# dafyomi

lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The same apples to goats that atone for (a mistaken
               ruling of the Sanhedrin that caused most of Yisrael
               to transgress) idolatry.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b>  R. Elazar and R. Shimon say that it is left to graze
          until it gets a Mum (blemish). It is redeemed, and the
          money goes to Nedavah (to buy Olos for the Tzibur to
          bring when the Altar is idle);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> (If an individual's Chatas cannot be offered, it
               must die, but) the Tzibur's Chatas is never left to 
               die.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Summation of question:</font></b> If Hekdesh purchases things
               for the Avodah on condition, we should redeem it
               Tam!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Answer (Rabah):</font></b> These are uncommon Korbanos (and it is
          rare that one would be lost). Hekdesh does not stipulate
          about them.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Question (Abaye):</font></b> It is uncommon that we will redeem a
          red heifer because a nicer one was found, yet Hekdesh
          stipulates about this!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa):</font></b> A red heifer is redeemed if it is
               disqualified in any way, if it died, if it was
               slaughtered (in the wrong place), or if a nicer red
               heifer was found;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> If it was slaughtered in the proper place (facing
               the entrance to the Heichal), it may never be
               redeemed.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Answer #1 (Rabah):</font></b> The red heifer is different, since it
          is Hekdesh Bedek ha'Bayis (it is not offered on the
          Altar), so even if Hekdesh did not stipulate, it can be
          redeemed Tam.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Question:</font></b> Why can it be redeemed after it died or
               was slaughtered? It must be stood up and evaluated!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer:</font></b> The Beraisa is R. Shimon, who says that only
               Kedushas ha'Guf must be stood up and evaluated
               (before redemption), and not Bedek ha'Bayis.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Question (end of the Beraisa):</font></b> If it was slaughtered
               in the proper place, it may never be redeemed.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (Beraisa - R. Shimon):</font></b> The red heifer receives
                    Tum'ah because there was a time when it was
                    Ra'uy (to be eaten).
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  (Reish Lakish):</font></b> He holds that it was Ra'uy
                    after slaughter, for if a nicer one was found,
                    we would have redeemed the first one. (This
                    contradicts the Beraisa!)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  Answer #2 (Rabah):</font></b> Rather, even though it is uncommon to
          find a nicer red heifer, Hekdesh stipulates about this
          because red heifers are very expensive.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)  (Beraisa):</font></b> If a red heifer died (without slaughter), it
          is redeemed.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)  Question:</font></b> We do not redeem Kodshim to feed them to dogs!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)  Answer (Rav Mesharshiya):</font></b> It is redeemed for its skin.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)  Question:</font></b> Does Hekdesh make the Kedushah conditional just
          so if it dies, we can redeem it for the skin?!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)  Answer (Rav Kahana):</font></b> Even the ear of an (expensive animal
          such as a) camel is worthwhile.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)  Question (Mishnah - Rabanan):</font></b> If a goat designated for
          one of these three atonements was lost, and it was found
          after a substitute was offered, may the found goat be
          used for another of the three atonements?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   R. Shimon:</font></b> Yes.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rabanan:</font></b> If it was originally designated for one
               atonement, how can it atone for something else?!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   R. Shimon:</font></b> They all atone for Tum'ah in the Mikdash
               or with Kodshim. This is essentially what it was
               designated for!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Summation of question:</font></b> Why didn't R. Shimon answer
               that Hekdesh buys things for the Avodah on
               condition?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)  Answer:</font></b> R. Shimon holds that Hekdesh does not buy things
          on condition.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Rav Idi bar Avin):</font></b> R. Shimon forbids redeeming Tam
               lambs for the Tamid that were not used by Nisan.
               Chachamim permit this.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)  Question:</font></b> Who are the Chachamim who argue with R. Shimon
          (and say that Hekdesh purchases on condition)? 
<br>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) THE REDEMPTION OF THE 'PARAH ADUMAH'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: Rebbi Shimon maintains that a Parah Adumah contracts Tum'ah like food, since there was a time when it was considered food. Reish Lakish explains that according to Rebbi Shimon, the Parah Adumah could be redeemed and eaten even if it had already been placed on the pyre.
</p><p>
The <b>RASHBA</b> quotes <b>TOSFOS</b> who explains that according to Rebbi Shimon, even when the Parah no longer can be considered food, it still contracts Tum'ah like food because it was <i>once</i> like food. This means that even once it has been slaughtered and its blood sprinkled opposite the Ohel Mo'ed (or Beis ha'Mikdash), it still contracts Tum'ah like food even though it cannot be redeemed from its state of Kedushah. However, <i>before</i> its blood has been sprinkled, it <i>may</i> be redeemed, even though it has been slaughtered.
</p><p>
The Rashba questions this explanation. The Gemara in Kerisus (24b) says that Rebbi Shimon maintains that anything designated to be sprinkled is considered as though it has already been sprinkled. Accordingly, the Parah Adumah should <i>not</i> be redeemable after it has been slaughtered, even if its blood has not yet been sprinkled, because its blood has been designated for imminent sprinkling.
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>RASHBA</b> answers in the name of the <b>RAMBAN</b> that the Parah Adumah indeed is fit for redemption. The Beraisa quoted by the Gemara earlier states that if one finds a nicer Parah Adumah, he should redeem the one he already consecrated and use the nicer one. The Ramban understands that it is even a Mitzvah to do so. Since one always looks for a nicer Parah Adumah, the blood of the present Parah Adumah cannot be considered as though it has already been sprinkled.
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> in Bava Kama (77a, DH Parah) answers that Rebbi Shimon considers blood designated to be sprinkled as though it has been sprinkled only once the Kabalas ha'Dam has been performed. However, between the Shechitah and Kabalas ha'Dam, the blood is <i>not</i> considered as though it has been sprinkled.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>RASHBA</b> himself gives a different answer in the name of Tosfos. He explains that Rebbi Shimon is not stating his own position, but he is addressing the Rabanan. Rebbi Shimon maintains that it is obvious that the Parah Adumah may be redeemed even after the Shechitah, because it is Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis and is not included in the law that a consecrated animal must be stood up and evaluated in order to be redeemed. He argues that the Rabanan, who maintain that a consecrated animal must be stood up and evaluated in order to be redeemed, still should agree that the Parah Adumah may contract Tum'ah like food since it technically could have been eaten when it was dying, after it was slaughtered. (Y. Montrose) 
</p><p>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) DOES HEKDESH BUY ON CONDITION?</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Answer #1:</font></b> It is Chachamim (Daf 10b) who permit redeeming
          the extra Ketores and giving it to the workers.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Rejection:</font></b> Ketores never gets a Mum, therefore they must
          stipulate, so it may be redeemed;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> We have no source that they stipulate to permit
               redeeming a Tam animal. We could wait until it gets
               a Mum!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer #2:</font></b> It is Chachamim (11b) who permit redeeming a 
          Tam red heifer.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Rejection:</font></b> Perhaps only there they stipulate, because it
          is very expensive.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Answer #3:</font></b> It is Rabanan who asked R. Shimon why he
          permits using goats of Rosh Chodesh for Yom Kipur. (They
          permit because Hekdesh buys on condition.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Rejection:</font></b> Granted, if Rabanan hold like R. Yehudah (that
          the goats atone for different things), they must hold
          that Hekdesh buys on condition;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> However, perhaps Rabanan hold like R. Meir, that all
               the goats atone for the same thing!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Answer #4:</font></b> R. Yochanan had a tradition that Chachamim say
          that Hekdesh buys on condition, and (Tosfos - he derived
          from our Mishnah) that R. Shimon argues.

<b><font color='blue'>2) WHAT WE DO WITH THE EXTRA KORBANOS</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Question:</font></b> According to R. Shimon, what do we do with the
          extra lambs for the Tamid?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Answer (R. Yitzchak):</font></b> They are brought for Nedavah (Olos
          when the Altar is idle).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  (Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak):</font></b> R. Shimon admits that
          extra Chatas goats of the Tzibur are not themselves
          brought for Nedavah;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Rather, they are left to graze until they get a Mum.
               They are redeemed, and the money goes to Nedavah.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> R. Shimon permits using the same animal only when it
               was originally an Olah as well (e.g. the Tamid);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> However, if it was originally a Chatas, the same
               animal is not offered for Nedavah;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  This is a decree, lest it be brought before the
                    replacement for the Chatas is offered (and then
                    it is still a Chatas, and it is not a valid
                    Olah).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Support #1 (Abaye - Mishnah - R. Yehudah):</font></b> If the (inner)
          bull or goat of Yom Kipur was lost, and another was taken
          in its place and the lost animal was found, we leave it
          to die;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The same applies to goats brought for (a mistaken
               ruling about) idolatry.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> R. Elazar and R. Shimon say, it is left to graze
               (until it gets a Mum; it is redeemed) and the money
               goes to Nedavah, because Chatas ha'Tzibur is never
               left to die.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Question:</font></b> Why can't the found animal itself be
               offered?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Answer:</font></b> This is a decree, lest it be brought before
               the replacement is offered.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Support #2 (Rava - Mishnah):</font></b> If (after the lottery to
          determine which goat is offered to Hash-m and which is
          sent, one of them dies, we take two other goats and do
          another lottery;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> One new goat will replace the dead goat; the other
               grazes until it gets a Mum, the money goes to
               Nedavah.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Question:</font></b> Why can't the goat itself be offered?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Answer:</font></b> This is a decree, lest it be brought before
               the original goat is offered.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Support #3 (Ravina - Mishnah):</font></b> If Reuven separated a
          Korban Asham, and he died, or he lost it and offered a
          different animal and then found the first one, the
          (unneeded) Asham grazes until it gets a Mum, and the
          money goes to Nedavah;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> R. Eliezer says, we leave the Asham to die;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> R. Yehoshua says, Reuven (or his heir, if he died)
               uses its money to buy an Olah and brings it.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Question:</font></b> Why can't the animal itself be offered for
               an Olah?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Answer:</font></b> This is a decree, lest it be brought before
               the replacement is offered.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Support (Beraisa):</font></b> Extra (Chatas) offerings that are not
          needed are brought for Kitz ha'Mizbe'ach, like Benos
          Shu'ach (a type of fig).
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE NATURE OF THE REQUIREMENT THAT A 'KORBAN ASHAM' GO OUT TO PASTURE</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak states that Rebbi Shimon agrees that a goat that was designated to be a public Chatas that became lost, and was found only after the public Korbanos began to be brought from the funds of the new year, cannot be offered as a Korban Olah. Rather, it is sent out to pasture ('Nituk'), and when it receives a blemish it is sold. The money received in return is used for the purchase of a Korban Olah, which is offered for 'Kayitz ha'Mizbe'ach.'
</p><p>
If a public Chatas may be brought as an Olah after the public already received the atonement for which the Chatas was designated, it might also be deemed fit to be brought as an Olah before such atonement has been attained. (For example, perhaps a nicer animal will be found, and people will suggest that they use that animal as the Chatas and convert this goat to an Olah.) Rebbi Shimon therefore agrees that the animal itself cannot be brought as an Olah for Kayitz ha'Mizbe'ach.
</p><p>
The Gemara cite proofs for this reasoning from various sources. One source is the Mishnah in Temurah (20b). The Mishnah there states that if the owner of a Korban Asham died, or the Korban became lost and another animal was offered in its place, the original animal should be left to graze until it receives a blemish, and its value should be used for a Nedavah. Rebbi Eliezer says that it should be put to death. Rebbi Yehoshua says that its value should be used to bring a public Olah. (The Gemara in Temurah (20b) explains that the difference between the Tana Kama and Rebbi Yehoshua is that the owner of a privately-donated Korban performs Semichah and must buy the Nesachim. No Semichah is performed with a public Olah, and the Nesachim are purchased from the public funds.)
</p><p>
Ravina asks, why is the animal itself not brought as an Olah? He asserts that the reason why it is not brought itself must be based on the logic above, that people might change it to an Olah even before an Asham is brought.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Asham) points out that this implies that there really would be no problem with bringing the Korban, according to Torah law, if another Asham had already been brought, even if the Asham had not been formally sent out to pasture.
</p><p>
Tosfos asks that this is problematic, because a Halachah l'Moshe mi'Sinai states otherwise (Temurah 18a, Nazir 25b, and other places). The Halachah is that in a situation in which the law dictates that an animal designated as a Chatas must be put to death, an animal designated as an Asham must be sent out to pasture until it receives a blemish. If this is a Torah law, then why does the Gemara here imply that it does not apply to this Asham?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> quotes <b>RABEINU TAM</b> who answers that the Halachah l'Moshe mi'Sinai states that if there is a situation in which an animal designated as a Chatas must be put to death, an Asham in the same situation would must be brought as an Olah. Whenever the Gemara quotes this Halachah, it adds the requirement of the Rabanan that the animal be sent to pasture until it receives a blemish.
</p><p>
Rabeinu Tam proves this from the Gemara in Pesachim (73a). Rav Huna there states that an Asham that was sent out to pasture and slaughtered without specific intent is valid as a Korban Olah. The Gemara infers that this means that even though it was not explicitly renamed an Olah, it is still fit to be brought as an Olah. The Gemara therefore asks, why does Rav Huna say that it was actively sent out to pasture? If it does not need to be renamed, it should also not need to be sent out to pasture! The Gemara answers that the Rabanan decreed that it be sent to pasture, lest people rename it even before the atonement for which it was dedicated is attained. Just as the Gemara here does not mention the law that when a Chatas is killed an Asham is sent to pasture, the Gemara in Pesachim similarly makes no mention of it. Rabeinu Tam concludes that this is because there is no such Torah law; the requirement is only mid'Rabanan.
</p><p>
(b) However, according to <b>RASHI's</b> understanding of Rav Huna's statement in Zevachim (5b) and Menachos (4a), sending the Asham out to pasture in these cases <i>is</i> a Torah law, a genuine Halachah l'Moshe mi'Sinai. According to Rashi's text in the Gemara there, the Gemara quotes Rav Huna's statement and then infers from it that Rav Huna specifically requires that the animal be sent to pasture. When the Gemara asks why this is so, it responds that it is because the verse says, '[Asham] Hu' -- 'it [is an Asham]' -- implying that it is unfit to be offered unless its designation as an Asham is changed. Rashi's words imply that this is a Torah law.
</p><p>
Tosfos in Shevuos says that according to Rabeinu Tam, Rashi's text of the Gemara in Zevachim and Menachos is inaccurate. Tosfos in Menachos (DH 4a, DH Asham) similarly quotes Rabeinu Shmuel as saying that this text is erroneous.
</p><p>
Tosfos adds that even if the text of Rashi is correct, it is possible that the Gemara means something entirely different. It may mean that 'Hu' -- 'it' is an Asham whose law is that it can be offered as an Olah and does not need to be renamed as an Olah in order for it to be valid. (See Tosfos here and in Menachos for a lengthy discussion of other Gemaras relevant to this topic.) (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) CHANGING TZEDAKAH</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>     </font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Rabanan asked R. Shimon why he permits using goats
               of Rosh Chodesh for Yom Kipur. If they hold like R.
               Yehudah (that the goats atone for different things),
               they permit because Lev Beis Din stipulates.
               However, perhaps Rabanan hold like R. Meir, that all
               the goats atone for the same thing!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> R. Yochanan had a tradition that Chachamim allow
               redeeming Tam lambs not needed for the Tamid (due to
               Lev Beis Din), and R. Shimon argues.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Bava Basra 8b (Beraisa):</font></b> The Kupah (a Tzedakah
               collection) is every Erev Shabbos, for Aniyim of
               that city. The Tamchuy is daily, and it is for all
               Aniyim. A city may change the Tamchuy to be like the
               Kupah, or vice-versa, or use the money for anything
               they want.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   (Abaye):</font></b> Originally, Rabah would not sit on the
               mattresses of the synagogue, because they were
               bought with Tzedakah money. After he heard the
               Beraisa that permits changing the money to any other
               usage, he sat on them.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   (Abaye):</font></b> Originally, Rabah had two Tzedakah wallets,
               one for the poor of his city, and one for poor
               people from anywhere. After he heard Shmuel tell Rav
               Tachlifa bar Avdimi to have one wallet and to
               stipulate (with the givers that he will give to
               whoever comes), he also kept one wallet and
               stipulated.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   (Rav Ashi):</font></b> I do not need to stipulate. Anyone who
               gives, he gives on condition that I will distribute
               it like I see fit.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   Erchin 6a (Beraisa):</font></b> If one said 'this coin is for
               Tzedakah', he may change it before the Gabai
               (overseer of Tzedakah) received it, but not
               afterwards.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b> R. Yanai was a Gabai. He borrowed Tzedakah and
               repaid, to benefit the poor (so he could tell people
               that there is no Tzedakah for the poor, to induce
               them to give).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.   6b (Beraisa):</font></b> If a Yisrael donated a candelabra or
               lamp to a Beis ha'Keneses, one may not change it.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>10.  Assumption (R. Chiya bar Aba):</font></b> It is Asur even for a
               Mitzvah.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>11.  R. Ami:</font></b> R. Yochanan permits changing it only for the
               sake of a Mitzvah, but not for Reshus. We learn this
               from R. Asi:
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (R. Asi citing R. Yochanan):</font></b> If a Nochri
                    donated a candelabra or lamp to a Beis
                    ha'Keneses, one may not change it as long as
                    people mention the donor (for the Nochri will
                    scream). Afterwards, it is permitted.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b> He cannot refer to changing it for Reshus. This
                    is forbidden even if a Yisrael donated it!
                    Rather, he refers to changing for a Mitzvah.
                    This is forbidden if a Nochri donated, for he
                    would scream. It is permitted if a Yisrael
                    donated it.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>12. </font></b> Shazrak (a Nochri merchant) donated a lamp to Rav
               Yehudah's Beis ha'Keneses. Rachbah changed it, and
               Rava was upset. (Some say vice-versa. Some say the
               city leaders changed it, and Rachbah and Rava were
               upset.)
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>13. </font></b> The one who changed it reasoned that it is
               permitted, for Shazrak is not often in the city, so
               we are not concerned lest he scream. The other
               opinion objected, lest Shazrak come on occasion.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rambam (Hilchos Matanos Aniyim 9:7):</font></b> People of a
               city may change the Kupah to be like the Tamchuy, or
               vice-versa, or change them to any need of the
               Tzibur, even if they did not stipulate when
               collecting. If there was a great Chacham in the
               region, and all collect with intent that he will
               distribute to Aniyim like he sees proper, he can
               change it to whatever the thinks the Tzibur needs.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rosh (Bava Basra 1:29, citing R. Tam):</font></b> They may
               change the money to anything, even Reshus (not a
               Mitzvah). He permitted to give Tzedakah money to
               guards of the city, for the money is given based on
               the will of the people of the city. Erchin 6a
               supports this. R. Ami taught that one may change for
               the sake of a Mitzvah, but not for Reshus. This is
               as long as people mention the donor. Afterwards, it
               is permitted even for Reshus. This is because one
               who donates to the Tzibur gives according to the
               will of the Tzibur. One who gives a coin for
               Tzedakah may not change it after the Gabai received
               it. We do not say so about giving it to the Tzibur.
               Even a Gabai may change it for a Mitzvah; he is
               forbidden to change it only for Reshus. Shazrak
               donated a lamp to the Beis ha'Keneses. Rachbah was
               upset that they changed it, only because the donor
               was a Nochri. Regarding a Yisrael, one may change it
               to a Mitzvah even after the Gabai received it. Do
               not say that matters of the Beis ha'Keneses are
               different, for they are a Tzibur and they can change
               even to Reshus, for in this case the Tzibur did not
               change it. The Gabai changed it.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Question (Rosh):</font></b> Since he says that the Isur to
                    change it after the Gabai received it is for
                    Reshus, how can he say that before the Gabai
                    received he may change it for Reshus? In Rosh
                    Hashanah (6a) we say that 'b'FIcha' alludes to
                    Tzedakah. (It is a vow, and) one may not
                    retract from it! Rather, before the Gabai
                    received he may change it, i.e. borrow on
                    condition to repay. After the Gabai received it
                    he may not borrow it for Reshus even on
                    condition to repay, but he may change it for a
                    Mitzvah, even if he will not repay. Erchin 6a
                    supports this. He borrows and repays.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rosh:</font></b> The Ri mi'Gash permits changing it only to a
               need of Aniyim, e.g. clothing, housing, lodging and
               burial. Even though the Tamchuy and Kupah are food,
               one can change them to other needs of Aniyim. One
               may not change them to matters not for Aniyim, for
               that is like stealing from the Aniyim.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   <i></i>Note:</font></b> The Rosh above and below and many
                    others explicitly say that the Kupah is money.
                    Presumably, the Ri mi'Gash means that even the
                    Kupah is for food. Bava Metzia 38a discusses
                    selling food of the Tamchuy when there are no
                    Aniyim. No one taught this about the Kupah!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Rosh:</font></b> The Ri mi'Gash brings a proof from Shekalim
               2:5. Mosar Aniyim (if money was collected for
               Aniyim, the excess above what is needed) goes to
               Aniyim. Mosar Shevuyim (excess money collected for
               redeeming captives) goes for captives. If money was
               collected for a particular Oni or captive, the
               excess goes to him. We cannot learn from the lamp
               given to the Beis ha'Keneses, for it is given to the
               Tzibur, and they may use it for beer to drink.
               Mattresses of a Beis ha'Keneses were changed to a
               Beis Medrash.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Piplulei Charifta (20):</font></b> A Chacham asked why the
                    Rif did not explain like Rashi, that the
                    mattresses were bought from money of the Kupah.
                    The Rif holds like the Ri mi'Gash, who forbids
                    changing to Reshus!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Rosh:</font></b> His proof from Shekalim is invalid. It does
               not refer to money of the Kupah. Rather, they
               happened to collect for a need of Aniyim, e.g.
               clothing, or many Aniyim came. This is like the case
               of captives, which was taught with it. Then, the
               excess goes for what or whom they collected for.
               When a city made a Kupah Stam, it is according to
               their will. They can change it like they desire, and
               collect again when needed for Aniyim of their city.
               'Whatever they want' connotes like this. It is not
               needed to permit needs of Aniyim We already taught
               that they can convert a Tamchuy, which is for all
               Aniyim, to a Kupah, which is only for Aniyim of that
               city, or vice-versa, we know that changing to other
               Aniyim is not called Gezel. All the more so, one may
               change to another need of the same Aniyim! The
               Yerushalmi says that Mosar Aniyim (and Mosar
               Shevuyim) goes for the Aniyim (or captives), and we
               do not protest against the leaders, i.e. if they
               want to change. Therefore, R. Tam's opinion seems
               primary.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (YD 256:4):</font></b> People of the city may
               change the Kupah to the Tamchuy or vice-versa, or
               change them to any need of the Tzibur. This is even
               if they did not stipulate when they collected.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (DH u'Mah she'Chosav u'Resha'in):</font></b> R.
                    Yerucham says that the Gabaim cannot change the
                    Kupah to the Tamchuy or vice-versa without
                    permission of the leaders. However, they can
                    make them a joint fund.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Beis Yosef (DH u'Mah she'Chosav b'Shem):</font></b> The
                    Ramban and Ran cite R. Tam, and say that the
                    Rif agrees. The Mordechai says so in the name
                    of the Ri, but he concludes that nowadays that
                    we use Tzedakah for all needs of Aniyim, Lev
                    Beis Din stipulates that when the city gives
                    Tzedakah, it is on condition that the Gabayim
                    can do what they want with it.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Beis Yosef (DH ul'Zeh):</font></b> The Tur, Ramban,
                    Rabbeinu Meir mi'Rottenberg, Semag and Semak
                    all say that the Tzibur can change even to
                    Reshus, unlike Ri ha'Levi.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Bach (2, citing Semak 248):</font></b> R. Tam says that
                    nowadays, we vow Tzedakah based on our own
                    intent. We are like Gizbarim (treasurers of
                    Hekdesh). If we wait until worthy Aniyim come,
                    there is no Isur of delaying giving Tzedakah. A
                    Gabai who received Tzedakah may not change it
                    without permission of the people of the city,
                    but they can change it even to Reshus, for Lev
                    Beis Din stipulates. This is the custom.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.   Shach (7):</font></b> They may change even to Reshus. This
                    is only for a regular matter, and if they lack
                    they will collect again, but if they happened
                    to collect for a need of Aniyim, e.g. clothing,
                    or many Aniyim came, they may not change it for
                    something else, not even for other Aniyim.
                    However, it seems that even in this case they
                    may change it to redeem captives.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>vi.  Gra (8):</font></b> Rav Ashi did not need to stipulate,
                    and all the more so the Tzibur themselves can
                    change it (even if they did not stipulate).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</font></b> If there was a great Chacham
               in the region, and everyone collects with intent
               that he will distribute to Aniyim like he sees
               proper, he can change it to any need of the Tzibur. 
<br>


lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Question:</font></b> 'V'Chol Devash Lo Saktiru... la'Shem' (we may
          not offer fruit on the Altar)!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Answer (Rav Chanina):</font></b> The Beraisa means, it is <i>like</i>
          figs for a person (i.e. a dessert).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  (Rav Nachman bar Rav Chisda):</font></b> We do not offer birds for
          Kitz ha'Mizbe'ach.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)  Rejection (Rava):</font></b> This is wrong!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)  Objection (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak):</font></b> What is wrong with
          it?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Rav Simi of Neharde'a):</font></b> Extra Korbanos are used for
               Nedavah of the Tzibur. The Tzibur does not bring
               birds for Olos.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)  Version #1 (Rashi):</font></b> Shmuel holds like R. Yochanan (that
          R. Shimon holds that extra lambs designated for the Tamid
          are brought for Olos Nedavah).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Shmuel):</font></b> Communal Korbanos may be slaughtered for
               something slightly different than their original
               designation, as long as it is similar.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Support (Beraisa):</font></b> R. Shimon admits that if a goat
               of the Mo'ed was not offered on the Mo'ed, it may be
               offered on Rosh Chodesh. If it was not offered on
               Rosh Chodesh, it may be offered on Yom Kipur, and if
               not then, on the next Mo'ed, and if not, on the
               following Mo'ed, for it was originally designated to
               be brought on the outer Altar.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b>  Version #2 (Tosfos) Shmuel holds like R. Yochanan (that
          Chachamim hold that Hekdesh purchases on condition, extra
          Tamid Korbanos can be redeemed Tam).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Shmuel):</font></b> Korbanos Tzibur may be changed from their
               original designation until they are slaughtered.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)  (Beraisa):</font></b> R. Shimon admits that if a goat of the Mo'ed
          was not offered on the Mo'ed, it may be offered on Rosh
          Chodesh, and if not, on Yom Kipur, and if not, on the
          next Mo'ed, and if not, on the following Mo'ed, for it
          was originally designated to be brought on the outer
          Altar. (Some explain that this is a support for Rav
          Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak, who says that R. Shimon admits
          that extra Chata'os Tzibur are not themselves brought for
          Nedavah.)
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>3) ATONEMENT FOR OTHER TRANSGRESSIONS</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> The inner goat and Yom Kipur atone for
          intentional Tum'ah in the Mikdash or with Kodshim.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question:</font></b> What is the source of this?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer (Beraisa):</font></b> 'V'Chiper Al ha'Kodesh mi'Tum'os Bnei
          Yisrael...';
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> 'Umi'Pisheihem' refers to intentional sins.
               'Chatosom' refers to unintentional sins.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  (Mishnah):</font></b> The goat sent to Azazel atones for all other
          transgressions, light or severe, intentional or
          unintentional, (whether or not the person knows he
          sinned, Lav or Aseh, even what is punishable by Kares or
          death)...
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Question:</font></b> The Mishnah teaches the same things in
          different ways!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> A light sin is a Lav or Aseh. A severe sin is one
               punishable by Kares or death!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> Intentional is when he knows that he sinned.
               Unintentional is when he does not know!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Answer (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> The Mishnah teaches as follows. The
          goat sent to Azazel atones for all other transgressions,
          light or severe, intentional or unintentional;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The unintentional sins are whether or not the person
               found out that <i>perhaps</i> he sinned (e.g. one of two
               pieces of meat was Chelev, and he is unsure which he
               ate. Normally, the doubt obligates him to bring an
               Asham.)
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> A light sin is a Lav or Aseh. A severe sin is one
               punishable by Kares or death.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Question:</font></b> What is the case of an Aseh?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> If he did not repent, Korbanos do not atone for him
               - 'Zevach Resha'im To'evah'!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> If he repented, he got atonement immediately!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (Beraisa):</font></b> If one transgressed an Aseh and
                    repented, he is forgiven immediately. 
<br>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) IS ONE CONSIDERED A 'RASHA' IF HE FAILS TO PERFORM A POSITIVE COMMANDMENT?</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Mishnah (2b) lists the transgressions for which the various types of Korbanos atone. In the end of its list, the Mishnah says that for all other transgressions, whether light or severe, the Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach atones. The Gemara here cites Rav Yehudah who says that 'light' transgressions refer to transgressions of a Mitzvas Aseh or Lo Ta'aseh.
</p><p>
The Gemara questions the intent of the Mishnah. If the Mishnah refers to a person who transgressed a Mitzvas Aseh but did not repent, the Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach cannot provide atonement for him, because the verse states, 'The sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination' (Mishlei 21:27).
</p><p>
The Gemara's application of the verse in Mishlei to a person who transgresses a Mitzvas Aseh implies that one who fails to fulfill a Mitzvas Aseh is considered a Rasha.
</p><p>
However, this seems to contradict the position of many Acharonim. The Torah states, 'Do not place your hand with the wicked to be a thieving witness' (Shemos 23:1). This verse teaches that a Rasha may not serve as a valid witness. The <b>NESIVOS HA'MISHPAT</b> (CM 34:1) rules that this verse does <i>not</i> apply to one who failed to fulfill a Mitzvas Aseh. He cites a number of sources in the Gemara to prove that such a person does not become disqualified from giving testimony. Rather, one becomes disqualified only if he actively transgressed a Lo Ta'aseh, or if he casts aside the yoke of Heaven entirely.
</p><p>
Moreover, the <b>TUMIM</b> (CM 34:1) rules that one who transgressed a Lo Ta'aseh in a passive manner (for example, he failed to burn his Chametz before Pesach and therefore owned Chametz during Pesach) is not disqualified from giving testimony. How is the opinion of these Acharonim to be reconciled with the Gemara?
</p><p>
ANSWER: The <b>MINCHAS CHINUCH</b> (Mitzvah 6:12) suggests that there is a difference between the way the Chumash uses the word 'Rasha' and the way the Book of Mishlei uses the word.
</p><p>
The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Edus 10:2) writes that one who transgresses a sin for which he is punished with lashes or death is considered a Rasha and is disqualified as a witness. This implies that one who transgresses lighter sins is still fit to testify. The Rambam writes that the source for the disqualification of a person who transgresses a sin punishable with lashes is the verse, 'If the Rasha deserves to be lashed...' (Devarim 25:2). The source for the disqualification of a person punished with death is the verse, '... who is a Rasha and is liable for death' (Bamidbar 35:31).
</p><p>
The Torah uses the word 'Rasha' to describe a sinner who is liable for lashes or for death. It does not use the word 'Rasha' to describe a person who transgresses a Mitzvas Aseh or a passive Lo Ta'aseh.
</p><p>
(This approach may shed light on the Gemara in Kidushin (33b). The Gemara there states, 'Any Talmid Chacham who does not stand up for his teacher is called a Rasha.' The Gemara cites support from a verse in Koheles. Although the perpetrator transgresses only a Mitzvas Aseh by not standing for his teacher, he is deemed a Rasha just as the verse in Mishlei calls such a person a Rasha. However, in the language of the Torah he is not classified as a Rasha. Therefore, one who neglects to stand up out of respect for a Torah scholar would not be disqualified from being a witness.) (D. Bloom) 
</p><p>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) ATONEMENT WITHOUT TESHUVAH</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Answer (R. Zeira):</font></b> The case is, he did not repent. The
          Mishnah is Rebbi;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Rebbi):</font></b> Yom Kipur atones for all sins, whether or
               not a person repented, with three exceptions: one
               who denies the basis of Torah, one who ridicules
               Torah, and one who annuls circumcision (he does not
               circumcise himself, or he stretches his skin in
               order to appear uncircumcised);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> For these three, Yom Kipur atones only if he
               repented.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question:</font></b> What is Rebbi's reason?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  (Beraisa):</font></b> 'Ki Davar Hash-m Bazah' is one who denies the
          basis of Torah or ridicules Torah;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> 'V'Es Mitzvaso Hefar' is one who annuls
               circumcision;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> 'Hikares Tikares' - he is cut off before Yom Kipur
               and after Yom Kipur.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps this is even if he repented!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Rejection:</font></b> 'Avonah Bah' - we discuss one who still
               has (not repented from) his sin.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b>  Chachamim expound 'Hikares' - he is cut off in this
          world; 'Tikares' - he is cut off in the world to come;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> 'Avonah Bah' - (this is only when he did not repent,
               but) if he repented and died, death cleanses.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Question:</font></b> Since the Seifa is R. Yehudah, also the Reisha
          must be R. Yehudah!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Seifa):</font></b> It atones for Yisraelim, Kohanim and an
               anointed Kohen alike.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> This is R. Yehudah's opinion!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Answer (Rav Yosef):</font></b> The Mishnah is Rebbi. He holds like
          R. Yehudah.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Question (Abaye):</font></b> Were you exact in saying that Rebbi
          holds like R. Yehudah, but we could not say the other
          way, for R. Yehudah does not hold like Rebbi?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Or, could we also say that the Mishnah is R.
               Yehudah, and he holds like Rebbi?  You merely taught
               like one normally says, that the Talmid (Rebbi)
               holds like his teacher (R. Yehudah)?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Answer (Rav Yosef):</font></b> R. Yehudah does not hold like Rebbi.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa) Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps Yom Kipur atones for
               people even if they do not repent;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Chatas and Asham atone only for one who
                    repented. Also Yom Kipur should atone only for
                    one who repented!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Rejection:</font></b> Chatas and Asham do not atone for
                    one who sinned b'Mezid. Yom Kipur atones even
                    for intentional sins, we should say that it
                    even atones for one who did not repent!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b>'Ach' is a distinction (there are people for
                    whom Yom Kipur does not atone, i.e. one who did
                    not repent).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> A Stam Sifra (Beraisa that expounds a verse of
               Vayikra) is R. Yehudah, and it says that Yom Kipur
               atones only for one who repents!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Contradiction (another Stam Sifra) Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps
          Yom Kipur applies only to one who fasted, blessed the
          day, and did not do Melachah! (Rashi; R. Tam  - he
          refrains from Melachah <i>due to</i> Kedushas ha'Yom.)
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rejection:</font></b> 'Yom Kipurim Hu' teaches that it atones
               even for one who did none of the above. (Presumably,
               such person did not repent.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  Answer #1 (Abaye):</font></b> The first Sifra is like R. Yehudah,
          and the latter Sifra is like Rebbi.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)  Answer #2 (Rava):</font></b> Both are like Rebbi. The first Sifra
          discusses transgressions of (Kares of) Yom Kipur itself.
          Rebbi admits that Yom Kipur does not atone for them
          without Teshuvah.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> We must say so. If not, according to Rebbi, the
               Kares written for eating or working on Yom Kipur
               would never apply!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Objection:</font></b> It would apply to one who transgressed at
               night and died that night, for only the <i>day</i> of Yom
               Kipur atones!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Correction:</font></b> Rather, we must say this way, for if
               not, the Kares for eating or working on the <i>day</i> of
               Yom Kipur would never apply!
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) IS A 'MEIFER BRIS B'BASAR' THE SAME AS A 'MASHUCH'?</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara quotes the opinion of Rebbi who maintains that Yom Kippur atones for a person's sins whether or not he repents. There are, however, three exceptions to this rule: a 'Porek Ol' (one who denies the existence of Hash-m), a 'Megaleh Panim b'Torah' (one who is arrogant in his criticism of statements of the Torah), and a 'Meifer Bris b'Basar' (one who violates the Mitzvah of Milah, as explained below). Rebbi maintains that for these three transgressions, Yom Kippur atones only if the person has repented.
</p><p>
(The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Teshuvah 1:3) does not rule like Rebbi. He rules that Yom Kippur atones only when the perpetrator has repented from his sin, regardless of what the sin was.)
</p><p>
What is the meaning of 'Meifer Bris b'Basar'? The words literally mean 'one who violates the covenant in the flesh.' Does this refer to a man who was never circumcised at all, or to one who was once circumcised but later pulled back the skin of the Orlah to make it look as if he had not been circumcised ('Mashuch')?
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> in Yevamos (72a, DH umi'Divreihem) apparently concludes that the Gemara here refers to one who was never circumcised. The Gemara in Yevamos (72a) quotes Rav Huna who says that according to Torah law, a Mashuch who is a Kohen is permitted to eat Terumah. However, the Rabanan decreed that he is prohibited from eating Terumah because he looks like an Arel (who is prohibited mid'Oraisa from eating Terumah).
</p><p>
Tosfos asks that the Gemara here says that a Mashuch is punished with Kares, as derived from the verses. This implies that the prohibition against making oneself a Mashuch is a Torah law. Tosfos answers that the Gemara here refers to someone who was never circumcised at all.
</p><p>
The Gemara here does not actually use the words 'Mashuch b'Orlah.' It says only 'Meifer Bris b'Basar,' words which can refer to either possibility mentioned above. Why, then, does Tosfos ask a question from the Gemara here in a manner that implies that the Gemara clearly says that 'Mashuch b'Orlah' is punished with Kares?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>TESHUVOS AMUDEI <b><b>OR</b></b></b> (#65) explains that it is evident from Tosfos' question from a 'Mashuch b'Orlah' that Tosfos had a Girsa in which Rebbi explicitly refers to a Meifer Bris as a 'Mashuch Orlah.'
</p><p>
How, though, can one suggest that Tosfos had such a text? If Tosfos' text in the Gemara reads 'Mashuch,' how can Tosfos answer that the Gemara refers to a person who was not circumcised at all?
</p><p>
(b) The <b>TESHUVOS PRI YITZCHAK</b> (#27, DH v'Yesh) therefore maintains that Tosfos indeed did not have the text 'Mashuch' in the Gemara here. However, Tosfos understood that the simple meaning of the term 'Meifer Bris' ('annulling the covenant') is a person who was already circumcised but did some action to annul his Bris (that is, he pulled the Orlah back). Tosfos' basis for this understanding is the Gemara in Yevamos that explains the verse, 'He nullified (Meifer) my Bris,' as a reference to Mashuch. (The Gemara there concludes that although the Gemara cites a verse that mentions 'Mashuch,' the verse is merely an 'Asmachta b'Alma' and the prohibition is only mid'Rabanan.)
</p><p>
Since the Gemara in Yevamos implies that the term 'Meifer Bris' refers to a Mashuch, Tosfos similarly assumed that when the Gemara here uses the term 'Meifer Bris' it also refers to Mashuch. Tosfos answers that since the Gemara in Yevamos concludes that Mashuch is only mid'Rabanan, it must be that the words 'Meifer Bris b'Basar' in the Gemara here does not necessarily refer to Mashuch, even though this would be the more straightforward interpretation of these words. Instead, the Gemara here must be referring to one who was not circumcised at all, which is a Torah prohibition for which one is punished with Kares. (D. Bloom)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) WHAT IS CALLED MIKRA KODESH?</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>     </font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa) Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps Yom Kipur applies only
               to one who fasted, and called it Mikra Kodesh and
               did not do Melachah!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Chagigah 18a (Beraisa - R. Yonason):</font></b> A Kal va'Chomer
               forbids Melachah on Chol ha'Mo'ed. There is no
               Kedushah before and after the first and seventh
               days, yet Melachah is forbidden on them. There is
               Kedushah before and after Chol ha'Mo'ed, all the
               more so Melachah is forbidden on them!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  This is unlike the six days of the week. Even
                    though there is Kedushah (Shabbos) before and
                    after them, Melachah is permitted on them, for
                    there is no (Korban) Musaf. On Chol ha'Mo'ed,
                    there is Musaf.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Question:</font></b> Rosh Chodesh has Musaf, yet Melachah is
               permitted!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Answer:</font></b> Rosh Chodesh is not called 'Mikra Kodesh'.
               We cannot learn from it to Chol ha'Mo'ed, which is
               called Mikra Kodesh.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Maseches Sofrim (19:1):</font></b> On Pesach, in Tefilah and
               Kidush, one must mention 'b'Yom Tov Mikra Kodesh
               ha'Zeh.' On Chol ha'Mo'ed, one says 'b'Mo'ed Chag
               ha'Matzos ha'Zeh.'
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rambam (Hilchos Yom Tov 6:16):</font></b> The Mitzvah of honor
               and Oneg on Shabbos applies also to Yom Tov, for it
               is called Mikra Kodesh.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rambam (22):</font></b> Chol ha'Mo'ed is called Mo'ed. Simchah
               is a Chiyuv.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rambam (7:1):</font></b> Even though Chol ha'Mo'ed is not
               called Shabboson, since it is called Mikra Kodesh
               and it is when Chagigah is brought in the Mikdash,
               it is forbidden to do Melachah.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Rosh (Hilchos Tefilin (after Menachos) 16):</font></b> Rav
               Bartzeloni says in the name of a Ga'on that
               'v'Shomarta Es ha'Chukah ha'Zos' forbids Tefilin on
               Shabbos and Yom Tov. One should not rely on this,
               for the Halachah follows R. Akiva, who holds that
               Chukah discusses Pesach. We learn Shabbos and Yom
               Tov from 'Lecha l'Os' (and Shabbos and Yom Tov
               themselves are an Os (sign that we are Hashem's
               servants)). R. Yosi ha'Glili expounds '<i>mi</i>'Yamim',
               but not all days. This excludes Shabbos and Yom Tov,
               and surely also Chol ha'Mo'ed, which is called Mikra
               Kodesh. According to R. Akiva, who learns from
               'l'Os', Chol ha'Mo'ed is not included. Some wear
               Tefilin on Chol ha'Mo'ed without a Berachah. One who
               blesses does not lose.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Rashi (Shevuos 13a DH Lo Kar'o):</font></b> Calling Yom Kipur a
               Mikra Kodesh is to bless Mekadesh Yisrael
               veha'Zmanim.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Rebuttal (Tosfos DH Lo):</font></b> There is no Berachah
                    mid'Oraisa of Yom Kipur! Rather, he admits that
                    Beis Din was Mekadesh it, and refrains from
                    Melachah <i>due to</i> Kedushas ha'Yom.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Ramban (Vayikra 23:2):</font></b> The name Mikra Kodesh is
               because everyone is Keru'im (invited) and they
               gather to sanctify it. It is a Mitzvah for all of
               Yisrael to gather in Beis Hash-m (the Beis
               ha'Mikdash) on the day of the Mo'ed to openly be
               Mekadesh the day in prayer and Hallel to Hash-m.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Ohr Some'ach (Hilchos Teshuvah 1:1):</font></b> If they
                    did not bring the goats due to negligence, it
                    is as if they did not call Yom Kipur a Mikra
                    Kodesh, and it does not atone.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (OC 188:7):</font></b> If one omitted Ya'aleh
               v'Yavo in Birkas ha'Mazon on Chol ha'Mo'ed, he need
               not go back, for one need not eat bread.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Gra (7):</font></b> Some disagree. It seems that they are
                    correct. R. Eliezer says that one must eat 14
                    meals in the Sukah (Sukah 27a). Toras Kohanim
                    expounds 'Mikra Kodesh' - honor it with eating
                    and drinking and clean clothing.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Mishnah Berurah (242:1):</font></b> The Mitzvah of Oneg
                    Shabbos is from Nevi'im - 'v'Korasa l'Shabbos
                    Oneg.' Some say that its source is from the
                    Torah, for Shabbos is included in Mikra'ei
                    Kodesh, and we expound that we honor it through
                    eating and drinking and clean clothing.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Shulchan Aruch (OC 487:1):</font></b> In Shemoneh Esre of
               Pesach, we say 'Es Yom Tov Mikra Kodesh ha'Zeh.'
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (DH va'Titen):</font></b> This is like it says
                    in Maseches Sofrim. The Tur omitted it, for in
                    Ashkenaz they do not say it. 'Yom Chag Ploni'
                    already includes this. There is no reason to
                    mention Mikra Kodesh more than the Isur
                    Melachah or all Hilchos. Rav Hai Gaon says that
                    they do not say it in Bavel. I say that the
                    custom of Sefard is correct, for it is in
                    Maseches Sofrim and no Tana or Amora disagrees.
                    Mikra Kodesh shows that we must mention it in
                    prayer, like the Ramban says. Perhaps we
                    mention only what the Torah says. Mikra
                    <i>Kodesh</i> implies that Melachah is forbidden.
                    When the Torah mentions afterwards the Isur
                    Melachah, this explains Mikra Kodesh.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Shulchan Aruch (490:3):</font></b> On Chol ha'Mo'ed, we say 'Es
               Yom Mikra Kodesh ha'Zeh.'
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Rema:</font></b> Our custom is not to say 'Mikra Kodesh' on Yom
               Tov or Chol ha'Mo'ed.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Tur:</font></b> Rav Hai Gaon was asked whether we say on
                    Chol ha'Mo'ed in Ya'aleh v'Yavo 'b'Yom Chag
                    Ploni ha'Zeh b'Yom Mikra Kodesh ha'Zeh.' He
                    answered 'we say it only in Musaf. Some are
                    meticulous not to say it in Musaf. They are
                    wrong.' I (the Tur) see no difference between
                    Ya'aleh v'Yavo and Musaf.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Beis Yosef (DH She'elah):</font></b> Rav Hai Gaon holds
                    that since Musaf is in place of Korban Musaf,
                    which is to honor the Mo'ed, therefore, we
                    mention it, just like on Yom Tov.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Bach (490:1):</font></b> Here Rav Hai Gaon connotes that
                    only on Chol ha'Mo'ed we do not say Mikra
                    Kodesh in Ya'aleh v'Yavo, butwe say it on Yom
                    Tov in Atah Vechartanu. In Siman 582, the Tur
                    says in his name that we do not say it in
                    Bavel. Here, the question was whether we say it
                    in Ya'aleh v'Yavo on Yom Tov, and he answered
                    'we say only Es Yom Chag Ploni ha'Zeh.' Perhaps
                    he meant that even on Yom Tov we do not say it
                    in Atah Vechartanu.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Bach (DH u'Mah she'Chosav v'Eini):</font></b> Rav Hai Gaon
                    holds that Mikra Kodesh means that everyone is
                    Keru'im and gather on the day for the Korban
                    Musaf, therefore, we say this only in Musaf.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.   Birkei Yosef (2):</font></b> On Chol ha'Mo'ed we do not
                    say in Tefilah 'Yom Tov Mikra Kodesh', for one
                    may do Melachah of Davar ha'Avud (there will be
                    a loss if he does not do it). People might
                    think that the same applies to Yom Tov if they
                    were called the same
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Shulchan Aruch (529:1):</font></b> One must honor Yom Tov like
               Shabbos... and fix every meal on wine. Yom Tov
               clothing should be better than Shabbos clothing.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Shulchan Aruch (2):</font></b> One is obligated to be happy on
               the Mo'ed, he and his wife, children and all his
               entourage. One gives parched and grain to children
               to make them rejoice; one buys nice clothing and
               ornaments for women according to his means.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Mishnah Berurah (16):</font></b> The Rambam says that Chol
                    ha'Mo'ed is called Mo'ed regarding Simchah.
                    However, there is no obligation of honor and
                    Oneg, for it is not called Mikra Kodesh.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Sha'ar ha'Tziyon (530:4):</font></b> The Rambam (7:1)
                    calls Chol ha'Mo'ed Mikra Kodesh, but in 6:16
                    he brings the Chiyuv of honor and Oneg due to
                    to Mikra Kodesh only regarding Yom Tov. This is
                    because there he discusses only Simchah. He
                    holds that one need not be stringent about this
                    on Chol ha'Mo'ed. Even though it is called
                    Mikra Kodesh, since the Torah permits Melachah,
                    at least for Davar ha'Avud according to
                    everyone, it is not as Kadosh as Yom Tov.
                    Therefore, also for honor it is not like Yom
                    Tov. Even though the Mechilta obligates
                    honoring it with eating and drinking and clean
                    clothing, this means more than a Yom Chol, but
                    we do not totally equate it to Yom Tov. Even
                    though one opinion learns the Isur Melachah on
                    Chol ha'Mo'ed from Mikra Kodesh, we permit
                    Davar ha'Avud. This shows that it is lighter
                    than Yom Tov. On Yom Tov one must eat bread,
                    therefore one must repeat Birkas ha'Mazon if he
                    forgot Ya'aleh v'Yavo, but not on Chol
                    ha'Mo'ed. Likewise, one must honor Chol
                    ha'Mo'ed with clean clothing more than a Yom
                    Chol, but not as much as Yom Tov. The Magen
                    Avraham (664:3) connotes that the custom is not 
                    to wear Shabbos clothing on Chol ha'Mo'ed,
                    except for Hoshana Rabah. The Maharil was
                    stringent for himself. However, it must be
                    nicer than clothing of Yom Chol.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Gra (597:1):</font></b> One may not fast on Rosh Hashanah
                    because it is called Mikra Kodesh.
<br>
<font color='blue'><i>See also:</i>
<br><b>SIMCHAH DURING THE REGEL </b>(</font><font color='blue'>


lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Rejection:</font></b> It would apply to one who died while
               transgressing (Tosfos - or he died at any time
               during Yom Kipur), or one who transgressed as the
               day ended, for there was no time for Yom Kipur to
               atone for him.
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>2) WHAT ATONES FOR THE KOHANIM?</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> It atones for Yisraelim, Kohanim and an
          anointed Kohen alike.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question:</font></b> The Mishnah proceeds to explain the difference
          between them!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> The Mishnah says, they all get
          atonement for <i>other</i> transgressions through the goat
          that is sent (to Azazel);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> It then explains that the bull atones for Tum'ah of
               Kohanim, and the inner goat atones for Tum'ah of
               Yisraelim.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b>  Our Mishnah is R. Yehudah;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Version #1 - Rashi (Beraisa - R. Yehudah):</font></b> 'V'Chiper
               Es Mikdash ha'Kodesh' - (the Kohen Gadol sprinkles
               the blood of the bull and inner goat to atone for
               Teme'im who entered) the Kodesh ha'Kodoshim. 'Ohel
               Mo'ed' teaches that it atones for (Teme'im who
               entered) the Heichal; 'ha'Mizbe'ach' teaches about
               (Teme'im who offered on) the Altar; 'Yechaper'
               teaches about (entering) the Chatzer of the Mikdash;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> Version #2 - Tosfos (Beraisa - R. Yehudah):
               'V'Chiper Es Mikdash ha'Kodesh' teaches about
               (sprinkling the bloods between the staves of the
               Aron, in) the Kodesh ha'Kodoshim. (He also sprinkles
               towards the Paroches, while in the) 'Ohel Mo'ed',
               (and on the inner) 'Mizbe'ach'. 'Yechaper' teaches
               about (pouring the leftover blood on the base of the
               outer Altar, which is in) the Chatzer; (end of 
               Version #2)
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  'Kohanim', 'Am ha'Kahal' (Yisraelim) and
                    'Yechaper' (to include Leviyim), to teach that
                    the goat that is sent atones equally for all of
                    them.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> R. Shimon says, just like the blood of the inner
               goat atones for Yisraelim for Tum'ah of the Mikdash
               or Kodshim, the blood of the bull atones for Kohanim
               for Tum'ah of the Mikdash or Kodshim;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Just like the confession over the inner goat
                    atones for Yisraelim for other transgressions,
                    the confession over the bull atones for Kohanim
                    for other transgressions.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Question:</font></b> Surely, the verse equates the atonement of
               Kohanim and Yisraelim. How does R. Shimon explain
               this?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Answer:</font></b> It teaches that they all get atonement for
               Tum'ah and for other transgressions. However, they
               get atonement through different Korbanos.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Question:</font></b> What is R. Shimon's reason?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Answer:</font></b> 'V'Lakach Es Shnei ha'Se'irim' equates the inner
          goat and the goat that is sent;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Just like the inner goat does not atone for Kohanim
               for Tum'ah (since it says 'la'Am'), the goat that is
               sent does not atone for Kohanim for other
               transgressions.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b>  R. Yehudah holds that the Torah equates the goats to
          teach that they should have the same appearance, height
          and price.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Question:</font></b> Who is the Tana of the coming Beraisa (which
          suggests that if Kohanim do not get atonement through the
          bull, they get no atonement)?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa):</font></b> 'V'Shachat Es Se'ir ha'Chatas Asher
               la'Am' - it does not atone for Kohanim;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Rather, they get atonement through the Kohen
                    Gadol's bull.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Question:</font></b> Regarding the bull it says 'Asher Lo.'
               This should teach that it does not atone for them!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  If so, and nothing would atone for them!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Answer #1:</font></b> 'Yechaper v'Al ha'Kohanim' proves that
               they get atonement;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  It is more reasonable to say that they get
                    atonement through the Kohen Gadol's bull, for
                    it atones for more than it says ('Lo', just
                    himself). It also atones for 'Beiso' (the Kohen
                    Gadol's wife);
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b> We do not find that the goat that is sent
                    atones for more than Yisraelim. It does not
                    atone for the Kohen Gadol's wife.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Answer #2:</font></b> Alternatively, we can learn from 'Beis
               Aharon Borechu Es Hash-m' - all the Kohanim are
               called 'Beiso.'
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Answer #1 (R. Yirmeyah):</font></b> The Tana is not R. Yehudah, for
          he says that Kohanim get atonement through the goat that
          is sent.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Question:</font></b> If so, who is the Tana?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer (Rava):</font></b> It is R. Shimon, who says that
               Kohanim do not get atonement through the goat that
               is sent. 
<br>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) HOW DOES YOM KIPPUR ATONE FOR ONE WHO EATS ON YOM KIPPUR?</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara (13a) quotes the opinion of Rebbi who maintains that Yom Kippur atones for a person's sins whether or not he repents. The Gemara later asserts that Rebbi agrees that if a person performed Melachah or ate on Yom Kippur, he is punished with Kares and the day does not atone for his sin. The Gemara proves this from logic: if the day would atone for his sin, the punishment of Kares which the Torah mandates for a person who ate or worked on Yom Kipper would never apply.
</p><p>
The Gemara rejects this proof. Perhaps the day of Yom Kippur <i>does</i> atone for eating and working on Yom Kippur, but it is only the <i>daytime</i> which atones for sins. When a person ate on the night of Yom Kippur and then died that night, the day of Yom Kippur was not able to atone for him. <b>RASHI</b> (DH v'Ha) explains that it is specifically the day of Yom Kippur which atones, and not the night, as the verse says, 'For on this day Hash-m will atone for you' (Vayikra 16:30).
</p><p>
Despite its refutation of the proof, the Gemara (13a-b) says that Rebbi still agrees that a person is punished with Kares for desecrating the day (and not just the night) of Yom Kippur. Rashi (DH u'Makshinan) explains that the Torah explicitly states that one who does not afflict himself or who performs Melachah 'b'Etzem ha'Yom ha'Zeh' -- 'on the very day of Yom Kippur' (Vayikra 23:29-30) -- will be punished with Kares.
</p><p>
The Gemara argues that Rebbi still may exempt a person from Kares if he lives to the end of Yom Kippur day, even if he ate or did Melachah earlier in the day. The punishment of Kares applies when he ate during the day and choked immediately and died. Rashi (DH v'Chanaktei) explains that since no time passed in the day after his transgression of eating, he attains no atonement from the day. (See also <b>TOSFOS</b> to 13a, DH d'Avad, and <b>MINCHAS CHINUCH</b> (Mitzvah 364:30, DH v'Hinei).)
</p><p>
The Gemara does not question the fact that such a person indeed would be liable for eating on Yom Kippur, even though he died before the food reached his stomach. This, however, seems to be the subject of a dispute between Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish in Chulin (103b), who disagree about the conditions necessary to be liable for eating a limb from a live animal. Rebbi Yochanan maintains that as long as the person's 'throat derives benefit' ('Hana'as Garon') from a k'Zayis of the forbidden food, he is liable. Reish Lakish maintains that he is liable only when a k'Zayis of the forbidden food enters his stomach ('Hana'as Mei'av).
</p><p>
According to Reish Lakish, why should a person who died while eating on Yom Kippur be liable, if his stomach never derived benefit from the food?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b><b><b>OR</b></b> SAME'ACH</b> (Hilchos Shevisas Asor 2:4) writes that Reish Lakish agrees that in order to be Chayav for eating on Yom Kippur, it suffices for the throat to derive benefit, and it is not necessary for the food to enter the stomach.
</p><p>
He proves this from the Gemara here which states that when a person ate on Yom Kippur and choked to death immediately, he is punished with Kares, clearly implying that a person is liable as soon as he swallows even though the food has not reached his stomach.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>CHIDUSHEI CHASAM SOFER</b> in Chulin disagrees. He maintains that liability for transgressing the prohibition against eating on Yom Kippur and other fast days also depends on 'Hana'as Mei'av.' He cites proof from the Gemara in Berachos (14a) which states that one who is fasting is permitted to taste food (such as one who is cooking).
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> there (DH To'em) writes that he must spit out what he tastes, because as long as he does not swallow the food he is not considered to have derived benefit from it. The Chasam Sofer infers from Tosfos that the prohibition of eating on a fast is transgressed not when the throat benefits, but when the stomach benefits. This certainly applies on Yom Kippur, because the Gemara in Yoma (79a) explains that the reason why the size of a Koseves (date) is the minimum amount necessary for liability for eating on Yom Kippur is that this is the amount that alleviates a person's hunger. Rashi in Yoma (79a, DH Kim Lehu) explains that this is derived from the fact that the Torah prohibits eating on Yom Kippur with the words, 'one who does not afflict himself....' One whose stomach does not benefit from the food that he eats (because the amount is too small) is considered to be afflicted.
</p><p>
The Chasam Sofer rejects the Or Same'ach's proof from the Gemara here. He explains that the Gemara does not mean that the person actually choke to death when the food was in his throat. Rather, it means that he choked later when it had already reached his stomach. The Chasam Sofer's opinion is that 'Hana'as Mei'av' does not mean the actual stomach, but it refers to the stage at which the food enters the esophagus. The person died immediately after the food reached this stage. (D. Bloom) 
</p><p>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) WHAT ATONES FOR THE KOHANIM? (cont.)</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Answer #2 (Abaye):</font></b> The Beraisa can be R. Yehudah. It
          asked as follows:
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Question:</font></b> We should say that the bull does not atone
               for them for Tum'ah of the Mikdash or Kodshim, and
               nothing would atone for them for Tum'ah!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer #1:</font></b> 'Yechaper v'Al ha'Kohanim' proves that
               they get atonement for other transgressions;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Since they get atonement for other
                    transgressions, presumably they get atonement
                    also for Tum'ah.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b> It is more reasonable to say that they get
                    atonement through the Kohen Gadol's bull, for
                    it atones for more than it says. It atones also
                    for 'Beiso';
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b>We do not find that the inner goat atones for
                    more than Yisraelim.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Answer #2:</font></b> Alternatively, we can learn from 'Beis
               Aharon Borechu Es Hash-m.'
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question:</font></b> What forced the Tana to give an alternative
          answer? How could one challenge the first answer?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer:</font></b> The Torah says (only) 'Beiso'. Therefore, the
          Tana shows that all Kohanim are called Beiso.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Question:</font></b> (Above, we learned from 'la'Am' that the inner
          goat does not atone for Kohanim.) We need 'la'Am' to
          teach that the congregation pays for it!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Answer:</font></b> That is learned from 'ume'Es Adas Bnei Yisrael.'
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Question:</font></b> (Above, we thought to learn from 'Asher Lo'
          that the bull does not atone for Kohanim.) 'Asher Lo' is
          needed to teach the following!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa):</font></b> The Kohen Gadol pays for the bull
               himself. The congregation does not pay;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps the congregation does not
                    pay, because it does not atone for them, but
                    Kohanim pay, for it atones for them!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Rejection:</font></b> 'Asher Lo.'
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps the Kohanim should not pay,
                    but if they did, it is Kosher!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Rejection:</font></b> Another verse repeats 'Asher Lo' to
                    teach that even b'Diavad, it is invalid.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Answer:</font></b> The Tana asked, just like the bull does not atone
          for the congregation, because they do not pay for it, it
          should not atone for Kohanim, for also they do not pay
          for it!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> He answered that Kohanim are called Beiso.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Question:</font></b> According to R. Shimon, we understand why the
          Torah teaches about two confessions (over the bull) and
          the (sprinkling of its) blood. These atone for the
          Kohanim for the three atonements Yisraelim get from the
          inner and outer goats and the goat that is sent;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> However, according to R. Yehudah, the goat that is
               sent atones also for Kohanim. One confession and the
               blood should suffice!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Answer:</font></b> The extra confession is to atone for himself
          before he atones for the Kohanim;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa - Tana d'Vei R. Yishmael):</font></b> It is proper
               that the one making atonement for others should
               already have atonement himself.
<br>
<br><center><font color='ff0000' size='+1'><b>*****<b>PEREK YEDI'OS HA'TUM'AH</b>*****</b></font></center><p>
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>2) YEDI'OS OF TUM'AH</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> There are two primary Yedi'os (awarenesses) of
          Tum'ah. There are four in all:
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> He knew that he became Tamei, then forgot and
               knowingly ate Kodshim;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> He knew that he became Tamei, then forgot (that this
               meat is) Kodesh and ate it;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> He forgot the Tum'ah and the Kodesh, and after
               eating it he found out. In all these cases, he
               brings an Oleh v'Yored.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b> He knew that he became Tamei, then forgot and
               knowingly entered the Mikdash;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b> He knew that he became Tamei, then forgot the (place
               of the) Mikdash and entered;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b> He forgot the Tum'ah and the Mikdash, and after he
               left he found out. In all these cases, he brings an
               Oleh v'Yored.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b>  The same law applies to one who enters the Azarah
          (Chatzer) of the Mikdash, or a (valid) addition to it;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> To add onto Yerushalayim or the Azarah, we need a
               king, a Navi, the Urim v'Tumim, the great Sanhedrin
               of 71, two of the loaves that accompaniy a Korban
               Todah, and Shirah. Beis Din must walk (around the
               addition) , with the loaves after them, and all of
               Yisrael after them.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE MISHNAH IN SANHEDRIN</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Mishnah here lists the criteria necessary for making additions to the area of Yerushalayim and to the courtyards of the Beis ha'Mikdash. Enlarging the area may be done only in the presence of the king, a prophet, the Urim v'Tumim, and the Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges (Sanhedri Gedolah).
</p><p>
The Mishnah in Sanhedrin (2a) also discusses the requirements for extending the boundaries, but it mentions only the need for the presence of the Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges. What is the reason for this discrepancy between the two Mishnayos?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (15a) answers that the primary source for the procedure of adding to Yerushalayim is the Mishnah here, which lists all of the requirements. The Mishnah in Sanhedrin merely lists the various functions of judges and how many judges are needed for each function; it does not delve into the details of each function that it lists. This is also the reason why the Mishnah there mentions only the Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges as the criterion for starting a Milchemes ha'Reshus and does not mention the other requirements listed in the Gemara (Sanhedrin 16a).
</p><p>
Tosfos questions this approach from a different statement in that Mishnah. The Mishnah there says that only the Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges may adjudicate questions of a Shevet's inheritance of land. The Gemara there explains that because the inheritance was originally distributed by the Sanhedri Gedolah, it is also judged by them. The Gemara asks that if this is the reason, then the presence of the Urim v'Tumim and the Goral (lottery), which also were present at the time of the original division of the land, should also be necessary.
</p><p>
Why does the Gemara ask this question? Perhaps the Urim v'Tumim and Goral indeed are necessary in such a case. According to the answer of Tosfos here, the Mishnah in Sanhedrin lists only the functions of the Sanhedrin and not the details of each function, and thus the Mishnah there does not need to mention the other things which are necessary in order to judge a case of a Shevet's inheritance!
</p><p>
Tosfos answers that when the Mishnah in Sanhedrin states that only the Sanhedri Gedolah may judge the inheritance of a Shevet, it says also that only the Sanhedri Gedolah may judge a false prophet and a Kohen Gadol. The trial of a false prophet and Kohen Gadol needs nothing other than the Sanhedrin. From the fact that the Mishnah there groups judging a Shevet together with judging a false prophet and a Kohen Gadol, it is clear that the Mishnah maintains that nothing other than the Sanhedrin is needed to judge a Shevet! The Gemara therefore asks why the Urim v'Tumim and Goral are omitted.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>CHASAM SOFER</b> suggests another explanation. When the Mishkan was built, the Urim v'Tumim was not fashioned and put it into use until the eighth day of the inauguration of the Mishkan. This implies that the great holiness of the Mishkan and Beis ha'Mikdash take effect without the presence of the Urim v'Tumim. The prohibition of a Tamei person entering the Mishkan was taught only on the eighth day of the inauguration of the Mishkan.
</p><p>
Based on this, the Chasam Sofer explains the difference between the Mishnah in Sanhedrin and the Mishnah in Shevuos. The Mishnah in Sanhedrin is discussing the minimum requirement needed to give holiness to the Mikdash (which is necessary in order to offer Korbanos there). To provide the minimum degree of Kedushah, the presence of the Sanhedri Gedolah suffices. The Mishnah here in Shevuos, on the other hand, is listing the requirements necessary to give the Mikdash a higher degree of Kedushah -- the degree of Kedushah which prohibits a Tamei person from entering the Beis ha'Mikdash. For such a person to be punished with Kares, the place he enters must have been sanctified with the additional Kedushah that comes with the presence of the king, prophet, and Urim v'Tumim.
</p><p>
The <b>KENESES YISRAEL</b> says that the Chidush of the Chasam Sofer actually seems to be the view of the <b>RAMBAM</b>. The Rambam (Hilchos Beis ha'Bechirah 6:14) records the requirements for expanding the place of the Mikdash as mentioned in the Mishnah here. He concludes that 'any place that has not been sanctified with all of the above [requirements], and in the proper sequence, is not completely holy.' Why does the Rambam write that such a place is not 'completely holy,' implying that it <i>does</i> have some degree of Kedushah? If the Rambam is of the opinion that Kedushah is effected only when all of the criteria listed in the Mishnah here are present (as Tosfos maintains), then he should say that an area which was sanctified without all of these things is 'not holy' <i>at all</i>. The Rambam's words indicate that the area definitely achieves some degree of Kedushah, as the Chasam Sofer maintains. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) SEPARATING FROM ISHTO NIDAH</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>     </font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Mishnah):</font></b> If a woman told her husband during
               relations that she felt a flow of blood that makes
               her a Nidah, if he withdraws the Ever (during
               erection), he is Chayav Kares, because withdrawing
               it is pleasurable, just like inserting it.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   18b (R. Shimon ben Yosi):</font></b> The Lav forbidding
               relations with a Nidah is 'v'El Ishah b'Nidas
               Tum'asah Lo Sikrav.'
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   (Rav Papa):</font></b> If a woman told her husband during
               relations that she became Nidah, 'Lo Sikrav' is a
               Lav forbidding him to withdraw immediately. 'Lo
               Sikrav' can also mean 'do not separate' - 'Kerav
               Elecha Al Tigash Bi.'
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Sanhedrin 37a - A Min:</font></b> You permit a Nidah to be
               secluded with her husband. Is it possible that a
               fire will not singe chips?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Rav Kahana:</font></b> The Torah testified about us - 'Sugah
               ba'Shoshanim', we do not breach even a wall of
               roses.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Kesuvos 4a (Beraisa):</font></b> If the Kalah becomes Nidah, he
               sleeps among men, and she sleeps among women.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   4b:</font></b> This is when she became Nidah before they had
               Bi'ah.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.   Shabbos 11a (Mishnah):</font></b> Similarly, a Zav may not eat
               with a Zavah.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.   13a:</font></b> This is lest they come to have relations.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>10.  Question:</font></b> May a Nidah sleep (in the same bed) with
               her husband, when each is in his or her own garment?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>11.  Answer (Rav Yosef -- Mishnah - Beis Hillel):</font></b> Fowl
               and cheese may not be on the same table, or eaten
               together. (We similarly decree about a Nidah.)
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>12.  Support #1 (Seifa - R. Shimon ben Gamliel):</font></b> Two
               lodgers may eat at the same table, one meat and the
               other cheese, and we are not concerned.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  R. Chanan bar Ami taught that this refers to
                    strangers, but if they know each other, it is
                    forbidden. A husband and wife know each other!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>13.  Rejection:</font></b> Lodgers who know each other are
               forbidden, for there is no Shinuy. Here, there is a
               Shinuy! (Normally, they sleep unclothed).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>14.  Support #2 (Mishnah):</font></b> A Zav may not eat (with a
               Zavah...)
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>15.  Rejection:</font></b> There also, there are two people, but
               there is no Shinuy!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>16. </font></b> Rav Yosef argues with R. Pedas, who expounds 'Lo
               Sikrevu Legalos Ervah' - the Torah forbids only
               Kirvah (closeness) of Giluy (Bi'ah with) Ervah.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>17.  (Tana d'vei Eliyahu):</font></b> Once, a learned Talmid died
               very young. His widow was complaining why 'it
               (Torah) is the length of your days' was not 
               fulfilled. Eliyahu asked about his conduct with her
               during the seven clean days.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>18.  The widow:</font></b> He would eat and drink with me, and sleep
               (in the same bed) without clothes (on either of us),
               but he never even considered relations!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>19.  Eliyahu:</font></b> Blessed is Hash-m who killed him, and did
               not show partiality due to his Torah! It says 'v'El
               Ishah b'Nidas Tum'asah Lo Sikrav'!
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rambam (Hilchos Isurei Bi'ah 11:18):</font></b> One may not
               cling to his wife during the seven clean days... he
               may not eat with her from one bowl.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Ra'avad:</font></b> Our custom is even on one table. Rav
                    Acha agrees.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Beis Yosef (YD 195 DH u'Mah she'Chosav v'Lo
                    Yochal):</font></b> The Rashba explains that even on one
                    table is forbidden. It suffices to spread a
                    cloth on the table for a Heker. Some are
                    lenient like the Rambam. The Ran (5b DH
                    v'Chosav) says that the Gemara supports the
                    Rashba. R. Yerucham says that some make a Heker
                    between them, or they eat on two cloths or they
                    fold over the cloth. Some permit that she
                    changes and does not eat in her place. The
                    custom is to require a Shinuy.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Hagahos Maimoniyos (30):</font></b> One may not eat with
                    at the table unless there is a Shinuy, e.g.
                    bread or a bottle between his bowl and hers,
                    for Shabbos 13a compares this to two friends
                    eating meat and milk at one table, which is
                    forbidden without a Shinuy.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rosh (Shabbos 1:32):</font></b> Nowadays the custom is to eat
               with Ishto Nidah on one table. Before, everyone used
               to eat alone on a small table. When his wife was
               with him at the small table, this showed affection.
               Nowadays the household eats at one table, so it does
               not show affection. Some make a Heker between them,
               like two people eating at one table, one milk and
               one meat.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Hagahos Ashri:</font></b> If when she is Tehorah they eat
                    from one bowl, and now they eat from separate
                    bowls, this is a Shinuy; it is permitted.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (YD 195:1):</font></b> One must separate from
               Ishto Nidah until she counts seven clean days and
               immerses. He may not jest with her or be lightheaded
               (Rema - even verbally), lest this lead to Aveirah.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (DH u'Mah she'Chosav v'Lo
                    Yishtamesh):</font></b> The Rashba learns from Avos d'R.
                    Noson (2:1). It expounds 'v'El Ishah b'Nidas
                    Tum'asah Lo Sikrav' to forbid hugging, kissing
                    and speaking idle words.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</font></b> He may be secluded with her.
               Since he once had Bi'ah with her, his Yetzer does
               not overpower him.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Shulchan Aruch (3):</font></b> One may not eat with her at the
               table unless there is a Shinuy, i.e. something
               separates between his bowl and hers, bread or a
               bottle, or each eats on his own cloth.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Taz (1):</font></b> The bread or bottle does not permit if
                    they eat or drink from it.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Shach (6):</font></b> It suffices if they uncover part of
                    the table, and her bowl is on the table
                    (without a cloth).
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Gra (8 and Likut in 88:2):</font></b> The first opinion in
                    Tosfos (Chulin 107b DH k'Ein) holds that a
                    Shinuy suffices for meat and milk. The same
                    applies here. A Shinuy permits everything,
                    except sleeping together. Many rule like the
                    second opinion, that a Shinuy does not permit
                    eating together (meat and milk, or with Ishto
                    Nidah). However, scrutiny shows that the first
                    opinion is correct. We conclude that Rav Yosef
                    argues with R. Pedas, who says that the Torah
                    forbids only Kirvah of GIluy Ervah. We must say
                    that Shinuy permits eating; and they argue only
                    about whether it permits sleeping.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Gra (Likutim here (8) and 88:2):</font></b> We hold like
                    the latter opinion in Tosfos, that a Shinuy
                    does not permit eating together. The Rosh,
                    Mordechai, Avi ha'Ezri, and She'altos forbid.
                    It was a mere Dichuy in Shabbos to say that
                    Shinuy permits. The conclusion forbids sleeping
                    in one bed, or eating at the same table.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Rema:</font></b> Some require a separation between their bowls
               only if when she is Tehorah, they eat from separate
               bowls.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Shach (7):</font></b> The Bach says that this leniency is
                    only when others eat at the table with them. If
                    not, even if no one else is there, we forbid
                    even if they normally eat from one bowl. The
                    Bach is not necessarily correct.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Rema:</font></b> If when she is Tehorah, they eat from one
               bowl, it suffices for her to eat from a separate
               bowl. This Heker suffices. This is the custom. Some
               say that he may not eat from her leftovers, just
               like he may not drink her leftovers.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Shach (8):</font></b> Darchei Moshe (4) found this in a
                    treatise. Really, it is from Hagahos Maimoniyos
                    and the Mordechai. They say oppositely, that we
                    learn the Isur to drink her leftovers, from the
                    Isur to eat leftovers!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Gra (10):</font></b> The Gemara said that the Talmid ate
                    and drink with his wife during her seven clean
                    days. Also this justified his death. He sinned
                    by drinking her leftovers, and similarly
                    regarding eating. We forbid a Zav to eat <i>with</i>
                    a Zavah, i.e. after her, but not vice-versa.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Note:</font></b> In Shabbos, Amora'im explained why the
                    Talmid was lenient to sleep with her, but not
                    why he ate and drank with her.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Taz (2):</font></b> Some cut the food into small pieces,
                    and they take one by one until they finish
                    eating. This does not help, unless each first
                    puts the food on his own plate before eating
                    it.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.   Taz (3):</font></b> The Bach says that since we equate
                    eating to drinking, she may not bring food to
                    him. This is difficult, for Ishto Nidah may do
                    all labors, except for mixing his drink...
                    (Kesuvos 61a). We did not list bringing food
                    among them! It seems that Chachamim estimated
                    that this does not cause closeness. It is
                    merely a labor of toil, unlike mixing his
                    drink.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>vi.  Pischei Teshuvah (YD 195:10):</font></b> Perhaps one may
                    not hear Ishto Nidah sing. Shabbos 13a connotes
                    that whatever is Asur with an Eshes Ish is Asur
                    with Ishto Nidah, except for seclusion. This
                    requires investigation.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>vii. Taz (4):</font></b> If someone else ate from her food in
                    between it is permitted, just like if someone
                    drank from her cup in between. Likewise, all
                    leniencies of drinking her leftovers apply
                    here.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Shulchan Aruch (OC 217:4):</font></b> One may not bless on
               fragrances of Ervah, e.g. if it hangs on her neck or
               is in her hand, for one may not smell it, lest he
               come to kiss or touch her.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Taz (3):</font></b> The Shulchan Aruch discusses the usual
                    case. It is forbidden even if she removed it,
                    for the fragrance is made for Ervah (i.e. to
                    arouse desire). Further, it will cause him to
                    have thoughts if he knows her.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Birkei Yosef (3):</font></b> It is proper not to smell
                    perfumes of Ishto Nidah. Even though Chachamim
                    did not decree about seclusion, and the Torah
                    testified 'Sugah ba'Shoshanim', one must
                    distance himself. The verse hints that a Seyag
                    (fence) is needed even for Shoshanim (roses,
                    i.e. Yisrael).
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Pischei Teshuvah (YD 195:1):</font></b> Likewise, one may
                    not smell perfumes of Ishto Nidah even if they
                    are on the table.
<br>
<font color='blue'><i>See also:</i>
<br><b>MELACHOS A NIDAH MAY DO FOR HER HUSBAND </b>(</font><font color='blue'>


lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> The inner loaf is eaten, and the outer loaf is
               burned.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> If an addition was made without all this, one who
               enters there (b'Tum'ah) is exempt.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b>  If one became Tamei in the Azarah, then forgot the Tum'ah
          but remembered (that he was in) the Azarah; or, if he
          remembered that he was Tamei, but forgot the Azarah; or,
          he forgot both:
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> If he bowed (before leaving), or delayed the time
               needed to bow, or did not leave on the shortest
               path, he is liable;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> If he left on the shortest path, he is exempt.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b>  This is a Mitzvas Aseh (that he must leave on the
          shortest path) to which the Korbanos for a mistaken
          Hora'ah (ruling of the great Sanhedrin which caused most
          of Yisrael to transgress a Mitzvah involving Kares) do
          not apply.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b>  There is a Mitzvas Aseh regarding Nidah to which the
          Korbanos for a mistaken Hora'ah do apply:
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> If a woman told her husband during relations that
               she felt a flow of blood that makes her a Nidah, if
               he withdraws the Ever (while it is still in
               erection), he is Chayav Kares, because withdrawing
               it is pleasurable, just like inserting it. (Rather,
               he must not withdraw it until the erection ceases.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b>  R. Eliezer says, 'Sheretz Tamei v'Nelam' teaches that he
          brings a Korban only if he forgot the Tum'ah, but not if
          he forgot the Mikdash;
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b>  R. Akiva says, 'v'Nelam Mimenu v'Hu Tamei' - he brings a
          Korban only if he forgot the Tum'ah, but not if he forgot
          the Mikdash. (The Gemara will explain what they argue
          about.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b>  R. Yishmael says, it says 'v'Ne'elam' twice, to obligate
          in both cases, i.e. forgetting the Tum'ah or the Mikdash.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  (Gemara - Rav Papa) Question:</font></b> Why does the Mishnah say
          that there are four Yedi'os in all? Really there are six!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> There is Yedi'ah of the Tum'ah at the beginning and
               at the end;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> There is Yedi'ah of the Kodesh at the beginning and
               at the end;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> There is Yedi'ah of the Mikdash at the beginning and
               at the end!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Question:</font></b> Why didn't Rav Papa say that there are
               eight cases?
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Each of the two Yedi'os of Tum'ah is really two
                    cases, i.e. when he later ate Kodshim, or
                    entered the Mikdash!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Answer:</font></b> Both are considered a Yedi'ah of Tum'ah, so
               we do not distinguish them.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  Answer (Rav Papa):</font></b> Really, there are eight Yedi'os (like
          suggested above);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Version #1:</font></b> The Tana counts only the four Yedi'os at
               the end, for these Yedi'os cause him to bring a
               Korban.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Version #2:</font></b> The Tana counts only the four Yedi'os at
               the beginning, for these are unique to Tum'ah in the
               Mikdash or with Kodshim;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Regarding other Aveiros for which one bring a
                    Korban, one is liable even if he had Yedi'ah
                    only at the end.
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>3) IGNORANCE OF THE LAWS</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Question (Rav Papa):</font></b> What is the law if he forgot the
          laws of Tum'ah?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Question:</font></b> What is the case?
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Suggestion:</font></b> He does not know which rodents are
                    Metamei and which are not.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Rejection:</font></b> Even children learn this. Surely
                    lack of this Yedi'ah does not exempt him!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer:</font></b> Rather, he knows which rodents are Metamei,
               but he did not know whether a lentil's worth of a
               rodent is Metamei.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Is knowing that rodents are Metamei considered
                    Yedi'ah?
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b> Or, since he did not know whether a lentil's
                    worth is Metamei, it is not Yedi'ah?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b>  This question is not resolved.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Question (R. Yirmeyah):</font></b> If someone from Bavel never knew
          where the Mikdash is (and entered while Tamei), what is
          the law?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Question:</font></b> According to whom does he ask?
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Suggestion:</font></b> He asks according to R. Akiva, who
                    obligates obligates a Korban only if he knew at
                    the beginning.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Rejection:</font></b> R. Akiva does not obligate for
                    forgetting the place of the Mikdash!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Suggestion:</font></b> He asks according to R. Yishmael,
                    who obligates a Korban for forgetting the place
                    of the Mikdash.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Rejection:</font></b> R. Yishmael obligates even if he did
                    not know at the beginning! (Surely, he is
                    liable!)
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer:</font></b> He asks according to Rebbi, who obligated a
               Korban only if he knew at the beginning, and
               obligates for forgetting the place of the Mikdash;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Rebbi also holds that having once learned is
                    considered Yedi'ah (at the beginning).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> Is knowing that there is a Mikdash considered
               Yedi'ah?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b> Or, since he did not where it is, it is not Yedi'ah?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b>  This question is not resolved. 
<br>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) ONE WHO REMAINS IN THE BEIS HA'MIKDASH WHEN HE IS 'TAMEI'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Mishnah discusses cases of a person who becomes Tamei while in the Beis ha'Mikdash, and one who remembers while he is standing in the Beis ha'Mikdash that he is Tamei. The Mishnah teaches that in the case of a person who realizes that he has become Tamei while he is standing in the Beis ha'Mikdash, the person must exit the Mikdash immediately, using the shortest route possible, and he may not bow down or tarry in any way. If he does not exit as soon as possible, he transgresses the sin of Tum'as Mikdash.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b>, the <b>RAMBAN</b>, and others point out that there is an important difference between a person who intentionally lingers in the Mikdash while he is Tamei and a person who enters the Mikdash while Tamei. The person who knows that he is Tamei when he enters the Mikdash transgresses the prohibition with an action and commits a 'Lav she'Yesh Bo Ma'aseh' when he enters the Mikdash while he is Tamei. In contrast, a person who finds out that he is Tamei while he is in the Mikdash transgresses the prohibition only passively; he commits only a 'Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh.'
</p><p>
The Gemara later (17a) discusses how much time the person must wait in the Mikdash before exiting in order to be Chayav Malkus for Tum'as Mikdash. What does the Gemara mean when it says that remaining in the Mikdash is an act punishable with Malkus? One does not receive Malkus for a Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh!
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> answers that the Gemara here follows the opinion that one <i>does</i> receive Malkus for a Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh (see Makos 2b).
</p><p>
The <b>MAHARI KURKUS</b> (Hilchos Bi'as ha'Mikdash 3:21) proposes that this is also the view of the <b>RAMBAM</b>. The Rambam (Hilchos Sanhedrin 18:2) rules in accordance with the view that there is no Malkus for a Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh. Accordingly, when the Rambam (Hilchos Sanhedrin 19:1) lists the transgressions for which a person receives Malkus, he includes a person who enters the Azarah while Tamei, and he does not include a person who <i>remains</i> in the Azarah while Tamei. The Mahari Kurkus points out that the Rambam apparently follows Tosfos' understanding of the Gemara.
</p><p>
(b) Alternatively, Tosfos explains that sometimes a person can be punished with Malkus even though he performed no action when he transgressed the Lav. When a transgression must be preceded by an action and the results of that action cause the person to continue to transgress the prohibition, the person can be punished with Malkus for continuing to transgress the prohibition, since his transgression was brought about initially through an action. The <b>RITVA</b> in Makos (21b; see Insights there) suggests a similar answer. (See <b>MISHNEH L'MELECH</b>, Hilchos Bi'as ha'Mikdash 3:21, <b>SHA'AGAS ARYEH</b> #32 and Sha'agas Aryeh Chadashos #12, <b>IMREI BINYAMIN</b>, and Insights to Nazir 17:1:d.)
</p><p>
Since the prohibition of Tum'as Mikdash can be transgressed only with an action of entering the Mikdash, it is not comparable to prohibitions that are entirely passive.
</p><p>
The <b>MINCHAS CHINUCH</b> (#11), quoting the <b>SHA'AR HA'MELECH</b>, uses this principle to explain a difficulty in the laws of Pesach. The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Chametz u'Matzah 1:3) and the <b>SEFER HA'CHINUCH</b> maintain that one who possesses Chametz during Pesach is punished with Malkus. Why, though, is the Isur of possessing Chametz not considered a Lav she'Ein Bo Ma'aseh? According to the principle of Tosfos, the answer is clear. Since it is necessary to do an action in order to acquire Chametz in the first place, possessing Chametz during Pesach is considered a Lav she'Yesh Bo Ma'aseh and is not passive.
</p><p>
A number of Acharonim ask various questions on Tosfos' principle. For example, in the Gemara in Zevachim (29b) which discusses the sin of Pigul (a Kohen who, while performing the Avodah, thinks about eating the meat of a Korban after the allotted time), Rebbi Yanai cites a verse which prohibits Pigul with a Lo Ta'aseh, and he proves from there that the sin of Pigul is punishable with Malkus. Rav Ashi asks Rav Mari that the Isur of Pigul is a passive prohibition and thus it should not be punishable with Malkus. Rav Mari answers that Rebbi Yanai's statement follows the opinion that transgressing a passive prohibition is punishable with Malkus. If, as Tosfos asserts, every prohibition that depends on an initial action is considered a Lav she'Yesh Bo Ma'aseh, then why does the Gemara there not answer that Pigul is considered a Lav she'Yesh Bo Ma'aseh (<b>OLAS SHLOMO</b>)? This is one of the questions that the Acharonim ask on Tosfos' principle. (See also <b>ARUCH LA'NER</b> to Makos 21b, and <b>KEHILOS YAKOV</b> to Shevuos, #3.) (Y. Montrose) 
</p><p>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) SANCTIFICATION OF KLEI SHARES</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> The same law applies to one who enters the
          Azarah, or a (valid) addition...
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question:</font></b> What is the source of this?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer (Rav Simi bar Chiya):</font></b> 'Like (Hash-m) showed
          (Moshe) the form of the Mikdash and Klei Shares (vessels
          used in the Mikdash) v'Chen Ta'asu' - for all
          generations, they must be sanctified (the same way as in
          Moshe's day).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Question (Rava - Beraisa):</font></b> All the Klei Shares made in
          Moshe's day were sanctified through the anointing oil.
          After Moshe, they are sanctified through usage.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> 'V'Chen Ta'asu' should teach that they must be
               sanctified like in Moshe's day!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Answer:</font></b> 'Va'Yimshachem va'Ykadesh <i>Osam</i>' - only those
          Klei Shares were anointed, but not those of later
          generations.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Question:</font></b> Perhaps those Kelim had to be anointed, but
          later generations can sanctify them by anointing <i>or</i> by
          usage!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Answer (Rav Papa):</font></b> 'Asher Yesharasu Vam ba'Kodesh'
          teaches that usage sanctifies them.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Question:</font></b> Why is the other verse ('Osam') needed?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Answer:</font></b> If not for 'Osam', one might have thought that
          future generations sanctify Kelim through anointing (due
          to 'v'Chen Ta'asu' <i>and</i> usage (due to 'Asher
          Yesharasu');
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> 'Osam' teaches that they are not anointed.
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>2) ADDITIONS TO THE CITY OR THE AZARAH</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> And with two Todah offerings.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  (Beraisa):</font></b> Bread of the Todos is used, but not the meat.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Question:</font></b> What is the source of this?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Answer (Rav Chisda):</font></b> We learn from 'Shtei Sodos Gedolos.'
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Question:</font></b> What does 'Gedolos' mean?
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Suggestion:</font></b> It is the biggest species that may
                    be brought (bulls).
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Rejection:</font></b> If so, the verse should explicitly
                    say 'bulls'!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Suggestion:</font></b> It is big animals of whichever
                    species they brought.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Rejection:</font></b> That is not important in Hashem's
                    eyes!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.   (Beraisa):</font></b> It says 'Re'ach Nicho'ach' regarding
                    animal offerings, bird offerings and flour-
                    offerings, to teach that Hash-m is equally
                    pleased with a small or big offering, as long
                    as the person intended to please Hash-m.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer:</font></b> It refers to the largest type of Minchah
               that accompanies a Todah, i.e. Chametz.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   (Mishnah):</font></b> The Menachos that accompany a Todah are
               made from five Sa'im of Yerushalayim, which equal
               six Sa'im of when Yisrael were in the wilderness;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b> This amount equals two Efos, which is 20 Esronim;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Ten Esronim are used for the (10) Chametz
                    loaves, 10 are used (altogether) for the three
                    types of Matzah:</font></b> loaves, wafers and Matzah that
                    was first scalded with boiling water.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  (Rami bar Chama):</font></b> The remainder of a Minchah (after
          taking the Kometz) is used to be Mekadesh the Azarah.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Question:</font></b> What is the reason?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Answer:</font></b> It should be like the Kidush of Yerushalayim.
          Just like we are Mekadesh Yerushalayim with something
          (Todos) that may be eaten there, we are Mekadesh the
          Azarah with something that may be eaten in the Azarah.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Objection:</font></b> We should use Todos. They may be eaten in the
          Azarah!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Correction:</font></b> Rather, just like we are Mekadesh
          Yerushalayim with something that is disqualified if it
          leaves Yerushalayim, we are Mekadesh the Azarah with
          something that is disqualified if it leaves the Azarah.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  Question:</font></b> We should use Chametz, like Kidush of 
          Yerushalayim!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)  Objection:</font></b> Menachos are not Chametz!
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THINGS NECESSARY FOR ADDING TO THE AREA OF YERUSHALAYIM OR THE BEIS HA'MIKDASH</b></font>
<br>QUESTIONS: The Mishnah (14a) lists the criteria necessary for making additions to the area of Yerushalayim and to the courtyards of the Beis ha'Mikdash. Enlarging the area may be done only in the presence of the king, a prophet, the Urim v'Tumim, and the Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges (Sanhedri Gedolah).
</p><p>
The Gemara inquires about the source for these requirements. Rav Simi bar Chiya says that these requirements are derived from the verse which states with regard to building the Mishkan, '[They shall make a sanctuary for Me...] like everything that I am showing you, the form of the Mishkan and the form of all of its vessels, and so shall you do' (Shemos 25:9). Rav Simi says that 'so shall you do' implies that this is what should be done <i>for all generations.</i>
</p><p>
(a) How does Rav Simi derive from this verse that the expansion of the holy areas needs the king, a prophet, the Urim v'Tumim, and the Sanhedri Gedolah?
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> asks that if Moshe Rabeinu is considered a king, then whenever the Gemara derives from Moshe Rabeinu that a Sanhedrin is necessary (since Moshe Rabeinu was equivalent to the Sanhedri Gedolah, as the Gemara in Sanhedrin 16b teaches), a king and a prophet also should be required!
</p><p>
(c) Tosfos asks further that the Mishkan was erected before Aharon became the Kohen Gadol, and thus clearly the Urim v'Tumim was not in use at that time. How, then, can the Gemara learn from the consecration of the Mishkan that the Urim v'Tumim is necessary when expanding the area of the Mikdash?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>RASHI</b> explains that Rav Simi understands that the last words in the verse, 'And so shall you do,' seem extra. From these words he derives that in the same way the Mishkan was consecrated in the time of Moshe Rabeinu, so shall it be consecrated for all generations. Moshe Rabeinu was considered a king and a prophet, his brother was the Kohen Gadol (with the Urim v'Tumim), and the seventy elders constituted the Sanhedri Gedolah.
</p><p>
(b) Although Tosfos does not answer his second question, he concedes that his first question is not difficult. This is because the phrase, 'v'Chen Ta'asu' -- 'and so shall you do,' implies the inclusion of many things. Accordingly, for adding area to the Mikdash, many requirements must be included, whereas for other things which require the Sanhedrin, as learned from Moshe Rabeinu, only the Sanhedrin is necessary and nothing else.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>RITVA</b> answers the second question of Tosfos. He explains that the requirement for the Urim v'Tumim is based on the first part of the verse. The verse includes everything that Hash-m showed ('Mar'eh') to Moshe Rabeinu. This is similar to the term '<i>Urim</i> v'Tumim.' The way in which Hash-m communicated the directions for building the Mishkan, and the way in which Hash-m communicates messages through the Urim v'Tumim, are the same. Therefore, the verse teaches that the Urim v'Tumim is also required.
</p><p>
Alternatively, the Gemara in Ta'anis (11a) states that Moshe Rabeinu served as the Kohen Gadol during the first seven days of the Mishkan's inauguration. The Ritva says that when he served as the Kohen Gadol, he did so with the Urim v'Tumim. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>


<font><b>2) USING THE 'URIM V'TUMIM' TO ADD TO SANCTIFIED AREAS</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Mishnah (14a) lists the criteria necessary for making additions to the area of Yerushalayim and to the courtyards of the Beis ha'Mikdash. Enlarging the area may be done only in the presence of the king, a prophet, the Urim v'Tumim, and the Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges (Sanhedri Gedolah).
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> asks that the Mishkan was erected before Aharon became the Kohen Gadol, and thus clearly the Urim v'Tumim was not used for the inauguration of the Mishkan. How, then, can the Gemara learn from the consecration of the Mishkan that the Urim v'Tumim is necessary when expanding the area of the Mikdash? (See previous Insight.)
</p><p>
Tosfos states in his question that the Urim v'Tumim was not <i>used</i> for the inauguration of the Mishkan, and not that it was not <i>present</i>. Tosfos implies that when the Mishnah (which is the Halachah) requires the Urim v'Tumim whenever the area of Yerushalayim or the Mikdash is expanded, it means that the Urim v'Tumim must be <i>consulted</i>. How does Tosfos know that the Urim v'Tumim must be asked when consecrated areas are expanded?
</p><p>
ANSWER: The <b>AYELES HA'SHACHAR</b> explains as follows. Tosfos in Yoma (21b) explains that when the Gemara states that the Urim v'Tumim did not exist during the time of the second Beis ha'Mikdash, it does not mean that it was totally absent. Rather, the Gemara means that the Urim v'Tumim was present but that it could no longer answer questions. The <b>KESEF MISHNEH</b> (Hilchos Beis ha'Bechirah 4:1) explains this further and says that the name of Hash-m that was used when the Kohen Gadol would ask questions to the Urim v'Tumim and which was worn on the Urim v'Tumim was missing in the time of the second Beis ha'Mikdash. The Gemara later in Shevuos (16a) says that in the times of Ezra, they could not consecrate the areas because they were missing the Urim v'Tumim. Based on the explanation of Tosfos in Yoma, the Gemara later in Shevuos (16a) means that even though the Urim v'Tumim was physically present during the times of Ezra, they could not consecrate the areas, because consecrating the areas required asking the Urim v'Tumim, which they no longer could do.
</p><p>
The Ayeles ha'Shachar adds that the same question applies with regard to the necessity to have a prophet present at the consecration of areas of Yerushalayim and the Mikdash. Does the prophet need to prophesy that the consecrated area be extended, or is merely his presence required? Since Moshe Rabeinu was giving instructions to consecrate the Mishkan based on Hashem's word to him, perhaps it is also necessary for the prophet to prophesy in order to extend consecrated areas.
</p><p>
<b>RABEINU CHAIM HA'LEVI SOLOVEITCHIK</b> states that the words spoken by Hash-m to Moshe Rabeinu had the unique status of words of <i>Torah</i> and not words of prophecy. Accordingly, one cannot from Moshe Rabeinu that a prophet must also prophesy and not only be present at the expansion of consecrated areas, because the prophecies of all other prophets do not have the status of words of Torah. Therefore, it suffices for a prophet to be present, and he does not need to prophesy. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) KRI'AS SHEMA AL HA'MITAH</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>     </font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The Leviyim sing from 'Yoshev b'Seser Elyon' until
               'Elyon Samta Me'onecha' (and 'b'Varcho Mipenei
               Avshalom Beno' (Tehilim 3) - Gra deletes this).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> R. Yehoshua ben Levi would say these verses before
               going to sleep at night.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Question:</font></b> He himself said that one may not use words
               of Torah to heal himself!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Answer:</font></b> One may use words of Torah for protection.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Berachos 5a (R. Yitzchak):</font></b> Anyone who reads Shema
               before sleep is like one who bears a double-edged
               sword (to kill Mazikin) -- 'Romemos Kel bi'Gronam
               v'Cherev Pifiyos b'Yadam.'
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   (Mar Zutra):</font></b> We know that the verse refers to
               Keri'as Shema, for before this it says 'Yalzu
               Chasidim b'Chavod Yeranenu Al Mishkevosam.'
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   (R. Yitzchak):</font></b> Mazikin avoid one who reads Shema
               before sleep -- 'u'Venei Reshef Yagbihu Uf.'
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Verses teach that 'Uf' is Torah, and 'Reshef'
                    is Mazikin.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.   13b:</font></b> One may not say Kri'as Shema lying down, even
               if he leans a bit to the side.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.   Question:</font></b> R. Yochanan would say Shema this way!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>10.  Answer:</font></b> He was fat (it was hard for him to turn
               totally onto his side, therefore he was permitted to
               lean slightly).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>11.  24a (Shmuel):</font></b> If two are sleeping (naked, under a
               blanket) on a bed, each may turn his head away to
               say Keri'as Shema.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>12.  Megilah 28a:</font></b> One of the merits to which R. Nechunya
               ben Hakanah attributed his long life was that he
               would not sleep before forgiving one who had cursed
               him. This is like Mar Zutra. Before Mar Zutra went
               to sleep, he would forgive all who pained him.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   R. Yonah (15a DH Shnayim):</font></b> Why do we permit two
               sleeping under one garment to turnaway from each
               other and say Shema? One may not say Kri'as Shema
               lying down, even if he leans a bit to the side! The
               Heter to lean is while sitting, not while lying
               down! We can say that the Isur when lying down and
               leaning is when lies on his back and leans a bit to
               the side. If one turns totally on his side, it is
               permitted. A better answer is that we find that when
               it would be an exertion (to sit up), it is
               permitted, like for R. Yochanan, for he was fat.
               Here also, since he took off his clothes, it would
               be an exertion to get dressed again (to say Shema
               sitting), so he may read leaning.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (OC 239 DH ucheshe'Yirtzeh):</font></b> R.
                    Yonah permits to say Shma while leaning only if
                    it is an exertion to get up. He cannot explain
                    'Al Mitaso' to literally mean on his bed.
                    Rather, it is shortly before sleeping. Rashi,
                    the Rambam and Tur permit when one is totally
                    on his side. They can explain that he is lying
                    on his bed.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rambam (Hilchos Kri'as Shema 7:2):</font></b> One reads the
               first Parshah of Shema and goes to sleep. If he is
               overcome by sleep, he reads even the first verse or
               verses of mercy and then sleeps.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rosh (Berachos 9:23):</font></b> R. Chananel says that one must
               say also Parshas 'v'Hayah Im Shamo'a', for it says
               'when you lie down and rise.' Perhaps the text of
               the Gemara is 'one says Shema <i>and</i> 'v'Hayah Im
               Shamo'a.'
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>     (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (OC 63:1):</font></b> One recites Shema walking,
               standing, lying, riding on an animal, or sitting,
               but not lying face down or on his back. He may read
               leaning to the side.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rema:</font></b> This is because he is already lying, and it is
               an exertion to stand.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</font></b> If he is very fat and he
               cannot turn on his side, or he is sick, he leans a
               little and reads.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Shulchan Aruch (239:1):</font></b> One reads Al Mitaso the
               first Parshah of Shema and blesses 'ha'Mapil
               Sheinah...'
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Magen Avraham (1):</font></b> R. Yerucham says, based on
                    Medrash Tehilim that one should say all of
                    Kri'as Shema, which has 248 words, to guard his
                    248 limbs.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Mishnah Berurah (1):</font></b> If is good to always say
                    all three Parshiyos, which have 248 words (with
                    Kel Melech Ne'eman) to guard his 248 limbs.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Kaf ha'Chayim (1,2):</font></b> We should say all 248
                    words. Chasidim Rishonim did not need to say
                    more than the first verse. He repeats 'Hashem
                    Elokeichem Emes' to complete the 248 words.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Magen Avraham (2):</font></b> Only Shema and ha'Mapil are
                    a Chiyuv, but not the Tehilim. R. Yehoshua ben
                    Levi himself said only two Tehilim. One who is
                    sick or Anus is exempt. Women do not say Kri'as
                    Shema Al ha'Mitah. Perhaps this is because it
                    applies only at night.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.   Rebuttal (Eliyahu Rabah 4):</font></b> Sifrei Musar say
                    that also women must say it, for it is for
                    Shmirah (protection). Also they need this!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>vi.  Eshel Avraham (2):</font></b> Those who exempt hold that
                    Kri'as Shema Al ha'Mitah is for the sake of
                    (Divrei) Torah. Nowadays, the custom is that
                    women say it.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>vii. Kaf ha'Chayim (3):</font></b> Just like men need
                    protection from female Shedim that can cause
                    emissions, women need protection from male
                    Shedim that can defile them.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Rema (ibid.):</font></b> See above (63:1) whether one may read
               while lying.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Magen Avraham (5):</font></b> This is for the Chiyuv
                    Kri'as Shema. If one was Yotzei already and
                    reads just for Shmirah, he may lie. We find
                    that R. Zeira read repeatedly until he fell
                    asleep. (Surely, he was lying down.)
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Mishnah Berurah (6):</font></b> It is clear there in the
                    Rema that l'Chatchilah one should not lie down
                    to read while lying, even if he turns on his
                    side. Some are stringent to stand or sit even
                    if they were already Yotzei Shema. If he is
                    already lying, all agree that he may lean on
                    his side and read. One should accustom himself
                    to lie on his side. It is a great Isur to lie
                    face down or on his back (lest this lead to
                    erections and emissions).
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Kaf ha'Chayim (11):</font></b> Even if one already was
                    Yotzei Shema, Kri'as Shema Al ha'Mitah is
                    obligatory. One should say it with great
                    Kavanah.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Mishnah Berurah (5):</font></b> If one will have
                    relations, afterwards he cleans himself from
                    semen, washes his hands, and recites at least
                    ha'Mapil and Shema.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.   Kaf ha'Chayim (10):</font></b> One may say Shema and bless
                    before relations. It depends on the person (if
                    he will be able to say Shema and bless later).
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>vi.  Beis Yosef (DH v'Chosav):</font></b> Rabbeinu Meir would
                    read 'vi'Hi No'am' before going to sleep during
                    the day.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>vii. Mishnah Berurah (8):</font></b> During the day one does
                    not bless ha'Mapil. It is good to say
                    'Yoshev...','vi'Hi No'am...'...
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>viii.Mishnah Berurah (9):</font></b> At night, before sleep, it
                    is proper to investigate what he did during the
                    day. If he finds a sin, he should confess and
                    resolve not to repeat it, especially common
                    sins such as fattery, lying, Lashon ha'Ra.
                    Bitul Torah requires great investigation. It is
                    proper to pardon anyone who sinned against him
                    or pained him. This is a merit for long life.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ix.  Kaf ha'Chayim (2):</font></b> One says 'Ribono Shel
                    Olam...' (and forgives all who pained him)
                    before Kri'as Shema Al ha'Mitah. One does not
                    say it on Shabbos or Yom Tov.<p>


lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Suggestion:</font></b> We should ferment (make Chametz) the
               remainder of a Minchah and be Mekadesh with it!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rejection:</font></b> 'Lo Se'afeh Chametz Chelkam';
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (Reish Lakish):</font></b> Even the remainder, which the
                    Kohanim eat, may not be baked as Chametz.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)  Question:</font></b> The two loaves brought on Shavu'os are a
          Minchah of Chametz!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)  Answer:</font></b> They are never proper to be Mekadesh the Azarah.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Possibility #1:</font></b> The Azarah (or addition) was built
               before Shavu'os, and the Kidush is before Shavu'os.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rejection:</font></b> The loaves do not get Kedushah (to be
               disqualified if they leave the Azarah) until the
               accompanying lambs are slaughtered on Shavu'os!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Possibility #2:</font></b> The Azarah was built before
               Shavu'os, and the Kidush is on Shavu'os.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Rejection:</font></b> The Kidush must be at the time it is
               completed!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Possibility #3:</font></b> The building was finished on
               Shavu'os, and the Kidush is on Shavu'os.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Rejection:</font></b> We may not build the Mikdash on Shabbos
               or Yom Tov!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   Possibility #4:</font></b> The building was finished the day
               after Shavu'os, and then we are Mekadesh.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.   Rejection:</font></b> The loaves are disqualified since they
               were left overnight.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.   Possibility #5:</font></b> The building was virtually finished
               before Shavu'os, and the last bit was finished right
               after nightfall after Shavu'os (and then we are
               Mekadesh).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>10.  Rejection:</font></b> We may not build the Mikdash at night.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (Abaye):</font></b> 'Uv'Yom Hakim Es ha'Mishkan' - the
                    Mikdash may be erected or built only during the
                    day.
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>3) SHIRAH</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> And with singing.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  (Beraisa):</font></b> They sing the Shirah of Todah (Tehilim 100),
          with harps and cymbals, on every corner and every big
          rock;
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b>  They also sing 'Aromimcha...' (the song of inauguration,
          Tehilim 30) and the song of (Hashem's protection from)
          damaging angels (Tehilim 91):
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Some call this the song of plagues - 'v'Nega Lo
               Yikrav b'Ahalecha';
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> The first opinion calls it the song of damagers
               because it says 'Yipol mi'Tzidecha Elef.'
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b>  They sing from 'Yoshev b'Seser Elyon' until 'Elyon Samta
          Me'onecha' (and 'b'Varcho Mipenei Avshalom Beno' (Tehilim
          3) - Gra deletes this).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b>  R. Yehoshua ben Levi would say these verses before going
          to sleep at night.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Question:</font></b> He himself said that one may not use words of
          Torah to heal himself!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Answer:</font></b> One may use words of Torah for protection.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Question:</font></b> Is healing a wound merely 'forbidden?'
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Mishnah):</font></b> One who whispers (the verse 'Kol
               ha'Machalah... Lo Asim Alecha Ki Ani Hash-m
               Rofe'echa') over a wound has no share in the world
               to come.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Answer:</font></b> R. Yochanan explained that is when he spits
          first, for we do not mention Hashem's name after
          spitting.
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>4) HOW THE LOAVES ARE CARRIED</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> Beis Din walking, the loaves (after them - Gra
          deletes this)...
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Inference:</font></b> Beis Din walks in front of the loaves!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Question:</font></b> 'Achareihem Hoshaya va'Chatzi Sarei Yehudah'
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Answer:</font></b> The Mishnah means that Beis Din walks and the
          loaves are carried;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> (The Mishnah did not mean that Beis Din is in
               front,) the loaves are in front.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Question:</font></b> How are they carried?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Answer #1 (R. Chiya or R. Shimon b'Rebbi):</font></b> One is beside
          the other.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b>  Answer #2 (the other of R. Chiya and R. Shimon b'Rebbi):
          One is in front of the other.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  (Mishnah):</font></b> The inner loaf is eaten, the outer loaf is
          burned.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> According to the opinion that one is beside the
               other, the inner loaf is the one closer to the wall
               (Rashi - both are outside the wall; Tosfos - they
               are inside).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> According to the opinion that one is in front of the
               other, the inner loaf is the one (in back,) which is
               closer to Beis Din.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> According to this latter opinion, we understand why
               the inner loaf is eaten and the outer loaf is
               burned. The second loaf was taken on a path already
               Mekudash by the first loaf (i.e. the first loaf left
               Yerushalayim, but the second loaf did not).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Question:</font></b> According to the opinion that one is beside the
          other, they jointly are Mekadesh the place. They should
          have the same law!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Counter-question:</font></b> Also according to the opinion that
               one is in front of the other, it is difficult. How
               can the front loaf be Mekadesh without the latter?
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  An addition that was not made with everything
                    mentioned in the Mishnah (and two loaves are
                    listed) does not get Kedushah!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> Even like the opinion that an addition made with
               even only one of the things mentioned in the Mishnah
               gets Kedushah, the two loaves are one Mitzvah (one
               loaf by itself does nothing)!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  Answer (R. Yochanan):</font></b> A prophet instructed that the inner
<br><br>          loaf is eaten, and the outer loaf is burned. <p>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>3) BUILDING THE BEIS HA'MIKDASH AT NIGHT</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara teaches that it is not possible that the Shtei ha'Lechem is necessary for extending the sanctified area of the Beis ha'Mikdash. After it discusses a number of possible scenarios, the Gemara asks that the Shtei ha'Lechem <i>could</i> be used if most of the construction is completed before the arrival of Shavu'os, and then at night, immediately after Shavu'os, the remaining part is finished, at which time the Shtei ha'Lechem has not yet become Nosar (they became Nosar only at sunrise). The Gemara answers that this is not a possibility, because the Beis ha'Mikdash may not be built during the night. Abaye derives this from the verse, 'And on the day of the erecting of the Mishkan' (Bamidbar 9:15), which teaches that the Mishkan may be erected only during the <i>day</i> and not at night.
</p><p>
The Gemara here seems to contradict the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah (30a) and Sukah (41a) which clearly says that the third Beis ha'Mikdash may be built in the middle of the night. How are these Gemaras to be reconciled?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>RASHI</b> in Rosh Hashanah (30a), <b>TOSFOS</b> here (quoting the Midrash Tanchuma), and others answer that the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah and Sukah refers only to the building of the <i>third</i> Beis ha'Mikdash. Unlike the first two, the third Beis ha'Mikdash will be built by 'the hands of Hash-m,' as the verse states, 'Mikdash Hash-m Konenu Yadecha' -- 'the Mikdash, Hash-m, that Your hands established' (Shemos 15:17), and thus Hash-m may build it even at night. The Gemara here in Shevuos refers to the first two Batei Mikdash, which may not be built at night.
</p><p>
The <b>MIKDASH DAVID</b> (#1) analyzes this conclusion. He maintains that this is the view of the <b>MINCHAS CHINUCH</b>. The Minchas Chinuch writes that although there is a prohibition against building the Beis ha'Mikdash at night, if people transgress and build it at night it nevertheless is considered a valid Beis ha'Mikdash. Hash-m is not bound by any prohibition, and thus He certainly may build the Beis ha'Mikdash at night. Since a Beis ha'Mikdash built at night is valid, we may use the Beis ha'Mikdash that Hash-m builds at night. This means that the Halachah is the same for every Beis ha'Mikdash, but the building of the third one circumvents this prohibition (since it will not be built by man but by Hash-m).
</p><p>
However, the Yerushalmi in Yoma (1:1) apparently disagrees with this approach. The Yerushalmi states that if the Mishkan would be erected at night, it indeed would be <i>unfit</i> to use for the Avodah. Abaye himself derives the law with regard to the Beis ha'Mikdash from the Mishkan. Since the verse requires that the Beis ha'Mikdash be built during the day, and if it is not built during the day it is invalid, it should make no difference whether the Beis ha'Mikdash is made by Hash-m or by man.
</p><p>
1. The <b>KEHILOS YAKOV</b> (#10a) gives a simple answer to this question. Even according to the Yerushalmi, the problem is not the building of the Beis ha'Mikdash at night. Rather, the problem is that a Mishkan or a Beis ha'Mikdash that is supposed to be erected by man must be erected in the proper time. He compares this to the Lechem ha'Panim. There is a Mitzvah for the loaves of the Lechem ha'Panim to be arranged on the Shulchan on Shabbos (see Yoma 29a). If it was done before Shabbos, it is not considered 'arranged,' as the arrangement was not done in its proper time. Similarly, the Mishkan had to be erected by people in the proper time. If it was not erected in the proper time, then the Mitzvah of erecting it was not fulfilled. This prevents the Avodah from being done there. However, this law applies only when there is a requirement to erect it in a certain manner. The verse (in Shemos 15:17) reveals that the third Beis ha'Mikdash has different guidelines, as it is supposed to be made by Hash-m. Since the building of that Beis ha'Mikdash has different guidelines, its construction at night is not relevant.
</p><p>
2. The <b>AYELES HA'SHACHAR</b> suggests a different answer. The Mishkan was constantly being erected and dismantled in the Midbar. The Yerushalmi means that if the Mishkan was erected incorrectly at night, the obligation remained to dismantle it and erect it again during the day. The Beis ha'Mikdash, in contrast, is a permanent structure. If the Beis ha'Mikdash was erected at night, it is not logical to say that the builders must 'destroy' an intrinsically valid Beis ha'Mikdash in order to rebuild it. Hence, if they do not rebuild it, the Korbanos brought there are valid. Although there are similarities between the laws of the Mishkan and the laws of the Beis ha'Mikdash, when the Yerushalmi says that the Avodah is invalid when the structure was built at night, it apparently refers only to the Mishkan. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
(b) The <b>ME'IRI</b> in Sukah (41a) gives an original answer. When the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah and Sukah says that the Beis ha'Mikdash might be built at night, it does not mean that it is permitted to build it at that time. Rather, the Gemara is concerned that a Beis Din To'eh (a misguided Beis Din) will be responsible for the building of the Beis ha'Mikdash. Out of their fervent longing for the Beis ha'Mikdash, they might overlook the Halachah and build it even at a time when its construction is prohibited. Once such a Beis ha'Mikdash has been built, b'Di'eved it may be used.
</p><p>
The Me'iri here in Shevuos suggests another answer. The Me'iri says that the Sugya here and the Sugya in Sukah argue about whether the Beis ha'Mikdash may be built on Yom Tov and at night. The Gemara here prohibits building the Beis ha'Mikdash on Yom Tov and at night. </p><p>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) IS EVERY DETAIL ESSENTIAL?</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> An addition that was not made with all of
          these (does not get Kedushah).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  (Rav Huna):</font></b> This is the correct text.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  (Rav Nachman):</font></b> The text should say 'an addition that was
          not made with one of these' (does not get Kedushah).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> (According to Rav Huna, Ezra could not be Mekadesh
               the second Mikdash, since they lacked the Urim
               v'Tumim.) Rav Huna must hold that Shlomo's Kedushah
               of Bayis Rishon was permanent. Ezra's actions were
               only a commemoration of Kidush.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> Rav Nachman holds that the Kedushah of Bayis Rishon
               had ceased. (According to his text, Ezra was able to
               be Mekadesh Bayis Sheni, even without the Urim
               v'Tumim. Tosfos (DH Teni) asks why he changed the
               text, for in any case there are Stam Mishnayos that
               hold that the first Kedushah was permanent.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Question (Rava - Mishnah):</font></b> An addition that was not made
          with all of these (does not get Kedushah).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Answer (Rav Nachman):</font></b> The text should say 'an addition 
          that was not made with one of these.'
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Question (Beraisa - Aba Sha'ul):</font></b> There were two swamps on
          the Mount of Olives. The lower one was Mekudash with
          everything mentioned in the Mishnah (during the first
          Mikdash), and the upper one was Mekudash by the exiles
          who returned from Bavel, without a king or the Urim
          v'Tumim;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The lower swamp had full Kedushah. Ignoramuses would
               eat Kodshim Kalim there, but not Ma'aser Sheni.
               Chaverim (people who properly guard the laws) would
               eat Kodshim Kalim and Ma'aser Sheni there;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> The upper swamp did not have full Kedushah.
               Ignoramuses would eat Kodshim Kalim there, but not
               Ma'aser Sheni. Chaverim would not eat Kodshim Kalim
               nor Ma'aser Sheni there.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  They could not fully be Mekadesh it, for to add
                    on to Yerushalayim or the Azarah we need a
                    king, a prophet, the Urim v'Tumim, the great
                    Sanhedrin of 71, two loaves of a Todah and
                    singing.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Question:</font></b> Why were they Mekadesh it?
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Objection:</font></b> The Beraisa said that they could not
                    be Mekadesh it!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Correction:</font></b> Rather, why did they build a new
                    wall including it within Yerushalayim?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Answer:</font></b> It was the easiest place for enemies to
               attack from and conquer Yerushalayim.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Answer:</font></b> Tana'im argue (below) about whether the Kedushah
          of the first Mikdash ceased. (Rav Nachman holds like the
          opinion that it ceased.)

