5:3). Rebbi Akiva and Rebbi disagree about the intention of the verse.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> explains their disagreement as follows: Rebbi Akiva learns from the first word of 'v'Ne'elam' that one is liable only for He'elem Tum'ah but not for He'elem Mikdash. He derives from the second phrase, 'v'Ne'elam v'Hu Yada,' that there was a Yedi'ah that preceded the Ha'alamah, because the phrase 'v'Hu Yada' should be read before the second 'v'Ne'elam' and after the first, which implies that he forgot after he first knew. The second Yedi'ah (when the person eventually discovers his mistake) does not need to be stated explicitly, because it is obvious that he brings a Korban only when he discovers his mistake; if he has not discovered his mistake, he obviously would not be bringing a Korban. Rebbi, on the other hand, learns from the first 'v'Ne'elam' the law of He'elem Tum'ah, and from the second 'v'Ne'elam' the law of He'elem Mikdash. Rebbi does not need an extra verse to teach that the person knew about his state of being Tamei and then forgot, because that is the simple meaning of the word 'v'Ne'elam.'
</p><p>
Rashi apparently means that the Torah does not need to mention the second Yedi'ah, because the person obviously is bringing a Korban only because he discovered that he sinned. Therefore, the words 'v'Hu Yada,' referring to the second Yedi'ah, are superfluous. This is the source for the Derashah of Rebbi Akiva, who maintains that the phrase 'v'Hu Yada' should be placed between the two phrases of 'v'Ne'elam.'
</p><p>
However, there are a number of difficulties with Rashi's interpretation, as <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH v'Ne'elam) asks.
</p><p>
(a) Why does Rebbi Akiva teach that because it says 'v'Ne'elam' twice, there must be a Yedi'ah before the Ha'alamah? The Derashah is not from the second 'v'Ne'elam' but from the words, 'v'Hu Yada,' as Rashi writes that the words 'v'Hu Yada' are placed between the words of 'v'Ne'elam.'
</p><p>
(b) Why indeed does the verse say 'v'Ne'elam' a second time, according to Rebbi Akiva, if the first Yedi'ah is already derived from the words 'v'Hu Yada'? Perhaps Rashi means that the second 'v'Ne'elam' is needed to teach that one is liable <i>only</i> for He'elem Tum'ah and not for He'elem Mikdash. However, this explanation seems illogical, because Rebbi uses the repetition of 'v'Ne'elam' to reach the opposite conclusion -- that one <i>is</i> liable for He'elem Mikdash! Indeed, Rebbi's logic is clear: without a second verse, there would be no reason to assume that one is liable for He'elem Mikdash. Why, then, does Rebbi Akiva require a second verse (of 'v'Ne'elam') to teach that one is <i>not</i> liable for He'elem Mikdash?
</p><p>
(c) According to Rebbi, who derives the first Yedi'ah from the word 'v'Ne'elam,' why does the verse need to say 'v'Hu Yada' to teach that there was a second Yedi'ah? As Rashi writes in his explanation of Rebbi Akiva's view, the second Yedi'ah is obvious and there is no need to learn it from a verse!
</p><p>
ANSWERS: The <b>RITVA</b> and the <b>MAHARSHA</b> explain that Rashi does not mean that Rebbi Akiva derives the first Ha'alamah from the words 'v'Hu Yada.' Rather, Rashi means that Rebbi Akiva derives the first Yedi'ah from the repetition of the word 'v'Ne'elam' (this indeed is explicit in the text of Rashi according to our Girsa, in DH v'Ne'elam). However, the Rishonim apparently did not have the words 'v'Idach Kera Yeseirah Hu l'Derashah' in their texts of Rashi, as is evident from the way the <b>TOSFOS HA'ROSH</b> cites the words of Rashi.)
</p><p>
Although the Torah does not need to mention the second Yedi'ah, it is the manner of the verse to mention that the sinner discovered his sin, as Tosfos writes (DH v'Ne'elam). Therefore, those words ('v'Hu Yada') are not considered superfluous.
</p><p>
This explanation answer all of the questions.
</p><p>
(a) Rebbi Akiva mentions the repetition of 'v'Ne'elam' because that is the source for his Derashah.
</p><p>
(b) The second 'v'Ne'elam' is not extra, because it is that word that teaches the first Yedi'ah.
</p><p>
(c) Rebbi does not need to explain the words 'v'Hu Yada,' since it is the manner of the verse to mention one's discovery of his sin even if it is self-evident.
</p><p>
One may ask why, according to this approach, does Rashi write that according to Rebbi Akiva, 'v'Hu Yada' should be placed between the two words of 'v'Ne'elam'? Rashi should say simply that the second 'v'Ne'elam' teaches that there must have been another Yedi'ah!
</p><p>
The answer to this question lies in Rashi's text of the Beraisa, a Girsa which is cited by the <b>RAMBAN</b> and other Rishonim. According to Rashi's Girsa, Rebbi Akiva's words were 'v'Ne'elam <i>Mimenu v'Hu Yada</i> v'Ne'elam' (without the words 'Shtei Pe'amim'). Rebbi Akiva himself reversed the order of the verse, placing 'v'Hu Yada' before the second 'v'Ne'elam,' to show that there was a first Yedi'ah before the Ha'alamah. 
</p><p>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) WHAT MAY BE GIVEN FOR PIDYON HA'BEN?</font></b>
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     </font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa - Rebbi):</font></b> One may use anything for Pidyon
               ha'Ben (to redeem a firstborn son), except for
               documents;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> Chachamim say, one may use anything except for
               slaves, documents and land.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> They derive from a Klal u'Frat u'Chlal that one may
               use things similar to money, i.e. Metaltelim
               (mpvable olbjects) that are Gufo Mamon (have
               intrinsic value). This excludes land, slaves (since
               they are equated to land) and documents (which are
               not Gufo Mamon).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Kidushin 8a (Beraisa):</font></b> If a man said 'I give this
               calf (or this garment, to Ploni the Kohen) for
               Pidyon ha'Ben', this does not work. If he said 'I
               give this calf (or this garment to Ploni) for five
               Sela'im for Pidyon ha'Ben, it works.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b> If they are not worth five Sela'im, how can he say
               they are like five Sela'im to make the redemption
               work?!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Answer:</font></b> Really, they are not worth five Sela'im. The
               case is, the Kohen accepted them in place of five
               Sela'im;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Rav Kahana accepted a turban in place of the
                    five Sela'im for Pidyon ha'Ben. To him, it was
                    worth five Sela'im.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   (Rav Ashi):</font></b> This works only for a great man like Rav
               Kahana, who needs a turban, but not for regular
               people.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rambam (Hilchos Bikurim 11:6):</font></b> One may redeem with
               five Sela'im of money or Shavah Kesef, from
               Metaltelim that are Gufo Mamon, like Shekalim. One
               may not redeem with land, or with slaves, which are
               like land, or with documents, which are not Gufo
               Mamon. If he did, his son is not redeemed.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rambam (7):</font></b> If one gave a Keli that is not worth
               five Sela'im in the market, and the Kohen accepted
               it for five Sela'im, his son is redeemed.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rosh (Bechoros 8:10):</font></b> The Halachah follows Rav Ashi.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Ran (Kidushin 4a DH Garsinan):</font></b> Rav Kahana
                    accepted a turban in place of the five Sela'im.
                    The same applies to anyone who sometimes pays
                    extra for something. If not, when is a calf
                    valid in place of five Sela'im? However, if he
                    would not normally pay five Sela'im for this
                    item, he cannot say 'it is worth five to me.'
                    Why did the Rambam say only that the Kohen
                    accepted it for five, but he did not stipulate
                    that the Kohen sometimes pays more for it?
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Beis Yosef (YD 305 DH v'Li):</font></b> The Rambam holds
                    that if it is worth five Sela'im to some
                    person, even if it is not worth five Sela'im to
                    this Kohen, he can accept it for five. Rav Ashi
                    said 'this works only for a great man like Rav
                    Kahana...', i.e. if it is not worth five
                    Sela'im to any person, Rav Kahana could not say
                    'it is worth five to me.' Rav Ashi means 'this
                    is only for a turban, which is sometimes worth
                    five for people like Rav Kahana, even though it
                    is not worth so much to others. Then, Rav
                    Kahana can accept it for five. Everyone else,
                    i.e. something that is not worth five to
                    anyone, he cannot say that it is like five for
                    him. The Rambam means that in the market it is
                    not worth five, but for some people it is worth
                    five.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Rebuttal (Taz 305:5):</font></b> If so, why did the Gemara
                    say that the Kohen accepted it for five? Even
                    if he was silent, since it is worth five to
                    someone, his son is redeemed! Do not say that
                    the Gemara proves that we need his words.
                    According to the Beis Yosef, Rav Kahana did not
                    say so about himself. It depends only on being
                    worth five Sela'im to someone! Rather, he meant
                    'to me and people like me, it is worth five.'
                    If so, whenever we know that it is worth five
                    to some, the Kohen need not say or accept
                    anything. Rav Kahana just informed that it is
                    worth five to people like him.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Bach (8):</font></b> The Rosh said that a Kohen can accept
                    it for five only if he would pay five for it.
                    Why did the Tur say Stam that any Kohen can say
                    this, even if it is not worth five to anyone?
                    Rather, the Tur distinguishes. When the father
                    tells the Kohen 'take this for five', and the
                    Kohen accepts it surely his son is redeemed,
                    even if it is not worth five to anyone in the
                    world, since the father considers it to be
                    worth five. The Kelim that one uses are dear to
                    him, so it is as if he gave five. In the case
                    of Rav Kahana, the father gave the turban Stam.
                    Rav Kahana said on his own that it is worth
                    five to him. Rav Ashi taught that in such a
                    case we require that he would pay five for it.
                    The Tur discusses the case of the Beraisa, when
                    the father said that it is worth five. This
                    works as long as the Kohen accepts it. The Tur
                    omitted Rav Kahana's case, for perhaps it
                    applies only to a turban and a great person
                    like Rav Kahana who does not go without a
                    turban. It does not help for other items.
                    Nowadays turbans are rare, so the Tur omitted
                    this. He was drawn after the Rambam, who
                    brought only the Beraisa.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.   Rebuttal (Taz 5):</font></b> If so, the entire Sugya in
                    the Gemara was unnecessary. When the Gemara
                    asked 'if they are not worth five, why is his
                    son redeemed?', it should have answered that
                    'it is because the father explicitly said that
                    it is worth five'! This is unlike the case of
                    Rav Kahana, which the Gemara brought to support
                    the answer! The Bach's distinction between a
                    turban and other items does not deserve to be
                    written. Rather, the Rambam was bothered why
                    the Gemara did not say that the item is worth
                    five to the Kohen, for this is the primary
                    answer. Rather, it suffices for the Kohen to
                    say that he accepts it for five, even if it is
                    not worth five. It brings a proof from Rav
                    Kahana, who said 'it is worth five to me.' This
                    is worse than saying 'I accept it (even if it
                    is not worth five)', for he says that he
                    accepts it because it is worth five to him.
                    Therefore, it must really be worth five to him.
                    How can he say they are like five Sela'im to
                    make the redemption work?!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>vi.  R. Yerucham (Toldos 1:3 14:3):</font></b> Some say that
                    only a great person can accept it for more than
                    it is worth. Some require a great person only
                    if he accepted it like five after the Pidyon,
                    when he saw that it is not worth five. The
                    Rambam holds like this.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>vii. Shach (5 and Gra 8):</font></b> The Beis Yosef, Bach and
                    R. Yerucham are difficult. Rather, the Rambam
                    holds like Bahag, wose text said 'really, it is
                    not worth five. In the Reisha, the father said
                    'it is worth five.' In the Seifa, the Kohen
                    accepted it, like the case of Rav Kahana. Rav
                    Ashi said that this is only for a great person
                    like Rav Kahana,who knows to pardon. This shows
                    that whenever the Kohen accepts it, his son is
                    redeemed. This explains why the Beraisa said
                    only 'this calf for five Sela'im', without
                    specifying that the Kohen would pay five for
                    it.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Rashba (Teshuvah 198):</font></b> A Kohen cannot accept what is
               not worth five for five, unless he is esteemed and
               we know that if he needed this item, he would pay
               this amount for it, e.g. a nice Talis for a
               Chacham.for
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Ohr Some'ach (12:11):</font></b> The Rambam holds that the
                    Kohen can accept anything for Pidyon ha'Ben. It
                    seems that this does not apply to Pidyon Peter
                    Chamor (firstborn donkey), for which we say
                    that one gives a goat or sheep or its value. It
                    is difficult to say that this is only without
                    the Kohen's consent. Rather, Pidyon ha'Ben is
                    the Kohen's monetary privilege, so he can
                    pardon it. Pidyon Peter Chamor permits the Isur
                    on the donkey, so it is like Pidyon Hekdesh.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (YD 305:3):</font></b> One may give to the Kohen
               for the five Sela'im money or Shavah Kesef, anything
               he wants, except for land, slaves or documents. If
               he redeemed with them, his son is not redeemed.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Sha'ar ha'Melech (Hilchos Ishus 3:3 DH
                    ul'Inyan, cited in R. Akiva Eiger):</font></b> Tosfos
                    (Eruvin 31b DH v'Nosan) says that something
                    that was detached and later attached to the
                    ground is considered detached regarding Pidyon
                    Hekdesh. If so, the same applies to Pidyon
                    ha'Ben. However, Rashi (Bava Kama 104b DH
                    Aseifa) disagrees (regarding Kinyanim).
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Chasam Sofer (YD 134):</font></b> Why do Gedolim make
                    people swear about paper money and apply laws
                    of Shomerim to it? Paper money is a document!
                    The Pri Megadim suggested that it is better
                    than a document, for it does not mention the
                    lender's name, and anyone can collect with it.
                    People have always considered it like
                    documents. However, a regular document puts a
                    lien against the borrower, and his property is
                    a guarantor. Therefore, if he dies there is no
                    lien against his heirs. It is a mere Mitzvah
                    for them to pay their father's debt, when they
                    are adults. Therefore, the document is not Gufo
                    Mamon. Paper money is not against the king
                    himself. When he dies, the next king must honor
                    it. Therefore, they are more Gufo Mamon. Rashi
                    says that documents are not Gufo Mamon because
                    they are only for the proof. Even though the
                    paper has value, and a document can be written
                    on gold, it is worth less than the proof. One
                    would not cut then or wrap them on a bottle. If
                    so, the same applies to our coins! The metal is
                    not worth a third of the minted value. No one
                    would melt them down! Rather, coins are what
                    the king decreed to accept for buying and
                    selling. He could kill one who refuses to
                    accept them. It does not matter if they are
                    gold or silver or paper. The king did not
                    decree to accept loan documents. One need not
                    accept them for payment, so they are considered
                    documents. I say that paper money is like coins
                    for anything between people, which includes
                    redeeming Hekdesh (from the Gizbar) or Ma'aser
                    Sheni. However, one redeems his son from Hash-m
                    (and gives it to a Kohen). The decree of a
                    mortal king does not help for this. Hash-m
                    decreed a Shi'ur of silver for this.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Shulchan Aruch (5):</font></b> If one gave a Keli that is not
               worth five Sela'im in the market, and the Kohen
               accepted it for five Sela'im, his son is redeemed.
               This is only if it is worth five Sela'im to some
               person.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   R. Akiva Eiger:</font></b> The Maharsha (Kesuvos 56a)
                    corrects the text of Tosfos (DH Harei) to say
                    that pardon does not help for Pidyon ha'Ben. 
<br>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) INCLUSIONS AND EXCLUSIONS (cont.)</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Answer (Ameimar):</font></b> Normally, Rebbi expounds Klal u'Frat.
          Redemption of a firstborn is different, like Tana d'Vei
          R. Yishmael taught.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa - Tana d'Vei R. Yishmael):</font></b> It says
               (regarding Simanim of Kosher fish) twice 'ba'Mayim'
               (and afterwards, Pratim). Therefore, we do not
               expound according to Klal u'Frat, rather, according
               to Ribuy and Mi'ut.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question:</font></b> Why do Chachamim argue with Rebbi about
          redemption of a firstborn son? (Since the Klalim are
          adjacent, they should agree that we expound through Ribuy
          and Mi'ut!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer (Ravina):</font></b> Chachamim expound like Chachamim of
          Eretz Yisrael;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Chachamim of Eretz Yisrael):</font></b> Whenever there are two
               adjacent Klalim, we put the Pratim in the middle and
               expound through Klal u'Frat.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Question:</font></b> Since Rebbi normally expounds according to Klal
          u'Frat, surely he holds like R. Yishmael regarding oaths!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Answer:</font></b> Indeed, Rebbi taught R. Akiva's opinion regarding
          oaths, even though he disagrees.

<b><font color='blue'>2) FORGETTING AFTER KNOWING</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Beraisa - R. Akiva):</font></b> 'V'Ne'elam... v'Ne'elam' teaches
          that one brings a Korban only if he knew at the beginning
          and at the end, and forgot in between (when he
          transgressed);
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b>  Rebbi says, 'v'Ne'elam' connotes that he knew. 'V'Hu
          Yada' also teaches this!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The extra 'v'Ne'elam' obligates him, whether he
               forgot the Tum'ah or the Mikdash (or Kodshim). This
               is like R. Yishmael.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Question:</font></b> Rebbi says that 'v'Ne'elam' connotes that he
          knew. How is this implied?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Answer #1 (Rava):</font></b> It is because it does not say 'it was
          hidden <i>from him</i>' (which would imply that he never
          knew).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Objection #1 (Abaye):</font></b> It says about a Sotah 'v'Ne'lam
          me'Einei Ishah.' Will you say that he knew and forgot?!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> 'V'Nikah ha'Ish me'Avon and she will bear her sin' -
               the water tests her only if her husband acted
               properly. (Tosfos - even if he did not have Bi'ah
               with her afterwards, forgetting that she became
               forbidden to him is a gross negligence.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Objection #2 (Abaye):</font></b> Regarding Torah, it says
          'v'Ne'elmah me'Einei Kol Chai.' Will you say that it was
          once known?!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> 'Lo Yada Enosh Erkah' (no person knows its worth)!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Answer #2 (Abaye):</font></b> Rebbi considers having learned the
          laws of Tum'ah (Rashi - and having felt the rodent when
          it touched him, even though he did not reflect and
          realize that he is Tamei) as having once known. (Had he
          thought about the Tum'ah, he would have known to avoid
          transgressing.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Question (Rav Papa - Mishnah):</font></b> If he never knew of the
          Tum'ah (and entered the Mikdash or ate Kodshim), and
          later was told that he was Tamei...
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Surely, any adult once learned the laws of Tum'ah!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Answer (Abaye):</font></b> The case is, when he was a child, he was
          captured by Nochrim (and never learned the laws of
          Tum'ah).
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>3) THE YETZI'OS OF SHABBOS</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> There are two primary forms of Yetzi'ah on
          Shabbos. There are four in all.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  (Mishnah (in tractate Shabbos)):</font></b> There are two primary
          forms of Yetzi'ah and two secondary forms inside (Rashi -
          bringing something into a Reshus ha'Yachid; Tosfos -
          regarding a person standing in a Reshus ha'Yachid);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> There are also two primary and two secondary
               Yetzi'os outside.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Question:</font></b> Why does our Tana mention only four of the
          eight?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Answer #1:</font></b> There, the focus of the tractate is the laws
          of Shabbos, so the Tana mentions also the derivative
          Melachos;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Our tractate does not focus on the laws of Shabbos
               (it is merely brought in passing), so the Tana
               mentions only the Av Melachos.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Question:</font></b> The Avos are Yetzi'os. There are only two of
          them (yet our Mishnah mentions four)!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps the Mishnah mentions Avos that
               one is liable for, and also those for which one is
               exempt!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rejection:</font></b> Presumably, the Yetzi'os are similar to
               appearances of Tzara'as, i.e. one is liable for all
               of them.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Answer #2 (Rav Papa):</font></b> There, the focus of the tractate is
          Shabbos, so the Tana mentions Yetzi'os for which one is
          liable, and for which one is exempt;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Our tractate does not focus on the laws of Shabbos,
               so the Tana mentions only Yetzi'os for which one is
               liable.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Question:</font></b> There are only two Yetzi'os for which one is
          liable for (yet our Mishnah mentions four)!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Answer:</font></b> There are also two Hachnasos (bringing something
          into a Reshus ha'Yachid).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Question:</font></b> The Tana says there are a total of four
          Yetzi'os!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  Answer #1 (Rav Ashi):</font></b> Hachnasos are also called Yetzi'os.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Question:</font></b> What is the source to say this?
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) A HUSBAND WHO FORGOT ABOUT THE ACT OF HIS WIFE WHO IS A 'SOTAH'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara proves that the word 'v'Ne'elam' does not always indicate prior knowledge of something. The Gemara proves this from the word 'v'Ne'elam' as it appears with regard to Sotah (Bamidbar 5:13) and with regard to Torah (Iyov 28:21). When the verse describes a Sotah, it says that her act was 'Ne'elam' from her husband. If this means that her husband once knew -- and then forgot -- what she did, then how can the Sotah water test her honesty? The Gemara says that the Mei Sotah tests the woman's honesty only when her husband is free of sin. If the husband himself is not free of sin, then the water is not effective at all.
</p><p>
How would the knowledge of the husband be considered in the category of not being free of sin? In what way is he considered not 'Menukeh me'Avon,' free of sin? The Derashah that the husband must be free of sin means that if the husband lived with his wife after she became a Sotah (which he is not allowed to do, as derived from the verse 'v'Nitme'ah' (Bamidbar 5:29)), then the Mei Sotah will not work. How does the Gemara here know that the husband lived with his wife and forgot what she did?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH v'Ne'elam) and others explain that the state of 'Menukeh me'Avon' is not limited to sins involving forbidden relations. Even if the husband did not have forbidden relations but did something which he should not have done with regard to his relationship with his wife, he is not considered 'Menukeh me'Avon.' Therefore, if the husband knows that his wife sinned in private and he does not divorce her immediately, he is not 'Menukeh me'Avon.' Alternatively, when the husband does not know for sure that his wife committed adultery, but he does know that his wife secluded herself with another man, and then he forgot that fact, he is not considered 'Menukeh me'Avon.' The husband's forgetfulness about his wife's seclusion with another man shows that he did not consider her seclusion important enough to remember. This displays a lack of regard for the sin of a Sotah.
</p><p>
The <b>RITVA</b> suggests a similar explanation. He adds that this Halachah -- that the Mei Sotah is not effective when the husband does not show proper regard for the prohibition of Sotah -- is learned from another verse, as the Sifri (Naso #7) says, 'v'Ne'elam me'Einei Ishah' (Bamidbar 5:13). The Gemara is asking that even if the husband <i>is</i> 'Menukeh me'Avon,' meaning that he did not live with his wife during the period that he forgot about the sin, the Mei Sotah still should not be effective because her husband did not show proper respect for the Isur of Sotah. Consequently, the implication of the verse -- that if the husband <i>is</i> 'Menukeh me'Avon' the Mei Sotah will be effective -- would be incorrect.
</p><p>
(b) <b>RASHI</b> (DH Ein ha'Ish) seems to take a different approach. Rashi apparently understands that if the husband forgets about his wife's sin, then the Mei Sotah will not be effective because he lived with her. Why, according to Rashi, does the Gemara assume that he lived with her during the period that he forgot about her sin? The <b>TOSFOS HA'ROSH</b> explains that if 'v'Ne'elam' teaches that the husband forgot something, there must be a reason why it is important to know that the husband forgot; it must be a significant fact. There is, however, no significance to his forgetting unless he did a sin during that period (i.e., he lived with her). In this sense, the Ha'alamah of Sotah is comparable to the Ha'alamah of Yedi'as ha'Tum'ah in the Mishnah. That is why the Gemara asks that if there was a Ha'alamah -- that is, the husband forgot his wife's sin and because of that he had relations with her, then the Mei Sotah should not be effective.
</p><p>


<font><b>2) 'YEDI'AS BEIS RABO'</b></font>
<br>QUESTIONS: Rebbi derives from the word 'v'Ne'elam' (Vayikra 5:2) the requirement that there be an initial Ha'alamah (forgetting of prior knowledge) in order for the person to be obligated to bring a Korban for Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav. 'V'Ne'elam' implies that he already knew previously about his Tum'ah. The additional words 'v'Hu Yada' (Vayikra 5:3) imply a second Yedi'ah. This teaches that one is obligated to bring a Korban only when he had a Yedi'ah at the beginning (before he sinned) and at the end (after he sinned).
