# dafyomi

lvr: 43
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Summation of question:</font></b> R. Shimon said that the
               trees nurture from Hekdesh; we cannot answer (for
               Rav Huna, end of 71b) that R. Shimon holds like R.
               Akiva!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #2 (to Question 3:e, 71b):</font></b> (Indeed, Rav Huna's
          law is even like R. Akiva.) R. Shimon addresses Chachamim
          according to their reasoning. I (R. Shimon) say that just
          like one sells stingily, he is Makdish stingily, and
          keeps land for himself;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Granted, you say that he is Makdish more
               generously than he sells, but you should admit that
               he (is not as generous as one who gives. He) is
               Makdish only grafted carob and sycamore stumps (for
               they will nurture from Hekdesh, but not pits,...)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Chachamim disagree. They say that he is Makdish
               as generously as he gives.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>REDEMPTION OF AN INHERITED FIELD</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> The Seifa is not like R. Shimon!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> Even if he was Makdish the trees, and
               afterwards the land, he redeems the trees according
               to their value, and the land according to 50
               Shekalim for a Beis Kor.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> According to R. Shimon, the law should depend on
               the time of redemption (when it is all Kodesh), and
               the trees should be redeemed along with the land!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa - R. Yehudah and R. Shimon):</font></b> If Reuven
                    bought a field from his father Yakov, and was
                    Makdish it, and Yakov died, it is now
                    considered an inherited field. (Its redemption
                    is fixed. It is 50 Shekalim for a Beis Kor);
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> We learn from 'Asher Lo mi'Sede Achuzaso' -
                    redemption (according to the value) applies
                    only to fields that were not destined to be
                    inherited (but he would have inherited this
                    field even if he did not buy it)!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b></b>R. Meir says, if Reuven bought a field from
                    his father Yakov, and Yakov died, and then
                    Reuven was Makdish it, it is considered an
                    inherited field;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv. </font></b></b> We learn from 'Asher Lo mi'Sede Achuzaso' -
                    a field that was not inherited when he was
                    Makdish it. (He inherited this field. Before
                    his father died, the field was due to return in
                    Yovel). (End of Beraisa)
<br>            <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.  </font></b></b> R. Yehudah and R. Shimon did not need a verse
                    for R. Meir's case. They expounded it to teach
                    their case.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>vi. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> What is their source (when Yakov
                    died before Reuven was Makdish it)?
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>vii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Answer:</font></b> They hold (from reasoning) that it
                    depends on the redemption. (At the first time
                    it could be redeemed, it was inherited, so it
                    is like an inherited field).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak):</font></b> Really, they hold
          that it does not depend on the redemption;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> They expounded the verse to teach their Chidush.
               Had it come only to teach like R. Meir, it should
               have said 'Lo Achuzaso' or 'Lo Sede Achuzaso';
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  Rather, it says 'mi'Sede Achuzaso' to teach
                    that it was not even fit to be inherited.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rav Huna):</font></b> Grafted carob trees and sycamore stumps are
          considered trees, and are also considered land;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> They are considered trees, i.e. if one was
               Makdish or sold two (regular) trees and one of
               these, the land between them is included;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> They are considered land, i.e. they are not sold
               along with the land.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rav Huna):</font></b> A sheaf the size of two Sa'im is considered
          a sheaf, and also a stack.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> It is considered a sheaf, i.e. two sheaves are
               Shichechah (if one forgot to harvest them, one may
               not return to take them), if this big sheaf was
               forgotten with them, they are not Shichechah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> It is considered a stack, i.e. it itself is never
               Shichechah.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If one forgot a sheaf that is
                    Sa'atayim, it is not Shichechah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rabah bar bar Chanah):</font></b> If one was Makdish a field, R.
          Menachem b'Rebbi Yosi and Chachamim argue about whether
          or not grafted carob and sycamore stumps are included.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> Why didn't he say that R. Shimon and
          Chachamim argue about this?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> He teaches that R. Menachem b'Rebbi Yosi holds
          like R. Shimon.
<br>

<p>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) WHY ARE THREE BUNDLES NOT CALLED 'SHICHECHAH'</b></font><b>
<br>OPINIONS:</b> The Gemara teaches that when a bundle contains two Se'ah of produce, sometimes it has the Halachic status of an 'Omer' ('sheaf') and sometimes the status of a 'Gadish' ('pile'). It is considered a sheaf with regard to the Halachah that when three sheaves are found within close proximity of each other, they are not Shichechah. Produce is considered Shichechah only when it is two sheaves or less. When there are two sheaves in close proximity to the large bundle that contains two Se'ah, the sheaves are not considered Shichechah. Nevertheless, when the large bundle with two Se'ah is found by itself, it has the status of a Gadish, pile, and not a sheaf, and it is <i>not</i> considered Shichechah.
</p><p>
What is the source for the Halachah that produce is Shichechah only when there are less than three normal-sized sheaves in one area?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>RASHBAM</b> (DH Shnei Omrim) quotes the Sifri which derives this Halachah from the verse, 'v'Shachachta Omer ba'Sadeh' -- 'and if you forget a sheaf in the field' (Devarim 24:19). This implies that only when the amount forgotten is a <i>sheaf</i> does it have the status of Shichechah, but not when it is a pile. This is also the opinion of the <b>ME'IRI</b>.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Matnos Aniyim 5:14) gives a different source. He explains that this Halachah is derived from the verse, 'l'Ani vela'Ger Ta'azov Osam' -- 'for a poor person and a convert you shall leave them' (Vayikra 19:10). This verses teaches that Shichechah constitutes one sheaf for the poor person and one sheaf for the Ger, or up to two sheaves. Three sheaves, however, does not constitute Shichechah. The <b>DERECH EMUNAH</b> points out that the Rambam's source is mentioned in the Yerushalmi.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>SEFER HA'YERA'IM</b> gives a different reason for why three sheaves are not Shichechah. He explains that the status of Shichechah depends on whether the produce is something that the owner might forget, such as one or two sheaves of wheat. Three sheaves of wheat, in contrast, is something that the owner would notice is missing and will eventually 'remember' them. Three sheaves therefore do not constitute Shichechah. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>



</p><p>


lvr: 43
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO SELLS A SHIP</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Mishnah):</font></b> If one sells a ship, this includes the mast,
          sail, anchors, and oars;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  	He did not sell the slaves, bags (for merchandise) or
          merchandise;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  	If he said 'it and everything inside', all these are
          included.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Gemara):</font></b> (The Gemara proves from verses that the words
          in the Mishnah refer to the mast, sail, anchors and
          oars.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Beraisa):</font></b> If one sells a ship, this includes the ramp
          (to board or get off) and water cistern;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  	R. Nasan says, it includes the Beitzis;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  	Sumchus says, it includes the Gigis.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rava):</font></b> Beitzis and Gigis both refer to a small,
          shallow boat which can go to the shore. Each Tana speaks
          in the language of his area.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>VISIONS AT SEA</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b></b>  	(The main point of the following Agadatos are very
          hidden. We will give some deeper meanings from Meforshim.
          Comments in square brackets [ ] are from the Maharsha.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rabah:</font></b> Sailors told me that a wave [oppressor of
          Yisrael] about to sink a ship [Yisrael] is preceded by a
          damaging angel that looks like a white flame. They hit it
          with sticks on which certain names of Hash-m are written,
          then it calms down. (Kikayon d'Yonah - the waves are
          incitements of the evil inclination, to make one doubtful
          about the world to come).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  	Sailors (Ritva - Chachamim) told me that 300 Parsa'os
          separate between waves. The height of a wave is 300
          Parsah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Once I was traveling, and a wave [Edom] lifted us
               until we could see the middle of a small star. It
               appeared 40 times the size of a Beis Kor of mustard
               (which is more than a normal Beis Kor).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Had it lifted us higher, the heat would have
               roasted us [had Yisrael joined more with Edom (like
               Esav wanted) we would have perished in exile].
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Another wave [oppressor] called to it 'did you
               destroy the entire world, and not leave anything for
               me to destroy?'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> The previous wave:</font></b> Your Master put a thin border
               of sand [Yisrael] which we cannot pass [destroy] -
               'Samti Chol Gevul la'Yam.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rabah:</font></b> I saw a demon [evil inclination, which is the
          angel of death] on a wall above a man [a Tzadik] riding a
          horse. The demon was unable to catch him [Torah and
          Mitzvos protected him].
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) UNDERSTANDING AGADAH</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara records a number of extraordinary narratives, including the stories of Rabah bar bar Chanah. When they are read literally, their descriptions of the natural world seem to conflict with the world as we know it. The accounts of the things that Rabah bar bar Chanah saw certainly seem most bizarre. Although the <b>RASHBAM</b> implies that the events actually took place and that the descriptions are real, others (such as the <b>RITVA</b> and <b>RASHBA</b>) explain that some or all of these narratives were either dreams or allegories that the Chachamim chose in order to teach important lessons in Avodas Hash-m. Even the Rashbam may agree that these narratives are recorded in the Gemara not only for their literal meaning but for the allegorical messages that they contain. The <b>MAHARSHA</b>, who writes that one should not discount the literal meaning of these stories, also explains at great length their allegorical meanings. The <b>VILNA GA'ON</b> (in Pirush Al Kamah Agados) and <b>NESIVOS HA'MISHPAT</b> (in Emes l'Yakov) explain that these stories are parables that teach various truths about man's role in this world, about the study of Torah, and about Jewish destiny.
</p><p>
If the lessons contained within these stories are so important, why are they garbed in such obscure expressions and not written explicitly?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) Some of these lessons contain abstruse concepts which cannot be readily understood by everyone. If they were to be taught explicitly and thereby made available to all, they would be subject to serious misunderstanding and distortion. Therefore, the Chachamim preserved these lessons in a coded form -- the obscure form of parable and allusion. The keys to their true meaning would continue to be transmitted orally, from teacher to student. In this manner, the Torah's deepest wisdom would be preserved, and at the same time it would be protected from the ravages of misunderstanding. Wise students would be shown the way to understand the true meanings behind the parables, while the inept would take them for nothing more than interesting tales or shrewd advice.
</p><p>
However, not all parts of Agadah deal with esoteric wisdom. There are many parts of Agadah which could be conveyed in ordinary language which are taught, nevertheless, in an obscure manner. Many of the parables in the Gemara here do not seem so complex that they would be liable to misunderstanding if conveyed in a straightforward manner. Why did the Chachamim convey them in such obscure terms?
</p><p>
(b) One reason for why the Chachamim taught important lessons in obscure terms is that the Chachamim sought to teach that wisdom is acquired only by those willing to expend the necessary effort. People who do not exert themselves to understand wisdom do not appreciate its value and certainly will not trouble themselves to live by it. The parables and wordplays are all means of separating the serious students from the uninterested.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Introduction to Perush ha'Mishnayos) writes that Agadah was kept obscure 'to sharpen the students' minds and to inspire their hearts, and also to blind the eyes of those fools... who, if the full force of the truth were revealed to them, would reject it because of their character deficiencies.' When they see that they cannot even understand the statements at face value, they will be humbled and realize that the deficiency in understanding is theirs and not the Chachamim's.
</p><p>
(d) The Chachamim commonly had many intentions behind their sayings. A parable is the most efficient way of conveying all of these levels of meaning at once.
</p><p>
Also, by using parables, the Chachamim were able to add overtones of meaning to their ideas that shed light on other verses or dictums of the Chachamim, which could not be expressed by an ordinary statement. A plain statement could not possibly be laden with such potency of suggestion.
</p><p>
(e) The Chachamim often used the same metaphors to convey (relatively) comprehensible ideas as they used to convey more esoteric teachings. By using these metaphors early on in a student's career, they introduced him to the meanings hidden therein and thus prepared him for the later time when he would be worthy of studying the hidden aspects of wisdom.
</p><p>
In addition, the Chachamim garbed important lessons in the language of Agadah so that these lessons can be remembered even by children and beginners, so that when their minds develop they will be able to analyze the memories of their youth and appreciate their deep messages. (<b>RAMBAM</b>, ibid.)
</p><p>
(Adapted from <b>THE JUGGLER AND THE KING</b>, Rav Aharon Feldman, 5750/1990, Feldheim Publishers, with permission from the author.)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>TZITZIS AND SHA'ATNEZ IN SHROUDS</font></b>
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (a)</b>  Gemara</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rabah bar bar Chanah):</font></b> In the Midbar, I saw those
               who died in the Midbar. I cut the corner of one of
               their garments, with Tzitzis on it.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Berachos 18a:</font></b> R. Chiya and R. Yonasan were walking
               in a cemetery; R. Yonasan's Techeiles (of his
               Tzitzis) was showing.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Chiya:</font></b> Lift it up (so it will not show), lest the
               dead say 'today they mock us, and tomorrow they will
               join us!'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Menachos 41a:</font></b> Clothes designated for shrouds are
               exempt from Tzitzis. At the time (when he dies),
               Raminin Lah (we put on the shrouds) Tzitzis, to
               avoid 'Lo'eg la'Rash Cheref Osehu' (mocking the
               dead).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Kesuvos 111b (R. Chiya bar Rav Yosef):</font></b> Wheat is
               planted bare, and it rises with many covers.
               Tzadikim are buried clothed, all the more so they
               will rise clothed!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Mishnah (Kil'ayim 9:4):</font></b> We are not concerned for
               Sha'atnez in shrouds.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Maseches Semachos (Perek 12):</font></b> Aba Sha'ul ben Bitnis
               told his children to bury him by the feet of his
               father, and to remove the Techeiles from his Talis.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Maseches Tzitzis (after Avodah Zarah, p.63):</font></b> We do
               not untie Tzitzis from a Mes. Aba Sha'ul ben Bitnis
               permits. Aba asked to remove the Tzitzis from his
               garment, for they have Kedushah. Chachamim say, they
               have no Kedushah. We may use them for shrouds or a
               saddle.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Nidah 61b (Beraisa):</font></b> If Kil'ayim was lost in a
               garment, one may use it for shrouds.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>10. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference (Rav Yosef):</font></b> (We are not concerned that
               the Mes will be wearing Sha'atnez when he is
               revived.) This shows that the Mitzvos will cease!
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>11. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question (Abaye):</font></b> R. Yanai permits clothing the Mes
               in such shrouds at the time of eulogies, but we may
               not use them for burial!
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>12. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer (Rav Yosef):</font></b> R. Yochanan permits them even
               for burial. He expounds 'ba'Mesim Chofshi' -- once
               someone dies, he is (forever) exempt from Mitzvos.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (b)</b>  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rif and Rosh (Hilchos Tzitzis (after Menachos) 11b
               and Siman 9):</font></b> We put Tzitzis on the shrouds, to
               avoid Lo'eg la'Rash.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rambam (Hilchos Kil'ayim 10:25):</font></b> One may make
               shrouds from Kil'ayim, for Mesim have no Mitzvos.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question (Rosh Mo'ed Katan 3:80):</font></b> Tzadikim will
               return to life clothed (Kesuvos 111a). Menachos 41a
               connotes that we put Tzitzis on shrouds after death.
               Why are we not concerned for Sha'atnez in shrouds
               (Kil'ayim 9:4)?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> Answer #1 (Rashbam, in Tosfos Nidah 61b DH Aval):
               Even a living person may wear Kil'ayim without
               benefit. A clothing salesman may wear Kil'ayim, as
               long as he does not intend to be protected from the
               sun or rain.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rebuttal (and Answer #2 - Rosh):</font></b> Also Tzitzis is
               obligatory only if worn for benefit - 'your garment
               that you are covered in.' A clothing salesman is
               exempt from Tzitzis, yet Lo'eg la'Rash applies! R.
               Tam says that Lo'eg la'Rash applies more to Tzitzis,
               which (through its Gematriya, knots and strings) is
               equal to all the Mitzvos. Also, it is evident if a
               garment has no Tzitzis, but Kil'ayim is not evident.
               We cannot prove from Mesei Midbar that we put
               Tzitzis on shrouds, for they entered their graves
               dressed on Erev Tish'ah b'Av (Eichah Rabsi).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rosh (ibid. and Berachos 3:5):</font></b> Why is our custom to
               remove Tzitzis from a Mes' shrouds? R. Tam answers
               that Tzitzis are testimony one fulfilled all the
               Mitzvos, we and not worthy of this. The Medrash says
               that 'l'Dorosam' is written missing a Vov, i.e. Dor
               Tam (a perfect generation). Also, previous Doros
               wore Tzitzis all day, so they put them on shrouds
               due to Lo'eg la'Rash. Nowadays, many people do not
               wear a four-cornered garment; we do not put for them
               in their death what they did not fulfill in life. We
               do not put only on those who wore Tzitzis in their
               lives, lest others be ashamed. We should not shame
               them, for the Torah obligates only one who wears a
               four-cornered garment. Aba Sha'ul ben Bitnis told
               his children Lehatil Techeiles from his Talis.
               'Lehatil' (normally) connotes to put on, but here it
               says 'from my Talis', not 'on my Talis', so it means
               'to remove.'
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Ba'al ha'Ma'or (Mo'ed Katan 16a DH Aba):</font></b> Some
                    say that Raminin Lah means that we remove
                    Tzitzis from shrouds. The primary opinion
                    explains that we put them on, for it says
                    Raminin Lah (on it), not 'Minah' (from it). The
                    Ri bar Malki Tzedek explains that we put
                    Tzitzis on shrouds when carrying the Mes to the
                    grave. Lo'eg la'Rash applies then, for the
                    carriers are wearing Tzitzis. When we bury him,
                    we remove the Tzitzis, to fulfill R. Yochanan's
                    opinion that Mitzvos will be Batel in the
                    future.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Hasagos ha'Ra'avad:</font></b> We put Tzitzis on shrouds,
                    without tying them on. If they were tied, we
                    untie them. Since there are Tzitzis, the living
                    do not mock the Mes. Since they are not tied,
                    he doesn't mock other Mesim. The episode with
                    R. Yonason shows that normally, we bury Mesim
                    without Tzitzis.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Rebuttal (Rosh ibid.):</font></b> We cannot learn from the
                    episode! Even if Mesim have Tzitzis, since they
                    are not fulfilling the Mitzvah, Lo'eg la'Rash
                    applies.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Hasagos ha'Ra'avad:</font></b> Some say that Aba Sha'ul
                    was concerned lest the Techeiles perish, not
                    for Lo'eg la'Rash. My first Perush is primary.
                    However, since also removing the Tzitzis is due
                    to Lo'eg la'Rash, the Gemara should have
                    mentioned it. We cannot say that it is because
                    Mitzvos will not be Batel, for the dead are not
                    commanded about 'Bal Tosif' (adding to
                    Mitzvos).
<br>            <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Milchamos Hash-m:</font></b> Aba Sha'ul's father commanded
                    to remove his Tzitzis when he dies, for they
                    have Kedushah. The Halachah follows Chachamim;
                    things used for a Mitzvah may be discarded. Aba
                    Sha'ul agrees about Tzitzis put on shrouds
                    (that they have no Kedushah), for they are put
                    on at that time (not for a Mitzvah,) only due
                    to Lo'eg la'Rash.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rosh (ibid.):</font></b> We often follow minor tractates
               against the Gemara. Rabbeinu Meir says that Aba
               Sha'ul used to wear a linen garment. He put Tzitzis
               in it, like Beis Shamai. He commanded his children
               to remove its Tzitzis, like Beis Hillel. Akavya ben
               Mehalalel similarly told his children 'follow the
               majority of Chachamim who argued with me' (Eduyos
               5:7). If so, there is no proof from here. R. Yehudah
               of Paris says that Menachos 41a is like Shmuel, who
               holds that Mitzvos will not be Batel in the future
               (Shabbos 151b). Burial without Tzitzis is Lo'eg
               la'Rash, for he will be revived without Tzitzis, and
               he will be obligated then. Shmuel explains the
               Mishnah in Kil'ayim like R. Yanai, who permits
               Kil'ayim at the time of eulogies, but not for
               burial. We bury Mesim without Tzitzis because we
               hold, like R. Yochanan, that Mitzvos will be Batel.
               A Medrash says that the Parshah of the one who
               gathered wood on Shabbos is put next to the Mitzvah
               of Tzitzis to teach that Mesim must have Tzitzis.
               This Medrash is like Shmuel. When Rabbeinu died, he
               commanded 'the Tzitzis Chutz.' It is not clear
               whether he wanted them removed, or that they should
               hang outside the casket.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (c)</b>  Poskim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (YD 301:7):</font></b> One may make shrouds from
               Sha'atnez, even to bury the Mes in them.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Beis Yosef (DH Tachrichei):</font></b> The Rambam and Rosh
                    rule like R. Yochanan.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Bach (DH Tachrichei):</font></b> The Beraisa permits a
                    garment in which Kil'ayim was lost. If the
                    Kil'ayim is evident, this is Lo'eg la'Rash. We
                    disqualify Tzitzis in shrouds so it is not
                    evident. One should be stringent, even though
                    the Tur says 'similarly, one may make a saddle
                    from Kil'ayim', i.e. even if it is evident.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (YD 351:2):</font></b> We bury a Mes only in a
               Talis with Tzitzis.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rema:</font></b> Some say that it does not need Tzitzis. The
               custom is to bury a Mes in Tzitzis, but first we
               disqualify them or cut one of the corners.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Beis Yosef (DH uv'Inyan):</font></b> Toras ha'Adam (p. 98)
                    discusses the opinions, and concludes that one
                    should bury only with Tzitzis. The Mordechai
                    (Mo'ed Katan 863) counsels to remove the
                    Tzitzis from a corner and tie them on.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Darchei Moshe (1):</font></b> Avi ha'Ezri says that we
                    remove the Tzitzis only from one who did not
                    normally wear Tzitzis in his life.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Bach (DH uv'Inyan):</font></b> The Roke'ach forbids
                    removing Tzitzis from a Mes' garment, for R.
                    Yanai forbids burial in Kil'ayim. The Halachah
                    does not follow R. Yochanan and Aba Sha'ul ben
                    Botnis, who say that Mitzvos will be Batel. The
                    Ri commanded to tie Tzitzis to the corners of
                    his shrouds, so when he is revived he can untie
                    them and fulfill the Mitzvah. It seems that he
                    ordered to tie Tzitziyos of each pair of
                    corners together, so there will be no Mitzvah.
                    Most opinions say that one should not
                    disqualify the Tzitzis; one should follow them.
                    One can tie the Tzitziyos or cover them, to
                    fulfill both opinions.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Drishah (1):</font></b> We do not require Tzitzis or
                    forbid Kil'ayim in shrouds, because the Mes
                    does not benefit from the garment. It is proper
                    counsel to put Tzitzis and avoid Kil'ayim, so
                    the Mes will be able to wear it when he is
                    revived.
<br>            <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Kaf ha'Chayim (OC 23:7):</font></b> We bury a Mes with
                    Tzitzis to show our Emunah that he will be
                    revived with the clothes he was buried in.
<br>
<font color='blue'><i>See also:</i>
<br><b><b>MAY ONE WEAR TZITZIS NEAR MESIM? </b></b>(</font><font color='blue'>


lvr: 43
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Once the demon was jumping back and forth across
               a river; it poured out wine from two cups
               [punishment awaiting the Nochrim] and caught it
               (each in the other cup) without losing a drop.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> The King [Hash-m; Rashbam - of the Shedim] killed
               it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rabah:</font></b> I saw a Re'em (a giant animal) [Yehoshua] the
          day it was born. It was 400 Parsa'os. It excreted,
          damming up the Yarden (perhaps an allusion to the water
          of the Yarden piling up when Yisrael crossed).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rabah bar bar Chanah:</font></b> I saw a frog [Yavan] as big as 60
          houses. A snake [Romi] came and swallowed it. A raven
          [Yishmael] came and swallowed the snake. It perched on a
          branch [the merit of Avraham].
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Papa bar Shmuel:</font></b> Had I not seen this
               (Ya'avetz - had my Neshamah not seen the Torah given
               on Sinai), I would not believe it (how strong the
               branch (Torah) is)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rabah bar bar Chanah:</font></b> I was on a ship, and saw a fish
          [Haman] that had a rodent [Mordechai] in its nostrils.
          The fish died, and the water cast it ashore. This
          destroyed 60 great cities. Sixty cities ate its flesh
          (fresh), and another 60 ate flesh from it that they
          salted. They filled 300 barrels of oil from one eye.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> I returned the next year, and saw them sawing
               beams from its bones to rebuild the destroyed
               cities.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rabah bar bar Chanah:</font></b> I was on a ship, and I saw a fish
          that had sand on its back. Grass was growing from it. We
          thought that it was an island [Yisrael thought that Galus
          was over]. We came up, and were cooking on its back
          [enjoying the feast of Achashverosh]. When it got hot, it
          flipped over. Had we not been close to our ship
          [repented], we would have drowned.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rabah bar bar Chanah:</font></b> I was on a ship. We were
          traveling between two fins of a fish [Yisrael was in
          danger]. For three days and nights [Yisrael were in
          danger, and they fasted], the fish [Haman] was on top
          (Rashbam - swimming against the current). We were on
          bottom (with the current).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rabah bar bar Chanah:</font></b> I was on a ship. We saw a bird
          standing up to its ankles in water [the revealed part of
          Torah]. Its head reached to the sky [the deep secrets of
          Torah]. We thought that the water was very shallow.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> A voice from Heaven:</font></b> Do not come to here (the
               secrets of Torah until having properly learned the
               revealed part of Torah)! A carpenter (Chacham) once
               dropped his ax, and it did not land (he had a
               question and was unable to settle it) for seven
               years;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> This is not due to the amount of water (a large
               question), rather because it flows rapidly (the
               matter is very deep - Etz Yosef).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Ashi):</font></b> The bird was Ziz Sadai  - 'v'Ziz Sadai Imadi'
               (such a person is fitting to be near Hash-m).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rabah bar bar Chanah:</font></b> We were traveling in the
          wilderness, and we saw ducks whose wings were falling off
          due to their fatness (Ben Yehoyada - great Chachamim who
          had utterly separated from physicality). There were
          streams of oil flowing under them (the world was fed in
          their merit). I asked 'do we have a share in the world to
          come with you'? One lifted a wing, and another lifted a
          thigh. (To merit this, you must properly use the hand
          (Chesed) and thigh.)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Elazar:</font></b> Yisrael will be held accountable
               (Shita Mekubetzes - our merits will be reduced
               because we ate them.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rabah bar bar Chanah:</font></b> We were traveling in the
          wilderness. A Yishmaeli merchant accompanied us. He would
          smell the dirt and say to which place it led, and how far
          we were from water. (Etz Yosef - this was Eliyahu. He
          could tell a person's level, and how far he is from
          Chasid, the highest level.)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> To test him, we gave him different dirt. He knew
               the difference.
<br>