<b><font color='blue'>2) DID THE FIRST KEDUSHAH CEASE?</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b>  Rather, the following Tana'im argue about whether or not
          the first Kedushah ceased. (A Mishnah (Erchin 32a) lists
          walled cities - old Ketzarah of Tzipori...)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  (Beraisa - R. Yishmael b'Rebbi Yosi):</font></b> Chachamim listed
          cities that the returning exiles (from Bavel) were
          Mekadesh;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The Kedushah of walled cities (from the days of
               Yehoshua) ceased when the Kedushah of Eretz Yisrael
               ceased (when Nebuchadnetzar conquered it).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> This shows that R. Yishmael b'Rebbi Yosi holds that
               the first Kedushah ceased.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Contradiction (Beraisa - R. Yishmael b'Rebbi Yosi):</font></b> The
          cities listed are not the only walled cities. Moshe
          conquered 'Shishim Ir... Mamleches Og... Betzuros
          Chomah!' We list only the cities that the returning
          exiles found and were Mekadesh.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Interjection:</font></b> The Seifa (of this Beraisa) says that
               they did not need to be Mekadesh them!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Correction:</font></b> Rather, we list cities known to have had
               a wall;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  If there is a tradition about another city that
                    it had a wall when Yehoshua entered Eretz
                    Yisrael, the Mitzvos of walled cities (one who
                    sells a house has a year to redeem it, and a
                    Metzora cannot stay there) apply also to it,
                    because the first Kedushah remains.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> R. Yishmael b'Rebbi Yosi contradicts himself!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Answer #1:</font></b> The Tana'im of these two Beraisos argue about
          his opinion.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Answer #2:</font></b> The latter Beraisa is really R. Elazar b'Rebbi
          Yosi:
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa - R. Elazar b'Rebbi Yosi):</font></b> 'Asher Lo
               Chomah' - 'Lo' is spelled with an Aleph, to hint
               that even if now it does not have a wall, but once
               it did, it is considered a walled city (because the
               first Kedushah remains).
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) HALACHAH: OFFERING KORBANOS TODAY</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: A number of Tana'im and Amora'im disagree about whether the first Kedushah of Yerushalayim remains or whether it was removed at the time of the destruction of the Beis ha'Mikdash. This argument is the basis for the discussion among the Poskim concerning whether Korbanos may be offered today.
</p><p>
(a) The <b>DERISHAS TZIYON</b> (<b>HA'GA'ON RAV TZVI HIRSH KALISHER</b>, as cited by <b>TZITZ ELIEZER</b> 10:5:1) writes that the <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Beis ha'Bechirah 6:16) rules that Kedushah Rishonah, the original Kedushah of Eretz Yisrael, remains in effect with regard to all Halachos associated with Yerushalayim and the Beis ha'Mikdash. The <b>RA'AVAD</b> (ibid.), however, argues that even according to the opinion that the Kedushah is still extant, it is extant only with regard to the Kedushah of the rest of Eretz Yisrael; all of the Tana'im and Amora'im agree that the Kedushah of Yerushalayim and the Beis ha'Mikdash is no longer present. (It will return only at the time of the building of the third Beis ha'Mikdash.)
</p><p>
The Derishas Tziyon asserts that it should be permitted -- according to both opinions -- to bring the Korban Pesach today at the location of the Mizbe'ach. According to the Rambam, the Kedushah is still present. According to the Ra'avad, it should be no different from bringing the Korban on a Bamah. The Gemara in Megilah (10a) implies that the opinion that the Kedushah is no longer present permits offering Korbanos on a Bamah. Why, then, do the Jewish people not offer the Korban Pesach today?
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> in Megilah (10a) and others assert that both opinions agree that a Bamah remains prohibited even after Yerushalayim is destroyed and loses its Kedushah. This is because the Torah's allowance for offering Korbanos on Bamos applied only until the Mizbe'ach in Yerushalayim was built. Once the Korbanos were offered upon the Mizbe'ach in the Beis ha'Mikdash, Bamos became forever prohibited, even when the Beis ha'Mikdash would no longer be standing, and regardless of whether the city still has Kedushah. The argument between these opinions is whether or not one may bring a Korban at the location of the Mizbe'ach in the Beis ha'Mikdash. The opinion that there is no longer any Kedushah maintains that all Korbanos are forbidden today, even if they are brought in the place of the Mizbe'ach. This contradicts the Derishas Tziyon's argument that the Ra'avad would permit bringing such a Korban. (For a comprehensive discussion of the opinion of the Rishonim regarding this argument, see Insights to Megilah 10:1.)
</p><p>
(c) Nevertheless, it seems that at least according to the Rambam, offering Korbanos today at the location of the Mizbe'ach should be permitted. However, there are many reasons why this still may be Halachically unacceptable. One reason is that from the times of the Rishonim, there has been a doubt about the lineage of every Kohen. (It is said that the Vilna Ga'on, who was a firstborn son, would perform Pidyon ha'Ben and redeem himself, out of doubt, from every Kohen he would meet, in order to ensure that he was redeemed from a genuine Kohen.) No Korban may be offered without a genuine Kohen to perform the Avodah.
</p><p>
A second reason involves the issue of offering the Korban Pesach when everyone is Tamei. The Halachah is that the Korban may be brought when the entire nation is Tamei. The Gemara asks, however, that there still is prohibition against entering the Beis ha'Mikdash while Tamei. One opinion in the Gemara says that the bringing of the Korban overrides the prohibition of Tum'as Mikdash and permits transgressing the Isur ('Dechuyah'), while another opinion says that the issue of Tum'ah is not relevant at all; the Isur does not apply when the entire nation is Tamei ('Hutrah'). The difference between these two opinions is whether or not there is a need for atonement after the Korban is brought, due to the presence of a person who was Tamei in the Mikdash. If the Isur of Tum'as Mikdash applies but may be transgressed for the sake of bringing the Korban, then the Kohen Gadol's wearing of the Tzitz atones for the Tum'as Mikdash. Nowadays, though, there is no Tzitz to wear and to atone for the Tum'ah, and thus bringing a Korban when everyone is Tamei should not be possible, since there will be no way to atone for the Tum'as Mikdash afterwards.
</p><p>
(d) The <b>CHASAM SOFER</b> proposes an argument in favor of bringing Korbanos today. He maintains that the correct opinion in the argument regarding the suspension of the Isur of Tum'as Mikdash when everyone is Tamei is that the Tum'ah is 'Hutrah' -- the Isur does not apply at all (and not that it applies but may be transgressed for the sake of bringing a Korban), and thus atonement for the Tum'as Mikdash is not necessary. However, the Chasam Sofer admits that there is another serious problem with offering Korbanos today. <b>REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b> wrote to the Chasam Sofer that the exact identity of the Techeles and Argaman has been forgotten (regarding Techeles, see Insights to Shabbos 75:1). <b>RASHI</b> and the <b>RAMBAM</b> disagree about the identity of Argaman, and there are other opinions among the Rishonim. Consequently, the Avnet (the belt of the Bigdei Kehunah) cannot be fashioned, and without all of the Bigdei Kehunah the Kohen may not perform the Avodah.
</p><p>
(e) There have been at least two famous Halachic authorities who strongly disagreed with the above arguments. As noted above, the Chasam Sofer writes that the problem of Tum'ah is not an issue. Moreover, in a famous letter to the <b>BINYAN TZIYON</b> (the author of the <b>ARUCH LA'NER</b>), <b>RAV TZVI HIRSCH KALISHER</b> addresses the problem that today's Kohanim lack indubitable lineage. The Mishnah in Eduyos (8:7) quotes Rebbi Yehoshua who says, 'I have a tradition from Rebbi Yochanan ben Zakai who heard from his teacher, who heard from his teacher, that there is a Halachah l'Moshe mi'Sinai that Eliyahu ha'Navi is not coming to make Tamei and Tahor, to distance and to make close. Rather, he will distance those who forced themselves close, and make close those who were forcibly distanced.' This means that Eliyahu ha'Navi is not going to reveal anything new with regard to lineage. He will only push away people who forced themselves to be accepted as having proper lineage, and he will gather in people who were knowingly and wrongfully distanced. Rav Tzvi Hirsh Kalisher questions the wording of this Mishnah: why does Rebbi Yehoshua open his Agadic comment with such forceful language to insure that his statement will be accepted? The Gemara usually does not deal with topics that are relevant only in the time of Mashi'ach. What, then, is so important about Rebbi Yehoshua's statement?
</p><p>
Rav Tzvi Hirsch Kalisher explains that Rebbi Yehoshua's statement has a very practical ramification. Rebbi Yehoshua is teaching that there is a Halachah l'Moshe mi'Sinai that Eliyahu ha'Navi will make no new revelations concerning any Kohen who is now accepted as a Kohen. This shows that the lineage of a Kohen is not suspect.
</p><p>
The Binyan Tziyon (#1) rejects this argument because it contradicts the words of <b>TOSFOS</b> in Sanhedrin (51b). Tosfos there asks a similar question. Why does the Gemara in Kidushin (72b) state that the Halachah follows the opinion of Rebbi Yosi, who says that in the future (in the times of Mashi'ach) people who have questionable lineage will be 'purified'? What difference does it make now to know that in the future the Halachah will follow the view of Rebbi Yosi? Tosfos answers that there is a practical ramification even nowadays. This Halachah teaches that one does not have to be careful to refrain from marrying people of uncertain lineage. Rebbi Yosi reassures us that those people will be found to have good lineage. The Binyan Tziyon states that Tosfos similarly would say that this is the reason for the strong language of the Mishnah in Eduyos. Thus, the practical ramification of these statements of the Tana'im is <i>not</i> that a Kohen's lineage today is undoubted, but that <i>an ordinary person's</i> lineage (with regard to Mamzerus) is not doubted (and thus one may marry a person of uncertain lineage). The Binyan Tziyon cites additional sources in the Gemara which apparently disprove the rest of Rav Tzvi Hirsch Kalisher's arguments.
</p><p>

HALACHAH: Although the <b>KAFTOR VA'FERACH</b> was in favor of bringing Korbanos nowadays, almost all Halachic authorities were vehemently opposed to bringing Korbanos nowadays. May the Beis ha'Mikdash be rebuilt speedily in our days. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1)  BOWING IN SHEMONEH ESRE</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>    </font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa):</font></b> 'Kidah' refers to bowing and putting
              one's face on the ground - 'va'Tikod Bas Sheva
              Apayim Eretz';
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> 'Kri'ah' is bending the knees - 'mi'Kero'a Al
              Birkav';
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> 'Hishtachava'ah' is prostrating on the hands and
              feet - 'Lehishtachavos Lecha Artzah.'
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Berachos 12a (Rav):</font></b> When one bows during Tefilah, he
              bends his knees at 'Baruch' and straightens himself
              ba'Shem.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   (Shmuel):</font></b> He learns from 'Hash-m Zokef Kefufim.'
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Question:</font></b> 'Mipnei Shmi Nichas Hu' (one should be
              submissive, i.e. bowed, when saying Hashem's name!)
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   Answer:</font></b> It does not say 'bi'Shmi' (<i>when</i> saying My
              name), rather, 'Mipnei Shmi' (<i>before</i> saying My
              name).
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b> Rav Sheshes would bow like a stick. He would
              straighten himself slowly, like a snake.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.   28b (R. Tanchum):</font></b> When praying, one must bow until
              all the vertebrae in the spine protrude;
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>10.  (Ula):</font></b> He must bow until he could see an Isar
              opposite his heart.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>11.  (R. Chanina):</font></b> As long as he moves his head, this is
              not necessary.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>12.  (Rava):</font></b> This is only if he is in pain and looks like
              he wants to bow.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>13.  34a (Beraisa):</font></b> One bows in the beginning and end of
              Modim.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>14.  34b (Beraisa #1):</font></b> It is praiseworthy to bow during
              Hoda'ah (Modim).
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>15.  Contradiction (Beraisa #2):</font></b> It is contemptible.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>16.  Resolution:</font></b> It is praiseworthy to bow at the
              beginning of Modim, it is contemptible to bow at the
              end.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>17. </font></b> Rava, Rav Nachman and Rav Sheshes bowed at the
              beginning and end of Modim. They hold that 'Hoda'ah'
              in Beraisos #1 and #2 refers to Hallel.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>18.  Bava Kama 16a (Beraisa):</font></b> One's spine becomes a snake
              after seven years if he does not bow at 'Modim'.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>    (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rambam (Hilchos Tefilah 5:10):</font></b> The four times one
              bows in Shemoneh Esre, he bows at Baruch and
              straightens himself ba'Shem.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rambam (9:4):</font></b> When the Shali'ach Tzibur reaches
              Modim, the Tzibur bows with him a little. They
              should not bow too much. They say 'Modim...'
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rosh (Berachos 1:15, from the Yerushalmi):</font></b> Once, a
              Shali'ach Tzibur bowed too much, and R. Yochanan
              deposed him. Some say that he rebuked him.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Rosh (5:22):</font></b> Rav Hai Gaon explains that one bows
              until he could see a coin on the ground even with
              his heart. Rava explains that moving the head
              suffices only if he looks like he bows, but he
              cannot bow properly due to illness.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Hagahos Ashri (Perek 4, Halachah 21):</font></b> However,
                   it is better to exert himself and bow more. One
                   should not bow so much until his head reaches
                   the belt of his pants.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Beis Yosef (OC 113 DH Kasuv):</font></b> The Yerushalmi
                   says so about Modim d'Rabanan. Many Rishonim
                   say so about all bowings in Shemoneh Esre.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. R. Yonah (Berachos 24a DH Ad):</font></b> Rashi explains
                   that one must bow until someone else standing
                   opposite him can see only an Isar even with his
                   heart. Rav Hai Gaon gave another Perush, that
                   he bows until his navel, which is opposite his
                   heart, makes a cavity the size of an Isar.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Tosfos (Bava Kama 16b DH v'Hu):</font></b> One should bow, and
              straighten himself slowly, like a snake. If he did
              not, Midah k'Neged Midah, his spine becomes a snake.
              Some say that there is a bone in the spine from
              which one is revived, and if it becomes a snake, he
              will not be revived. It is unreasonable that the
              punishment for this is so great. All Yisrael have a
              share in the world to come!
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Kaf ha'Chayim (113:18):</font></b> The Zohar explicitly
                   says that one who does not bow will not be
                   revived.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>    (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (OC 113:4):</font></b> One who prays must bow
              until all the vertebrae in the spine protrude.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Kaf ha'Chayim (16):</font></b> This is to fulfill 'all my
                   bones (will say 'Hashem, who is like You?')'
                   (Pri Chodosh, citing the Yerushalmi).
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</font></b> He does not bow from the
              midlle (his hips) and leave his head straight.
              Rather, also his head he bows like a reed.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Beis Yosef (DH u'Mah she'Chosav u'Piresh):
                   Rashi explains that one must bow until there
                   are two folds of flesh, one above and one
                   below, with an Isar between them.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Beis Yosef (DH u'Mah she'Chosav v'Rabeinu):</font></b> The
                   Rashba says that he does not divide his height
                   into two and bend. Rather, he bows until he
                   could see a coin on the ground even with his
                   heart.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Magen Avraham (4):</font></b> When saying 'Baruch', he
                   bends the knees. When saying 'Atah', he bows
                   until the vertebrae protrude.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Shulchan Aruch (5):</font></b> He does not bow so much until
              his head reaches the belt of his pants. If he is old
              or sick and cannot bow until the vertebrae in the
              spine protrude, it suffices to lean (lower) the
              head, since it is evident that he wants to bow, but
              it pains him.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Taz (5):</font></b> It is haughtiness to bow more than the
                   Shi'ur.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Divrei Chachamim (70, citing ha'Gaon R. C.P.
                   Scheinberg Shlita):</font></b> It suffices to bow 45
                   degrees. The Isur is to bow 90 degrees.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Shulchan Aruch (6):</font></b> One bows quickly, at once. He
              straightens himself slowly, first his head, and
              afterwards his body, lest it looks like a burden.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Shulchan Aruch (7):</font></b> When one bows, he bends his
              knees at 'Baruch' and straightens himself ba'Shem.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Mishnah Berurah (12):</font></b> When one bows in Modim,
                   he bows his head and body like a reed at once.
                   He stands bowed until Hashem's name, and then
                   he straightens up.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Kaf ha'Chayim (21):</font></b> The Ari Zal says that one
                   bows the body at Baruch, and the head at Atah.
                   (In Modim, and Modim d'Rabanan, he bows the
                   body at Modim, and the head at she'Atah.)
                   Similarly, at 'Hashem', he straightens up first
                   the body, and then the head. Even a sick person
                   must bow (slightly) in two stages.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Shulchan Aruch (127:1):</font></b> When the Shali'ach Tzibur
              reaches Modim, the Tzibur says Modim d'Rabanan and
              bows with him. They should not bow too much. Some
              say that one must bow also at the end of Modim
              d'Rabanan. It is good to be concerned for this
              opinion.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (DH Kosav):</font></b> The Tur explains that R.
                   Yochanan objected only to the Shali'ach Tzibur
                   bowing too much. The Rambam holds that the same
                   applies to the Tzibur. Perhaps he rules like
                   the latter opinion, and holds that R. Yochanan
                   rebuked one of the Tzibur who bowed too much.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Taz (1 and Mishnah Berurah 2):</font></b> One bows like in
                   Shemoneh Esre. If one bows less, the Shulchan
                   Aruch should have given the Shi'ur! The Bach
                   says that one should just move his head a
                   little. This is not the custom.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Kaf ha'Chayim (2):</font></b> Many say that one bows
                   fully, like in Shemoneh Esre. The Bach says
                   that it suffices to bend the head, but he does
                   not forbid full bowing. Therefore, one should
                   bow fully.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   Rema:</font></b> Some say all of Modim d'Rabanan in one bowing.
              This is the custom.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Mishnah Berurah (5 and Bi'ur Halachah DH
                   v'Yesh):</font></b> People follow the Rema, but the
                   Maharshal holds that one straightens up a
                   little at Hash-m, and bows again at the end.
                   Chayei Adam holds that this is primary.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Kaf ha'Chayim (10):</font></b> The Ari Zal holds that one
                   bows only at the beginning.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Kaf ha'Chayim (113:17):</font></b> Ya'aros Devash says
                   that bowing shows that one (his body) will
                   return to the dirt, and his Ru'ach will return
                   to Hash-m. One who does not bow to show
                   humility that he will be dirt, his spine
                   becomes a snake, which eats dirt. Ru'ach Chayim
                   explains (Tehilim 119:25) 'Davka Nafshi le'Afar
                   Chayeni ki'Dvarecha' (since I bowed, like You
                   said that one must bow lest his spine become a
                   snake, You will revive me in Techiyas
                   ha'Mesim). 
<br>


lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>3) ONE WHO BECAME TAMEI IN THE MIKDASH</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> If he became Tamei in the Azarah and forgot...
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question:</font></b> What is the source that one is liable (lashes
          or Kares) if he became Tamei in the Azarah (and did not
          leave immediately)?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer (R. Elazar (the Amora)):</font></b> It says 'Es Mishkan
          Hash-m Timei' and 'Es Mikdash Hash-m Timei';
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> We do not need two verses for when he became Tamei
               outside and entered, so one teaches about when he
               became Tamei inside.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Question:</font></b> We need both for when he became Tamei outside!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa - R. Elazar (the Tana)):</font></b> The Torah needed
               to teach that he is liable for the Mishkan and the
               Mikdash, because we could not learn from one to the
               other.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Had it taught only about the Mishkan, one might
                    have thought that this is because it was
                    anointed with the anointing oil!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b> Had it taught only about the Mikdash, one might
                    have thought that this is because its Kedushah
                    is permanent! (Rashi - once the Mikdash was
                    built, private altars were forbidden forever;
                    Tosfos - it endured longer than the Mishkan, or
                    because it can be rebuilt only in the same
                    place.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Answer:</font></b> R. Elazar (the Amora) expounded the change of
          expression.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Since the Mishkan is called Mikdash and vice-versa,
               the Torah could have written both times 'Mishkan' or
               'Mikdash', and we would have known to include both;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> It changed the expression to teach another law as
               well (when he became Tamei inside).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b>  We know that the Mishkan is called Mikdash - 'v'Nasati
          Mishkani b'Sochechem';
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Question:</font></b> What is the source that the Mikdash is called
          Mishkan?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Suggestion:</font></b> We learn from 'v'Nase'u ha'Kehasim
               Nose'ei ha'Mikdash.'
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rejection:</font></b> That does not refer to the Mikdash
               itself, rather to the Aron (and the Kelim of the
               Mikdash.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Answer:</font></b> We learn from 'v'Asu Li Mikdash v'Shachanti
          b'Socham... Tavnis ha'Mishkan.'
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>4) WAITING LONG ENOUGH TO BOW</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> If one is Mishtachaveh (bows) or delays long
          enough to be Mishtachaveh...
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Version #1 (Rava):</font></b> (He is liable for a quick
          Hishtachava'ah.) This is when he bows towards the west
          (where the Divine Presence is);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> If he bows towards the east, he is liable only if he
               delays (the time of a proper Hishtachava'ah).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Version #2 - Inference:</font></b> He is liable for Hishtachava'ah 
          only if he delays.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  (Rava):</font></b> This is when he bows towards the east, but if he
          bows towards the west, he is liable even without
          delaying. (end of Version #2)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Question:</font></b> What is Hishtachava'ah with and without delay?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Answer:</font></b> Hishtachava'ah without delay is bending the
          knees. Hishtachava'ah with delay is prostrating on the
          hands and feet.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Question:</font></b> What is the time for Hishtachava'ah with delay?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Answer #1 (R. Yitzchak bar Nachmani or R. Shimon ben
          Pazi):</font></b> It is the time to say the verse 'v'Chol Bnei
          Yisrael ... va'Yichre'u... va'Yishtachavu...'
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Answer #2 (the other of R. Yitzchak bar Nachmani and R.
          Shimon ben Pazi):</font></b> It is the time to say the end of this
          verse starting from 'va'Yichre'u.'
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  (Beraisa):</font></b> 'Kidah' refers to bowing and putting one's
          face on the ground - 'va'Tikod Bas Sheva Apayim Eretz';
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> 'Kri'ah' is bending the knees - 'mi'Kero'a Al
               Birkav';
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> 'Hishtachava'ah' is prostrating on the hands and
               feet - 'Lehishtachavos Lecha Artzah.' 
<br>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) DIFFERENT FORMS OF BOWING</b></font>
<br>QUESTIONS: The Gemara teaches that 'Kidah' is the term the verse uses to refer to an act of bowing down upon one's face (bringing one's face to the ground). This is learned from the verse which says, 'va'Tikod Bas Sheva Apayim Eretz' -- 'And Bas Sheva bowed her face down upon the ground' (Melachim I 1:31). The Gemara continues and says that 'Hishtachava'ah' refers to prostration while outstretching one's hands and feet on the ground. The Gemara proves this from Yakov Avinu who said to Yosef, 'Ha'vo Na'vo... l'Hishtachavos Lecha Artzah' -- 'Are we going to come... to bow down to you to the ground?' (Bereishis 37:10).
</p><p>
(a) The Mefarshim ask that if there are two places in the Torah from which a principle can be learned, the Gemara will always pick the first verse in the Torah to show that lesson. Why, then, does the Gemara here not teach the meaning of 'Hishtachava'ah' from an earlier verse which mentions 'Hishtachava'ah' as being done upon the ground (such as Bereishis 18:2, 24:52, or 33:3)?
</p><p>

(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> asks that we find places in the Torah where 'Hishtachava'ah' refers to bowing down on one's face as well (such as in Bereishis 19:1). Why, then, does the Gemara say that 'Kidah' refers specifically to bowing on the face, and not 'Hishtachava'ah?'
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>RITVA</b> quotes some who answer that the verse here regarding Yosef's dream does not mention the face at all, and thus it must mean that the bowing was done with the arms and legs upon the ground.
</p><p>
The Ritva rejects this answer, because there are also verses that discuss 'Kidah' without mentioning that it is done on one's face, and thus we should learn from those verses that '<i>Kidah</i>' involves bowing with one's arms and legs. Therefore, the Ritva agrees with Tosfos' answer, that the Gemara had a tradition that 'Kidah' means bowing on one's face, and that 'Hishtachava'ah' can refer to both forms of bowing. The Gemara here simply is citing a verse which reflects that meaning, and it is not attempting to derive its definition from the verse.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>MINCHAS CHINUCH</b> (28:2), <b>RAV ELAZAR MOSHE HA'LEVI HOROWITZ</b>, and others answer the second question as follows. It is possible that Lot just happened to do 'Hishtachava'ah' in such a manner (upon his face), but that does not mean that 'Hishtachava'ah' is always done like that. The Gemara proves its description of 'Hishtachava'ah' from Yosef, because Yosef saw in his dream that his family would do 'Hishtachava'ah' to him. His father chastised him and said, 'Are we going to come... to bow down to you to the ground?' If the normal definition of 'Hishtachava'ah' is just to bow down, then why would Yakov accuse Yosef of saying that they would all bow down <i>on the ground</i>? He never said that! It must be that the normal manner of 'Hishtachava'ah' is to bow down, with one's arms and legs outstretched, on the ground. (Y. Montrose) 
</p><p>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) THE DELAY FOR WHICH ONE IS LIABLE</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Question (Rava):</font></b> If Reuven (became Tamei and) delayed
          leaving the Mikdash less than the time for Hishtachava'ah
          (Tosfos - but at least the time needed to leave the
          Azarah and re-enter), is he lashed?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Does the time for Hishtachava'ah apply only to the
               obligation to bring a Korban, but not to lashes?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> Or, does it apply to anyone who became Tamei in the
               Mikdash, both regarding a Korban and lashes?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b>  This question is not resolved.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Question (Rava):</font></b> If Reuven (became Tamei and) suspended
          himself in the air above the Azarah, what is the law?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Does the time for Hishtachava'ah apply only to one
               who could bow (but one who could not bow is exempt)?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> Or, does it apply to anyone Tamei in the Mikdash,
               whether or not he can bow?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b>  This question is not resolved.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Question (Rav Ashi):</font></b> If Reuven b'Mezid became Tamei in
          the Mikdash, what is the law?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Does the time for Hishtachava'ah apply only to one
               who became Tamei through Ones (but if he b'Mezid
               became Tamei, he is liable even if he delays less
               than this)?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> Or, does it apply to anyone Tamei in the Mikdash,
               whether he became Tamei through Ones or not?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b>  This question is not resolved.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Question (Rav Ashi):</font></b> If a Nazir in a cemetery delays
          leaving less than the time for Hishtachava'ah, is he
          lashed?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Was the time for Hishtachava'ah taught only
               regarding the Mikdash?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> Or, does it apply to anyone who became Tamei through
               Ones, in the Mikdash or outside?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b>  This question is not resolved.

<b><font color='blue'>2) THE SHORTEST PATH OUT</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> If he did not leave on the shortest path, he
          is liable. If he left on the shortest path, he is exempt.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  (Rava):</font></b> If he left on the shortest path, he is exempt,
          even if he walked heel to toe, even if he took the entire
          day to leave.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Question (Rava):</font></b> If he intermittently pauses and walks,
          do the delays join up?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Question:</font></b> Obviously, from Rava's previous law, the
               delays do not join up!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer:</font></b> No, there he did not delay, rather he was
               continuously walking very slowly.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Question (Abaye):</font></b> If he ran out on a longer path, in the
          same amount of time as if he walked normally on the
          shortest path, what is the law?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Does the Torah allot a time for him (what he would
               need walking normally on the shortest path), and he
               is exempt if he leaves in this time?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> Or, is he always liable for taking a longer path,
               and always exempt if he takes the shortest path?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Answer (Rabah):</font></b> He is liable for taking a longer path.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Question (R. Zeira):</font></b> The law is, a Tamei Kohen who served
          in the Mikdash is Chayav Misah b'Yedei Shamayim;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Question:</font></b> What is the case?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Suggestion:</font></b> He did not delay (the time for
               Hishtachava'ah).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rejection:</font></b> He cannot complete an Avodah in less than
               this time!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Suggestion:</font></b> He delayed (the time for Hishtachava'ah.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Rejection:</font></b> If so, he is Chayav Kares (for delaying
               leaving). This already includes Misah b'Yedei
               Shamayim!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Answer #1:</font></b> If we say that the Torah allots a time
               for him, and he is exempt if he leaves in this time,
               we can answer. He did Avodah and ran out, all within
               the allotted time.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) A PERSON WHO IS 'TAMEI' IN THE AIRSPACE OF THE BEIS HA'MIKDASH</b></font>
<br>QUESTIONS: The Gemara earlier (16b) teaches that in order for one to be obligated to bring a Korban for becoming Tamei while in the Beis ha'Mikdash, he must have either bowed down in the Azarah or tarried the amount of time that it takes to bow down. In the Gemara here, Rava asks whether a person who is Tamei who is suspended in the air of the Azarah for this amount of time is obligated to bring a Korban. Perhaps only one who has the ability to bow down will be obligated to bring a Korban if he waits that amount of time in the Azarah while Tamei, but since one who is suspended in the air is unable to bow down he will not be obligated to bring a Korban. On the other hand, perhaps the Halachah l'Moshe mi'Sinai that says one is obligated to bring a Korban when he waits the amount of time that it takes to bow down applies regardless of whether it is physically possible to bow, and thus he will be obligated to bring a Korban once that time has passed. The Gemara leaves this question unanswered.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> cites another Girsa of the Gemara, which is the text of <b>RASHI</b> (according to the <b>RITVA</b>), the <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Shegagos 11:4), and other Rishonim. According to this Girsa, Rava's doubt is simply whether being in the air of the Azarah is considered the same as being in the Azarah.
</p><p>
Tosfos questions this Girsa from the Gemara in Zevachim (32a). The Gemara there explicitly states that when a person who is Tamei stretches his hand into the airspace of the Azarah, he is guilty of entering the Azarah while Tamei. The Gemara there explains that even a partial entrance into the Azarah is considered being in the Azarah. The same should apply to one who is suspended in the airspace of the Azarah.
</p><p>
Furthermore, the Gemara there (32b) asks how is a Metzora permitted to extend his right thumb and big toe into the airspace of the Azarah (as part of his purification process), according to the opinion that even a partial entry into the Azarah while Tamei is forbidden. It is evident from the Gemara's question that even the airspace is considered like the Azarah, for if it were not considered like the Azarah, then the Metzora should be permitted to extend his hand into the airspace even if a partial entry is considered a full entry.
</p><p>
Finally, Tosfos asks that the airspace certainly must be considered part of the Azarah, because otherwise all of the blood and limbs of the Korbanos that are carried to the Mizbe'ach should be rendered unfit, as if they left the Azarah, by being lifted into the airspace of the Azarah! Tosfos, therefore, concludes that this Girsa is not correct.
</p><p>
How can these questions on this Girsa be reconciled?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>TOSFOS HA'ROSH</b> answers that when a person stands outside of the Azarah and stretches his hand into the Azarah, his hand is considered situated on the ground of the Azarah and is <i>not</i> in the airspace, since <i>he</i> is standing on the ground and his hand is attached to him (according to the opinion that a partial entry is considered a full entry). Accordingly, a person who is Tamei who extends his hand into the Azarah, and a Metzora who extends his hand into the Azarah, and the blood and limbs of Korbanos being carried by a Kohen are all considered resting on the ground of the Azarah, since they are attached to, or being held by, someone touching the ground. In contrast, Rava's question involves a person who is completely suspended in the air, with no connection at all to the ground.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RITVA</b> rejects this answer. The Gemara in Zevachim (32a) and Yoma (31a) proves that partially entering the Azarah is not called 'being in' the Azarah, as is evident from the fact that a Metzora is permitted to stretch his hand into the airspace of the Azarah. According to the logic of the Tosfos ha'Rosh, the Gemara has no proof from the case of a Metzora, because perhaps the hand of the Metzora is not considered to be in the Azarah at all, since it follows the position of the Metzora's body (which is outside the Azarah)! Since the Metzora's hand is attached to his body, and his body is touching the ground, his hand is considered to be touching the ground where his body is, and it is not considered to be in the Azarah at all. How, then, can the Gemara prove from a Metzora that a partial entry is not considered a full entry? There is not even a partial entry in that case.
</p><p>
The <b>RAMBAN</b> and <b>RITVA</b> conclude that the two different Girsa'os actually mean the same thing. When the Gemara, according to the second Girsa, says that Rava's doubt is whether the airspace of the Azarah is like the Azarah, it means that the doubt is whether the airspace of the Azarah -- in which one is not able to bow down -- is like the Azarah, in which one is able to bow down.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>KEHILOS YAKOV</b> (#12) suggests another explanation for this Girsa, which he says is the approach of <b>RABEINU CHANANEL</b> (who also has the Girsa of Rashi). Rabeinu Chananel quotes Rava's question as, 'Is he (the one suspended in the airspace of the Azarah) guilty of causing the Mikdash to become Tamei, or is he not guilty since he is not touching it?' The Kehilos Yakov explains that being in the Mikdash while Tamei differs from other prohibitions. It is obvious, as Tosfos asserts, that the airspace of the Mikdash is holy, and that blood and limbs of Korbanos being carried to the Mizbe'ach are considered to be inside the Beis ha'Mikdash. Rava's doubt was whether the sin of bringing Tum'ah into the Beis ha'Mikdash applies only to one who comes into <i>physical contact</i> with the Beis ha'Mikdash, or it applies even to merely bringing Tum'ah into the holy airspace of the Beis ha'Mikdash.
</p><p>
This, however, does not answer Tosfos' question from the Gemara in Zevachim which states that a person who is Tamei who stretches his hand into the airspace of the Azarah is guilty of Tum'as Mikdash. If the Torah prohibits Tum'ah in the Beis ha'Mikdash only when it makes physical contact with the Mikdash, then why should one be liable for stretching his hand into the airspace of the Azarah? The Kehilos Yakov answers that there are two prohibitions of Tum'ah, as Tosfos earlier describes (16b, DH Teneihu). One prohibition is, 'She shall not come into the Mikdash [while Tamei]' (Vayikra 12:4), and the other is, 'They shall not defile their camps' (Bamidbar 5:3). In the case of the person who is Tamei who extends his hand into the Mikdash, the hand certainly is considered as having 'come into the Mikdash,' and thus the person transgresses the first prohibition. In contrast, in the case of Rava, the person is not considered to have 'come into the Mikdash,' because Rava refers to a person who becomes Tamei <i>while he is in</i> the Beis ha'Mikdash. Such a person does not transgress the prohibition against 'coming into the Mikdash' in a state of Tum'ah, since he entered the Mikdash while he was Tahor. Rava's doubt is whether physical contact is required in order to qualify as 'defiling their camps,' or whether merely being in the airspace of the holy place suffices. (See extensive discussion on this topic in the Kehilos Yakov here.) (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) HASTENING MELACHAH</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>    </font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Rav Huna):</font></b> If a non-Kohen flipped a fork, he is
              Chayav Misah b'Yedei Shamayim (because this is an
              Avodah).
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Question:</font></b> If the limbs were consumed only because he
              flipped them, obviously he is liable for Avodah! If
              the limbs would have been consumed in any case, he
              accomplished nothing. Why is he liable?
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Answer:</font></b> The case is, the limbs would have been
              consumed, but not as soon. Rav Huna teaches that
              hastening the Avodah is considered Avodah.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Beitzah 34a (Beraisa):</font></b> If one brings the fire, and
              one brings the wood, and one sets the pot down, and
              one puts in the water, and one puts in the spices,
              and one stirs, all of them are liable (if there was
              a fire from the beginning).
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Shabbos 18b (Beraisa):</font></b> A baker may not fill a flask
              with water and put it in an oven just before
              Shabbos.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b> This is a decree, lest one stoke the coals (on
              Shabbos to hasten the cooking).
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   Question:</font></b> If so, we should forbid leaving dye in a
              pot!
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.   Answer (Shmuel):</font></b> It is permitted when the pot is off
              the fire.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.   Question:</font></b> It should be forbidden, lest he stir the
              pot!
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>10.  Answer:</font></b> The case is, the pot is plastered shut (it
              is an exertion to open it, before doing so he would
              remember that it is Shabbos).
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>    (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 9:3):</font></b> If one cooks on fire
              something that is fully cooked, or need not be
              cooked, he is exempt.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rosh (Shabbos 1:34):</font></b> One may not put water in an
              oven just before Shabbos, lest it cool off towards
              the end of Shabbos, and he stoke the coals so it
              will cook immediately after dark. We decree about
              flax in a pot off the fire if it is not plastered,
              lest one stir it. Rashi explains that he would be
              liable for cooking while it is boiling, even though
              it is off the fire. All the more so one may not put
              a ladle into a pot on the fire.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rosh (3:11):</font></b> Rashi explained that we are concerned
              lest one heat up a food that cooled off, and be
              liable for cooking. On 18b, Rashi says that Bishul
              applies to something that was cooked, i.e. if it
              cooled off and has liquid. From his words (this is
              the Bach's text), the Heter to soak (on Shabbos) in
              hot water something that was cooked applies to
              something dry, e.g. the chicken of R. Aba (Shabbos
              145b. It is soaked many days, for healing.) Beitzah
              34a supports Rashi. If one brings the fire, and one
              brings the wood... all of them are liable. Even
              though the one who brings the water is liable for
              cooking, the one who stirs is liable. This shows
              that Bishul applies after Bishul, even if it was
              still boiling. However, one can reject this. Until
              it is k'Ma'achal ben Drusai (the way a certain thief
              used to eat, i.e. a half or a third cooked), one is
              liable for hastening the Bishul. After it reached
              k'Ma'achal ben Drusai, perhaps there is no Bishul
              after Bishul. Presumably, until it is k'Ma'achal ben
              Drusai, one is liable for hastening the Bishul.
              After it reached k'Ma'achal ben Drusai, if it cooled
              off and one heated it, he is liable, like Rashi
              said. We can say that we decree lest one stir wool,
              because it always needs Bishul. Alternatively, we
              did not ask due to Bishul, rather, due to dying the
              wool.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Kitzur Piskei Rosh (3:11):</font></b> Before a food is
                   k'Ma'achal ben Drusai, one is liable for
                   hastening Bishul. After it reached this stage,
                   as long as it is boiling, Bishul does not
                   apply. If it cooled off and one heated it, he
                   is liable, i.e. if it is a liquid. Bishul after
                   Bishul does not apply to solids.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Ritva (17b DH v'Ha):</font></b> Here we say that hastening
              Avodah is Avodah. If a Yisrael put meat on coals,
              and a Nochri turned it over it is not considered
              Bishul Nochri, even though he hastened the Bishul
              (Avodah Zarah 38a)! Even if Bishul Nochri were
              mid'Oraisa, we could say that the Torah is more
              stringent about Avodah. Really, here and for cooking
              on Shabbos, we follow Torah law (it is Bishul). We
              are lenient about Bishul Nochri, which is
              mid'Rabanan, also when a Nochri put the meat a
              Yisrael hastened the Bishul. We forbid only when a
              Nochri totally cooked it.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>    (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (OC 318:4):</font></b> If a food is not fully
              cooked, even if it is k'Ma'achal ben Drusai, Bishul
              applies to it, even if it is still boiling.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Gra (13):</font></b> This is unlike the Rosh, (Dameshek
                   Eliezer - rather, like the) Tur and Rambam.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Mishnah Berurah (26):</font></b> Bishul applies mid'Oraisa
                   until it is fully cooked.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Mishnah Berurah (27):</font></b> One may not even tell a
                   Nochri to finish cooking it. B'Di'eved, one may
                   rely on the lenient opinions.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Shulchan Aruch (18):</font></b> If one took a boiling pan or
              pot off the fire, if the food was not fully cooked,
              one may not remove the food with a ladel, for this
              stirs and cooks.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Kaf ha'Chayim (171):</font></b> If it was stirred once and
                   this suffices to cook it, one is exempt for
                   stirring more. In Siman 253, the Beis Yosef
                   cites the Kolbo, who says that one who stirs a
                   fully cooked food on the fire is liable.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</font></b> If the food is fully cooked,
              it is permitted. One may not stir wool in a pot,
              even if it absorbed the dye.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Beis Yosef (DH Afilu):</font></b> Bishul does not apply to what
              was already cooked. In Shabbos, we decree to forbid
              Hatmanah (wrapping a food to keep it warm) in Davar
              she'Eino Mosif Hevel (something that does not add
              heat), lest one heat the food. There, the decree is
              not lest he cook, rather, lest he stoke coals. Rashi
              concludes that one is liable for cooking something
              that was fully cooked only if it he heated it up
              after it cooled off. If it was (still) boiling, he
              would be exempt, for it reached k'Ma'achal ben
              Drusai. If so, Rashi should rule like the Rosh, that
              if it reached k'Ma'achal ben Drusai and cooled off
              and he heated it, he is liable, like the Remazim
              (the Tur's Kitzur Piskei Rosh, 3:11). Here, the Tur
              says that Bishul applies even while it is boiling!
              Perhaps the Tur does not write his own reasoning in
              the Remazim; he just abridges the Rosh. In the
              Arba'ah Turim, he teaches the Halachah, so he did
              not rely on the Rosh, for there is no proof for him.
              A Beraisa (Beitzah 34a) says Stam that all are
              liable; it does not distinguish whether or not the
              food reached k'Ma'achal ben Drusai. The Gemara asked
              why we do not decree lest he stir the pot, and gave
              a weak answer; we do not rely on it. Rather, Bishul
              applies even after food is k'Ma'achal ben Drusai,
              even if it is still boiling. Rashi said that we
              decree lest he heat something that was cooked and
              cooled off, i.e. after it was fully cooked.
              Therefore, he is liable only if it cooled off. If it
              was never fully cooked, he is liable even if it is
              still boiling. Also, one does Hatmanah in Davar
              she'Eino Mosif Hevel only if the food was fully
              cooked. Even so, one is liable if it cooled off and
              he heated it up. Do not say that the Tur rules like
              the Rosh. The Rosh distinguishes whether or not it
              reached k'Ma'achal ben Drusai only regarding Chiyuv
              Chatas, but one may not cook it more even after it
              reached k'Ma'achal ben Drusai.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Gra (51):</font></b> The Heter to return a fully cooked
                   food to the fire shows that Bishul after Bishul
                   does not apply to it. This is like a Tosefta
                   (15:14; one may bake what was baked and cook
                   what was cooked).
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Mishnah Berurah (113):</font></b> The Shulchan Aruch
                   forbids when it is not fully cooked even when
                   the pot is off on the fire. When it is fully
                   cooked, the Beis Yosef permits using a ladle
                   even when it is on the fire; Eliyahu Rabah is
                   stringent.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Chazon Ish (15 DH Siman):</font></b> If one wants to leave
                   it on a fire that is not covered, since he may
                   not return it if he takes it off, one may be
                   lenient to take with a ladle.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Kaf ha'Chayim (175):</font></b> If one needs to keep the
                   food on the fire, he may remove it with a
                   spatula, even if this will stir the contents.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Rema:</font></b> L'Chatchilah, one should be careful about a
              pot in every case.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Taz (23):</font></b> Mahariyo brings a proof from Shabbos
                   18b. This is not a proof. There it discusses
                   wool, which is more stringent (for it needs
                   much Bishul; or, one is liable for dying it).
                   One may stir something that was fully cooked.
                   This is why one may dice porridge in the pot
                   with a wooden spoon (321:19), i.e. after it is
                   fully cooked. The Rema is an excessive
                   stringency. Therefore, I permit using a ladle
                   to remove from a pot without intent to stir the
                   pot. Even though this is forbidden if it is not
                   fully cooked, one need not be careful about
                   this if it is fully cooked. In 321:19, we
                   permit l'Chatchilah! One who wants to be
                   stringent will tilt the pot.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Magen Avraham (44):</font></b> People are lenient about
                   taking legumes out with a ladle, for there is
                   no alternative.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Mishnah Berurah (117):</font></b> The custom is not to be
                   stringent like the Rema. One may even stir
                   something fully cooked. It suffices to be
                   stringent not to stir, but one need not be
                   stringent about removing food with a ladle when
                   it is not on the fire.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Kaf ha'Chayim (177):</font></b> If it is easy to pour
                   without a ladle, one should do so. If it is not
                   Yad Soledes Bo (too hot to hold, the minimal
                   temperature at which Bishul occurs), there is
                   no concern. 
<br>


lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  However, if he is always liable for a delay
                    (even if he leaves in the time it would
                    normally take), what is the case?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Answer (and Answer #2 - Abaye):</font></b> He left on the shortest
          path and flipped a fork (and thereby turned over limbs
          burning on the Altar).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Rav Huna):</font></b> If a non-Kohen flipped a fork, he is
               Chayav Misah b'Yedei Shamayim (because this is an
               Avodah).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Question:</font></b> What is the case of Rav Huna's law?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> If the limbs would not have been consumed had he not
               flipped them, obviously he is liable for Avodah!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> If the limbs would have been consumed in any case,
               he accomplished nothing. Why is he liable?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Answer:</font></b> The case is, the limbs would have been consumed
          anyway, but not as soon;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Rav Huna teaches that hastening the Avodah is
               considered Avodah.
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>3) ENTERING ABNORMALLY</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  R. Oshaya:</font></b> I want to teach a law, but I fear lest my
          colleagues object!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> I say that if one enters a house with Tzara'as
               walking backwards, even if he is entirely inside
               except for his nose, he is not Tamei. 'Veha'Ba El
               ha'Bayis' discusses only entering normally.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> I fear lest my colleagues object that if so, he
               should be Tahor even if he enters totally!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Rava:</font></b> That is no objection. If he enters totally, he is
          Tamei, just like vessels inside become Tamei - 'Yitma Kol
          Asher ba'Bayis'!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Support (Beraisa):</font></b> One may not eat Kodshei Kodoshim
               or slaughter Kodshim Kalim on the roofs of the
               (chambers of the) Azarah;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> If a Tamei person entered the Heichal through the
               roof, he is exempt. 'V'El ha'Mikdash Lo Savo'
               discusses only entering normally.
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>4) WITHDRAWING FROM A NIDAH</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> This is the Mitzvas Aseh in the Mikdash to
          which the Korbanos for a mistaken Hora'ah do not apply.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question:</font></b> This connotes that the Tana was discussing when
          the Korbanos for a mistaken ruling apply!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer:</font></b> Our Mishnah is a follow-up to a Mishnah in
          Horiyos:
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Mishnah):</font></b> Beis Din is not liable for a (mistaken)
               Hora'ah about a Lav or Aseh in the Mikdash;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  One does not bring an Asham Taluy (the Korban
                    for one who is unsure whether or not he must
                    bring a Chatas) for a Lav or Aseh in the
                    Mikdash;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> Beis Din is liable for a Lav or Aseh regarding
               Nidah;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  One brings an Asham Taluy for a Lav or Aseh
                    regarding Nidah.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> Our Tana teaches that this is the Mitzvas Aseh in
               the Mikdash to which the Korbanos for Hora'ah do not
               apply. They do apply to the following Mitzvah Aseh
               of Nidah;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  If a woman told her husband during relations
                    that she felt a flow of blood that makes her a
                    Nidah, if he withdraws (the Ever) immediately
                    (while it is still in erection), he is Chayav
                    (Kares), because withdrawing is pleasurable,
                    just like entrance.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  (Rava citing Rav Huna):</font></b> If he withdrew immediately he
          must bring two Korbanos, one for relations with a Nidah,
          and one for withdrawing.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Question (Rava):</font></b> What is the case?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Suggestion:</font></b> It was shortly before her Veses (the
               time she normally menstruates).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Question:</font></b> Does her husband know the laws?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Answer #1:</font></b> Yes.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Objection:</font></b> Granted, he brings a Korban for
               relations, for he did not sin b'Mezid. He expected
               to finish relations before she became Nidah.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  However, why does he bring a Korban for
                    withdrawing? He sinned b'Mezid!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Answer #2:</font></b> He does not know the laws.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Objection:</font></b> Why does he bring two Korbanos? (Since he
               does not know that one may not have relations with
               her right before her Veses, even when she told him
               that she became Nidah, he did not realize his sin.
               His transgression of withdrawing is not a 'new'
               mistake.) He is like one who unknowingly ate two
               olives' worth of Chelev. He brings only one Korban! 
<br>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) LEAVING HIS NOSE OUT OF THE 'BAYIS HA'MENUGA'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: Rebbi Oshiya said that he wanted to state a certain teaching but he was afraid of the response of his colleagues. He explained that he wanted to state that a person who walks backwards into a Bayis ha'Menuga, leaving only his nose outside of the house, remains Tahor. This is because the verse, 'ha'Ba El ha'Bayis' (Vayikra 14:46), implies that only one who enters the house in the normal manner of entering ('Derech Bi'ah') becomes Tamei. Rebbi Oshiya said that he was afraid of the response of his colleagues, because according to his logic a person who walks backwards into a Bayis ha'Menuga should remain Tahor even if his entire body enters the house, since he did not enter in the normal manner. Rava gave an answer to Rebbi Oshiya's question on his own statement: a person who finds himself inside of a Bayis ha'Menuga should be no different from vessels that are completely in the house, and thus once he is completely inside the house he should become Tamei regardless of how he entered.
</p><p>
A number of sources (Zevachim 32a, Yoma 31a) indicate that a partial entry into the Beis ha'Mikdash is considered a full entry (see previous Insight). According to those sources, how does Rava's answer reconcile the view of Rebbi Oshiya? If Rebbi Oshiya agrees that a person becomes Tamei when he is entirely in the Bayis ha'Menuga (regardless of how he entered), then he should also say that a person whose body is partially inside the house is Tamei, even though part of his body remains outside! Why, then, does Rebbi Oshiya say that such a person remains Tahor because he did not enter the house in a normal manner when he walked backwards? It does not matter how he entered; once he is considered to be entirely in the Bayis ha'Menuga, he should be Tamei!
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> explains that Rebbi Oshiya maintains that a partial entry is <i>not</i> considered a full entry. Therefore, when a person enters a Bayis ha'Menuga in a normal manner of entering, he becomes Tamei only when most of his body enters the Bayis ha'Menuga, since 'Rubo k'Chulo,' most of his body is considered like all of his body.
</p><p>
However, even Ula, who maintains that a partial entry is considered a full entry, says this only with regard to one who enters the Beis ha'Mikdash (because the verse from which he derives this principle is written with regard to the Beis ha'Mikdash). He agrees with Rebbi Oshiya that most of a person's body must enter a Bayis ha'Menuga in order for him to become Tamei.
</p><p>
Based on this approach, <b>TOSFOS</b> and the <b>RITVA</b> ask a question. If a person who enters a Bayis ha'Menuga in a normal manner becomes Tamei when most of his body enters the house because of 'Rubo k'Chulo,' then the same should apply when he enters the house in an unusual way! When he walks in backwards, he should become Tamei when most of his body enters, because once most his body enters it is considered as though his entire body has entered. Such a person, whose entire body enters even in an unusual manner, becomes Tamei, as Rava states!
</p><p>
Tosfos and the Ritva answer that a person does not become Tamei through the principle of 'Rubo k'Chulo' when he walks backwards into a Bayis ha'Menuga for the following reason. The verse teaches that entering the house in a normal manner makes one Tamei, while entering in an unusual manner does not make one Tamei. This indicates that it is easier to become Tamei when entering in a normal manner than when entering in an unusual manner. Accordingly, it must be that if one becomes Tamei when <i>most</i> of his body enters the house in a <i>normal</i> manner, then when one enters in an <i>unusual</i> one does not become Tamei until <i>all</i> of his body enters. (Y. Montrose) 
</p><p>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) WITHDRAWING FROM A NIDAH (cont.)</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Answer:</font></b> It was not shortly before her Veses.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question:</font></b> Does her husband know the laws?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> If he does, he should not bring any Korbanos!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  He is Ones (blameless) for relations, and he
                    sinned b'Mezid by withdrawing.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> If he does not know the laws, he brings only one
               Korban!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  He is exempt for relations (it was Ones), and
                    he is liable for withdrawing (he was Shogeg).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer (Rava):</font></b> Really, it was shortly before her Veses.
          He knows that relations are forbidden then. He does not
          know that one may not withdraw an erect Ever.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  (Rava):</font></b> Mishnayos teach the obligation to bring a Korban
          for relations and withdrawing!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Withdrawing - (Mishnah):</font></b> If a woman told her husband
               during relations that she became Nidah, if he
               withdraws immediately he is liable.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Relations - (Mishnah):</font></b> If a man found blood on the
               cloth he used to clean his Ever after relations, he
               and his wife are Teme'im (she is Nidah, and he had
               relations with a Nidah), and each must bring a
               Korban.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Suggestion:</font></b> The case is, they had relations shortly
               before her Veses. They are liable for relations.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Rejection (Rav Ada bar Masnah):</font></b> No, it was not
               shortly before her Veses. They are liable for
               withdrawing. (Noda b'Yehudah - the case is, she told
               him to withdraw. Chasam Sofer - we could have asked
               why she is liable, for she is blameless! Rather, we
               ask a better question below (e).)
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Question:</font></b> Why should a second Mishnah teach
               liability for withdrawing?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Answer:</font></b> The latter Mishnah is needed to teach the
               law when she found blood on the cloth she used to
               clean herself (shortly but not immediately) after
               relations;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Then, he is doubtfully Tamei, and they do not
                    bring a Korban (perhaps she became Nidah after
                    relations).
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b> Once it teaches the law when she finds blood on
                    her cloth, it also teaches about when he finds
                    blood on his.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Question (against Rav Ada - Ravina):</font></b> You cannot establish
          the Mishnah not just before her Veses, and the liability
          is for withdrawing;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> It says that blood <i>was found</i> on his cloth. This
               implies that before this, they did not know that she
               became Nidah!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> If liability is for withdrawing, they must have
               known that she became Nidah!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  (Rava):</font></b> Ravina is correct!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Objection (Rav Ada - Beraisa):</font></b> This (the case of the
          Mishnah) is the Mitzvas Aseh of Nidah to which the
          Korbanos for Hora'ah apply.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> According to Ravina (they are liable for relations),
               it should say 'this is the <i>Lav</i>... !
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Answer (Rava):</font></b> If there is such a Beraisa, it is
          abbreviated, and it means as follows. This (the case of
          the Mishnah) is the Lav of Nidah to which the Korbanos
          for a mistaken ruling apply;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> If a woman told her husband during relations that
               she became Nidah, if he withdraws immediately he is
               liable. This is the Mitzvas Aseh of Nidah to which
               the Korbanos for a mistaken ruling apply.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  (Mishnah):</font></b> If he withdraws immediately he is liable.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  Question:</font></b> What should he do?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)  Answer (Rav Huna):</font></b> He should stick his toenails in the
          ground (and not move the Ever) until the erection ceases,
          then withdraw.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)  Inference (Rava):</font></b> We may infer that if one has forbidden
          relations with a limp Ever, he is exempt.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> If he would be liable, we would have to say that he
               is exempt (in our case) because he was Ones;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> If so, he would be exempt even if he withdrew
               immediately!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)  Rejection (Abaye):</font></b> Really, if one has forbidden relations
          with a limp Ever, he is liable;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> One is exempt (in our case) because he was Ones;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> He must withdraw with minimal pleasure. If he
               withdraws immediately, he is liable for getting
               extra pleasure!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)  Question (Rabah bar Chanan):</font></b> If indeed relations with a
          limp Ever are considered relations, and there is an
          exemption for withdrawing later but not immediately, the
          Mishnah should have taught this along with the exemption
          for leaving the Mikdash (on the shortest path, and not on
          a longer one)!

<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE FORBIDDEN ELEMENT OF AN 'ISUR HANA'AH'</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Mishnah (14b) states that if a man's wife tells him that she has become a Nidah while they are having relations, and he separates from her immediately, he is Chayav, because by separating from her he had pleasure. Rather, he must wait until he will no longer derive pleasure from separating from her, and then he must separate from her. The Gemara here quotes Rava who derives from this law that a man who is 'Meshamesh Mes' with a woman who is forbidden to him is <i>not</i> Chayav, since he derives no pleasure.
</p><p>
Does this Gemara imply that in a case of an Isur Hana'ah, the prohibition is the <i>pleasure</i> that is derived ('Hana'as Be'ilah'), and not the <i>act</i> that is performed ('Ma'aseh Be'ilah')?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>ASVUN D'ORAISA</b> (#24) proves from this Gemara that such Isurim are, by definition, 'prohibitions of pleasure,' and not Isurim of prohibited actions. He points out that the Gemara emphasizes that in the case of the Mishnah, the man has transgressed because he derived pleasure.
</p><p>
He proves this further from the Gemara in Chulin (115b), which teaches Rebbi's opinion of how the Torah teaches that one may not derive pleasure from a mixture of meat and milk. Rebbi says that there is a Gezeirah Shavah which teaches that just as there is pleasure in the sin of a Kadesh, deriving pleasure from a mixture of meat and milk is also forbidden. If, in the case of a Kadesh, the Torah prohibits the act itself and not the pleasure per se, then how can Rebbi derive from there that deriving pleasure from a mixture of meat and milk is prohibited? The Torah does not mention that the pleasure is forbidden!
</p><p>
The <b><b><b>OR</b></b> SAME'ACH</b> (Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros 14) agrees in part with this approach, but he adds that there is a difference between the Isurim of forbidden relations and the Isurim of forbidden foods. In Isurim of forbidden relations, there is no 'amount' which is forbidden. Therefore, it is logical to assume that the Torah prohibits the actual pleasure, as the Gemara here says. Isurim of forbidden foods, in contrast, are of a different nature. The Torah established amounts (such as a k'Zayis, k'Beitzah, etc.) of forbidden food for which one transgresses the prohibition. This indicates that the physical amounts are of consequence, and not the amount of pleasure.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>KEHILOS YAKOV</b> (Kidushin #40) disagrees with the premise of the Asvun d'Oraisa. The Torah forbids actions, not pleasure. Prohibitions against eating certain items are prohibitions against performing acts of eating, not of deriving pleasure. He rejects the proofs of the Asvun d'Oraisa and explains that the Gemara here means that since the pleasure of separating from relations is similar to the pleasure of having relations, it is considered an <i>action</i> of having relations, and it is that <i>action</i> which is forbidden (and not the pleasure derived therefrom). The Kehilos Yakov further asserts that the Gemara in Chulin is no proof, since the Gemara can use a Gezeirah Shavah to take a normal characteristic of a prohibition and teach another similar prohibition.
</p><p>
The Kehilos Yakov admits, however, that the Gemara here poses a problem to his approach. The Gemara quotes Rava who states that one who is 'Meshamesh Mes' with a woman who is forbidden to him does not transgress the Isur of forbidden relations. Abaye argues and says that Rava's inference from the Mishnah is incorrect. A person normally <i>is</i> Chayav for an act of 'Meshamesh Mes.' The Mishnah is discussing a person who was notified of the Isur only while in the midst of the act. Such a person is considered a victim of circumstance and is not guilty when he separates 'b'Ever Mes.' The Gemara asks that if the reason for his innocence is that he is a victim of circumstance, then even when he separates immediately he should be innocent! The Gemara answers that since he could have separated with only a <i>small</i> amount of pleasure and he chose to separate with an <i>increased</i> amount of pleasure, he is guilty. This implies that according to Abaye, the pleasure itself is what is prohibited, because if the <i>action</i> is what is prohibited, then the man should be innocent in both cases, since he had to cease the prohibited action in whatever way he could.
</p><p>
The Kehilos Yakov answers this question based on the words of the <b>ROSH</b> in Yevamos (6:2). The Rosh writes that a man is required to allow himself to be killed rather than transgress an Isur of forbidden relations. Although he is not considered to be transgressing the Isur when he remains passive, the Gemara attests that a man is never considered passive in an act of relations, since he is physically able to have relations only if he has intention to do so. The Rosh asks how this principle is consistent with Abaye's statement. If one who is a 'Meshamesh Mes' is guilty, then the Gemara there does not need to say that the man's involvement is always active; even if he is passive, he still derives pleasure and is guilty according to Abaye!
</p><p>
The Rosh answers that the Gemara in Yevamos follows the view of Rava as expressed here in Shevuos, who maintains that 'Meshamesh Mes' is <i>not</i> a transgression. Moreover, even according to Abaye, when a man increases his pleasure by becoming physically able to have relations, his action is considered as though it was done intentionally in its entirety. This is like Abaye's own answer here in Shevuos, when he says that the man is guilty because he should have separated with less pleasure.
</p><p>
The Kehilos Yakov explains that his question was incorrect, according to the words of the Rosh. While it is true that the man was forced to separate in one way or another, by separating with <i>more</i> pleasure he removed himself from the status of being a victim of circumstance, and instead categorized himself as one who did the act willingly. This means that even according to Abaye, the man's choice of the more pleasurable way to separate categorizes him as one who knowingly transgressed an Isur with an action. Accordingly, it still stands to reason that the <i>action</i> of the sin is forbidden, and not the pleasure.
</p><p>
A practical consequence of these two approaches -- whether the action itself is prohibited or whether the pleasure is prohibited -- exists in a case in which a person is forced, due to circumstances (such as Piku'ach Nefesh), to transgress an Isur (such as to eat non-kosher meat). If the action is what is prohibited, then perhaps the person may eat the choicest, tastiest meat, since he is permitted to do the action in this circumstance. If, however, the pleasure is what is prohibited, then perhaps he may not eat the choicest, tastiest meat, but rather he may eat only meat of lesser quality, because he must minimize the pleasure that he receives, since it is the pleasure which is forbidden. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) SEPARATION BEFORE THE VESES</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>    </font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa - R. Yoshiyah):</font></b> 'V'Hizartem... mi'Tum'asam'
              forbids a man to his wife shortly before her Veses
              (when she is due to menstruate).
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer (Rabah):</font></b> He must separate one Onah (a don).
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Nidah 63b (Mishnah - R. Yosi):</font></b> A Veses can depend on
              days and hours. If she normally sees at sunrise, she
              is forbidden only at sunrise;
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b> R. Yehudah says, she is permitted the entire day
              (but she is forbidden the night before).
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   (Beraisa):</font></b> If she normally sees on the 20th (of the
              month) during the sixth hour, when the 20th comes,
              if she did not see, R. Yehudah forbids relations
              during the first six hours; R. Yosi permits
              relations before the sixth hour, she refrains during
              the sixth hour.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b> If the sixth hour passed and she did not see, R.
              Yehudah forbids relations the rest of the day. R.
              Yosi permits from Minchah (after midday) and
              onwards.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   (Beraisa #1 - R. Yehudah):</font></b> She is forbidden before
              her Veses, she is permitted after it.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.   Contradiction (Beraisa #2 - R. Yehudah):</font></b> She is
              forbidden after her Veses, she is permitted before
              it.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.   Resolution:</font></b> In Beraisa #1, she normally sees at the
              end of the night; in Beraisa #2, she normally sees
              at the beginning of the day.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>10.  (Rava):</font></b> The Halachah follows R. Yehudah.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>11.  65a (Beraisa - Beis Hillel):</font></b> If a virgin saw blood
              before she was married, we give her (attribute all
              blood to Dam Besulim), a full Onah.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>12.  (R. Shimon ben Gamliel):</font></b> An Onah is a night and half
              a day.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>13.  Question:</font></b> Regarding Taharah of a winepress, R. Chiya
              bar Aba cited R. Yochanan to say that an Onah is a
              day or a night, and Rabah bar bar Chanah cited him
              to say that it is half a day and half a night;
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak):</font></b> Both refer to 12
                   hours. R. Chiya discusses Nisan and Tishrei
                   (when the nights and days are equal), and Rabah
                   discusses winter or summer.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>14.  Answer #1:</font></b> R. Shimon ben Gamliel means that an Onah
              is a day or night of Nisan or Tishrei, or half a day
              and half a night in winter or summer.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>15.  Answer #2:</font></b> Besulah is different, for every wedding
              is delayed until they agree on (stipulations in) the
              Kesuvah and sign it (we assume that half the night
              will pass before they have relations).
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>16.  Yevamos 62b (R. Yehoshua ben Levi):</font></b> A man must be
              with his wife before he goes on a trip - 'v'Yadata
              Ki Shalom Ohalecha (u'Fakadta Navcha)'.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>17.  (Rav Yosef):</font></b> This applies evens needed for Samuch
              l'Vestah.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>    (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rambam (Hilchos Isurei Bi'ah 4:12):</font></b> One may not have
              Bi'ah with his wife shortly before her Veses, lest
              she see blood during Bi'ah - 'v'Hizartem...'
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rosh (Yevamos 6:10):</font></b> We cannot say that he has Bi'ah
              with her Samuch l'Vestah, for the Torah forbids
              this! R. Tam explains that he speaks (intimately)
              with her. Most texts say that this is when she is
              Nidah (surely, we do not permit Bi'ah)!
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rosh (Nidah 9:2):</font></b> If a woman normally sees at Netz,
              and she is not sure if it is before or after, the
              Ra'avad says that some are stringent and forbid the
              entire night and the entire day. Some are lenient,
              for Vestos are mid'Rabanan, and all the more so
              shortly before her Veses is mid'Rabanan, so we are
              lenient about a Safek, and we forbid only the day,
              which is Vadai within the days of (when she is
              expected to be) Nidah. The Ra'avad concluded like
              the lenient opinion.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Ran (Shevuos 1b DH v'Hizartem):</font></b> 'V'Hizartem' is an
              Asmachta, for we hold that Vestos are mid'Rabanan
              (Nidah 16a). Also, we permit one leaving on a trup
              to be Poked (have Bi'ah with) his wife shortly
              before her Veses. If it were mid'Oraisa, we could
              not permit it!
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>    (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (YD 184:2):</font></b> At the time of a woman's
              Veses, one must separate from her one Onah, i.e.
              from relations. If the Veses is during the day, he
              separates that entire day, even if the Veses is at
              the end of the day, and he is permitted immediately
              the coming night. If the Veses is at the beginning
              of the day, he separates that entire day, and he is
              permitted the entire previous night .If the Veses is
              during the night, he separates that entire night,
              and he is permitted the entire previous day and the
              next day. This is whether she established the Veses
              through one appearance or three.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Beis Yosef (DH uv'Sha'as):</font></b> The Ran, Rashba and
                   Rosh say that the verse is an Asmachta, for
                   Vestos are mid'Rabanan. Sefer ha'Terumos and
                   Tosfos and the Rosh in Yevamos say that Vestos
                   are mid'Oraisa Perhaps they only mean that
                   there is an Asmachta from the Torah.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Beis Yosef (DH u'Mah she'Chosav Im):</font></b> All Poskim
                   rule like R. Yehudah, who forbids only the Onah
                   in which she normally sees, except for the Or
                   Zaru'a. He obligates separating that Onah and
                   the previous one, i.e. 24 hours in all. If she
                   normally sees during the day, he separates that
                   day and the previous night, and correspondingly
                   if she normally sees at night. There is no
                   reason or source for this. The Gemara
                   explicitly says like the Poskim. The Agur
                   (1358) calls the Or Zaru'a 'an excessive
                   stringency.'
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Bach (DH v'Nir'eh):</font></b> The Or Zaru'a means that
                   even though the Halachah follows R. Yehudah, it
                   is proper to be stringent like the simple
                   reading of R. Yirmeyah (our text - R.
                   Yoshiyah), which forbids also the previous
                   Onah, lest she see at the end of the night and
                   think that it was the beginning of the day, or
                   vice-versa. A support for this is the opinion
                   that is stringent when she is unsure if she saw
                   before or after sunrise.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Note:</font></b> If she sees at the beginning of the day,
                   but thinks that it is the end of the night,
                   even if we forbid also the Onah before the
                   Veses, due to her mistake she may have Bi'ah
                   during her Veses!
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.   Taz (2):</font></b> It is astounding to be stringent. The
                   Gemara is explicitly lenient!
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>vi.  Shach (7 DH uv'Or):</font></b> Ra'avan explains that the
                   Gemara discusses one who always sees at the
                   same time within an Onah, but if she sees at
                   varying times during the day, the entire day is
                   her Veses, and surely she must refrain also the
                   previous Onah! Or Zaru'a discusses such women.
                   Also Sha'arei Dura and the Maharil bring the Or
                   Zaru'a l'Halachah.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>vii. Beis Yosef (DH Kasvu Hagahos):</font></b> Hagahos
                   Maimoniyos (4:9) says that Onah is a day or
                   night in Nisan or Tishrei, or half of a day and
                   night in Tamuz or Teves. He holds that Onah is
                   12 hours. I say that one need not be concerned
                   for this, since the Poskim did not mention it.
                   Also the Gemara connotes that we are concerned
                   only for a day or night, and not for hours. It
                   mentioned hours in Nidah only due to R. Yosi's
                   opinion.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>viii.Rebuttal (Bach DH Kasav):</font></b> Nidah 65a says that
                   Onah is 12 hours. The Halachah follows this.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>ix.  Support (of Bach - Shach 7):</font></b> Also Ma'adanei
                   Melech (Nidah 1:2) and Ra'avan say so. The
                   Poskim did not mention this because they
                   discuss an average day or night, but indeed, in
                   winter or summer we must calculate <i></i>relative
                   hours, like we find regarding Kri'as Shema,
                   Chametz on Erev Pesach, and calculations of
                   Tekufos (seasons).
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>x.   <i></i>Hagahos Chasam Sofer:</font></b> These words are
                   astounding.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>xi.  Sidrei Taharah (3 DH Mah):</font></b> The text of the
                   Shach should say <i>equal</i> hours. He must hold
                   that the times for Kri'as Shema and Chametz are
                   three and four equal hours; this equals three
                   or four relative hours only in Nisan or
                   Tishrei, and likewise regarding Onah. I say
                   that Aviasaf learned from Nidah 63b. Day begins
                   at dawn. Why does the Gemara discuss sunrise?
                   In Nisan or Tishrei, there are 12 hours from
                   sunrise to sunset. Between dawn and sunrise is
                   considered part of the previous Onah.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>xii. Defense (of Beis Yosef - Taz 2):</font></b> If it depends
                   on hours, the Onah in which she sees is a full
                   day or night only in Nisan or Tishrei, and only
                   if she sees at midday or midnight. If she sees
                   at the end of the day, if we count the 12 hours
                   from that time, she is permitted during the day
                   before this time, and forbidden the next night.
                   R. Yehudah and all the Poskim forbid her during
                   the day! If the 12 hours end at the time she
                   sees, if she sees at the start of the day, she
                   is permitted during the day after this time.
                   Chas v'Shalom to say so! Even if we forbid six
                   hours before and six after, she is not
                   forbidden the entire day. Rather, it depends on
                   the day or night, whether it is long or short,
                   whether she sees at the beginning or end.
                   Chachamim gave a fixed Shi'ur. Nidah 65
                   discusses Dam Besulim. It depends on hours, and
                   not on day or night. It is unreasonable to give
                   only a short time to one who had Bi'ah at the
                   end of the night, and to give the entire night
                   to to one who had Bi'ah at the beginning of the
                   night. Vestos depend on when she normally sees,
                   during the day or at night.<p>				   
				   

<font color='darkblue'>Other Halachos relevant to this Daf:<br>
<b>IS WINE REQUIRED FOR KIDUSH AND HAVDALAH? </b>(</font><font color='darkblue'>


lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)  Answer (Abaye):</font></b> The Mishnah did not teach them together
          because they are contrary to each other!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> In the Mikdash, the exemption is for the shortest
               path, and not a longer one;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> The exemption for withdrawing from a Nidah is if he
               delays, and not if he withdraws immediately!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)  Question (Rav Huna brei d'Rav Yehoshua):</font></b> If Abaye exempts
          him due to Ones, it was not shortly before her Veses;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> However, Abaye said (17b) that he brings two
               Korbanos. It must have been shortly before her
               Veses!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)  Answer:</font></b> That teaching of Abaye did not refers to the case
          of the Mishnah.
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>2) SEPARATION FROM A NIDAH AND BEFORE HER VESES</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Question (R. Yonason ben Yosi):</font></b> What is the Lav
          forbidding relations with a Nidah?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Objection (R. Shimon ben Yosi):</font></b> Obviously, it is 'v'El
          Ishah b'Nidas Tum'asah Lo Sikrav'!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Correction:</font></b> Rather, if a woman told her husband during
          relations that she became Nidah, what forbids him to
          withdraw immediately?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Answer (Chizkiyah):</font></b> 'U'Sehi Nidasah Alav.'
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Question:</font></b> That is an Aseh. What is the Lav?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Answer (Rav Papa):</font></b> It is 'Lo Sikrav' (the above verse);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> 'Lo Sikrav' can also mean 'do not separate', like it
               says 'Kerav Elecha Al Tigash Bi.'
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  (Beraisa - R. Yoshiyah):</font></b> 'V'Hizartem... mi'Tum'asam'
          forbids a man to his wife shortly before her Veses.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Question:</font></b> How much in advance must he separate?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Answer (Rabah):</font></b> He must separate the night or day (from
          morning until evening) when she is due to menstruate.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  (R. Yochanan):</font></b> Anyone who does not separate from his wife
          shortly before her Veses, even if his sons are like
          Aharon's sons, they will die prematurely;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Right after 'v'Hizartem...', it discusses the death
               of Aharon's sons.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)  (R. Chiya bar Aba):</font></b> Anyone who separates from his wife
          shortly before her Veses, he will merit to have sons;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Just after 'Lehavdil Bein ha'Tamei u'Vein ha'Tahor',
               it says 'v'Yaldah Zachar.'
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   (R. Yehoshua ben Levi):</font></b> Such a person merits that
               his children will be qualified to give Halachic
               rulings - (it says earlier, Vayikra 10:10-11)
               'Lehavdil... u'Lhoros.'
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   (R. Chiya bar Aba):</font></b> Anyone who makes Havdalah over
               wine after Shabbos, he will merit to have sons. It
               says (Vayikra 10:10) 'Lehavdil Bein ha'Kodesh u'Vein
               ha'Chol', similar to 'Lehavdil Bein ha'Tamei u'Vein
               ha'Tahor', which is followed by 'v'Yaldah Zachar.'
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)  (R. Binyamin bar Yefes):</font></b> Anyone who has relations
          modestly, he will merit to have sons. It says
          'v'Hiskadishtem vi'Hyisem Kedoshim', and (soon
          afterwards) 'v'Yaldah Zachar.'
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>3) MUST ONE KNOW HOW HE BECAME TAMEI?</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah - R. Eliezer):</font></b> 'Sheretz Tamei v'Nelam'...
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question:</font></b> R. Akiva agrees that he brings a Korban only if
          he forgot the Tum'ah. What do they argue about?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer #1 (Chizkiyah):</font></b> They argue about w	hether or not
          he must know what made him Tamei.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> R. Eliezer holds that he brings a Korban only if he
               knows how he became Tamei, e.g. through a rodent or
               a Neveilah. R. Akiva holds that it suffices that he
               knew that he became Tamei.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b>  Ula agrees with Chizkiyah.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Question (Ula):</font></b> Here, R. Eliezer says that he brings a
          Korban only if he knows how he became Tamei;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Contradiction (Mishnah - R. Eliezer):</font></b> If one ate
               Chelev or Nosar (and is unsure which), in either
               case he must bring a Chatas! Likewise, if he did
               Melachah on Shabbos or Yom Kipur, or if he had
               relations with a Nidah (his wife) or his sister (and
               is unsure which), he brings a Chatas.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> R. Yehoshua says, 'Hoda Elav Chataso Asher Chata
               Bah' teaches that he must know what he transgressed.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Answer (Ula):</font></b> Regarding (the Chatas of a commoner), it
          says 'Chata v'Havi' - he brings a Chatas whenever he
          knows that he sinned (even if he does not know which sin
          of Kares it was);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Regarding Tum'ah, it already said 'b'Chol Davar
               Tamei.' 'Oh b'Nivlas Sheretz Tamei' is extra!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  This teaches that he brings a Korban only if he
                    knows how he became Tamei (through a Sheretz or
                    Neveilah... )
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> R. Akiva argues. Since the verse needed to mention
               Behemah and Chayah to teach Rebbi's Gezeirah Shavah
               (to reveal that the verse discusses Tum'ah of the
               Mikdash or Kodshim), it also mentioned Sheretz.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (Beraisa - Tana d'Vei R. Yishmael):</font></b> Any Parshah
                    in the Torah that was repeated, it is possible
                    that it teaches only one Chidush (we need not
                    expound every repeated word). 
<br>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) HALACHAH: THE NATURE OF THE PROHIBITION OF 'SAMUCH LA'VESTAH'</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Gemara records a Beraisa in which Rebbi Yoshiyah teaches that the Torah requires a man to separate from his wife when she is 'Samuch la'Vestah,' when she nears the time that she expects to become a Nidah. He learns this from the verse, 'You shall separate the people of Israel from their Tum'ah' (Vayikra 15:31).'
</p><p>
Is this a Torah prohibition, or is it a rabbinical prohibition which uses the verse as an Asmachta?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>RASHBA</b> and <b>RITVA</b> in Yevamos (62b) explain that the prohibition against being with one's wife when she is 'Samuch la'Vestah' is mid'Rabanan. This view is supported by the Gemara in Yevamos, which says that a man is obligated to be with his wife before he departs on a trip, even if it happens to be 'Samuch la'Vestah.' If the Isur of 'Samuch la'Vestah' is mid'Oraisa, the Rabanan would not have instituted such an obligation. If the Isur is mid'Rabanan, then it is clear that the Rabanan have the right to override their own enactment when they see fit to do so.
</p><p>
The Ritva here in Shevuos, however, refutes the proof from the Gemara in Yevamos. Even if the prohibition against being with one's wife when she is 'Samuch la'Vestah' is mid'Oraisa, the Torah itself permits a man to be with his wife immediately before he departs on a trip, even when it is 'Samuch la'Vestah.' This is derived from the end of the verse quoted in the Gemara in Yevamos, 'And you shall visit your residence and you will not sin' (Iyov 5:24). The verse concludes with the words 'and you will not sin' because it is assuring the man that since he is fulfilling his obligation to be with his wife for the purpose of a Mitzvah, his wife will not become a Nidah at that moment even though she is 'Samuch la'Vestah.' (See Insights to Yevamos 62:2.)
</p><p>
The <b>RAN</b>, <b>RASHBA</b>, and other Rishonim give another proof that the Isur of 'Samuch la'Vestah' is mid'Rabanan. The Gemara in Nidah (15a) records a dispute about whether the Isur during the woman's Veses is mid'Oraisa or mid'Rabanan. These Rishonim rule that the Isur during the Veses itself is only mid'Rabanan. According to this opinion, it is obvious that 'Samuch la'Vestah' must also be mid'Rabanan.
</p><p>
(b) Other Rishonim explain the Gemara in Nidah differently. They explain that the dispute in Nidah is not about a woman's prohibition during her Veses. Rather, the dispute involves merely the woman's status after her Veses has passed and she has not yet determined her status. Everyone agrees that during her Veses, the Torah forbids her to have relations. According to this interpretation, there is no reason why 'Samuch la'Vestah' cannot be a Torah prohibition.
</p><p>
The <b>NODA B'YEHUDAH</b> (YD 1:55) cites proof for this view from the Gemara in Gitin (28b). The Gemara there rules that when relevant, the Halachah takes into account, in cases of doubt, the possibility that a person might die, but the Halachah does not suspect that a person has already died. What is the logic behind this difference? The difference lies in the Chazakah (status quo) of the person. If a person has a Chazakah that he is alive, then the Halachah does not suspect, out of doubt, that he might have already died, since that would be counter to his Chazakah. On the other hand, if there is a concern that someone might die due to circumstances, the Halachah may suspect that he will die; this does not contradict his status quo that says that <i>until now</i> he was alive, since the doubt is whether he will die in the near future.
</p><p>
The Noda b'Yehudah explains that according to the Gemara in Gitin, the prohibition during a woman's Veses is a relatively weak prohibition (according to the opinion that it is mid'Rabanan), because once a woman passes her Veses without becoming a Nidah, it makes sense that she retains her previous status of Tehorah. The Halachah does not suspect that she became a Nidah and did not know it, just as the Halachah does not suspect that someone died, since such a suspicion would be counter to the person's Chazakah (status quo). Therefore, the Torah does not forbid the time of the actual Veses. However, at the time immediately <i>before</i> she expects to become a Nidah, there <i>is</i> concern that she is about to become a Nidah. Hence, it is possible that the opinion that the Isur of Veses is mid'Rabanan may agree that 'Samuch la'Vestah' is forbidden by the Torah. This is also the approach of the <b>CHASAM SOFER</b> (Teshuvos YD 170, 179).
</p><p>
(The <b>ARUCH HA'SHULCHAN</b> (YD 184) adds that this is the approach of many Rishonim. He cites the <b>RAMBAM</b> who rules that the Isur of Veses is mid'Rabanan, but when the Rambam writes that 'Samuch la'Vestah' is forbidden he makes no mention that it is mid'Rabanan. The Aruch ha'Shulchan asserts that the Rambam almost always mentions when an Isur is mid'Rabanan if that is the case. The Rambam's omission here indicates that 'Samuch la'Vestah' is forbidden mid'Oraisa. The Aruch ha'Shulchan adds that this is also the proper way of understanding <b>TOSFOS</b> in Yevamos (62b) and the <b>ROSH</b>.)
</p><p>
Although the Aruch ha'Shulchan and others agree that 'Samuch la'Vestah' is forbidden mid'Oraisa even though the Isur of Veses is mid'Rabanan, they disagree with the proof cited by the Noda b'Yehudah. The Aruch ha'Shulchan says that the case of Veses is not comparable to the case in Gitin. In the case in Gitin, the threat of death constantly looms over the person, and therefore the possibility of his death is a very real concern. In contrast, a woman is not inevitably going to have a flow of Dam; there are many factors (such as pregnancy, or illness) that may prevent her from becoming a Nidah at any future time.
</p><p>
The Aruch ha'Shulchan instead suggests a different argument to explain why 'Samuch la'Vestah' is Asur mid'Oraisa even though Veses itself is Asur mid'Rabanan. He explains that, in contrast to the assumption of the Noda b'Yehudah, there is no Chazakah at all that a woman who was Tehorah in the past is still Tehorah. The nature of a woman is to constantly change from the status of Tehorah to the status of Teme'ah. Under such circumstances, no Chazakah can be established. This is known as 'Chazakah ha'Asuyah l'Hishtanos.'
</p><p>
According to this approach, why does the verse need to warn men to separate from their wives 'Samuch la'Vestah'? Even without the verse, they should be prohibited from being with their wives, since the woman is expected to become a Nidah and has no Chezkas Taharah!
</p><p>
The <b>CHAZON ISH</b> (YD 80:8) explains that although the verse indeed is not needed to teach that a man must separate from his wife at the time of 'Samuch la'Vestah,' the verse <i>is</i> needed to teach that if he had relations 'Samuch la'Vestah,' he is considered a sinner even if his wife does <i>not</i> become a Nidah at that time.
</p><p>
(This discussion applies only to the requirement to separate, at 'Samuch la'Vestah,' from a woman who has a Veses Kavu'a, a set time at which she becomes a Nidah each month. The requirement to separate from a woman who has a Veses which is not Kavu'a (the category into which most women fall nowadays) is only mid'Rabanan according to all opinions.) (Y. Montrose) 
</p><p>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) THE ARGUMENT OF R. ELIEZER AND R. AKIVA</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Question:</font></b> What does R. Eliezer learn from 'Bah'
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Answer:</font></b> This excludes Mis'asek (one who did an action he
          did not intend for).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer #2 (to Question 3:b, 18b - R. Yochanan and Rav
          Sheshes):</font></b> R. Eliezer and R. Akiva do not argue about the
          law, only about how we derive it.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Since Rav Sheshes held that they do not argue about
               the law, he was not careful and sometimes switched
               the opinions of R. Eliezer and R. Akiva.
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>2) ONE WHO FORGETS BOTH TUM'AH AND THE MIKDASH</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Question (Rava):</font></b> If one forgot that he was Tamei <i>and</i>
          the place of the Mikdash (or that this meat is Kodesh),
          what is the law (according to R. Eliezer and R. Akiva,
          that one is liable for forgetting the Tum'ah, and not for
          forgetting the Mikdash)?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Answer #1 (Rav Nachman):</font></b> Since he forgot the Tum'ah, he
          is liable.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Question:</font></b> Why not say the contrary, that since he
               forgot the Mikdash, he is exempt!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer #2 (Rav Ashi):</font></b> It depends. If he would have
          refrained had he remembered the Tum'ah, this is like
          forgetting the Tum'ah, so he is liable;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> If he would have refrained had he remembered the
               Mikdash, this is like forgetting the Mikdash, so he
               is exempt.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Objection (Ravina):</font></b> Had he remembered only one of them,
          he would not refrain!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Answer #3 (Ravina):</font></b> Rather, in either case he is exempt.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  (Beraisa):</font></b> If there are two paths, and somewhere along
          one of them there is a Mes under the ground spanning the
          entire width of the path, anyone who walks on that path
          will become Tamei.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> If a man walked on one path, and later on the other
               path, and then entered the Mikdash, he is liable
               (since he is Vadai (surely) Tamei);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> If he man walked on one path, entered the Mikdash,
               was sprinkled (with Mei Chatas, to become Vadai
               Tahor), walked on the other path and entered the
               Mikdash, he is liable (since one of the times he
               entered the Mikdash he was Tamei);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> R. Shimon exempts;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b> R. Shimon ben Yehudah cites R. Shimon to say that he
               is exempt in every case.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Question:</font></b> Does R. Shimon ben Yehudah exempt even in the
          first case? No matter which path is Tamei, he was Tamei
          when he entered the Mikdash!
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) AN ORDINARY 'KORBAN CHATAS' IN A CASE OF 'HE'ELEM MIKDASH'</b></font>
<br>OPINIONS: The Mishnah (14b) records a three-way Machlokes regarding the obligation to bring a Korban Oleh v'Yored for accidentally entering the Beis ha'Mikdash in a state of Tum'ah. Rebbi Eliezer states that the person is Chayav only when he forgot what made him Tamei. Rebbi Akiva states that the person is Chayav when he forgot that he was Tamei, but not when he forgot that he was entering the Beis ha'Mikdash. Rebbi Yishmael maintains that he is Chayav for entering the Beis ha'Mikdash while Tamei whether he forgot that he was Tamei or that he was in the Beis ha'Mikdash.
</p><p>
The Gemara here quotes Rava who asked Rav Nachman that according to the opinions that one is Chayav to bring a Korban Oleh v'Yored only if he entered the Beis ha'Mikdash when he forgot that he was Tamei, but not if he forgot that the place he was entering was the Beis ha'Mikdash, what is the Halachah when he forgot both details? Does the fact that he forgot that this was the Beis ha'Mikdash disqualify him from bringing a Korban for also forgetting that he was Tamei?
</p><p>
What exactly is Rava's question? Does Rava mean that one who forgets both details should be completely exempt from any Korban, or does he mean that such a person should be exempt only from the Korban Oleh v'Yored, but he should be Chayav to bring an ordinary Korban Chatas?
</p><p>
(a) <b>RABEINU TAM</b> (cited by Tosfos) explains that Rava refers only to the obligation to bring a Korban Oleh v'Yored. Certainly, however, such a person will be obligated to bring an ordinary Korban Chatas. This is consistent with the rule that a Korban Chatas is brought for the unintentional transgression of any Isur which, when transgressed intentionally, is punishable with Kares.
</p><p>
However, this seems difficult to understand. The first Mishnah in Shevuos (2a) states that when a person entered the Beis ha'Mikdash unaware of his original state of Tum'ah ('Ein Bah Yedi'ah ba'Techilah'), or unaware of the fact that he was entering the Beis ha'Mikdash, the Sa'ir ha'Chitzon atones for him. This implies that the person does <i>not</i> bring an ordinary Chatas, because the Sa'ir ha'Chitzon atones only for sins for which a person has no obligation to bring a Korban (7b).
</p><p>
The <b>RITVA</b> answers that Rabeinu Tam maintains that in the case of 'Ein Bah Yedi'ah ba'Techilah,' a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv teaches that the person brings no Korban (and thus the Sa'ir ha'Chitzon atones for him). This is logical, he explains, because it would not be proper for a person who had no knowledge beforehand that he was Tamei to be required to bring an ordinary Chatas, while a person who did have previous knowledge that he was Tamei is required to bring only a Korban Oleh v'Yored.
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> disagrees with Rabeinu Tam for a number of reasons. First, the wording of the Gemara is that perhaps one who forgets both details is 'Patur' from bringing a Korban. 'Patur' usually means that the person is totally exempt from any obligation. Second, the Gemara later (24b) searches for a sin that involves Tum'ah, for which an ordinary Korban Chatas is brought. The Gemara comes up with the case of a Nasi who eats Kodshim while he is Tamei. According to Rabeinu Tam, why does the Gemara there not give the simple case in which a person forgot that he was Tamei and he forgot that he was entering the Beis ha'Mikdash (according to Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Akiva)?
</p><p>
Tosfos therefore asserts that Rava's question is whether such a person brings a Korban Oleh v'Yored or he brings no Korban at all.
</p><p>
Why, though, does the Gemara not apply the rule that a Korban Chatas is brought for the unintentional transgression of any Isur which, when transgressed intentionally, is punishable with Kares? Tosfos explains that this rule does not apply here, because one of the methods of expounding Torah law is that if a certain law was in a certain category and then that law was found to be an exception, it no longer has any connection to that category ('Davar she'Hayah bi'Chelal v'Yatza li'Don b'Davar he'Chadash').
</p><p>
The <b>KEHILOS YAKOV</b> (13:2) explains why Rabeinu Tam does not agree with Tosfos' explanation that this is a 'Davar she'Yahah bi'Chelal v'Yatza li'Don b'Davar he'Chadash.' Rabeinu Tam maintains that there are two different transgressions with regard to Tum'as Mikdash: entering the Mikdash while forgetting that one is Tamei, and entering the Mikdash when Tamei while forgetting that one is in the Mikdash. Although Rabeinu Tam agrees that the sin of entering the Mikdash while forgetting that one is Tamei has left the general category (of sins for which one is obligated to bring a Korban Chatas for unintentional transgression, and is Chayav Kares for intentional transgression) and is a 'Davar... v'Yatza li'Don b'Davar he'Chadash' (one brings a Korban Oleh v'Yored instead of an ordinary Korban Chatas), that sin is not the same as forgetting about the Beis ha'Mikdash. Since, according to Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Akiva, the sin of entering the Mikdash while forgetting that it is the Mikdash never left the general category, it remains in the general category and one is obligated to bring a Korban Chatas.
</p><p>
<b>REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b> (on the Mishnayos, and in Teshuvos, end of #8) suggests another approach to understanding the view of Rabeinu Tam. He asks that Rebbi Yishmael's opinion -- that one brings a Korban Oleh v'Yored for either type of forgetting, even for forgetting that he is entering the Mikdash -- seems to contradict a rule in the Gemara earlier. The Gemara states that one who does an act of Aveirah while 'Mis'asek' is not considered guilty, except in cases of forbidden relations and forbidden food items (from which a person derives pleasure through the act). An example of 'Mis'asek,' Tosfos says, is one who uproots a vegetable from the ground thinking that it was already detached from the ground. Why, then, should a person who is Tamei, who thinks that he is entering an ordinary house (not realizing that it is the Beis ha'Mikdash), be required to bring a Korban? His act should be an act of 'Mis'asek,' and he should be exempt!
</p><p>
Rebbi Akiva Eiger answers that the exemption of 'Mis'asek' applies only to exempt the person from the obligation to bring an ordinary Korban Chatas. It does not exempt him from the obligation to bring a Korban Oleh v'Yored in a case where such an obligation exists.
</p><p>
Based on the words of Rebbi Akiva Eiger, Rabeinu Tam's opinion may be understood as follows. Rabeinu Tam maintains that Rava's question was that according to Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Akiva, perhaps one who forgets that he is Tamei and forgets that he is entering the Beis ha'Mikdash is exempt even from an ordinary Korban Chatas, because such a person, who forgets that he is entering the Mikdash, is considered 'Mis'asek'! (This also explains why Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Akiva in the Mishnah state that 'one is not obligated [to bring a Korban] if he forgets [the holiness of] the Mikdash,' instead of saying that one is not obligated 'if he forgets [the holiness of] a piece of meat that is Kadosh.' If he eats a piece of meat that is Kadosh while he is Tamei, unaware that the meat is Kadosh, he <i>would</i> have to bring a Chatas, because the exemption of 'Mis'asek' does not apply to sins from which a person derives pleasure.) (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) SHEVU'AS BITUY</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>    </font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Mishnah):</font></b> There are two primary kinds of Shevuos
              (of Bituy). There are four in all. The two primary
              kinds are 'I swear that I will eat' and 'I swear
              that I will not eat.' The other two are 'I swear
              that I ate' and 'I swear that I did not eat.'
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   25a (Mishnah):</font></b> Oaths of Bituy apply to one's own
              things, and to other people's. They apply to
              tangible and intangible things.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> If Reuven swore 'I will give (or not give) to
              Ploni', 'I gave (or did not give) to Ploni', 'I will
              (or will not) sleep', 'I slept (or did not sleep)',
              'I will (or will not) throw a rock into the sea', 'I
              threw (or did not throw) a rock into the sea.'
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b> R. Yishmael says, one is liable (a Korban) only for
              oaths about the future - 'Lehara Oh Leheitiv.'
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   R. Akiva:</font></b> If so, he should only be liable for doing
              good or evil. What is the source to include neutral
              things (e.g. throwing a rock into the sea)?
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   R. Yishmael:</font></b> The Torah includes this ('l'Chol Asher
              Yivatei').
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.   R. Akiva:</font></b> This also includes oaths about the past!
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.   (Rav):</font></b> If one said 'I swear that Ploni threw (or did
              not throw) a rock into the sea', he is liable (for
              an oath of Bituy if this is false);
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.   (Shmuel):</font></b> He is exempt.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>10. </font></b> Rav obligates. Since the oath applies in the
              positive and negative, it is Bituy. Shmuel exempts.
              Since it does not apply to the future, it is not
              Bituy.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>11.  Nazir 20b (Mishnah):</font></b> If Reuven said 'I am a Nazir';
              another (heard him and) said 'and I'; (and another
              said) 'and I', they are all Nezirim.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>    (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rambam (Hilchos Shevuos 1:2):</font></b> Shevu'as Bituy applies
              only to things that one could do in the future or in
              the past. Oaths of the past are 'I ate', 'I threw a
              rock into the sea' or 'Ploni spoke with Almoni'.
              Oaths of the future are 'I will eat', or 'I will not
              eat', 'I will (or will not) throw a rock into the
              sea.'
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Ramban (Bava Basra 126 DH v'Ika Lemeidak):</font></b> Why does
              a Tanai help for Nezirus? Nezirus cannot be through
              a Shali'ach, so Tanai does not help for it, like we
              say about Chalitzah (Kesuvos 74a)! Some say that we
              learn from Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven only Tanayim
              between people, but any Tanai that pertains only to
              himself is always valid. Some say that Nezirus can
              be through a Shali'ach. One can say 'when you want,
              vow that I am a Nazir.'
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Noda b'Yehudah (1 YD 67):</font></b> I did not find
                   explicitly whether Shlichus helps for Shevu'ah.
                   It seems that it must, for Tana'im help for
                   Shevuos.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Beis Meir (EH 120:4 DH Emnam):</font></b> The Ran
                   (Pesachim 3b) says that one cannot make a
                   Shali'ach for Bitul Chametz, for a Shali'ach
                   cannot make Hefker. I do not know why this is
                   obvious. The Beis Yosef (OC 434) says that
                   Hefker works through a Neder, and one cannot
                   vow through a Shali'ach. I say that this is
                   because 'Motza'ei Sefasecha Tishmor' is a
                   Mitzvah on his body, which cannot be done
                   through a Shali'ach. The Ramban says that any
                   Tanai that pertains only to himself is always
                   valid. Since he himself stipulated and he wants
                   to fulfill his Tanai, it need not be Kaful. His
                   initial reasoning was that Shlichus does not
                   help for Nezirus; the same applies to Hekdesh
                   and Nedarim. Likewise, a Shevu'ah cannot be
                   through a Shali'ach, for it says 'Levatei
                   bi'Sfasayim.' The Noda b'Yehudah overlooked the
                   Ramban. Surely, Shevu'ah is like Nezirus. The
                   Ramban's answer explains also Shevu'ah. It
                   follows that if one made a Tanai in a Shevu'ah
                   to another person, he needs Mishpatei Tanayim.
                   Since Shevu'ah cannot be through a Shali'ach,
                   Mishpatei Tanayim are not fulfilled, so the
                   Tanai is Batel and the Shevu'ah is valid.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Tzlach (Berachos 21b DH R. Tam):</font></b> The Ramban
                   holds that Shome'a k'Oneh (one who listens is
                   like one who answers) to be Yotzei a Berachah,
                   but it is not considered a Hefsek in Tefilah.
                   If so, hearing a Shevu'ah is not like saying a
                   Shevu'ah. Nazir 20b proves this. If it suffices
                   to hear, why must each say 'and I'? However,
                   perhaps Berachos are different. All Yisrael say
                   the same text of Berachos, but the first
                   Nazir's words apply only to making himself a
                   Nazir. Also, he did not intend for the
                   listener; Shome'a k'Oneh requires the speaker
                   to intend for the listener.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>    (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (YD 236:1):</font></b> 'Nefesh Ki Sishava
              Levatei bi'Sfasayim' includes (false) Shevuos about
              the past, e.g. 'that I ate' but (really) he did not
              eat, or 'I did not eat' and really he ate, and for
              the future, e.g. 'I will eat' and he does not eat,
              or 'I will not eat' and he eats.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Gra (1):</font></b> The entire Sugya is like R. Akiva.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Be'er ha'Golah (232, after Os 25):</font></b> The Ri
                   mi'Gash said that if one swore through writing
                   but did not say the oath, he is obligated to
                   fulfill it. If he does not, Shamayim punishes
                   him, but Beis Din does not.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Chavos Ya'ir (194):</font></b> A document said 'Levi
                   accepted with a handshake and Shevu'ah b'Po'el
                   Mamash.' Levi claimed that it was Asmachta (an
                   exaggerated promise). The Shulchan Aruch
                   (207:19) and <b>SMA</b> (73:18) say that an oath helps
                   for Asmachta. If the document said that Levi
                   admits, if he knows that it is false, he is not
                   liable. However, if he wrote 'I swear that I
                   wil pay', or 'I accept with an oath and
                   handshake...', it is as if he swore, and he
                   must pay. One who vowed not to speak with Ploni
                   may write to him, for vows depends on the way
                   people speak. For monetary laws, writing is
                   stronger than speech; one cannot say 'I was
                   joking' or 'I did not want people to think that
                   I am rich.' Likewise, one who writes 'I accept
                   upon myself to fast on Monday... or to give
                   Tzedakah', it is as if he said it. We hold that
                   one must bless Birkas ha'Torah for writing, for
                   it is like saying the words. I suspect that
                   even if he did not write exactly what he
                   accepts, rather 'I accept to continue the
                   stringency I adopted for another half year' or
                   'I accept to fulfill what I dreamed', it takes
                   effect, like one who vowed Stam and explained
                   later what he meant. In any case, if he
                   specified, it is a vow. For testimony, the
                   Torah excluded writing. (This implies that it
                   helps for other matters.) A written command to
                   write a Get is invalid, for the husband must
                   write it, and a Shali'ach is like him only if
                   he commanded him in front of him. Or, this is a
                   stringency of Eshes Ish. A written oath
                   obligates b'Yedei Adam, but not b'Yedei
                   Shamayim.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Chasam Sofer (YD 220):</font></b> If one wrote a Shevu'ah
                   without saying it, if he admitted that he will
                   pay by a certain day, the Terumas ha'Deshen
                   says that it takes effect. The Chavos Ya'ir
                   obligates only b'Yedei Adam, but not b'Yedei
                   Shamayim. I.e. if Beis Din does not force him,
                   and he knows that he did not swear and he
                   admitted falsely merely to placate his
                   opponent, he need not fulfill it. Beis Din
                   would accept a good excuse for swearing
                   falsely. If he swore 'I accept upon myself',
                   then the oath takes effect from when he writes
                   it. The Ri mi'Gash obligates b'Yedei Shamayim
                   and exempts b'Yedei Adam. Shev Yakov (49)
                   disagreed with the Chavos Ya'ir. I defend the
                   Chavos Ya'ir. Speech is stronger for
                   interpersonal matters such as testimony, for
                   one understands the intent better. For what one
                   will fulfill himself, writing is better. It is
                   more of an action. The Torah said 'to utter' to
                   exclude thought, but Kal va'Chomer writing
                   works.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.   Pischei Teshuvah (1):</font></b> R. Mordechai Bana'at said
                   that a Cherem written in a Sefer that no one
                   else may publish it is invalid, for a written
                   Shevu'ah is invalid. Tiferes Tzvi (YD 62)
                   disagrees. However, if the first publisher
                   already sold his Seforim, he cannot stop others
                   from publishing, for this inhibits Shamayim's
                   work, and he does not lose. R. Efrayim
                   Margoliyos says that he keeps he rights (to
                   stop others for publishing it) until the time
                   that Chachamim fixed. The Noda b'Yehudah (1 YD
                   66) says that even if a written Shevu'ah is
                   invalid, surely a written Cherem is valid. He
                   also wrote (67) that Shevu'as Heses through a
                   Shali'ach is valid, for one can stipulate about
                   Shevuos. Shemen Roke'ach (2:27) disagrees.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</font></b> It applies also to matters
              that do not entail harm or benefit, e.g. 'I threw a
              rock into the sea'or 'I did not throw' or 'I will
              throw' or 'I will not throw.' It applies even to
              intangible things, e.g. 'I slept', 'I did not
              sleep', 'I will sleep' or 'I will not sleep.'
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Shach (1):</font></b> This refers to an amount of time
                   that he could survive without sleeping or
                   eating. If he said that he will not sleep for
                   three days, or Stam, it is a Shevu'as Shav (a
                   vain oath), for it is impossible. The Bach says
                   that if he swore Stam, he is believed to say
                   that he meant one day. If so it is Shav when he
                   intended for whatever his words connote, or
                   when he forgot what he meant.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Atzei Levonah:</font></b> Even though this is Devarim
                   sheb'Lev (unspoken intents), the Bach (232)
                   says that we can testify that he meant today,
                   for one cannot live three days without
                   sleeping. Simlas Binyamin questions this, for
                   one can explain his intent (unlike the simple
                   meaning) only when an extortionist forced him
                   to swear. When (there was no Ones and) his
                   words were clear, this is Devarim sheb'Lev (to
                   say that he meant today).
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</font></b> It applies even to things
              that can be done only through others, e.g. 'I gave
              or did not give to Ploni', 'I will or I will not
              give.' It applies even to things that others did,
              e.g. 'Ploni threw a rock into the sea' or 'he did
              not throw.' All of these are Bituy. If his oath was
              false, he brings a Korban.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Gra (4):</font></b>  The Halachah follows Rav regarding
                   Isurim. 
<br>


lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Answer (Rava):</font></b> The case is, when he walked on the second
          path he forgot that he had walked on the first path, so
          he never knew for sure that he was Tamei.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The first Tana holds (according to R. Shimon) that
               partial knowledge is like full knowledge (that he
               was Tamei);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> R. Shimon ben Yehudah holds (according to R. Shimon)
               that partial knowledge is not like full knowledge.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  (Beraisa):</font></b> If he man walked on one path, entered the
          Mikdash, was sprinkled, walked on the other path and
          entered the Mikdash, he is liable. R. Shimon exempts.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  Question:</font></b> Why does the first Tana obligate him? Each time
          he entered the Mikdash, he only knew (initially and
          forgot) that he was <i>Safek</i> Tamei!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)  Answer #1 (R. Yochanan):</font></b> Here, knowledge of a Safek is
          considered like (full) Yedi'ah;
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)  Answer #2 (Reish Lakish):</font></b> The Beraisa is R. Yishmael, who
          does not require initial knowledge.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)  Question:</font></b> R. Yochanan and Reish Lakish both contradict
          what they said elsewhere!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa - Rebbi):</font></b> If b'Shogeg, one ate Safek
               Chelev, then found out (that he ate Safek Chelev),
               and again ate and found out, just like one brings a
               Chatas for each time he (b'Shogeg) ate (Vadai)
               Chelev (after realizing his previous mistake), so he
               brings an Asham Taluy for each time he (b'Shogeg)
               ate Safek Chelev (after realizing his previous
               mistake);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> R. Shimon ben Yehudah and R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon
               say, he brings only one Asham Taluy;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  'Al Shigegaso Asher Shagag' teaches that one
                    Asham Taluy atones for many mistakes.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   (Reish Lakish):</font></b> Rebbi holds that Yedi'ah of Safek
               transgression separates, and obligates a separate
               Chatas (if he later learns that he truly
               transgressed) for his transgressions before the
               Yedi'ah and after, just like it separates regarding
               Asham Taluy (it obligates him to bring another Asham
               for Safek transgressions after the Yedi'ah);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   (R. Yochanan):</font></b> Just like Vadai Yedi'ah separates for
               Chatas, Safek Yedi'ah separates for Asham.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)  Answer (for R. Yochanan):</font></b> We only <i>inferred</i> that Yedi'ah
          is needed for Tum'ah from 'v'Nelam', therefore Safek
          Yedi'ah is considered Yedi'ah;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Regarding Chatas, it explicitly says 'Oh Hoda Elav.'
               Full Yedi'ah is needed.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)  Clarification of the question against Reish Lakish:</font></b> If he
          holds (according to Rebbi) that Safek  Yedi'ah is
          considered Yedi'ah (even for Chatas), why did he
          establish the Beraisa like R. Yishmael (who does not
          require initial Yedi'ah)? It could be (like Chachamim,
          who require initial Yedi'ah) according to Rebbi!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)  Answer:</font></b> Reish Lakish wanted to teach that R. Yishmael
          does not require initial Yedi'ah.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)  Objection:</font></b> This is obvious! Since he expounds 'v'Nelam'
          to obligate for forgetting the Mikdash, he has no source
          to require initial Yedi'ah!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)  Answer:</font></b> One might have thought that he has no source from
          the verses, but he has a tradition from Moshe from Sinai
          to require it;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Reish Lakish teaches that this is not so.
<br>
<br><center><font color='ff0000' size='+1'><b>*****<b>PEREK SHEVU'OS SHETAYIM</b>*****</b></font></center><p>
<br>

<b><font color='blue'>3) THE PRIMARY OATHS</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah):</font></b> There are two primary kinds of Shevu'os (of 
          Bituy). There are four in all;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The two primary kinds are 'I swear that I will eat'
               and 'I swear that I will not eat';
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> The other two are 'I swear that I ate' and 'I swear
               that I did not eat.'
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b>  R. Akiva says, if one swore 'I will not eat' and he ate
          Mashehu (any amount), he is liable;
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Chachamim:</font></b> We never find that someone is liable for
          eating Mashehu!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  R. Akiva:</font></b> We never find that one brings a Korban for
          speaking! (The Korban is for transgressing his words. His
          intention was not to eat at all. If he eats Mashehu he
          transgressed!)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  (Gemara) Inference:</font></b> Our Mishnah teaches that 'she'Ochel'
          means 'I will eat.'
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Contradiction (Beraisa (Tosfos - an abridged form of
               a Mishnah)):</font></b> If one said 'I swear that I will not
               eat your food' or 'I swear she'Ochel (your food)' or
               'I do not swear that I will not eat', he is
               forbidden to eat. 
<br>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) ENTERING THE BEIS HA'MIKDASH WHILE 'SAFEK TAMEI'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara discusses the possible variations of a case in which one person walked on two paths, one of which was definitely Tamei, and then he entered the Beis ha'Mikdash. One case involves a person who walked on one of the paths, was Metaher himself, then walked on the other path, and then entered the Beis ha'Mikdash. The Tana Kama maintains that he is obligated to bring a Korban. Rebbi Shimon says that he is exempt.
</p><p>
Rebbi Yochanan explains the Machlokes. In order to be obligated to bring a Korban for entering the Mikdash while Tamei, a person must first have known that he was Tamei and then forgot. What, though, is the law when one has knowledge of a Safek Tum'ah? The Tana Kama maintains that when the person already walked on the first path, and then walked on the second, even the knowledge that he is Safek Tamei is considered a 'Yedi'ah' such that the person originally 'knew' that he was 'Tamei' and should not go into the Mikdash.
</p><p>
This explanation of the opinion of the Tana Kama seems to contradict the Gemara earlier. The Gemara (14b) says that if a person knew that touching a Sheretz causes a person to become Tamei but was uncertain about the <i>size</i> of a Sheretz that makes a person Tamei, that is <i>not</i> called 'knowing' that he was Tamei (when he touched an amount that made him Tamei). Why does the Gemara here call one's awareness of a Safek Tum'ah 'knowing' that he was Tamei, while in the case earlier in which the person knew that he touched a Sheretz which is Metamei but did not know how much is Metamei, he is not called 'knowing' that he was Tamei?
</p><p>
ANSWER: <b>TOSFOS</b> answers that there is a fundamental difference between the two cases. In the case of the Gemara here, the person knows that if he indeed walked on both paths consecutively and then entered the Mikdash, his entry into the Mikdash was in a state of Tum'ah. In the case earlier, the person never knew that he became Tamei; he did not know that such a small amount of Sheretz could make him Tamei. Since he had no <i>definite</i> knowledge that he was Tamei and forbidden from entering the Mikdash, he never really 'knew.'
</p><p>
The <b>MAHARSHA</b> asks a question on Tosfos. The Gemara later challenges Rebbi Yochanan's explanation from a different case. A person ate a piece of meat and discovered later that the meat might have been Chelev (but it also might have been kosher). He then ate another piece of meat and discovered that the second piece of meat, too, was questionable. Rebbi Yochanan says that Rebbi taught that in such a case, if the person eventually finds out that both pieces were Chelev, he is obligated to bring only one Korban Chatas. He is not required to bring two Korbanos for his two sins because he did not find out for certain, between the time he ate the first piece and the time he ate the second piece, that he had eaten Chelev. In order to be Chayav to bring two Korbenos Chatas, the person needs to know that he was Chayav to bring one Korban before he can become Chayav to bring another. This Halachah is known as 'Yedi'os Mechalkos' ('knowledge separates' the obligation to bring Korbanos).
</p><p>
The Gemara asks how can Rebbi Yochanan state in the case of Safek Tum'ah that doubtful knowledge of his Tum'ah is considered 'knowing' when, in this case, he dismisses the doubtful knowledge that the meat was Chelev (that is, the person's knowledge after he ate the first piece) and requires only one Korban?
</p><p>
According to the answer of Tosfos, in the case of Chelev the person had absolutely no idea that he was possibly eating Chelev, which is exactly like the case of the person who did not know how much Sheretz is Metamei. How, then, can the Gemara ask from this case on a case where the person will know, at one point, that he was certainly Tamei?
</p><p>
The <b>MITZPEH EISAN</b> answers that the case of Chelev cannot be referring to a person who ate only one piece of meat at a time. The Gemara in Kerisus (18a) discusses whether there must be two pieces of meat present, one Chelev and one kosher, in order for a person who ate one of them (and only later finds out that he ate Chelev) to be obligated to bring a Korban. Even though, according to Rebbi, both pieces of meat do not need to be present when the person eats one of them, there must have been two pieces of meat there originally in order for there to have been a definite presence ('Ikva Isura') of forbidden food.
</p><p>
This answers the question of the Maharsha on Tosfos. In the case of the Chelev, Chelev definitely was present. The person who ate the meat, therefore, was eating something when there definitely was a presence of Isur. This is similar to the case of Tum'ah, where the person knew that after walking on the second path, he definitely would be Tamei in the Mikdash at one point. (Y. Montrose) 
</p><p>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) ONE WHO SAID 'SHE'OCHEL'</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Answer #1 (Abaye):</font></b> In our Mishnah, he was not being
          pressured to eat, so 'she'Ochel' means 'I will eat.'
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> In the Beraisa (Tosfos - other Mishnah), he was
               being pressured to eat, and kept refusing;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> When he finally swore 'she'Ochel', he meant 'I will
               not eat' (so they will stop insisting).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Answer #2 (Rav Ashi):</font></b> The text (there) should read
          'she'Iy Ochel' (that I will not eat).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Question:</font></b> The Tana already taught 'she'Lo Ochel.' Why
          must he teach also 'she'Iy Ochel'?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Answer:</font></b> One might have thought that he meant to say
          'she'Ochel', and mispronounced it. The Tana teaches that
          this is not so.