</p><p>
The Gemara challenges Rebbi's assumption that 'v'Ne'elam' implies a previous knowledge. The verse uses the word 'v'Ne'elam' with regard to a husband's knowledge of the actions of his wife who is a Sotah, and with regard to knowledge of the Torah, and yet in those two cases there was no prior knowledge. Abaye answers that when Rebbi says that there was prior knowledge he means that the sinner knew about the sin of Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav through 'Yedi'as Beis Rabo,' what he learned as a child in school, and that knowledge is enough to qualify as prior knowledge to obligate him to bring a Korban.
</p><p>
What was it that the person learned when he was a child? He learned that a Sheretz is Metamei, and that a person who is Tamei may not eat Kodshim or enter the Mikdash. <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Yedi'ah) and other Rishonim explain that according to Rebbi, the prior knowledge of these Halachos qualify as a Yedi'ah b'Techilah, even if he <i>never forgot</i> them. The person who went into the Mikdash knew the Halachos but was not aware that he himself was Tamei or that he was entering the Mikdash (or eating Kodshim). Rebbi maintains that a person is obligated to bring a Korban Oleh v'Yored in such a case since a prior knowledge of the Halachos suffices, and there is no need to have knowledge of the specific circumstances of his own sin; he needs to know only the Halachos that apply.
</p><p>
This is how the Gemara answers the question. 'V'Ne'elam' implies a vague knowledge, and not a prior, clear knowledge. In the case of Sotah, there is a vague knowledge but not a clear knowledge (<b>TOSFOS</b> DH Yedi'as).
</p><p>
The <b>CHIDUSHEI HA'RAN</b> explains the Gemara's answer differently. The Chidushei ha'Ran suggests that the fact that the sinner must have Yedi'as Beis Rabo is learned from the words 'v'Ne'elam Mimenu <i>v'Hu Tamei</i>.' These words imply that the sinner was not aware that he touched the Sheretz, but he was aware of the Halachos of Tum'ah because he learned them in his youth.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> explains the Gemara's answer differently. Rashi here (DH Yedi'as Beis Rabo; the word 'she'Hirgish' in Rashi should be amended to 'v'Hirgish,' or omitted altogether, as in all of the old manuscripts of Rashi's text) and later (14b, DH O Dilma) explains that according to Rebbi, Yedi'as Beis Rabo is enough to obligate the person if he once learned the law that one may not eat Kodshim or enter the Mikdash while Tamei, and he knows what makes a person Tamei. At the time that he touched the Sheretz, however, he did not realize that he became Tamei, even though he was aware that he touched a Sheretz. It seems that Rashi means that it indeed is necessary for the person to know that he touched the Sheretz in order for him to be obligated to bring a Korban Oleh v'Yored. Accordingly, when the Gemara says that Yedi'as Beis Rabo suffices to make him liable, it means that the person indeed learned that a Sheretz is Metamei but at the time that he touched the Sheretz he forgot that Halachah. Consequently, although he was aware that he touched a Sheretz, he was not aware that he became Tamei. (See <b>TOSFOS</b> to 14b, DH O Dilma, <b>TOSFOS HA'ROSH</b> here, <b>CHASAM SOFER</b>, and Acharonim.)
</p><p>
There are a number of difficulties with Rashi's explanation.
</p><p>
(a) From where does Rashi derive that a person is obligated to bring a Korban only if he is aware that he touched a Sheretz? Rashi's words (in DH Yedi'as) imply that he derives this from the phrase, 'v'Hu Yada,' which implies that the person was aware of something at the time that he sinned. However, the Beraisa earlier (4b) implies that Rebbi understands that 'v'Hu Yada' refers to Yedi'ah b'Sof; the sinner became aware of his sin after he sinned. It does <i>not</i> refer to the moment at which he touched the Sheretz (see Insights there). What, then, is Rashi's source that the sinner must be aware that he touched the Sheretz at the time that he touched it? If the Gemara was not bothered by the Derashah of the words 'v'Hu Yada' until now, then why does Rashi find it necessary to give a new explanation for that Derashah according to the conclusion of the Gemara? (See the <b>CHASAM SOFER's</b> discussion of this at length, end of 4b.)
</p><p>
(b) According to Rashi, the person did not even have a Yedi'as Beis Rabo at the time that he touched the Sheretz. How, then, can he infer from the word 'v'Ne'elam' -- which, like the words 'v'Hu Yada,' describes what the person was aware of at the time that he touched the Sheretz -- that the person must have Yedi'as Beis Rabo? At the time that the person touched the Sheretz, he no longer had a knowledge of what he learned when he was a child! It seems that the Gemara returns to its previous explanation, that 'v'Ne'elam' implies a prior knowledge. However, if this is true, then even according to the Gemara's conclusion, how has the Gemara answered the verses which use the word 'v'Ne'elam' with regard to a Sotah and with regard to the Torah?
</p><p>
(c) Rav Papa asks Abaye, how is it possible to ever have a person who has no Yedi'ah b'Techilah if it suffices to have learned the laws as a child (for, presumably, every Jew learned the laws)? The Gemara answers that such a person exists in the case of a child who was captured and raised by Nochrim and was never able to learn the laws of Tum'as Mikdash. According to Rashi, however, a much simpler case of a person who has no Yedi'ah b'Techilah exists: one who touched a Sheretz without realizing that he touched it (even though he knows the laws)! (<b>TOSFOS</b> to 14b, DH O Dilma, cited by the <b>GILYON HA'SHAS</b>)
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) Many Rishonim explain that Rashi does not mean that the person forgot that a Sheretz makes him Tamei at the time that he touched it. Rather, Rashi means that even at the time that he touched the Sheretz and was aware that he touched it, he knew that a Sheretz makes a person Tamei. However, he did not take note of the fact that since he is touching a Sheretz, he is now Tamei; he knew the Halachah only in theory, and he failed to apply it in practice to his particular situation. (See <b>RITVA</b> and <b>CHIDUSHEI HA'RAN</b>.)
</p><p>
According to this explanation, the Yedi'ah b'Techilah is the knowledge that he touched the Sheretz. The knowledge of the Halachos (the Yedi'as Beis Rabo) serves only to make that touching of the Sheretz qualify as a Yedi'ah b'Techilah.
</p><p>
Thus, the argument between Rashi and the other Rishonim is that according to the other Rishonim, the knowledge of the laws at the time that the person touched the Sheretz qualifies as Yedi'ah b'Techilah even if he did not know that he touched a Sheretz at the time that he touched it. Rashi maintains that the knowledge of the laws is not considered a Yedi'ah b'Techilah unless that knowledge caused a Yedi'ah at the time that the person touched the Sheretz. This occurs only if the person was aware that he touched the Sheretz. According to both Rashi and the other Rishonim, the verse clearly requires that there be some knowledge at the time that he touches the Sheretz.
</p><p>
(b) According to this approach, the answer of the Gemara to the question from Sotah and Torah is the same according to Rashi and the other Rishonim. Rashi will also explain that 'v'Ne'elam' implies a vague Yedi'ah, as Tosfos explains, or that Yedi'as Beis Rabo is not learned from 'v'Ne'elam' but from the words 'v'Hu Tamei,' as the Chidushei ha'Ran explains.
</p><p>
(c) <b>TOSFOS</b> later (14b, DH O Dilma) and the <b>RITVA</b> here explain that according to Rashi, the Gemara indeed could have answered that an example of 'Ein Bo Yedi'ah b'Techilah' is when a person did not realize that he touched a Sheretz. This answer also would have sufficed.
</p><p>
It seems that these Rishonim understand that even according to Rashi, Rav Papa was not aware that the Yedi'as Beis Rabo must be accompanied with a knowledge that the person touched a Sheretz. That is why he asked his question.
</p><p>
However, this answer is not sufficient, since the Gemara does not explicitly disagree with Rav Papa on this point. Where in the Gemara does Rashi find that the person must know that he touched a Sheretz? A number of Rishonim reject Rashi's explanation for this reason.
</p><p>
Perhaps the following answer to this question may be suggested. The Mishnah states that there are four different Yedi'os of Tum'ah, and it continues and says which Korban atones when there is no Yedi'ah b'Techilah. This implies that it is possible to have a situation in which the person has no prior knowledge of any one of the four Yedi'os ha'Tum'ah mentioned in the Reisha of the Mishnah.
</p><p>
Moreover, in the Gemara later (14b) Rebbi Yirmeyah asks that if a person from Bavel knows that there is a Beis ha'Mikdash but does not know where it is, and he enters the Beis ha'Mikdash while he is Tamei, does the knowledge that there exists a Beis ha'Mikdash suffice to be considered Yedi'as Beis Rabo, or does he also have to know <i>where</i> the Beis ha'Mikdash is located in order to be considered Yedi'as Beis Rabo? Rav Papa obviously maintains that knowledge that there exists a Beis ha'Mikdash suffices, for otherwise the Gemara would have an obvious case of 'Ein Bo Yedi'ah b'Techilah' -- the case of a person from Bavel who does not know where the Beis ha'Mikdash is located, as Rebbi Yirmeyah discusses.
</p><p>
Accordingly, one may suggest as follows. Rav Papa is asking how will Rebbi find a case in which there is no Yedi'ah b'Techilah <i>of the Mikdash</i>? That is, it is easy to find a case in which there is no Yedi'ah of Tum'ah at first, since, according to Rashi, if the person was not aware that he touched a Sheretz, it is considered a lack of Yedi'as Tum'ah. However, a lack of Yedi'as <i>Mikdash</i> exists only when -- at the time the person touched the Sheretz -- he was not aware that there was a Beis ha'Mikdash in the world. (Similarly, it is not considered a lack of Yedi'ah of Kodesh unless the person who touched the Sheretz was unaware that there was any Kodshim in the world.)
</p><p>
This is why Rav Papa asks how a person could not know that there is a Mikdash. If Yedi'as Beis Rabo does not suffice, then it does not suffice to know that there is a Mikdash; a person also must know exactly where the Mikdash is (as the Gemara says on 14b). According to Rebbi, however, who maintains that Yedi'as Beis Rabo suffices, the very knowledge that a Beis ha'Mikdash exists would be considered a Yedi'ah. In what case can there be no Yedi'ah of Mikdash (or Kodesh) at the time that the person touches the Sheretz? Abaye answers that indeed the only case where there is no Yedi'ah of Mikdash is where the person is a Tinok she'Nishba who, due to his circumstances, had no knowledge that there was a Beis ha'Mikdash.
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) WHERE DO WE PERMIT FISH WITHOUT SIMANIM?</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>     </font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa - Tana d'Vei R. Yishmael):</font></b> It says
               (regarding Simanim of Kosher fish) twice 'ba'Mayim'
               (and afterwards, Pratim). Therefore, we do not
               expound according to Klal u'Frat (general and
               specific terms), rather, according to Ribuy and
               Mi'ut (inclusions and exclusions):
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Chulin 66b (Beraisa) Question:</font></b> What is the source to
               permit fish (even without Simanim, i.e. fins and
               scales) in Kelim?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Answer #1:</font></b> 'This you will eat, among all that is in
               water... (in seas and rivers)' - in seas and rivers,
               we may eat only fish with Simanim, but in Kelim, we
               may eat fish even without Simanim.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b> 'In water' is a Klal. 'In seas and rivers' is a
               Prat. 'In water' is another Klal;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (Ravina):</font></b> Chachamim of Eretz Yisrael teach that
                    we may insert a Prat between two adjacent
                    Klalim to make a Klal u'Frat u'Chlal.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b> We learn cases like the Prat, i.e. flowing water.
               This includes (to forbid fish without Simanim in
               flowing) Charitzim and Ne'itzim (long pits or
               quarries. All) fish in (still) pits are permitted.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Question:</font></b> Perhaps the Prat is bodies of water (in
               the ground, not in Kelim), and all such cases are
               forbidden!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   Answer:</font></b> If so, the repetition 'you may eat' would
               not teach anything.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.   Answer #2 (Tana d'Vei R. Yishmael):</font></b> We do not
               expound 'in water... in water' according to Klal
               u'Frat, rather, like Ribuy and Mi'ut;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  'In water' is a Ribuy. 'In seas and rivers' is
                    a Mi'ut. 'In water' is another Ribuy. We
                    (initially) include everything, i.e. we forbid
                    (fish without Simanim) in Charitzim and
                    Ne'itzim. We exclude pits (of still water, to
                    permit).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.   Question:</font></b> Perhaps pits are included (to forbid fish
               without Simanim), and Kelim are excluded (to permit
               fish without Simanim)!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>10.  Answer:</font></b> If so, the repetition 'you may eat' would
               not teach anything.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>11.  Question:</font></b> We should say oppositely, that pits are
               included to forbid, and Charitzim and Ne'itzim are
               excluded to permit!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>12.  Answer (Matisyahu ben Yehudah's Beraisa):</font></b> We include
               pits to permit, for they are still water, like
               Kelim. We exclude Charitzim and Ne'itzim and forbid,
               for they are not still, unlike Kelim.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rambam (Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros 2:18):</font></b> If a water
               Sheretz was created in a pit, since the water does
               not flow, and it is still, this is like water in
               Kelim, so it is permitted. One may bend down and
               drink water from a pit, even though he swallows some
               small Sheratzim.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Magid Mishneh:</font></b> The Rambam forbids Charitzim and
                    Ne'itzim that are not still, even if they do
                    not flow. He permits only pits, which are
                    still, like Kelim. He explains like Tosfos, and
                    rules like R. Yishmael. The Sifra supports him.
                    The Rashba agrees.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rambam (20):</font></b> One need not refrain from drinking
               wine, vinegar or beer due to worms inside.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rosh (Chulin 3:68):</font></b> Tosfos says that according to
               Tana d'Vei R. Yishmael, who expounds Ribuy and
               Mi'ut, we forbid even Charitzim and Ne'itzim that do
               not flow. According to Tana d'Vei Rav (the first
               Tana; also in Rashi's text, this is Tana d'Vei Rav),
               who expounds Klal u'Frat, we permit Charitzim and
               Ne'itzim, since they do not flow. Also according to
               this Perush, it seems that the Halachah follows Tana
               d'Vei Rav, for it was fluent in people's mouths,
               against Tana d'Vei R. Yishmael.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Ma'adanei Yom Tov (80, based on Rashi 66a DH
                    Tana):</font></b> Answer #1 was from Tana d'Vei Rav, i.e.
                    Sifra (Beraisos that expound verses in
                    Vayikra).
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (YD 84:1):</font></b> Sheratzim that grow in
               water in Kelim and pits that do not flow are
               permitted, even if they do not have fins and scales.
               Therefore, one may bend down and drink from them,
               without concern lest Sheratzim come to his mouth.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Shach (1):</font></b> The same applies to other liquids.
                    The Rambam, Hagahos Maimoniyos and other Poskim
                    say so.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Taz (2):</font></b> Isur v'Heter ha'Aruch says that if
                    they disgusthim,or there is danger, it is
                    forbidden due to Bal Teshaktzu. Also the Rambam
                    (Hilchos Rotze'ach 11:6) and Maharshal say so.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Shach (3):</font></b> The Shulchan Aruch connotes that
                    there is no problem of Bal Teshaktzu. Sefer
                    ha'Chinuch explicitly says so. The Rema (13:1)
                    forbids eating live fish, but here he intends
                    only to drink, and he does not overtly swallow
                    fish.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Shulchan Aruch (2):</font></b> Some forbid fish that grow in
               Charitzim and Ne'itzim (pits that are long and thin,
               or wide, like fish quarries) that are Moshech but do
               not flow, and some permit.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Shach (2):</font></b> It does not depend on the shape of
                    the pit. It depends only on whether it is
                    Moshech, i.e. it has Motza u'Va.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Mishbetzos Zahav (Reish ha'Siman):</font></b> Motza u'Va
                    means that it has a source, e.g. when there is
                    much rain,water drips to it, and from it to
                    another place.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Beis Yosef (DH Sheratzim):</font></b> Rashi connotes that
                    there is no argument between the first Tana and
                    Tana d'Vei R. Yishmael. All agree that we
                    forbid Charitzim and Ne'itzim only if they
                    flow. We permit if they do not flow, for then
                    they are unlike seas and rivers. Tosfos
                    challenged this. If so, why did the Gemara say
                    that it depends on whether the water is still?
                    It should include and forbid Charitzim and
                    Ne'itzim, which flow, like seas and rivers!
                    Rather, we discuss Charitzim and Ne'itzim that
                    do not flow. This is why the Gemara asked why
                    they are different than regular pits! It
                    answered that even though they do not flow,
                    they are like seas and rivers, for they are not
                    still. The one who expounds Ribuy u'Mi'ut
                    includes to forbid Charitzim and Ne'itzim that
                    do not flow, and permits regular pits. The one
                    who expounds Klal u'Frat includes to permit
                    even Charitzim and Ne'itzim that are not still
                    like Kelim, since they do not flow. The Rosh
                    says that even according to Tosfos, the
                    Halachah follows the first Tana. However, the
                    Magid Mishneh says that the Rambam rules like
                    R. Yishmael.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Taz (Reish ha'Siman):</font></b> The Tur says that the
                    Rambam permits only in (regular) pits; the Rosh
                    says otherwise. It seems that also the Rambam
                    holds like Tana d'Vei Rav, but the Rambam holds
                    that all forbid Charitzim that do not flow, but
                    are Moshech and Zochel (flow very slowly). Tana
                    d'Vei Rav and Tana d'Vei R. Yishmael argue
                    about Charitzim that do not flow and are not
                    Moshech. Tana d'Vei Rav considers these like
                    pits, and Tana d'Vei Rav forbids, for they are
                    big and unlike Kelim. Elsewhere, we say that a
                    Keli that holds more than 40 Sa'im is not
                    considered a Keli! The Tur learned from the
                    repetition in the Rambam 'the water does not
                    flow, and it is still, like Kelim.' This
                    teaches that even if the water does not flow,
                    if it is Zochel, it is forbidden like flowing
                    water. It is permitted only if it is still.
                    This applies even to Charitzim. The Rambam said
                    so about pits, for they are surely still. The
                    Tur says that the Rosh disagrees, for he does
                    not forbid Charitzim ha'Moshchim as if they
                    flow. He forbade only what truly flows. Also
                    the Ran connotes that the primary Chidush is
                    that Zochelim are like flowing.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.   Shach (8):</font></b> The Maharshal is stringent, and it
                    seems that also Isur v'Heter ha'Aruch is
                    stringent.<p>


lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer (Mishnah):</font></b> One who is Motzi from one domain
               to another domain is liable.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  This includes taking from a Reshus ha'Rabim to
                    a Reshus ha'Yachid, and the Tana calls it
                    Hotza'ah!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Question:</font></b> Perhaps it only refers to taking from a
               Reshus ha'Yachid to a Reshus ha'Rabim!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Answer:</font></b> If so, it should have said 'one who is Motzi
               from a Reshus ha'Yachid to a Reshus ha'Rabim';
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Rather, it says 'from one domain to another
                    domain' to teach both directions;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b> Any uprooting of an object from its place is
                    called Hotza'ah.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Support (Ravina - Mishnah):</font></b> There are two primary
               forms of Yetzi'ah and two secondary forms inside,
               and two primary and two secondary Yetzi'os outside;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  The Tana then details the Yetzi'os, and some
                    are Hachnasos!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)  Version #1 - Rashi - Answer #2 (Rava):</font></b> The Tana (there)
          says that there are two domains of Shabbos, which lead to
          four Isurim inside and four outside.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)  Version #2 - Tosfos - Answer #2 (Rava):</font></b> The Tana (there)
          says that (transferring between) domains of Shabbos
          entails two Isurim for which one is liable (and four in
          all) inside, and two Isurim of liability and four in all
          outside.
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>4) PRIMARY APPEARANCES OF TZARA'AS</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> There are two primary appearances of Tzara'as.
          There are four in all.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  (Mishnah (in tractate Nega'im)):</font></b> There are two primary
          appearances of Tzara'as. There are four in all. Baheres
          is as bright as snow. Its secondary appearance is k'Sid
          (like plaster of) the Heichal. Se'es is like white wool.
          Its secondary appearance is k'Karom (like the membrane
          of) an egg.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  (R. Chanina):</font></b> This latter Mishnah is not like R. Akiva.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Version #1 (Rashi, Tosfos):</font></b> R. Akiva says that the
               different appearances are one above (whiter than)
               the other. (Different appearances join together to
               complete the area of plagued skin only if there is
               not another of the four appearances in between.)
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> If the Mishnah were R. Akiva, k'Sid would not join
               with any appearance!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  It cannot join with Baheres, because Baheres is
                    not directly whiter than it (Se'es is in
                    between);
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b> It cannot join with Se'es, because our Mishnah
                    says that it is not a secondary appearance of
                    Se'es! (Tosfos - it teaches precisely this,
                    that it does not join with Se'es; R. Akiva
                    himself holds that it joins to Se'es, even
                    though it is secondary to Baheres. Rashi - R.
                    Akiva holds that k'Sid is secondary to Se'es).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   (Other versions: Ba'al ha'Ma'or - our Mishnah holds
               that there are only three different shades of white.
               Se'es is also k'Sid, but plagues of Se'es and k'Sid
               have different textures. Ramban - R. Akiva holds
               that all the appearances are the same shade of
               white. They vary only in intensity. Gra - R. Chanina
               holds that R. Akiva says that Se'es is whiter than
               k'Sid, unlike our Mishnah which puts k'Sid second to
               Baheres. We explain below only according to Rashi
               and Tosfos.)
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b> Question:</font></b> If so, also k'Karom would not join with
               any appearance!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  It cannot join with Se'es, because Se'es is not
                    directly whiter than it (k'Sid is in between);
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b> It cannot join with k'Sid, because it is from a
                    different primary appearance than k'Sid!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Rejection:</font></b> 'Vela'Se'es vela'Sapachas' teaches that
               the secondary appearance of Se'es joins with Se'es,
               even though Se'es is not directly whiter than it.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  The question from k'Sid remains (if the Mishnah
                    is R. Akiva, and nothing joins with it);
<br><br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Conclusion:</font></b> The Mishnah is not R. Akiva. <p>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>3) TWO 'YETZI'OS' WHICH ARE FOUR</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara explains the intent of the Mishnah (2a) when it says that there are 'two Yetzi'os of Shabbos which are four.' The Gemara first suggests that the four Yetzi'os refer to the Avos Melachos of Hotza'ah, but not to the Toldos Melachos. The Gemara rejects this suggestion, because only Hotza'ah is considered an Av Melachah, and there are only <i>two</i> cases of Hotza'ah. Hachnasah is not considered an Av Melachah.
</p><p>
Rav Papa concludes that the Mishnah counts all of the cases of carrying from one domain to another on Shabbos for which one is obligated to bring a Korban Chatas, whether it is an Av or a Toldah. This includes Hachnasah.
</p><p>
The Gemara asks how can the Mishnah be referring to Hachnasah when it uses the word 'Yetzi'os,' which implies <i>Hotza'ah</i>? Rav Ashi answers that the word 'Yetzi'os' refers to Hachnasah as well as to Hotza'ah, and he proves this from the Mishnah in Shabbos which lists the Avos Melachos. The concluding words of the Mishnah there are, 'ha'Motzi me'Reshus li'Reshus.' Rav Ashi says that it is clear that the Mishnah is referring to Hachnasah as well, even though it refers to it as Hotza'ah ('ha'Motzi').
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> (DH Mi Lo Askinan) asks how Rav Ashi knows that the words 'ha'Motzi me'Reshus li'Reshus' include Hotza'ah. Rashi writes that those words must include Hachnasah, since one is liable for doing an act of Hachnasah just as one is liable for Hotza'ah, and therefore it must be included in the words of that Mishnah.
</p><p>
Rashi's comment is very difficult to understand. Although one is liable for Hachnasah, that does not make it an Av Melachah! Rashi himself writes (5a, DH Toldos) that Hachnasah is considered a Toldah since it is not written explicitly in the verse, as the Gemara there teaches. Since the Mishnah which says 'ha'Motzi me'Reshus li'Reshus' lists only the Avos Melachos of Shabbos, why must it include Hachnasah which is a Toldah? (<b>TOSFOS HA'ROSH</b>)
</p><p>
ANSWER: The <b>TOSFOS HA'ROSH</b> explains that the reason why the Gemara assumes that 'ha'Motzi me'Reshus li'Reshus' includes Hachnasah is that the Mishnah does not say 'ha'Motzi me'Reshus ha'Yachid li'Reshus ha'Rabim,' as the Gemara explains a few lines later. This seems to be the approach of the other Rishonim as well. Rashi, however, did not find this approach satisfactory, because the Gemara has not yet made this inference from the words 'me'Reshus li'Reshus' at this stage. He therefore explains the proof from the Mishnah in Shabbos in a different manner.