<p>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) AGADAH: 'HOW GREAT IS THE STRENGTH OF THAT TREE!'</b></font><b>
<br>OPINIONS:</b> Rabah bar bar Chanah related that he saw a frog as large as the city of Hegroniya, which was the size of sixty houses. A serpent came and swallowed the frog, and then a raven came and ate the serpent. The raven went and sat in a tree. The Gemara exclaims, 'See how great is the strength of that tree!' Rav Papa bar Shmuel said, 'Had I not been there, I would not have believed it.'
</p><p>
There are a number of approaches to understanding the meaning of this Agadah.
</p><p>
(a) The <b>RITVA</b> explains that the 'raven' alludes to the kingdom of Yishmael who overpowered and swallowed numerous other nations before taking power over Eretz Yisrael. The <b>MAHARSHA</b> explains this in more detail and explains that the 'frog,' or 'Tzefarde'a,' alludes to the kingdom of Yavan, whose main preoccupation was the development of man's knowledge ('De'ah'; Yavan is referred to as 'Tzafir' in Daniel 8:5). The 'sixty houses' refer to the sixty nations conquered by Alexander the Great, the leader of Yavan, as the Targum says in Shir ha'Shirim (6:8).
</p><p>
The 'serpent' alludes to the kingdom of Edom, which is identified with Esav, who is compared with a snake (Pesichta Esther Rabah 5; see Insights to Kidushin 29:2). Edom conquered Yavan. Later, Yishmael came and conquered Edom. Yishmael is compared to a 'Pushkantza,' a raven (see Bava Kama 92b). Also, a raven represents cruelty (since it does not feed its young; Eruvin 22a). The Maharsha adds that Yishmael is represented by a female raven, since all of his power comes through the prayers of his mother, Hagar.
</p><p>
The Ritva continues and says that when the raven went up to rest in the tree, that signified that Bnei Yishmael used their power to prevent the Jewish people from learning Torah, which is compared to a tree. 'See how great is the strength of that tree' refers to the way the Jewish people continue to learn Torah despite the efforts of Yishmael. Rav Papa bar Shmuel said that he would not have believed that it was possible to survive the efforts of Yishmael had he not seen it for himself. (See Maharsha.)
</p><p>
(b) The <b>VILNA GA'ON</b> explains that the 'Tzefarde'a' alludes to a Talmid Chacham, who constantly talks words of Torah like the incessant croaking of a frog. The sixty houses that measure the size of the frog refer to the sixty Masechtos in Shas which the Talmid Chacham has mastered. Sometimes, the Yetzer ha'Ra, represented by a serpent (Nachash ha'Kadmoni), manages to prevent the Talmid Chacham from learning Torah. He argues that the Talmid Chacham must go to work to support his family and that he cannot learn Torah all the time, and he thereby manages to persuade the Talmid Chacham to stop learning. However, there is a Talmid Chacham who can conquer that Yetzer ha'Ra, and that is a Talmid Chacham who is like a raven who 'is cruel to his young' in that he does not let the arguments of the Yetzer ha'Ra persuade him that he needs to spend more time providing food to his family, as the Gemara says in Eruvin (22a), 'In whom will you find the Torah? In a person who is as cruel to his children and family as a raven,' who commits himself exclusively to learning Torah. However, such a Talmid Chacham will not be able to support himself and his family; how will he survive? He will find a tree on which to rest -- that is, a benefactor to support him, like Zevulun, who supported Yissachar so that he could be immersed totally in learning Torah. The verse, 'Etz Chaim Hi la'Machazikim Bah,' teaches that the people who support Torah are compared to a tree. The Gemara here emphasizes, 'See how great is the strength of that tree,' a reference to the greatness of those who support Torah. Rashi (Devarim 33:18) writes that Zevulun's blessing in the Torah precedes that of Yissachar because of Zevulun's great merit in supporting Torah with his resources; since he must conquer a greater Yetzer ha'Ra -- the test of parting with his hard-earned money and giving it to Talmidei Chachamim -- in order to do his part, his blessing precedes that of Yissachar. Zevulun has 'great strength' -- he is a Gibor because he conquers his Yetzer ('Eizehu Gibor? Ha'Kovesh Es Yitzro'). Rav Papa bar Shmuel adds that had he not been there -- that is, in Eretz Yisrael -- he would not have believed that wealthy people support Torah in such a dedicated manner, because in Bavel, where he lived, the wealthy people did not support Torah scholars, as the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah (17a) says, 'The rich people in Mechoza will inherit Gehinom' because they do not use their money to support Torah.
</p><p>



</p><p>


lvr: 43
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>TRAVELS OF CHACHAMIM</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b></b>  	The guide showed us those who died in the wilderness.
          Their faces were happy like drunkards. They were sleeping
          with their faces up [showing that they trusted in
          Hash-m]. One had his knees bent. Our guide passed
          underneath, riding a camel and holding a spear, without
          touching him. (Etz Yosef - Zimri's knees were bent.
          Eliyahu (Pinchas) killed him with a spear, and no one was
          able to touch (i.e. stop) him.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  	I cut the corner of one of their garments, with Tzitzis
          on it. We (the animals we were riding on) were unable to
          travel.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> The guide:</font></b> Did you take something from them?
               Return it, for one who takes something from them is
               unable to go [Hash-m swore that they will not enter
               Eretz Yisrael. This applies even to their garments.]
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> I returned it, and we were able to proceed.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> When I returned, Rabanan rebuked me. 'You cut the
               corner in order to determine whether the Halachah
               follows Beis Shamai or Beis Hillel. You should have
               counted the number of strings and knots!'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	The guide showed us Har Sinai:</font></b> It was surrounded by
          scorpions, guarding it like white donkeys [allusions to
          Chachamim].
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> A voice from Heaven:</font></b> Woe to Me that I swore. Now
               that I swore, who will permit My oath?!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> When I returned, Rabanan rebuked me. 'You should
               have permitted Hashem's oath (Tosfos - that those
               who died in the wilderness will not enter Eretz
               Yisrael; Rashbam - that Yisrael will be in Galus.)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Rabah bar bar Chanah thought that Hash-m referred
               to His oath not to flood the world again.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> Rabanan reason that Hash-m would not regret that
               oath so much.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  	The guide showed us where Korach and his cohorts were
          swallowed. There were two crevices. Smoke was exuding. He
          soaked wool in water, put it on the end of a spear and
          put it inside. It became singed. I was able to hear them
          saying 'Moshe and his Torah are true, and they (Korach
          and his congregation) are liars.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> The guide:</font></b> Every 30 days Gehinom returns them to
               here, like meat in a frying pan, and they say this.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  	The guide showed us where Heaven touches earth [where
          prayer can change one's Mazal]. I put my [prayer for]
          bread in the window. After praying, I did not find it
          [that my prayer was answered]. I thought this was due to
          thieves [who blocked my prayer]!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> The guide:</font></b> No. The sphere (on which the
               constellations are fixed) moved. You will find it
               [that your Mazal has changed] tomorrow.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	R. Yochanan:</font></b> I was on a ship, and saw a fish [the Mazal
          of Adar] take its head out of the water. Its eyes were
          like moons. Water {Torah) came from its two nostrils like
          rivers of Sura (Etz Yosef - due to the birth of Moshe and
          the second acceptance of the Torah (in the days of
          Mordechai), which were in Adar.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rav Safra:</font></b> I was on a ship, and I saw a horned fish
          (ha'Kosev (in Ein Yakov) - a kingdom). Engraved on the
          horn it said 'I am a small sea creature. I am 300
          Parsa'os. I will fall into the mouth of Livyasan (Edom,
          to which most kingdoms will be drawn).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Ashi:</font></b> That was the sea-goat. It digs with its
               horns to seek food.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	R. Yochanan:</font></b> I was on a ship, and I saw a chest with
          precious gems. A fish surrounded it. An expert swimmer
          descended to take it. The fish sought to bite his leg. He
          threw vinegar at it, and it fled.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) AGADAH: THE BASKET IN THE WINDOW OF HEAVEN</b></font><b>
<br></b>Rabah bar bar Chanah related that a certain traveling merchant said to him, 'Come and I will show you where earth and heaven touch.' He saw that heaven was made entirely of windows (Girsa of Bach, Ein Yakov, and Dikdukei Sofrim). He took his basket and placed it in one of the windows, and went to pray. When he finished, he returned and looked for his basket but could not find it. 'There are thieves here!' he said. He was told that there are no thieves, but that 'it is only the heavenly sphere that is turning.' He was advised to 'wait until tomorrow, and you will find it here.'
</p><p>
The <b>VILNA GA'ON</b> gives a beautiful explanation for the meaning behind this story.
</p><p>
(a) The Vilna Ga'on explains that the 'merchant' is an allusion to the Yetzer ha'Ra. The Zohar (Bereishis 80a) says that the Yetzer ha'Ra is called a 'merchant' because 'it peddles all kinds of evil for the body.' Rabah bar bar Chanah is relating the lessons he learned from his experience with this 'peddler' and his sales tactics.
</p><p>
The Yetzer ha'Ra is particularly interested in peddling its wares to Talmidei Chachamim in order to prevent them from learning Torah. His tactic in persuading the Talmid Chacham to listen to him is by portraying in glowing colors the material and spiritual pleasures of wealth and power which, the Yetzer ha'Ra claims, will certainly come to the Talmid Chacham if he will stop learning Torah and involve himself in the activity of the marketplace. The Yetzer ha'Ra argues that by working, the Talmid Chacham will gain the best of both worlds -- he will have material success, and he will be able to return to his studies later, with no financial burdens. He promises to show the Talmid Chacham how he can have both heaven and earth -- spiritual achievement and material success. He will show him where 'earth and heaven touch.'
</p><p>
(b) The Talmid Chacham, confused by the righteous talk of the Yetzer ha'Ra, follows his advice. He leaves his Torah study and goes into business. He works hard at achieving financial success, but to no avail. Recalling the empty promise of guarantees of success that the Yetzer ha'Ra made to him, he begins to see that he was fooled, and the truth becomes clear to him. No man can assure himself of material success; it is Hash-m Who decides who will be rich and who will be poor. He sees that heaven is made all of windows, and all the wealth in the world comes through them. It is Hash-m Who opens His gates according to His will and showers blessing upon His world, as one recites in the Rosh Hashanah prayers, 'Open the gates of heaven, Your goodly storehouse fling wide open.'
</p><p>
(c) The Talmid Chacham, realizing that all blessing comes from Hash-m and that man must only pray for Hashem's help, 'places his basket in the window of heaven.' He recognizes that all of his needs will be provided through Hashem's mercy, and he goes to pray. Only when this is done is it time for him to go and do business, with a heart full of trust that Hash-m will send success to his endeavors.
</p><p>
However, when he returns from his prayers, he finds that his basket is gone and his prayers were not answered. His business endeavors were not successful. He realizes that 'there must be thieves here' -- meaning that he himself has not been sufficiently honest and forthright in his business dealings. For the flow of blessing to descend from heaven, man must first be worthy of it. If he deceives his neighbor in any way, he ceases to be worthy of receiving the flow of blessing from heaven and his prayer is useless. He decides that he must be even more scrupulous in his transactions in order to merit a flow of wealth from heaven.
</p><p>
(d) That is not necessarily the case, though. There is another aspect to Hashem's Hashgachah other than rewarding man for good and punishing him for evil. There is a 'heavenly sphere that is turning.' Hashem's ultimate goal is not merely to reward man, but for all mankind to recognize Him as Creator and King. To lead man to this recognition, Hash-m brings to the world wealth and poverty, happiness and sorrow, health and suffering, plagues and cures, in order that man confront the problems of existence and ultimately realize that only devotion to spirituality and self-effacement before Hashem's sovereignty can solve his problems. This 'heavenly sphere that is turning' might require that there be certain circumstances (such as wealth, poverty, well-being, or sickness) in the lives of certain nations or individuals, even though according to their deeds they do not deserve to be in these situations.
</p><p>
'Health, children, and sustenance are determined not by merit but by 'Mazal'' (Moed Katan 28a). The aspect of Hashgachah that leads the world to its destiny is called 'Mazal' since, most of the time, man does not understand its seemingly random guidance of human affairs. When a person's situation has been determined by this aspect of Hashgachah, even prayer -- accompanied by the most scrupulous honesty -- might not be effective to bring him material success (unless it is accompanied by acts of great merit which are able to change one's Mazal). By serving Hash-m in these situations a person contributes (in a way often known only to Hash-m) to the ultimate purpose of the world. Thus, it is not necessarily dishonesty ('thieves') that prevented the Talmid Chacham's prayers from being answered. Rather, 'it is only the heavenly sphere turning.'
</p><p>
(e) However, the Talmid Chacham was told that he should 'wait until tomorrow, and you will find it here.' Justice is always done. 'Today' refers to Olam ha'Zeh, this world, when we must do the Mitzvos of Hash-m. This world is not the world of reward. 'Wait until tomorrow' -- until the World to Come -- 'and you will find it there' -- one's reward awaits him there in full. The Talmid Chacham realizes that the most effective way to arrive at that reward is to return to his Torah learning and his Avodas Hash-m.
</p><p>
(Adapted from <b>THE JUGGLER AND THE KING</b>, Rav Aharon Feldman, 5750/1990, Feldheim Publishers, with permission from the author.)
</p><p>



</p><p>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHO MAY MAKE TZITZIS?</font></b>
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (a)</b>  Gemara</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> A voice from Heaven:</font></b> That chest is for the wife of
               R. Chanina ben Dosa. She will put in it Techeiles
               for Tzadikim in the world to come.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Menachos 42a (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> A Nochri cannot make
               Tzitzis, for it says 'Daber El Benei Yisrael v'Asu
               Lahem Tzitzis.' Yisraelim can make Tzitzis, but
               Nochrim cannot.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Gitin 45b (Rav Hamnuna - Beraisa):</font></b> A Sefer Torah,
               Tefilin, or Mezuzah written by an informer, Nochri,
               slave, woman, minor, Kusi, or Yisrael Mumar is
               Pasul.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  'You will bind... and you will write' - only
                    one who is commanded to wear Tefilin is
                    qualified to write them.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Avodah Zarah 39a:</font></b> A certain woman married a Chaver 
               (pious man), and would tie Tefilin on his arm. She
               later married a tax collector (he is assumed to
               steal), and helped tie the seals (receipts for those
               who paid) on his arm.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (b)</b>  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rambam (Hilchos Tzitzis 1:12):</font></b> If a Nochri made
               Tzitzis, it is Pasul, for it says 'Daber El Bnei
               Yisrael v'Asu Lahem Tzitzis.' If a Yisrael made
               Tzitzis without intent, it is Kosher. If Tzitzis
               were made from what was already made, it is Pasul.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Hagahos Maimoniyos (9):</font></b> The Ri and Rabbeinu
                    Yehudah derived from here that women are Kosher
                    to make Tzitzis, for we exclude only Nochrim.
                    Rabbeinu Yehudah permitted his wife to make
                    Tzitzis. My Rebbi says that they should not
                    make Tzitzis, for it says 'Bnei Yisrael...
                    v'Asu', but they may make the garment and spin
                    the threads. A case occurred in which a woman
                    inserted the Tzitzis into the garment, and R.
                    Tam disqualified it. We find that a woman tied
                    Tefilin on a Chaver's arm. We must say that she
                    only helped him to tie it. Alternatively, a
                    woman is disqualified only to make the matter
                    herself, e.g. write, make Tzitzis or tie a
                    Lulav, but she may tie (Tefilin), for this is
                    not making the Mitzvah. I say that the same
                    applies to spinning thread for Tzitzis. Bava
                    Basra 74b proves this.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rosh (Gitin 4:46):</font></b> R. Tam learns from the Beraisa
               here that a woman cannot make Tzitzis or tie a
               Lulav. If she did, it is Pasul, for she is not
               commanded. In Menachos we disqualify a Nochri who
               made Tzitzis, for we require 'Bnei Yisrael.' This
               implies that a woman is Kosher. We say in Sukah that
               a woman's Sukah is Kosher. In Bava Basra, it says
               that R. Chanina ben Dosa's wife will put Techeiles
               for Tzadikim in the world to come. A woman is Pasul
               only for a Sefer Torah, which we learn from Tefilin
               and mzu through a Gezerah Shavah. We do not learn to
               other Mitzvos.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Korban Nesanel (40):</font></b> The Taz (OC 14:1) says
                    that even R. Tam permits women to spin thread
                    for Tzitzis. This is wrong, for if so there is
                    no proof from Bava Basra. (Perhaps R. Chanina
                    ben Dosa's wife will spin thread for
                    Techeiles!)
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Einayim l'Mishpat (Bava Basra 74b):</font></b> The Taz
                    holds like Hagahos Maimoniyos, who is stringent
                    about making Tzitzis and lenient about spinning
                    thread for Tzitzis. He explains (according to
                    R. Tam) that our Gemara teaches that she will
                    spin thread for Tzitzis. The Rashbam and R.
                    Gershom explain that she will store Techeiles
                    for Tzadikim. If so, there is no proof at all.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Mordechai (Hilchos Ketanos (after Menachos) 949):
               Some disqualify women, just like we expound
               regarding Tefilin that only one who is commanded to
               wear is Kosher to write. The Ri disagrees. Bnei
               Yisrael excludes only a Nochri. Women would be
               commanded to wear Tzitzis if the Mitzvah applied at
               all times! They are disqualified only from Tefilin.
               Our custom is that women make Tzitzis. Maharam did
               not allow this, for one who is exempt cannot exempt
               one who is obligated. I say that this is only
               l'Chatchilah. If not, why is a woman's Sukah Kosher?
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (c)</b>  Poskim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (OC 14:1):</font></b> If a Nochri made Tzitzis
               it is Pasul.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Mishnah Berurah (1):</font></b> We are concerned only for
                    putting the Tzitzis in the garment and making
                    the first knot and windings. A Nochri may do
                    the rest of the knots and windings, which are
                    only l'Chatchilah. The Rosh says that a Nochri
                    may spin or twine Tzitzis.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question (Nezirus Shimshon 14, brought in R.
                    Akiva Eiger 1):</font></b> We require spinning Lishmah
                    (for the sake of the Mitzvah), and the Rosh is
                    Machshir when a Yisrael supervisies. All the
                    more so we should be Machshir making Tzitzis
                    (in such a case), for the Rambam does not
                    require Lishmah for this!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Answer (R. Akiva Eiger):</font></b> We disqualify making
                    Tzitzis due to a Gezeras ha'Kasuv 'Bnei
                    Yisrael... v'Asu', not due to Lishmah.
                    Therefore, even Yisrael supervision does not
                    help. This is how the Rosh explains the need
                    for the verse, even though he requires making
                    them Lishmah, for he holds that a Nochri with
                    Yisrael supervision is considered Lishmah. The
                    Rambam holds that it is not Lishmah; this
                    forced him to hold that Asiyah need not be
                    Lishmah (for if not, we would not need 'Bnei
                    Yisrael... v'Asu').
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Kaf ha'Chayim (1):</font></b> If a Yisrael and a Pasul
                    slaughtered together, the Beis Yosef
                    disqualifies and the Shach is Machshir (YD
                    2:11). They argue similarly about a Yisrael and
                    Nochri who made Tzitzis together. We follow the
                    Beis Yosef.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</font></b> A woman may make Tzitzis.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Beis Yosef (DH uv'Hagahos):</font></b> The custom is to be
                    lenient, for the majority permit, and they have
                    a proper reason.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question (Magen Avraham 2):</font></b> We always exclude
                    women from 'Bnei Yisrael' (Kidushin 36a,
                    Menachos 61b)!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Mizrachi (Reish Parshas Emor):</font></b> In the entire
                    Torah it says 'Bnei Yisrael', yet women are
                    equated to men for all laws, i.e. they are
                    commanded about all Mitzvos. We exclude women
                    only when 'Bnei Yisrael' is superfluous, or
                    regarding a Mitzvas Aseh sheha'Zman Gerama (it
                    does not apply at all times).
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Chachmas Shlomo:</font></b> I say that there is no
                    argument. A woman cannot make Tzitzis by
                    herself for a man to wear, but she can be a
                    man's Shali'ach to make Tzitzis. Even though
                    one cannot be a Shali'ach for a matter that
                    does not apply to him, women may fulfill a
                    Mitzvas Aseh sheha'Zman Gerama. All the more so
                    it applies to her according to the opinions
                    that she may bless on such Mitzvos! According
                    to the opinion that a slave cannot receive his
                    own Get of freedom, it applies to him (and he
                    can make a Shali'ach to receive his Get)
                    because he can receive a Get for another slave
                    of a different master (Kidushin 23b). A woman
                    can fulfill Tzitzis herself, and make Tzitzis
                    for herself, therefore, she can be a Shali'ach
                    for a man. The Mechaber allows a woman to be a
                    man's Shali'ach. The Rema disqualifies when she
                    is not a Shali'ach; we learn this from 'Bnei
                    Yisrael.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rema:</font></b> Some are stringent to require men to make
               them. It is good to do so l'Chatchilah. If a Yisrael
               made Tzitzis without intent, it is Kosher. If
               Tzitzis were made from what was already made, it is
               Pasul.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Magen Avraham (3):</font></b> This opinion is stringent
                    about every Mitzvah that women are exempt from,
                    e.g. Sukah and Lulav. A minor is like a woman.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Magen Avraham (649:8):</font></b> The Rema holds that if a
                    Nochri tied a Lulav, it is Kosher b'Di'eved. We
                    hold that a Lulav need not be tied. If so, it
                    is not part of the Mitzvah, so we should permit
                    a Nochri l'Chatchilah! We must say that since
                    it beautifies the Mitzvah, it is like the
                    Mitzvah itself.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Mishnah Berurah (2):</font></b> Even if a man stands by
                    her, it is Pasul due to 'Bnei Yisrael...
                    v'Asu.'
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Mishnah Berurah (3):</font></b> Women may spin and twine
                    the Tzitzis.
<br>            <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Mishnah Berurah (4):</font></b> It is proper that a minor
                    less than 13 not make Tzitzis. One may use a
                    boy above 13 years even if he did not bring two
                    hairs. Eretz ha'Chayim allows using a minor
                    l'Chatchilah if an adult supervises and tells
                    him to make them Lishmah. If he made them
                    without adult supervision, one must untie them
                    and make them again.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>vi. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Kaf ha'Chayim (4):</font></b> One may use a boy above 13
                    only if he brought two hairs.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>vii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Mishnah Berurah (5):</font></b> If a woman put the Tzitzis
                    in, b'Di'eved it is Kosher even without a man
                    supervising. She is believed to say that she
                    did so Lishmah.
<br>

<p>


lvr: 43
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> A voice from Heaven:</font></b> That chest is for the wife
               of R. Chanina ben Dosa [who convinced her husband
               not to take any of their reward in this world]. She
               will put in it Techeiles for Tzadikim in the world
               to come.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rav Yehudah Hindu'ah:</font></b> I was on a ship, and I saw a gem
          (Torah). A giant crocodile was by it. A swimmer came to
          take it, and the crocodile sought to swallow the ship. A
          raven came and cut off its head. The sea turned red from
          all the blood. Another crocodile took the stone, and hung
          it on the dead crocodile; it revived, and sought to
          swallow the ship again. The raven cut off its head again,
          and threw the gem into our ship.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> We had some salted birds. We put the gem on them,
               and they revived, took the gem and flew away.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b></b>  	R. Eliezer and R. Yehoshua were on a ship. R. Eliezer
          was sleeping. R. Yehoshua was agitated, and woke R.
          Eliezer.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Eliezer:</font></b> What agitated you?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Yehoshua:</font></b> I saw a great light! (Iyun Yakov -
               he thought it was the light at the head of a great
               wave ready to sink the ship (73a).)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Eliezer:</font></b> Perhaps it was the eyes of Livyasan -
               'v'Einav k'Afapei Shachar.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b></b>  	Huna bar Nasan was traveling in the wilderness. They
          had a thigh of meat. They opened it, removed the Chelev
          and Gid ha'Nasheh, and put it on grass. By the time they
          gathered firewood, the thigh had closed up.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The next year, they returned and saw that the
               coals were still burning.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Ameimar:</font></b> That was Samterei grass (which
               constricts; R. Gershom - a life-giving drug) and
               Risma coals (which burn a long time).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Chachamim of Bavel):</font></b> 'Va'Yivra Elokim Es ha'Taninim
          ha'Gedolim' refers to Re'emim (giant creatures) of the
          sea.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(R. Yochanan):</font></b> It refers to the male Livyasan, which is
          straight as a bolt; and the female Livyasan, which
          surrounds the world - '...Livyasan Nachash Bari'ach v'Al
          Livyasan Nachash Akalason'.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>LIVYASAN</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b></b>  	[The simple meaning of these accounts is also true.]
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rav Yehudah):</font></b> Hash-m created all creatures male and
          female, also a male Livyasan (Rashba, Chidushei Agados -
          intellect) and female (Nefesh);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the male and female Livyasan would mate (all
               would be according to Sechel (intellect)), the world
               would be desolate (no one would have children).
               Therefore, Hash-m castrated the male (Rashbam - lest
               it mate with other fish, or be pained by unfulfilled
               lust) and killed and salted the female for Tzadikim
               to eat (Rashba - to draw close to Hash-m; Shitah -
               it will sustain every Tzadik, joining his Nefesh and
               body, so it will not return to dirt) in the world to
               come - 'v'Harag Es ha'Tanin Asher ba'Yam.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Also the giant Behemos of Harerei Elef (Resha'im)
               would destroy the world if they would mate. Hash-m
               cooled (removed lust from) the female (physical
               bodies) and castrated the male (their forms) -
               'Hinei Kocho v'Masnav v'Ono bi'Shriri Vitno.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> Why didn't He likewise cool the female
          Livyasan?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> Fish are different. They are lewd. (Iyun Yakov
          - even though they are naturally cold. Shita - if the
          castrated male would see the female, he would destroy the
          world).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> Why didn't He kill the male and castrate the
          female?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #1:</font></b> A salted female is better (Shita - the flesh
          is fatter).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #2:</font></b> 'Livyasan Zeh Yatzarta Lesachek Bo' - it is
          improper to frolic with a female.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> Why didn't He likewise salt the female giant
          Behemah?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> Salted fish is good, but salted meat is not.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE SEAS</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rav Yehudah):</font></b> When Hash-m wanted to create the world,
          he told the Sar of (angel appointed over) the sea to open
          its mouth and swallow all the (Ben Yehoyada - evaporate
          the excess) water.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> The Sar:</font></b> It is enough that I swallow my water!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Hash-m kicked it (made it physical) and killed it
               - 'b'Kocho Raga ha'Yam uvi'Svunaso Machatz Rahav';
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Yitzchak):</font></b> This teaches that the Sar of the
                    sea was called Rahav.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> If the water would not cover it, no creature
               could stand its smell - 'ka'Mayim la'Yam Mechasim';
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  We understand this, it covers the Sar of the
                    Yam. (R. Yitzchak E. Chaver - the Sar is the
                    evil inclination. Hash-m asked it to contain
                    all illusory temptations. It refused. It wanted
                    to dominate this world. Hash-m reduced its
                    power. This is called 'killing' it.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rav Yehudah):</font></b> The Yarden emanates from the Pamyus
          cave.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Beraisa):</font></b> The Yarden emanates from the Pamyus cave
          (Rashba - the Nefesh is a emanation; its first source is
          Sechel of Hash-m), passes through the seas of Sivki and
          Tiveryah, goes to the Yam ha'Gadol (where it becomes a
          Nefesh) and enters the mouth of Livyasan - 'Yivtach Ki 
          Yagi'ach Yarden El Pihu.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (Rabah bar Ula):</font></b> That refers to animals
          (physical bodies)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> It means that animals are secure until the
          Yarden enters the mouth of Livyasan. (Ha'Kosev - the
          Nochrim are not worried as long as Yisrael is in exile,
          for they will not be judged until Mashi'ach comes.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (Rav Dimi):</font></b> What does it mean 'Ki Hu Al Yamim
          Yesadah v'Al Neharos Yechoneneha'?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> These are the seven seas and four rivers that
          encompass Eretz Yisrael;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The seas are Tiveryah, Sedom, Chilas, Chilta,
               Sivki, Aspamya and Yam ha'Gadol;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> The rivers are Yarden, Yarmoch, Kidomiyon, and
               Pigah.
<br>