<b><font color='blue'>2) WHAT IS ISAR?</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Beraisa):</font></b> 'Mivta' is a Shevu'ah. 'Isar' is a Shevu'ah;
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b>  The prohibition of Isar - if you will say that Isar is a
          Shevu'ah, he is liable. If not, he is exempt.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Objection:</font></b> The Tana just said that Isar is a Shevu'ah!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Answer #1 (Abaye):</font></b> The Beraisa means: if one says
          'Mivta', this is a Shevu'ah. If he says 'Isar', this is
          Hatfasah in a Shevu'ah (forbidding something like
          something else forbidden by a Shevu'ah);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Version #1 (Rashi):</font></b> The prohibition of Isar: if you
               will say that Hatfasah in a Shevu'ah is like saying
               a Shevu'ah, he is liable (if he transgresses it). If
               not, he is exempt.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Version #2A (Tosfos):</font></b> The prohibition of Isar: if he
               was Matfis in a Shevu'ah, he is like one who said a
               Shevu'ah, and he is liable. If he said 'this is Isar
               upon me', this is not a Shevu'ah, and he is exempt.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Version #2B:</font></b> The prohibition of Isar: if he used the
               text of a Shevu'ah to be Matfis (e.g. I will not eat
               this, like this (other food forbidden by a
               Shevu'ah)), he is like one who said a Shevu'ah, and
               he is liable. If he did not say the text of a
               Shevu'ah (he said only 'this is like this'), this is
               not a Shevu'ah, and he is exempt.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Version #2C:</font></b> If one was Matfis item A in a Shevu'ah,
               and one was Matfis B in A, one is liable for B only
               if Hatfasah in a Shevu'ah is exactly like saying a
               Shevu'ah, for then this is like normal Hatfasah in a
               Shevu'ah. . If not, he is exempt. (end of Version
               #2)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Question:</font></b> What is the source that 'Mivta' is a Shevu'ah?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Answer #1:</font></b> We learn from '... Ki Sishava LeVaTei.'
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Question:</font></b> We should say the same about Isar - 'V'Chol
          Shevu'as Isar'!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Answer:</font></b> We must say that we learn that 'Isar' is Hatfasah
          in a Shevu'ah from '... Isar Al Nafshah bi'Shvu'ah.'
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Question:</font></b> We should say the same about Mivta, for it says
          'Asher YeVaTei ha'Adam bi'Shevu'ah'!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  Answer #2 (Abaye):</font></b> No, we learn that 'Mivta' is a
          Shevu'ah from '... u'Nedareha Aleha Oh Mivta...';
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The verse does not mention a Shevu'ah. We must say
               that she forbade herself through Mivta alone!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)  Answer #2 (to Objection c - Rava):</font></b> Really, Hatfasah in a 
          Shevu'ah is not like saying a Shevu'ah;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The Beraisa means as follows. 'Mivta' is a Shevu'ah.
               Also 'Isar' is a Shevu'ah;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> Isar is not always a Shevu'ah. The Torah wrote it
               between Neder and Shevu'ah to teach that it can be
               either;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> If it was said in the text of a Shevu'ah (forbidding
               an action), it is a Shevu'ah. If it was said in the
               text of a Neder (Alai, forbidding an object to
               himself), it is a Neder.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)  Question:</font></b> Where did the Torah wrote Isar between Neder
          and Shevu'ah?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)  Answer:</font></b> It says 'V'Im Beis Ishah Nadarah Oh Asrah Isar Al
          Nafshah bi'Shevu'ah.'
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b>  Abaye and Rava explain according to what they taught
          elsewhere:
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Abaye):</font></b> Hatfasah in a Shevu'ah is like saying a
               Shevu'ah;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   (Rava):</font></b> It is not like saying a Shevu'ah.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)  Question (against Rava - Beraisa):</font></b> Examples of the Isar
          that the Torah discusses are 'eating meat and drinking
          wine are forbidden to me like the day that my father
          died... or the day Gedalyah ben Achikam was killed, the
          day that I saw Yerushalayim in ruins... ' He is
          forbidden.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Shmuel):</font></b> The case is, he had already taken a Neder
               never to eat meat or drink wine on that day.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> This is not difficult for Abaye. The Beraisa
               explains Hatfasah in a Neder, for this takes effect
               just like (Tosfos - and is learned from) Hatfasah in
               a Shevu'ah.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE PROHIBITION OF AN 'ISAR'</b></font>
<br>QUESTIONS: The Beraisa says that the word 'Mivta' represents a Shevu'ah, and the word 'Isar' represents a Shevu'ah. The Beraisa continues and says that if the utterance of the word 'Isar' is like an explicitly-stated Shevu'ah, then one is Chayav, and if it is not like an explicitly-stated Shevu'ah, then one is Patur. The Gemara points out that the Beraisa seems to contradict itself, since it begins by saying that an 'Isar' is a Shevu'ah, and then it casts doubt on whether or not it is a Shevu'ah.
</p><p>
Abaye explains that the Beraisa means that the word 'Isar' represents a Shevu'ah created through 'Hatfasah' (a comparison of one object to another object that was previously prohibited through a Shevu'ah). The concluding words of the Beraisa mean that if making a Shevu'ah through Hatfasah is comparable to making an explicit Shevu'ah, then one is Chayav for his Isar, and if not, the Isar does not obligate the person and he is exempt if he transgresses it.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> explains that when the Gemara says that 'Isar' represents a Shevu'ah made through Hatfasah, it means that when a person declares, 'This object is an 'Isar' upon me,' he is considered as though he prohibited one object through a Shevu'ah and then pointed to a second object and said, 'This object is like the first.' The doubt of the Beraisa is whether or not Hatfasah creates a Shevu'ah like an explicitly-stated Shevu'ah or not.
</p><p>
The Rishonim point out a number of difficulties with the explanation of Rashi.
</p><p>
(a) How can the Beraisa first assert that the word 'Isar' refers to making Hatfasah to an object already prohibited through a Shevu'ah, and then doubt whether Hatfasah creates a prohibition altogether? The verse which Abaye quotes (Bamidbar 30:3) clearly states that an Isar creates a prohibition just as a Shevu'ah does.
</p><p>
(b) How can the Beraisa leave this Halachah in doubt? The normal manner of a Beraisa is to quote the opinions of Tana'im, not to mention a Halachah merely in order to teach that the Halachah is subject to doubt and the ruling in practice is not known. (<b>TOSFOS</b> DH Isar)
</p><p>
(c) Why does Rashi explain that the word 'Isar' refers to a person who says, 'This object is an 'Isar' upon me'? Such an expression does not seem to be related to Hatfasah at all, since the person does not refer to any previous Shevu'ah. Moreover, such an expression should constitute not a Shevu'ah but a <i>Neder</i>, since the person uses an expression of Neder ('This object is 'Isar' <i>upon me</i>') and not an expression of Shevu'ah ('I shall not eat the object'). (<b>RAMBAN</b>, <b>RASHBA</b>)
</p><p>
Rashi should explain the meaning of 'Isar' the way the Beraisa describes it (later on this Daf): 'What is the 'Isar' to which the Torah refers? When a person says 'I shall not eat meat... like the day on which his father died' (and on the day that his father died he had vowed not to eat meat).' (<b>TOSFOS</b>)
</p><p>
(d) The Gemara continues and says that Abaye is consistent with his interpretation of the Beraisa when he rules that when a person makes a Hatfasah from a Shevu'ah, he is considered as though he has expressed a Shevu'ah explicitly. Why is this consistent with his interpretation of the Beraisa? The Beraisa remains in doubt about whether or not Hatfasah is like an explicit Shevu'ah. Why is Abaye certain that it <i>is</i> like a Shevu'ah? (<b>TOSFOS</b>)
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) As the <b>RAMBAN</b> and others point out, the answer to the first question is evident from the words of Rashi. When the Beraisa expresses doubt about whether or not Hatfasah is like an explicit Shevu'ah, it is not questioning whether or not Hatfasah creates an Isur. Rather, Hatfasah certainly creates an Isur of Shevu'ah. This is what the Beraisa means when it states that 'Isar is a Shevu'ah.' The question is whether Isar is similar to a Shevu'ah with regard to all of the aspects of Shevu'ah. For example, can it obligate a person to receive Malkus or to bring a Korban if he transgresses it? (This view is also evident from the ruling of the <b>RAMBAM</b> in Hilchos Shevu'os 2:8.)
</p><p>
(b) The doubt in the Beraisa may indicate that there was another part to this Beraisa which preceded these words (but which is not quoted by the Gemara). In that first part of the Beraisa, Tana'im argue about whether or not Hatfasah is like an explicit Shevu'ah. The Tana'im in that part of the Beraisa might have been discussing a situation in which a person actually specified a Shevu'ah about one item and then pointed to a second item and said, 'This is like the first.' The next part of the Beraisa (which the Gemara quotes) then says that since saying 'Isar' is equivalent to performing such a procedure, when a person says, 'This object is an 'Isar' upon me,' the Halachah depends on the Machlokes Tana'im (expressed in the first part of the Beraisa) regarding Hatfasah of a Shevu'ah. The Tana who considers Hatfasah an explicit Shevu'ah will also considered an Isar an explicit Shevu'ah, while the Tana who does not consider Hatfasah an explicit Shevu'ah will rule the same way with regard to Isar. (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>
(c) The answer to the second question also answers Tosfos' question. According to Rashi, the case of an Isar cannot refer to a person who prohibits an item with a Shevu'ah and then prohibits a second item 'like the first,' because that <i>is</i> the normal case of Hatfasah, and from the Beraisa it is clear that the concept of Isar is an <i>extension</i> of the law of Hatfasah and it is not the actual case of Hatfasah (about which the Tana'im argue).
</p><p>
How does the word 'Isar' imply that the person wants this object to be as though it is connected to another object that previously was made prohibited through a Shevu'ah? How does it imply that there is a second object involved?
</p><p>
The <b>RAMBAN</b> explains that 'Isar' literally means 'bound' or 'tied together,' as in the verse, 'Osri la'Gefen Iro' -- 'He will tie his donkey to the vine' (Bereishis 49:11), and in other verses. The usage of this word implies that this object is bound to another object that previously was prohibited (through a Shevu'ah).
</p><p>
Why, though, does Rashi explain that the case of Isar is when a person says, 'This is an 'Isar' upon me'? Why does he not explain that the case of Isar is when one says, ''Isar' that I will not do this'?
</p><p>
To understand this, it is necessary to analyze the difference between Hatfasah and an explicit Shevu'ah. Why should the Isur of Hatfasah be any less binding than that of an explicit Shevu'ah? Rashi (beginning of 20b, DH Taritz) implies that the difference is that when one expresses Hatfasah, he does not mention the word 'prohibited.' He says merely, 'This [object] is like this [other object].' That is, in a case of Hatfasah, the person never states that he will not eat the object. He simply says that the second object is like the first. He becomes prohibited from eating the second object because his second statement implies that he will not eat it, and he is obligated by the Mitzvas Aseh of keeping one's word ('k'Chol ha'Yotzei mi'Piv Ya'aseh,' Bamidbar 30:3). However, not all Tana'im agree that he will be obligated because of the prohibition of Shevu'as Sheker since, by definition, a Shevu'ah might mean specifying explicitly that the object is prohibited.
</p><p>
This is why Rashi explains that the case of Isar is <i>not</i> when a person says, ''Isar' that I will not do this,' but rather he simply says, 'This object is an 'Isar' upon me.'
</p><p>
If this is true, however, then why does the Beraisa say that 'Mivta' is like an explicit Shevu'ah, while 'Isar' is only Hatfasah? If a person says 'this item is a 'Mivta' upon me,' it should not be like a Shevu'ah since he did not mention the word 'prohibited.' Also, why is 'Isar' the only term that may be used to express Hatfasah? The same Halachah of Hatfasah should apply when a person says, 'This object is a 'Shevu'ah' upon me.'
</p><p>
The answer is that 'Isar' is the only term that implies 'binding' two objects together (as mentioned above). Therefore, when a person says 'Isar,' his words (comparing one object to another one) may be interpreted as the creation of a prohibition without the need for an explicit mention of prohibiting the object. In contrast, the words 'Shevu'ah' and 'Mivta' have no implication of binding one object to another. Hence, if a person uses such terms, the only possible interpretation is that he really wants to prohibit the object with a Shevu'ah. Consequently, he is considered as though he said explicitly, 'I want this object to be prohibited to me with a Shevu'ah.'
</p><p>
(Rashi maintains that a Shevu'ah may be uttered using the terminology of a Neder, in contrast to the view of other Rishonim. See Rashba to Nedarim 2b.)
</p><p>
(d) How does Abaye know that the Halachah is that Hatfasah <i>is</i> like a Shevu'ah with regard to Malkus and Korban? Perhaps he learns from the wording of the Beraisa -- which places the opinion that Hatfasah <i>is</i> like a Shevu'ah before the possibility that Hatfasah is not like a Shevu'ah -- that the first part of the Beraisa (which lists the opinions regarding Hatfasah) attributes the majority opinion to those who maintain that Hatfasah <i>is</i> like a Shevu'ah, and thus Abaye rules accordingly.
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) HATFASAH IN A SHEVU'AH</font></b>
<b><font color='darkgreen'>    </font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Gemara</font></b>
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa):</font></b> 'Isar' is a Shevu'ah. If you will say
              that Isar is a Shevu'ah, he is liable for it. If
              not, he is exempt.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Objection:</font></b> The Tana just said that Isar is a
              Shevu'ah!
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Answer #1 (Abaye):</font></b> The Beraisa means that Isar is
              Hatfasah in a Shevu'ah (forbidding something like
              something else forbidden by a Shevu'ah);
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   The prohibition of Isar:</font></b> if you will say that
                   Hatfasah in a Shevu'ah is like saying a
                   Shevu'ah, he is liable (if he transgresses it).
                   If not, he is exempt.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Answer #2 (Rava):</font></b> Really, Hatfasah in a Shevu'ah is
              not like saying a Shevu'ah. The Beraisa means that
              'Isar' is a Shevu'ah, but not always. The Torah
              wrote it between Neder and Shevu'ah to teach that it
              can be a Shevu'ah (If it was said in the text of a
              Shevu'ah, forbidding an action), or a Neder, if it
              was said in the text of a Neder (Alai, forbidding an
              object to himself).
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>    (b)  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Rif and Rosh (3:1):</font></b> Abaye explains the Beraisa to
              say that Isar is Hatfasah in a Shevu'ah. He is
              liable for it only if Hatfasah in a Shevu'ah is like
              saying a Shevu'ah. Rava explains that 'Isar' is a
              Shevu'ah if it was said in the text of a Shevu'ah.
              If it was said in the text of a Neder, it is a
              Neder. There is no Hatfasah in a Shevu'ah. Abaye and
              Rava explain according to what they taught
              elsewhere. Abaye taught that Hatfasah in a Shevu'ah
              is like saying a Shevu'ah, and Rava said that it is
              not. The Halachah follows Rava.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Ran (8a, second column):</font></b> Rava holds that
                   Hatfasah in a Neder works, for it forbids the
                   item. A Shevu'ah forbids the person, not the
                   item, so Hatfasah in the item does not work.
                   However, if Reuven swore not to eat meat and
                   Shimon said 'also I am like him', Hatfasah in a
                   person could work. The Rif says that even this
                   does not work.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Question (Ran):</font></b> Why don't we learn from
                   Nedarim, just like we learn Yados (partial
                   statements; one who says a Yad is like one who
                   said the entire vow) from Nedarim to Shevuos?
                   Even though we cannot learn regarding Hatfasah
                   in an object, we can learn regarding Hatfasah
                   in a person!
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. Answer (Ran):</font></b> Rather, initially we thought that
                   the Beraisa teaches that Isar is Hatfasah. Rava
                   answered that really, it discusses the primary
                   Neder of the Torah, which is Hatfasah in Davar
                   ha'Nadur (something forbidden through a vow).
                   Ultimately, the source of Hatfasah is Hekdesh,
                   which can transfer its Kedushah. A Neder can
                   work without Hatfasah, but only due to Yados.
                   If one said 'this is forbidden to me', we
                   complete his words 'like a Korban.' Since all
                   Nedarim are based on Hatfasah (in Hekdesh), we
                   cannot learn to Shevuos. There is no source
                   about which we could say that all Shevuos are
                   Matfis in that source. It says 'Oh Hishava
                   Shevu'ah' for parallel structure with 'Ki Yidor
                   Neder.' Perhaps Hatfasah in a person who swore
                   is not applicable, because this does not give
                   to him a new status, the way that a Neder makes
                   something Kodesh.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv.  Question:</font></b> Why doesn't it forbid like a Yad for
                   Shevu'ah?
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.   Answer (Ran):</font></b> It is not a Yad because he said
                   all that he wanted to say. Nevertheless, I am
                   stringent about Hatfasah in a person who swore.
                   Abaye and Rava argue in a case in which one
                   swore not to eat meat, and then said 'this
                   bread is to me like this meat.'
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Rosh:</font></b> Abaye brought the Beraisa to prove that just
              like Hatfasah in a Neder is a Neder, Hatfasah in a
              Shevu'ah is a Shevu'ah. Rava answered that the
              Beraisa discusses the Isar Neder; it does not
              discuss Hatfasah. We learn from 'Ki Yidor Neder'
              that Hatfasah in Davar ha'Nadur works, but not in
              Davar ha'Asur (something forbidden not due to a
              vow), and not Hatfasah in a Shevu'ah.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Pilpulei Charifta (6):</font></b> This is from the fact
                   that the Torah taught this only regarding
                   Neder.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Rosh:</font></b> R. Yosef ha'Levi says that Hatfasah in a
              Shevu'ah is not like a Shevu'ah regarding Korban,
              but it forbids. Also the Ra'avad says that 'Oh
              Hishava Shevu'ah' includes Hatfasah in a Shevu'ah
              regarding 'Lo Yachel Devaro', but not regarding
              Korban.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Ramban (Nedarim 4a):</font></b> If Rava agreed that
                   Hatfasah in a Shevu'ah forbids, he and Abaye
                   would have argued about whether or not one is
                   liable for it. 'It is not like saying a
                   Shevu'ah' connotes that it is not a Shevu'ah at
                   all. (Even if it would connote otherwise,)
                   perhaps Rava said this to parallel Abaye's
                   words.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Ran (Sof 7b and Reish 8b):</font></b> It seems that the
                   Rif holds like the Ramban. I say that the
                   Gemara did not say 'it is not a Shevu'ah at
                   all' because sometimes it takes effect, i.e.
                   Hatfasah in a person, which works due to
                   Hatfasah or Yados. Hatfasah in an object does
                   not work at all. Perhaps we forbid Hatfasah in
                   an object mid'Rabanan, due to Hatfasah in a
                   person, which is mid'Oraisa.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Rosh (10 and Nedarim 2:1):</font></b> Abaye holds that Hatfasah
              in a Shevu'ah is like swearing, but Rava disagrees.
              It does not help, because a Shevu'ah forbids the
              person to an item, and not the item. A Neder forbids
              an item to himself. Hfh in a Neder is a Neder, for
              he forbade a loaf to himself, and makes another loaf
              like the first. Hfh in a Shevu'ah is not a Shevu'ah,
              for if he swore not to eat a loaf, and makes another
              loaf like it, there is no Isur in the first loaf. If
              he said 'I swear about this loaf just like I swore
              about that one', that is a new Shevu'ah. It is not
              hfh. The first oath merely spares him from
              explicitly saying that the oath is not to eat it. If
              one swore to fast one day, and later said 'today is
              like that day', it has no effect, for the day has no
              Kedushah.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Rambam (Hilchos Shevuos 2:8):</font></b> If Levi heard David
              swear, and said 'I am like you', since he did not
              say 'Shevu'ah', and David did not impose an oath on
              him, he is exempt (if he transgresses). This is
              Hatfasah in a Shevu'ah, which is exempt.
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.   Rambam (9):</font></b> Similarly, if swore not to eat this
              meat, then said 'this loaf is like this meat', he is
              exempt (if he eats the loaf), for he did not say a
              Shevu'ah. He was only Matfis. Even though he is
              exempt from lashes and Korban, it is forbidden to
              eat the loaf that he was Matfis in a Shevu'ah.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Hagahos Ba'al ha'Hashlamah:</font></b> Some say that Rava
                   exempts only from a Korban, but there are
                   lashes for 'Lo Yachel Devaro.'
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'>    (c)  Poskim</font></b>
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Shulchan Aruch (YD 239:9):</font></b> One who is Matfis in a
              Shevu'ah is exempt. E.g., if he swore not to eat a
              loaf, and said about another 'this is like the
              forbidden loaf', he is exempt from lashes and
              Korban.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Gra (YD 239:23):</font></b> If 'Isar' of the Torah were
                   Hatfasah, we would be forced to say that
                   Hatfasah in a Shevu'ah takes effect. Isar was
                   written primarily regarding Shevu'ah - 'Oh
                   Osrah Isar Al Nafshah bi'Shevu'ah.' From there,
                   we learn to Nedarim. We conclude that Hatfasah
                   is not learned from Isar, rather, from 'Ki
                   Yidor Neder.'
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Shulchan Aruch (ibid.):</font></b> Nevertheless, there is an
              Isur on the latter loaf.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Gra (10):</font></b> The Gemara said 'it is not like
                   saying a Shevu'ah.' It did not say 'it is
                   nothing.'
<br>         <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Shulchan Aruch (10):</font></b> If Levi heard David swear, and
              said 'I am like you', he is forbidden.
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Question (Simlas Binyamin):</font></b> Why did the
                   Shulchan Aruch teach this? Even Hatfasah in an
                   object forbids. Nowadays, in any case there are
                   no lashes!
<br>              <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  Answer (Etzei Levonah):</font></b> This is a proper
                   Shevu'ah, with lashes. One who transgresses a
                   Lav with lashes is disqualified from testimony
                   (CM 34:12).
<br>
<font color='blue'><i>See also:</i>
<br><b>CONDITIONS OF HATFASAH IN NEDARIM </b>(</font><font color='blue'>


lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b> This refutes Rava (who says that Isar is not through
               Hatfasah)!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)  Answer:</font></b> The Beraisa means that the <i>Neder</i> that the Torah
          discusses is 'eating meat and drinking wine are forbidden
          to me like the day that my father died... ' He is
          forbidden.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Shmuel):</font></b> The case is, he had already taken a Neder
               never to eat meat... on that day.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Question:</font></b> Why must that be the case?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Answer:</font></b> 'Ish Ki Yidor Neder la'Shem' - Hatfasah must
               be in Davar ha'Nadur (something forbidden by a vow).
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Question:</font></b> If so, what is special about the day that
               his father died?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Answer:</font></b> Indeed, there is nothing special about it.
               The Chidush is the day that Gedalyah died;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  One might have thought that since he is
                    forbidden to eat that day (Tzom Gedalyah) even
                    without his Neder, it is like Hatfasah in a
                    forbidden matter, and not in Davar ha'Nadur.
                    The Beraisa teaches that this is not so.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b>  Also R. Yochanan holds like Rava.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Ravin citing R. Yochanan):</font></b> 'Mivta I will not eat
               your food' is a Shevu'ah. 'Isar I will not eat your
               food' is a Shevu'ah.
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>3) FALSE AND VAIN OATHS</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Rav Dimi citing R. Yochanan):</font></b> If one swore 'I will eat'
          or 'I will not eat' (and transgressed), this is Shevu'as
          Sheker (a false oath). 'V'Lo Sishav'u bi'Shmi la'Shaker'
          forbids it.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> If one falsely swore 'I ate' or 'I did not eat',
               this is Shevu'as Shav (a vain oath). 'Lo Sisa...
               la'Shav' forbids it.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> If one transgresses Konamos (Nedarim), he
               transgresses 'Lo Yachel Devaro.'
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question (Beraisa):</font></b> Shav and Sheker are the same.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Suggestion:</font></b> This means that just like Shav is in the
               past (i.e. it is false the moment he says it), also
               Sheker;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> This says that 'I ate' is Sheker! (People might
               believe it. Shav is something obviously false.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer:</font></b> No, they are different (Shav is in the past, and
          Sheker depends on the future).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Question:</font></b> The Beraisa says that they are the same!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Answer:</font></b> It means that they were both taught in one (of
          the Ten) Utterances.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa):</font></b> 'Zachor (mention Shabbos, i.e. in
               Kidush)' and 'Shamor (guard Shabbos, i.e. don't do
               Melachah)' were said simultaneously, something that
               only Hash-m could do.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Question:</font></b> There, we learn from the fact that they were
          said together;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Rav Ada bar Ahavah):</font></b> Mid'Oraisa, women are
               commanded in Kidush of Shabbos (even though they are
               usually exempt from positive Mitzvos that apply only
               at particular times);
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  We are commanded 'Zachor' and 'Shamor' -
                    whoever is commanded to guard, must also
                    mention;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b> Since women are commanded Lishmor (a Lav), they
                    are commanded Lizkor.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Summation of question:</font></b> Here, what do we learn from
               the fact that they were taught in the same
               Utterance?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Answer #1:</font></b> Just like one is lashed for Shav, also for
          Sheker.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Objection:</font></b> Just the contrary (it is more obvious that one
          is lashed for (some oaths of) Sheker, which one
          transgresses through an action)!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Answer #2:</font></b> Rather, just like one is lashed for Sheker,
          also for Shav.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  Question:</font></b> This is obvious. Both are Lavim!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)  Answer #1:</font></b> One might have thought (like Rav Papa) that
          one is not lashed for Shav.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Rav Papa):</font></b> 'Lo Yenakeh' teaches that this sin will
               not be cleansed (by lashes or other punishments)!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> The Beraisa teaches that this is not so (like Abaye
               answered Rav Papa. Hash-m does not cleanse, but Beis
<br><br>               Din lashes to cleanse it.) <p>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) ONE WHO PROHIBITS HIMSELF FROM EATING LIKE HE WAS PROHIBITED FROM EATING ON 'TZOM GEDALYAH'</b></font>
<br>QUESTIONS: The Beraisa says that a person can create a Neder by saying, 'I will be prohibited from eating today just as I was prohibited from eating on the day that Gedalyah ben Achikam was killed.' Shmuel adds that the Neder takes effect only if the person previously prohibited himself from eating on Tzom Gedalyah <i>with a Neder</i>. The Gemara says that the Beraisa means to teach that even though a person is prohibited from eating on that day even without the Neder, his present Neder nevertheless takes effect. One might have thought that when a person prohibits himself from eating by saying, 'just as I was prohibited to eat on the day that Gedalyah ben Achikam was killed,' he intends to prohibit himself with an Isur similar to the Isur d'Rabanan of eating on that day, and not with a Neder. The Beraisa therefore teaches that his Neder takes effect and is considered Hatfasah, because he intends to prohibit himself in a way similar to the Isur Neder of that day.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> writes that there was another Girsa in the Gemara, according to which the Gemara says that the only reason why the Hatfasah creates an Isur is that Tzom Gedalyah is an Isur d'Rabanan, and therefore his Neder not to eat on Tzom Gedalyah takes effect. According to that Girsa, if Tzom Gedalyah would have been an Isur d'Oraisa, then his Neder would not have been able to take effect, because a Neder cannot prohibit what the Torah already prohibits.
</p><p>
Rashi rejects this Girsa, pointing out that the Gemara earlier (25a) says that a Neder can take effect even to override a Mitzvah d'Oraisa, and, therefore, a Neder to fulfill a Mitzvah (such as not to eat on Yom Kippur) will take effect as well.
</p><p>
There are a number of difficulties with Rashi's explanation.
</p><p>
(a) If the Neder would have taken effect to prohibit him from eating even on a day on which the Torah prohibits him from eating, then why does the Beraisa give the example of a person who makes a Neder to prohibit himself from eating just as he is prohibited on Tzom Gedalyah? The example of such a Neder should have been one who prohibits himself from eating just as he prohibited himself with a Neder from eating on Yom Kippur! (<b>RAMBAN</b>, <b>RASHBA</b>)
</p><p>
(b) There is a principle that 'Ein Isur Chal Al Isur' -- once an object is prohibited with an Isur Torah, it cannot become prohibited again with another Isur Torah. Therefore, even if the Mishnah says that a Neder can override a Mitzvah and obligate a person to transgress a Mitzvah of the Torah, nevertheless a Neder should not take effect to prohibit a person in what the Torah already prohibits him, because 'Ein Isur Chal Al Isur.' Why should a Neder be different from any other Isur in the Torah? (<b>TOSFOS</b>)
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) Perhaps the Beraisa gives the example of a person who prohibited himself with a Neder from eating on Tzom Gedalyah and did not prohibit himself with a Neder from eating on Yom Kippur, because it is uncommon for a person to prohibit himself with a Neder from eating on Yom Kippur since he is already prohibited to eat on that day by the Torah. The Beraisa mentions the more common example.
</p><p>
(b) With regard to the question from the rule of 'Ein Isur Chal Al Isur,' the simple answer is that Rashi understands the Gezeiras ha'Kasuv of 'Neder la'Hashem' (Bamidbar 30:3) -- which teaches that a personal Neder can override a Mitzvah (Nedarim 16b) -- to be a blanket, general Gezeiras ha'Kasuv that states that a Neder can take effect regardless of what the Torah says. This Gezeiras ha'Kasuv removes Nedarim from the normal rule of 'Ein Isur Chal Al Isur.'
</p><p>
However, the <b>RAN</b> in Nedarim (18a) offers a logical distinction, in addition to the Gezeiras ha'Kasuv, between Nedarim and other Isurim of the Torah. The Ran cites the Gemara in Nedarim (2b) which teaches that a Neder creates an Isur Cheftza (the <i>object</i> becomes prohibited), while a Shevu'ah creates an Isur Gavra (the <i>person</i> becomes prohibited from performing a specific action). The Ran explains that most Isurim of the Torah are Isurei Gavra; they prohibit the person from performing a specific act, or they obligate him to perform a specific act. A Neder, aside from being an Isur Gavra like every other Isur in the Torah, also creates an Isur Cheftza, making the object of the Neder into a prohibited object (like a Korban, which has the distinction of being Kadosh). Normally, an Isur cannot take effect when a previous Isur exists, because the Isurim of the Torah were not given to reinforce what was previously prohibited. A Neder, however, does not merely reinforce what was prohibited previously; it also creates something that did not exist previously -- an Isur Cheftza, a prohibition on the object. Since the Isur of Neder adds something that did not exist previously, it can take effect to prohibit a person from something that the Torah already prohibits.
</p><p>
The <b>BA'AL HA'ME'OR</b> (27a) asks a strong question on Rashi's opinion that a Neder can prohibit an action that was already prohibited. The Mishnah in Makos (21b) lists eight Isurim that a person can transgress with a single act of plowing. Rebbi Ze'ira (Makos 22a) asks why the Mishnah does not list an additional prohibition that can be transgressed in the same act: the prohibition of Shevu'ah, such as when the person prohibited himself with a Shevu'ah from plowing. The Gemara answers that the Mishnah includes, among the eight transgressions, the act of plowing on Yom Tov, a day on which the Torah prohibits plowing. Since it was Yom Tov, the Gemara asserts, the Shevu'ah cannot take effect, because a Shevu'ah cannot take effect to prohibit a person in what the Torah already prohibits him. Rebbi Ze'ira asks that the Mishnah still should have added the prohibition of Shevu'ah by mentioning a case in which a person prohibited upon himself plowing both on Yom Tov and during the week, making it an Isur Kollel. When there is an Isur Kollel, the Shevu'ah <i>does</i> take effect to prohibit something that was already prohibited! The Gemara concludes that the Mishnah must be following the opinion that does not allow a second prohibition to take effect, even if the second prohibition is an Isur Kollel.
</p><p>
The Ba'al ha'Me'or asks that according to Rashi, Rebbi Ze'ira should have asked another question: the Mishnah should include a case in which the person prohibited himself with a Neder from using the plow, since, according to Rashi, a Neder <i>does</i> take effect to reinforce a previously-existing prohibition, even when the Neder is <i>not</i> an Isur Kollel! This seems to be a very strong refutation on Rashi's assertion.
</p><p>
The <b>RAMBAN</b> (in Milchamos) suggests a forced answer, that the Gemara indeed could have given this example of a ninth prohibition that a person could transgress while plowing, but since it already produced a long list of other possible transgressions (see Makos there), the Gemara did not bother to add this possible transgression.
</p><p>
However, according to the logic cited above in the name of the Ran in Nedarim, a more basic answer may be suggested. The reason why a Neder takes effect when a prohibition already exists is that the Neder is adding a new dimension to the prohibition -- an Isur Cheftza. In this sense, it is similar to an Isur Kollel (or Isur Mosif). Once the Gemara establishes that the Mishnah in Makos follows an opinion that does not accept the rule that an Isur Kollel (or Mosif) can take effect on a previous prohibition, it follows that an Isur Neder also will not take effect on a previous prohibition.
</p><p>


<font><b>3) THE PROHIBITION OF VIOLATING ONE'S OATH</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: Rav Dimi says in the name of Rebbi Yochanan that a person who swears that he will eat (or not eat) and then violates his Shevu'ah is guilty of transgressing the prohibition of 'v'Lo Sishav'u vi'Shemi la'Shaker' (Vayikra 19:12), while a person who transgresses a Konam (Neder) violates the prohibition of 'Lo Yachel Devaro' (Bamidbar 30:3). The words of Rav Dimi imply that the prohibition of 'Lo Yachel Devaro' does not apply to a Shevu'ah but only to a Neder. How can he make such an assertion? The verse of 'Lo Yachel Devaro' explicitly states, 'If a man makes a Neder to Hash-m, or swears a Shevu'ah to create a prohibition upon himself, he may not violate his word (Lo Yachel Devaro)'! It is clear from the verse that the prohibition applies equally to a Neder and to a Shevu'ah. (<b>TOSFOS</b> DH Konamos)
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> explains that Rav Dimi's intention is not to limit 'Lo Yachel Devaro' to a Neder, because the verse clearly prohibits violating a Shevu'ah. Rather, he means that the only new prohibition learned from 'Lo Yachel' is the prohibition of Neder, since the prohibition of a Shevu'ah is known already from 'v'Lo Sishav'u vi'Shemi la'Shaker.'
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> (DH Konamos), however, writes that 'Lo Yachel' does not refer to the prohibition of violating one's Shevu'ah l'Haba (an oath to do, or not to do, something in the future).
</p><p>
However, the <b>RITVA</b> explains that Rashi, too, intends to make the same point as Tosfos -- that 'Lo Yachel' is not needed to teach the prohibition of Shevu'ah, since the prohibition is learned from 'v'Lo Sishav'u vi'Shemi la'Shaker.' However, one who violates his Shevu'ah certainly is also guilty of transgressing the prohibition of 'Lo Yachel Devaro.'
</p><p>
Nevertheless, this view does not seem to be accepted by all. The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Lo Sa'aseh #157) and the <b>CHINUCH</b> (Mitzvah #407) write clearly that 'Lo Yachel' prohibits a person from violating a <i>Neder</i> and <i>not</i> a Shevu'ah. They seem to understand the words of Rav Dimi literally. (See also the Rambam's abridged listing of Mitzvos at the beginning of Yad ha'Chazakah.) In fact, the Rambam elsewhere (Hilchos Shevu'os 1:3) writes that one who violates his Shevu'ah receives Malkus only for transgressing 'v'Lo Sishav'u vi'Shemi la'Shaker.' The <b>KESEF MISHNEH</b> there asserts that one who violates a Shevu'ah also transgresses 'Lo Yachel Devaro' according to the Rambam. However, the Rambam in Sefer ha'Mitzvos (Shoresh Teshi'i) maintains that a person does not receive an extra set of Malkus when the Torah prohibits a single act with two Lavim (unless there is an explicit Kabalah otherwise).
</p><p>
However, the <b>MINCHAS CHINUCH</b> (227:1) points out that this interpretation is inconsistent with the words of the Rambam in Hilchos Nezirus (1:2), who writes that a Nazir who drinks wine is punished with two sets of Malkus, one set for 'Lo Yachel Devaro' and one set for the Lav of Nazir. It is clear that 'Lo Yachel Devaro' is not treated as a second, reinforcing Lav, but rather as an entirely new Mitzvah. This indeed is logical, because 'Lo Yachel Devaro' is not simply a repetition of the prohibition of Shevu'ah, as it includes many more laws, such as Neder and Nezirus. Conversely, the prohibition of Shevu'ah includes acts that are not included in the prohibition of 'Lo Yachel Devaro,' such as Shevu'as Sheker l'she'Avar (swearing falsely about a past action). Accordingly, if the Rambam indeed maintains that 'Lo Yachel Devaro' applies to Shevu'ah, then he should write in Hilchos Shevu'os as well that a person receives two sets of Malkus for violating a Shevu'ah.
</p><p>
Therefore, it seems clear that according to the Rambam, 'Lo Yachel' applies only to Nedarim, as the straightforward reading of the Gemara implies. How, though, does he understand the fact that the verse of 'Lo Yachel Devaro' mentions Shevu'ah? The Rambam himself seems to address this in Sefer ha'Mitzvos. From the Rambam's wording there, it appears that he maintains that when the verse says 'O Hishava Shevu'ah,' it does not refer to a person who prohibited something upon himself with a Shevu'ah. Rather, it refers to a person who obligated himself to do or not to do a particular action by saying, 'This object will be prohibited upon me if I do or fail to do such-and-such an action.' The verse uses the word 'Shevu'ah' to describe this prohibition since the person has created a Isur Gavra through his Neder, similar to the Isur of Shevu'ah.
</p><p>
This interpretation sheds new light on the Gemara in Nedarim (3b) which states that a person transgresses 'Lo Yachel Devaro' when he makes a Neder that he will eat a loaf of bread and then fails to eat it. <b>REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b> (in Gilyon ha'Shas there) points out that this is not consistent with the rules of Neder, which limit a Neder to a prohibitory statement. According to the Rambam, such a Neder indeed is written explicitly in the verse of 'Lo Yachel Devaro.' (M. Kornfeld) </p><p>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) FALSE AND VAIN OATHS (cont.)</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b></p><b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  Answer #2:</font></b> Just like one brings a Korban for Sheker, also
          for Shav;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The Beraisa is R. Akiva, who obligates a Korban for
               oaths of the past like for the future.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question (Beraisa):</font></b> A Shav oath is one that everyone
          knows to be false. Sheker is swearing to change (from the
          truth, i.e. something of the past).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer:</font></b> The Beraisa means, Sheker is swearing <i>and
          changing</i> (from what he swore to do, i.e. in the future).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  (Ravin citing R. Avahu citing R. Yochanan):</font></b> If one
          falsely swore 'I ate' or 'I did not eat', this is Sheker.
          V'Lo Sishav'u bi'Shmi la'Shaker' forbids it;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> If he swore 'I will eat' or 'I will not eat', he is
               commanded 'Lo Yachel Devaro.'
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> A Shav oath is one that everyone knows to be false.
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>2) FOR WHICH OATHS IS ONE GIVEN MALKUS?</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Rav Papa):</font></b> R. Yochanan did not explicitly say the above
          teaching. Rather, R. Avahu inferred it from the
          following.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Rav Idi bar Avin citing R. Yochanan):</font></b> One is lashed
               for a Lav that is done through an action;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> The only Lavim without an action for which one is
               lashed are swearing (falsely), Temurah and cursing a
               Yisrael with Hashem's name.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question:</font></b> What is the source of lashes for swearing?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer (R. Yochanan):</font></b> 'Lo Sisa... la'Shav Ki Lo Yenakeh'
          - the Heavenly court does not cleanse, but Beis Din
          lashes and cleanses.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Question (Rav Papa):</font></b> Perhaps it is not cleansed at all!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Answer (Abaye):</font></b> Had it said only 'Lo Yenakeh', that would
          be correct;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Rather, it says 'Lo Yenakeh Hash-m', but Beis Din
               cleanses.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Question:</font></b> This teaches about lashes only for a Shav oath.
          What is the source for Sheker?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Answer (R. Yochanan):</font></b> It says twice 'la'Shav';
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> We use the extra one to teach about Sheker.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Question (R. Avahu):</font></b> What kind of Sheker do we learn to?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Suggestion:</font></b> If he swore 'I will not eat' and he ate,
               he transgressed through an action! (We already know
               that he is lashed.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Answer #1:</font></b> Rather, he swore 'I will eat', and he did not
          eat.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  Objection:</font></b> He is not lashed for this!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (R. Yochanan and Reish Lakish):</font></b> If one swore 'I will
               eat this loaf today' and he did not, he is not
               lashed.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (R. Yochanan):</font></b> He is not lashed because he
                    transgressed without an action. One is not
                    lashed for such a Lav;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii.  (Reish Lakish):</font></b> He is not lashed because he did
                    not receive definite warning (right before
                    transgressing, at the end of the day. No one
                    knows precisely when the day ends.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)  Answer #2 (R. Avahu):</font></b> Rather, he swore 'I ate' or 'I did
          not eat.'
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)  Question:</font></b> Here also, he transgressed without an action. 
          Why is he lashed?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)  Answer (Rava):</font></b> The Torah teaches that one is lashed for
          Sheker that resembles Shav, i.e. in the past.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)  Question (against R. Avahu - R. Yirmeyah - Mishnah):</font></b> If
          Reuven said 'I swear that I will not eat this loaf, I
          swear that I will not eat it, I swear that I will not eat
          it' and ate it, he is liable only for one oath;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> <i>This</i> is the Shevu'ah of Bituy for which one is
               lashed if he was Mezid, and brings an Oleh v'Yored
               if he was Shogeg.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Suggestion:</font></b> 'This' excludes 'I ate' or 'I did not
               eat.' He is not lashed for them!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)  Answer #1:</font></b> No, it excludes 'I ate' or 'I did not eat', to
          teach that he does not bring a Korban for them;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The Mishnah is R. Yishmael, who says that a Korban
               is brought only for oaths about the future;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> He is lashed for 'I ate' or 'I did not eat.'
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) LEARNED FROM AN INFERENCE</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: Rav Dimi (20b) says in the name of Rebbi Yochanan that a person who swears that he will eat (or not eat) and then violates his Shevu'ah is guilty of transgressing the prohibition of 'v'Lo Sishav'u vi'Shemi la'Shaker' (Vayikra 19:12), while a person who transgresses a Konam (Neder) violates the prohibition of 'Lo Yachel Devaro' (Bamidbar 30:3). (See previous Insight.) Ravin disagrees with Rav Dimi. He quotes Rebbi Avahu in the name of Rebbi Yochanan as saying that the verse of 'v'Lo Sishav'u vi'Shemi la'Shaker' (Vayikra 19:12) prohibits a Shevu'as Sheker l'she'Avar (swearing falsely about a past action). On the other hand, the prohibition against making a Shevu'as Sheker leha'Ba (an oath to do, or not to do, something in the future), is derived from 'Lo Yachel Devaro' (Bamidbar 30:3).
</p><p>
Rav Papa asserts that Rebbi Avahu did not say this teaching explicitly, but rather Ravin deduced it from a statement which Rebbi Avahu made in a different context. Rebbi Yochanan taught that a person is punished with Malkus for making a Shevu'as Sheker because the verse of Shevu'as Shav (Shemos 20:7) teaches that the transgression against making a Shevu'as Shav is punishable with Malkus. The verse says 'la'Shav' a second time in order to teach that a second type of Shevu'ah is also punishable with Malkus. Since the second type of Shevu'ah cannot be a Shevu'as Shav (which is already mentioned in the verse), it must be referring to a Shevu'as Sheker. Rebbi Avahu explains that the only Shevu'as Sheker to which Rebbi Yochanan can be referring is a Shevu'as Sheker <i>l'she'Avar</i>, and yet Rebbi Yochanan refers to such a Shevu'ah as a Shevu'as <i>Sheker</i>, implying that it is prohibited by the verse of 'v'Lo Sishav'u vi'Shemi la'Shaker' (Vayikra 19:12) and <i>not</i> by the verse of 'Lo Sisa Es Shem Hash-m... la'Shav' (Shemos 20:7), the verse that prohibits Shevu'as Shav.
</p><p>
Normally, when the Gemara writes that an opinion expressed in the Gemara was deduced from a different statement ('Michlala Itmar'), it is understood to be an unreliable teaching. The Gemara always asks what difference it makes that it was deduced from another statement, and the Gemara goes on to explain how the inference may have been incorrect (see, for example, Berachos 12a, Shabbos 40a, Yevamos 60b). In what way is the deduction from Rebbi Avahu's words here incorrect?
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>RITVA</b> writes that the term 'Michlala Itmar' here is used in a unique way. It does not mean that the deduction was incorrect, but rather that Rebbi Avahu's statement was not explicit. This is why the Gemara does not conclude by explaining what was incorrect about the inference from Rebbi Avahu's words.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>CHASAM SOFER</b> suggests that the term 'Michlala Itmar' here may be interpreted in its normal manner. It is true that according to Rebbi Avahu, Rebbi Yochanan requires the second word 'la'Shav' to teach that a Shevu'as Sheker l'she'Avar is treated the same way as a Shevu'as Shav. However, once we know that the second 'la'Shav' refers to a Shevu'as Sheker l'she'Avar, we know that such a Shevu'ah indeed may be included in the prohibition of 'Lo Sisa...' written in the beginning of the verse. (That is, 'la'Shav' is not merely a Ribuy for Malkus, but rather it places Shevu'as Sheker l'she'Avar into the verse of 'Lo Sisa.') Therefore, Rebbi Avahu might be expressing the same opinion as Rav Dimi, that Shevu'as Sheker l'she'Avar is learned from 'Lo Sisa,' as well as 'Lo Sishav'u.' Shevu'as Sheker leha'Ba is learned from 'Lo Sishav'u,' and 'Lo Yachel Devaro' teaches Konamos (Neder), as Rav Dimi teaches in the name of Rebbi Yochanan. (The Gemara does not ask what is incorrect about making this inference from Rebbi Avahu's words, because the weakness of this inference is so obvious.)
</p><p>
This indeed is consistent with the ruling of the Rambam, who rules that both a Shevu'as Sheker l'she'Avar and a Shevu'as Sheker leha'Ba both included in the prohibition of 'Lo Sishav'u.'
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafbbb'><span class='numt'>1)</span> DO WE SAY A BERACHAH ACHARONAH FOR A SMALL BRIYAH?</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span> Gemara</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> (Mishnah - Chachamim):</span> We never find that someone is liable for eating any amount!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Question:</span> One is liable for eating an ant of any size!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Answer:</span> That is because it is a full creation.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'> Makos 17a (Beraisa - R. Shimon):</span> Also a wheat kernel is a Briyah!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span> R. Shimon addresses Chachamim according to their reasoning. I hold that even for flour, one is liable for any amount. You should admit to me about a wheat kernel, for it is a Briyah!</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span> Chachamim say, an ant has a Neshamah, so it is a significant Briyah. A wheat kernel is not so important.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span><span class='desl2'> Berachos 38b (R. Chiya bar Aba):</span> I saw R. Yochanan eat a salted (i.e. pickled) olive. He blessed before and after eating it.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'> Question (R. Yirmeyah):</span> How could R. Yochanan bless after eating a salted olive? Since the pit was removed, it is less than a k'Zayis!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'> Answer (R. Zeira):</span> One need not eat the volume of a big olive to make a Berachah Acharonah, it suffices to eat the volume of an average olive. R. Yochanan ate a big olive. Without the pit it was the volume of an average olive.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span><span class='desl2'> Chulin 119a:</span> The law of Shomer (something attached to food that protects it, e.g. a lentil pod) applies to a Briyah of any size.</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span> Rishonim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> Rif and Rosh (Berachos 27a and 6:16):</span> We learn from here that a Berachah Acharonah is needed only when there is a k'Zayis.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Rosh:</span> The Yerushalmi brings another episode in which R. Chiya bar Aba was amazed that R. Yochanan blessed after eating an olive, for the pit was removed, and it was less than a k'Zayis. R. Yochanan blessed because it was a Briyah. If so, the same applies to a grape or a pomegranate pip. If this was the same episode that the Bavli brings, the Bavli argues and holds that even a Briyah must be a k'Zayis. The Bavli is primary. However, perhaps it was a different episode. In the case in the Yerushalmi, a full olive with the pit was brought in front of him. Even though he discarded the pit, since a full Briyah was in front of him and he benefitted from a full Briyah and ate all that is normally eaten from it, there is a Shi'ur. The Bavli could discuss when an olive without the pit was brought in front of him. One with Yir'as Shamayim will avoid the Safek and not eat (a Briyah) less than a k'Zayis.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> R. Yonah (27b DH uvi'Gmara):</span> It seems that the Bavli argues with the Yerushalmi. However, we can say that for something that is normally eaten without the pit, it must have a Shi'ur without the pit, for it is not considered a Briyah. If something is normally eaten with the pit, e.g. grape or a pomegranate pip or cherries, if he eats when it is considered a Briyah and he blesses afterwards even if in all there is less than a k'Zayis.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Pnei Yehoshua (Berachos 38b DH Iy):</span> It seems that the Yerushalmi discusses grapes and pomegranate pips, and the episode in the Bavli was with an olive, because the law of Briyah applies only to the seven species. They are more important; a special Berachah was enacted for them. Some say that the Berachah me'Ein Shalosh is mid'Oraisa. Even according to those who say that it is mid'Rabanan, there is an Asmachta from a verse. Since the Torah wrote them in the singular ('Gefen u'Te'enah v'Rimon'), one is considered a Briyah. There is no source to say that a Briyah of other species is important. Normally, a Briyah is only a living animal with a Neshamah, e.g. for Bitul. A Neshamah is a Briyah, but a wheat kernel is not (Makos 17a). One opinion calls a wheat kernel a Briyah, but only for Tevel, for one wheat kernel exempts the entire pile. This explains our Gemara. If cooked foods keep their status, we understand why there is a Berachah Acharonah for a salted olive, even though it is less than a k'Zayis (for it is from the seven species). But if it loses its status, it is like another species. Why is there a Berachah Acharonah? The Gemara answered that one blesses afterwards Borei Nefashos, i.e. and this does not require a Shi'ur, like Tosfos said in the name of the Ri. This was R. Chiya bar Aba's Chidush! In the Yerushalmi, R. Yochanan asked 'don't you hold that the seven species require a Berachah Acharonah?!' R. Chiya was surprised because the pit was removed. R. Yochanan blessed because it was a Briyah, and the same applies to grapes and pomegranate pips. I.e. R. Yochanan initially meant that a Briyah of the seven species requires a Berachah Acharonah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'> Rebuttal (Kaf ha'Chayim 210:17):</span> Chulin 119a connotes that a lentil is a Briyah. The Acharonim say that Briyah applies to all species, including a small fish.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Tosfos (39a DH Batzar):</span> The Bavli argues with the Yerushalmi. The Bavli is primary. R. Yosef says that they do not argue. The Bavli holds that it was a pitted olive. The Yerushalmi holds that it was complete with the pit, so one would bless even for a grape or a pomegranate pip.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'> Rambam (Hilchos Berachos 3:12):</span> One who eats less than a k'Zayis does not say a Berachah Acharonah.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'> Tosfos (Sukah 26b DH v'Lo):</span> We can say that in the case of the Yerushalmi, he ate a small olive with the pit. In all, it was less than a k'Zayis. The Bavli needed to say that it was a big olive, for Stam salted olives are pitted.</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span> Poskim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> Shulchan Aruch (OC 210:1):</span> One who eats less than a k'Zayis of bread or other food does not bless afterwards at all. Some are unsure if we bless after something k'Briyaso, e.g. a grape or a pomegranate pip, even if it is less than a k'Zayis. Therefore, it is proper not to eat a Briyah less than a k'Zayis</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Beis Yosef (DH veha'Rashba):</span> The Rashba derives that the Bavli argues with the Yerushalmi, for it did not say that he blessed afterwards because it was a Briyah, rather, because it was a big olive. However, we can say that the Bavli holds that he did not eat the pit, and the Yerushalmi holds that he ate the pit. After it was cut or dissolved it is not considered a Briyah for any Isur in the Torah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Beis Yosef (DH veha'Rif):</span> The Rif and Rambam say that we bless afterwards for a k'Zayis. They do not mention a Briyah. They hold that the Bavli argues with the Yerushalmi. Even so, since so many Rabanan were unsure about this, one should not eat a Briyah less than a k'Zayis, like the Rosh, Tosfos, Hagahos Maimoniyos and Tur say.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'> Kaf ha'Chayim (20):</span> If one wants to eat a Briyah less than a k'Zayis, he should cut off a small amount.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Rema:</span> It is a Briyah only if he ate it like it is.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Magen Avraham (3):</span> Chulin 119a connotes that one lentil is a Briyah, even though many grow in one pod.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl2'> Magen Avraham (4):</span> If he ate what is inside the pit, this is called a Briyah, for he ate what is proper to eat. It is unreasonable to say that R. Yochanan ate the olive seed with its shell. Rather, he ate the inside and discarded the shell. Even if he ate the pit, we do not call a Briyah something that is not normally eaten, e.g. an olive seed, but it is normal to eat the seed of a grape or pomegranate. However, the Rashba holds that it is always a Briyah, and Tosfos says so even if he did not eat the seed. It seems that R. Yonah holds that R. Yochanan did not eat an olive, rather, another Briyah. The Shulchan Aruch discusses a grape or pomegranate pip, so the Rema's comment is according to all opinions. The Rosh agrees that if one did not eat a seed normally eaten, it is not considered that he ate a Briyah. The Beis Yosef (YD 101:6) bring from Hagahos Sha'arei Dura that if a little fell off in cooking, like normally happens, it is called a Briyah. This is like the Rosh.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'> Sha'ar ha'Tziyon (20):</span> Also a small fish is a Briyah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'> Mishnah Berurah (6):</span> We bless after a Briyah because it is important. If it was diced, it is not a Briyah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'> Mishnah Berurah (7):</span> Even if the seed is not proper to eat, since he ate (all of) it as it is, he ate a Briyah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'> Mishnah Berurah (8):</span> All the more so, if part of the fruit was removed, it is not a Briyah. It seems that the same applies if a little fell off during cooking, like normally happens.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span><span class='desl2'> Rema (ibid):</span> If he removed the seed, it is not called a Briyah.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Mishnah Berurah (9):</span> Even if the seed is not proper to eat, since it was removed, the fruit is not called a Briyah. The Magen Avraham and Eliyahu Rabah hold that if he ate what is proper to eat inside the pit, this is called a Briyah.</p>
<p class='seealso'>See also:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>WHAT IS A BRIYAH? (Nazir 52)</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>IS A BRIYAH BATEL? (Makos 17)</p>
<p class='doublespace'></p>