</p><p>
How, though, does Rashi answer our question?
</p><p>
Rashi's explanation here is based on his opinion expressed elsewhere. Rashi understands that the term 'Av Melachah' does not always refer to an Av as opposed to a Toldah. Rather, it means 'a category of Melachah which the Torah prohibits on Shabbos,' and it includes both Avos and Toldos Melachos (see Rashi to Shabbos 68a, DH Av Melachah, and Shabbos 18a, DH she'To'anin). The Mishnah which lists the thirty-nine Avos Melachos is not listing Avos as opposed to Toldos, but rather it is listing thirty-nine <i>categories</i> of Melachah, each of which may include many Toldos. Therefore, the words 'ha'Motzi me'Reshus li'Reshus' represent a category which includes all of the Melachos d'Oraisa of Hotza'ah, both the Avos and the Toldos, and thus it may be assumed that this category includes Hachnasah as well. (See also Insights to Chulin 14:5 and Shabbos 2:2.)
</p><p>
Therefore, according to Rashi, the words 'ha'Motzi me'Reshus li'Reshus' also include walking four Amos in Reshus ha'Rabim, since the Mishnah uses a term which refers to any of the Toldos of Hotza'ah. How, though, is carrying for a distance of four Amos in Reshus ha'Rabim included in this phrase? Apparently, Rashi understands the Melachah of carrying four Amos in Reshus ha'Rabim the way the <b>BA'AL HA'ME'OR</b> explains it in Shabbos (96b). The 'place' of a person extends four Amos around him. If he carries an object from where he is standing a distance four Amos away from him, it is considered as though he moved it from its present Reshus to a different Reshus (see Insights to Shabbos 96:3). </p><p>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) THE ORDER OF BRIGHTNESS OF THE LESIONS OF TZARA'AS</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Question:</font></b> What is the source that R. Akiva says that
          different appearances join together only when one is
          (directly) whiter than another (or Se'es with its
          secondary appearance)?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Answer #1 (Beraisa - R. Yosi):</font></b> Yehoshua asked his father
          R. Akiva why Chachamim detailed the different
          appearances, and it did not suffice to say that k'Karom
          or above (whiter) is Tamei.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   R. Akiva:</font></b> It was necessary to teach that the
               appearances join together.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Yehoshua:</font></b> Why didn't it suffice to say that anything
               k'Karom or above is Tamei, and the appearances join?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   R. Akiva:</font></b> This teaches that a Kohen cannot rule on
               Tzara'as unless he is an expert on the appearances
               and knows their names.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Inference:</font></b> Yehoshua (who surely asked according
                    to R. Akiva's opinion) thought it should
                    suffice to say 'anything k'Karom or above is
                    Tamei, and the appearances join.' He did not
                    need to say <i>also</i> 'anything k'Sid or above is
                    Tamei, and the appearances join'! (If he held
                    that k'Sid joins with its primary appearance,
                    he should have said so! Rashi - Rather, since
                    both secondary appearances are derived from
                    Se'es, it was clear that each joins with the
                    appearance directly above it. Tosfos - surely
                    Yehoshua also intended that the Mishnah would
                    explicitly say that each joins with the
                    appearance directly above it!)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Rejection:</font></b> Perhaps Yehoshua meant that it should suffice
          to say that 'anything k'Karom or above is Tamei, and
          anything k'Sid or above is Tamei' (and each joins with
          its primary appearance, like Chachamim);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> This was obviously his intent. The Tana saw no need
               to elaborate!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Answer #2 (R. Chanina):</font></b> A parable explains R. Akiva's
          opinion of the appearances that join. There were four
          cups of milk. Two drops of blood fell into one cup, four
          drops fell in a second cup, eight drops in the third cup,
          12 (some say - 16) fell in the fourth;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> All appear white, but each is whiter than the next.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Rejection:</font></b> That shows only about mixed colors. Perhaps
          regarding pure colors, he holds like Chachamim!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Suggestion:</font></b> Since he holds like this regarding mixed
               colors, we may infer that the same applies to pure
               colors!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Question:</font></b> Does he really hold this way regarding
               mixed colors?!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (Mishnah - R. Akiva):</font></b> Redness mixed in a
                    Baheres looks like redness in k'Sid. Their
                    color is like wine mixed with water;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b> The difference is in the white part. The white
                    of the (mixed) Baheres is bright like snow, and
                    the white of the (mixed) k'Sid is weaker.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE QUALIFICATIONS A KOHEN FOR RULING ON MATTERS OF 'NEGA'IM'</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Mishnah (2a) states that there are two Mar'os Nega'im that are actually four. <b>RASHI</b> (2a, DH she'Hen) writes that for each of the two Avos Nega'im (principle forms) there is a Toldah (secondary form).
</p><p>
The Gemara cites a Beraisa which relates that Yehoshua, the son of Rebbi Akiva, asked his father why the Chachamim in the Mishnah enumerate the Mar'os Nega'im in this manner, 'two which are four.' Rebbi Akiva answered that this wording teaches that any Kohen who is not an expert in the Nega'im and their names is not qualified to examine Nega'im and rule about their status. (The word 'Mar'os,' 'sights,' implies that the Kohen who examines Nega'im must recognize their different shades and know their different names.)
</p><p>
The Gemara in Erchin (3a) asks that the Gemara here apparently contradicts the Mishnah in Nega'im (3:1). The Mishnah in Nega'im states, 'Everyone is qualified to examine Nega'im.' The Gemara in Erchin understands that the Mishnah's intention is to include a Kohen who is not expert in the shades of the Nega'im and their names. This, however, contradicts the Gemara here, which says that any Kohen who is not an expert in the Nega'im and their names is not eligible to examine Nega'im and rule about their status. The Gemara answers that 'one refers to a case in which someone explains to him and he understands, and the other refers to a case in which someone explains to him and he does not understand.' What does this mean?
</p><p>
(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> in Echin (3a, DH d'Misberi) states that the Kohen must be an expert only when there is no other expert present. Tosfos quotes the Toras Kohanim which says that if an expert in the laws of Nega'im accompanies the unqualified Kohen, even if the expert is a Yisrael and the Kohen is a Shoteh, the expert may examine the Nega and then tell the Kohen, 'Say it is impure,' and the Kohen says after him, 'It is impure.'
</p><p>
Tosfos in Erchin explains that the Gemara and Toras Kohanim do not refer to a Kohen who is an actual Shoteh. Rather, they mean that as long as the Kohen merely is not learned, but he can understand, when it is explained to him, that a certain mark is a Nega, he may proclaim it to be a Nega. (The <b>ROSH</b> in the beginning of the third chapter of Nega'im similarly explains that the Kohen is called a 'Shoteh' in contrast to the scholarly Yisrael, but he is not an actual Shoteh.)
</p><p>
(b) Tosfos in Erchin and Tosfos here (DH Kol Kohen) give another explanation for the Gemara in Erchin. The Gemara means that if the expert who is a Yisrael can explain to another Yisrael how to determine whether or not this form of Nega is Tamei, and the second Yisrael can communicate this information to the Kohen, the Kohen may proclaim that Nega to be impure even if he is a real Shoteh. Even though the Yisrael who instructs the Kohen is not an expert in the laws of Nega'im, and he was merely shown by an expert how to determine whether this type of Nega is Tamei, he may relate what he knows to the Kohen, who then may proclaim the Nega to be Tamei.
</p><p>
Tosfos here (DH Kol Kohen) questions this explanation. Why should the Gemara refer to a case in which one Yisrael (who is an expert in Nega'im) explains the laws to another Yisrael (who is not an expert), who then explains the laws to the Kohen? Why does the expert not explain the laws directly to the Kohen? Tosfos suggests that the Gemara refers to a case in which the expert cannot see, and therefore he needs to explain it to someone else, who in turn may explain it to the Kohen Shoteh.
</p><p>
(c) When the <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Tum'as Tzara'as 9:2) records this Halachah, he writes that the Kohen may rely on a Yisrael who is an expert, and he adds, 'This applies when he relies on the words of a Chacham. However, if the Kohen sees and relies on his own opinion, he may not examine any Nega until his teacher instructs him and he will be an expert in all of the Nega'im, and their names, of people and houses.' The <b>YAD BINYAMIN</b> in Erchin (3a) implies that the Rambam's view seems to be in conflict with the opinion of Tosfos, who says that it is possible that a Kohen may know how to examine just one Nega well and be able to issue a ruling about its status. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) WHEN IS MIXED WINE CONSIDERED WINE?</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>     </font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Mishnah - R. Akiva):</font></b> Redness mixed in a Baheres
               looks like redness in k'Sid. Their color is like
               wine mixed with water.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Bava Basra 96b (Beraisa):</font></b> One blesses sheha'Kol on
               dregs of wine;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> Others say, if the dregs have the taste of wine, he
               blesses Borei Peri ha'Gafen.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   (Rabah and Rav Yosef):</font></b> The Halachah does not follow
               'Others'.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  (Rava):</font></b> All agree that if one put three measures of
               water on the dregs and four measures of liquid come
               out, it is considered wine;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  This is like Rava taught elsewhere, that if one
                    measure of (raw) wine cannot be mixed with
                    three measures of water (lest the mixture be
                    too weak), the (raw) wine is substandard.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   (Rava):</font></b> All agree that if one put in three measures
               and three come out, it is considered water. If he
               put three, and three and a half come out, Chachamim
               say that the same water came out, and a half-measure
               from the dregs. There is six times as much water as
               dreg-wine, so this is not wine. Others say that two
               and a half measures of water came out, and one from
               the dregs. There is two and a half times as much
               water as dreg-wine, so this is wine.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   Avodah Zarah 73b (R. Ami citing R. Yochanan):</font></b> If two
               cups of diluted wine, Chulin and Terumah, got mixed,
               we ignore the Chulin wine, and the water is Mevatel
               the Terumah.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.   Shabbos 76b (Rav Nachman):</font></b> One must put a quarter
               Revi'is of (raw) wine in the Kos of Berachah, so
               that after it is mixed there will be a Revi'is.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.   Objection (Abaye - Mishnah):</font></b> (Dam Nidah is Tamei if
               it is the color of) two measures of water mixed with
               one measure of Sharoni wine.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>10.  Answers (Rava):</font></b> Sharoni wine is weaker than regular
               wine. Alternatively, for drinking it is proper to
               mix wine with three measures of water, but this is
               not the right color to compare to Dam Nidah.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rif (Berachos 32b):</font></b> The Halachah does not follow
               'Others'.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   R. Yonah (DH Shemarim):</font></b> If one put three
                    measures of water in and four came out, it is
                    proper wine, so we bless Borei Peri ha'Gefen.
                    If less than four came out, even if it has the
                    taste of wine, one does not bless (Borei Peri
                    ha'Gefen, only sheha'Kol). It seems that when
                    four came out it is considered wine regarding
                    their wines, which were strong. Where wines are
                    not so strong, we do not consider it wine and
                    bless Borei Peri ha'Gefen even if four came
                    out. Perhaps this is why the Rif did not
                    explain this, and Stam said that the Halachah
                    does not follow Others.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rambam (Hilchos Berachos 8:9):</font></b> If one put three
               measures of water on dregs and four came out, he
               blesses Borei Peri ha'Gefen, for this is mixed wine.
               If less than four came out, even if it tastes like
               wine, he blesses sheha'Kol.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rosh (Avodah Zarah 2:13):</font></b> Yayin Nesech applies to
               mixed wine as long as it tastes like wine. Regarding
               dregs, we distinguish between when three measures
               come out, and when three and a half come out,
               regarding Borei Peri ha'Gefen. That is because a
               mere acidity comes out of dregs, even if it has the
               taste of wine. People dilute pure wine according to
               their nature and custom. Therefore, Yayin Nesech
               applies as long as it tastes like wine.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (OC 204:5):</font></b> If one put three measures
               of water on dregs and he found four measures of
               wine, this is like mixed wine, and he blesses Borei
               Peri ha'Gefen. If he found less than four, even if
               it has the taste of wine, it is mere acidity and he
               blesses sheha'Kol. This refers to their wines, which
               were strong. Our wines are not so strong, so even if
               he put three and found four he does not bless Borei
               Peri ha'Gefen. It seems that we estimate according
               to how people mix wine in that locale.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (DH v'Al):</font></b> Since the Halachah does
                    not follow Others, we bless Borei Peri ha'Gefen
                    only when four came out. R. Yonah says that
                    this is only for their wines, which were
                    strong. This seems correct.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Gra (15 and YD 123):</font></b> Most Poskim hold that it
                    is wine only when he put three and found four.
                    Regarding Yayin Nesech, we are concerned until
                    it is diluted with six parts of water. That
                    refers to (diluting) proper wine (not just
                    dregs). The Rema discusses diluting proper
                    wine. He learns from Avodah Zarah 73b. The cups
                    were mixed normally, three parts of water for
                    each part of wine. The cups are equal size. In
                    all, there are six parts of water against the
                    Terumah. We ignore the Chulin wine, and the
                    Terumah wine is Batel in six parts of water.
                    Normally, Min b'Eino Mino (when mixed with
                    another species), Terumah is Batel in 60, like
                    other Isurim. Wine is Batel in six parts of
                    water, for it does not improve the water. It is
                    detrimental, i.e. Nosen Ta'am li'Fgam, which is
                    permitted regarding all Isurim.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Gra (16):</font></b> Sharoni wine must be diluted with
                    less water, for it is weaker, and all the more
                    so our wine!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  R. Akiva Eiger:</font></b> If between three and a half and
                    four came out, the Rashba and Ran argue. We
                    bless sheha'Kol due to Safek. For the Berachah
                    Acharonah, one should drink proper wine and
                    bless Al ha'Gefen, and this exempts the Safek.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.   Mishnah Berurah (32):</font></b> If one diluted pure wine
                    with almost six parts of water, it is proper
                    wine as long as it tastes and smells like wine,
                    and people drink it mixed this way, in place of
                    wine. If not, we follow most people and ignore
                    one who drinks this.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>vi.  Kaf ha'Chayim (32):</font></b> Olas Tamid says that
                    nowadays that our wines are weak, we do not mix
                    them with water at all, so if water was mixed
                    in, even less than the amount of the wine, one
                    does not bless Borei Peri ha'Gefen. This
                    requires investigation. Eliyahu Rabah says that
                    this is why the Levush omitted the Rema. Eshel
                    Avraham says that for our wines, if there is
                    more water, one blesses sheha'Kol. This implies
                    that if they are equal, one blesses Borei Peri
                    ha'Gefen. One should be careful to avoid a
                    majority of water, even in pressed
                    circumstances, i.e. he has only a little wine.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rema:</font></b> This is only if the wine is not less than one
               part in six of the water. If it is, it is surely
               Batel.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (DH Kosav ha'Agur):</font></b> The Agur says
                    that even though normally, R. Tam rules like
                    Ta'am k'Ikar (something that absorbed taste is
                    like the matter itself) is mid'Oraisa, even to
                    be lenient, regarding Berachah, one in six is
                    not considered taste. It is Batel regarding
                    Berachah. If it is more than one part in six
                    wine, it depends on the taste. If people
                    normally drink it in place of wine, one blesses
                    Borei Peri ha'Gefen.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Magen Avraham (16):</font></b> Regarding wine in water, it
                    is not considered taste unless it is at least
                    one part in six. If it is at least one part in
                    six, if it is proper to drink such a diluted
                    wine, and people drink it in place of wine, we
                    do not say that his opinion is Batel to that of
                    everyone else. The Taz (YD 114:4) says that
                    wine is Batel also in six parts of other
                    liquids. I say that only (this ratio of) water
                    ruins wine. Also Isur v'Heter says so. However,
                    our wines are surely Batel (in six parts of
                    other liquids).
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Mishnah Berurah (31):</font></b> The Mechaber holds that
                    our wine can be diluted only with less than
                    three parts of water, even if people drink it
                    like this, for wine of the Gemara can be
                    diluted only with three parts of water. The
                    Rema connotes that (also the Mechaber) allows
                    almost six parts of water for one part of
                    dregs! The Agur said so only regarding diluting
                    pure wine.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Shulchan Aruch (272:5):</font></b> One may say Kidush over pure
               wine, even if it is strong and can be diluted with
               three parts of water. It is better to dilute it
               properly.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Rema:</font></b> Our wines are better unmixed.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (DH u'Mah she'Chosav umi'Kol):</font></b> This
                    is obvious, in order that it will be pleasant
                    to drink.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Kaf ha'Chayim (31):</font></b> The Ari Zal says that based
                    on Kabalah, one should mix the wine. Since our
                    wines are better unmixed, one should add only
                    three drops to fulfill the Kabalah.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Minchas Shlomo (1:4):</font></b> If one adds four parts of
                    water for each part of grape juice concentrate,
                    he does not Borei Peri ha'Gefen. We bless
                    sheha'Kol on overdiluted wine, and it tastes
                    like wine more than reconstituted grape juice.
                    One could say that the concentrate is primary,
                    and the water is secondary, and since one must
                    mix in much water, we bless Borei Peri
                    ha'Gefen, just like on Konditon, which is a
                    third wine (and a third honey and a third
                    peppers. Wine is the minority, but the rest is
                    to improve the wine.) However, grape juice is
                    Borei Peri ha'Gefen only because it is destined
                    to be wine. We say Borei Peri ha'Gefen on wine
                    only because it was changed for the better; it
                    gives sustenance, and gladdens. Grape juice
                    does not gladden; letter of the law, one may
                    drink grape juice at the meal before Tish'ah
                    b'Av. According to this, if one made wine
                    essence and added even 100 parts water to the
                    wine concentrate, if it returns to tastes like
                    wine, perhaps he blesses Borei Peri ha'Gefen,
                    just like we bless Borei Peri ha'Gefen on wine
                    diluted with three parts of water. We do not
                    say so for reconstituted grape juice. It is
                    unlike a k'Zayis of Chelev or Neveilah that
                    shriveled in the sun to less than a k'Zayis,
                    and rain came and it returned to a k'Zayis. One
                    is Chayav Kares or lashes, for the same matter
                    inflated again.
<br>
<font color='blue'><i>See also:</i>
<br><b>WHICH WINE IS KOSHER FOR KIDUSH? </b>(</font><font color='blue'>


lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Summation of question:</font></b> If R. Akiva held that
                    wool-white is second to Baheres, he should have
                    said that the white of the (mixed) wool
                    appearance is weaker than that of Baheres!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Answer:</font></b> Indeed, he holds this way!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (Beraisa - R. Noson):</font></b> R. Akiva did not say that
                    the white of (mixed) k'Sid is weaker than that
                    of Baheres, rather that the white of the
                    (mixed) wool appearance is weaker than that of
                    Baheres!
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>2) THE DIFFERENT APPEARANCES OF TZARA'AS</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Question:</font></b> What is the source to say that Baheres is the
          brightest?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Answer:</font></b> 'V'Im Baheres Levanah Hi' - it is white, and
          nothing is as white as it.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  (Beraisa):</font></b> Baheres appears deeper (than the surrounding
          skin) - 'u'Mareha Amok Min ha'Or', like a sunlit area
          appears deeper than the shade;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> <i>Se'es</i> connotes elevation - 'v'Al Kol ha'Geva'os
               ha'Nisa'os.'
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> <i>Sapachas</i> connotes being subordinate - 'v'Amar
               Sefacheni Na.'
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Question:</font></b> The verse shows that there is a secondary
          appearance to Se'es. What is the source for a secondary
          appearance to Baheres?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Answer #1 (R. Zeira):</font></b> It says 'Levanah' about Baheres,
          just like about Se'es;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Just like there is a secondary appearance to Se'es,
               also to Baheres.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Answer #2 (Beraisa):</font></b> The Torah wrote 'Sapachas' in
          between Se'es and Baheres to teach that there is a
          secondary appearance to each.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  (Mishnah):</font></b> Se'es is like white wool.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Question:</font></b> What does this refer to?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Answer (Rav Bivi):</font></b> It is clean wool of a newborn lamb
          that people cover (to keep it white) to use for Milas
          (soft wool).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  (R. Chanina):</font></b> A parable explains Chachamim's opinion (of
          how appearances join). There were two kings, and each had
          a mayor under him;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> One king was above the other, and his mayor was
               above the other's. (I.e. one primary appearance is
               above the other and joins with it, and its secondary
               appearance is above the other's secondary appearance
               and joins with it.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)  Objection:</font></b> That is R. Akiva's opinion, that each
          appearance joins to the one above it!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)  Correction:</font></b> Rather, each king is above his own mayor
          (i.e. each primary appearance joins with its secondary
          appearance).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)  (Rav Ada bar Ava):</font></b> A parable explains Chachamim's opinion
          (of how appearances join). A king (above) an Alkafta (a
          lesser king) (above) the king's mayor (above) the
          Alkafta's mayor.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)  Objection:</font></b> That is R. Akiva's opinion, that each
          appearance joins to the one above it!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)  Correction:</font></b> Rather, the king is above his mayor, and the
          Alkafta is above his own mayor.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Rava):</font></b> An example illustrates these two kings -
               Shevor Malka (king of Persia) and the Kaiser (of
               Romi).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rav Papa:</font></b> Which is the more important?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rava:</font></b> 'V'Seichul Kol Ara' (the last creature in
               Nebuchadnetzar's dream alludes to a kingdom that
               will destroy every land);
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (R. Yochanan):</font></b> This is Romi.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)  Version #1 - Rashi - (Ravina):</font></b> A parable explains
          Chachamim's opinion. A new wool garment is only slightly
          whiter than a new linen garment, but a worn out wool
          garment is much whiter than a worn out linen garment.
          (I.e. the primary appearances are very similar, but the
          secondary appearances are not.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)  Version #2 - Tosfos - (Ravina):</font></b> A parable explains
          Chachamim's opinion. The difference in importance between
          new garments of wool and linen is small, but the
          difference in importance between worn garments of wool
          and linen is great.
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>3) TUMAH FOR WHICH ONE MUST BRING A KORBAN</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> If one knew of the Tum'ah, and later forgot...
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  (Beraisa) Question:</font></b> ('Nefesh Asher Tiga b'Chol Davar
          Tamei... Oh Chi Yiga b'Tum'as Adam' brings an Oleh
          v'Yored.) What is the source that the verses discuss one
          who entered the Mikdash or ate Kodshim?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer #1:</font></b> We learn from the warnings and punishments for
          intentional transgressions of Tum'ah.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Kares (for Tum'ah) is only for one who enters the
               Mikdash or eats Kodshim (when he is Tamei).
               Likewise, the Korban for Tum'ah applies only to
               these two cases. 
<br>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) THE FEATURES OF 'SE'ES' AND 'BAHERES'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara cites a Beraisa which states that Baheres (Vayikra 13:2) is a deep form of Nega. The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Tum'as Tzara'as 1:6) writes that this does not mean that it is deep when one feels it on the skin, but rather that it appears to the eye to be a deep color in the same way as the light of the sun appears deeper than the shade. When one looks at the light of the sun next to a shaded area, the sunny part appears to extend deeper than the shady part, which appears to be on the surface of the ground. This is the meaning of the verse, 'Its appearance is deeper than the flesh' (Vayikra 13:3).
</p><p>
The Beraisa continues and says that the Nega of Se'es has a 'high' appearance. The Gemara earlier (5b) quotes the Mishnah in Nega'im (1:1) that states that the white of Baheres is as strong as the white of snow. In contrast, the white of Se'es is similar to white wool.
</p><p>
The Rambam writes that no appearance of leprosy on the skin is deemed a Nega Tamei unless it is deeper than the skin. However, if its appearance is 'higher' (that is, darker, in the same way that shade is 'higher' than sunlight) or equal to the skin, it is not considered a Nega but is merely a growth on the body.
</p><p>
What does the Ramban mean when he writes that if the Nega is higher than the flesh it is pure? Although this may be true of a Baheres, it does not seem to apply to Se'es. The Gemara itself states that Se'es, which is Tamei, appears higher than the skin. (See <b>RA'AVAD</b>.)
</p><p>
ANSWER: The <b>KESEF MISHNEH</b> answers that since the Torah says that Baheres must be deeper than the skin, it follows that Se'es also must be deeper than the skin. When the Gemara states that Se'es is high, it does not mean that it is higher than the skin, but rather that it is higher than Baheres. It still looks deeper than the skin.