<p>


lvr: 43
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE END OF LIVYASAN</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rav Dimi):</font></b> Gavri'el will fight Livyasan (Rashba - to
          end this world when its allotted time expires) -
          'Timshoch Livyasan b'Chakah...'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> He cannot defeat it without Hashem's help (since
               Hash-m gave everything power to endure, only He can
               end it) - 'ha'Oso Yagesh Charbo.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rav Dimi):</font></b> When Livyasan is hungry, it spews hot air
          from its mouth and boils [makes foam] all the water in
          the depths - 'Yati'ach ka'Sir Metzulah';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If it would not put its mouth in Gan Eden, no
               creature could stand its smell - 'Yam Yasim
               ka'Merkachah'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  	When it is thirsty (and drinks), it makes furrows in
          the sea - 'Acharav Ya'ir Nasiv' (the depths are
          uncovered).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rav Acha bar Yakov):</font></b> The depths do not return to
          normal for 70 years - 'Yachshov Tehom l'Seivah.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Seivah is never less than 70 years.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rabah):</font></b> In the future, Hash-m will make a feast for
          Tzadikim from the meat of the Livyasan - 'Yichru Alav
          Chabarim';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> 'Kerah' refers to a meal - 'va'Yichreh Lahem
               Kerah Gedolah va'Yochelu va'Yishtu.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> 'Chabarim' refers to Chachamim - 'ha'Yosheves
               ba'Ganim Chaverim Makshivim l'Kolech Hashmi'ini.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> The rest of Livyasan will be divided among
               Chachamim and sold in the markets of Yerushalayim
               (ha'Rif - it will be given to those who supported
               Chachamim) - 'Yechetzuhu Bein Kena'anim';
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  'Kena'anim' means merchants - 'Kena'an b'Yado
                    Moznei Mirmah.'
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> We could also learn from 'Sochareha Sarim
                    Kin'aneha Nichbadei Aretz.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rabah):</font></b> In the future, Hash-m will make a Sukah for
          Tzadikim from the skin of the Livyasan - 'ha'Semalei
          b'Sukos Oro';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> It is a Sukah (Rashbam - complete, with walls)
               for one who merits [did Mitzvos purely to serve
               Hash-m]. For one with less merit [his Mitzvos were
               in order to get reward from Hash-m], it is only
               shade [protects from the day of judgment] -
               'uv'Tzaltzal Dagim Rosho.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> For one with less merit [his Mitzvos were in
               order to get honor from people], it is a necklace -
               'va'Anakim l'Gargerosecha.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> For one with even less merits [his Mitzvos were
               in order to get reward from people], it is an amulet
               - 'v'Siksherenu l'Na'arosecha.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> Hash-m will spread the rest on the walls of
               Yerushalayim. Its radiance will shine to the ends of
               the world - 'v'Holchu Goyim l'Orech...'.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>NEW THINGS THAT HASH-M WILL MAKE</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(R. Shmuel bar Nachmani):</font></b> 'V'Samti Kadchod
          Shimshosayich' [Hash-m will make a new source of light
          for us] - two angels argue about this, Micha'el and
          Gavri'el;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Some say that two Amora'im argue about it,
               Yehudah and Chizkiyah, the sons of R. Chiya.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> One opinion says that this is Shoham, and the
               other says that it is Yashfeh (precious stones of
               the Choshen).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Hash-m decides that it will be 'k'Dein uch'Dein
               (from 'Kadchod', i.e. both will be used).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(R. Yochanan):</font></b>  'U'Sh'arayich l'Avnei Ekdach' teaches
          that Hash-m will bring gems and pearls 30 Amos by 30
          Amos, and carve out a hole 10 Amos by 20 Amos, and erect
          them at the gates of Yerushalayim.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> A Talmid scoffed. Today we don't find gems the
               size of a small egg. Will such giant gems be found?!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Shortly after this, he was on a boat (Ya'avetz -
               used names of Hash-m,) and saw angels sawing holes
               in gems, exactly like the dimensions that R.
               Yochanan taught. He asked what they are for. They
               answered that Hash-m will put them by the gates of
               Yerushalayim in the future. He told R. Yochanan that
               his teaching was correct.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Yochanan:</font></b> Had you not seen it, you would not
               believe it?! You mock the words of Chachamim!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  R. Yochanan put his eyes on the Talmid, and he
                    became a mound of bones.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (Beraisa - R. Meir):</font></b> 'Va'Olech Eschem
          Komemiyus' - the gates will be 200 Amos tall, twice the
          Komah (height) of Adam ha'Rishon;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Yehudah says, it will be 100 Amos, like the
               height of the Heichal and its wall - 'Benoseinu
               ch'Zaviyos Mechutavos Tavnis Heichal.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> R. Yochanan refers to the gates around the
          windows in the wall.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rabah):</font></b> In the future, Hash-m will make seven canopies
          for every Tzadik - 'u'Vora Hash-m... Anan Yomam (1)
          v'Ashan (2) v'Nogah (3) Esh (4) Lehavah (5) Laylah Ki Al
          Kol Kavod Chupah (6). V'Sukah Tihyeh l'Tzel Yom (7)';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> 'Ki Al Kol Kavod' teaches that Hash-m makes a
               canopy for everyone according to his honor.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> Why is there smoke?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer (R. Chanina):</font></b> Anyone who is stingy with
          Chachamim (does not want them to enjoy his property) in
          this world, his eyes are filled with smoke in the world
          to come.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> Why is there fire?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer (R. Chanina):</font></b> Everyone is singed by the canopy
          of someone greater. (He will regret that he did not
          attain that level.)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Woe, the shame that one will feel!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b></b>  	Similarly, 'v'Nosata me'Hodecha Alav' (Moshe was told
          to put some of his glory on Yehoshua), but not all of
          your glory;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Chachamim of that generation said that Moshe's
               face was radiant like the sun, and Yehoshua's face
               was radiant like the moon.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Woe, what shame (Shita - of Yehoshua, who did not
               reach Moshe's level; Iyun Yakov - of that
               generation. Had they merited, Yehoshua would have
               reached the level of Moshe!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(R. Chama b'Rebbi Chanina):</font></b> Hash-m made 10 canopies for
          Adam ha'Rishon - 'Odem Pitdah v'Yahalom Tarshish Shoham
          v'Yashfeh Sapir Nofech u'Varkas v'Zahav';
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(R. Yochanan):</font></b> The lowest of them is gold, for it is
          last.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> What does 'Meleches Tupecha u'Nkavecha Bach'
          mean?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Version #1 - Answer (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> Hash-m told Chiram,
          king of Tzur 'I foresaw that you would claim to be G-d,
          therefore I made man full of pores (Rashbam - for
          excrement).'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Version #2 - Answer (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> Hash-m told Chiram
          'I foresaw that you would claim to be G-d, therefore I
          decreed death on Adam ha'Rishon.'
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) AGADAH: MOSHE, LIKE THE SUN; YEHOSHUA, LIKE THE MOON</b></font><b>
<br></b>The Gemara says that in the World to Come a person will experience great shame when he sees the reward that the other person receives. To demonstrate, the Gemara relates that the elders of the generation that left Mitzrayim commented, 'The face of Moshe shines like the sun while the face of Yehoshua shines only like the moon!' The Gemara says, 'Woe to one who bears such shame! Woe to one who bears such humiliation!'
</p><p>
What is meant by the analogy between Moshe and Yehoshua, and the sun and the moon? In order to attain a deeper understanding of this Agadah, one must first analyze the difference between Moshe's leadership and Yehoshua's leadership from the Torah's perspective.
</p><p>
(a) The Gemara in Sanhedrin (8a) says that Moshe told Yehoshua, 'You will come <i>with</i> the Jewish people into the promised land (Devarim 31:7); the elders and you will lead the people together.'  Hash-m corrected him and instructed him to tell Yehoshua, 'You will <i>bring</i> the Jewish people into the land which I have promised (Devarim 31:23); take a stick and beat the elders until they follow your orders! There can be only one leader in each generation; there cannot be a joint leadership.' Yehoshua would not be able to lead the Jews properly if other elders or prophets would join him. The concept of joint leadership was foreign to him.
</p><p>
In fact, Yehoshua himself expressed this on another occasion. When Moshe appointed the seventy elders to their position of authority, he asked them to join him in front of the Mishkan. There he 'kindled their spirits' and caused them to experience prophetic visions. Two others, Eldad and Meidad, prophesied without Moshe's help while they were still in the camp. When Yehoshua heard of this he came running to Moshe, calling for Moshe to put an end to the prophecy of Eldad and Meidad (Bamidbar 11:26-9). Yehoshua could not tolerate independent prophets declaring the word of Hash-m simultaneously. He therefore assumed that the two self-declared prophets were fabricating. Moshe Rabeinu, however, saw things differently. His reaction to Yehoshua was, 'If only Hash-m would make <i>all</i> of His people into prophets by resting His spirit upon them!' As far as he was concerned, it was perfectly acceptable for numerous prophets to lead the people jointly. In fact, Hash-m explicitly told Moshe to appoint elders 'so that they may bear the burden of the people <i>together</i> with you' (Bamidbar 11:17). This was probably why Moshe originally instructed Yehoshua to lead <i>with</i> the elders -- just as Moshe himself had done.
</p><p>
(b) Why, though, was Moshe Rabeinu different? Why was he exempt from the rule of 'one leader per generation'? The <b>RAMBAM</b> describes the difference between Moshe's prophecy and that of all other prophets as follows: 'All the other prophets received their prophecy through an angel. This is why they saw what they saw only as a metaphoric vision or a non-explicit statement (which needed to be interpreted before it was understood). Moshe, however, did not receive his prophecies through an angel.... He did not see a metaphoric vision, but rather Hash-m revealed His word to Moshe clearly.... [As a result of his unique closeness to the Divine word,] Moshe's face radiated light and he became as spiritual as the angels' (Hilchos Yesodei ha'Torah 7:6; see also chapter 7 of 'Shemoneh Perakim.') This is also the meaning of the Gemara in Yevamos (49b) that states, 'Moshe saw a clear reflection, while the others saw an unclear reflection' (see Insights there).
</p><p>
Normally, successful leadership requires that one person serve as the sole authority. This is because each leader has his own distinct personality, and the differences between the personalities of two leaders inevitably will be expressed in their leadership decisions. Even if the leaders base their decisions on Divine revelation (as was the case in the times of Yehoshua), they are still liable to have differences of opinion. As the Rambam explains, a prophet's vision is still open to interpretation. Since the prophet's own input is required, the interpretation of his prophecy inevitably will be affected by his own unique personality. This is why the Gemara says that 'two prophets never prophesy with an identical phraseology' (Sanhedrin 89a). Even two prophets would not be perfectly compatible leaders, since their differing personalities would be reflected in their interpretation of their prophecies.
</p><p>
Moshe's leadership was different. He did not merely see a vision; he heard the actual words of Hash-m, which he was able to pass on to others. He kindled the prophetic spirit of the seventy elders 'as one candle kindles another' (Bamidbar 11:17; see Rashi there). Since Moshe's prophecy was the <i>source</i> of the elders' prophecy, the elders would never reach a conclusion that was contrary to Moshe's own conclusion. All of their decisions would be unanimous. Similarly, on the occasion that Eldad and Meidad prophesied in the camp, they received the Divine word directly from Hash-m, due to the influence of Moshe. They did not simply see a vision, as did normal prophets. (This is why the two were able to prophesy with an identical phraseology, contrary to the rule cited above.) They, too, would be no threat to Moshe's leadership. Since they saw clearly the will of Hash-m, they could only agree to what Moshe, who experienced the exact same prophecy, would decide.
</p><p>
Yehoshua, on the other hand, was like any other prophet. He could not 'bring down' prophecy for others; he only could receive his own personal prophecy which would be affected by his own personality. Therefore, he would have to lead single-handedly. For the same reason, Yehoshua did not believe that Eldad and Meidad were true prophets. He assumed that all other prophets were like himself and could not be granted prophecy independent of Moshe while Moshe was the leader.
</p><p>
This explains why Moshe told Yehoshua to lead <i>with</i> the elders. Moshe thought that his student Yehoshua would lead in the same manner that he himself led. He assumed that the elders could lead the generation together with Yehoshua, just as they had done with Moshe. Hash-m, however, knew that this was not the case. Yehoshua would not be able to 'share' his perception with the elders, since he would perceive only a weak reflection of Hashem's word. Hash-m therefore told Moshe, 'He should take a stick and beat them until they obey!' Yehoshua must lead alone.
</p><p>
(c) Based on this, the Gemara's analogy between Moshe and the sun, and Yehoshua and the moon, is understood. The sun not only gives forth its own shine, it illuminates the other heavenly bodies as well. The moon and the planets, in contrast, shine only due to their reflection of the light of the sun. It is in this manner that Moshe resembled the sun and Yehoshua resembled the moon. Moshe was able to be a source of prophetic illumination to others, such as the seventy elders (which is what caused his facial radiance, as the Rambam mentions). Yehoshua, in contrast, could become illuminated with the Divine light only through a 'reflection' of the original light ('an unclear reflection'). He could not illuminate others. (The Zohar (Shemos 215a) indeed explains that this is the meaning of the comparison between Moshe and Yehoshua and the sun and the moon.)
</p><p>
Perhaps it is for this reason that specifically the <i>elders</i> commented on Yehoshua's likeness to the moon. The comparison between Yehoshua and the moon was most evident to the elders. It was the elders who would suffer the consequences of Yehoshua's inferiority to Moshe. The elders who led the generation together with Yehoshua's master, Moshe, would not be able to lead together with Yehoshua. This is why it was specifically the <i>elders</i> who noted Yehoshua's likeness to the moon! (M. Kornfeld. See <b>YA'AROS DEVASH</b> of <b>RAV YONASAN EIBESHITZ</b>, Derush #11, and <b>BIRCHAS AVRAHAM</b> of <b>RAV ABISH'L FRANKFURTER</b>, Eruvin 63a.)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>HONORING ELDERS</font></b>
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (a)</b>  Gemara</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> 'Seivah' is never less than 70 years.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Kidushin 32b (Beraisa) Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps 'rise in
               front of a Seivah' includes even an Ashmai
               (ignoramus) elder!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> The verse also says 'Zaken', which
               connotes a Chacham - 'gather for me 70 men from the
               Zekenim of Yisrael.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> R. Yosi ha'Gelili says, 'ZaKeN' denotes one
               'she'KaNah' (who acquired) Chachmah - 'Hash-m Konani
               Reishis Darko.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b></b> R. Shimon ben Elazar says, 'Zaken and you will fear'
               teaches that a Zaken should not unnecessarily cause
               people to rise for him.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b></b> Isi ben Yehudah says, 'rise in front of Seivah'
               refers to any elder.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> The first Tana and R. Yosi ha'Gelili
               agree!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> They argue about whether or not one must
               rise for a young Chacham. R. Yosi holds that the
               Torah interrupted between 'Seivah' and 'Zaken', to
               teach that one can be 'Seivah' without being
               'Zaken', or vice-versa. The first Tana holds that
               the Torah refers to one person (an old Chacham).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Yochanan):</font></b> The Halachah follows Isi.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>10. </font></b></b> R. Yochanan would rise for Nochri elders, because
               they have experienced many afflictions and many
               miracles. Rava would not rise for them, but he would
               show honor. Abaye would give them a hand. Rava and
               Rav Nachman would send messengers to give them a
               hand.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>11. </font></b></b> Rav Nachman thought that it would belittle the honor
               of Torah if he himself would help them.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (b)</b>  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rif and Rosh (Kidushin 14a and 1:53):</font></b> The Halachah
               follows Isi.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Ran (DH Omar):</font></b> The Halachah follows Isi. We
                    rise in front of even an Ashmai elder, i.e. an
                    ignoramus, but not a Rasha, [and all the more
                    so an idolater. R. Yochanan] would stand in
                    front of old Nochrim.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Hagahos ha'Bach:</font></b> The bracketed words should say
                    'like it says that R. Yochanan.'
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Ran (ibid.):</font></b> R. Yochanan did so for the sake of
                    Shalom. Rava showed honor, and Abaye gave a
                    hand, but they did not stand for Nochrim. Rashi
                    connotes that Isi holds like R. Yosi, that
                    Zaken refers even to a young Chacham, for one
                    must stand for an elder even if he is not a
                    Chacham. However, it seems that the Rif rules
                    like the first Tana, who exempts standing for a
                    young Chacham. The Torah wrote Zaken to put it
                    next to 'you will fear' (to teach that a Zaken
                    should not cause people to rise for him). This
                    is not clear. Throughout Shas we say that we
                    stand in front of a Chacham. According to the
                    Rif, it depends only on age! The Ramban defends
                    the RIf, and says that the Gemara always refers
                    to standing for old Chachamim. The difference
                    between an old ignoramus and an old Chacham is
                    that a Chacham need not stand for the former,
                    for it is below his honor. This is not clear.
                    Shmuel stood for Rav Yechezkeil, for he had
                    great deeds (33b). I say that we must stand for
                    Chachamim only because Chachmah generally
                    brings to great deeds! The Torah did not
                    command to stand for such people, for usually
                    it is not evident. One must stand for a young
                    Chacham is only if he is greater than himself,
                    but not if he is smaller, and perhaps not even
                    if he is equal. Chachamim of Bavel stood for
                    each other. Rashi explains that they learned
                    each other's teachings, so each was like the
                    other's Rebbi, for whom one must stand from
                    when he sees him.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rambam (Hilchos Talmud Torah 6:9):</font></b> If one is
               extremely old, we stand in front of him, even if he
               is not a Chacham. Even a young Chacham stands in
               front of an extremely old person. One need not stand
               totally, rather, just enough to honor him. We honor
               even an old Nochri verbally, or extend a hand to
               support him. 'Rise in front of Seivah' refers to any
               elder.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Yere'im (36, cited in Mekoros in Frankel
                    Rambam):</font></b> We stand for a Nochri only if he keeps
                    his seven Mitzvos.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rosh:</font></b> R. Tam explains that 'Ashmai' refers to an
               unlearned elder. Rashi says that it is a wicked,
               ignorant elder. This is wrong. Isi would not
               obligate honoring a Rasha. One may hit and curse
               him, for he does not act like your nation! What do
               the first Tana and R. Yosi ha'Gelili learn from
               Seivah? If not for Seivah, one might have thought
               that Zaken refers to any old person. Since it says
               Seivah first, we learn that Zaken must be a Chacham.
               Alternatively, both of them require rising in front
               of an elder who is not ignorant, even if he is not a
               great Chacham. Since Isi expounds Seivah to refer to
               even an ignorant Chacham, he must expound Zaken to
               refer to a great Chacham even if he is young.
               Someone above 70 is called Seivah.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (c)</b>  Poskim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (YD 244:1):</font></b> It is a Mitzvah to rise
               in front of any Chacham, even if he is young, even
               if the Chacham is not his Rebbi.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Beis Yosef (DH Kasuv):</font></b> Shibolei ha'Leket says
                    that the argument is about a young Chacham
                    below Bar Mitzvah. Tosfos and Semak say that
                    one stands only for a young Chacham outstanding
                    in Chachmah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rema:</font></b> One stands only for a Chacham greater than 
               himself, from whom it is appropriate to learn.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Shach (2):</font></b> The Ramah says that one must stand
                    only in front of one greater than Stam people.
                    If not, an ignoramus would be obligated to
                    stand in front of everyone, and this is totally
                    unreasonable.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</font></b> Also, it is a Mitzvah to rise
               in front of a Seivah, i.e. who is at least 70.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Beis Yosef (DH u'Mah she'Chosav v'Chen):</font></b> We
                    learn from Pirkei Avos (5:27), that Seivah is
                    70.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Birkei Yosef (4):</font></b> The Ari Zal says that based
                    on Kabalah, there is a Mitzvah to stand for
                    someone above 60.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Halichos Olam (8 Ki Tetzei 5):</font></b> Hadrei Da'as
                    says that the Ari Zal holds like the Rif, and
                    obligates standing for a Chacham above 60, and
                    even an ignoramus above 70. Birkat Yosef says
                    that the Ari Zal obligates standing for one
                    above 60 who is not an ignoramus, even if he is
                    not a Chacham, and for anyone above 70. Really,
                    the Ari Zal holds like the Zohar, which says
                    that 60 is Seivah, unlike our Mishnah in Avos.
                    We rule like our Gemara (Bava Basra), which
                    says that Seivah is 70; it is good to be
                    stringent like the Ari Zal.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rema:</font></b> This is even if he is ignoramus, as long as he
               is not a Rasha.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (7):</font></b> Even a young Chacham stands in
               front of an extremely old person. He does not stand
               totally, rather, just enough to honor him. We honor
               even an old Nochri verbally, or extend a hand to
               support him.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Beis Yosef (DH v'Afilu):</font></b> The Tur holds that R.
                    Yochanan did not totally stand for old Nochrim;
                    he rules like him. It seems that also the
                    Rambam explains this way. If so, we must say
                    that Rava (and Abaye) did not stand for them at
                    all. Even though the verse says 'stand', it
                    does not equate an old Ashmai Nochri to a
                    Chacham Yisrael. Tosfos says that the verse
                    does not include Nochrim. This is why R.
                    Yochanan needed to give a reason (they
                    experienced many afflictions...) He did not say
                    that he rises because the Halachah follows Isi!
                    The Rambam rules like Abaye and Rava.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Lechem Mishneh (Hilchos Talmud Torah 6:9):</font></b> R.
                    Yochanan was a Chacham. It was below his honor
                    to stand for elders. Therefore, he explained
                    why he stood. Why didn't the Rambam rule like
                    Rava against Abaye? Because there is such an
                    extreme argument between R. Yochanan (who
                    himself stood) and Rava (who did nothing
                    himself), the Rambam rules like Abaye, who is
                    an intermediate opinion (he extended a hand).
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Bach (DH v'Afilu):</font></b> The Tur holds that R.
                    Yochanan stood. Abaye and Rava hold that we
                    should not equate Nochrim to Yisre'elim. Rava
                    showed honor, i.e. he rose only a little. Abaye
                    gave a hand. The Tur rules like them. The
                    Rambam holds that Rava verbally honored them,
                    and rules that one does like Rava <i>or</i> Abaye.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Taz (4):</font></b> The Tur says that a young Chacham does
                    not disgrace himself to totally stand for him.
                    Other people totally stand for him, like for a
                    Chacham.
<br>            <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Eshel Avraham:</font></b> Beis Yehudah (YD 28) says that
                    all the more so, one stands for an old woman.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (8):</font></b> Two Chachamim or elders need not
               rise for each other, but they show honor.
<br>