lvr: 46
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Question (Seifa):</font></b> <i>This</i> is the Shevu'as Shav for
               which there are lashes, but not a Korban;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Suggestion:</font></b> This excludes 'I ate' or 'I did not
                    eat.' He is not lashed for them!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Answer:</font></b> No, it excludes 'I ate' or 'I did not eat',
               to teach that he brings a Korban for them;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  This is like R. Akiva, who obligates a Korban
                    for the past like for the future.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Objection:</font></b> Is the Reisha R. Yishmael, and the Seifa
               is R. Akiva?!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)  Answer #2:</font></b> The entire Mishnah is R. Akiva;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> The Reisha does not exclude 'I ate' or 'I did not
               eat' from a Korban. Rather, it excludes 'I will eat'
               from lashes (if he does not eat, since he
               transgresses through inaction), but he brings a
               Korban (if he was Shogeg).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)  Version #1 (Rashi) Question:</font></b> Why didn't he say that the
          Reisha excludes also 'I ate' and 'I did not eat' from
          lashes?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)  Version #2 (Tosfos) Question:</font></b> Why didn't he answer that
          the entire Mishnah is R. Yishmael? The Reisha excludes 'I
          ate' and 'I did not eat' from lashes, and the Seifa
          excludes them from a Korban. (end of Version #2)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(s)  Answer:</font></b> The Reisha teaches about an oath of the future.
          Presumably, it excludes an oath of the future.
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>3) LIABILITY FOR EATING A SMALL AMOUNT</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah - R. Akiva):</font></b> If one swore 'I will not eat' and
          he ate Mashehu, he is liable...
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question:</font></b> How does R. Akiva hold in general?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Possibility #1:</font></b> He holds like R. Shimon, that one is
               lashed for eating Mashehu of any prohibition;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   (Beraisa - R. Shimon):</font></b> One is lashed for eating
                    Mashehu of any prohibition. A k'Zayis (the
                    volume of an olive) pertains only to bringing a
                    Korban.
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b> Really, the argument of R. Akiva and Chachamim
                    could have been taught elsewhere. It was taught
                    about Shevu'os to teach that Chachamim do <i>not</i>
                    say that just like he is liable for Mashehu if
                    he specifies (in the oath that he will not eat
                    Mashehu), he is liable for Mashehu (even
                    without specifying),
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Possibility #2:</font></b> Normally, R. Akiva holds like
               Chachamim;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Only regarding Shevu'os he obligates for
                    Mashehu, just like he is liable for Mashehu if
                    he specifies.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer #1 (Mishnah - Chachamim):</font></b> We never find that
          someone is liable for eating Mashehu!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> If R. Akiva normally holds like R. Shimon, he should
               answer 'I hold that one is always liable for eating
               Mashehu'!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Rejection:</font></b> R. Akiva answered Chachamim according to their
          opinion;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> I normally hold like R. Shimon. You should admit to
               me about Shevu'os, for just like he is liable for
               Mashehu if he specifies, he is liable for Mashehu
               even without specifying.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> Chachamim did not agree.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Answer #2 (Mishnah - R. Akiva):</font></b> If a Nazir ate bread that
          was soaked in wine and there is a k'Zayis of wine and
          bread together, he is liable.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> If he normally held like R. Shimon, a Nazir would be
               liable for Mashehu of wine, so there would be no
               need to join to a k'Zayis! (This proof is accepted.
               We bring another proof, anyway.)
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Answer #3 (Mishnah):</font></b> If one swore 'I will not eat', and
          he ate Neveilos, Treifos, rodents or insects, he is
          liable (for the oath);
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> R. Shimon exempts.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Question:</font></b> Why do Chachamim obligate him? The oath
               (that Yisrael accepted on Sinai) already obligates
               him not to eat them (so his oath does not takes
               effect)!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Answer #1 (Rav, Shmuel and R. Yochanan):</font></b> Since his
               oath takes effect on permitted food, it takes effect
               also on forbidden food.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Answer #2 (Reish Lakish):</font></b> The Torah forbids him only
               from eating a k'Zayis of these things. His oath
               forbids him from eating Mashehu;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  We find this according to Chachamim if he
                    specified (Mashehu), or according to R. Akiva
                    even without specifying.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.   Culmination of answer:</font></b> If R. Akiva held like R.
               Shimon, the Torah forbids him from eating Mashehu!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b> We conclude (from Reish Lakish) that normally, R.
               Akiva does not hold like R. Shimon.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  (Mishnah - Chachamim):</font></b> We never find that someone is
          liable for eating Mashehu!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Question:</font></b> One is liable for eating an ant of any size!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Answer:</font></b> That is because it is a full creation.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  Question:</font></b> One is liable for eating Hekdesh, even less
          than a k'Zayis!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)  Answer:</font></b> There is a minimum quantity (albeit of value) for
          liability, i.e. a Perutah.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)  Question:</font></b> If one specified in his oath, he is liable for
          Mashehu!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)  Answer:</font></b> There, he showed that Mashehu is important to
          him, so he is liable for it, just like for a creation.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)  Question:</font></b> Why don't we say that he is liable for Mashehu
          of dirt (i.e. a k'Zayis is the quantity only for things
          normally eaten)?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Suggestion:</font></b> Since Chachamim say that he is never
               liable for Mashehu, they must hold that one is
               liable for dirt only for a k'Zayis. This settles
               Rava's question!
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i.   Question (Rava):</font></b> If one said 'I swear that I
                    will not eat', and he ate dirt, how much must
                    he eat to be liable?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)  Answer (and rejection of suggestion):</font></b> Chachamim meant
          that we never find that one is liable for eating Mashehu
          of something that is normally eaten.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)  Question:</font></b> One is liable for eating Mashehu of Konamos
          (something forbidden through a Neder)!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)  Answer:</font></b> Also Konamos is like specifying (Mashehu, since
          he does not mention eating). 
<br>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) 'MUSHBA V'OMED ME'HAR SINAI'</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: The Gemara quotes the Mishnah later (22b) which teaches that if a person makes a Shevu'ah that he will not eat, and then he eats Neveilos (which the Torah prohibited before he made his Shevu'ah), he is punished for violating his Shevu'ah as well as for transgressing the Isur of Neveilos. The Gemara asks that he should not be punished for violating his Shevu'ah, because he is 'Mushba v'Omed me'Har Sinai.' An oath cannot take effect to enforce an act for which one is already bound by an oath. A person is considered bound by the Mitzvos as if he took an oath at Har Sinai to keep them.
</p><p>
Why does the Gemara use the words 'Mushba v'Omed...' to explain why a Shevu'ah does not take effect on what the Torah prohibits? It should give the normal principle of 'Ein Isur Chal Al Isur' as the reason for why the Shevu'ah does not take effect in such a case!
</p><p>
The same point may be made about the Gemara's statement that if a person prohibits an object with a Shevu'ah and then repeats the Shevu'ah, the second prohibition does not take effect because 'Ein Shevu'ah Chal Al Shevu'ah' (Nedarim 18a). Why does the Gemara not say simply, 'Ein Isur Chal Al Isur'? (<b>NODA B'YEHUDAH</b> OC 1:36; see also Insights to Nedarim 18:2.)
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>NODA B'YEHUDAH</b> suggests that, apparently, the rule of 'Ein Isur Chal Al Isur' applies only to what the Torah itself prohibits; it does not apply to what a person prohibits upon himself through a Shevu'ah.
</p><p>
The Noda b'Yehudah does not explain the basis for his hypothesis. What is the logical distinction between a Shevu'ah and any other Isur in the Torah? Perhaps he means that an ordinary Isur in the Torah does not address a particular person or a particular situation. It does not <i>need</i> to take effect when there is already another prohibition, and in fact the Torah does not <i>intend</i> for the second prohibition to apply when another prohibition is already in place. A Shevu'ah, however, is stated with the explicit intention that it apply to a particular person and to a particular situation. Since the one who swore did not intend for the Shevu'ah to be limited to what was not previously prohibited to him, perhaps it should apply even where a prohibition of the Torah (or another Shevu'ah) is already in force.
</p><p>
The Gemara therefore explains that since a Torah prohibition is also a form of Shevu'ah, a second Shevu'ah cannot take effect and reinforce it. (This logic may not apply to a Neder, since the prohibition created by a Neder must be based on the Torah's prohibition of Korban. Therefore, it does not depend on the person's specific intent any more than does the Isur of Korban. This is why Tosfos (20b, DH d'Chi) applies the rule of 'Ein Isur Chal Al Isur' to a Neder.)
</p><p>
(b) The <b>KOVETZ HE'OROS</b> (#33) suggests that a Shevu'ah does not create an actual prohibition. Rather, when a person makes a Shevu'ah that he will do a particular act, he is asserting that such an act will certainly take place. If that act does not take place (that is, if he does not fulfill his Shevu'ah), then he has lied. He is obligated to fulfill his Shevu'ah simply in order to prevent himself from having lied retroactively. (For an in-depth discussion of the nature of the prohibition of a Shevu'ah, refer to Rav Dov Zupnik's online Audio Shi'ur to Shevu'os 22a.)
</p><p>
Accordingly, the Isur of Shevu'ah is not similar at all to any other Isur of the Torah, since it takes effect neither on a particular object nor on a particular act. Rather, it forces a person to act in a certain way to prevent himself from lying. The reason why an Isur cannot take effect where a previous Isur exists is because the second Isur adds no new dimension to the Isur that already exists (see Insights to 20b). A Shevu'ah, in contrast, <i>does</i> add a new dimension and does not simply reinforce the previously-existing Isur.
</p><p>
Both of these approaches, however, are not consistent with the words of the Rishonim who explicitly use the principle of 'Ein Isur Chal Al Isur' when they discuss a Shevu'ah. (See, for example, the <b>BA'AL HA'ME'OR</b>, end of third Perek.)
</p><p>
(c) The <b>AVNEI MILU'IM</b> (#12) suggests that the logic of 'Ein Isur Chal Al Isur' <i>does</i> apply with regard to a Shevu'ah. However, when the rule of 'Ein Isur Chal Al Isur' is applied, normally the second Isur cannot obligate the transgressor to receive a second set of Malkus or a Korban, but, nevertheless, it <i>does</i> increase the strength of the prohibition. The Gemara in Yevamos (33b) explains that because the prohibition becomes stronger, the transgressor is considered a greater Rasha, and thus, when he is buried, he is buried among similar Resha'im.
</p><p>
The Gemara intends to teach that when a Shevu'ah is made to prohibit something that is already prohibited by the Torah, not only does the Shevu'ah not obligate a new set of Malkus or a Korban, but the Shevu'ah does not even strengthen the prohibition. That is, 'Mushba v'Omed me'Har Sinai' is a more effective way of stopping the Shevu'ah from taking effect than 'Ein Isur Chal Al Isur.'
</p><p>
(The logic for this seems to be as follow. The Torah does not give a person the right to prohibit himself with a Shevu'ah from doing something which he is already prohibited from doing with a Shevu'ah ('Mushba v'Omed...'). The verses that discuss Shevu'ah teach that if the second Shevu'ah creates a new prohibition, or even adds a Chiyuv of Malkus or Korban to a pre-existing Shevu'ah, the second Shevu'ah should take effect. However, when the Shevu'ah creates no new obligation of any sort but merely strengthens a prohibition that already exists, no source teaches that the Torah recognizes such a Shevu'ah as binding. Consequently, because of the principle of 'Ein Isur Chal Al Isur' -- which teaches that the Shevu'ah cannot create a Chiyuv of Malkus or Korban when an Isur Torah already exists -- one must conclude that a Shevu'ah made to prohibit something that is already prohibited by the Torah will not be valid.)
</p><p>
The Avnei Milu'im mentions a number of practical consequences of the fact that the Shevu'ah does not even strengthen the pre-existing Isur:
</p><p>
1. The obvious consequence is that a person who transgresses such a Shevu'ah is <i>not</i> buried among the more wicked Resha'im.
</p><p>
2. If a person is so ill that the doctors say that he will die unless he eats Neveilah, then he is permitted to eat Neveilah. What is the Halachah in a case in which the sick person previously prohibited himself with a Shevu'ah from eating Neveilah? Since a person can repeal a Shevu'ah through 'She'eilah,' the law of Piku'ach Nefesh does not permit a person to violate his Shevu'ah. If the normal rule of 'Ein Isur Chal Al Isur' would apply, then the person would be required to perform 'She'eilah' before he eats the Neveilah, in order to remove at least one of the Isurim. However, because of the principle of 'Mushba v'Omed,' the Shevu'ah will not take effect at all and it will not be necessary to do 'She'eilah' in order to repeal the Shevu'ah.
</p><p>
3. The Gemara (24a) relates that according to Reish Lakish, even if the principle of Isur Kolel teaches that a second Isur which includes more than the first Isur takes effect, this rule does not apply to a self-created Isur such as a Shevu'ah. The Avnei Milu'im asserts that this is also based on the principle that 'Mushba v'Omed' is more limiting that the principle of 'Ein Isur Chal Al Isur.' An Isur Kolel takes effect only because of the fact that the second Isur would exist even if it could not obligate the transgressor to receive Malkus; since the Isur creates Malkus with regard to other objects, the rule of Isur Kolel states that there will be Malkus as well for the Isur that was created on top of the pre-existing Isur. However, since the Shevu'ah does not create an Isur at all on what was previously prohibited, the principle of Isur Kolel will not apply.
</p><p>
4. The Avnei Milu'im suggests further that when the Gemara says 'Mushba v'Omed me'Har Sinai' and 'Ein Shevu'ah Chal Al Shevu'ah,' its intention is to show that even if the Isur of the Torah and the person's Shevu'ah come into effect at the same time ('b'Vas Achas'), the Shevu'ah still does not take effect even though, normally, when two Isurim come into effect at the same time they <i>do</i> take effect. For example, if a person makes a Shevu'ah prohibiting himself from eating Neveilah, and after he makes the Shevu'ah his animal dies, then even though the animal becomes forbidden to him because of the Isur Torah of Neveilah and because of his Shevu'ah at the same time, the Shevu'ah does not take effect.
</p><p>
The logic for this seems to be similar to the logic mentioned above (in #3). The reason why two Isurim normally can take effect 'b'Vas Achas' is that even if they would not create a Chiyuv of Malkus (because of 'Ein Isur Chal Al Isur'), nevertheless the Isurim co-exist. However, because of the principle of 'Mushba v'Omed me'Har Sinai' (or 'Ein Shevu'ah Chal Al Shevu'ah'), the Shevu'ah itself cannot take effect if there is a pre-existing Isur. Therefore, even if the Shevu'ah and Isur take effect simultaneously, the Isur will take effect and the Shevu'ah will not take effect. (This might be true even according to those who disagree with Reish Lakish and maintain that a Shevu'ah <i>does</i> take effect through Isur Kolel.)
</p><p>
However, the Acharonim point out that the Gemara in Makos (22a) implies that even before the animal dies and becomes Neveilah, the Isur Torah was already in effect, and therefore the Isur of Shevu'ah should <i>not</i> take effect when the animal dies, even if the animal dies after the Shevu'ah was made (<b>MISHNAS REBBI AHARON</b>, Yevamos 19; <b>SHI'UREI REBBI SHMUEL</b>, Yevamos 32:270).
</p><p>
Moreover, the Acharonim ask that the approach of the Avnei Milu'im is not consistent with the <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Shevu'os 4:10), who apparently maintains that the second Shevu'ah <i>does</i> take effect to make a more severe Isur. 
</p><p>


lvr: 46
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) MALKUS FOR SPEAKING</font></b>
     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Mishnah - R. Akiva):</font></b> We never find that one brings a
          Korban for speaking!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question:</font></b> R. Akiva himself holds that one who curses
          Hash-m (b'Shogeg) brings a Korban!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer:</font></b> He means, we never find one who creates a
          prohibition (that entails a Korban) through speech;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> There, the Korban is due to his sin.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Question:</font></b> The prohibitions of Nezirus come through
          speech, and they entail Korbanos!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Answer:</font></b> There, the Korbanos are not for transgressing the
          prohibitions, rather to (end the Nezirus and) permit him
          to drink wine.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Question:</font></b> One creates Hekdesh through speech, and it
          entails a Korban!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Answer:</font></b> R. Akiva refers to Isurim that one forbids to
          himself;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> Hekdesh is forbidden to everyone.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Question:</font></b> Konamos is an Isur to himself!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Answer:</font></b> He holds that Me'ilah (and therefore Korbanos) do
          not apply to Konamos.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)  (Rava):</font></b> R. Akiva and Chachamim argue in a case that he
          does not specify, but if he specifies 'I will not eat
          Mashehu', (all agree that) he is liable for Mashehu.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> By specifying, he gives importance to Mashehu, just
               like a creation.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)  (Rava):</font></b> R. Akiva and Chachamim argue in a case that he
          swears 'I will not eat';
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> However, if he swore 'I will not taste', he is
               liable for Mashehu.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Objection:</font></b> This is obvious!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Answer:</font></b> One might have thought that 'tasting' refers
               to eating (i.e. a k'Zayis), as people commonly say.
               Rava teaches that this is not so
<br>
<b><font color='blue'>2) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN KONAMOS AND SHEVU'OS</font></b>
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'></font></b><p><b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)  (Rav Papa):</font></b> R. Akiva and Chachamim argue only about
          Shevu'os, but all agree that for Konamos, one is liable
          for Mashehu.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)  Question:</font></b> What is the reason?
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)  Answer:</font></b> Also Konamos are like specifying Mashehu, since
          he does not mention eating.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)  Question (Beraisa):</font></b> (If one eats less than a Shi'ur from
          each of) two Konamos, the amounts join up (to the
          quantity for liability). Two Shevu'os do not join;
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b> R. Meir says, Konamos are like Shevu'os.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b> If one is liable for Mashehu for Konamos, there is
               no need to join up!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)  Answer #1:</font></b> The case is, he mentioned 'eating' in each
          Konam (therefore, he is liable only for a k'Zayis).
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)  Objection:</font></b> If so, why do they join up? He did not <i>eat</i>
          (i.e. a k'Zayis) from either!
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)  Answer #2:</font></b> The case is, he said 'eating from both of
          these is (forbidden) upon me like Konam (i.e. a Korban).'
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   Question:</font></b> If so, the corresponding Shevu'ah is 'I
               swear that I will not eat from both of them'. Why
               don't they join up?
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.   Answer (Rav Pinchas):</font></b> Because oaths are separate
               regarding Korbanos Chatas (one brings a Korban for
               each oath violated, even if he did not remember in
               between), they do not join.
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.   Question:</font></b> Why does R. Meir say that Konamos are like
               Shevu'os?
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  Rav Pinchas' law would explain why Shevu'os do
                    not join, but why don't Konamos join? (Even
                    according to the opinion that Me'ilah applies
                    to Konamos, they are not separate for Korbanos
                    Asham.)
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.   Correction:</font></b> Rather, R. Meir says that Shevu'os are
               like Konamos (they join up). He does not agree with
               Rav Pinchas.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)  Answer #3 (Ravina):</font></b> Rav Papa's law is only for lashes.
          The Beraisa refers only to Korban.
<br>     <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)  Question:</font></b> This implies that Chachamim hold that (Korban)
          Me'ilah applies to Konamos. This is unlike a Beraisa!
<br>          <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.   (Beraisa - R. Meir):</font></b> If one said 'this loaf is
               Hekdesh', if he or anyone else eats it, they
               transgress Me'ilah; therefore, it can be redeemed;
<br>               <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b>  If he said 'this loaf is Hekdesh upon me', only
                    he transgresses Me'ilah if he eats it.
                    Therefore, it cannot be redeemed;
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) LIABILITY FOR A SMALL AMOUNT</b></font>
<br>QUESTION: In the Mishnah (19b), Rebbi Akiva states that when a person makes an oath that 'I will not eat' and then he eats even the smallest amount, he violates his Shevu'ah. The Chachamim disagree and maintain that there is no case in the Torah in which a person who eats a small amount of something (less than the amount which makes him liable, such as a k'Zayis) is liable for transgressing a Torah law.
<p>
The Gemara (21b) questions this argument of the Chachamim. A person who eats an ant of the smallest possible size is fully liable for transgressing the prohibitions against eating bugs. Clearly, the Torah makes one fully liable for eating a small amount of something that is prohibited. The Gemara answers that when one eats an ant he is liable because the ant is a 'Biryah,' a complete creature, and as such it is significant even without having a minimum size.
</p><p>
The Gemara asks another, similar question. The law is that a person is liable for benefiting from even a small amount of Hekdesh. (<b>RASHI</b> (DH v'Harei) explains that as long as the value of Hekdesh is a Perutah, one is fully liable for eating it even he eats less than a k'Zayis.) The Gemara answers that Hekdesh still has a minimum amount -- the value of a Perutah. Therefore, one is not considered to be liable for eating the smallest amount, even though it is less than a k'Zayis.
</p><p>
Rava (22a) says that Rebbi Akiva and the Chachamim disagree about the law in the case of a person who swears, 'I will not eat,' but he does not say how much he will not eat. They agree that one who swears, 'I will not eat anything,' is liable for eating the smallest amount, in the same way that one is liable for eating a Biryah.
</p><p>
In the Gemara later, Rav Papa says that the dispute between Rebbi Akiva and the Chachamim applies only in the case of a Shevu'ah. They agree in the case of a Neder; when a person forbids an item to himself with the term 'Konam' (he says, 'This loaf of bread is Konam on me'), he is liable for eating even a small amount. This is because making a Neder with the word 'Konam' (without mentioning 'eating' at all) is tantamount to explicitly stating 'anything,' in which case one is liable for even a small amount, as Rava states.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Aval) questions Rav Papa's assertion that everyone agrees that using the word 'Konam' makes one liable for a small amount. The Mishnah in Nedarim (10a) states that the word 'Konam' is an alternative way of saying 'Korban'; when a person says that a loaf of bread is 'Konam' on him, it is equivalent to saying that the bread is forbidden to him the same way a Korban is forbidden to him.
</p><p>
If the word 'Konam' makes the item forbidden to him like a Korban, how can the laws of Konam be more stringent than the laws of Hekdesh? Since the Gemara states that one is not liable for eating Hekdesh worth less than a Perutah, how can the law of Konam, which itself is derived from Hekdesh, make one liable for eating a small amount? The law of Konam cannot be more stringent than the source from which it is derived, Hekdesh.
</p><p>
ANSWERS:
<br>(a) The <b>TOSFOS HA'ROSH</b> answers that although the law of Konam is derived from Hekdesh, the amount of a prohibition of Konam is not derived from the amount of the prohibition of Hekdesh. Since the person made the bread forbidden to him but did not mention that it was forbidden to eat, his intent must have been to make even the smallest amount forbidden.
</p><p>
The <b>TORAS CHAIM</b> elaborates on this answer. When a person sanctifies an object, his specific intent is to sanctify it for the purposes of the Beis ha'Mikdash. The effect of his words is that the object becomes forbidden to him. Once it is forbidden as Hekdesh, a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv states that he is liable to bring a Korban Me'ilah only if he derives benefit worth more than a Perutah. In contrast, when a person says that a loaf of bread is 'Konam' for him, his specific intent is that it should be forbidden to him. Since he did not mention 'eating,' he is forbidden from eating even a small amount.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAMBAN</b> and <b>RASHBA</b> distinguish between the obligation to bring a Korban for accidental transgression of one's vow, and the obligation to receive Malkus for willful transgression of one's vow. Accidental transgression of a vow of Konam must be identical to an accidental transgression of a vow of Hekdesh (as there is no Korban brought for the accidental transgression a Neder). Accordingly, only if one derives benefit worth a Perutah, and the benefit was derived inadvertently, is he obligated to bring a Korban, just as he is obligated to bring a Korban when he derives benefit worth a Perutah, inadvertently, from Hekdesh. Rav Papa, in contrast, refers to one who <i>willfully</i> derives benefit from the object of his Neder, who is punished with Malkus, which is clearly not the same as the law for one who willfully derives benefit from Hekdesh. This is because the prohibition against violating a vow is independent from the prohibition against deriving benefit from Hekdesh. (See <b>REBBI ELIEZER MOSHE HA'LEVI HOROWITZ</b> on Tosfos who also expresses this idea.) (D. Bloom)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<p class='newsubafdaf'><span class='numt'>1)</span> UPROOTING A LIEN THROUGH KONAMOS</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(a)</span> Gemara</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> (Beraisa - R. Meir):</span> If one said 'this loaf is Hekdesh', if anyone eats it, they transgress Me'ilah; therefore, it can be redeemed. If he said 'it is Hekdesh to me', only he transgresses Me'ilah if he eats it; therefore, it cannot be redeemed;</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span> Chachamim say, there is no Me'ilah for benefit from Konamos (forbidding something like a Korban), no matter who eats it.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>3.</span> The opinions must be switched. R. Meir says, there is no Me'ilah for benefit from Konamos. Chachamim say, only he transgresses Me'ilah if he eats it.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>4.</span><span class='desl2'> Nedarim 28b (Rava):</span> Kedushas Damim (monetary Kedushah) can vanish, but Kedushas ha'Guf (intrinsic Kedushah) cannot vanish.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>5.</span><span class='desl2'> (Abaye):</span> Also intrinsic Kedushah can vanish!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>6.</span> Bar Pada holds that even Kedushas Damim cannot vanish.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>7.</span><span class='desl2'> Kesuvos 59a - Contradiction:</span> Shmuel rules that if a wife vowed 'what my hands produce is Konam to your mouth', he should annul it, lest he divorce her and be unable to remarry her. He also rules that Hekdesh does not take effect on something not yet in the world!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>8.</span><span class='desl2'> Answer (Rav Ashi):</span> Konamos are different. They are like Hekdesh ha'Guf, like Rava taught:</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> (Rava):</span> The following uproot a lien: (the collateral was made) Hekdesh, the Isur of Chametz, and freedom (the collateral was a slave).</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>9.</span> Chachamim strengthened the lien of a husband, therefore her earnings do not become Hekdesh now.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>10.</span><span class='desl2'> 70a (Mishnah):</span> If one vowed that his wife may not benefit from him, up to 30 days, he gets someone to finance her.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>11.</span><span class='desl2'> Question:</span> He is obligated to her! How can he uproot his obligation through a vow?!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>12.</span><span class='desl2'> Erchin 23b (Mishnah):</span> If Reuven owed a Kesuvah and was Makdish his property, his creditor may not take the property from Hekdesh. Rather, the redeemer redeems the property in order to pay the debt. If the property is worth 90 and the debt is 100, he adds a Dinar and redeems it to pay the debt.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>13.</span><span class='desl2'> Question:</span> Why does it say 'the redeemer redeems'?</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>14.</span><span class='desl2'> Answer:</span> This is due to R. Avahu's reason, lest people say that Hekdesh becomes Chulin without redemption.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>15.</span><span class='desl2'> Bava Kama 89b (Beraisa #1):</span> If Leah brought a slave into her marriage to be Melug property, if she destroys a limb of his, the slave goes free, but not if her husband destroys a limb.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>16.</span><span class='desl2'> (Beraisa #2):</span> He does not go free whether he or she destroys a limb.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>17.</span><span class='desl2'> 90a Suggestion:</span> Tana #1 holds like Rava, and Tana #2 disagrees!</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>18.</span><span class='desl2'> Rejection:</span> Even Tana #2 holds like Rava. Chachamim strengthened a husband's lien on his wife's property (so freedom does not uproot his lien).</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(b)</span> Rishonim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> Rambam (Hilchos Malveh 18:7):</span> If one was Makdish his property, his creditor cannot take it from Hekdesh, for Hekdesh uproots liens. When one redeems the land from Hekdesh, we estimate how much one would like to pay for the field in order to give it to the creditor. Therefore, after Ploni redeems it, it is Chulin in his hands, and the creditor collects it.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> Rebuttal (Ra'avad Hilchos Erchin 14:7):</span> Hekdesh did not uproot the lien. The redemption is a token amount, lest people say that Hekdesh becomes Chulin without redemption. Only Kedushas ha'Guf, e.g. Konamos or garments put on a Mes (to be shrouds), uproot liens.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'> Magid Mishneh:</span> The Rambam holds that all Hekdesh, even Kedushas Damim, uproots liens. Rava taught that all Hekdesh uproots liens. The Mishnah in Erchin says 'lest people say that Hekdesh becomes Chulin without redemption.' I.e. this is why Chachamim said that Kedushas Damim uproots liens, even though the creditor will collect it from the redeemer. Hekdesh profits a little, lest people belittle other Hekdesh and say that it becomes Chulin without redemption. Hekdesh ha'Guf permanently uproots liens. Kedushas Damim uproots a lien until it is redeemed. The Ra'avad and all the Meforshim argue with the Rambam. Really, Kedushas Damim does not uproot liens. The Mishnah in Erchin is not because the Hekdesh uprooted the lien. Rather, we require a Dinar lest people say that Hekdesh becomes Chulin without redemption.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'> Ran (DH Kesuvos 24a DH v'Ika):</span> Rashi explains 'Konamos are different. They are like Hekdesh ha'Guf' to mean that just like one cannot redeem a Korban, one cannot redeem Konamos to permit them. Therefore, it is like Kedushas ha'Guf to uproot liens. If one put a lien on his ox to his creditor, and he was Makdish the ox for a Korban, the creditor collects from elsewhere and the ox is a Kosher Korban. It is not stolen. Kedushas Damim, i.e. for Bedek ha'Bayis, does not uproot liens, like it says in Erchin, that he adds a Dinar and redeems the property. We discuss when he put a lien on (the ox, or other) Metaltelim Agav (along with) land. If not, even (selling or giving to) a person uproots the lien, and all the more so Kedushas Damim, which is like giving to Hekdesh. Hekdesh is no weaker than a person! If one made an ox an Apotiki (designated it to pay a loan, but not along with land), if he sold it, the lender cannot collect from it. A Gabai'on explained like Rashi. R. Tam says that even Kedushas Damim uproots liens. This is wrong.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'> Tosfos (59b DH Konamos):</span> If Konam uproots liens, any borrower can stop his creditor from collecting! Rather, Chachamim strengthened a creditor's lien, just like they strengthened a husband's lien. This is not only for a husband. The Gemara (70a) asked how a man can forbid his wife, i.e. for also a wife's lien was strengthened. The lien was strengthened only against a Konam to the creditor, but not if it forbids to everyone, like the case of the shrouds. Rava holds like the Tana who says that Melug slaves go free if she destroys a limb, but not if he does. Alternatively, her husband has more rights than her (more than a mere lien, therefore, they do not go free even if she destroys a limb).</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>v.</span><span class='desl2'> Gra (25):</span> Chachamim strengthened a husband's lien even regarding freedom, which is like Hekdesh.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>vi.</span><span class='desl2'> Nimukei Yosef (Yevamos 22b Sof Dibur Rishon):</span> Some learn from Rava (in Kesuvos) that one can forbid his property (through Konam) to his creditor, but we excommunicate him until he permits his vow. Even if he vowed Al Da'as Rabim (according to the will of (at least three) others), he can permit it for the Mitzvah to pay his debt. The Ri says that (he need not permit it, for) Chachamim strengthened the lien of a creditor, lest the debtor forbid his property to them. They did not do so regarding shrouds, for it is not common, and for the honor of the Mes.</p>
<p class='firstindent'><span class='numl1'>(c)</span> Poskim</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>1.</span><span class='desl2'> Shulchan Aruch (CM 117:7):</span> Isur Hana'ah uproots a lien, just like Kedushas ha'Guf does.</p>
<p class='secondindent'><span class='numl2'>2.</span><span class='desl2'> Rema:</span> However, Kedushas Damim does not uproot a lien. Rather, the creditor redeems it for a small amount, lest people say that Hekdesh becomes Chulin without redemption. The redemption money is added to the debt, and he collects it from the borrower. Even Kedushas ha'Guf he cannot forbid to only the lender, e.g. 'my property is Konam to him.' He can forbid it only to the entire world. Some disagree.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>i.</span><span class='desl2'> SMA (24):</span> The dissenting opinion says that he can forbid just the lender. However, we excommunicate him until he permits his vow.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>ii.</span><span class='desl3'> Bedek ha'Bayis:</span> Hekdesh nowadays is for the poor. All agree that it does not uproot liens.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iii.</span><span class='desl2'> Ketzos ha'Choshen (2 DH uleha'Rambam):</span> The Ra'avad holds like Tosfos, that once Kedushas ha'Guf takes effect, it stays. He rules (in Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashim) like Bar Pada, that even Kedushas Damim cannot vanish. The Ra'avad hold that Kedushas Damim is light, and it does not uproot liens; the redemption is needed only due to R. Avahu's concern. Since he holds that it does not vanish, once it takes effect, it should not vanish! In Erchin, Bar Pada agrees that one need not redeem for the full value. He said only that some redemption is needed to become Chulin. A fortune of Hekdesh can be redeemed on one Perutah (Kidushin 11b). However, here the Ra'avad said that the redemption is only due to R. Avahu. According to Bar Pada, letter of the law it is required! It seems that since the lender takes (from Hekdesh), for him it is not for nought. His lien is like giving money. The Rashba (Gitin 40b DH ked'Rava) says so. The Rambam holds that even Kedushas Damim uproots liens. Even though he holds that Kedushas Damim can vanish, that is only when he was Makdish only for a limited time. When the time expires, his Hekdesh expires. A borrower was Makdish permanently, just the lender takes it. Since we say that he collects from now and onwards (not retroactively), the Kedushah took effect before he collects, so it does not vanish.</p>
<p class='thirdindent'><span class='numl3'>iv.</span><span class='desl2'> Ketzos ha'Choshen (5 DH Emnam):</span> We hold that a Konam Klali (it forbids everyone) can be redeemed, so it is like Kedushas Damim. It does not uproot a lien, for it can be permitted. We say that Konamos uproot liens (Kesuvos 59b, unless Chachamim strengthened the lien), i.e. when he forbids only one person. It is like Kedushas ha'Guf, which cannot be redeemed.</p>
<p class='seealso'>See also:</p>
<p class='seealsotext'>DOES KEDUSHAH VANISH? (Shevuos 10)</p>
<p class='doublespace'></p>