</p><p>
This may also be the view of <b>RASHI</b> (5b, DH Sheniyah). Rashi writes that Se'es is close to the whiteness of Baheres, but it is slightly higher than the shade of Baheres because it is not as white as Baheres. These words imply that Se'es is not actually higher than the skin itself; it merely is higher than Baheres. It is still deeper than the skin, as the Kesef Mishneh explains.
</p><p>
This explanation also clarifies Rashi's comment on the verse, 'And the appearance of the Nega is deeper than the skin of his flesh' (Vayikra 13:3). Rashi explains, 'Every shade of white is deep, in the same way that the sun is deeper than the shade.'
</p><p>
The <b>RAMBAN</b> (on the verse there) questions Rashi's words from the Gemara here. Even though Se'es is white, it is a 'high' shade. If Se'es is deep, why does the Torah call it high?
</p><p>
The Ramban himself answers for Rashi that perhaps Se'es is called 'high' relative to Baheres, because when they are placed next to each other, the Baheres appears to be the color of the sun and the Se'es appears, in comparison, like shade. However, both are deeper than the color of the skin. (D. Bloom) 
</p><p>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) TUMAH FOR WHICH ONE MUST BRING A KORBAN (cont.)</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Question:</font></b> We should say that one brings a Korban for
          eating Terumah when he is Tamei, for the Torah warns and
          punishes for this!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Answer #1:</font></b> We do not find that the Torah obligates a
          Korban for a Lav punishable (only) by Misah b'Yedei
          Shamayim (death at the hands of Heaven), only for Lavim
          punishable by Kares).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Question:</font></b> Perhaps that general rule only applies to
               a Chatas Kavu'a (it is an animal, even if the sinner
               is poor), but not to an Oleh v'Yored;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  We find that one brings an Oleh v'Yored for a
                    false oath of not knowing testimony or of
                    Bituy, even though these are not punishable by
                    Kares!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer #2:</font></b> 'Bah' - one brings an Oleh v'Yored for Tum'ah
          of the Mikdash or Kodshim (like above), but not for
          Tum'ah of Terumah.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Question:</font></b> Perhaps one brings an Oleh v'Yored for eating
          Terumah when he is Tamei, and 'Bah' excludes one who
          entered the Mikdash or ate Kodshim (when Tamei), for he
          does not bring an Oleh v'Yored, rather a Chatas Kavu'a!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Answer (part 1 - Rava - Beraisa - Rebbi):</font></b> ('Nefesh Asher
          Tiga... v'Nivlas Chayah... Behemah') - Behemah was
          already included in Chayah!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> This is extra, to learn a Gezeirah Shavah 'Behemah-
               Behemah' from eating Kodshim when Tamei (also our
               verse discusses this).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Question:</font></b> How do we learn entering the Mikdash (when
               Tamei)?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Answer (part 2):</font></b> 'B'Chol Kodesh Lo Siga v'El ha'Mikdash
          Lo Savo' equates entering the Mikdash and eating Kodshim.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Question:</font></b> If so, we should say the same for eating
          Terumah!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> '<i>B'Chol</i> Kodesh Lo Siga' includes Terumah!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Answer:</font></b> 'Bah' excludes Terumah.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Question:</font></b> Perhaps 'Bah' excludes entering the Mikdash,
          but one brings a Korban for eating Terumah!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  Answer:</font></b> Presumably, entering the Mikdash is like eating
          Kodshim, for both are punishable by Kares.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)  Rejection:</font></b> Eating Terumah is more similar to eating
          Kodshim, for both are acts of eating!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)  Answer #3 (to Question 3:b, Daf 6B - Rava):</font></b> We learn from
          the three times it says 'Kares' for a Tamei person who
          eats Shelamim:
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> One teaches about Shelamim itself;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> One teaches about the general category of Kodshim
               (that Kares is only for Kodshim similar to Shelamim,
               i.e. they are destined for the Altar);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> One teaches about the unspecified Tum'ah for which
               the Torah obligates an Oleh v'Yored, that it is for
               eating Kodshim (when he is Tamei);
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  We already know (from Answer (e), part 1) that
                    one is liable for eating Kodshim, therefore, we
                    apply the third 'Kares' to obligate for another
                    transgression of Tum'ah punishable by Kares,
                    i.e. entering the Mikdash.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)  Objection #1:</font></b> The third Kares is needed to teach R.
          Avahu's law!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (R. Avahu):</font></b> It says 'Kares' three times regarding a
               Tamei person who eats Shelamim. One teaches about
               Shelamim itself. One teaches about the general
               category of Kodshim (as above);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> The third obligates Kares for eating (while Tamei)
               Kodshim that are not normally eaten (e.g. wood
               burned on the Altar, frankincense, and incense).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)  Objection#2:</font></b> According to R. Shimon, who exempts (from
          Kares) for Kodshim that are not normally eaten, the third
          'Kares' is needed to teach about Chata'os whose blood is
          offered on the inner Altar;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> One might have thought that since R. Shimon taught
               that Kares of Pigul (a Korban offered with intent to
               eat it after the allowed time) only for Kodshim
               brought on the outer Altar, like Shelamim, the same
               applies to Tum'ah. The third 'Kares' teaches that
               this is not so.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)  Answer #4 (Chachamim of Neharde'a):</font></b> We learn from the
          three times it mentions Tum'ah regarding a Tamei person
          who eats Shelamim:
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> One teaches about Shelamim itself; one teaches about
               the general category of Kodshim;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> One teaches about the unspecified Tum'ah for which
               the Torah obligates an Oleh v'Yored, that it is for
               eating Kodshim (while Tamei);
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  We already know that one is liable for eating
                    Kodshim. Therefore, we apply the third Tum'ah
                    to obligate for another transgression of Tum'ah
                    punishable by Kares, i.e. entering the Mikdash.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)  Objection:</font></b> Since the Torah needed to teach Kares three
          times for R. Avahu's law, it must mention Tum'ah three
          times. (Tum'ah is not free to be expounded!)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)  Answer #5 (Rava):</font></b> We learn from a Gezeirah Shavah
          'Tum'aso-Tum'aso';

<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) A 'TAMEI' PERSON WHO EATS THE MEAT OF A 'KORBAN SHELAMIM'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: Rebbi Avahu explains why the Torah mentions the punishment of Kares in three verses with regard to a Tamei person who eats the meat of a Korban Shelamim. The first verse states, 'Any man who shall come near [to eat]... the consecrated meat that the Jewish people bring to Hash-m, and his Tum'ah is upon him, that soul shall be cut off from before Me' (Vayikra 22:3).
</p><p>
The second verse states, 'The person who will eat from the Korban Shelamim that is for Hash-m at the time that the state of Tum'ah is upon him... his soul shall be cut off from its people' (Vayikra 7:20).
</p><p>
The third verse states, 'Any soul who touches any impurity...and eats from the meat of the Shelamim...will be cut off from its people' (Vayikra 7:21).
</p><p>
Rebbi Avahu explains that the first verse teaches a Klal, a general rule that all forms of Kodshim are included in the prohibition against eating Kodshim when one is Tamei (see Rashi DH Achas). The second verse is required to teach a Prat, a specific detail in the law. Rashi (DH Achas) writes that since the first verse discusses all forms of Kodshim, and the second and third verses refer specifically to a Korban Shelamim, one of those two specific verses teaches that only forms of Kodshim which are similar to a Korban Shelamim are included in the prohibition.
</p><p>
Accordingly, only Kodshei Mizbe'ach (animals fit to be offered on the Mizbe'ach) are included in the prohibition, but not Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis (inanimate items consecrated for the upkeep of the Beis ha'Mikdash).
</p><p>
The third verse teaches that one is liable even when he eats an inedible item when he is Tamei, like the wood of the fire on the Mizbe'ach, or the incense offering. The Gemara adds that according to Rebbi Shimon, who maintains that a Tamei person is not liable for eating inedible items from the Mizbe'ach, the third verse teaches that even if one eats a Chatas ha'Penimis (a Chatas offered inside the Heichal), he is liable.
</p><p>
Why does Rebbi Shimon need a special verse to include a Chatas ha'Penimis in this law? The Gemara explains that Rebbi Shimon maintains that any Korban that differs from a Korban Shelamim and is not offered on the Mizbe'ach in the Azarah cannot make one liable for Pigul. Accordingly, it is possible that he also maintains that one who is Tamei is not liable for eating the Chatas ha'Penimis, since it is not offered on the outer Mizbe'ach. The third verse therefore teaches that one indeed is liable for eating a Chatas ha'Penimis when he is impure.
</p><p>
The <b>RITVA</b> asks that the third verse could teach something else. Many forms of Kodshim are offered on the outer Mizbe'ach but never become permitted to eat. For example, the Kometz of a Minchah, the Minchas Nesachim, and the Minchas Kohanim are offered on the outer Mizbe'ach but may not be eaten. What is the source that a Tamei person who eats these forms of Kodshim is liable?
</p><p>
The Ritva adds that the Gemara in Zevachim (44a) states that only parts of Korbanos that eventually become permitted to be eaten can become Pigul. Accordingly, one is not liable for Pigul if the part of the Korban which is in question would never become permitted to be eaten. This means that the Gemara's logic for why a verse is needed to include a Chatas ha'Penimis similarly applies to these Korbanos. One would have thought that just as one is not liable when he eats these Korbanos when a Kohen had Pigul thoughts about them, so, too, he should not be liable when he eats these Korbanos in a state of impurity.
</p><p>
Why does the Gemara not say that <i>this</i> is the law derived from the third verse which mentions that one who eats Shelamim while Tamei receives Kares?
</p><p>
ANSWER: The Ritva answers that this law is already derived from the second verse. The verse states, 'The person who will eat from the Korban Shelamim that is for Hash-m....' The Gemara in Zevachim (36b) explains that the words, 'that is for Hash-m,' teach that one who is Tamei is liable for eating from the limbs of Kodshim Kalim that are offered on the Mizbe'ach (even though they are for Hash-m and are not permitted to be eaten, even by one who is Tahor).
</p><p>
If one who is Tamei is liable for eating limbs which must be burned on the Mizbe'ach and which are never permitted to be eaten, then one similarly is liable for eating any of the items mentioned above, such as the Kometz, Minchas Nesachim, and Minchas Kohen.
</p><p>
In contrast, the two examples which the Gemara here mentions, inedible items and Chatas ha'Penimis, cannot be derived from the teaching in Zevachim (36b). Inedible items cannot be derived because the verse is discussing a person who 'eats meat,' which suggests that one who is Tamei is liable for Kares only when he eats edible items of Kodshim.
</p><p>
Liability for eating a Chatas ha'Penimis also cannot be derived from this verse, because this type of Chatas is not considered 'for Hash-m,' since it is burned outside of Yerushalayim and not on the Mizbe'ach. This is why the Gemara chooses to include either inedible items or the Chatas ha'Penimis in the teaching of the third verse, and not other things that are not permitted to be eaten. (D. Bloom)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) WORKING WITH DIVERSE SPECIES</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>     </font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa - Rebbi):</font></b> Why does it say 'Nefesh Asher
               Tiga... v'Nivlas Chayah... Behemah'? Behemah was
               already included in Chayah!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer:</font></b> This is extra, to learn a Gezeirah Shavah
               'Behemah-Behemah' from eating Kodshim when Tamei
               (also our verse discusses this).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Makos 22a (R. Hoshaya):</font></b> One who mates (even with its
               own species) Pesulei ha'Mukdashim (a blemished
               Korban that was redeemed, or Ma'aser or Bechor,
               which need not be redeemed) is lashed. It is like
               two species, Chulin and Kodshim.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   (R. Yitzchak):</font></b> One who conducts (works with) Pesulei
               ha'Mukdashim is lashed. Even though it is one
               animal, the Torah considers it like two species.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Bechoros 33a:</font></b> Three verses mention Tzvi v'Ayal (a
               deer and a wild goat). One of them teaches the laws
               of R. Yitzchak and R. Oshaya.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Bava Kama 54b (Mishnah):</font></b> The following apply to all
               Behemos (domestic animals), Chayos (wild animals)
               and fowl... working with or crossbreeding diverse
               species.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b> We learn about working with diverse species from a
               Gezeirah Shavah 'Shor-Shor' from Shabbos. We learn
               about crossbreeding diverse species from a Gezeirah
               Shavah 'Behemah-Behemah' from Shabbos.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.   55a - Question (Rachbah):</font></b> May one use a goat and
               Shibuta (a fish) to pull together?
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Since goats never go in the sea, and fish never
                    go on the land, it is permitted. Or, since he
                    works with them, it is forbidden.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.   Mishnah (Kilayim 8:1):</font></b> One may raise and keep Kilai
               Behemah. It is forbidden only to crossbreed them.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>10.  Mishnah (2):</font></b> One may not plow, pull or lead diverse
               species, whether they are both Behemos or Chayos or
               one of each. This is whether they are Tahor or Tamei
               or one of each.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rambam (Hilchos Kilayim 9:7):</font></b> If one works with two
               Behemos or Chayos and one was Tahor and one was
               Tamei, he is lashed.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rambam (8):</font></b> One is liable for any Tahor species with
               a Tamei species, whether they are Behemos or Chayos
               or one of each. Mid'Rabanan, one may not work with
               any two species that one may not mate together (even
               if both are Tahor or Tamei).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rambam (11):</font></b> The Torah considers Pesulei
               ha'Mukdashim like two bodies. It was Kodesh, and now
               it is Chol, so it is like a Tamei and Tahor animal
               together - 'Kol Behemah Teme'ah Asher Lo Yakrivu...'
               Therefore, one who plows with it or mates it is
               lashed.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Rebuttal (Ra'avad):</font></b> Bechoros 33a considers it
                    like a Behemah and Chayah, for it is like Tzvi
                    and Ayal, but it does not consider it Tamei.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Perush ha'Mishnayos (Kilayim 8:2):</font></b> Since the (first)
               Mishnah said that the only Isur of Kilai Behemah is
               to crossbreed them, our Mishnah explains that this
               is only for two Chayos or two Behemos and the rest
               of what it details. However, if one is Tahor and one
               is Tamei, there is another Isur in addition to
               crossbreeding, i.e. one may not plow, pull or lead
               them. Mid'Rabanan, this is forbidden with any two
               diverse species.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Radvaz (8):</font></b> The Mishnah supports the Rambam. If
                    there were no difference between (which
                    combinations of animals are forbidden for)
                    mating and plowing, one Mishnah would have
                    taught both of these together. Rather, first it
                    taught the Isur of crossbreeding, then it lists
                    combinations of animals, then it teaches the
                    Isur of working together. Semag supports the
                    Rambam from a Tosefta, in which R. Meir forbids
                    tying together Tamei animals, and Chachamim
                    permit. Surely all agree that tying connects
                    them (this is like working together), but
                    Chachamim permit because both are Tamei! In any
                    case the Mishnah is not difficult for the
                    Rambam. Even if it forbids in every case, the
                    Isur is mid'Oraisa only when one is Tamei and
                    one is Tahor. Rachbah asked about a goat and
                    Shibuta, for Shibuta is Tamei. Even if you will
                    say that it is Tahor, he asked about whether
                    there is an Isur mid'Rabanan. The Rambam
                    explained that the Torah equated Pesulei
                    ha'Mukdashim to a Tamei and Tahor animal. It
                    says Tzvi v'Ayal just to teach that it may be
                    eaten in Tum'ah (therefore, it needed to
                    discuss Tahor species).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Rosh (Hilchos Kilayim 5):</font></b> The Rambam holds that the
               Gezeirah Shavah 'Shor-Shor' from Shabbos teaches
               that every animal and Chayah is like an ox or
               donkey, but the Isur is only if they are like an ox
               and donkey, i.e. one is Tamei and one is Tahor. If
               both are Tahor or both are Tamei, the Isur is only
               mid'Rabanan. The Mishnah includes whether both are
               Tamei or both Tahor or one of each. This shows that
               we do not distinguish. The Mishnah discusses various
               laws that apply to Behemos and Chayos. It seems that
               the same law applies to all of them. In Makos we say
               that one who mates or conducts Pesulei ha'Mukdashim
               is lashed, for it is like two species, Chulin and
               Kodshim. R. Tam explains that it is like a deer and
               wild goat. Bechoros 33a proves this. It says that
               one of the three verses that mention Tzvi v'Ayal
               teaches the laws of R. Yitzchak and R. Oshaya. The
               Rambam is forced to say that Kodesh and Chulin is
               like Tahor and Tamei. It is difficult to say that
               this obligates lashes. The Sifri says that one is
               liable for any diverse species. 'Ox and donkey'
               exclude a man who plows with an animal. This is the
               only Heter it found, for the Torah forbids any two
               different animals!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Rosh (Teshuvah 2:16):</font></b> Rachbah asked if one may use a
               goat and Shibuta to pull together. Shibuta is Tahor;
               in France, they eat it. (Rachbah asked only because
               one is a fish, but he does not exempt two Tahor 
               species!)
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   Tosfos (Avodah Zarah 39a DH v'Simanech):</font></b> Shibuta is
               Tahor, like it says in Kidushin (41a) that Rava
               salted Shibuta to honor Shabbos. We see from
               Rachbah's question that it is the sea creature that
               corresponds to a goat.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Shnos Eliyahu (Kilayim 9:8):</font></b> 'Behemtecha Lo
                    Sarbi'a Kilayim' connotes all Behemos, and
                    Chayos are included. 'Lo Sacharosh b'Shor
                    v'Chamor Yachdav' forbids only like an ox and
                    donkey, i.e. one is Tahor and one is Tamei.
                    This is like the Rambam.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Note:</font></b> It seems that the Gra retracted. In his
                    Perush on Shulchan Aruch (below) he rules like
                    the Rosh.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Da'as Zekenim mi'Ba'alei ha'Tosfos (Devarim
                    22:10):</font></b> The Torah forbids working with an ox
                    and donkey because the ox chews its cud and the
                    donkey is pained when it hears the ox eat.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Meshech Chachmah:</font></b> This is like the Rambam, who
                    forbids only Tamei and Tahor. One must
                    reconcile this with the Yerushalmi, which
                    forbids riding on a mule (because it comes from
                    two species). In Moreh Nevuchim (3:49), the
                    Rambam explains that the Torah merely distances
                    us from crossbreeding any two species. This is
                    unlike what he wrote in Mishnah Torah. A
                    crossbreed of Tamei and Tahor is unlikely to
                    produce offspring!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.   Note:</font></b> The Meshech Chachmah could have asked
                    from the Bavli, which forbids working with
                    Pesulei ha'Mukdashim, even though the reason of
                    Da'as Zekenim mi'Ba'alei ha'Tosfos does not
                    apply. According to his reason, perhaps 'Tahor'
                    and 'Tamei' refer to animals that do and do not
                    chew the cud, respectively. If so, a camel
                    would have the law of a Tahor animal. The
                    reason does not apply when the animals work
                    with food that it can eat (since one must let
                    them eat). Also the Ramban (Devarim 22:8) says
                    that the Isur to work with Kilayim is due to
                    the Isur of crossbreeding. This explains the
                    side to permit a fish with a goat, since fish
                    never go on the land and there is no concern
                    lest they mate.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (YD 297:10):</font></b> One may not do Melachah
               with two species, e.g. to plow or pull a wagon,
               whether they are Tahor or Tamei or one of each,
               whether they are Behemos or Chayos or one of each.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Gra (21):</font></b> The Shulchan Aruch did not say that
                    he is lashed, for the Rambam holds that he is
                    lashed only for a Tamei and Tahor species. The
                    Rosh refuted this, and all Poskim hold like the
                    Rosh. 
<br>


lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Just like there it discusses a Tamei person who
               entered the Mikdash, also here (regarding Oleh
               v'Yored).
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>2) WHAT WE LEARN FROM 'BAH'</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Question:</font></b> Since we have no source to include Terumah,
          what does 'Bah' come to exclude?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Answer:</font></b> It comes to <i>include</i> one who ate Neveilah of a
          Tahor bird (and later entered the Mikdash), that he is
          liable.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Question:</font></b> 'Bah' comes to exclude!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Answer:</font></b> 'Chi Yiga' already excludes one who ate Neveilah
          of a Tahor bird (since one who touches it does not become
          Tamei, only one who eats it);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> 'Bah' also comes to exclude. Two exclusions for the
               same matter teach that we include it.
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>3) THE ATONEMENT OF THE GOAT OFFERED INSIDE</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> If he knew of the Tum'ah, and forgot (and
          entered the Mikdash or ate Kodshim), and did not remember
          before Yom Kipur, the goat (whose blood is) offered
          inside (the Kodesh ha'Kodoshim on Yom Kipur and Yom Kipur
          itself protect him from punishment).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  (Beraisa - R. Yehudah) Suggestion:</font></b> It says the inner goat
          of Yom Kipur 'v'Chiper Al ha'Kodesh mi'Tum'os Bnei
          Yisrael umi'Pisheihem l'Chol Chatosom.' Perhaps it atones
          for three transgressions that are called 'Tum'ah', i.e.
          idolatry, Arayos (forbidden relations), and murder!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> It says about idolatry 'Lema'an Tamei Es Mikdashi.'
               It says about Arayos 'v'Lo Sitame'u Bahem.' It says
               about murder 'v'Lo Sitamei Es ha'Aretz.'
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Rejection:</font></b> It atones 'Mi'Tum'os Bnei Yisrael', and not
          from all Tum'os.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Question:</font></b> Which Tum'os have a special law?
               (Presumably, the verse refers to these.)
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer:</font></b> It is Tum'ah of the Mikdash and Kodshim.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b>  R. Shimon says, obviously the verse discusses Tum'ah of
          the Mikdash and Kodshim - 'v'Chiper Al ha'Kodesh
          mi'Tum'os', i.e.Tum'os of Kodesh!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps it atones for all transgressions
               of Tum'os of Kodesh!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rejection:</font></b> 'Umi'Pisheihem l'Chol Chatosom' - it
               atones for Chata'im (unintentional sins) that
               resemble Pesha'im (intentional sins);
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  There is no Korban for Pesha'im. This Korban
                    atones for such Chata'im (to exclude one who
                    knew he was Tamei, forgot, and later learned of
                    his sin).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Question:</font></b> What is the source that this Korban
               protects from punishment one who knew at the
               beginning (that he became Tamei, forgot and entered
               the Mikdash or ate Kodshim), but not at the end (he
               did not realize his sin before Yom Kipur)?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Answer:</font></b> 'L'Chol Chatosom' refers to one who will
               bring a Korban (when he later realizes his sin). 
<br>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) THE ATONEMENT PROVIDED BY THE 'SA'IR HA'PENIM'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The verse states that the Sa'ir ha'Penim, the goat offered by the Kohen Gadol on Yom Kippur, the blood of which is sprinkled in the Kodesh ha'Kodashim, atones for the 'impurities of the Jewish people' (Vayikra 16:6). The Beraisa says that this may refer to the three major impurities (sins) of Bnei Yisrael: idolatry, immorality, and murder. The Beraisa later rejects this possibility and concludes that the Sa'ir atones for the impurities of the Beis ha'Mikdash and its holy vessels.
</p><p>
The Gemara (end of 7b) asks, what did the Beraisa mean when it originally suggested that the Sa'ir atones for idolatry? Certainly, the Beraisa could not have meant that the Sa'ir atones for intentional idol-worship, because the perpetrator in such a case is Chayav Misah, and he cannot be exonerated with the offering of a Korban. If the idol was worshipped accidentally, then the perpetrator is obligated to bring the special Korban Chatas for such a sin (Bamidbar 15:27). How could the Beraisa originally have suggested that the Sa'ir ha'Penim atones for idol worship?
</p><p>
Why does the Gemara not address the possibility that perhaps the Torah is teaching that this special offering on Yom Kippur indeed atones for both deliberate and inadvertent sins of idolatry? (<b>RITVA</b>)
</p><p>
ANSWER: The <b>RITVA</b> (see also <b>TOSFOS</b> DH Iy b'Shogeg) answers that the Gemara's source that the Sa'ir ha'Penim does not atone for idolatry is the Gemara in Kerisus (25a). The Mishnah there states that one who is obligated to bring a Chatas or an Asham for a sin he committed must bring his Korban even if Yom Kippur passes before he has brought his Korban.
</p><p>
The Gemara there (25b) discusses at length the source that the Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach itself does not atone for these transgressions. The Gemara concludes that this is derived from various verses. The Gemara there (26a) also states that if one is liable for lashes and Yom Kippur passes, he is not exempt from the lashes. It follows that the Sa'ir ha'Penim does not effect any such atonement.