lvr: 43
dfh: b
trd:
<b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE FUTURE YERUSHALAYIM</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> What does 'v'Al Mikra'eha' mean?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer (R. Yochanan):</font></b> Yerushalayim of this world is not
          like Yerushalayim of the world to come;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> In this world, anyone who wants can come to
               Yerushalayim. In the world to come, one must be
               invited.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rabah):</font></b> In the future, Tzadikim will be called by
          Hashem's name - 'Kol ha'Nikra vi'Shmi v'Lichvodi
          Berasiv.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(R. Shmuel bar Nachmani):</font></b> Three are called by Hashem's
          name - Tzadikim (like above), Mashi'ach and Yerushalayim.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Mashi'ach - 'v'Zeh Shemo Asher Yikre'o Hash-m
               Tzidkeinu.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Yerushalayim - 'v'Shem ha'Ir mi'Yom Hash-m
               Shamah.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(R. Elazar):</font></b> In the future, (angels) will say 'Kadosh'
          in front of Tzadikim (Etz Yosef - those who remain alive
          at the time of revival of the dead), just like they say
          in front of Hash-m - 'ha'Nish'ar... Kodesh Ye'amer Lo.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rabah):</font></b> In the future, Hash-m will lift Yerushalayim
          three Parsa'os - 'v'Ra'amah v'Yoshvah Sachteha.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> What does 'Sachteha' mean?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> It equals the area Tachteha (underneath
               it).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> What is the source that the area
               underneath is three Parsa'os?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer (Rabah):</font></b> An elder (Ya'avetz - Eliyahu) who
               had seen the first Yerushalayim told me that it was
               three Parsa'os.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps it will be difficult to ascend to
          Yerushalayim!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rejection:</font></b> 'Ka'Av Te'ufenah'.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Papa):</font></b> This teaches that clouds are three
               Parsa'os above the ground.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(R. Chanina bar Papa):</font></b> Hash-m wanted to put a measure
          (limit) to Yerushalayim - 'Lamod Es Yerushalayim...';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The angels protested 'You did not put a measure
               to cities of Nochrim. Will You put a measure to
               Yerushalayim, which contains Your name, Your Mikdash
               and Tzadikim?!'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> 'Rutz... Perazos Teshev Yerushalayim' (Hash-m
               retracted).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Reish Lakish):</font></b> In the future Hash-m will add to
          Yerushalayim 169,000 gardens, 210,000 towers, 146,000
          buildings, 345,690 small buildings (Ra'avad - 1,000
          locked gardens, 1,000 locked towers, 1,000 locked
          buildings...)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Each of these will be like Tzipori when it was
               serene.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Yosi):</font></b> Tzipori had 180,000 markets
               selling condiments.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> What does it mean '...Shalosh u'Shloshim
          Pe'amim'?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer (R. Levi):</font></b> If the future Yerushalayim will be
          three times as big as the old, each building will have 30
          stories. If it will be 30 times as big, each building
          will have three stories.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>KINYAN OF A SHIP</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rav):</font></b> Meshichah (pulling) a ship any amount acquires
          it;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Shmuel):</font></b> He must pull it its own length.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Suggestion:</font></b> They argue like the following Tana'im.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> Mesirah (handing over to transfer
               ownership) is when the buyer grabbed it by the hoof,
               hair, saddle or sack on it, bit in the mouth, or
               bell on its neck. He acquires it;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Meshichah is when he calls to it and it comes, or
               he hits it and it runs in front of him. Once it
               moves a foreleg and hind leg, he acquires;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> R. Achi says, it must move all its legs.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> Rav holds like the first Tana, Shmuel
               holds like R. Achi.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rejection #1:</font></b> Rav can even be like R. Achi.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Achi said only about an animal that moving a
               foreleg and hind leg does not suffice, for the
               animal remains in its place. For a ship, moving any
               amount moves the entire ship.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rejection #2:</font></b> Shmuel can even be like the first Tana.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The first Tana said only about an animal that
               moving a foreleg and hind leg suffices, for then it
               surely will go. For a ship, he must move it its
               length.
<br>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) DOING 'MESHICHAH' TO ACQUIRE AN ANIMAL</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> Rav and Shmuel argue with regard to how much a person must pull a boat in order to acquire it through the act of Meshichah. Rav says that one needs only to pull it a small amount. Shmuel says that one must pull the boat so that it moves entirely out of the place in which it was standing. The Gemara cites a Beraisa and suggests that Rav's view is supported by the opinion of the Tana Kama in the Beraisa. When the Tana Kama describes the way to acquire an animal through Meshichah, he states that when the animal moves a foreleg and a hind leg, it is considered a valid Meshichah even though the other two legs have not moved. This implies that the animal does not have to leave its original place entirely, but rather it suffices that it move a small amount. The Gemara responds that Shmuel might agree with the Tana Kama, because doing Meshichah to acquire an animal is different from doing Meshichah to acquire a boat. Once an animal has moved two legs, the other two legs certainly are going to follow, and thus as soon as it moves two legs it is considered as though it has moved all four legs.
</p><p>
How does the Gemara's explanation reconcile Shmuel's opinion with that of the Tana Kama? Although it is considered as though the animal has moved all four legs, even when the animal moves all four legs it is still partially in the place in which it was originally standing! It has not moved <i>entirely</i> out of its place, which Shmuel maintains is a necessary requirement for the Kinyan of Meshichah to be effective.
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER:</b> The <b>RASHBA</b> and <b>RITVA</b> explain that when an animal moves even a small amount by moving all four legs, it is comparable to a boat moving entirely out of its place. This also seems to be the intention of the <b>RASHBAM</b> and <b>RABEINU GERSHOM</b> (DH Idach).
</p><p>
The logic for this distinction seems to be that when a boat is pulled, it is constantly in contact with the water (or ground) underneath it. If it is partially in the place in which it was standing previously, then it has not yet been lifted off of its place. In contrast, the only part of an animal that rests on the ground is its hooves. As long as it moves each leg out of the place in which that leg was standing previously, it is considered Meshichah. According to this understanding, if the animal would place its hoof down only slightly forward such that the back part of the hoof is resting in the place that the front hoof was resting previously, it would not be a valid Meshichah.
</p><p>
Alternatively, when an animal lifts all four legs, there is a moment at which each leg is actually lifted off of the ground on which it stood. Therefore, it is considered as though it moves entirely from its place as soon as it places all four legs on different places than the places on which they stood previously. According to this understanding, if the animal would place its hoof down only slightly forward such that the back part of the hoof is resting in the place that the front hoof was resting previously, it <i>would</i> be a valid Meshichah.
</p><p>
According to both explanations, if a person physically drags an animal along the ground, he would have to drag it completely out of its resting place in order for the Meshichah to be valid, similar to the Meshichah required for a boat.
</p><p>


lvr: 43
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>KINYAN OF A SHIP (cont.)</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Suggestion:</font></b> Rav and Shmuel argue like the following
          Tana'im.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> A ship is acquired through Meshichah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Nasan says, a ship or Osiyos (the contents of
               a document) is acquired through Meshichah or a
               document.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> Why did R. Nasan teach about acquiring
               Osiyos? The first Tana did not mention this!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> The Beraisa is abbreviated. It means as
               follows. A ship is acquired through Meshichah, and
               Osiyos are acquired through Mesirah;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  R. Nasan says, a ship or Osiyos is acquired
                    through Meshichah or a document.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Objection:</font></b> Why does a document acquire a ship? A
               ship is Metaltelim!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Rather, it means that a ship is acquired
               through Meshichah, and Osiyos are acquired through
               Mesirah. R. Nasan says, a ship is acquired through
               Meshichah, and Osiyos are acquired through a
               document.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> Also the first Tana says that a ship is
               acquired through Meshichah!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> They argue about how far it must be
               pulled, like Rav and Shmuel argue. (Rashbam - the
               latter Tana always comes to add, i.e. the entire
               ship must be pulled; Tosfos - just like R. Nasan
               requires a greater Kinyan for Osiyos, also for a
               ship.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rejection:</font></b> No, both hold like Rav, or like Shmuel. They
          argue only about Osiyos.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Nasan says 'I agree with you about a ship, but
               I say that Osiyos are acquired only with a
               document.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> They argue like Rebbi and Chachamim argue.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa #1 - Rebbi):</font></b> Osiyos are acquired
                    through Mesirah;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b>  Chachamim say, he must write another
                    document and do Mesirah. Doing only one is not
                    enough.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> The Tana who argues with R. Nasan
               cannot be Rebbi, for Rebbi holds that also Mesirah
               acquires a ship!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa #2 - Rebbi):</font></b> A ship is acquired
                    through Mesirah;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> Chachamim say, it is not acquired until he
                    does Meshichah or rents the place where it is
                    standing.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) ACQUIRING A 'SHTAR' THROUGH 'MESIRAH'</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Tana'im agree that a Shtar can be acquired through Mesirah. They disagree about whether Mesirah alone accomplishes the Kinyan, or whether the Mesirah must be accompanied by the writing of an additional Shtar in order to show that the buyer is acquiring not only the paper but also the debt that is written in it.
</p><p>
The <b>RASHBAM</b> (76b, DH Lo Kashya) writes that whenever an object can be acquired through Meshichah it cannot be acquired through Mesirah. Meshichah is considered a stronger sign of ownership, and therefore it is not the common practice to transfer the ownership of an object through Mesirah when it can be transferred through Meshichah. Since it is not the common practice, Mesirah does not work.
</p><p>
The Rishonim (<b>TOSFOS</b> DH Sefinah) cite a source for this from the Gemara later (86a) which makes a similar statement with regard to Hagbahah. The Gemara there says that any object that can be lifted cannot be acquired through Meshichah, because common practice is to transfer its ownership through Hagbahah, which is a stronger sign of ownership than Meshichah. How, then, can a person acquire a Shtar through Mesirah? Since it is possible to do Meshichah to the Shtar (such as in a Simta, which is what the Beraisa is discussing), it should be necessary to perform Meshichah. Moreover, according to the Gemara later (86a), even Meshichah should not suffice; it should be necessary to perform Hagbahah in order to acquire the Shtar. (<b>RAMBAN</b> and Rishonim)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>RABEINU YONAH</b> writes that when the Beraisa uses the word 'Mesirah' it refers to what normally is called 'Hagbahah,' and not to Mesirah. That is, the buyer must receive the Shtar and hold it above the ground such that he acquires it through an act of Hagbahah. Why does the Beraisa use the word 'Mesirah' for such an act? The answer is that the act of Hagbahah normally means that the buyer lifts up the object from wherever it happens to be resting, even from the ground. A Shtar, however, is never placed on the ground, but rather it is transferred directly from hand to hand. Since it is not common to ask the buyer to lift up the Shtar from the ground, that form of Hagbahah will <i>not</i> work to acquire the Shtar. Rather, a Hagbahah must be performed through a transfer of the Shtar from the hand of the seller to the hand of the buyer. That is why the Beraisa describes the Hagbahah that is done to a Shtar as 'Mesirah.'
</p><p>
Tosfos (DH Iy) explains the Gemara in a similar manner. When the Gemara says that a Shtar can be acquired with Mesirah, the Gemara means that besides the Meshichah that is done to the Shtar (or Hagbahah, according to the Gemara on 86a that requires Hagbahah for objects that can be lifted; see Tosfos 86a, DH Aval), there is the addition stipulation that the Shtar must be handed over by the seller (Mesirah). Tosfos explains, however, that the reason it must be handed over is not related to the common manner of transferring ownership of a Shtar, but rather it is in order to show that the buyer is acquiring not only the paper but the debt that is written in it, which originally obligated the Shtar's author to the one who is now selling the Shtar.
</p><p>
This seems to be the intention of the Rashbam as well (75b, DH v'Osiyos, and 76a, DH v'Osiyos b'Mesirah). The Rashbam describes the act of Mesirah that is done with a Shtar as the delivery of the Shtar from the hand of the seller to the hand of the buyer, which is done in order to show that the debt, and not just the paper, is being transferred.
</p><p>
The Acharonim use this explanation to answer a problematic point in the Rashbam. The Gemara initially assumed that a Shtar is acquired through Meshichah. The Rashbam (75b, DH Osiyos, and 76a, DH uv'Shtar), however, writes that even at that point the Gemara understood that a Shtar is transferred through <i>Mesirah</i>. Why does the Rashbam mention Mesirah if the Beraisa says 'Meshichah'? (See <b>MAHARSHA</b> and <b>RASHASH</b> to 75b.)
</p><p>
The <b>PNEI SHLOMO</b> and the <b>NIMUKEI HA'GRIV</b> (on the Maharsha) explain that the Rashbam understands, like Tosfos, that even according to the Gemara's conclusion the Mesirah is done together with Meshichah. Therefore, the Rashbam explains that even when the Gemara originally used the word 'Meshichah,' it meant 'Meshichah with Mesirah.'
</p><p>
The factor that forced the Rashbam to learn this way in the Gemara's original assumption is the question of Tosfos (DH Chasurei): Why does the Gemara add the word 'Mesirah' into the Beraisa, if the Beraisa mentions only 'Meshichah'? Instead of assuming that the Chachamim require Mesirah and Rebbi Nasan requires Meshichah for a Shtar, it should have said that they <i>both</i> require Meshichah for a Shtar. The answer to this question (as the Rashba writes according to Rabeinu Yonah) is that the Gemara knew that neither Mesirah alone nor Meshichah alone can acquire a Shtar. (Meshichah does not show the transfer of a debt; only Mesirah shows the transfer of a debt. On the other hand, Mesirah does not work to acquire Metaltelin that can be acquired through Meshichah or Hagbahah.) Therefore, the Gemara used the terms 'Mesirah' and 'Meshichah' interchangeably with regard to the acquisition of a Shtar.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAMBAN</b>, <b>RASHBA</b>, and <b>RAN</b> explain that the rule that Hagbahah or Meshichah is preferable to Mesirah does not apply to a Shtar. The reason for this is that the act of Hagbahah or Meshichah is performed only with the paper, but not with the debt which the paper represents. With regard to the debt, it makes no difference what kind of act is done to the Shtar; even Mesirah can acquire the debt in the Shtar, and certainly Meshichah and Hagbahah can work. It seems that even according to these Rishonim, if the Shtar is handed over with Mesirah, the buyer acquires the paper as well, for the purpose of proving that he now owns the debt (as the wording of the Ran implies; see footnote 21 in He'oros to the Chidushei ha'Ran). The Kinyan of the Shtar will be accomplished by acquiring the debt (Shibud), since the Shtar was written to describe the Shibud and attest to the ownership of the Shibud ('Afsera d'Shibud'; see Bava Basra 53a and Kidushin 27a). Tosfos, however, understands that the acquisition of a Shibud occurs in the opposite manner. The buyer first must acquire the paper which proves that there is a Shibud, and only afterwards does he acquire the Shibud.
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHERE MESIRAH AND MESHICHAH ACQUIRE</font></b>
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (a)</b>  Gemara</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - Rebbi):</font></b> A ship is acquired through
               Mesirah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Chachamim say, it is not acquired until he does
               Meshichah or rents the place where it is standing.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Rebbi said that a ship is acquired through Mesirah,
               i.e. in a Reshus ha'Rabim. In a Simta (an area next
               to a Reshus ha'Rabim), Meshichah acquires.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> They cannot discuss a Reshus ha'Rabim, for
               one cannot rent a Reshus ha'Rabim! Also, Meshichah
               does not acquire there!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Abaye and Rava):</font></b> Mesirah acquires in a Reshus
                    ha'Rabim, or in a Chatzer that is not of both
                    of them. Meshichah acquires in a Simta or in
                    their joint Chatzer. Hagbahah (lifting the
                    item) acquires everywhere.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Chachamim mean, it is not acquired until he
               does Meshichah from the Reshus ha'Rabim to a Simta.
               If it is in the owner's premises, he must rent the
               place it is standing.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> Abaye and Rava hold like Rebbi, unlike
               Chachamim (who say that Mesirah does not acquire in
               a Reshus ha'Rabim).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection (Rav Ashi):</font></b> Chachamim agree that Mesirah
               acquires if the seller said 'go make Chazakah and
               acquire.' They argue when he said 'go be Moshech and
               acquire'. Chachamim say that he is insistent that
               the buyer do Meshichah. Rebbi says, he merely
               suggests that he may acquire through Meshichah if he
               wants. He may also acquire through Mesirah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> 86a (Mishnah):</font></b> Metaltelim are acquired only through
               Meshichah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Chisda):</font></b> That applies only to something not
               normally lifted. What is normally lifted is acquired
               through Hagbahah, but not Meshichah.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>10. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question (Rav Ada bar Masnah - Beraisa):</font></b> If one
               stole a wallet on Shabbos, and he was dragging it
               out, he need not pay, for the liabilities for theft
               and Shabbos come at the same time. (Since he is
               liable to die, he need not pay.)
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  A wallet can be lifted, yet he acquires it
                    through Meshichah!
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>11. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Kidushin 25b (Rav):</font></b> A large animal is acquired
               through Meshichah.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>12. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question (Shmuel):</font></b> The Mishnah says that it is
               acquired through Mesirah!
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>13. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Rav holds like a different Tana.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>14. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Bava Metzia 8b (Idi):</font></b> The word 'Mosirah' connotes
               that like one who is Moser (hands over) something to
               another person.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>15. </font></b></b> This applies to buying, but no one gives over
               Hefker!
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (b)</b>  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rambam (Hilchos Mechirah 4:3):</font></b> Mesirah acquires only
               in a Reshus ha'Rabim, or in a Chatzer that does not
               belong to both of them. Meshichah acquires only in a
               Simta or in their joint Chatzer. Hagbahah acquires
               everywhere.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rosh (5:2):</font></b> The Rivam says that Mesirah is only when
               he gives the item from hand to hand. He learns from
               Bava Metzia 8b. It says that 'Mosirah' connotes
               handing over to another, therefore, it does not 
               apply to Hefker. This is wrong. Holding it by the
               hoof is Mesirah, and the Gemara connotes that the
               seller did not hand it over! Also, all agree that
               Mesirah acquires if the seller said '<i>go</i> make
               Chazakah and acquire', which connotes that it is not
               from hand to hand. Bava Metzia 8a means that when
               the seller said 'go make Chazakah' and the buyer
               holds it, it acquires, for the seller gave it to him
               to hold it on his command.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rosh (5:4):</font></b> Rebbi holds that a ship is acquired
               through Mesirah, and all the more so through
               Meshichah. We derive this from Chachamim, who say
               '<i>until</i> he does Meshichah to exclude Mesirah. This
               implies that Rebbi holds that also Meshichah
               acquires. Also, we said that Rebbi holds that <i>also</i>
               Mesirah acquires a ship, i.e. in addition to
               Meshichah. Just like here, Mesirah does not exclude
               Meshichah, also everywhere it means Mesirah and all
               the more so Meshichah. This is clear from the
               Rashbam, who says that Mesirah acquires in Reshus
               ha'Rabim because Meshichah does not work there.
               Meshichah is taking to one's Reshus, and Reshus
               ha'Rabim is not his Reshus. Meshichah acquires in a
               Simta, for it is his Reshus to rest things there.
               Since Meshichah, an important Kinyan, can be done,
               Mesirah, an inferior Kinyan, does not acquire. Also,
               if some item could be acquired with Mesirah, but not
               Meshichah, Mesirah would acquire it in a Simta, for
               Meshichah does not acquire it! In Kidushin, Rav
               taught that a large animal is acquired through
               Meshichah. Shmuel challenged him from a Mishnah that
               says that Mesirah acquires it. We must say that the
               Mishnah means that even Mesirah acquires it, and Rav
               holds that only Meshichah acquires. We cannot say
               that Rav meant that even Meshichah acquires, and
               Shmuel asked from the Mishnah, which holds that only
               Mesirah acquires, for Shmuel himself explains a
               Mishnah (Bava Metzia 2a) to say that Meshichah
               acquires animals. R. Shimshon rejected these proofs.
               A Hefker animal is different, for Mesirah does not
               apply to it. The Halachah follows Chachamim, who say
               that he is insistent that the buyer do Meshichah. If
               he said 'go make Chazakah and acquire', all agree
               that he acquires through Mesirah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Tam (brought in Rosh):</font></b> Meshichah and Mesirah are
               not Mitzvos that Mevatel each other, i.e. only the
               best one works! Also, on 86a, we asked why Meshichah
               acquires something that can be lifted. Why didn't
               our Sugya ask this, if it also holds that Meshichah
               (an inferior Kinyan) does not acquire when Hagbahah 
               (a better Kinyan) is possible?! Rav taught that
               Meshichah acquires a large animal. We challenged him
               from a Mishnah that says that Mesirah acquires. Why
               didn't we answer that the Mishnah discusses in a
               Reshus ha'Rabim, where Meshichah does not acquire?
               Mesirah is better, for it is given from hand to
               hand, in front of the seller. It acquires in a
               Reshus ha'Rabim, and all the more so in a Simta. The
               Mishnah teaches that only Mesirah acquires a large
               animal, but Meshichah does not. Meshichah works in
               the owner's absence, but Mesirah does not. This is
               not because Meshichah is better. Rather, 'Mesirah'
               connotes that it is in front of him.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rebuttal (Rosh):</font></b> Mesirah need not be from hand to
               hand, like I explained (above, 2). Mesirah works
               even in the seller's absence, e.g. when he says 'go
               make Chazakah and acquire.' I showed that a big
               animal is acquired also with Meshichah, unlike R.
               Tam. If Mesirah acquires in a Simta, what forced the
               Gemara to explain the Beraisa to mean 'it is not
               acquired until he does Meshichah from the Reshus
               ha'Rabim to a Simta'? We could say that both discuss
               a Simta, and they argue about whether the seller is
               particular about Meshichah, like we conclude! The
               Rashbam's Perush is primary. Also Rav Hai Gaon says
               that Meshichah is better than Mesirah. We find that
               Hagbahah is Mevatel other Kinyanim, which are
               inferior to it. In Kidushin, we did not answer that
               the Mishnah discusses in a Reshus ha'Rabim, and Rav
               discusses a Simta, because Mesirah connotes that
               also Meshichah acquires, but Meshichah connotes only
               Meshichah (so Rav should not have said 'Meshichah').
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Tosfos (Bava Basra 76a DH Sefinah):</font></b> The Ri says that
               Mesirah is weak, therefore, Meshichah is Mevatel it.
               Meshichah is strong, so Hagbahah is not Mevatel it.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Tosfos (Kidushin 25b DH Behemah):</font></b> R. Chayim Kohen
               says that Mesirah does not work in a Simta because a
               Simta belongs to whoever was there first.
               Presumably, the seller was there first, and no
               Kinyan works in the seller's Reshus. Meshichah works
               only because the buyer takes it to his Reshus.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (c)</b>  Poskim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (CM 198:9):</font></b> Mesirah acquires only in
               a Reshus ha'Rabim, or in a Chatzer that does not
               belong to both of them (Rema - and he brought the
               item there without permission of the owner of the
               Chatzer).
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  SMA (16):</font></b> If he brought it there with
                    permission, it is like the Reshus of the one
                    who was authorized or of both of them.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Gra (13):</font></b> Rashi (Bava Kama 48a DH Havya) says
                    (regarding damages) that when one is allowed to
                    enter a Chatzer, it is like his Chatzer.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</font></b> Meshichah acquires only in a
               Simta or in their joint Chatzer. Hagbahah acquires
               everywhere.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  SMA (17):</font></b> Even though Meshichah acquires only
                    with Mesirah (i.e. authorization to acquire),
                    and Mesirah acquires in Reshus ha'Rabim, since
                    he showed that he wants to acquire specifically
                    with Meshichah, he acquires only through it.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rema:</font></b> If the seller said to acquire with Mesirah or
               Meshichah in a place where it does not acquire, the 
               buyer does not acquire.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Gra (14):</font></b> The Gemara said that (always,) Meshichah
               does not acquire in a Reshus ha'Rabim! Kidushin 25b
               asks how one can acquire an elephant according to R.
               Shimon, who requires Hagbahah. We do not say that he
               authorized him (to acquire with Mesirah or
               Meshichah)! This is unlike a stipulation to acquire
               land with money (which works), for letter of the law
               money acquires; the document is needed only because
               the buyer lacks resolve without it. If he says to
               acquire with money, he resolves without the
               document! This contradicts the Rema in Sa'if 5 (who
               said that a stipulation to acquire Metaltelim with
               money works. Nowadays, letter of the law money does
               not acquire!)
<br>

<p>


lvr: 43
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Rebbi said that a ship is acquired
               through Mesirah, i.e. in a Reshus ha'Rabim. In a
               Simta (areas next to the Reshus ha'Rabim), Meshichah
               acquires.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHERE THE VARIOUS KINYANIM WORK</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> We cannot establish Beraisa #2 to be in a
          Reshus ha'Rabim, for Chachamim say that it is not
          acquired until he does Meshichah or rents the place it is
          standing;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> From whom can one rent a Reshus ha'Rabim?!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Also, Meshichah does not acquire in a Reshus
               ha'Rabim!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Abaye and Rava):</font></b> Mesirah acquires in a Reshus
                    ha'Rabim, or in a Chatzer that does not belong
                    to both of them;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> Meshichah acquires in a Simta or in their
                    joint Chatzer;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b></b>Hagbahah (lifting the item) acquires
                    everywhere.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> Chachamim mean, it is not acquired until he
          does Meshichah from the Reshus ha'Rabim to a Simta. If it
          is in the owner's premises, he must rent the place it is
          standing.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Suggestion:</font></b> Abaye and Rava hold like Rebbi, unlike
          Chachamim (who say that Mesirah does not acquire in a
          Reshus ha'Rabim).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rejection (Rav Ashi):</font></b> Chachamim agree that Mesirah
          acquires if the seller said 'go make Chazakah and
          acquire';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> They argue when he said 'go be Moshech and
               acquire';
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  Chachamim say that he is insistent that the
                    buyer do Meshichah;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> Rebbi says, he merely suggests that he may
                    acquire through Meshichah if he wants. He may
                    also acquire through Mesirah.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>SALE OF OSIYOS (A DOCUMENT)</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rav Papa):</font></b> If Reuven sold Osiyos to Shimon, he must
          write (in the document to transfer ownership) 'acquire it
          and all liens that it creates.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (Rav Ashi):</font></b> If he did not write this, for what
          does he sell the document? To cork up a bottle?!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer (Rav Kahana):</font></b> Yes!
<br>