</p><p>
Moreover, the two Se'irim are compared to each other in the verse, 'And he shall take the two Se'irim' (Vayikra 16:7). Accordingly, just as the Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach does not atone for the sins for which individuals must bring Korbanos, the Sa'ir ha'Penim also does not atone for such sins. (D. Bloom) 
</p><p>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) ATONEMENT FOR OTHER SINS</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Beraisa) Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps it atones for idolatry,
          Arayos, and murder.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question:</font></b> What is the case of idolatry?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> If he served b'Mezid, he is Chayav Misah (he should
               be executed! Surely the goat does not atone for
               him!)
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> If he served b'Shogeg, he must bring a Korban!
               (Surely the goat does not exempt him from this!)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer #1:</font></b> He served b'Mezid without warning (so Beis Din
          does not kill him);
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Answer #2:</font></b> He served b'Shogeg and never realized his sin
          (so he is not yet liable to bring a Korban).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Question:</font></b> What is the case of Arayos?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> If he sinned b'Mezid, he is Chayav Misah. If he
               sinned b'Shogeg, he must bring a Korban!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Answer:</font></b> We can say that he sinned b'Mezid without
          warning, or b'Shogeg and never realized his sin.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Question:</font></b> What is the case of murder?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> If he killed b'Mezid, he is Chayav Misah. If he
               killed b'Shogeg, he must be exiled in a city of
               refuge! (Surely the goat does not exempt him from
               this.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Answer:</font></b> We can say that he killed b'Mezid without
          warning;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Or, he killed b'Shogeg and never realized it, or in
               a way that is exempt from exile (e.g. he was engaged
               in an upward motion).
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>2) FOR WHICH TUM'OS DOES IT ATONE?</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Beraisa - R. Yehudah) Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps it atones for
          these three transgressions!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Rejection:</font></b> It atones 'mi'Tum'os', but not from all
          Tum'os.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Question:</font></b> Which Tum'os are have a special law?
               (Presumably, the verse refers to these.)
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer:</font></b> They are Tum'ah of the Mikdash and Kodshim.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Question:</font></b> In what respect do these Tum'os have a special
          law?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Answer:</font></b> The Korban for them is an Oleh v'Yored.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Question:</font></b> Also idolatry has a special law! The Korban
          Chatas for idolatry must be a female goat. A regular
          Chatas can be a female lamb or goat! (We should say that
          the inner goat atones for idolatry!)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Answer (Rav Kahana):</font></b> The inner goat atones for something
          that has a special leniency, and not a special
          stringency.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Question:</font></b> A woman who gave birth has a special leniency.
          She brings an Oleh v'Yored!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Answer (R. Hoshaya):</font></b> 'L'Chol Chatosom' does not apply,
          for her Korban is for Tum'ah, and not for a sin.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Question:</font></b> According to R. Shimon, who says that the
               Korban is to atone in case she swore during labor
               that she will never have relations with her husband
               again, how can we answer?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer:</font></b> There is no question according to R. Shimon.
               He says that 'v'Chiper Al ha'Kodesh' teaches that it
               atones for Tum'os of the Mikdash and Kodshim.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Question:</font></b> A Metzora has a special leniency (he brings an
          Oleh v'Yored)!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  Answer (R. Hoshaya):</font></b> 'L'Chol Chatosom' does not apply,
          for his Korban is for Tum'ah, and not for a sin.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Question:</font></b> According to Rav Shmuel bar Nachmani, who
               says that Tzara'as comes for seven sins, how can we
               answer?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer:</font></b> The Tzara'as atoned for him. The Korban is
               only to permit him to eat Kodshim.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)  Question:</font></b> A Nazir Tamei has a special leniency. He brings
          pigeons or doves (in place of animals)!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)  Answer (R. Hoshaya):</font></b> 'L'Chol Chatosom' does not apply,
          for his Korban is for Tum'ah, and not for a sin.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Question:</font></b> According to R. Eliezer ha'Kapar, who says
               that a Nazir is a sinner (for denying himself wine),
               how can we answer?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer:</font></b> He must hold like R. Shimon (who learns from
               'v'Chiper Al ha'Kodesh').
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)  Question:</font></b> Why doesn't R. Yehudah learn like R. Shimon?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)  Answer:</font></b> He uses 'v'Chiper Al ha'Kodesh' to teach that the
          blood is sprinkled in the Heichal the same way it is
          sprinkled in the Kodesh ha'Kodoshim (once downwards, and
          seven times upwards).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> R. Shimon learns this from 'v'Chen Ya'aseh l'Ohel
               Mo'ed.'
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> R. Yehudah holds that if we only learned from that
               verse, one might have thought that he slaughters
               another bull and goat in order to sprinkle their
               blood in the Heichal.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> R. Shimon holds that the verse connotes that the
               sprinkles from the same blood mentioned above.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)  (Beraisa) Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps it atones for all
          transgressions of Tum'os of Kodesh!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rejection:</font></b> It atones 'umi'Pisheihem l'Chol Chatosom'
               (only for Chata'im that resemble Pesha'im, i.e.
               there is no Korban for them).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)  Question:</font></b> This excludes Chata'im in which he knew (of the
          Tum'ah) at the beginning and (realized his sin) at the
          end. One brings a Korban for the,. Surely the goat does
          not exempt him from the Korban!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)  Answer:</font></b> The case is, he realized his sin just before
          sunset of Erev Yom Kipur, and there was no time to bring
          the Korban;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> One might have thought the goat protects him from
               punishment. The verse teaches that it does not.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) ONE WHO FINDS OUT THAT HE IS OBLIGATED TO BRING A KORBAN CHATAS ON THE DAY BEFORE YOM KIPPUR</b></font>
<br>QUESTION:
<br>The verse states that the Sa'ir ha'Penim, the goat offered by the Kohen Gadol on Yom Kippur, the blood of which is sprinkled in the Kodesh ha'Kodashim, atones for the 'impurities of the Jewish people, and from their Pesha'im (intentional sins) for all of their Chata'os (unintentional sins)' (Vayikra 16:16).
</p><p>
The Gemara (7b) quotes a Beraisa which derives from the words 'Pesha'im' and 'Chata'os' that a Chet can be compared to a Pesha. Just as no Korban is brought for a Pesha (since no Korban is brought to atone for a deliberate sin, with the exception of Shifchah Charufah), the Chata'im for which the Sa'ir atones are those for which no Korban is brought.
</p><p>
The Gemara (end of 8a) suggests that this excludes a case in which the person knew that he became Tamei but forgot and entered the Beis ha'Mikdash or ate Kodshim, and afterwards he realized his sin. The Gemara asks that no verse should be necessary to teach that this case is excluded from the atonement of the Sa'ir ha'Penim. Since the person must bring a Korban Chatas Oleh v'Yored for his sin, it is not logical that the Sa'ir ha'Penim should atone for it.
</p><p>
The Gemara answers that the verse is necessary for a case in which the person only found out shortly before sunset on Erev Yom Kippur that he had eaten Kodshim while he was Tamei. <b>RASHI</b> (DH Samuch) explains that one might think that because he did not have sufficient time to bring the Korban before Yom Kippur, he indeed is exempt when the Sa'ir ha'Penim is brought on Yom Kippur. The verse therefore teaches that even in such a case the Sa'ir ha'Penim does not atone for his sin.
</p><p>
Why is it necessary for the Gemara to say that he found out about his sin shortly before the onset of Yom Kippur? Even if he would have found out on the morning of Erev Yom Kippur, he still would not have been able to bring a Korban, because of the principle stated by the Gemara in Pesachim (13b): one may not offer a Korban when it will not be able to be eaten for the allotted number of days, and the meat will likely end up as Nosar. (This rule is known as 'Ein Mevi'in Kodshim l'Beis ha'Pesul.')
</p><p>
Since a Korban Chatas may be eaten for one day and one night (see Zevachim 53a), it follows that one may not bring a Korban Chatas on the morning before Yom Kippur because he thereby will lose the opportunity to eat the Chatas at night. (This is the reason why 'Mizmor l'Sodah' is omitted from Pesukei d'Zimrah in the morning service of Erev Yom Kippur. That chapter of Tehilim corresponds to the offering of a Korban Todah, which cannot be offered on Yom Kippur since it cannot be eaten on Yom Kippur night. See <b>REMA</b> OC 604:2.)
</p><p>
Accordingly, why does the Gemara say that the person found out about his sin shortly before sunset? Even if he discovers his sin much earlier, on the morning of Erev Yom Kippur, he still is not permitted to bring his Korban Chatas before Yom Kippur.
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>PORAS YOSEF</b> suggests that since Rebbi Shimon is mentioned in the Beraisa, it may be that he is consistent with his opinion in Zevachim (76a), where he disagrees with the law of 'Ein Mevi'in Kodshim l'Beis ha'Pesul.'
</p><p>
1. However, the Poras Yosef questions this answer. The Gemara in Zevachim implies that Rebbi Shimon is lenient only b'Di'eved, but not l'Chatchilah. The Gemara suggests that Rebbi Shimon allows bringing Korbanos in such a case only when the purpose is 'l'Tikunei Gavra' -- 'to make a person fit' to bring Korbanos if his status will be changed by the Korban (such as in the case of a Metzora).
</p><p>
(b) Therefore, the Poras Yosef suggests that the principle of 'Ein Mevi'in Kodshim l'Beis ha'Pesul' is only mid'Rabanan, but mid'Oraisa one may bring a Chatas on Erev Yom Kippur. Since the Gemara here is explaining the verses of the Torah, the Gemara mentions a case in which the person finds out about his sin only shortly before sunset. If he would find out about it in the morning, he would be able to bring his Korban on Erev Yom Kippur, mid'Oraisa.
</p><p>
Similarly, the <b>MELECHES BETZALEL</b> cites the <b>SHA'AR HA'MELECH</b> (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 6:18) who also writes that the principle of 'Ein Mevi'in Kodshim l'Beis ha'Pesul' is only mid'Rabanan. The Sha'ar ha'Melech cites <b>TOSFOS</b> in Pesachim (89a, DH Hani) who also implies that the reason for this law is that the Korban might become Nosar, which is only a concern only mid'Rabanan.
</p><p>
(c) The Meleches Betzalel suggests another answer to the question. The Gemara here indeed may follow the view of Rebbi Shimon, as suggested by the Poras Yosef. The Poras Yosef's question on his answer is not difficult. Perhaps the purpose of bringing the Korban on Erev Yom Kippur is indeed 'l'Tikunei Gavra.' As mentioned earlier, Rebbi Shimon agrees that the prohibition of bringing Kodshim to the Beis ha'Pesul does not apply in such a case. The Meleches Betzalel explains that the reason why this is considered 'l'Tikunei Gavra' is that the purpose for bringing the Chatas is to protect the person from suffering (see Rashi to 8b, DH Nisli). As long as he does not bring his Korban, he is in danger of Divine punishment. Therefore, there is no greater form of 'l'Tikunei Gavra' than this. (D. Bloom)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) MURDERERS WHO ARE NOT EXILED</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>     </font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The goat offered inside on Yom Kipur atone for one
               who killed b'Mezid without warning, or one who
               killed b'Shogeg and never realized it, or in a way
               that is exempt from exile.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Makos 7b (Beraisa):</font></b> 'Bi'Shgagah' excludes Mezid.
               'Bi'Vli Da'as' excludes one who intended.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Objection:</font></b> If he was Mezid, obviously he is not
               exiled. He is killed!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Answer (Rava):</font></b> It excludes (something close to)
               Mezid, i.e. Omer Mutar (he thought that murder is
               permitted).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Question (Abaye):</font></b> Omer Mutar is Ones!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Answer (Rava):</font></b> I say that it is close to Mezid.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   (Beraisa):</font></b> 'B'Lo Eivah' excludes if he hated the
               victim;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.   Bava Kama 32b (Beraisa):</font></b> If Ploni entered Reuven's
               carpentry shop without permission, and a piece of
               wood flew off and killed him, Reuven is exempt. If
               Ploni had permission to enter, Reuven is liable.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.   Version #1 (R. Yosi bar Chanina):</font></b> He is liable to
               pay damage (if Ploni was hurt), but exempt from
               exile (if he died), for this is unlike a forest, in
               which, each enters his own domain. Here, the victim
               entered Reuven's domain.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>10.  (Rava):</font></b> In a forest, (Ploni did not ask permission,
               yet) Reuven is exiled. Here he had explicit
               permission, all the more so Reuven should be exiled!
               Rather, Reuven is exempt, i.e. he does not merit
               exile, for he is close to Mezid.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>11.  Question (Mishnah):</font></b> If Reuven threw a stone to a
               Reshus ha'Rabim and killed someone, he is exiled.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  This is close to Mezid, for many go in a Reshus
                    ha'Rabim!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>12.  Answer (Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak):</font></b> The case is,
               Reuven was destroying his wall during the day into a
               waste-heap.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>13.  Question:</font></b> If people frequent it (to use it for a
               privy), he is (close to) Mezid! If people don't
               frequent it, he is (close to) Ones!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>14.  Answer (Rav Papa):</font></b> People often frequent it at
               night. Occasionally they frequent it by day.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>15.  Version #2 (R. Yosi bar Chanina):</font></b> In the Reisha of
               the Beraisa he is exempt from exile, but is liable
               to pay for damages.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>16.  Question (Beraisa):</font></b> If a man entered a smith's shop,
               and a spark flew off and killed him, the smith is
               exempt, even if the victim entered with permission.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>17.  Answer:</font></b> This Beraisa discusses an apprentice. The
               teacher asked him to leave, and he refused. Others
               do not fear the smith, so he should check that they
               left. An apprentice fears the smith, so he could
               assume that he left.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>18.  Version #3 (Beraisa):</font></b> 'And it found' excludes a
               victim who brought himself to be damaged;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>19. </font></b> R. Eliezer ben Yakov says, this teaches that if
               Reuven threw a stone, and Shimon stuck out his head
               and was killed, Reuven is exempt.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>20.  (R. Yosi bar Chanina):</font></b> He is exempt from exile, but
               he pays damages.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rambam (Hilchos Rotze'ach 4:8):</font></b> If one killed in
               front of two witnesses, but they did not see
               together, rather, one after the other, or he killed
               in front of witnesses without warning, we confine
               the murderer in Kipah (a cell) and feed him sparse
               bread and water to construct is stomach, and later
               we feed him barley to burst his stomach.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rambam (6:5):</font></b> If one was close to Mezid, (he does
               not go to Galus). He guards himself from the Go'el
               ha'Dam. The same applies to murderers who killed in
               front of one witness, without warning, or similar
               cases. If the Go'el ha'Dam killed him, he is not
               killed. These cases are no more severe than one who
               killed without intent.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Rebuttal (Ra'avad):</font></b> How is one witness believed
                    to permit his blood to the Go'el ha'Dam?!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Defense (Kesef Mishneh):</font></b> The Rambam does not
                    mean one witness, rather, Edus Meyuchedes, i.e.
                    the witnesses testified on different days, or
                    saw the murder one after the other, like the
                    Rambam wrote about Kipah (4:8). Perhaps
                    'similar cases' alludes to when the witnesses
                    contradicted each other about matters not
                    essential to the testimony.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Moreh ha'Nevuchim (3:40):</font></b> One who owns the land
                    where a murdered body was found will strive to
                    find a witness, even a woman, to testify, lest
                    they bring Eglah Arufah (behead a calf to atone
                    for the murder), which would forbid him to farm
                    the area. A king may kill the murderer based on
                    estimation (e.g. one witness, if it seems
                    true). If the king does not kill him, the Go'el
                    ha'Dam will scheme to kill him.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Radvaz (5:213):</font></b> It seems to me our text of the
                    Rambam is mistaken. Rather, he discusses only
                    when the witnesses did not see at the same
                    time, like he says in 4:8. There, he says that
                    we put the murderer in Kipah. Here, he teaches
                    that if the murderer escaped and the Go'el
                    ha'Dam killed him, he is not liable. In any
                    case we must say so to explain why above he
                    says that one who killed in front of witnesses
                    without warning gets Kipah, and here he says
                    that the Go'el ha'Dam is exempt for killing
                    him.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rambam (Hilchos Malachim 3:10):</font></b> If there is not a
               clear proof that Ploni killed, or he killed without
               warning, even in front of one witness, or if Ploni
               killed b'Shogeg one whom he hates, the king can kill 
               Ploni according to the needs of the time.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Hilchos Rotze'ach (6:6):</font></b> If Reuven threw a rock into
               Reshus ha'Rabim and killed, or he destroyed his wall
               into Reshus ha'Rabim and a rock fell and killed,
               whether this was during the day or at night, he is
               close to Mezid and he is not exiled. This is
               negligence. He should have looked before throwing or
               destroying.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Rambam (7):</font></b> If he destroyed his wall into a waste
               area at night, if people are often found there, he
               is close to Mezid, and he is not exiled. If people
               are (almost) never found there, he is close to Ones
               and exempt from exile.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Tosfos (Bava Kama 32b DH Mesivei):</font></b> In Makos 7b,
                    Rava exempts Omer Mutar, for he is close to
                    Mezid. Why didn't the Gemara challenge him from
                    the Mishnah of one who threw a stone to a
                    Reshus ha'Rabim. He is exiled, even though he
                    is close to Mezid! This is because there is
                    different (it is <i>closer</i> to Mezid). The Sugya
                    in Makos 8a is like Version #1 here.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b> Lechem Mishneh (Hilchos Chovel u'Mazik 1:17):
                    The Rambam rules like Version #2, in which one
                    is exempt if the victim entered without
                    permission, but he is liable if he entered with
                    permission. If so, the Halachah does not follow
                    the discussion in Version #1. We explain the
                    Mishnah simply. Close to Mezid does not exempt
                    from exile! Why did the Rambam rule like
                    Version #1 regarding destroying a wall? He
                    cannot rely on Makos 8a, for it is like Version
                    #1! The Rambam holds that since it was taught
                    Stam in Makos, it is the Halachah, and it is
                    (even) like Version #2. The Mishnah of throwing
                    a stone to a Reshus ha'Rabim must discuss
                    destroying a wall. The Rambam does not
                    distinguish different kinds of close to Mezid.
                    However, according to Version #2, we must say
                    that the Beraisa discusses an apprentice. Why
                    did the Rambam omit this?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Rambam (8):</font></b> If people often use it for a privy at
               night, but during the day they do so only
               occasionally, and one happened to use it during the
               day, and a rock fell and killed him when Reuven
               destroyed his wall, Reuven is not exiled. If after
               the rock fell, the victim sat and it hit him and he
               died, Reuven is exempt from exile.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Kesef Mishneh:</font></b> It is know that the Halachah
                    always follows R. Eliezer ben Yakov. The Rambam
                    discusses when the rock fell from the wall
                    before Reuven sat. 
<br>


lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)  (Beraisa) Question:</font></b> What is the source that the inner
          goat protects one who knew at the beginning but not at
          the end?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Question:</font></b> The Tana already learned that it atones
               for something for which one does not bring a Korban!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer:</font></b> We taught that it atones for Chata'im that
               resemble Pesha'im, i.e. there is no Korban for them.
               The Tana thought to extend this further;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  One will never bring a Korban for Peshai'im,
                    and also for such Chata'im in which he did not
                    know at the beginning, but he knew at the end.
                    Perhaps it atones for such Chata'im!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> However, it would not atone for Chata'im which he
               knew at the beginning but not at the end, for he
               brings a Korban for them when he finds out.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Question:</font></b> How could he think that the inner goat
               atones when he did not know at the beginning but he
               knew at the end? The outer goat and Yom Kipur atone
               for this!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Answer:</font></b> One might have thought oppositely, that the
               inner goat atones when he knew only at the end, and
               the outer goat atones when he knew only at the
               beginning;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  'Umi'Pisheihem l'Chol Chatosom' teaches that
                    the inner goat atones for Chata'im that can
                    result in bringing a Korban.
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>3) THE GOAT OFFERED INSIDE ONLY SUSPENDS PUNISHMENT</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Suggestion:</font></b> The inner goat should give a full atonement!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Answer:</font></b> Had it said 'mi'Chatosom', that would be true;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> However, since it says 'l'Chol Chatosom', this
               teaches that a Chatas will later be brought for
               them.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Question:</font></b> Since it does not fully atone, why does it
          suspend punishment?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Answer #1 (R. Zeira):</font></b> If the person dies without finding
          out, it is considered that he died without sin.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Rejection (Rava):</font></b> Death itself atones!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Answer #2 (Rava):</font></b> It protects him from punishment (until
          he realizes his sin).
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>4) THE GOAT OFFERED OUTSIDE</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> If he never knew of the Tum'ah (and entered
          the Mikdash or ate Kodshim), and later was told that he
          was Tamei, the goat (whose blood is) offered outside (the
          Heichal) and Yom Kipur itself atone for him...
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Suggestion:</font></b> The Torah equates the inner and outer goats.
          We should say that the inner goat also atones for what
          the outer goat atones for!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> This makes a difference if they were unable to bring
               the outer goat.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Rejection:</font></b> 'V'Chiper... Achas' - the inner goat makes one
          atonement, but not two.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Suggestion:</font></b> We should say that the outer goat also atones
          for what the inner goat atones for!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> This makes a difference for Chata'im of Tum'ah after
               the inner goat was offered and before the outer
               goat.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Rejection:</font></b> 'Achas b'Shanah' - the atonement of the inner
          goat comes only once a year. 
<br>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) MAY ONE OF THE TWO 'SE'IRIM' OF YOM KIPPUR BE OFFERED WITHOUT THE OTHER ONE?</b></font>
<br>QUESTION:<br>The Mishnah (2a) states that the 'Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh bi'Fnim' together with Yom Kippur suspends atonement for people who originally knew that they had become impure, and later forgot about their Tum'ah when they entered the Beis ha'Mikdash or ate Kodshim. Later, when they realize their sin, they will bring a Korban Chatas Oleh v'Yored.
</p><p>
If, however, the person did not know originally that he had become Tamei, but he later realized that when he entered the Beis ha'Mikdash or ate Kodshim that he was in a state of Tum'ah, the 'Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh ba'Chutz' together with Yom Kippur atones for his sin.
</p><p>
The Gemara here asks that since the two Se'irim are compared to each other (as the Gemara earlier teaches), why does the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh bi'Fnim not provide atonement for both situations? It should atone not only for a person who knew originally that he had become Tamei and later forgot, but also for a person who did not know originally but found out later.
</p><p>
The Gemara explains that this would be significant if the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh ba'Chutz was not offered. RASHI (DH Hachi Garsinan v'Nafka) writes that this might occur if they did not have enough goats.
</p><p>
The Gemara here seems to contradict the Mishnah in Menachos (27a) which states that the two goats of Yom Kippur are 'Me'akvin Zeh Es Zeh' -- 'they hold each other back.' This means that both of them must be offered, or neither of them may be offered. Why does the Gemara discuss a situation in which only one of them might be brought?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:<br>
(a) The <b>MITZPEH EISAN</b> answers that only when there *are* two goats may one not be offered without the other. However, if only one is available, the absence of the other does not prevent the first one from being offered. (The Mitzpeh Eisan cites a proof for the notion that 'Me'akvin' applies only when sufficient Korbanos are available from TOSFOS in Menachos (45a, DH u'Minayin).)
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RASHASH, CHAZON ISH</b> (OC 127:14), and others also understand that when only one goat is available, it may be offered. However, they maintain that in such a case the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh ba'Chutz should be offered, and not the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh bi'Fnim. This is implied by various Gemaras, such as the Gemara in Yoma (62b), which states that in order to designate a goat as the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh bi'Fnim, a lottery between it and another goat (which will be offered as the Sa'ir la'Azazel) is required.
</p><p>
However, they note that this is inconsistent with Tosfos' conclusion (DH l'Tum'ah), based on the Gemara here, that in such a case the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh bi'Fnim would be offered. Tosfos makes a simple deduction: the Gemara asks that since the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh ba'Chutz should atone both for the sin for which it is brought, and for the sin for which the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh bi'Fnim is brought, what is the practical difference if both are brought anyway? The Gemara does not answer that the difference would be in a case in which only the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh ba'Chutz is brought. This clearly implies that if there would be only one goat, only the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh bi'Fnim would be brought. The Chazon Ish asks, therefore, what is the reason behind the Gemara's implication that if there would be only one goat, the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh bi'Fnim would be brought?
</p><p>
The Chazon Ish writes that Tosfos apparently rules like the Gemara in Yoma (62b), which implies that the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh ba'Chutz would not be valid if offered before the regular Korbanos of the day, because it would be deemed as being brought 'before its time.' Indeed, the <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Yom ha'Kipurim 5:3) writes that that if the ram or goat of the Korban Musaf was offered before the daily service of Yom Kippur, it is invalid. The source for this ruling, the Chazon Ish asserts, is the Gemara here. Just as a Chatas Chitzonah is invalid if offered 'before its time,' that is, before other Korbanos that are supposed to be offered first, so, too, the ram or goat of Musaf is invalid if it is offered before the Korbanos that are supposed to precede it. The Chazon Ish therefore suggests that the Gemara in Yoma is the source for the words of Tosfos here. (It also seems that according to Tosfos the lottery is not 'Me'akev' the offering of the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh bi'Fnim, and it is required only l'Chatchilah.)
</p><p>
(See also <b>CHIDUSHEI HA'GRIZ HA'LEVI</b> on the Rambam, in the name of his father, <b>RAV CHAIM SOLOVEITCHIK</b>.) (D. Bloom)
</p><p>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) R. YISHMAEL'S OPINION</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Question:</font></b> According to R. Yishmael, we cannot say that
          the outer goat atones for a Chet that was not known at
          the beginning and was known at the end, for he obligates
          a Korban in such a case;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> What does the outer goat atone for?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Answer:</font></b> It atone for one who did not know at the
          beginning, nor at the end.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Question:</font></b> The goats of Rosh Chodesh and the Mo'adim atone
          for this!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Answer:</font></b> R. Yishmael holds like R. Meir, who says that the
          goats of Rosh Chodesh, the Mo'adim and the outer goat all
          atone for the same thing.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Question:</font></b> Why was it necessary for the Torah to equate
          the outer goat to the inner goat?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Answer:</font></b> This teaches that just like the inner goat atones
          only for Chata'im of Tum'ah of the Mikdash and Kodshim,
          also the outer goat.

<b><font color='blue'>2) THE GOATS OFFERED ON MO'ADIM AND ROSH CHODESH</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah - R. Yehudah):</font></b> The goats of the Mo'adim and Rosh
          Chodesh atone for Tum'ah that was never known.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> How does R. Yehudah learn this
          (Rashi; Tosfos - that they atone for Tum'ah of the
          Mikdash and Kodshim)?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer (part 1 - Rav Yehudah):</font></b> He learns (the goat of
          Rosh Chodesh) from 'u'Se'ir Izim Echad l'Chatas la'Shem.'
          This refers to Chata'im that only Hash-m knows about.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Question:</font></b> That verse is needed for Reish Lakish's
               teaching!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (Reish Lakish):</font></b> In the Chatas of Rosh Chodesh
                    it says 'la'Shem' to hint that Hash-m commanded
                    us to bring an atonement for diminishing the
                    moon. (Hash-m needs no atonement. He merely
                    teaches that one who must censure someone
                    should appease them.)
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer:</font></b> If it came only for Reish Lakish's teaching,
               it should have said 'Al Hashem';
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  'La'Shem' teaches like Rav Yehudah expounded.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Question:</font></b> Perhaps it teaches only like Rav Yehudah,
               and not Reish Lakish's teaching!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Answer:</font></b> If so, it should have said 'Chatas Hashem';
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  'Chatas La'Shem' teaches both.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Suggestion:</font></b> The goat of Rosh Chodesh should atone for all
          Chata'im (that only Hash-m knows about)!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Rejection (Beraisa - Tana d'Vei R. Yishmael):</font></b> The goat of
          Rosh Chodesh comes at fixed times, just like the outer
          goat (of Yom Kipur);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Just like the outer goat atones only for Tum'ah of
               the Mikdash and Kodshim, also the goat of Rosh
               Chodesh.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Question:</font></b> We have answered only for the goat of Rosh
          Chodesh;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> What is the source that goats of the Mo'adim atone
               for Tum'ah of the Mikdash and Kodshim, even though
               these are Chata'im of Kares?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Suggestion:</font></b> Tana d'Vei R. Yishmael's teaching
               applies also to them.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rejection:</font></b> We cannot learn from the goat of Rosh
               Chodesh, for the Mo'adim come less regularly;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  We cannot learn from the outer goat, for the
                    atonement of Yom Kipur is greater (it is for
                    all Chata'im).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Question:</font></b> We learned Rosh Chodesh from the outer
               goat, without objecting that Rosh Chodesh comes more
               regularly (and therefore, perhaps it atones for
               more)!
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) AGADAH: HASHEM'S KORBAN TO APPEASE THE MOON</b></font>
<br>According to Rebbi Yehudah in the Mishnah (2a), the Se'irim offered in the Beis ha'Mikdash on Rosh Chodesh and on the Shalosh Regalim atone for a person who entered the Beis ha'Mikdash or ate Kodshim when he was Tamei, when that person did not know that he was Tamei at the beginning (when he became impure) or at the end (when he entered the Beis ha'Mikdash or ate Kodshim).
</p><p>
In the Gemara here, Rav Yehudah says in the name of Shmuel that Rebbi Yehudah derives his view from the verse, 'And one male goat as a Chatas for Hash-m... shall be offered' (Bamidbar 28:15). The words 'Chatas for Hash-m' imply a Chet (sin) that only Hash-m knows about; the person himself was totally unaware that he ever became Tamei. Since the verse is discussing the Sa'ir offered on Rosh Chodesh, it is clear that the Sa'ir of Rosh Chodesh and the Shalosh Regalim atones for this sin.
</p><p>
The Gemara asks that this verse cannot be the source for Rebbi Yehudah's opinion, because this verse is used already for another teaching. Reish Lakish derives from the verse that Hash-m declared, 'This goat shall be an atonement for Me, because I diminished the size of the moon.' (<b>RASHI</b> (DH Hevi'u) explains that Hash-m commanded that this Korban be offered in order to appease the moon.)
</p><p>
The Gemara answers that both teachings are derived from the verse. If the intention of the verse is only Reish Lakish's teaching, then the Torah should state, 'a Chatas <i>on</i> Hash-m.' The Torah's words 'for Hash-m' imply Rebbi Yehudah's law as well, that the Sa'ir of Rosh Chodesh atones for sins that only Hash-m knows about.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Sa'ir) writes in the name of the <b>ARUCH</b> that this Sa'ir is actually an atonement for the Jewish people (not for Hash-m). However, it was Hashem's responsibility to establish the time for their atonement, and thus He established Rosh Chodesh as the time for appeasing the moon with the Korban.
</p><p>
The <b>ARUCH'S</b> explanation may be understood better based on the explanation of the <b>RIF</b> here. The <b>RIF</b> cites the Gemara in Chulin (60b) that relates that after Hash-m created 'the two great luminaries,' the moon argued that 'it is impossible for two kings to use the same crown.' Hash-m told the moon that he is correct, and therefore, he must make himself smaller than the sun. The moon complained, 'Why should I have to make myself smaller simply because I made a logical argument?'
</p><p>
Hash-m attempted to appease the moon by making the moon visible during both the day and night, by having the Jewish people count the days and years according to the moon's cycle, and by having great Tzadikim (such as Yakov Avinu, David ha'Melech, and Shmuel ha'Navi) called 'small' like the moon. 
</p><p>
The moon, however, was not satisfied. The <b>RIF</b> writes that Hash-m therefore said that He would establish a form of honor for the moon to appease him: the Jewish people will offer a Korban every Rosh Chodesh for Hash-m to atone for their sins. This Korban will complete the glory which Hash-m promised to restore to the moon in compensation for its diminution.
</p><p>
<b>RAV</b> Y. S. <b>ELYASHIV</b> shlit'a cites a question in the name of <b>HA'MIDRASH VEHA'MA'ASEH</b>. Why did the moon complain about being made smaller? The moon itself had pointed out that two kings cannot use the same crown, and thus one of the two great luminaries had to be reduced in size; the moon did not argue that the sin should be made smaller.
</p><p>
Ha'Midrash veha'Ma'aseh answers that the moon's complaint was that Hash-m did not make the sun <i>larger</i> and leave the moon at its original size. Hash-m did not consider this an option, because the Gemara in Chagigah (12a) relates that when Hash-m saw the evil deeds of the Generation of the Flood and of the Generation of the Tower of Bavel, he hid away the great primordial light with which the world was created. Accordingly, the sun was already as bright as it could possibly be and it could not be made any larger. For this reason, a Korban Chatas must be brought on Rosh Chodesh; it is to atone for the fact that the world is not worthy of the original light of Creation. (See also <b>LEV ARYEH</b> to Chulin 60b.)
</p><p>
This explanation answers another question. The verse states with regard to the Korban of Rosh Chodesh, 'He has given it to you to bear the sin (Avon) of the congregation' (Vayikra 10:17). Since the word 'Avon' refers to a deliberate transgression, why does Rebbi Yehudah state that the Sa'ir of Rosh Chodesh atones for the <i>inadvertent</i> transgression of entering the Beis ha'Mikdash or eating Kodshim while Tamei?
</p><p>
The answer is that the Korban of Rosh Chodesh is necessary to atone for the fact that the Jewish people are not worthy of using the light as it was created originally.
</p><p>
Rav Elyashiv shlit'a offers a different explanation for why the Torah uses the word 'Avon' with regard to the Sa'ir of Rosh Chodesh. He cites the Tosefta in Shevuos (1:2) in which Rebbi Shimon states that the transgression of Tum'ah in the Beis ha'Mikdash and its holy objects is more severe than all transgressions in the Torah. This is because all of the transgressions in the Torah gain atonement by one Sa'ir (the Sa'ir la'Azazel of Yom Kippur), while 32 Se'irim (the goats of Rosh Chodesh and the Shalosh Regalim) are needed to atone for Tum'ah in the Beis ha'Mikdash and its holy objects. Rav Elyashiv shlit'a therefore concludes that since this transgression is so severe, even though it is done accidentally, when the Torah discusses the Korban of Rosh Chodesh which atones for this Tum'ah it refers to the sin as though it was done deliberately. (D. Bloom)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) SHOGEG IS CONSIDERED A TRANSGRESSION</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>     </font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> According to R. Yishmael, the outer goat atones for
               one who did not know at the beginning, nor at the
               end.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Bechoros 37a (Mishnah):</font></b> If Reuven slaughtered a cow
               (and sold it to Shimon), then it became known that
               it is a Tereifah, what was eaten was eaten, Shimon
               returns the meat that was not eaten, Reuven returns
               the money.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Kidushin 42b - Question:</font></b> Why does a Beraisa teach
               that if Reuven's Shali'ach bought something with
               Hekdesh money, Reuven transgressed Me'ilah? We
               should say that the Shelichus is invalid!
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rambam (Hilchos Shegagos 5:6):</font></b> If a couple had
               relations not at the time of her Veses (when she
               expects to become Nidah) and she became Nidah, they
               are exempt from a Korban. This is like Ones, not
               Shogeg. Shogeg is one who should have checked and
               been careful, and because he was not careful before
               acting, he came to err. Here, he did nothing wrong.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rambam (Hilchos Isurei Bi'ah 1:12):</font></b> If one had Bi'ah
               with Ervah (a woman forbidden to him with Kares)
               k'Mis'asek (he did not intend for the action), even
               though he did not intend, he is liable. The same
               applies to Chayvei Lavin and Sheniyos (Arayos
               mid'Rabanan).
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Rebuttal (Ra'avad):</font></b> What liability for a Korban
                    applies (to Chayvei Lavin and Sheniyos)?!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Kesef Mishneh:</font></b> The Magid Mishneh said that this
                    must be a printing mistake in the Rambam. I say
                    that the Rambam means that even though he is
                    not lashed, he is liable to Shamayim like one
                    who transgressed.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rambam (Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros 14:12):</font></b> If one ate
               an Asur food in jest or Mis'asek, even if he did not
               intend to eat, since he benefited, he is liable only
               one who intended to eat.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Tosfos (Shevuos 19a DH Harei):</font></b> R. Tam says that
               Helam Mikdash exempts from Oleh v'Yored (i.e. a rich
               person brings an animal, a poor person brings birds,
               and a very poor person brings a Minchah flour
               offering), but he is liable to bring Chatas Kavu'a
               (it must be an animal). We learn from Avodah Zarah
               that whenever one is Chayav Kares b'Mezid, he brings
               Chatas for Shogeg. We said (2a) that the inner goat
               atones for Aveiros of Tum'as Mikdash in which there
               was no Yedi'ah (knowledge) at the beginning. This
               connotes that there is no Chatas for it, for if
               there were, the goat would not atone for it! There,
               surely it atones totally, for we should not be more
               stringent when there was Yedi'ah only at the end
               than when there was Yedi'ah at the beginning and at
               the end. However, 'exempt' connotes totally exempt.
               Also, the Gemara found Chatas Kavu'a for Tum'as
               Mikdash only regarding a Nasi (24b). Rather, he is
               totally exempt.This was a matter that was in a
               general rule (Chatas Kavu'a), and left for a Chidush
               (Oleh v'Yored), and it does not return to the rule
               even when there is no Oleh v'Yored.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Tosfos (Kidushin 42b DH Amai):</font></b> Why did the Gemara
               ask why the Meshale'ach is Mo'el through his
               Shali'ach? Surely we discuss Shogeg, for there is no
               Me'ilah b'Mezid. If so, there is Shali'ach l'Devar
               Aveirah, for we cannot say 'you should listen to the
               Rav (Hash-m), and not the Talmid!' The Ri says that
               we ask why the Meshale'ach is liable even if the
               Shali'ach was Mezid.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Nesivos ha'Mishpat (348:4):</font></b> I say that since
                    one who was Shogeg must bring a Kaparah for
                    Me'ilah, he is considered liable, for he should
                    have checked. Therefore, it is more appropriate
                    to say that the Shali'ach was Mo'el, since he
                    did the action. Because 'you should listen to
                    the Rav...', he should have checked better. We
                    find that a woman who remarried based on one
                    witness that her husband died must bring a
                    Korban (if he was really alive). Yo'av should
                    not have relied on David to cause Uriyah's
                    death, just like Sha'ul's servants did not rely
                    on Sha'ul.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Ohr Some'ach (Hilchos Gerushin 1:1):</font></b> R.
                    Gershom's Cherem not to divorce Bal Korchah
                    (against her will) applies also to the
                    witnesses and scribe. If they knew that he
                    divorces Bal Korchah, they are Pasul and the
                    Get is Pasul. If they were Shogeg, perhaps
                    their Shlichus is Batel, for had they known,
                    they would not have signed. However, if the
                    Cherem is mid'Rabanan, like Acharonim wrote,
                    perhaps Shogeg about a mid'Rabanan is not an
                    Aveirah at all. Isurim mid'Rabanan are not
                    intrinsically forbidden. One must guard them
                    due to Lo Sasur. If one was Shogeg, his
                    transgression was not due to disobeying
                    Chachamim, rather, because he did not know, and
                    this is not an Aveirah at all. If one bought
                    Isur, and found out that it was Asur only after
                    he ate it, it is a Mekach Ta'os (mistaken sale)
                    and he gets back his money. He does not deduct
                    for what he ate. The Rambam connotes like the
                    Shach, that if it was Asur mid'Rabanan, he
                    deducts the full value. This is because eating
                    an Isur mid'Rabanan is not considered an Isur
                    at all, like the Nesivos ha'Mishpat explained.
                    However, if so one may give an Isur mid'Rabanan
                    to another if the other does not know! Surely
                    one may not say so! Rav said 'Shmuel would not
                    stumble by giving to me something that I forbid
                    (even mid'Rabanan)' (Chulin 111b). The Rambam
                    says that if one had Bi'ah with Sheniyos
                    k'Mis'asek (he did not intend for the act), he
                    is liable, i.e. to Shamayim (Kesef Mishneh),
                    and he needs a Kaparah. Do not say that
                    Mis'asek with Arayos is different because he
                    benefited, for the Rambam said similarly about
                    eating.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Note:</font></b> Mis'asek with Chelev and Arayos is liable
                    because he benefited! (Krisos 19a) The Radvaz
                    and Kesef Mishneh (Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros
                    14:12) say that the Rambam applies this to all
                    forbidden food. It seems that the Ohr Some'ach
                    disagrees.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Ohr Some'ach:</font></b> This disproves R. Akiva Eiger,
                    who said that Mis'asek transgressed and needs
                    Kaparah. It also proves that one who
                    transgressed a mid'Rabanan law b'Shogeg needs
                    Kaparah. We can say that Mis'asek b'Chelev or
                    Arayos, since he benefits, brings a Korban like
                    one who was Shogeg. However, if Shogeg in a
                    mid'Rabanan is not an Aveirah, Hana'ah is no
                    reason to consider it like Mezid! Therefore,
                    the Get is Pasul.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Nesivos ha'Mishpat (Bi'urim 28:8):</font></b> The Ketzos
               ha'Choshen (8) says that if one swore 'I do not know
               testimony for you', and witnesses testified that he
               saw testimony, he is not disqualified from swearing,
               for perhaps he did not know. Often, one swears 'I do
               not know', and he is not disqualified. We do not say
               that presumably, he knew. However, if he swore 'I
               <i>never</i> knew testimony for you', and witnesses
               testified that he saw and knew testimony, he is
               disqualified from swearing. He is not believed to
               say that he forgot. Tosfos (Shevuos 37a DH Hezid)
               says that we can never know if witnesses
               transgressed Shevu'as ha'Edus b'Mezid, for perhaps
               they forgot. He refers to Stam Shevu'as ha'Edus,
               i.e. I do not know (now). However, if he swore 'I
               did not know', he must pay arouse himself to
               remember, for man is always Mu'ad, and even Shogeg
               requires Kaparah.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Mesovev Nesivos (8):</font></b> This is not relevant to Shogeg
               requires Kaparah. He is not believed even if he says
               that he was Ones or Mut'eh (tricked), even though he
               needs no Kaparah. Rather, one who sins in front of
               us is not believed to claim Shogeg, Ones or Mut'eh
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Eliyahu Rabah (524:13):</font></b> The Shlah was astounded.
               Sukos is called the first day for the calculation of
               Aveiros (Tanchuma on Vayikra 23:40), for Stam one
               does not sin between Yom Kipur and Sukos, for he is
               busy with Sukah and Lulav, but surely if one sins,
               they are counted! Perhaps one who sins b'Shogeg does
               not need Kaparah during these days, for he is busy
               with Mitzvos.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Aruch ha'Shulchan (568:3):</font></b> If one ate b'Mezid on a
               fast day, he should fast another day to atone for
               this. He need not do so if he was Shogeg.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Aruch ha'Shulchan (602:7):</font></b> Shogeg comes from a lack
               of carefulness. Ones is different. No Teshuvah is
               required for Ones.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Igros Moshe (1:175):</font></b> If one realized that he had
               Bi'ah with his wife b'Isur, he should tell her, so
               (also) she will repent. We find that one who never
               realized that he transgressed Tum'as Mikdash needs
               Kaparah even if he will never find out. Clearly, the
               same applies to all Mitzvos. 
<br>


lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Answer:</font></b> The Torah explicitly writes that the goat of
               Rosh Chodesh atones. The outer goat teaches only to
               limit the atonement of the goat of Rosh Chodesh
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Here, we seek a source that the goats of the
                    Mo'adim atone. We cannot learn from something
                    that atones more.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Answer (part 2):</font></b> We learn like R. Chama b'Rebbi Chanina
          taught;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (R. Chama b'Rebbi Chanina):</font></b> It says about the goats
               of the Mo'adim '<i>u</i>'Se'ir.' The extra 'Vov' equates
               it to the previous matter (the goat of Rosh
               Chodesh).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> Just like the goat of Rosh Chodesh atones (for
               Tum'ah of the Mikdash and Kodshim) when he did not
               know at the beginning nor at the end, also the goats
               of the Mo'adim.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Question:</font></b> If one has no knowledge of his Chet, but others
          know and (presumably) will tell him, what is the law?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Does R. Yehudah consider this a Chet that is known
               at the end, and the outer goat atones for it?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> Or, is it considered a Chet known only to Hash-m,
               and the goats of Rosh Chodesh and the Mo'adim atone
               for it?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Answer (Beraisa - R. Yehudah):</font></b> The goats of Rosh Chodesh
          and the Mo'adim atone for a Chet that is not known at the
          beginning nor at the end, or that others know about and
          will tell him.
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>3) R. SHIMON'S OPINION</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah - R. Shimon):</font></b> The goats of the Mo'adim atone for
          Tum'ah (of the Mikdash and Kodshim) that was never known,
          but those of Rosh Chodesh do not. (The goats of Rosh
          Chodesh atone for a Tahor person who ate Tamei Kodshim.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  (R. Elazar):</font></b> R. Shimon learns from a Gezeirah Shavah
          'Avon-Avon';
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> It says about the goat of Rosh Chodesh (when the
               Mishkan was inaugurated) 'Laseis Es Avon ha'Edah',
               and regarding the Tzitz (the plate on the Kohen
               Gadol's forehead) it says 'Avon'
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> The Tzitz makes acceptable a Korban whose meat
               (regarding an Olah, in which the meat is offered on
               the Altar) or blood or Chelev became Tamei.
               Similarly, the goat of Rosh Chodesh atones for (one
               who ate) Tamei Kodesh meat.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Question:</font></b> The Tzitz makes acceptable Tamei Kodshim
          brought on the Altar. We should learn that the goat of
          Rosh Chodesh does the same (R. Shmuel - that it atones
          for one who brought Tamei Kodshim on the Altar)!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Answer:</font></b> It says about the goat 'Avon ha'Edah' (a sin that
          only applies to people (R. Shmuel - to Yisraelim)).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Suggestion:</font></b> Since we learn each from the other through a
          Gezeirah Shavah, we should say that the goat effects its
          atonement, and also makes acceptable like the Tzitz!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> (Normally, there is no need for something else to
               make the Korban acceptable, but) this would makes a
               difference if the Tzitz was broken!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Rejection #1:</font></b> 'Avon (singular)' - the goat only bears one
          sin, and not two.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Suggestion:</font></b> We should say that the Tzitz makes
          acceptable, and also atones like the goat of Rosh
          Chodesh!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> This would give immediate atonement for a Tahor
               person who ate Tamei meat!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Rejection #1:</font></b> It says about the goat 'Osah (it)' - only
          the goat bears this sin.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Rejection #2 (to both suggestions - Rav Ashi):</font></b> It says
          about the goat 'Avon ha'Edah', but not the sin of Kodshim
          (that were offered in Tum'ah);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> It says about the Tzitz 'Avon ha'Kodshim', but not
               the sin of Yisraelim. 
<br>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) ONLY ROSH CHODESH IS DERIVED FROM YOM KIPPUR</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: According to Rebbi Yehudah in the Mishnah (2a), the Se'irim offered in the Beis ha'Mikdash on Rosh Chodesh and on the Shalosh Regalim atone for a person who entered the Beis ha'Mikdash or ate Kodshim when he was Tamei, when that person did not know that he was Tamei at the beginning (when he became impure) or at the end (when he entered the Beis ha'Mikdash or ate Kodshim).
</p><p>
Rav Yehudah says in the name of Shmuel (9a) that Rebbi Yehudah derives his view from the verse, 'And one male goat as a Chatas for Hash-m... shall be offered' (Bamidbar 28:15). The words 'Chatas for Hash-m' imply a Chet (sin) that only Hash-m knows about; the person himself was totally unaware that he ever became Tamei. Since the verse is discussing the Sa'ir offered on Rosh Chodesh, it is clear that the Sa'ir of Rosh Chodesh and the Shalosh Regalim atones for this sin. Tana d'Vei Rebbi Yishmael taught that the Sa'ir does not atone for any other transgressions known only to Hash-m. This is derived from a comparison of the Sa'ir of Rosh Chodesh to the Sa'ir of Yom Kippur, both of which are brought at a fixed time. Just as the Korban of Yom Kippur provides atonement only for the Tum'ah of the Beis ha'Mikdash and Hekdesh, the Sa'ir of Rosh Chodesh atones only for this type of Tum'ah.
</p><p>
The Gemara proceeds to ask that since Rebbi Yehudah derives this law from a verse which discusses the Sa'ir of Rosh Chodesh, how does he know that the Sa'ir of the Regalim also provides this type of atonement?
</p><p>
The Gemara explains that the atonement of the Korban of the Regalim cannot be derived from the Korban of Rosh Chodesh through the teaching of Tana d'Vei Rebbi Yishmael (since both are brought at a fixed time), because the Korban of Rosh Chodesh is more frequent than the Korban of the Regalim, and thus it is able to atone even though one was unaware of the Tum'ah. The less-frequent Korbanos of the Regalim might not be able to achieve such atonement.