<p>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) 'MESHICHAH' FROM 'RESHUS HA'RABIM' INTO A 'SIMTA'</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Chachamim state that when a person wants to acquire a boat which is in Reshus ha'Rabim, he can acquire it only through an act of Meshichah. The Gemara asks that Meshichah is not effective in Reshus ha'Rabim. The Gemara answers that the Chachamim mean that the boat cannot be acquired until the buyer pulls the boat from Reshus ha'Rabim <i>into a Simta</i>.
</p><p>
Why should pulling the boat into a Simta work to acquire the boat? The Gemara earlier (75b) quotes Shmuel (whose opinion is the Halachah) who says that it does not suffice to pull a boat only a small amount, but rather one must pull the boat completely out of the place in which it was standing (such that the stern of the boat is now where the bow of the boat was). Consequently, it should be necessary to pull the boat into a Simta <i>and</i> to continue pulling it until it has completely left its original place in the Simta. Even according to Rav, it should be necessary to pull the boat at least a small amount in the Simta. Why does the Gemara say that it suffices to pull it into the Simta and no more?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>RAMBAN</b> (Kesuvos 31a, cited by the <b>MAGID MISHNEH</b>, Hilchos Mechirah 4:4) explains that although according to Shmuel it is necessary to pull a boat its entire length, it is not necessary to do so in a Reshus in which Meshichah works to acquire it. The only concern is that when the Meshichah is completed, the boat should be resting entirely in a Reshus in which Meshichah can work to be Koneh. Therefore, when one pulls the boat from Reshus ha'Rabim to a Simta, the buyer acquires the boat as soon as the entire boat enters the Simta.
</p><p>
The logic for this ruling is as follows. Meshichah works in a manner similar to the Kinyan d'Oraisa of Chatzer. It works to acquire the object by placing the object into the buyer's domain. If the seller places his object in a Simta or in a jointly-owned Chatzer, the area beneath the object becomes the seller's for his momentary use as long as the object is there. Therefore, that area cannot be considered the Chatzer of the buyer to acquire the object for him, and he must take it out of that area. When the buyer pulls the object to another area in the Simta or in the jointly-owned Chatzer, the new area beneath the object now becomes the buyer's property, and thus it can be Koneh the object for him, similar to the manner in which his Chatzer is Koneh for him. In contrast, in Reshus ha'Rabim Meshichah does not work, since nobody has permission to park an object in an area which is designated as a public thoroughfare. Therefore, when a buyer pulls an object to a place in Reshus ha'Rabim, the area beneath the object does not become the buyer's for the sake of keeping the object there and acquiring it. When the buyer pulls the object from Reshus ha'Rabim into a Simta, the area in the Simta on which the object now rests becomes his and can acquire the object for him, and he does not need to pull the object any further in the Simta.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Mechirah 4:4, Perush ha'Mishnayos Bava Basra 5:7) writes that if an object is in Reshus ha'Rabim and the buyer pulls it with Meshichah into Reshus ha'Yachid or into a Simta, as soon as <i>part</i> of the object leaves Reshus ha'Rabim the buyer acquires it. The <b>MAGID MISHNEH</b> explains that the Rambam also maintains that the Meshichah may be performed in Reshus ha'Rabim as long as the object <i>ends up</i> in Reshus ha'Yachid.
</p><p>
However, the Rambam is adding that even if only <i>part</i> of the object ends up in Reshus ha'Yachid or in a Simta, the Meshichah acquires the object for the buyer. Why is this? The Gemara in Bava Metzia (8a) relates that if a person lifts up part of an object of Hefker (such as a cloak) in his hands and the other part is still resting on the ground, he does <i>not</i> acquire the object, since part of it is still on the ground. Similarly, the <b>VILNA GA'ON</b> (Bi'ur ha'Gra to Shulchan Aruch 198:14) proves from the laws of Shabbos that the <i>entire</i> object must reach the Reshus ha'Yachid in order for the buyer to acquire it; the Halachah is that dragging an object partially into Reshus ha'Rabim from Reshus ha'Yachid on Shabbos does not constitute the Melachah of Hotza'ah (Shabbos 90b). Why, then, does the Rambam write that pulling part of an object into a Reshus ha'Yachid suffices to acquire it?
</p><p>
Perhaps the Rambam maintains that the second half of an object which is outside of the Reshus of the buyer prevents the Kinyan from working only when the Reshus in which that second half is resting is the seller's domain from which the buyer is taking the object. The fact that the object is resting in the seller's Reshus contradicts the Kinyan of the buyer's Chatzer. Therefore, if the second half is in Reshus ha'Rabim, it does <i>not</i> contradict the Kinyan of the buyer, and the Chatzer beneath part of the object is Koneh the object for him. This is the way the <b>SHA'AR HA'MELECH</b> (Hilchos Geneivah 3:2) understands the Rambam here (he infers this point from the wording of the Rambam).
</p><p>
If this is indeed the view of the Rambam, the Rambam's ruling is no longer problematic. The Gemara in Bava Metzia (8a) is discussing an object acquired from Hefker. Since the Reshus ha'Rabim is the Reshus of Hefker in which the object was originally resting, the fact that part of the cloak is still resting in Reshus ha'Rabim is a contradiction to the Kinyan. In the laws of Shabbos, resting in Reshus ha'Rabim is a contradiction to being in Reshus ha'Yachid with regard to the Melachah of Hotza'ah. Therefore, an object is not considered 'resting' (with 'Hanachah') in one of the two Reshuyos unless it is entirely moved into that Reshus. (See also Insights to Gitin 78:3:a.)
</p><p>
(c) The <b>RA'AVAD</b> (Hilchos Mechirah 4:4) seems to have a third approach. The Ra'avad maintains that the Meshichah of the entire length of the object begins only when the object enters the Simta. However, it is not necessary for the entire object to enter the Simta in order to begin the Meshichah. As soon as part of the object enters the Simta, the Meshichah begins. Therefore, once the entire object has entered the Simta, a Meshichah has been performed with the entire length of the object.
</p><p>
The Ra'avad adds that if an animal is pulled such that it puts a foreleg and a hind leg into a Simta, it is considered a Meshichah and the buyer acquires it, even though the other two legs are still in Reshus ha'Rabim. The Ra'avad also understands that, in theory, a Simta can acquire an object for the buyer even when only part of the object is resting in the Simta. However, he is stringent in that he requires that the Meshichah must start only from when the object enters the Simta (and thus, practically, the object must be moved its entire length while in the Simta).
</p><p>
Some explain that the Rambam agrees with the Ra'avad, except that he maintains that any object other than a boat does not need to be pulled its entire length. It suffices to drag it a small amount (as the <b>ROSH</b> (5:2) writes). The reason why the Rambam maintains that bringing part of an object into a Simta will be Koneh the object is that the object has moved a small amount from the time that part of it entered the Simta. It is not necessary to drag it its entire length in the Simta. (See Ra'avad there, and <b>RABEINU YERUCHAM</b> 10:1.)
</p><p>



</p><p>


lvr: 43
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>SALE OF OSIYOS (cont.)</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Version #1 - Rashbam - (Ameimar):</font></b> The Halachah follows
          Rebbi. Osiyos are acquired through Mesirah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Version #2 - Tosfos - (Ameimar):</font></b> The Halachah follows
          Chachamim. Osiyos are not acquired through Mesirah. (End
          of Version #2)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rav Ashi:</font></b> Did you hear that, or do you say it from
          reasoning?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Ameimar:</font></b> I heard it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rav Ashi:</font></b> Reasoning also says so!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Osiyos are Mili (mere words, without intrinsic
               value). They cannot be acquired through Mili
               (Rashbam - another document; Tosfos - Mesirah).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> Rabah bar Yitzchak taught that there are two
          laws of documents:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the seller said 'acquire the field for Ploni
               (through Chalipin) and write the document', he can
               retract his authorization of a document, but not the
               gift (they acquired immediately for Ploni);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If he said 'acquire the field for him on
               condition that you write the document', he can
               retract the document and the gift (until Ploni
               receives the document).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Chiya bar Avin):</font></b> There is a third law. The
               seller wrote the document in the buyer's absence;
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) CONSENT TO WRITE A 'SHTAR'</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara teaches that when a person sells a field and tells a Shali'ach to make a Kinyan on the field on behalf of the buyer and to write a Shtar, with witnesses, for the purchase, the seller may not retract from the sale because the Shali'ach already made the Kinyan. However, he <i>may</i> retract from his command to write a Shtar. He may tell the Shali'ach not to deliver the Shtar as long as the Shtar has not yet reached the hands of the buyer.
</p><p>
How can the seller prohibit the buyer from writing a Shtar with the signatures of witnesses to attest to the sale? If the witnesses saw the sale take place, then they should be able to testify to that effect and sign a Shtar without the consent of the seller! This seems clear from the Gemara later in Bava Basra (171a) which teaches that if a buyer loses a Shtar, he may tell the witnesses to write him another Shtar without the consent of the seller, as long as the Shtar does not involve a Shibud of the property of the seller. Here, too, the witnesses should be permitted to write a Shtar that does not include Achrayus Nechasim.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> points out that the Gemara here does not mean that the Shtar <i>may</i> be written but <i>Achrayus</i> cannot be included in the Shtar when the seller retracts his consent to write the Shtar, because the Shtar is not needed to create a Chiyuv of Achrayus in this case. The Gemara (41b) teaches that when one sells a field in front of witnesses, the Chiyuv of Achrayus is created automatically. Hence, the Shtar is necessary only as proof of the sale, and as such it should be permitted to write the Shtar even without the consent of the seller. (<b>TOSFOS</b> DH Chozer)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>PISKEI RID</b> and the <b>RA'AVAD</b> cited by the Shitah Mekubetzes explain that the Gemara indeed prohibits the writing of the Shtar without the permission of the seller only when the Shtar includes Achrayus Nechasim. For example, if the seller specified at the time of the sale that he does <i>not</i> want to obligate himself with a Chiyuv of Achrayus unless he later writes a Shtar to obligate himself, the seller may change his mind about writing that Shtar.
</p><p>
How can these Rishonim say that the Gemara is discussing such a limited and specific case, when the Gemara makes no mention of such specific circumstances? These Rishonim explain that the Gemara (on 41b) does not mean that every sale without a Shtar includes a Chiyuv of Achrayus. Rather, the Gemara means that if the seller specifies that he is obligating himself with Achrayus, then the buyer may collect not only from Nechasim Bnei Chorin, but even from Nechasim Meshubadim. They infer this from the Gemara in Bava Metzia (14a) which says that 'Achrayus Ta'us Sofer,' which means that (according to the Rabanan who argue with Rebbi Meir) when a Shtar written for a sale does not specify a Chiyuv of Achrayus, it is assumed that there is a Chiyuv of Achrayus anyway and that the scribe merely forget to write it in the Shtar. These words imply that only with a written Shtar is it assumed that the seller intended to obligate himself with Achrayus even if it is not written in the Shtar, since he went through the trouble of writing a Shtar. In contrast, when the field is sold without a Shtar, it is assumed that the seller is not Chayav for Achrayus unless he explicitly says that he accepts Achrayus.
</p><p>
(b) <b>RABEINU YEHONASAN</b> cited by the Shitah Mekubetzes writes that the Shtar may be written even without the seller's permission. When the Gemara says that the seller may change his mind, it means that if he originally offered to pay for the writing of the Shtar, he may change his mind and the buyer will have to pay on his own to have the Shtar written.
</p><p>
(c) <b>TOSFOS</b> answers that a Shtar that was lost may be rewritten since the seller has nothing to lose if the Shtar is rewritten. In the case of the Gemara here, however, the seller will lose if a Shtar is written, because there never was a Shtar until now. A Shtar publicizes that the person has sold his land, and thus people will not want to extend loans to him since he does not have as much real estate to collateralize for the loan. The <b>RASHBA</b> adds that the value of his real estate will decrease when the word spreads that he needs to sell his property. (Although when one sells his property without a Shtar, his property becomes Meshubad because of the rumor (Kol), nevertheless a Shtar publicizes this even more (Rashba).)
</p><p>
<b>RABEINU TAM</b> cited by Tosfos suggests a similar answer. The Gemara here is discussing land that was given as a gift without a Shibud on the giver's Nechasim. If the recipient writes a Shtar, those who hear about the Shtar might mistakenly assume that the Shtar was either a Shtar Mecher (a bill of sale) or a Shtar Chov (a bill of debt, in which the land mentioned in the Shtar was collateral for the debt), and that the owner was Meshabed himself. Since it is to the detriment of the giver to have a Shtar written, it may not be written without his consent. (In the case in which a person lost the original Shtar, the giver does not lose by having another Shtar written, because people will realize that both Shtaros were written for the same field and it will not look like he is giving an additional field, or that he is giving a Shtar Chov.)
</p><p>
(d) <b>RABEINU YONAH</b> explains that even though there already exists a Shibud, the witnesses may not sign a Shtar which can also be used to prove that there is a Shibud without the consent of the seller, since this Shtar might be used in court to prove the Shibud. A Shtar written without the consent of the seller is not valid to prove the Shibud, since testimony must be given in front of the court and in front of the seller whom the Shibud obligates. Therefore, if the witnesses sign a Shtar without the consent of the seller, the Shtar is entirely invalid, even as proof to the transaction, since the witnesses were presenting testimony (not in the presence of the seller) that would obligate the seller to pay as a result of the Shibud.
</p><p>
The Gemara that allows a Shtar that was lost to be rewritten without the consent of the seller only allows the Shtar to be written without Achrayus. Such a Shtar -- which pertains only to what already happened (i.e. the field was already sold or given), but which does not obligate the seller in any future obligations (such as a Shibud) -- may be written even when not in the presence of the seller. In the case of the Gemara here, the buyer would be permitted to write a Shtar which does <i>not</i> include Achrayus, without the consent of the seller.
</p><p>
(e) The <b>RAMBAN</b>, <b>RASHBA</b>, and <b>RAN</b> go a step further than Rabeinu Yonah. They write that even a Shtar Ra'ayah (a Shtar used only as proof), which does not involve Achrayus, cannot be written without the consent of the seller. The reason for this is that the Torah teaches that written evidence is not accepted in court ('mi'Pihem v'Lo mi'Pi Kesavam,' Kesuvos 20a). Indeed, for this reason <i>no</i> Shtar should be valid as proof in court. However, when the person whom the Shtar obligates requests that a Shtar be written and signed by witnesses, the signed Shtar serves as a form of Hoda'as Ba'al Din in court. The signatures simply confirm that the person admitted to his obligation by requesting that the Shtar be written. Accordingly, when the seller does not request that a Shtar be written, any testimony in the Shtar is not valid because of the rule of 'mi'Pihem v'Lo mi'Pi Kesavam.'
</p><p>
The Gemara later (171a) allows witnesses to rewrite a Shtar that was lost because the witnesses are able to testify that they were asked by the seller (or giver) to sign on a Shtar. In the case here, in which the giver tells the witnesses not to sign on a Shtar, their signatures on the Shtar are not valid testimony.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (39b, DH Macha'ah) presents the same approach to explain the validity of a Shtar. Why, then, does Tosfos here allow a Shtar to be written without the consent of the seller, if the seller suffers no harm from it? Perhaps it is because in the case of the Gemara here, the seller allowed the Shtar to be written at the time the buyer acquired the field. The Gemara (40a) teaches that a Kinyan made in front of witnesses is meant to be written down in a Shtar ('Stam Kinyan l'Kesivah Omed'), and the giver does not need to request from witnesses to write it down, as the Rashbam here cites. Since the Kinyan was already made with the seller's permission to commit it to writing, the seller may no longer retract his permission.
</p><p>
Although the Rashbam disagrees with this and writes that a Kinyan includes only <i>implied</i> consent, but if the seller later specifies that he does not consent to having a Shtar written he may retract his original implied consent, the <b>RAMBAN</b> (in Kidushin 27a) writes that the Gemara means to say more than this. The Gemara means to say that a Kinyan gives the buyer permission to write the Shtar, and the seller cannot change his mind once the Kinyan was already made. That is why Tosfos maintains that in the case of the Gemara here, it would have been permitted to write the Shtar even after the seller's retraction of his consent if not for the fact that the Shtar could harm the seller, and therefore the Kinyan -- from the start -- was not meant to be committed to writing.
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>DOES THE PRICE PROVE WHAT WAS SOLD?</font></b>
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (a)</b>  Gemara</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> 61b (Rav Nachman):</font></b> If one sold a house in a big
               Birah (building), even if he gave boundaries of the
               entire Birah, he merely gave boundaries that people
               recognize.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> If people call the house a house, and the
               Birah a Birah, this is obvious! If people call also
               the Birah a house, he sold the whole Birah!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Most call the house a house, and the Birah a
               Birah. Some call also the Birah a house. One might
               have thought that he sold the whole Birah. Rav
               Nachman teaches that this is not so. Had he sold it,
               he would have written 'I do not omit anything from
               this sale.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> 77b (Mishnah):</font></b> If one sold a yoke, he did not sell
               the oxen. If he sold the oxen, he did not sell the
               yoke;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b></b> R. Yehudah says, the price indicates whether or not
               he sold the oxen. If he sold a yoke for 200 Zuz,
               surely this includes the oxen!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b></b> Chachamim say, the price is not a proof.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> What is the case? If people call a yoke
               (only) a yoke, and call oxen (only) oxen, obviously,
               the oxen are not sold!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Rather, they call a yoke a yoke, and call
               oxen oxen, and some use 'yoke' to refer to the oxen
               as well. R. Yehudah holds that the price indicates
               what he sold. Chachamim hold that the price is not a
               proof.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> If the price is not a proof, the sale
               should be invalid!
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>10. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #1:</font></b> Indeed, Chachamim mean that the sale is
               invalid.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>11. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #2:</font></b> Chachamim say that Ona'ah (returning the
               overcharge) and voiding of the sale apply in a case
               in which one could err. If clearly he knew that the
               price is too high, he gave the extra money for a
               gift.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>12. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> 92a (Rav):</font></b> If Reuven sold an ox to Shimon, and it
               was found to be a gorer, it is a Mekach Ta'os (a
               mistaken sale; it is void).
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>13. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Shmuel):</font></b> Reuven can say 'I sold it to you for
               slaughter.'
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>14. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> Let us see whether Shimon buys oxen for
               plowing or for slaughter!
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>15. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> The case is, he buys for both.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>16. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> Let us see whether the price was of a
               plowing ox or an ox for slaughter!
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (b)</b>  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rambam (Hilchos Mechirah 27:2):</font></b> If one sells a yoke,
               he did not sell the oxen. If he sold the oxen, he
               did not sell the yoke, even in a place where some
               call a yoke 'oxen.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rambam (5):</font></b> The price is not a proof. If he erred a
               plausible amount, Ona'ah and Bitul Mekach apply like
               in any sale. If he erred an implausible amount,
               there is no Bitul Mekach, for he gave a gift. The
               price is not a proof.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Hagahos Maimoniyos (3):</font></b> This is not difficult
                    for Rav, who says (Kidushin 46b) that if one
                    was Mekadesh his sister, the money is a
                    deposit. There, the Kidushin is totally Batel.
                    Here, the sale is valid. It is unreasonable
                    that the seller keep the value of the yoke and
                    return the rest.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rosh (6:2):</font></b> Chachamim agree that the price is a
               proof when it does not contradict the primary way
               people speak.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Tosfos (92a DH v'LIchzi):</font></b> Chachamim hold that the
               price is not a proof only when the majority (of how
               people speak) and Chazakah (he has the money) favor
               the seller. Even according to texts that say (on
               77b) '<i>some</i> call a yoke a yoke... and some...'
               (there is no majority), the price is not a proof
               because the Chazakah favors the seller. If there is
               a majority (e.g. most buy cows for plowing) against
               a Chazakah, the price determines what was sold.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rashbam (92a DH v'LIchzi):</font></b> Chachamim hold that the
               price is not a proof only when not everyone calls
               oxen 'yoke'. The seller can say that the buyer calls
               oxen oxen, and he sold only a yoke. Ha'Motzi
               mi'Chavero Alav ha'Re'ayah; since the buyer cannot
               prove how he speaks, he gets only a yoke. Here, we
               know that the buyer ofen buys for plowing and
               Shechitah, therefore, the price is a proof. Also
               above, if everyone calls also oxen 'yoke', even if
               they sometimes call them oxen, the price is a proof,
               for we know that the buyer often calls them yoke.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Tosfos (61b DH Ela):</font></b> The Rivam says that if everyone
               calls the Birah a house, and when they mean just the
               house they specify, one who bought a house receives
               the entire Birah even without a proof (from the
               borders). The Ri explains that if everyone calls
               also the Birah a house, even though they call also
               the house a house, the boundaries proves that he
               sold the whole Birah. Rather, some do not call the
               Birah a house, therefore the boundaries are not a
               proof.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (c)</b>  Poskim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (CM 220:4):</font></b> If one sells a yoke, he
               did not sell the oxen. If he sold the oxen, he did
               not sell the yoke, even in a place where (Rema -
               some) call a yoke 'oxen.'
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  SMA (10):</font></b> Also the Rambam and Rema (Sa'if 8)
                    discuss where they call a yoke 'oxen.' If this
                    is not a printing mistake, we must say that
                    this refers to 'if he sold the oxen, he did not
                    sell the yoke.' However, in Sa'if 8 the Rema
                    says 'if everyone calls a yoke 'oxen', and when
                    they mean just a yoke they say 'a yoke alone',
                    then even without a proof from the price,
                    everything is sold.' This shows that he
                    discusses whether oxen are included with a sale
                    of a yoke. Therefore, it seems that the text
                    should say 'where they call oxen 'yoke'. This
                    applies also in the Tur. When everyone calls a
                    yoke 'oxen' and vice-versa, even without a
                    proof from the price, all agree that he sold
                    according to how people speak, like it says in
                    Bava Basra (61b).
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Gra (5):</font></b> The Shulchan Aruch is like the Rif's
                    text.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (8):</font></b> In all these cases, the price is
               not a proof. If he erred a plausible amount, Ona'ah
               and Bitul Mekach apply like in any sale. If he erred
               more than a plausible amount, there is no Bitul
               Mekach, for he gave a gift.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Beis Yosef (DH u'Mah):</font></b> The Rashbam says that
                    the first answer (Chachamim say the price is
                    not a proof, i.e. the sale is invalid) is weak.
                    Presumably, the Halachah follows the latter
                    answer. The Ran says that the Halachah follows
                    the latter answer, and that the Rashbam and
                    Ramban agree, and it seems that also the Rif
                    agrees, for he brought both versions Stam. I am
                    astounded by R. Chananel. In the next Perek he
                    says that the price is not a proof, and it is
                    Bitul Mekach, i.e. like the first answer. The
                    Tur says that Rav Hai Gaon holds that the price
                    proves that there is Bitul Mekach, for he rules
                    like the first answer. The Tur says that the
                    Rosh rules like the Rashbam, even though the
                    Rosh did not explicitly say so. Since the Rosh
                    brought both answers Stam, this connotes that
                    the rules like the latter, like the Ran said
                    about the Rif. The Ran says that the price is
                    not a proof even if the buyer was Mioshech the
                    yoke and oxen and he still has the money, for
                    when we say 'he did not sell', this is not due
                    to Safek. Rather, this is the Halachah. Also
                    the Ramban says so.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rema:</font></b> This is only in a place where where people
               call oxen oxen and they call a yoke a yoke, but if
               most call a yoke 'oxen', then we say that the price
               indicates what he sold. If everyone calls a yoke
               'oxen', and when they mean just a yoke they say 'a
               yoke alone', then even without a proof from the
               price, everything is sold.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Beis Yosef (DH v'Ela):</font></b> If everyone calls also
                    oxen 'yoke', and the price was appropriate for
                    oxen, all agree that the price is a proof. The
                    seller should have specified if he sells only
                    the yoke. Since he did not, we say that he sold
                    everything.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Beis Yosef (DH v'Afilu):</font></b> The Tur says that the
                    Ramah holds that even if only the majority call
                    a yoke 'oxen' the the price is a proof, unlike
                    the Rashbam, who says that the the price is a
                    proof only when everyone speaks this way.
                    Really, the Tur means that the majority call
                    oxen 'yoke'.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Gra (11):</font></b> 'They call a yoke a yoke, and call
                    oxen oxen, and some...' connotes that the
                    majority speak the first way. This is like
                    Tosfos 92a. The Rashbam and Rosh hold that the
                    price is a proof when everyone calls oxen yoke,
                    but they also call a yoke yoke without
                    specifying. This is like the Ri in Tosfos 61b.
                    The Rema and Ramah are like the Rivam in that
                    Tosfos.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rema:</font></b> Some say that one who sold oxen did not sell
               the yoke Stam, for we can say that he sold them for
               Shechitah. If he specified that they are for
               plowing, the yoke is sold with the oxen.
<br>
<font color='blue'><i>See also:</i>
<br><b><b>WHEN CAN ONE SAY THAT HE SOLD AN OX FOR SHECHITAH? </b></b>(</font><font color='blue'>


lvr: 43
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  A seller may write the document in the buyer's
                    absence.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> When the buyer makes Chazakah on the field, he
               acquires the document, wherever it is. (Ran - even
               if it contains extra rights for the buyer, i.e.
               Osiyos.)
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> Metaltelim can be acquired Agav
                    (along with Kinyan of) land, through money, a
                    document or Chazakah. (Rashbam - the document
                    is acquired just because the seller wants to
                    give it; Tosfos - Agav is a weak Kinyan, like
                    Mili, and it works.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> Agav is different (it is a strong Kinyan).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Support:</font></b> Agav is stronger than Chalipin regarding
          money. Money is not acquired through Chalipin, but it is
          acquired Agav land.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Rav Papa had 12,000 Dinarim in Bei Chuza'i. He
               gave them to Rav Shmuel bar Acha, Agav the corner of
               his house, in order that the one guarding them would
               give them to Rav Shmuel (to return to Rav Papa).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Mishnah):</font></b> He did not sell the slaves, bags or Antiki.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> What is Antiki?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rav Papa):</font></b> It is the merchandise in the ship.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHAT IS INCLUDED WITH A WAGON</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Mishnah):</font></b> If one sold a wagon, he did not sell the
          mules. If he sold the mules, he did not sell the wagon.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  	If one sold a yoke, he did not sell the oxen. If he
          sold the oxen, he did not sell the yoke;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  	R. Yehudah says, the price indicates whether or not he
          sold the oxen;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If he sold a yoke for 200 Zuz (about a standard
               year's income), surely this includes the oxen!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  	Chachamim say, the price is not a proof.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Gemara - Rav Tachlifa bar Ma'arava - Beraisa):</font></b> If one
          sold a wagon, he sells the mules.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	R. Avahu:</font></b> Our Mishnah says that he did not sell the
          mules!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rav Tachlifa:</font></b> I will no longer recite this Beraisa (it
          is mistaken).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	R. Avahu:</font></b> It is not mistaken. The case is, the mules
          are attached to the wagon.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Mishnah):</font></b> If one sold a yoke, he did not sell the
          oxen...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> What is the case?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If people call a yoke (only) a yoke, and call
               oxen (only) oxen, obviously, the oxen are not sold!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #1:</font></b> Rather, 'yoke' refers to the yoke and the
          oxen.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rejection:</font></b> If so, surely he sold the oxen as well!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #2:</font></b> Rather, they (the majority) call a yoke a
          yoke, and call oxen oxen, and some use 'yoke' to refer to
          the oxen as well.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Yehudah holds that the price indicates what he
               sold. Chachamim hold that the price is not a proof.
<br>

<p>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) ACQUIRING A 'SHTAR' WITH 'MILI'</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara proves that it is possible to transfer the ownership of a Shtar with 'Mili,' words, from the ruling of Rav Huna who says that in the case of a landowner who wrote a Shtar for a sale before the sale took place, when the buyer later acquires the field he acquires the Shtar as well, even though it was not yet handed over to him. From this ruling, the Gemara attempts to prove that it is not necessary to make a strong act of Kinyan on a Shtar. Even a weak act of Kinyan (what the Gemara calls 'Mili') also suffices.
</p><p>
The Rishonim (see <b>TOSFOS</b> DH Nikneh) ask how can the Gemara compare the transfer of ownership of a Shtar Mecher (a bill of sale) with the transfer of ownership of a Shtar Chov (a bill of debt)? When one transfers the ownership of a Shtar Chov, the buyer must acquire not only the proof that is written on the paper, but the debt (the Shibud) itself as well. Since the Shibud is not a tangible object, a stronger Kinyan must be made on the Shtar. The case which the Gemara is discussing, in contrast, is that of a bill of sale, where no Shibud is transferred, but where the Shtar merely testifies that a sale occurred, and therefore it does not require a strong Kinyan!
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> answers that the Gemara is discussing even a Shtar Mecher that <i>does</i> create a Shibud, such as when the property was originally sold with a stipulation that there is no Shibud on the seller's property, and now a Shtar has been written which creates a Shibud.
</p><p>
Alternatively, the Shtar has new conditions in it that obligate the seller, conditions which he was not obligated to fulfill until now. (<b>RAN</b>)
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAN</b> suggests further that even if the Shtar does not obligate the seller in any new obligations, it still requires a strong Kinyan, because it is not merely the paper and signatures that are being transferred; the permission of the seller to use the Shtar as proof of purchase is also being transferred. The reason for this is, as mentioned above, that testimony that is written is not valid in court (because of 'mi'Pihem v'Lo mi'Pi Kesavam'). The Shtar becomes valid only because of the permission given to write it by the one whom the Shtar obligates (which makes the Shtar like Hoda'as Ba'al Din).
</p><p>
The Ran maintains that it does not suffice to have the permission at the time that the Shtar is written; permission must be given at the time that the Shtar is handed to the bearer (the one who will use it as proof). Therefore, a strong Kinyan is required to transfer the Shtar in order to show that the permission of the giver was given along with the Shtar. The paper alone will not suffice.
</p><p>