</p><p>
The atonement of the Korban of the Regalim also cannot be derive from the Korban of Yom Kippur (even though the former is more frequent), because the Sa'ir of Yom Kippur has a different advantage in that it atones for many sins, and thus it also can atone for Tum'ah of which one was totally unaware. The Sa'ir of the Regalim have no such advantage, and thus perhaps it cannot atone for such a sin.
</p><p>
The Gemara (beginning of 9b) asks that according to this reasoning (for why the atonement of the Sa'ir of the Regalim cannot be derived from the Sa'ir of Yom Kippur), how can the atonement of the Sa'ir of Rosh Chodesh be derived from Yom Kippur? The Sa'ir of Yom Kippur has the advantage that it atones for many sins, which the Sa'ir of Rosh Chodesh does not have! (See <b>TOSFOS</b> DH Ha Gamrinan.)
</p><p>
The Gemara answers that there is a difference between Rosh Chodesh and the Regalim. The Torah explicitly mentions atonement when it discusses Rosh Chodesh, and only a 'Giluy Milsa' is needed (to limit the atonement) from Yom Kippur. In contrast, the entire atonement of the Sa'ir of the Regalim needs to be derived, and thus it cannot be derived from Yom Kippur.
</p><p>
What is the meaning of the Gemara's answer?
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI</b> (DH Hasam Kaparah) explains that atonement is written explicitly with regard to Rosh Chodesh. The verse states, 'Chatas for Hash-m' (Vayikra 28:15), which teaches explicitly that the atonement is for an unknown sin. This implies that the atonement of the Sa'ir should be effective for <i>all</i> unknown sins. The Sa'ir's atonement is limited, however, by the derivation from Yom Kippur, which teaches that the Sa'ir of Rosh Chodesh atones only for Tum'ah of the Beis ha'Mikdash and Hekdesh, but not for other unknown transgressions (Rashi DH Giluy). Therefore, the derivation from Yom Kippur cannot be rejected on the grounds that Yom Kippur atones for many sins, since the only point of the derivation is to limit the atonement of Rosh Chodesh based on the limited atonement of the Sa'ir of Yom Kippur.
</p><p>
In contrast, the Torah writes with regard to the Sa'ir of the Regalim, 'to atone' (Bamidbar 28:22, 28:30), but it gives no details about the sin for which the Sa'ir atones. One cannot derive from Yom Kippur that the Sa'ir of the Regalim atones for Tum'ah of the Beis ha'Mikdash and Hekdesh, a prohibition punishable with Kares, because Yom Kippur is different in that it atones for many sins. (The <b>RITVA</b> agrees with Rashi's explanation.)
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAMBAN</b> explains that the verse of 'Chatas for Hash-m' (Vayikra 28:15) stated with regard to Rosh Chodesh is apparently superfluous. Therefore, it may be used to teach the additional law that the Sa'ir of Rosh Chodesh atones for a sin that only Hash-m knows. If a Sa'ir offered on Yom Kippur, which generally atones for many sins, atones only for unknown sins of Tum'ah in the Beis ha'Mikdash and Hekdesh, then Rosh Chodesh certainly will atone only for such a sin. In contrast, there is no superfluous verse for Regalim. Therefore, one can derive only that the Sa'ir of the Regalim atones for the transgression of ordinary Mitzvos Aseh and Lo Ta'aseh, but not for Tum'ah of the Beis ha'Mikdash which is punishable with Kares.
</p><p>
(The <b>NETZIV</b> in <b>HA'EMEK DAVAR</b> (Bamidbar 28:15) suggests a different reason for why the Torah states 'to atone for you' with regard to the Se'irim of Pesach, Shavuos, and Rosh Hashanah. He explains that those Se'irim also atone for transgressions committed by the public as a result of their merriment on Yom Tov. The Gemara in Kidushin (81a; see <b>RASHI</b> there DH Sakva) relates that when the men and women came together on Yom Tov to hear the Derashah, there often was inappropriate mingling. The Se'irim of the Regalim atoned for those sins. However, on Rosh Chodesh and Yom Kippur there was no merriment, and thus this Korban was not needed for that purpose. With regard to Sukos, the Netziv suggests that the merit of the Mitzvah of Sukah protected the people from sinning. The Torah therefore does not say 'to atone for you' with regard to the Korbanos of Sukos.) (D. Bloom) 
</p><p>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) GOATS OFFERED ON THE MO'ADIM</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Question:</font></b> What is R. Shimon's source that goats of the
          Mo'adim atone for (Tum'ah of the Mikdash or Kodshim) that
          was not known at the beginning nor at the end?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Answer:</font></b> He learns like R. Chama b'Rebbi Chanina taught;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (R. Chama b'Rebbi Chanina):</font></b> It says about the goats
               of the Mo'adim '<i>u</i>'Se'ir.' The extra 'Vov' equates
               it to the previous matter (the goat of Rosh
               Chodesh).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> Just like the goat of Rosh Chodesh atones for a
               matter of Kodshim, also the goats of the Mo'adim.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps they atone for the same thing as the
          goat of Rosh Chodesh!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Rejection:</font></b> It says about the goat of Rosh Chodesh 'Osah'
          - only the goat bears this sin.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps they atone for the same thing as the
          outer goat of Yom Kipur!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Rejection:</font></b> 'Achas b'Shanah' teaches that the atonement of
          the outer goat comes only once a year.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Question:</font></b> What knowledge was there about the Chata'im it
          atones for?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> If he knew at the beginning and at the end, he must
               bring a Korban!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> If he knew at the beginning but not at the end, the
               inner goat and Yom Kipur suspend punishment for
               this!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> If he knew at the end but not at the beginning, the
               outer goat and Yom Kipur atone for this!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Answer:</font></b> We must say that he did not know at the beginning
          nor at the end.

<b><font color='blue'>2) R. MEIR'S OPINION</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> R. Meir says, all the goats (of Rosh Chodesh,
          the Mo'adim and Yom Kipur) atone for the same things (a
          Tamei person who entered the Mikdash or ate Kodshim, or a
          Tahor person who ate Tamei Kodshim).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question (R. Chama b'Rebbi Chanina):</font></b> What is R. Meir's
          reason?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer #1 (R. Chama):</font></b> It says about the goats of the
          Mo'adim '<i>u</i>'Se'ir.' The extra 'Vov' equates it to the
          previous matter.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> We are thinking that (the first is learned from Rosh
               Chodesh, and) each (other) is learned from the
               previous one. (Parshas Pinchas lists the Korbanos
               brought on Rosh Chodesh and the Mo'adim.)
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Question:</font></b> R. Yochanan taught a general rule, that if
               matter B was learned from matter A, B can teach
               about other matters, in all areas of Torah except
               Kodshim!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Answer:</font></b> Rather, everything is learned from one
               source (we learn each Mo'ed directly from Rosh
               Chodesh).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Objection:</font></b> Regarding Shavu'os and Yom Kipur it says
          'Se'ir', and not ''u'Se'ir'. How can we learn these?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Answer #2 (R. Yonah):</font></b> Rather, 'Eleh Ta'asu la'Shem
          b'Mo'adeichem' equates all the Mo'adim.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Question:</font></b> Rosh Chodesh is not a Mo'ed!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Answer:</font></b> Indeed, a verse calls it Mo'ed!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Abaye):</font></b> 'Kara Alai Mo'ed' - Tamuz (when the
               Meraglim toured Eretz Yisrael) was a full month of
               30 days. This caused them to return (after 40 days)
               before the eve of the ninth of Av.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  (R. Yochanan):</font></b> R. Meir admits that the inner goat of Yom
          Kipur does not atone for what these goats atone for, and
          vice-versa.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The inner goat of Yom Kipur does not atone for what
               the others do. 'V'Chiper... Achas' teaches that it
               makes only one atonement;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> The others do not atone for what the inner goat
               atones for. 'Achas b'Shanah' teaches that the
               atonement of the inner goat comes only once a year.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Support (Beraisa - R. Meir):</font></b> The goats of Rosh Chodesh,
          the Mo'adim and the outer goat of Yom Kipur atone for a 
          Tamei person who entered the Mikdash or ate Kodshim if he
          did not know at the beginning (whether or not he later
          found out), and for a Tahor person who ate Tamei Kodshim;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The Beraisa omits the inner goat, and what it atones
               for (if he knew at the beginning but not at the
               end).
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>3) R. SHIMON'S OPINION</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah - R. Shimon):</font></b> The goat of Rosh Chodesh atones
          for a Tahor person who ate Tamei Kodshim...
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b>  We understand why it does not atone for what the goats of
          the Mo'adim atone for. 'Avon (singular)' connotes that
          the goat bears only one sin, and not two.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Question:</font></b> Why don't the goats of the Mo'adim atone for 
          what the goat of Rosh Chodesh atones for?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Answer:</font></b> It says about the goat of Rosh Chodesh 'Osah
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>(it)</font></b>.' Only the goat bears this sin.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b>  We understand why the goats of the Mo'adim do not atone
          for what the outer goat of Yom Kipur atones for. 'Achas
          b'Shanah' teaches that the atonement comes only once a
          year.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Question:</font></b> Why doesn't the outer goat atone for what the
          goats of the Mo'adim do?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Answer:</font></b> 'V'Chiper... Achas' teaches that it makes only
          one atonement.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Question:</font></b> That verse is written about the inner goat!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Answer:</font></b> 'Milvad Chatas ha'Kipurim' equates the inner and
          outer goats.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) ANNULING 'HEKDESH'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Mishnah (2b) states that Rebbi Shimon used to say that the Se'irim of Rosh Chodesh atone for a person who ate Kodshim that was Tamei. The Se'irim of the Regalim (Pesach, Shavuos, and Sukos) atone for a person who became Tamei and ate Kodshim or entered the Beis ha'Mikdash without knowing about his Tum'ah, either at the beginning or the end. The Se'irim of Yom Kippur atone for a person who was not aware initially that he became Tamei, but afterwards he became aware of it.
</p><p>
The Mishnah continues and relates that Rebbi Shimon was asked whether each day's Sa'ir may be offered on the other days. That is, if the Sa'ir that had been set aside to be brought on Yom Kippur was lost and another Sa'ir was offered in its place, and then the original Sa'ir was found on the Regel (or on Rosh Chodesh), may that Sa'ir (that was intended for Yom Kippur) be offered on the Regel or on Rosh Chodesh (<b>RASHI</b> DH Hayah)?
</p><p>
Rebbi Shimon replied that they indeed may be offered on the other days. The Mishnah explains that although the specific sins for which these Se'irim atone are different, they all share a common factor: they atone for the Tum'ah of the Beis ha'Mikdash and its holy items (see Rashi DH Kulan).
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (10a, DH Mahu) points out that everyone agrees that if a Sa'ir of Rosh Chodesh was lost and another offered in its place, and then the original Sa'ir was found, it may be offered on a different Rosh Chodesh. The same applies to a Sa'ir of a Regel (it may be offered on a different Regel).
</p><p>
Tosfos asks that this seems to contradict the Gemara in Zevachim (6a). The Gemara there discusses a case in which a person designated an animal as a Korban Olah, which is burned in its entirety on the Mizbe'ach and which atones for transgressions of Mitzvos Aseh, and after he designated it he transgressed a Mitzvas Aseh. Does the Korban Olah which he already designated atone for his new transgression?
</p><p>
How can the Gemara in Zevachim entertain the possibility that the Olah does <i>not</i> atone for a sin committed after the animal was designated? The Mishnah here clearly says that a Sa'ir that was designated for one Rosh Chodesh may be offered on a subsequent Rosh Chodesh, and thereby atone for the sins of Tum'ah which occurred in the interim (<i>after</i> the Korban was designated)!
</p><p>
Tosfos answers that since the first Sa'ir was lost, its original designation was annulled. When the subsequent Rosh Chodesh arrives (and the original Sa'ir was found), the Sa'ir is designated anew, and thus it can atone for transgressions committed after the previous Rosh Chodesh. (See Tosfos to Zevachim 6a, DH Iy, who explains this in further detail.)
</p><p>
What does Tosfos mean when he writes that because the first Sa'ir was lost, its designation was annulled? How can the Kedushah of a Korban be annulled merely because the Korban became lost?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>KEHILOS YAKOV</b> (#7, DH Reish) writes that one might suggest that Tosfos' logic is based on the concept of 'Lev Beis Din Masneh Aleihen' (see 11a). This means that Beis Din stipulates, at the moment that the Sa'ir is designated as a Korban for Rosh Chodesh, that if the Sa'ir should become lost the designation will never have been in force in the first place. The Kehilos Yakov explains that this answer is not viable, because the Gemara here follows the view of Rebbi Shimon who does not agree with the concept of 'Lev Beis Din Masneh' (11b). The Kehilos Yakov cites Tosfos in Zevachim (6a) who writes explicitly that his answer applies even according to Rebbi Shimon who does not maintain 'Lev Beis Din Masneh.'
</p><p>
The Kehilos Yakov adds that one cannot say that the fact that it later transpired that the Sa'ir was not required is reason to annul the original designation, because if it is, then a Korban Tamid which is no longer needed should be able to be redeemed even according to Rebbi Shimon. The Gemara later (end of 11b), however, states that it cannot be redeemed according to Rebbi Shimon. It is clear, therefore, that this logic by itself is insufficient.
</p><p>
The Kehilos Yakov answers that Tosfos writes that the original designation is annulled because of the rule of 'Hekdesh b'Ta'us' -- 'consecration done under mistaken pretenses.' If the overseer of the Korbanos in the Beis ha'Mikdash would have known that the Sa'ir would be lost and could not be offered, he would not have sanctified it in the first place. Alternatively, he would have done so only on condition that if it could not be offered later, the Hekdesh would not apply.
</p><p>
The Kehilos Yakov points out that although with regard to a sale, when an item which was in good condition at the time of the sale developed some sort of deficit after the sale, the sale certainly is not nullified, this law applies only to a sale, because a buyer is presumed to be willing to buy something even though the possibility exists that problems with the item might develop later. (See Tosfos to Kesuvos 47b, DH Shelo.) In contrast, when a person is Makdish a Korban, he does so based on the understanding that it will not become invalid or lost later. Therefore, when the overseer consecrated the Sa'ir, had he considered that it might become lost and not be offered, he would have made a condition that on such terms it should not become sanctified.
</p><p>
In contrast, when the Gemara later (10b) discusses the surplus Temidin, it cannot be that the overseer stipulated that the surplus animals should not be Hekdesh according to Rebbi Shimon (who does not maintain 'Lev Beis Din Masneh'). The Mishnah (Erchin 13a; see following Insight) teaches that four sheep were leftover every year from the sheep that were consecrated as Temidin (as well as two and a half Maneh of incense consecrated as Ketores). Accordingly, since it was not possible for the overseer to make such a condition, it follows that these sheep remained Hekdesh even though they were no longer needed. (D. Bloom)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) DOES KEDUSHAH VANISH?</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>     </font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Ula):</font></b> (Starting in Nisan, Korbanos Tzibur must be
               bought from the Shekalim collected for the coming
               year.) When Nisan comes, remaining lambs bought for
               the Tamid (daily offering) are redeemed Tam (without
               a blemish).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Question (Rav Chisda):</font></b> Did the Kedushah vanish? (Why
               can they be redeemed Tam?!)
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Counter-question (Rabah - Mishnah):</font></b> If Ketores
                    (incense) was not used before Nisan, we redeem
                    it on money owed to workers. We give the
                    Ketores to the workers, and buy it back using
                    the new Shekalim.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Answer (Rav Chisda):</font></b> Ketores has only Kedushas
                    Damim (monetary Kedushah), therefore its
                    Kedushah vanishes.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Nedarim 28a (Mishnah):</font></b> If one said 'these saplings
               are Hekdesh until they are uprooted' or 'this Talis
               is Hekdesh until it is burned', they cannot be
               redeemed.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Question:</font></b> Are they always Hekdesh?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Answer #1 (Bar Pada):</font></b> No matter how many times they
               are redeemed before they are uprooted, they become
               Hekdesh again. Once they are uprooted, if they are
               redeemed, they become Chulin.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Answer #2 (Ula):</font></b> Once they are cut, one need not
               redeem them.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   Question (Rav Hamnuna):</font></b> To where did the Kedushah
               go? If a man told a woman 'today you are my wife, 
               but tomorrow you are not', does she cease to be his
               wife without a Get?!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.   Answer (Rava):</font></b> Kedushas Damim can vanish, unlike
               Kedushas ha'Guf (intrinsic Kedushah), which cannot
               vanish.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.   Objection (Abaye):</font></b> Also Kedushas ha'Guf can vanish!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (Beraisa):</font></b> If one said 'this ox is an Olah for
                    30 days. After 30 days, it is a Shelamim', for
                    30 days it is an Olah; after that, a Shelamim.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>10.  Answer (Rava):</font></b> The case is, he said that the value
               of the ox should be for an Olah.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>11.  Question (Seifa):</font></b> (If he said) 'after 30 days, this
               ox is an Olah. From now, it is a Shelamim' (his
               words are fulfilled)?
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Granted, if one clause discusses Kedushas Damim
                    and one discusses Kedushas ha'Guf, the Tana
                    needed to teach that both of them vanish.
                    However, if both discuss Kedushas Damim, why
                    are both needed?
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b> If a severe Kedushah (an Olah) can vanish, to
                    be replaced by a light Kedushah (a Shelamim),
                    all the more so, a light Kedushah can vanish,
                    to be replaced by a severe Kedushah!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>12.  Suggestion:</font></b> This refutes Bar Pada, who says that
               even Kedushas Damim cannot vanish.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>13.  Rejection (Rav Papa):</font></b> No. He can explain the Beraisa
               to say that had he not said 'It is a Shelamim from
               now', it would be an Olah after 30 days. This is
               like one who tells a woman 'you will be Mekudeshes
               to me after 30 days.' The Kidushin takes effect,
               even if the money is consumed in the meantime.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>14.  Kesuvos 59a - Contradiction:</font></b> Shmuel rules that if a
               wife vowed 'what my hands produce is Konam (Asur
               like a Korban) to your mouth', he should annul it,
               lest he divorce her and be unable to remarry her. He
               also rules that Hekdesh does not take effect on
               something not yet in the world!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>15.  Answer (Rav Ashi):</font></b> Konamos are different. They are
               like Hekdesh ha'Guf' ha'Guf, like Rava taught:
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (Rava):</font></b> The following uproot a lien: (the
                    collateral was made) Hekdesh, the Isur of
                    Chametz, and freedom (the collateral was a
                    slave).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>16.  Erchin 23b (Mishnah):</font></b> If Reuven owed a Kesuvah or
               debt and was Makdish his property, his creditor may
               not take it from Hekdesh. Rather, the redeemer
               redeems it (and adds a Dinar), to pay the debt.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>17. </font></b> It says 'the redeemer redeems' due to R. Avahu's
               reason, lest people say that Hekdesh becomes Chulin
               without redemption.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>18.  Yevamos 66b:</font></b> A woman brought a silk cloak into the
               marriage. It was written in the Kesuvah. When he
               died, the orphans spread it on the corpse.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>19.  Rava:</font></b> It gets the status of shrouds (it is buried
               with the Mes).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>20. </font></b> Even though Rava said that the Halachah follows Rav
               Yehudah (she has the right to reclaim it), until
               then, it belongs to her husband;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (Rava):</font></b> Freedom, Chametz and Hekdesh uproot
                    liens.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rambam (Hilchos Erchin 14:7):</font></b> If one owed (a Kesuvah
               or) debts with documents, and he was Makdish his
               property, his creditor may not take it from Hekdesh,
               for Hekdesh uproots the lien. Rather, when Hekdesh
               sells the property and it becomes Chulin, the
               creditor collects, for his lien remains.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Rebuttal (Ra'avad):</font></b> Hekdesh did not uproot the
                    lien. The redemption is a token amount, for R.
                    Avahu's reason, lest people say that Hekdesh
                    becomes Chulin without redemption. Only
                    Kedushas ha'Guf, e.g. Konamos or things put on
                    a Mes (to be shrouds) uproot liens.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Magid Mishneh (Hilchos Malveh 18:7):</font></b> The Rambam
                    holds that all Hekdesh, even Kedushas Damim,
                    uproots liens. The Ra'avad and all the
                    Meforshim disagree. Really, Kedushas Damim does
                    not uproot liens.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Ran (DH Kesuvos 24a DH v'Ika):</font></b> Rashi explains
                    'Konamos are different. They are like Hekdesh
                    ha'Guf' to mean that just like one cannot
                    redeem a Korban, one cannot redeem Konamos to
                    permit them. Therefore, it is like Kedushas
                    ha'Guf to uproot liens. The Gemara says that
                    Chametz uproots liens. The same applies to all
                    Isurei Hana'ah, e.g. putting a garment on a Mes
                    to be shrouds.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rambam (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 15:7):</font></b> If one
               said 'the value of this cow is an Olah for 30 days,
               and afterwards it is for an Olah', or vice-versa,
               his words are fulfilled. If he offers its value
               within 30 days, he brings like he vowed, and if he
               offers its value after 30 days, he brings like he
               vowed.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Rebuttal (Ra'avad):</font></b> If he sold it within 30
                    days, it already received Kedushas Olah. If he
                    offers it after 30 days, how is Kedushas Olah
                    uprooted?! Rather, surely, we redeem the cow
                    onto an animal or coins for the needs of an
                    Olah, and afterwards we offer a Shelamim. It
                    seems that we redeem for any amount. If you
                    will say that Kedushas Damim vanished, I answer
                    that Bar Pada disagrees. We are stringent about
                    a Safek Isur. Bar Pada explains the Beraisa to
                    say that he said 'this cow is a Shelamim for 30
                    days', <i>or</i> 'after 30 days, it is a Shelamim.'
                    (In the latter case) he did not mention any
                    Kedushah now at all. His words are fulfilled
                    even if he retracted within 30 days. Rav Papa,
                    who is Basra, explains the Beraisa this way
                    according to Bar Pada. Also, we hold that if
                    one was Makdish a male for its value (to buy an
                    Olah), it itself is offered for an Olah. This
                    shows that even when one says 'for its value',
                    it gets Kedushas ha'Guf.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Kesef Mishneh:</font></b> The Mefaresh ('Rashi') in
                    Nedarim explains that Ula was refuted. The
                    Halachah follows Bar Pada, like Rav Papa
                    explained. The Ran (in Nedarim) explains that
                    Rava is refuted. If Kedushas ha'Guf cannot
                    vanish, the Beraisa must discuss only Kedushas
                    Damim, and there is no need for two clauses.
                    Rav Hamnuna asked that if Kedushah can vanish,
                    one can say 'today you are my wife, tomorrow
                    you are not.' Rava's answer, that Kidushin is
                    like Kedushas ha'Guf, which does not vanish, is
                    wrong. Rather, a wife is unlike Kedushas
                    ha'Guf, for Kidushin cannot be half-way, but
                    something can be Hekdesh for a fixed time. It
                    seems that the Rambam holds that Rava did not
                    answer, and the Gemara did not say that he is
                    refuted, for he saw no need to answer (why two
                    cases are needed). Perhaps the entire Beraisa
                    is one clause! Whether he said 'this ox is an
                    Olah for 30 days. After 30 days, it is a
                    Shelamim', or 'after 30 days, this ox is an
                    Olah. From now, it is a Shelamim', his words
                    are fulfilled. Alternatively, saying 'this ox
                    is an Olah for 30 days. After 30 days, it is a
                    Shelamim', is like saying 'after 30 days, this
                    ox is an Olah. From now, it is a Shelamim.'
                    Since the latter Kedushah is greater, the first
                    Kedushah vanishes. A support for the Rambam is
                    that everyone (Ula, Rav Hamnuna, Bar Pada and
                    Rava) argues with Abaye, who says that even
                    Kedushas ha'Guf can vanish. Only Bar Pada says
                    that Kedushas Damim cannot vanish. Rav Papa
                    explained how Bar Pada learns the Beraisa, but
                    it seems that he himself disagrees. The Ra'avad
                    rules like Bar Pada. He says, if you will say
                    that Kedushas Damim vanishes (like Rava, who is
                    Basra), I answer that Rav Papa, who is also
                    Basra, explains the Beraisa like Bar Pada, and
                    he himself agrees. Therefore, it is a Safek
                    Isur, so we must be stringent to say that
                    Kedushah cannot vanish. Therefore, we redeem
                    the cow onto an animal or coins for the needs
                    of an Olah, and afterwards we offer a Shelamim.