</p><p>


lvr: 43
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO GROSSLY OVERPAID</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> If the price is not a proof, the sale should
          be invalid! (He overcharged much more than a sixth.)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> Chachamim holds that overcharging
               does not invalidate a sale.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection (Mishnah - R. Yehudah):</font></b> If one sells a
               Sefer Torah, animal or pearl, the buyer cannot claim
               Ona'ah (that he was overcharged);
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  Chachamim say, only the exceptions we listed
                    (Bava Metzia 56a - slaves, documents, land and
                    Hekdesh) are not subject to Ona'ah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #1:</font></b> Indeed, Chachamim say that the price is not
          a proof, i.e. the  sale is invalid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #2:</font></b> Chachamim say that Ona'ah and voiding of the
          sale apply to a case in which one could err;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If clearly he knew that the price is too high, he
               gave the extra money for a gift.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>ARE KELIM SOLD WITH A DONKEY?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Mishnah):</font></b> If one sells a donkey, he does not include
          its Kelim;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  	Nachum ha'Midi says, he includes its Kelim.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  	R. Yehudah says, sometimes they are included, and
          sometimes not;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the donkey was in front of him and the Kelim
               were on it, and the buyer said 'sell to me this
               donkey of yours', they are included;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If the buyer asked 'is this your donkey (so I can
               buy it)?'  they are not included.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Gemara - Ula):</font></b> They argue about bags (for loads) and a
          saddle for women;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The first Tana holds that donkeys are normally
               for men to ride on, so these are not included;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Nachum ha'Midi holds that donkeys are (also) for
               carrying loads (and women), so they are included;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  All agree that Kelim needed for riding (e.g.
                    (men's) saddles) are included.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (Beraisa):</font></b> If one said 'I sell to you a donkey
          and its Kelim', Kelim needed for riding are included, but
          not bags or women's saddles;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If he said 'it and everything on it', all these
               are included.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> Had he not said 'I sell to you a
               donkey and its Kelim', he would not acquire Kelim
               needed for riding!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> No, even without saying this, he acquires them;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The Chidush is that even when he says this, bags
               and women's saddles are not included.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> Do they argue when the Kelim are on the
          donkey, but when they are not, Nachum ha'Midi admits that
          they are not included?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Or, do they argue when the Kelim are not on the
               donkey, but when they are on it, Chachamim (the
               first Tana) admits that they are included?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #1 (Beraisa):</font></b> If he said 'it and everything on
          it', all these are included.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If they argue when the Kelim are on the donkey,
               the Beraisa is Chachamim;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> However, if they argue when the Kelim are not on
               it, but when they are on it, all agree that they are
               included, the Beraisa is not like anyone! (Even
               though the bags are on it, they are included only if
               he said 'it and everything on it'!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rejection:</font></b> Really, they argue when the Kelim are not on
          it. The Beraisa is Chachamim;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> It discusses when (the bags are not on it, and)
               he said 'it and everything fitting to be on it.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #2 (Mishnah - R. Yehudah):</font></b> Sometimes they are
          included, and sometimes not...
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> R. Yehudah discusses the same case as
               the first Tana, i.e. the Kelim are on it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rejection:</font></b> No R. Yehudah teaches a new case.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) DOES 'ULA' ARGUE WITH 'ABAYE'?</b></font><b>
<br>OPINIONS:</b> The Mishnah states that one who sells a donkey does not include its accessories. Nachum ha'Madi says that the accessories <i>are</i> included. Ula explains that the argument between the Tana Kama and Nachum ha'Madi revolves around the accessories used to carry loads. The Tana Kama maintains that the primary purpose of a donkey is for riding, not hauling, and thus the hauling accessories are not included. Nachum ha'Madi maintains that a donkey is also used for hauling, and thus its sale includes the cargo accessories. Ula adds that everyone agrees that the riding accessories, such as the saddle, are included in the sale.
</p><p>
In the Gemara later (78b), Abaye gives a list of Tana'im who maintain that when one sells an object, he sells it with all of its accessories. One of those Tana'im is Nachum ha'Madi. According to the explanation of Ula that Nachum ha'Madi merely maintains that the hauling accessories are part and parcel of the purchase of a donkey, it seems that Nachum ha'Madi should <i>not</i> be in Abaye's list. Does Ula argue with Abaye?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>RASHBA</b> and <b>RAMBAN</b> explain that they do not argue at all. When Ula says that Nachum ha'Madi maintains that a donkey is used for hauling, he means that Nachum ha'Madi agrees that a donkey is used primarily for riding. However, because it is <i>also</i> used for hauling its hauling accessories are sold with the animal. This is because, as Abaye states, Nachum ha'Madi maintains that when one sells an object he includes all of its accessories in the sale.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RITVA</b> cites the explanation of the Rashba and Ramban, but he offers an alternative explanation and says that Ula and Abaye indeed argue about the opinion of Nachum ha'Madi. Ula understands that Nachum ha'Madi does not maintain that one always sells an object's accessories with the object. Rather, he maintains that one of the main purposes of a donkey is hauling, which is why the hauling accessories are included in the sale. Abaye disagrees and says that Nachum ha'Madi maintains that an object's accessories are always included in its sale. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>THINGS TO WHICH ONA'AH DOES NOT APPLY</font></b>
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (a)</b>  Gemara</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah - R. Yehudah):</font></b> If one sells a Sefer Torah,
               animal or pearl, the buyer cannot claim Ona'ah (that
               he was overcharged);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Chachamim say, only the exceptions listed (see the
               coming Mishnah) are not subject to Ona'ah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Bava Metzia 56a (Mishnah):</font></b> Ona'ah does not apply to
               the following: slaves, documents, land, and Hekdesh.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> 57a Question (R. Ami):</font></b> Does Bitul Mekach apply to
               them?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Nachman):</font></b> He later concluded that it applies.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Yonah citing R. Yochanan):</font></b> Ona'ah does not apply
               to Hekdesh, but Bitul Mekach applies.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Yirmeyah citing R. Yochanan):</font></b> Ona'ah does not
               apply to land, but Bitul Mekach applies.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b></b> R. Yonah says so about Hekdesh, and all the more
               about land (in which the buyer and seller erred)! R.
               Yirmeyah said so about land, but regarding Hekdesh,
               the sale is never invalid;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Shmuel):</font></b> If 100 Maneh were redeemed on a
                    Perutah, the redemption works.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> 58b (Beraisa - R. Yehudah):</font></b> Ona'ah does not apply
               even to a Sefer Torah, because it is priceless. It
               does not apply to an animal or pearl, because people
               want (and willingly pay extra for) a good match of
               animals or pearls;
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>10. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Chachamim:</font></b> People want a good match for everything!
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>11. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Yehudah:</font></b> These are more important to people than
               other things.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>12. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> Up to how much is there no Ona'ah?
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>13. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer (Ameimar):</font></b> It is until double their value.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>14. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Yehudah ben Beseira):</font></b> Also if one
               sells a horse, sword or shield in wartime, Ona'ah
               does not apply, for one's life depends on them.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>15. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> 108a - Assumption:</font></b> If land worth 100 was sold for
               200, Levi (the neighbor, who has first rights to buy
               it) tells the buyer 'you were like a Shali'ach to
               buy the land for me, but not to overpay! I need to
               pay you only 100.'
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>16. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection (Mar Kashisha):</font></b> Chachamim of Neharda'a say
               in the name of Rav Nachman that land is worth
               whatever one pays for it. (Levi must pay 200.)
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>17. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Kesuvos 100b - Question:</font></b> Up to how much can Beis Din
               err (and the sale stands)?
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>18. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer (Rav Huna bar Yehudah):</font></b> They can err up to
               half the value.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>19. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Support (Beraisa - R. Shimon ben Gamliel):</font></b> If Beis
               Din sold a field worth 200 for 100, or a field worth
               100 for 200, the sale stands.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (b)</b>  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rif (Bava Metzia 32a):</font></b> The Halachah follows Rav
               Nachman, who is Basra. T'here is no Ona'ah even when
               the price is double (Bava Metzia 108a).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rebuttal (Rosh Bava Metzia 4:21):</font></b> The Halachah
               follows the latter Chacham only from Abaye and Rava
               and onwards! We follow R. Yochanan against Shmuel,
               and all the more so against Rav Nachman, Shmuel's
               Talmid.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rif (32b) and Rosh:</font></b> Some say that since our Sugya
               strove to explain R. Yehudah, this shows that the
               Halachah follows him. It also follows R. Yehudah ben
               Beseira, who follows estimation (of intent). Rav Hai
               Gaon says that the only exceptions are what the
               Mishnah says (slaves, documents, land and Hekdesh).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rambam (Hilchos Mechirah 12:8):</font></b> Ona'ah applies to
               animals.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rambam (13:8):</font></b> Ona'ah does not apply to slaves,
               documents, land and Hekdesh, even if one sold
               something worth 1000 for one or vice-versa.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rambam (Hilchos Malveh 12:11):</font></b> If Beis Din properly
               announced (about a field they are selling) and
               investigated the price, if they sold land worth 100
               for 200 or vice-versa, the sale stands.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Magid Mishneh:</font></b> The Ramban says that if land
                    worth less than 100 was sold for 200, it is
                    Batel.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Tumim (66:65):</font></b> The Magid Mishneh brought the
                    Ramban without saying that he argues with the
                    Rambam. Surely the Ramban holds like the
                    Rambam, that normally there is no Bitul Mekach
                    even less than half. Also, Milchamos Hash-m
                    defended the Rif! Beis Din is authorized to
                    sell only the way people often buy, i.e. up to
                    half. We must say that there is no Bitul Mekach
                    at exactly half.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Tosfos (Bava Basra 61b DH Shma):</font></b> The Ri says that
               all agree that the price of land does not prove how
               much was sold, for people sometimes pay more than
               land is worth, like it says in Kesuvos (91b). The
               Rashbam says that it is because Ona'ah does not
               apply to land (it is worth whatever one pays for
               it). This is wrong. Ona'ah does not apply to slaves
               and Hekdesh, even though they are not always worth
               what one pays for them! Rather, it is a Gezeras
               ha'Kasuv. Also, Bitul Mekach applies to them (all
               things for which there is no Ona'ah)!
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (c)</b>  Poskim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (CM 227:15):</font></b> Ona'ah does not apply to
               slaves, documents, land and Hekdesh, even if one
               sold something worth 1000 for one or vice-versa.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Beis Yosef (Sof DH v'Elu):</font></b> Since the Rif and
                    Rambam agree, we rule like them.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rebuttal (Darchei Moshe 4):</font></b> I do not agree that
                    we follow the Rif and Rambam when the Rosh and
                    Tosfos disagree, especially since the Tur
                    agrees with the Rosh and Tosfos. In any case,
                    ha'Motzi mi'Chavero Alav ha'Re'ayah.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Beis Yosef (DH Kosav Rabbeinu):</font></b> R. Yerucham
                    says that Rav Hai Gaon says that Ona'ah does
                    not apply to 'Hekdesh' for Aniyim or for the
                    Beis ha'Keneses, and the Rif disagrees. R.
                    Yerucham holds like Rav Hai Gaon. The Tur holds
                    like the Rif.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> SMA (49 and Drishah 40):</font></b> The Tur, and the Rif
                    and Rosh (in their commentary on the Gemara)
                    did not mention Hekdesh. The Beis Yosef derives
                    from this that the Rif holds that Ona'ah
                    applies to Hekdesh Aniyim, for nowadays this is
                    the only Hekdesh, and it is Chulin (Teshuvas
                    Rosh 13:1). We exclude Hekdesh because it is
                    not 'Amisecha' (your fellowman). Hekdesh Aniyim
                    is of your fellowman, so Ona'ah applies.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rema:</font></b> Some say that this is only until half, but
               more than half, e.g. he sold something worth one for
               more than two, there is Ona'ah.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  SMA (50):</font></b> Indeed, Tosfos cited R. Tam to say
                    that Ona'ah applies to land above a half, but
                    this was merely to argue with the Rif and
                    Rambam. Really, it applies also at exactly a
                    half, like the Rosh and Tur say!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shach (17):</font></b> The Rema is precise, like Tosfos
                    (Bava Kama 14b DH Davar) and the Agudah. The
                    Yerushalmi was imprecise! Tosfos (Kidushin 42b
                    DH Hachi) says that either the Yerushalmi
                    (which says that there is Ona'ah at a half) is
                    imprecise, or Bava Metzia 108a is imprecise
                    (the land was sold for less than 200). However,
                    I hold that the Rif's opinion is primary.
                    (There is no Ona'ah even past a half.)
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Gra (41):</font></b> The Gemara in Bava Metzia 108a, 58b
                    and Kesuvos 100b connote that Ona'ah is only at
                    less than a half.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Tumim (65):</font></b> The simple reading of the Gemaros
                    connotes that Ona'ah is only at less than a
                    half. This mimimizes arguments among the
                    Meforshim. Also, if a commoner's sale (of land
                    worth 100) is valid only if the price was up to
                    199, why did Chachamim enact that Beis Din's
                    sale is valid up to one more (200)? Rather,
                    surely, they made Beis Din like commoners.
<br>            <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> SMA (51):</font></b> The Maharshal says that even though
                    Ona'ah does not apply to these things, Ona'as
                    Devarim and Geneivas Da'as apply, unless the
                    seller himself was unaware.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>vi. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> SMA (52):</font></b> 'Ona'ah' in the Rema refers to Bitul
                    Mekach.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>vii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Gra (40):</font></b> This opinion explains Bava Kama 14b
                    to say that land is worth all the money you pay
                    for it to a greater extent than Metaltelim are.
                    R. Yehudah taught that Ona'ah does not apply
                    <i>even</i> to a Sefer Torah, i.e. it has the same
                    law as land. The Gemara explained that Ona'ah
                    does not apply to a Sefer Torah until double
                    the value.
<br>
<font color='blue'><i>See also:</i>
<br><b><b>DOES BITUL MEKACH APPLY TO LAND AND DOCUMENTS? </b></b>(</font><font color='blue'>


lvr: 43
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #3 (Ravina - the previous Mishnah):</font></b> If one sells
          a wagon, he did not sell the mules. If he sold the mules,
          he did not sell the wagon;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Tachlifa bar Ma'arava - Beraisa):</font></b> If one
               sells a wagon, he sells the mules.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Avahu:</font></b> Our Mishnah says that he did not sell
               the mules!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Tachlifa:</font></b> I will no longer recite this
               Beraisa (it is mistaken).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Avahu:</font></b> It is not mistaken. The case is, the
               mules are attached to the wagon.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Summation of answer:</font></b> In the Beraisa, the mules
               are attached, but in the (previous) Mishnah, they
               are not attached. Presumably, also in our Mishnah
               they are not on it!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rejection (the first Mishnah of our Perek):</font></b> He did not
          sell the slaves or Antiki;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Papa):</font></b> Antiki is the merchandise in it.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> In the first Mishnah, they are on it. Presumably,
               the same applies in our Mishnah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Conclusion:</font></b> Each Mishnah is independent. They need not
          be like each other.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Abaye):</font></b> The following Tana'im all say that when one
          sells something, he includes everything used with it: R.
          Eliezer, R. Shimon ben Gamliel, R. Meir, R. Nasan,
          Sumchus, and Nachum ha'Midi.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah - R. Eliezer):</font></b> If one sells an olive-
               press, the beam is included.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah - R. Shimon ben Gamliel):</font></b> If one sells a
               city, the Santar is included.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Meir):</font></b> If one sells a vineyard,
               everything needed for it is included.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> R. Nasan and Sumchus say that a small boat is
               included with a ship (73a).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b></b> Nachum ha'Midi says so in our Mishnah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Mishnah - R. Yehudah):</font></b> Sometimes, they are included...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> What is the difference whether he says 'sell
          to me this donkey of yours' or 'is this your donkey?'?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer (Rava):</font></b> When he says 'this donkey of yours', he
          already knew that he owns it. 'This' comes to include the
          Kelim;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> When he says 'is this your donkey?', he did not
               know whether or not he owns it. He just asks if it
               is his to sell.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>IS AN ANIMAL'S CHILD INCLUDED?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Mishnah):</font></b> If one sells a donkey, he included the
          Si'ach (baby donkey). If one sells a cow, the calf is not
          included.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  	If one sells a waste-heap, the manure is included. If
          one sells a pit, the water is included.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  	If one sells a hive, the bees are included. If one
          sells a dovecote, the doves are included.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Gemara) Question:</font></b> What is the case?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If he said 'I sell it and its son', a calf should
               be included with the cow!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If he did not say 'it and its son', why is the
               Si'ach included?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer (Rav Papa):</font></b> He sold 'a nursing donkey (or cow)';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Regarding a cow, we can say that he mentioned
               that it is nursing, for the milk is valuable;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Regarding a donkey, we must say that he mentioned
               that it is nursing to include the Si'ach.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE MOST IMPORTANT CALCULATION</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> Why is a baby donkey called a Si'ach?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> It is because it follows a gentle Sichah
          (voice).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (R. Shmuel bar Nachmani):</font></b> What is the meaning
          of 'Al Ken Yomeru ha'Moshelim...'?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer (R. Shmuel):</font></b> 'Ha'Moshelim' are people who Moshel
          (rule over) their evil inclinations;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> 'Bo'u Cheshbon' - come, make the most important
               calculation, i.e. what one loses to do a Mitzvah,
               compared to the reward he will receive, and what one
               gains by a transgression, compared to what he will
               lose from it;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> 'Tibaneh v'Sikonen' - if you do so, you will be
               built in this world and prepared for the world to
               come;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> 'Ir Sichon' - if one acts like an Ayar (Si'ach),
               and follows the voice of his evil inclination and
               heresy, 'Esh Yotz'ah mi'Cheshbon';
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  Fire from those who calculate will consume
                    those who do not calculate.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> 'Lehavah mi'Kiryas Sichon' - from the city of
               Tzadikim, who are called Sichin (trees).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b></b> 'Achlah Ar...' refers to one who follows his evil
               inclination, like an Ayar.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b></b> 'Ba'alei Bamos...' are haughty people;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  Anyone who has haughtiness falls to Gehinom.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b></b> 'Va'Niram' - a Rasha says 'Ein Ram' (he denies
               the Exalted, i.e. Hash-m) and 'Ovad Cheshbon'
               (people are not judged).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b></b> 'Ad Divon' - Hash-m says, 'wait until judgment
               will come!'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.  </font></b></b> 'Va'Nashim Ad Nofach' - a fire will come that
               need not be fanned.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>10. </font></b></b>  'Ad Meideva' - until their Neshamos will be
               distraught.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  Some explain, until Hash-m punishes them like
                    d'Boi (He wants).
<br>

<p>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) ONE WHO SELLS A 'NURSING ANIMAL'</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Mishnah teaches that when one sells a donkey, he includes its offspring in the sale. When one sells a cow, however, he does <i>not</i> include its calf in the sale. What is the difference between the sale of a donkey and the sale of a cow? Rav Papa answers that the Mishnah refers to a case in which the seller specifies that he is selling a nursing cow or a nursing donkey. In an ordinary sale, only the animal itself is sold, not its offspring. When the seller specifies that he is selling a nursing animal, he clearly intends to include something additional in the sale by mentioning that the animal is nursing. In the case of a nursing cow, it is assumed that he intends to include the valuable milk in the sale. In contrast, in the case of a nursing donkey, the seller presumably does not intend to include the donkey's milk in the sale, because the donkey's milk is not kosher. For what purpose does he mention that the donkey is nursing? It must be that he intends to include the donkey's offspring in the sale.
</p><p>
The <b>VILNA GA'ON</b> and other Acharonim answer a problematic Midrash based on this Gemara. When the Torah lists the animals that Yakov Avinu sent to Esav as a present, it states, 'Gemalim Meinikos u'Veneihem Sheloshim' -- 'thirty nursing camels and their sons' (Bereishis 32:16). In his second explanation, <b>RASHI</b> (DH Gemalim) explains that the word 'u'Veneihem' does not mean simply 'and their sons,' but 'and their builders,' a reference to the camels that help the female camels 'build' baby camels, namely their male mates. Why does the verse not mention explicitly that thirty <i>male</i> camels were also sent, as the verse mentions with regard to the other animals that it lists? Rashi explains that the Torah alludes to the fact that camels are modest when they have relations.
</p><p>
What is problematic about the verse's simple explanation, that 'u'Veneihem' means 'and their sons'? Why does the Midrash need to suggest a novel interpretation of that word, and then pose a difficulty on the verse based on that interpretation?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The simple answer to this question is that the verse which lists the camels mentions only the females and not the males, while the verses which list the other animals which Yakov Avinu sent mentions both the females and the males. The Midrash understands that this verse also must be including the males in its list, but the verse disguises its mention of the males in order to show that camels mate in a modest manner.
</p><p>
(b) The Gemara here teaches that when a person specifies that he is selling a nursing animal, the additions included in the sale depend on whether or not the animal is kosher. If the animal is kosher, the milk is included. If the animal is not kosher, the animal's offspring is included. The verse states that Yakov Avinu sent 'thirty nursing camels and their sons' to Esav. Considering that Esav made himself appear to observe the Mitzvos, it seems odd that Yakov would send him a gift of unkosher camel milk. If Yakov treated Esav like an ordinary Jew who observes the Mitzvos, why does the verse mention that he sent him 'thirty nursing camels <i>and their sons</i>'? By merely mentioning '<i>nursing</i> camels,' the verse already includes their offspring and it does not need to add 'and their sons'! It must be that the word 'u'Veneihem' does not refer to the sons of the camels, which are already included with their mothers, but to the 'builders' of the camels -- the male camels. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>



</p><p>


lvr: 43
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO CEASES TO LEARN</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rav Yehudah):</font></b> Anyone who ceases to learn Torah is
          consumed by fire - 'veha'Esh Tochelem'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rav Dimi):</font></b> Anyone who separates himself from learning
          Torah falls to Gehinom - 'To'eh mi'Derech Haskel bi'Khal
          Refa'im Yanu'ach';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> 'Refa'im' refers to Gehinom - 'Refa'im Sham
               b'Imkei She'ol.'
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>THINGS THAT BECOME FULL</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Mishnah):</font></b> If one sells a waste-heap, the manure is
          included...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Mishnah - R. Yehudah):</font></b> If something is fit for (can be
          offered on) the Altar but not for Bedek ha'Bayis, or is
          only fit for Hekdesh Bedek ha'Bayis, or is not fit for
          either, Me'ilah applies to it and its contents;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If one was Makdish a pit full of water, a waste-
               heap full of manure, a dovecote full of doves, a
               field full of grass, or a tree laden with fruit,
               Me'ilah applies to it and its contents;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> However, if he was Makdish an empty pit (or
               waste-heap...) and it became full of water (or
               manure...), Me'ilah applies to it, but not to what
               came later.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> R. Yosi says, if one was Makdish a field or a
               tree, Me'ilah applies to it and what grows, for what
               grows is Hekdesh.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Beraisa - Rebbi):</font></b> Nir'im (I agree with) R. Yehudah's
          opinion about a pit and dovecote, and R. Yosi's opinion
          about a field and tree.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> What does this mean?!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> We understand 'I agree with R. Yehudah about a
               pit and dovecote', which implies that Rebbi
               disagrees about a field and tree (Rebbi holds like
               R. Yosi regarding them);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> However, 'I agree with R. Yosi regarding a field
               and tree' implies that Rebbi disagrees about a pit
               and dovecote. We do not find that R. Yosi and R.
               Yehudah argue about these!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> R. Yosi addresses R. Yehudah
               according to R. Yehudah's reasoning. (I (R. Yosi)
               argue in all cases. I understand why you (R.
               Yehudah) argue about a pit and dovecote, but you
               should admit about a field or tree, for what grows
               is Hekdesh!)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection (Beraisa - R. Yosi):</font></b> I disagree with R.
               Yehudah about a field and tree, for what grows is
               Hekdesh.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Inference:</font></b> He agrees about a pit and dovecote!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> Rebbi means, R. Yehudah's words about a pit and
          dovecote are Nir'im to R. Yosi (he agrees with them); R.
          Yosi argues only about a field and tree.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Beraisa):</font></b> If one was Makdish them when they are empty
          and then they became full, Me'ilah applies to it, but not
          to what came later;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  	R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon says, Me'ilah applies also to
          what came later.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rabah):</font></b> They argue about a field and tree. The first
          Tana holds like R. Yehudah, and R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon
          holds like R. Yosi;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> All agree about a pit and dovecote (that Me'ilah
               applies to the contents).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (Abaye - Beraisa):</font></b> If one was Makdish them
          when they are full, Me'ilah applies to them and their
          contents;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b></b>  	R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon switches (what he said about
          one who was Makdish them empty. Here he says that Me'ilah
          does not apply to the contents.)
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) AGADAH: THE FIERY FATE OF THOSE WHO SEPARATE THEMSELVES FROM TORAH</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> Rav Yehudah states that one who separates himself from words of Torah is consumed by fire, as it says, 'And I will set My wrath upon them, from the fire (i.e. the Torah) they left, and the fire (of Gehinom) will consume them' (Yechezkel 15:7). When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael he said that anyone who separates himself from words of Torah falls to Gehinom, as it says, 'A person who strays from the way of wisdom (i.e. the Torah), in the congregation of Refa'im (i.e. Gehinom) he will rest' (Mishlei 21:16). The word 'Refa'im,' Rav Dimi explains, refers to Gehinom.
</p><p>
Do Rav Yehudah and Rav Dimi agree about the fate of one who separates himself from Torah, and they argue only about the scriptural source, or do they argue also about the very fate of such a person? Alternatively, are they discussing two entirely different situations?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>MAHARSHA</b> explains that Rav Yehudah and Rav Dimi may agree with each other, and their two statements refer to two entirely different situations. Rav Yehudah refers to two people who interrupt each other's learning, and both of them stop learning. When they were learning, the fire of Torah protected them from harm (as the Mitzvah of learning Torah 'protects and saves'; see Sotah 21a). However, once they stop learning, they forfeit the protection of the Torah and now are vulnerable to be consumed by the fire of the nations of the world. Rav Dimi refers to an individual. Even though he does not prevent anyone else from learning Torah, if he leaves the path of Torah he will fall into Gehinom.
</p><p>
The Maharsha adds that this difference explains why Rav Yehudah derives his lesson from a verse which deals with many people ('Bahem' is plural), while Rav Dimi derives his lesson from a verse which refers to a single person ('a person').
</p><p>
(b) The MAR'EH <b>KOHEN</b> also apparently understands that Rav Yehudah and Rav Dimi are saying two entirely different things. This is clear from his assertion that the correct text of Rav Dimi's statement is 'anyone who <i>loosens</i> himself' from words of Torah. Although the Mar'eh Kohen does not explain the difference between the two statements, according to his Girsa (which is also the text in the <b>EIN YAKOV</b>) the difference is apparent. Rav Yehudah is discussing people who actively leave Torah learning. This is implied by his statement 'anyone who separates himself' from words of Torah, and by the verse he quotes which states 'from the fire they left.' Rav Dimi, in contrast, is discussing a person who merely loosens his grip on Torah, and as an indirect result strays from the path of Torah. This is apparent from his wording of 'anyone who loosens himself' from Torah, and from the verse he quotes which states, 'A person who strays from the way of wisdom (Torah).' (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>DOES HEKDESH ACQUIRE THROUGH A CHATZER?</font></b>
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (a)</b>  Gemara</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah - R. Yehudah):</font></b> If one was Makdish an empty
               pit, wasteheap or dovecote, and it became full of
               water, manure or doves, Me'ilah applies to it, but
               not to what came later.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Yosi says, if one was Makdish a field or a tree,
               Me'ilah applies to it and to what grows, for what
               grows is Hekdesh.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Rebbi taught that R. Yosi agrees with R. Yehudah
               about a pit and dovecote. R. Yosi argues only about
               a field and tree.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> If one was Makdish them when they were
               empty and then they became full, Me'ilah applies to
               them, but not to what came later;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b></b> R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon says, Me'ilah applies also
               to what came later.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rabah):</font></b> They argue about a pit and dovecote. All
               agree about a field and tree, that Me'ilah applies
               to them and their contents.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b></b> The first Tana holds like Chachamim, that one cannot
               be Makneh (transfer ownership, or be Makdish) Davar
               she'Lo Ba l'Olam (something that is not yet in the
               world). R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon holds like R. Meir,
               that one can transfer ownership of it.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> R. Meir said so only regarding fruits of a
               date tree, for they normally grow. An empty pit or
               dovecote will not fill itself!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer (Rava):</font></b> The case is, the pit is at the bottom
               of an incline (water normally flows into it), and
               the dovecote is near a thriving dovecote
               (presumably, offspring from the full dovecote will
               inhabit the empty one).
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>10. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Zevachim 45a (Beraisa):</font></b> One may not benefit from
               Kodshim of Nochrim. One who benefited did not
               transgress Me'ilah.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>11. </font></b></b> One may not benefit from them mid'Rabanan. We learn
               that Me'ilah does not apply to them from a Gezerah
               Shavah 'Chet-Chet' from Terumah. Regarding Terumah
               it says 'Bnei Yisrael.'
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (b)</b>  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rambam (Hilchos Me'ilah 5:6):</font></b> Me'ilah applies to
               things that grow from Hekdesh. If one was Makdish a
               field and it grew herbage, or a tree and it produced
               Peros, Me'ilah applies to them. However, if one was
               Makdish an empty pit, wasteheap or dovecote, and it
               became full of water, manure or doves, since they do
               not grow from Hekdesh, Me'ilah does not apply to
               them.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rashbam (79a DH Hachi):</font></b> Hekdesh is not strong enough
               to acquire through its Reshus. Regarding a person,
               we learn that his Chatzer acquires for him from
               'v'Im Himatzei Timatzei v'Yado.'
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Tosfos (79b DH Eimar):</font></b> Even if the water and
                    doves are likely to come, how does Hekdesh
                    acquire? Hekdesh has no Chatzer! One cannot be
                    Makdish what is not in his Reshus and will
                    never come to his Reshus! The Rashba answers
                    that he was Makdish the pit or dovecote on
                    condition that he retains rights in them to be
                    able to acquire the water and doves for
                    Hekdesh.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Ramban (79a DH v'Ha):</font></b> The Rashbam explains that
               Me'ilah does not apply to what is in them because
               Hekdesh has no Chatzer, for Chatzer works due to Yad
               and Hekdesh has no Yad. One could say that a Chatzer
               acquires for Hekdesh, but Me'ilah does not apply to
               what it acquires.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Ketzos ha'Choshen (DH v'Nistapakti):</font></b> Perhaps
                    only a Chatzer of Hekdesh does not acquire for
                    Hekdesh, but if a person said 'my Chatzer
                    should acquire for Hekdesh', it acquires. Or,
                    perhaps even this does not work. It seems that
                    it works. Rava (Nedarim 34b) taught that if one
                    said 'my Chatzer should acquire this (Hefker)
                    loaf for Hekdesh', Me'ilah applies to it. The
                    Ran says that one's four Amos acquire for
                    Hekdesh, like Ploni can acquire a Metzi'ah for
                    Reuven. Four Amos acquire like a Chatzer. This
                    is a proof for Tosfos and the Rashbam, that
                    Hekdesh has no Chatzer. If Hekdesh has a
                    Chatzer, but Me'ilah does not apply to what it
                    acquires, why does Me'ilah apply to this loaf?
                    What is the difference whether Hekdesh acquired
                    through Zechiyah of its own Chatzer, or through
                    a person's Chatzer? In both cases a person was
                    Makdish it through Zechiyah! This proves that
                    Me'ilah applies to Hekdesh through Zechiyah. We
                    must say, like Tosfos (Zevachim 45a DH Dumya),
                    that Kodshei ha'Guf of Nochrim are excluded
                    from Me'ilah, but not Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis.
                    Me'ilah applies to the loaf, for it is Hekdesh
                    Bedek ha'Bayis. I proved that a person's
                    Chatzer can acquire for Hekdesh. If so, why did
                    Tosfos (79b DH Eimar) need to say that he keeps
                    rights in the pit to be able to <i>himself</i>
                    acquire the water for Hekdesh?! It is because a
                    Chatzer acquires due to Shlichus, and one
                    cannot make a Shali'ach for Davar she'Lo Ba
                    l'Olam (Nazir 12b), his words help only
                    according to R. Meir, who holds that one can be
                    Makneh (or make a Shali'ach for) Davar she'Lo
                    Ba l'Olam.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (c)</b>  Poskim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question (Tosfos Yom Tov Me'ilah 3:6 v'Ein):</font></b> Why
               does Tosfos say that Hekdesh has no Chatzer, for it
               has no Yad? We conclude (Bava Metzia 12a) that even
               though Chatzer acquires like a Yad, it is no worse
               than Shlichus. Hekdesh has Shlichus! Kohanim who
               serve in the Mikdash are Hashem's Shluchim (Nedarim
               35b)! When the Gizbar is near the Chatzer, it is
               guarded, and it should acquire for Hekdesh! It is
               difficult to say that the Gizbar is a Shali'ach, and
               a Shali'ach cannot make a Shali'ach.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #1 (Tzon Kodoshim Me'ilah 13a DH Tosfos):</font></b> The
               Tosfos Yom Tov overlooked Tosfos Kidushin 23b (DH
               d'Omar), which concludes that the question was
               whether Kohanim are only Hashem's Shluchim, or
               Shluchim of Hash-m and of Yisrael. Since the
               question was not decided, we can say that they are
               also Yisrael's Shluchim, so the Gizbar cannot
               acquire for Hekdesh without Da'as of the owner.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rebuttal (Ketzos ha'Choshen 200:1):</font></b> Even if Kohanim
               are Shluchim also of Yisrael, surely the Gizbar is
               Hashem's Shali'ach. The question was about Kohanim,
               for they offer Yisrael's Korbanos. The Tosfos Yom
               Tov merely proved from here that Shamayim can have
               Shluchim. Also, Tzon Kodoshim said that the Gizbar
               cannot acquire for Hekdesh without Da'as of the
               owners. A Hefker object has no owner! Water and
               manure come from elsewhere and have no owners. They
               are Hefker.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #2 (Ketzos ha'Choshen):</font></b> In Gitin (21a), Abaye
               says that Chatzer acquires like a Yad, but Shlichus
               is not due to Yad. Tosfos (21a DH Atu) asks that we
               conclude (Bava Metzia 12a) that Chatzer acquires
               like a Yad, but it is no worse than Shlichus. It is
               Zechus to acquire a Metzi'ah, so one acquires even
               if he is not standing nearby. It is unlike a Yad. It
               acquires due to Shlichus; Zachin l'Adam she'Lo
               Befanav (one may acquire for someone in his
               absence). However, in other respects it must be like
               a Yad. This is why a moving Chatzer does not acquire
               like a Shali'ach. The Shitah Mekubetzes (12a) says
               that the Hekesh of Chatzer to Yad teaches that it
               must resemble a Yad. Since Hekdesh has no Yad, it
               has no Chatzer, for a Chatzer acquires like a
               Shali'ach only when it is like a Yad.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #3 (Nesivos ha'Mishpat 200 Hakdamah DH
               ul'Fi):</font></b> The Ran (Bava Metzia 12a) says that a
               Chatzer cannot acquire a Metzi'ah due to Shlichus,
               for we require Shlichus of the owner. Also, this
               harms others (who might want to acquire it).
               Therefore, it can acquire only due to Yad. Even
               though the Ran says that a Chatzer can acquire a
               Metzi'ah due to Shlichus mid'Rabanan, perhaps this
               is only for a person, just like it was enacted that
               a person acquires through his four Amos, and this
               does not apply to Hekdesh. However, we do find that
               Hekdesh has a Yad, i.e. the Gizbar (Shach 255:6)! It
               seems that this does not help for a Metzi'ah, for
               the Gizbar is Hashem's Shali'ach, and we require
               Shlichus of the owner. Also, this harms others. Just
               like Hash-m did not make the Gizbar a Shali'ach to
               acquire for one person and harm another, he is not a
               Shali'ach to acquire for Hekdesh and harm others.
               The Ramban agrees to this. The Ran (Nedarim 34b DH
               Omar Rava) says that one can acquire a Hefker loaf
               for Hekdesh through his Chatzer. There is different,
               for he has a Migo, i.e. he could acquire it for
               himself. This does not apply to a Chatzer of
               Hekdesh. The Ramban discusses a pit or dovecote that
               became full of water or doves, in which there is no
               loss to anyone else. If not for the pit or dovecote,
               there would be no water or doves. Hekdesh caused
               them to come. In such a case, the Gizbar is a Yad of
               Hekdesh and Hashem's Shali'ach. Also, we do not
               require Shlichus of the owner regarding Hefker. We
               require it for a Metzi'ah, for as long as no one
               else acquired it, it still belongs to the one who
               lost it. This is why Har ha'Bayis does not acquire
               money dropped there. Surely, if one gives to
               Hekdesh, even if he did not give to the Gizbar,
               rather, he put it in a Chatzer of Hekdesh, in front
               of the Gizbar, Hekdesh acquires. Here there is
               Shlichus of the owner, and it does not harm others.
<br>

<p>


lvr: 43
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon argued about a field
               and tree, why does he switch his opinion?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Retraction (Rabah):</font></b> They argue about a pit and
          dovecote;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> All agree about a field and tree that Me'ilah
               applies to them and their contents.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> Regarding a pit and dovecote, what do they
          argue about when they are initially empty and when they
          are initially full?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer - part 1:</font></b> When they are initially empty, they
          argue as R. Meir and Chachamim argue.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The first Tana holds like Chachamim, that one
               cannot transfer ownership of (or be Makdish)
               something that is not yet in the world;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon holds like R. Meir, that
               one can transfer ownership of something that is not
               yet in the world.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> R. Meir said so only regarding fruits
               of a date tree, for they normally grow. An empty pit
               or dovecote will not fill itself!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer (Rava):</font></b> The case is, the pit is at the
               bottom of an incline (water normally flows into it),
               and the dovecote is near a thriving dovecote
               (presumably, offspring from the full dovecote will
               inhabit the empty one).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question - part 2:</font></b> When they are initially full, what
          do they argue about?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer (Rava):</font></b> The case is, he said 'the pit (or
          dovecote) is Hekdesh' without specifying;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon holds like his father.
               We learn the law of Hekdesh from the law of
               commoners;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  A seller could say 'I sold only the pit, but
                    not the water. Likewise, the pit becomes
                    Hekdesh, but not the water.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> (The first Tana does not learn the law of Hekdesh
               from the law of commoners. Maharshal deletes this
               from the text.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> A seller could not say 'I sold only the pit'!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> If one sells a pit, the water is
               included.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer (Rava):</font></b> That Mishnah is the opinion of one Tana.
          Chachamim argue.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> If one sells a pit, the water is not
               included;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Nasan says, the water is included.
<br>

<p>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) THE DEFINITION OF 'AVIDI D'ASU'</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> Rabah explains that Rebbi Elazar and the Rabanan argue in a case in which a person is Makdish a well or pigeon coop: does one transgress Me'ilah when he benefits from the water which later fills up the well, or from the pigeons which later fly into the coop? Rebbi Elazar maintains that one transgresses Me'ilah, while the Rabanan maintain that he does not. What is the basis of their dispute? The Gemara suggests that their dispute is the same as the dispute between Rebbi Meir and the Rabanan in the case of a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam' -- 'something which has not yet entered the world.' The Rabanan maintain that such an object is not considered extant. Rebbi Meir maintains that it is considered extant even before it actually exists. Similarly, in the case of the Mishnah here, the Tana Kama follows the view of the Rabanan and says that the water which later fills the well is not included in the owner's pledge of Hekdesh since it does not exist at the time of the pledge. Rebbi Elazar follows the view of Rebbi Meir and says that a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam' <i>is</i> included in the owner's pledge.
</p><p>
The Gemara asks that even according to Rebbi Meir, a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam' is considered extant only when it is 'Avidi d'Asu' -- 'expected to arrive,' but not when its arrival into the world is unknown. Since it is unknown whether water will fill the well, or whether pigeons will fill the coop, why does the Gemara apply the opinion of Rebbi Meir to the case of the Mishnah here? Rava answers that the in the case of the Mishnah, water from the person's yard always runs into the well.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Eimur) asks that the Gemara's source that Rebbi Meir maintains that a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam' is considered to exist is based on the Gemara in Yevamos (93b). The Gemara there discusses a case in which an Eved Kena'ani gives money to a Jewish woman and says to her, 'You are betrothed to me after I will be freed.' Although he is not a full-fledged Jew until he is freed and thus is like a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam,' Rebbi Meir rules that he, as a Jew, is considered present in the world and his Kidushin will take effect. That case is not a case of 'Avidi d'Asu,' because no one knows for certain that the Eved Kena'ani's master will free him. Why, then, does the Gemara here assume that Rebbi Meir says that a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam' is considered to exist only when it is 'Avidi d'Asu'?
</p><p>
(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> quotes <b>RABEINU SHMUEL</b> who answers that the case in Yevamos involves an Eved Kena'ani whose master has promised to free him. Accordingly, his eventual status as a Jew is considered 'Avidi d'Asu.' (See <b>RASHI</b> to Bava Metzia 49a, DH Mishum Hachi).
</p><p>
(b) Tosfos quotes the <b>RIVAN</b> who explains that the freeing of an Eved Kena'ani is considered 'Avidi d'Asu' in a case of a 'Chatzi Eved v'Chatzi Ben Chorin' -- one who is a 'half slave and half free man,' in which case his master is bound by Halachah to free him (see Chagigah 2b).
</p><p>
The <b>CHIDUSHIM</b> U'VI'URIM adds that the wording of the Gemara in Yevamos indeed implies that this is the case. In the case of the Gemara there, the Eved Kena'ani says, 'You are betrothed to me after I will be freed.' If the case involves an Eved Kena'ani who has no basis to expect that he will be freed, then he should say, 'You are betrothed to me <i>if</i> I will be freed.' The fact that he says '<i>after</i> I will be freed' implies that the Eved Kena'ani has grounds to assume that his freedom is imminent.
</p><p>
According to both Rabeinu Shmuel and the Rivan, 'Avidi d'Asu' clearly means that the event is expected to happen.
</p><p>
(c) Tosfos quotes <b>RABEINU ELIEZER MI'FLIRA</b> who explains that in the case in Yevamos, the fact that the Eved Kena'ani presently exists is enough to satisfy the requirement of 'Avidi d'Asu.' Since the Eved is present, his status as a free man is considered 'Avidi d'Asu.' In the case of the Gemara here, the water which eventually will fill the well is not considered 'Avidi d'Asu' since it is not presently here, even though it is expected that it will come.
</p><p>
Rabeinu Eliezer apparently understands that 'Avidi d'Asu' means that the object (or status) is presently represented by some physical presence. This is also the opinion of the <b>RASHBA</b>. The <b>RITVA</b> clarifies this explanation further and writes that the creation of any object or status that depends on a person's action (such as the master's act of freeing his Eved) is considered 'Avidi d'Asu.' In contrast, the creation of any object or status which does not depend on the act of a person (such as rainfall) is not considered 'Avidi d'Asu.' Since the Eved can convince his master to set him free, his status as a free man is considered 'Avidi d'Asu,' while rainfall, which depends entirely on Hashem's will, is not considered 'Avidi d'Asu.' (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>



</p><p>


lvr: 43
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO BUYS THE YIELD OF A DOVECOTE OR HIVE</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Mishnah):</font></b> If Reuven buys the offspring of Shimon's
          dovecote, Shimon retains the first litter of chicks
          (normally, a male and female);
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  	If he buys the offspring of Shimon's hive, he gets the
          first three litters of bees, (then) he (Shimon) is
          Mesares (this will be explained);
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  	If he buys the loaves of honey of the hive, Shimon
          retains two loaves (to sustain the bees in winter);
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  	If he buys the rights to cut Shimon's olive trees, he
          must leave Shimon two branches.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Gemara - Beraisa) Contradiction:</font></b> Shimon retains the
          first two litters of chicks.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer (Rav Kahana):</font></b> Regarding the first litter (and
          every litter that Shimon is entitled to keep), Shimon
          retains its first litter (i.e. its first offspring, lest
          the new mother leave Shimon to be with its offspring);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Counting from the mother of the first litter,
               Shimon retains also its second (and third and
               fourth...) generation of firstborn litters.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> Why does Shimon retain the first litter of
          the first litter? Just like the mother will remain due to
          her offspring and her mate, the daughter will remain due
          to her mother and her mate!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> A mother is insistent to remain with its
          offspring. Offspring are not insistent to remain with
          their mother.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Mishnah):</font></b> If he buys the offspring of Shimon's hive,
          he gets the first three litters of bees, (then) he is
          Mesares.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> How does Shimon Mesares (sterilize the bees)?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #1 (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> He gives to them mustard to
          eat.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Yosi b'Rebbi Chanina):</font></b> This does not
               sterilize them. Rather, the sharp taste causes them
               to eat their honey;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  Once satiated, they do not reproduce, rather,
                    they make honey (Rashbam; R. Chananel - in the
                    holes (where they ate the honey) new bees will
                    be born next year. They belong to Shimon.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #2 (R. Yochanan):</font></b> Reuven is Mesares (alternates)
          when taking three litters, i.e. he gets the first, third
          and fifth.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #3 (Beraisa):</font></b> Reuven takes the first three
          litters, and after this he is Mesares, i.e. alternates,
          and leaves every second litter for Shimon.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE TUM'AH OF HONEY</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Mishnah):</font></b> If he buys the loaves of honey of the hive,
          Shimon retains two loaves.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rav Kahana):</font></b> Honey (even) in a hive is always
          considered food. (It receives Tum'ah, even though
          sometimes it is likely that the bees will eat it, unless
          he designated it for the bees; alternatively - honey is
          considered food only in its hive, but if it flows out, it
          receives Tum'ah like a drink, unless he explicitly
          planned to eat it.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Inference:</font></b> He holds that it receives Tum'ah even
          without intention (to eat it).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (Beraisa):</font></b> Honey in a hive is neither a food
          nor a drink.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #1 (Abaye):</font></b> The Beraisa refers to the two loaves
          (that sustain the bees in winter).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #2 (Rava):</font></b> The Beraisa is like R. Eliezer.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) ONE WHO SELLS THE FUTURE PRODUCE OF HIS BEEHIVE OR DOVECOTE</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Mishnah discusses what is included in the sale when a person sells 'the produce of my hive' or 'the produce of my dovecote.' The Mishnah details which generations of offspring of birds or bees are included in the sale.
</p><p>
How can a person sell the offspring of his birds or bees if the offspring have not yet been born? Since they have not yet been born, they are considered a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam' -- an object that is not yet in the seller's domain at the time of the sale, as the Gemara says earlier (79b). Although Rebbi Meir allows the sale of a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam,' the Rabanan (whose opinion is the Halachah) rule that a person does not have the power to sell what is not yet in his possession. Even when the object <i>does</i> come into existence, the seller is not bound by any agreement he made before the object came into existence. How, then, can a person sell the produce of his hive or dovecote which has not yet come into existence?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>NIMUKEI YOSEF</b> and <b>ME'IRI</b> point out that although the seller may back out of the sale of a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam' at any time, if he does not back out of the sale the buyer is entitled to keep what he purchased. Accordingly, the Mishnah might be discussing a case in which the seller does not back out of the sale, and it is teaching merely which items were included in the sale that he agreed to make.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Mechirah 23:9, also cited by the Nimukei Yosef) answers that the case of the Mishnah is <i>not</i> considered a case of a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam.' His reasoning is as follows. When a person sells a palm tree for the rights to its future fruits (but not for the wood of the tree itself), the sale is not considered to involve a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam.' The reason is that the palm tree itself already exists, and it is the tree which is being sold with regard to the rights to the fruits that it will produce; the fruits themselves are not being sold. That is, the buyer is purchasing the palm tree for a specific use -- to have the rights to the fruits that the tree will produce. (See Bava Basra 132b, 147b.)
</p><p>
The Rambam asserts that the same principle applies to the sale of a hive or a dovecote for its produce. The item being sold is a hive or a dovecote, not the offspring of the bees or birds that are not yet born. However, the sale of the hive and dovecote is only for a particular usage: to keep the bees and doves that will be born inside of them in the future. Since the sale takes effect on something that already exists in the world, the sale is valid. The seller is not selling a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam.' The Rambam compares this to a person who rents a stretch of area of a river in order to hunt the fish in it; even though the fish are not yet there at the time of the sale, the sale is valid since the <i>river</i> is being sold (for the purpose of fishing in it) and not the <i>fish</i> that will later come to the river.
</p><p>
The Rambam's answer, however, is difficult in light of the Gemara in Gitin (42b). The Gemara in Gitin questions whether a person may sell his slave solely so that the buyer will receive the rights to collect the thirty-Shekel penalty if the slave is gored by an ox. The Gemara explains that perhaps the Rabanan who argue with Rebbi Meir allow a person to sell a slave in order to collect the penalty payment, even though the penalty obligation does not yet exist, since the slave and ox already exist (and hence the payment is not completely non-existent; it is comparable to one who sells a palm tree for its future fruit). The Rishonim explain that the other side of the question is that selling a slave for the right to collect the penalty is <i>not</i> comparable to selling a palm for its fruit, since the fruit comes directly from the palm and is a physical derivation of the tree, while the penalty derives from the slave only in an indirect manner (<b>TOSFOS</b> DH Eved, <b>RASHBA</b>). The Gemara does not decide the Halachah in the case of the slave, but leaves the question unanswered. In Bava Metzia (33b) the Gemara seems to prefer the possibility that such a sale is not valid (see Tosfos there).
</p><p>
The same reasoning should apply to one who sells a hive or dovecote for its produce. Since their produce does not physically derive from them, it should be considered a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam,' like the penalty given for the goring of a slave!
</p><p>
The answer might be that according to the Rambam, one may sell future products even if they do not physically derive from a pre-existing object as long as the products come about through <i>natural processes</i> (such as being born in a dovecote). The Gemara's question in Gitin involves a product (penalty) which is derived Halachically and not through any natural process. Proof to this distinction may be found in Kesuvos (59b), where the Gemara suggests that a person can even sell or be Makdish his hands or his slave's hands for what they produce. In such a case, the handiwork that is produced certainly is not a product that grows physically <i>from</i> the hands, but rather it is a product produced <i>by</i> the hands, and yet it can be sold as a product of the hand since it is produced through natural, physical processes.
</p><p>
However, the <b>RASHBA</b> (in Kesuvos and Gitin there) infers from another Gemara (Bava Metzia 16a) that when a person sells a fishing net for its products (the fish that it will catch), the sale is considered to involve a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam' and the sale is not valid, since the fish do not derive <i>from</i> the net, but are only caught <i>by</i> the net. The <b>KETZOS HA'CHOSHEN</b> (209:4) points out that the Rashba seems to argue with the Rambam who writes (as mentioned above) that a person <i>may</i> sell a river for fishing rights, or a hive for the bees that will settle in it.
</p><p>
There are a number of ways in which the words of the Rashba may be reconciled with the teaching of the Rambam.
</p><p>
1. The Rashba there asks why a person may be Makdish his slave's hands for what they produce if he cannot sell a fishing net for what it will catch. He answers that the fishing net does not <i>actively</i> produce, or even catch, fish. It simply stays in place until a fish swims by and gets caught in its strings. For this reason, the rights to the future fish are not included in the sale of the net. The same is true of the penalty that comes from a gored slave; it is not something actively produced by the slave. Hands, in contrast, actively produce their handiwork, and therefore the ownership of the future handiwork may be transferred through the sale of the hands.
</p><p>
Perhaps the products of a hive and dovecote are comparable to the handiwork of hands, since they indeed are produced by the hive and dovecote. The hive and dovecote provide a comfortable environment for the bees and birds, attracting them to come and make their home there. The same applies to a river that is sold for its fish; fish are attracted to a river or to a certain part of a river. Therefore, they can be transferred in a sale as 'products' of the river. A fishing net, however, does not 'produce' fish in this manner. (Even if it is baited, it is the bait that attracts the fish and not the net.) The fish simply enter it on their own and become caught in it. (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>
2. The <b>KETZOS HA'CHOSHEN</b> (209:4) asks that it should be possible to sell a fishing net for its fish even though the fish are not produced by the net. The fishing net, as a utensil owned by the fisherman, should be able to acquire the fish that become caught in it for the fisherman through Kinyan Chatzer. Hence, it should be possible to sell the rights to what the net acquires through Chatzer!
</p><p>
It is true that perhaps one cannot own an object <i>solely</i> with regard to the rights to what it acquires through Kinyan Chatzer. Kinyan Chatzer is a <i>byproduct</i> of the ownership of an object or piece of land. The rights of Kinyan Chatzer cannot constitute the entire ownership itself. However, what a net acquires through Kinyan Chatzer certainly is directly produced by the net (through the Kinyan that it makes). Thus, the Rashba should compare it to the produce of one's hands!
</p><p>
<b>HAGA'ON RAV YISRAEL ZEV GUSTMAN</b> zt'l (in Kuntresei Shi'urim, Bava Metzia 13:9) answers that the net cannot acquire fish through Kinyan Chatzer because a fish does not 'land' or 'come to rest' in a net on its own. Rather, the fisherman actively catches fish in his net by moving it around in the water until he has the fish tangled in the net. The net does not act like a Chatzer and thus cannot be Koneh through Kinyan Chatzer. If, on the other hand, the net is already in place and catches fish passively, it indeed will by Koneh the fish through Kinyan Chatzer.
</p><p>
However, the Rashba (in the end of Kesuvos, and as printed in recent editions on Kesuvos 59b) seems to contradict this postulate. He rules that an entirely <i>passive</i> net, one that is already in place, cannot be sold for the fish that it catches.
</p><p>
Perhaps a fishing net is considered a 'Chatzer she'Eino Mishtameres,' an unguarded Chatzer (which is not Koneh through Kinyan Chatzer), since anyone can come and take fish from it. Consequently, it cannot acquire through Kinyan Chatzer (as the Gemara says in Bava Metzia 11b). A hive or dovecote, on the other hand, can acquire their bees and birds through Kinyan Chatzer and, therefore, it is possible to sell them for their future products and those products are not considered a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam.'
</p><p>
(For an explanation of how the Rambam explains the Gemara that calls the sale of doves a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam,' see below.)
</p><p>
3. Even if the Rashba <i>does</i> argue with the Rambam, he may learn that the Mishnah is not discussing one who sells the <i>dovecote</i> itself (i.e. a bird house) for its birds, since the birds are not a product of the dovecote and are a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam.' Rather, the Mishnah is discussing one who sells the <i>doves in a dovecote</i> for their offspring. That is, the word 'Shovach,' or 'dovecote,' refers not only to the structure itself, but to its occupants -- as the Ramban here writes (in Chidushim and in Milchamos). The offspring <i>do</i> derive directly from the doves and, therefore, they can be sold just as a tree can be sold for its fruit. The Gemara earlier (79b) calls the sale of future doves a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam' because it is discussing the sale of an <i>empty</i> dovecote. When, however, the dovecote contains birds and is sold for the offspring of those birds, the Kinyan is valid.
</p><p>
This might also be the intention of the Rashbam in the beginning of the Mishnah.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>RA'AVAD</b> (Hilchos Mechirah, loc. cit.) agrees with the principle of the Rambam that it is possible to sell a beehive for its fruits just as one can sell a tree for its fruits. However, he adds that the case of the Mishnah must be a case in which the seller <i>specifies in his sale</i> that he is selling 'a hive for its products.' If he simply says, 'I am selling you the products of my hive,' the sale is not valid because it is a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam.' This is also the opinion of the <b>YAD RAMAH</b> and <b>ME'IRI</b> here.
</p><p>
The words of the Ra'avad seem indisputable. The requirement to specify the details of such a sale is expressed by the Gemara itself. The Gemara writes clearly that the sale is valid only when the seller phrases the sale in a way that shows that he is selling the <i>tree</i> for the use of its fruits (and not that he is selling the fruits themselves), as the Gemara says in Bava Basra (147b). In addition, the Gemara earlier (79b) teaches that when one sells the future doves of an empty dovecote, they are considered a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam.' How, then, can the Rambam write that whenever a person sells 'the produce of his dovecote,' it is <i>as if</i> he specifies that he is selling the dovecote for its produce? (See <b>KESEF MISHNEH</b> to Hilchos Mechirah 23:9, and <b>BACH</b>, beginning of CM 213.)
</p><p>
The answer might be that the Rambam indeed makes the sale dependent on the wording that is used. He maintains, however, that as long as the seller relates the products to the hive, or the fruit to the tree, and gives the impression that the products are an aspect of the hive or tree itself, the sale is valid. It is as if the seller specifies that he is selling the tree for its fruit. (A similar idea may be found in the <b>RAN</b> to Nedarim 13b, DH b'Omer Ye'aser Pi l'Diburi.) By saying that he is selling the fruit <i>of a tree</i> or the products <i>of a hive</i>, the seller is viewing the produce as an <i>aspect of</i> the object which produces them and which is already in existence.
</p><p>
The case which <i>is</i> considered a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam' is where the seller specifies that he is selling 'products <i>that come from</i> the hive' or 'fruit <i>that is produced</i> by this tree.' Those words imply that he is attempting to sell the products or fruit, but not the tree's fruit-producing ability.
</p><p>
According to this approach, the Gemara earlier (79b) may be referring to a sale in which the seller specifies that he is selling 'the products <i>that will arrive</i> in this dovecote or hive,' and not simply 'the products of a dovecote or hive.' (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>
(d) The <b>NETZIV</b> (in Meromei Sadeh) suggests based on numerous inferences that the Rabanan instituted that any type of transaction that people become accustomed to conducting on a regular basis gains binding validity, even if that transaction involves the transfer of a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam.'
</p><p>
<b>HAGA'ON RAV YISRAEL ZEV GUSTMAN</b> zt'l (ibid. 13:2) cites the <b>HAGAHOS MORDECHAI</b> (end of Shabbos, #472, and as cited in brief by the <b>KETZOS HA'CHOSHEN</b> 201) who writes that a very similar point was debated among the Rishonim. The <b>MAHARAM</b> asserted that when people become accustomed to a type of transaction in which an object that is a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam' is traded, the trade becomes valid through the Kinyan of 'Situmta,' which gives Halachic validity to any commonplace practice used to finalize a pecuniary agreement (see Bava Metzia 74a). <b>RABEINU YECHIEL</b> disagrees and says that even the principle of 'Situmta' cannot transform the transfer of a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam' into a valid transaction.
</p><p>