                    The Ra'avad leans to say that the redemption is
                    for any amount, like Shmuel (Bava Metzia 57a).
                    He was not certain, for perhaps Shmuel
                    discusses only Bedek ha'Bayis. Also, perhaps
                    Shmuel said so only b'Di'eved. The Ra'avad
                    holds that we are lenient here, for if we
                    require the full value, perhaps one will not
                    fulfill his vow.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b>Nimukei Yosef (Yevamos 22b Sof Dibur Rishon):
                    The Ri says that Chachamim strengthened a
                    creditor's lien, lest the debtor vow to forbid
                    his property to him. They did not do so
                    regarding shrouds, for it is not common, and
                    for the honor of the Mes.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (CM 117:7):</font></b> Isur Hana'ah uproots a
               lien, just like Kedushas ha'Guf does. If a silk
               garment was put on a Mes with intent that it be
               buried with him, a creditor cannot collect from it.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   SMA (22):</font></b> The Shulchan Aruch omitted the law
                    that Hekdesh uproots liens, for nowadays there
                    is no Kedushas ha'Guf.
<br>
<font color='blue'><i>See also:</i>
<br><b>UPROOTING A LIEN THROUGH KONAMOS </b>(</font><font color='blue'>


lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  (R. Shimon ben Yehudah citing R. Shimon):</font></b> (The goats of
          Rosh Chodesh atone for a Tahor person who ate Tamei
          Kodshim. The goats of the Mo'adim atone for this, and
          also for Tum'ah (of the Mikdash or Kodshim) that was
          never known. The outer goat atones for both of these, and
          also for Tum'ah that is known only at the end.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)  Question:</font></b> Presumably, he learns that the goat of Rosh
          Chodesh does not make the atonement of the goats of the
          Mo'adim from 'Avon'. The goat only bears one sin, and not
          two;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> He should likewise say that the goats of the Mo'adim
               do not atone for what the goat of Rosh Chodesh
               atones for. 'Osah' teaches that only the goat bears
               this sin!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)  Answer:</font></b> He does not expound 'Osah' this way.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)  Question:</font></b> Presumably, he learns that the goats of the
          Mo'adim do not make the atonement of the outer goat from
          'Achas b'Shanah' - the atonement only comes once a year.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> He should likewise say that the outer goat does not
               atone for what the goats of the Mo'adim do.
               'V'Chiper... Achas' connotes that it makes only one
               atonement!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)  Answer #1:</font></b> He does not expound 'v'Chiper... Achas' this
          way.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)  Question:</font></b> Presumably, this is because that verse is
          written about the inner goat;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Also 'Achas b'Shanah' is written about the inner
               goat, yet he applies it to the outer goat!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)  Answer #2:</font></b> Really, he expounds 'v'Chiper... Achas';
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> 'V'Chiper... Al Karnosav Achas' teaches that the
               atonement on its (the inner Altar's) corners makes
               only one atonement, but the atonement on the outer
               Altar makes more than one atonement.
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>4) DOES KEDUSHAH VANISH?</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Ula):</font></b> (Starting in Nisan, Korbanos Tzibur must be bought
          from the Shekalim collected for the coming year.) When
          Nisan comes, remaining lambs bought for the Tamid (daily
          offering) are redeemed Tam (without a blemish).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question (Rav Chisda):</font></b> Did the Kedushah vanish? (Why can
          they be redeemed Tam?!)
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Counter-question (Rabah):</font></b> How can you argue? A
               Mishnah teaches this!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (Mishnah):</font></b> We redeem extra Ketores (incense)
                    (that was not used before Nisan) on money owed
                    to those who made it. We give the Ketores to
                    the workers, and buy it back using the new
                    Shekalim.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer (Rav Chisda):</font></b> Ketores has only monetary
<br><br>               Kedushah, therefore its Kedushah vanishes. <p>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) CHECKING ANIMALS FOR BLEMISHES BEFORE THEY ARE SANCTIFIED</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: Ula says in the name of Rebbi Yochanan that animals designated to be used as Temidin which are no longer needed by the community may be redeemed, even though they possess no blemish.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> (DH Temidin) explains that these animals were bought from the public funds. The Mishnah in Erchin (13a) teaches that there must never be less than six sheep that have been examined and found to be free of blemishes in the Lishkas ha'Tela'im (the room in the Beis ha'Mikdash where the sheep for the Korbanos are kept). Rashi explains that once Rosh Chodesh Nisan arrives, no Korban bought with the money of the previous year may be offered. Therefore, every year, after the two Korbanos of morning and evening Tamid of the last day of Adar are offered, at least four sheep are leftover which the no longer may be offered. Ula says that these animals may be redeemed.
</p><p>
The Gemara in Erchin (13b) explains that the reason why there must always be at least six examined sheep in the Lishkas ha'Tela'im is the law that requires that the Korban Tamid be examined four days before it is slaughtered.
</p><p>
It seems that there should be a way to avoid having any consecrated sheep leftover at the end of the year. The examinations could be performed on ordinary Chulin animals before Rosh Chodesh Nisan. Afterwards, when Rosh Chodesh arrives, those animals could be bought with the Hekdesh money of the new year and be consecrated as Korbanos for the next year. Why was this method not utilized to prevent having four consecrated sheep leftover every year?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>TUREI EVEN</b> in Megilah (29b, DH k'Man) answers that it is apparent from various Gemaras (and from Rashi here) that the law requires that the examinations must be done specifically after the animal has been consecrated as a Korban, and thus they must be bought from the previous year's money before they are examined. Accordingly, it would not help to check the animals while they are still Chulin. The Turei Even adds that although it is known in advance that these four sheep will not be able to be offered once Rosh Chodesh Nisan arrives, the Chachamim decreed that every day, without exception, there must be six sheep in the Lishkas ha'Tela'im. (See Menachos 49b.)
</p><p>
However, the <b>MITZPEH EISAN</b>, <b>CHAZON ISH</b> (OC 124), and others maintain that the examinations may be performed while the animals are still Chulin. According to these opinions, why must there always be four consecrated sheep leftover at the end of the year?
</p><p>
(b) The <b>YOSEF DA'AS</b> suggests an answer based on the words of the <b>RITVA</b> here. The Ritva asks, why did they not take two sheep on Erev Rosh Chodesh Nisan from the old money, borrow four sheep for the next day, and afterwards pay them back from the new money? He answers that the treasurers were not accustomed to taking merely six sheep at a time, because of the principle that 'there is no poverty in the place of wealth' (in the Beis ha'Mikdash), and everything was done in abundance. Therefore, the treasurers would take many sheep at one time for the majority of the year, so that they could fulfill later the Mitzvah of taking the 'one, special sheep' morning and evening for the Korban Tamid (see Megilah 28a). Afterwards, they would place six sheep in the special room reserved for the sheep that would be offered during the subsequent days.
</p><p>
Accordingly, although sheep <i>could</i> be borrowed for the next year, examined while Chulin, and then afterwards consecrated, this procedure would conflict with the practice of consecrating many sheep at one time. (D. Bloom) </p><p>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) THE KEDUSHAH OF KETORES</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Question (Rabah):</font></b> If Ketores has only monetary Kedushah,
          a Tevul Yom (one who immersed from Tum'ah today; he will
          be fully Tahor at nightfall) should not disqualify it!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa):</font></b> If Ketores was put in the grinder, if a
               Tevul Yom touches it, he disqualifies it.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps a Tevul Yom disqualifies things with
          monetary Kedushah!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Rejection (Mishnah):</font></b> From the time one is Makdish a
          Minchah (flour-offering), Me'ilah applies to it. When it
          is put in a Keli Shares (service vessel), it gets more
          Kedushah. It becomes disqualified if a Tevul Yom or
          Mechushar Kipurim (one who was Tamei, and his Taharah
          will be complete when he brings a Korban) touches it, or
          if left overnight;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The latter two laws apply only after it was put in a
               Keli Shares, but not before!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Counter-question (Rav Chisda):</font></b> If Ketores has
               Kedushas ha'Guf (it is considered destined to be
               used for the Avodah), it should be disqualified if
               left overnight!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (Mishnah):</font></b> Me'ilah applies to the following
                    from the time of Hekdesh: the Kometz (the
                    handful taken from a Minchah and burned on the
                    Altar), frankincense, Ketores, the Minchah of a
                    Kohen, the daily Minchah of an anointed Kohen
                    Gadol, and the Minchah that accompanies an
                    animal Korban;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b> After they are put in a Keli Shares, they are
                    disqualified if touched by a Tevul Yom or
                    Mechushar Kipurim, or if left overnight.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Inference:</font></b> Before they are put in a Keli
                    Shares, they are not disqualified if left
                    overnight!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Answer (Rabah):</font></b> Ketores is different. The Torah
               instructs to make it once for the entire year, so
               mid'Oraisa it is not disqualified if left overnight
               (Tosfos - until put in the pan in which it is
               burned).
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>2) HEKDESH BUYS ON CONDITION</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Question:</font></b> We still have not answered the question (4:b
          Daf 10b. Why can Tam Korbanos (or Ketores) be redeemed?
          Did the Kedushah vanish?!)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Answer (Rabah):</font></b> Beis Din (Hekdesh) purchases things
          needed for the Avodah on condition that anything that is
          not needed does not get Kedushas ha'Guf.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Question (Abaye):</font></b> You yourself taught that if one is
          Makdish a male animal to (sell it and use the money to)
          buy an Olah, the animal gets Kedushas ha'Guf!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Answer (Rabah):</font></b> That is because it was Hukdash for
          something for which it is Ra'uy (appropriate);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> However, if it was Hukdash to (sell it and use the
               money to) buy Nesachim (the accompanying Minchah),
               for which it is not Ra'uy, it does not get Kedushas
               ha'Guf.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Question (Abaye - Mishnah - R. Yehudah):</font></b> If the (inner)
          bull or goat of Yom Kipur was lost, and another was taken
          in its place and the lost animal was found, we leave it
          to die;
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE STATUS OF 'MENACHOS' TOUCHED BY A 'TEVUL YOM'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara (10b) explains the reason why the surplus Ketores may be redeemed and given to the workers in the Beis ha'Mikdash as their wages. Since the Ketores was sanctified only with Kedushas Damim (its monetary value, but not its actual substance, is sanctified), its sanctity may be redeemed onto money. This is in contrast to Korbanos, which are sanctified with Kedushas ha'Guf (the object itself is sanctified, and not just its value).
</p><p>
The Gemara here asks that if the Ketores possesses only Kedushas Damim, then why does it become invalid if a Tevul Yom touches it? The Beraisa explicitly states that if a Tevul Yom touches the mortar in which the Ketores has been placed for grinding, the Ketores becomes invalid.
</p><p>
The Gemara continues and says that one cannot suggest that any item that possesses Kedushas Damim becomes invalid if touched by a Tevul Yom, because the Mishnah in Me'ilah (9a) states that the placing of Menachos (flour offerings) into a Kli Shares makes them susceptible to disqualification if they are touched later by a Tevul Yom. This implies that merely possessing Kedushas Damim is not enough to enable the Menachos to be disqualified if touched by a Tevul Yom. They require the additional condition of placement into a Kli Shares.
</p><p>
The Gemara here seems to contradict the ruling of the <b>RAMBAM</b>. The Rambam (Hilchos She'ar Avos ha'Tum'ah 11:13) rules that Menachos that have not been sanctified by being placed inside a Kli Shares have neither the status of Kodesh nor the status of Chulin. Rather, they have a status equivalent to that of Terumah.
</p><p>
If, as the Rambam writes, Menachos have the same degree of sanctity as Terumah before they have been placed into a Kli Shares, then they should become invalid when a Tevul Yom touches them, just as Terumah becomes invalid when a Tevul Yom touches it. The Gemara here, however, implies that Menachos that have not been placed into a Kli Shares do <i>not</i> become invalid when touched by a Tevul Yom!
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>MISHNAH ACHARONAH</b> in Taharos (end of ch. 2) explains that Menachos are susceptible to two types of disqualification when touched by a Tevul Yom. Once the Menachos have been placed into a Kli Shares, they will have the status of a disqualified Korban if a Tevul Yom touches them. A disqualified Korban must be burned in the Beis ha'Deshen. (The verse states, 'He shall remove the ashes to outside the camp' (Vayikra 6:4). <b>RASHI</b> in Zevachim (47b, DH Nisrafim) explains that the Beis ha'Deshen is the place where these ashes are taken.)
</p><p>
Before the Menachos have been placed into a Kli Shares, a Tevul Yom who touches them gives them the status of Terumah Teme'ah. Terumah Teme'ah may be burned by the Kohen in his own home, and he is permitted to derive benefit from the fire.
</p><p>
(b) The <b><b><b>OR</b></b> SAME'ACH</b> (Hilchos She'ar Avos ha'Tum'ah 11:13) offers a novel explanation to reconcile the ruling of the Rambam with the words of the Gemara. According to the normal laws of Tum'ah and Taharah, Ketores should <i>not</i> be able to become Tum'ah because it is not a food or liquid. The only reason why Ketores can become Tamei is the unique law of 'Chibas ha'Kodesh.' (The Gemara in Pesachim (35a) derives from a verse items of Kodesh can become Tamei even though they are inedible. The Gemara there (20a, and Chulin 33a) explains that this is because of 'Chibas ha'Kodesh,' 'the endearment of Kodesh.' Due to the fact that Kodesh is particularly precious, it is more sensitive to Tum'ah than Chulin or Terumah.)
</p><p>
However, as long as the Ketores has not been sanctified with Kedushas ha'Guf, it is not subject to 'Chibas ha'Kodesh,' and therefore it cannot become Tamei. The Gemara proves this from the fact that as long as the Menachos are not in the Kli Shares, they do not possess Kedushas ha'Guf even though they <i>do</i> have the status of Terumah. (The Or Same'ach apparently agrees with the distinction of the Mishnah Acharonah that the Menachos become invalid as Terumah, even though they do not become invalid as Kodesh.)
</p><p>
Since the Ketores does not possess Kedushas ha'Guf <i>and</i> it is not a food item, it does not become disqualified at all if touched by a Tevul Yom, unless it was already placed in a mortar. Menachos, in contrast, are edible, and thus they become like Terumah according to the Rambam, even before they are placed in a Kli Shares. (D. Bloom)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) STIPULATIONS NOT TO GET KEDUSHAH</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>     </font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Rabah):</font></b> Beis Din purchases things needed for the
               Avodah on condition that anything that is not needed
               does not get Kedushas ha'Guf.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Question (Abaye - Mishnah - R. Yehudah):</font></b> If the bull
               or goat of Yom Kipur was lost, and another was taken
               in its place and the lost animal was found, we leave
               it to die. (If Hekdesh buys on condition, we should
               redeem it!)
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Answer (Rabah):</font></b> These are uncommon Korbanos (and it
               is rare that one would be lost). Hekdesh does not
               stipulate about them.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Megilah 26b (Beraisa):</font></b> Genizah is required for
               Tashmishei Kedushah, e.g. sacks for Seforim,
               Tefilin, and Mezuzos, cases of a Sefer Torah or
               Tefilin, and Tefilin straps.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   (Rava):</font></b> I used to think that a Bimah is Tashmish
               d'Tashmish (for the Sefer Torah rests on a cloth on
               the Bimah, so it is permitted). I saw that sometimes
               the Sefer is put directly on a Bimah, so it is
               Tashmishei Kedushah.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   (Rava):</font></b> I used to think that the inner curtain of an
               Aron is Tashmish d'Tashmish. I saw people fold it
               under the Sefer, so it is Tashmishei Kedushah.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   (Rava):</font></b> One may convert an Aron that is coming apart
               into a smaller Aron, but not into a Bimah. Worn out
               curtains (of the Aron) may be made into covers for a
               Sefer Torah, but not for a single Chumash. Sacks for
               Chumashim and chests for Seforim are Tashmishei
               Kedushah, and they require Genizah.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b> One might have thought that they are merely for
               protection; Rava teaches that this is not so. (They
               are for honor.)
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.   (Mar Zutra):</font></b> Worn-out covers of Seforim may be made
               into shrouds for a Mes Mitzvah. This is their
               Genizah!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>10.  27a (Beraisa):</font></b> We may wrap a Sefer Torah with covers
               of Chumashim, but not vice-versa.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>11.  Kidushin 54a (Rav):</font></b> Me'ilah does not apply to Bigdei
               Kehunah, for the Torah allows Kohanim to benefit
               from them. Kohanim are not like angels who could
               instantaneously remove them after serving in the
               Mikdash!
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rosh (Megilah 4:11):</font></b> In the Yerushalmi, R. Yirmeyah
               asked about putting a Keli in the Aron, for people
               used to do so. R. Mana said that they stipulated to
               do so from the beginning. R. Yonah made a cabinet
               and stipulated that the top shelp will be for
               Seforim, and the bottom for Kelim. Similarly, when
               we make a Korsiya (a chair for Seforim), one may use
               it (for Chulin) only if he stipulated. We can
               permit, for we normally put a Sefer on a cloth on
               the chair, so the chair is Tashmish d'Tashmish. Rava
               taught like this.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Terumas ha'Deshen (273):</font></b> If there was no initial
               Tanai (stipulation), surely one may not benefit from
               the Aron, cloths and covers of the Sefer Torah, even
               a casual, one-time benefit, or even to use it for a
               lower Kedushah. Therefore, one may not put other
               Seforim on the Bimah on which the Sefer Torah is
               put, unless there was a Tanai. A Tanai permits even
               Chulin uses, like the Yerushalmi says. We are not
               careful, even without a Tanai. We must say that
               since it is almost impossible to be careful, since
               we have many Sifrei Torah in the Beis ha'Keneses
               with cloths and covers, and many Seforim and
               Chumashim, and we extend prayer with songs and
               Piyutim unlike in the days of the Gemara, it is very
               hard not to put Seforim on the Bimah or cover them
               with cloths and covers of the Sefer Torah, or not to
               lean on the Bimah or sit on the cloths and covers.
               Me'ilah does not apply to Bigdei Kehunah, for
               Kohanim are not like angels. Even though Rashi
               connotes that we permit Hana'ah only b'Shogeg, we
               hear that such matters are considered impossible to
               be careful about. If so, Lev Beis Din stipulates
               about it, lest people transgress. One who donates
               such things to the Beis ha'Keneses authorizes the
               leaders of the city or Beis ha'Keneses over them, so
               there is such a stipulation. We say so about extra
               lambs for the Tamid. Rashi says that Beis Din
               stipulates about all matters of the Tzibur. This is
               not only when we know that extras will remain, e.g.
               the Tamid, rather, anything that often occurs. They
               do not stipulate about an ox or goat of Yom Kipur
               that was lost, for this is uncommon. This implies
               that that if it were common, they would stipulate
               about it. I was pressed to justify why people are
               not careful about these matters.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Magen Avraham (154:15):</font></b> His final words connote
                    that it is proper that one who donates, or a
                    Gizbar who buys for the Tzibur, stipulate that
                    it may be used for other things.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (OC 154:8):</font></b> A Tanai helps for the
               Aron and everything we make for a Sefer Torah, to
               use it for other things, even Chulin.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Taz (7):</font></b> The Maharshal says that putting other
                    Seforim in the Aron does not lower its
                    Kedushah. A proof is that people put inside
                    Pasul parchments. The same applies to Chumashim
                    and other Seforim. However, perhaps one may not
                    do so after the Sefer Torah was removed.
                    Perhaps then putting other things inside lowers
                    its Kedushah. The Bach proved that even
                    temporarily, this lowers its Kedushah. The
                    Gemara permits wrapping a Sefer Torah with
                    covers of Chumashim, but not vice-versa. The
                    Reisha discusses temporarily. If one
                    permanently designates the cover for the Sefer
                    Torah, surely it is permitted! Therefore, also
                    the Sefer forbids using a Torah cover for a
                    Chumash even temporarily, for this lower its
                    Kedushah. If so, on Hoshana Rabah, when they
                    remove all the Sifrei Torah from the Aron, it
                    is improper to put a lit lamp inside, for the
                    wall of the Aron serves the lamp. However, this
                    is for Kavod ha'Torah, to show that Torah is
                    light, i.e. and we need a lamp when there are
                    no Sifrei Torah inside. However, this does not
                    suffice, for it lower its Kedushah.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Kaf ha'Chayim (64):</font></b> The Bach says that a Tanai
                    permits only when there is a special place,
                    enclosed by walls, to use for Chulin. One may
                    not put Chulin in the same place as the Torah.
                    The Poskim said Stam that a Tanai permits, i.e.
                    even in the same place. R. Yonah mentioned
                    using the top of the cabinet for Seforim. He
                    merely taught that it is better that the
                    Seforim be on top. It is not Me'akev. The
                    Mordechai cites R. Yonah, and says that if one
                    does not stipulate about Korsiya, he may not
                    lean on it or put Seforim on it. A chair does
                    not have walls, yet a stipulation helps!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Taz (7):</font></b> It seems that Kedushas Aron is only
                    when it is made to always house a Sefer Torah.
                    If it is made temporarily, e.g. nowadays that
                    many Batei Kenesiyos became desolate, and when
                    Yisrael return they make a small Aron for the
                    Sefer Torah until they can make a bigger Aron.
                    Once the latter Aron is made, the former loses
                    its Kedushah. This is like a Beis ha'Keneses
                    that was rented temporarily. It does not get
                    Kedushas Beis ha'Keneses, therefore, one may
                    put Seforim inside. It seems that Lev Beis Din
                    stipulates also about this.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Kaf ha'Chayim (65):</font></b> Even if it will be used for
                    Kodesh temporarily, it is best to stipulate to
                    allow Chulin usage.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.   Taz (7):</font></b> It seems that the Isur to lower
                    Kedushah is only when the matter is still
                    Kosher for the greater Kedushah, but if it is
                    not, it is better to use it for a smaller
                    Kedushah than to leave it empty and bury it. A
                    proof is from cloths of Sifrei Torah. We make
                    them shrouds for a Mes, and this is their
                    Genizah. Surely one may not do so while they
                    are usable for a Sefer Torah! Similarly it is
                    better that the Aron hold Seforim than to be
                    empty.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>vi.  Mishnah Berurah (33):</font></b> There is no difference
                    between when it is empty or full.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>vii. Kaf ha'Chayim (66):</font></b> Bechor Shor on Megilah
                    brought proofs from the Gemara against the Taz.
                    Genizah is better than using for a lower
                    Kedushah. The Taz' proof is invalid, for only
                    Genizah was permitted.Yafeh l'Lev says that YD
                    290 is unlike the Taz. (It forbids making a
                    Mezuzah from a faded Sefer Torah or Tefilin.)
                    The Birkei Yosef (Shiyurei Berachah 2) cites
                    the Rosh's son to say that if one had a Sefer
                    Torah in an Aron, and made another Aron, one
                    may not put Gemaros and Perushim on top of the
                    first, just like one may not make a chair from
                    it.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>viii.Mishnah Berurah (34):</font></b> A stipulation allows
                    Chulin usage, but not anything disgraceful.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ix.  Kaf ha'Chayim` (68):</font></b> A Tanai does not help for
                    Seforim.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rema:</font></b> The custom is to get many benefits from Divrei
               Kedushah, e.g. cloths of Seforim and the table in
               the Beis ha'Keneses and covers of the Sefer Torah.
               They say that since this is the custom, and it is
               impossible to be careful about this, Lev Beis Din
               stipulates from the beginning, in order that people
               not stumble. Even if they did not stipulate, it is
               as if they stipulated.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (DH v'Zeh):</font></b> Why may we put Sidurim
                    and other Seforim on the cloth on the Bimah (on
                    which the Sefer Torah is read)? We must say
                    that since this is the custom, they stipulated
                    from the beginning. Even if they did not
                    stipulate, we can say that Lev Beis Din
                    stipulated.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Mishnah Berurah (35):</font></b> It is clear from the
                    Terumas ha'Deshen that the Heter to benefit,
                    because one cannot be careful, applies only in
                    a Beis ha'Keneses, but not to an individual's
                    Sefer Torah.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Mishnah Berurah (36):</font></b> We cannot be lenient
                    where there is no custom, for perhaps there was
                    no stipulation about this matter.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Bi'ur Halachah (DH v'Iy):</font></b> The Rema connotes
                    that we do not assume that Beis Din stipulated
                    about things one can be careful about.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.   Kaf ha'Chayim (69):</font></b> If Beis Din stipulated
                    about something we could be careful about, the
                    Tanai helps. 
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