<font><b>2) HONEY IN A BEEHIVE</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> Rav Kahana rules that honey inside a honeycomb never loses the status of a food item. The <b>RASHBAM</b> explains that Rav Kahana is teaching that even though there is a time when the bees eat from the honey (at which time a person would <i>not</i> eat it, in order not to disrupt the bees' food supply), it still is considered a food and still can be Mekabel Tum'ah. Only when the owner explicitly designates the honey for the bees does it lose its status of a food.
</p><p>
Why should the honey not be Mekabel Tum'ah when the owner designates it for the bees to eat? The Rashbam himself (80b, DH Al Gabei) writes that once something is considered a food it remains a food and is Mekabel Tum'ah until it becomes so spoiled that a dog would not eat it. If the honey inside the comb is considered a food before the owner decides to leave it for the bees, it should remain a food even after the owner designates it for the bees! (<b>TOSFOS</b> DH Devash)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>RAMBAN</b> and <b>RAN</b> answer that honey in a honeycomb differs form other types of food, since it is eaten by bees until it is removed from the comb. Since it is not a full-fledged food, when the owner decides to leave it exclusively for the bees it loses its status of food and will no longer be Mekabel Tum'ah.
</p><p>
The Ramban and Ran reject this answer because of another question which may be asked on the Rashbam's explanation. If the honey can lose its status of a food, then why does Rav Kahana say that it <i>never</i> loses its status ('l'Olam')?
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAMBAN</b> and <b>RAN</b> answer further that the Rashbam means to say that honey in the honeycomb will be Mekabel Tum'ah unless the owner designates that part of the beehive to be used to grow honey for the bees even before the honey is produced. The Rashbam writes this to explain why the two honeycombs that are left for the bees are not Mekabel Tum'ah.
</p><p>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>IS HONEY A LIQUID?</font></b>
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (a)</b>  Gemara</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Kahana):</font></b> Honey in a hive is always considered
               food.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question (Beraisa):</font></b> Honey in a hive is neither a
               food nor a drink.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #1 (Abaye):</font></b> The Beraisa refers to the two
               loaves (that sustain the bees in winter).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #2 (Rava):</font></b> The Beraisa is like R. Eliezer
               (who holds that it is considered to be attached,
               therefore it does not receive Tum'ah.)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Support (for Rav Kahana - Beraisa):</font></b> Honey in a hive
               receives Tum'ah like a food, even without intention
               to eat it.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shabbos 19a (Mishnah):</font></b> Beis Hillel and Beis Shamai
               agree that one may put beams (on top of olives or
               grapes...)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b></b> In the other cases, if one would do so on Shabbos he
               would be liable, Beis Shamai decree just before
               Shabbos. Here, if one would put on the beams on
               Shabbos he would be exempt, they do not decree.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> Who is our Tana, who permits whatever
               comes by itself (e.g. the juice that flows from the
               grapes and olives)?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer (R. Elazar):</font></b> It is (the Tana) R. Elazar:
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If cakes of honey were crushed
                    before Shabbos and the honey flowed out on
                    Shabbos, it is forbidden;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> R. Elazar permits.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>10. </font></b></b> R. Yosi b'Rebbi Chanina answered differently. He
               holds that we cannot learn from there, for the honey
               was a (solid) food from the beginning. Here, we
               permit even a liquid squeezed from a solid.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>11. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Menachos 30b (Ravin bar Chinena):</font></b> The Halachah
               follows R. Shimon Shezuri here, and in all places.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>12. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> 31a (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak):</font></b> He refers to the
               coming Mishnah.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>13. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah - R. Meir):</font></b> Oil is always a Rishon
               l'Tum'ah;
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>14. </font></b></b> Chachamim say, even honey (is always a Rishon);
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>15. </font></b></b> R. Shimon Shezuri says, even wine.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>16. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> Do the previous Tana'im say that wine is
               not (a Rishon)?!
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>17. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Correction:</font></b> Rather, R. Shimon Shezuri says, wine (is
               a Rishon, but oil and honey are not).
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (b)</b>  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rambam (Hilchos Tum'as Ochlim 1:18):</font></b> Honey in its
               hive has Tum'as Ochlim even without intent, i.e.
               even if without intent to eat it. If he scraped it
               out, it has Tum'as Mashkim. If it dripped out, it
               has Tum'as Mashkim; if one intended for a solid, it
               has Tum'as Ochlim
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Tosfos (80a DH Eino):</font></b> How can Rav Kahana say that
               honey in a hive is always a food? A Mishnah
               (Machshirin 6:4) counts it among the seven liquids
               that are Machshir! That it after it separates from
               the wax. In the hive, it is with the wax, so it is
               considered a food, and not a liquid.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Tosfos (Menachos 31a DH Eima):</font></b> R. Tam asked, here we
               rule like R. Shimon Shezuri, but throughout Shas,
               oil is considered a liquid! Wine and oil are among
               the seven liquids that are Machshir (Machshirin
               6:4), and this is why we are concerned for Tum'ah
               when harvesting olives (Shabbos 17a) and for the
               juice that comes from olives (Shabbos 144b). We must
               say that here we discuss congealed oil. The Reisha
               (Taharos 3:1) says 'gravy, porridge and Chelev, when
               they are liquids (are a Rishon l'Tum'ah).' This is
               why R. Meir says 'always.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Note:</font></b> If so, why was it clear to the Gemara that the
               previous Tana'im cannot argue about wine?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Tosfos (Pesachim 14b DH Afilu):</font></b> The Tana'im in
               Menachos discuss liquids that congealed, and
               afterwards melted.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (c)</b>  Poskim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (OC 158:4):</font></b> If one eats something
               dipped in one of the seven liquids, for which the
               acronym is Yad Shochat Dam (Rema - wine, honey, oil,
               milk, dew, blood, and water), and it is not dry, he
               must wash.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Magen Avraham (7):</font></b> Birkas ha'Zevach (Menachos
                    31a DH Tosfos) says that congealed honey is not
                    a liquid, therefore one need not wash for jam.
                    The Radvaz (4:1554) says that this is whether
                    it congealed through cooking or the cold, but
                    if it merely became slightly thick and it still
                    flows, one must wash. R. Shimshon (Taharos 3:1)
                    says that it is a liquid only if it is Tofe'ach
                    Lehatfi'ach (wet enough to wet something else).
                    If not, it is a food. In Mishnah 2 he brings
                    the Tosefta that says that honey that flows
                    from the hive has Tum'as Mashkim (of liquids),
                    but if he intended to eat it, it has Tum'as
                    Ochlim. Our honey jam is for eating, so it is
                    not a liquid and one need not wash for it.
                    Tosfos (Bava Basra 80) says that also congealed
                    oil, blood and milk are not liquids. The Kesef
                    Mishneh connotes that this is even if they
                    later melted, except for wine.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Machatzis ha'Shekel (7):</font></b> We discuss bee's
                    honey. Date honey is fruit juice, which is not
                    Machshir. The Magen Avraham holds that Tosfos
                    says that when it is with the wax it is
                    considered a food because it is congealed.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Taz (7):</font></b> Some want to permit eating jam with
                    honey without washing. They rely on the Tosefta
                    which says that if honey dripped from a hive
                    and one intended for a solid, it has Tum'as
                    Ochlim. Here, we intend to fry it for eating.
                    This is folly. Uktzin 3:11 says that honey
                    receives Tum'as Mashkim from when one scrapes
                    it out of the hive. All our honey is scraped
                    out with the wax. Since he did an action, it is
                    considered a liquid even if later he intended
                    for a food. The Rambam says that honey in its
                    hive has Tum'as Ochlim even without intent,
                    i.e. even without intent to eat it. If he
                    scraped it out, it has Tum'as Mashkim. If it
                    dripped out, it has Tum'as Mashkim; if one
                    intended for a solid, it has Tum'as Ochlim.
                    This shows that intent matters only when it
                    flowed out by itself, but not when he scraped
                    it out, for intent does not override an action.
                    Do not say that frying is an action and negates
                    the action of scraping. An action negates an
                    action only regarding Tum'ah of Kelim. Tum'ah
                    of food and drink goes away only when the food
                    is spoiled so that a dog would not eat it. When
                    something was Stam destined to be a liquid,
                    intent can change it to a food, but when an
                    action made something a liquid, no action can
                    change it to a food. If we would not say so,
                    honey would not be Machshir a food, for we
                    would say that intent for a food makes it a
                    food!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Machatzis ha'Shekel (7 DH Ayen):</font></b> According to
                    Tosfos in Pesachim, we have two Heterim for
                    (honey) jam (without washing). Firstly, it is
                    destined to be eaten. Secondly, if it was once
                    a solid, even if it later melted, it is not a
                    liquid. The Taz disagrees with the first Heter.
                    It seems that he disagrees also with the
                    second, for in Sa'if 9 he requires washing for
                    a dough fried in butter (even though the butter
                    was a solid). The Magen Avraham proved
                    otherwise from Tosfos.
<br>            <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Mishnah Berurah (14):</font></b> The Poskim say that if
                    any liquid congealed through cooking or the
                    cold, and it is not Tofe'ach Lehatfi'ach (wet
                    enough to wet something else), it is not a
                    liquid. Tosfos says that even if it later
                    melts, it is not a liquid, except for wine or
                    water. The same applies to frozen milk that
                    melted. According to this, if jam was fried in
                    honey and the honey hardened and it is not wet,
                    all agree that it is not a liquid. If it is
                    wet, the Taz considers it like a liquid. The
                    Magen Avraham considers it a solid, for it is
                    meant to be eaten. The Chayei Adam said that if
                    one bought honey with wax and melted it for
                    frying, it was never a liquid, so one need not
                    wash for it. If he bought honey already melted
                    for the sake of a drink, he must wash for it
                    even if he used it for frying. Derech ha'Chayim
                    is lenient if he uses a fork to eat jam fried
                    in honey. No one requires washing for jam fried
                    in sugar.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>vi. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Kaf ha'Chayim (15):</font></b> The Radvaz (1:78) says that
                    if one dips his finger in honey and eats it, he
                    need not wash. Some say that the Beis Yosef
                    disagrees. The Acharonim hold like the Radvaz
                    (Birkei Yosef 13)<p>


lvr: 43
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah - R. Eliezer):</font></b> A beehive is like land.
               We may write a Pruzbul if the borrower has a
               beehive, it cannot become Tamei in its place, and
               one who takes honey from it on Shabbos (b'Shogeg)
               brings a Korban Chatas;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Chachamim say, it is not like land. We may not
               write a Pruzbul unless the borrower has proper land,
               it can become Tamei in its place, one who takes
               honey from it on Shabbos is exempt.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Elazar):</font></b> R. Eliezer learns from 'va'Yitbol
               Osah b'Ya'aros ha'Devash';
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why are forests mentioned in
                    connection with honey?
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Just like uprooting from a forest
                    is a Melachah, also taking honey from a hive is
                    a Melachah (because the Torah considers it
                    attached. Therefore, it does not receive
                    Tum'ah.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (Beraisa):</font></b> Honey that flows from a hive is
          neither a food nor a drink.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This is not difficult for Abaye. He can say that
               the Beraisa discusses the two loaves. Since they did
               not receive Tum'ah in the hive, they do not receive
               Tum'ah when they flow out (until he intends to eat
               them).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> However, this is difficult for Rava!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #1 (Rav Zvid):</font></b> The case is, it flowed onto a
          repulsive Keli (it is unlikely that one will eat it).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #2 (Rav Acha bar Yakov):</font></b> The case is, it flowed
          onto chips of wood (great toil would be needed to gather
          it to eat it).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (Beraisa):</font></b> Honey in a hive is neither a food
          nor a drink;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If he had intention to eat it, it receives Tum'ah
               like a food. If he had intention to drink it, it
               receives Tum'ah like a drink,
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Abaye can say that the Beraisa discusses the two
               loaves;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> However, this is difficult for Rava!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> The Beraisa means 'it is not a food, i.e. that
          intent to eat it makes it receive Tum'ah like a food. It
          is not a drink, that intent to drink it makes it receive
          Tum'ah like a drink.' (Rather, it never receives Tum'ah.
          This is like R. Eliezer.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Support (for Rav Kahana - Beraisa):</font></b> Honey in a hive
          receives Tum'ah like a food, even without intention to
          eat it.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO BUYS THE RIGHT TO CUT TREES</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Mishnah):</font></b> If he buys the rights to cut Shimon's olive
          trees, he must leave Shimon two branches.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Beraisa):</font></b> If one buys a tree to cut, he must leave a
          Tefach (for the original owner, from which the tree will
          regenerate);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> For a virgin sycamore tree (it was never pruned),
               he must leave three Tefachim. For a (pruned)
               sycamore stump, he must leave two Tefachim;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> For reeds and vines, he must cut above the bulge
               (from which they branch out);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> For date trees and cedar trees, he digs and
               uproots the entire tree, for the stump will never
               grow back.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Contradiction:</font></b> A virgin sycamore does not need three
          Tefachim!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> One may not cut a virgin sycamore in
               Shemitah, for this promotes its growth;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Yehudah says, one may not cut it normally.
               Either he leaves 10 Tefachim, or cuts the entire
               stump.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Inference:</font></b> Cutting the entire stump is
                    detrimental. Leaving any amount is beneficial
                    (it will grow back)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer (Abaye):</font></b> Leaving three Tefachim is beneficial
          (it will grow back). Cutting the entire stump is
          detrimental,
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Leaving something less than three Tefachim is
               neither beneficial nor harmful;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  In Shemitah, we cut in a harmful way. For
                    business, we cut in a beneficial way.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Beraisa):</font></b> For reeds and vines, he must cut above the
          bulge;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> For date trees and cedar trees, he digs and
               uproots the entire tree, for the stump will never
               grow back.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> Is it really true that cedar stump will never
          grow back?!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question (R. Chiya bar Lulaini):</font></b> 'Tzadik ka'Tamar
               Yifrrach k'Erez...' - why are Tzadikim compared to
               date and cedar trees?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer (R. Chiya):</font></b> Had it mentioned only cedar
               trees, one might have thought that Tzadikim do not
               yield fruits;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> If it only mentioned date trees, one might have
               thought that Tzadikim do not regenerate (they die
               without righteous children; alternatively, if they
               fall, they do not get up).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> The Beraisa discusses different types of
          cedars, in which the stumps do not grow back.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rabah bar Rav Huna):</font></b> There are 10 types of
               cedars: 'Erez (cedar) Shitah (pine) va'Hadas
               (myrtle) v'Etz Shemen (balsam)...Berosh (box tree)
               Tidhar (teak?) u'S'ashur (?)';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> These are only seven!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Version #1 - Answer (Rav Dimi):</font></b> There are also
               Alonim (pistachio), Almonim (oak) and Almugim
               (coral).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Version #2 - Answer (Rav Dimi):</font></b> There are also
               Aronim (laurel), Armonim (chestnut) and Almugim.
<br>


lvr: 43
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>DOES ONE ACQUIRE LAND WITH TREES?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Mishnah):</font></b> If Reuven bought two trees in Shimon's
          property, he did not acquire land (with them);
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  	R. Meir says, he acquired land.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  	If the trees grew, Shimon may not cut the branches
          (even though the shade harms his field).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  	Reuven owns whatever grows from the stump, and Shimon
          owns whatever grows from the roots.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  	If the trees died, Reuven may not plant new ones in
          their place.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  	If Reuven bought three trees, he acquires land;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  	If the trees grew, Shimon may cut the branches. Reuven
          owns whatever grows from the stump and roots. If the
          trees died, Reuven may plant new ones.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE DECLARATION OF BIKURIM FOR FRUIT FROM THE MARKET</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Gemara - Mishnah):</font></b> If Reuven bought two trees in
          Shimon's property, he brings Bikurim, but does not recite
          the declaration (because he cannot say 'the land that
          You, Hash-m, gave to me.')
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  	R. Meir says, he brings and recites.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rav Yehudah):</font></b> R. Meir obligates (to bring and recite)
          even one who buys fruits in the market.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> How did Rav Yehudah infer this?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> He learns from the extra clause in the Mishnah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> In our Mishnah, R. Meir teaches that he acquired
               land. Obviously, he brings and recites!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> In the other Mishnah, R. Meir says 'he brings and
               recites' to teach about one who buys fruits in the
               market.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> It says 'Asher Tavi me'Artzecha'!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> That excludes fruits of Chutz la'Aretz.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> We already know this from 'Admasecha'!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> That excludes land of Nochrim.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> It says '(the land) that You, Hash-m, gave to
          me'!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> It means that Hash-m gave to him money to buy
          fruit.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (Rava - Beraisa - R. Meir):</font></b> If Reuven bought
          one tree in Shimon's property, he brings Bikurim but does
          not recite, because he did not acquire land.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This refutes Rav Yehudah.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>BRINGING BIKURIM WITHOUT THE DECLARATION</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (R. Shimon ben Elyakim):</font></b> Why does R. Meir say
          that one who buys one tree brings Bikurim but does not
          recite, and why do Chachamim say so about one who buys
          two trees?
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) BRINGING 'BIKURIM' FROM FRUITS OF 'CHUTZ LA'ARETZ'</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara explains that the verse, 'Asher Tavo me'Artzecha' (Devarim 26:2), teaches that one does not bring Bikurim from fruit grown in Chutz la'Aretz.
</p><p>
Why does the Gemara need to derive from a verse that the Mitzvah of Bikurim does not apply to fruit grown in Chutz la'Aretz? Bikurim should be no different from all of the other 'Mitzvos ha'Teluyos ba'Aretz,' such as Terumos and Ma'aseros, which apply only to fruit that grows in Eretz Yisrael (as the Gemara in Kidushin 37a teaches)!
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER: TOSFOS</b> here (DH ha'Hu, in his second approach) answers in the name of <b>RASHBA</b> (the Rash mi'Shantz) that the Mitzvah of Bikurim is an obligation on the person who owns the fruit to bring it to the Mizbe'ach. The Mitzvah is not on the object, the produce of Eretz Yisrael, which requires that a certain act be done with the produce before it is permitted to be eaten. He proves this from the fact that the rest of the fruit in the field is not prohibited from being eaten (like Tevel) before Bikurim are separated, and from the fact that Bikurim can be separated even before the fruit is picked, while it is still attached to the ground (and not yet considered 'produce').
</p><p>
This approach answers another question. The Mishnah in Kelim (1:6) states that Eretz Yisrael has more Kedushah than all other lands. 'In what way is it holier,' the Mishnah asks, 'because we bring from there the Korban ha'Omer, Bikurim, and Shtei ha'Lechem' which cannot be brought from any land outside of Eretz Yisrael.
</p><p>
Why does the Mishnah not mention that Eretz Yisrael is also holier because of the obligation to separate Terumos and Ma'aseros from produce that grows in Eretz Yisrael? (See Insights to Nedarim 22:1.)
</p><p>
According to Rashba cited by Tosfos, the reason why the Mishnah does not mention the other 'Mitzvos ha'Teluyos ba'Aretz' is that those Mitzvos are not an indication of the Kedushah of the land; rather, they are obligations that are incumbent upon the produce of Eretz Yisrael. That is, although the Torah forbids the eating of fruit grown in Eretz Yisrael before Terumos and Ma'aseros have been separated, the fact that Terumos and Ma'aseros must be separated is not a manifestation of the Kedushah of the land. The reason why the Mishnah lists the Korban ha'Omer and Shtei ha'Lechem is that the fact that these items may be brought to the Beis ha'Mikdash only if they grew in Eretz Yisrael demonstrates the <i>Kedushah</i> of Eretz Yisrael. The Mitzvah of Bikurim, too, is practiced in Eretz Yisrael <i>not</i> because it is a 'Mitzvah ha'Teluyah ba'Aretz,' but rather because of the Kedushah of Eretz Yisrael. (See also Insights to Kidushin 37:1. This approach also answers the question of the <b>VILNA GA'ON</b> in <b>ELIYAH RABAH</b> there in Kelim.)
</p><p>


<font><b>2) BRINGING 'BIKURIM' WITHOUT READING THE 'PARSHAH OF BIKURIM'</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> According to the Chachamim, one who buys two trees in the field of his neighbor brings Bikurim but does not read the Parshah of Bikurim ('Mevi v'Eino Korei'). The <b>RASHBAM</b> explains that he does not read the Parshah of Bikurim because he did not acquire the land beneath the trees, and therefore the verse in the Parshah of Bikurim which says, 'Asher Nasata Li' -- 'And now I have brought the first of the fruits of <i>the land which You, Hash-m, have given to me</i>' (Devarim 26:10), does not apply to these fruits, since they did not grow on a tree that was planted on land owned by the owner of the fruit.
</p><p>
Later (beginning of 81b, DH Mai Taima), when the Rashbam explains why, according to Rebbi Meir, a person is Mevi v'Eino Korei when he owns one tree (and, according to the Chachamim, a person is Mevi v'Eino Korei when he owns two trees), the Rashbam writes that he cannot read the Parshah of Bikurim because the verse says 'Asher Tavi me'Artzecha' -- 'And you shall take of the first of all the fruit of the earth, which you shall bring <i>from your land</i> that Hash-m gives you' (Devarim 26:2). The Bikurim must be brought from the land owned by the owner of the fruit. As the Rashbam explains, the Gemara then asks that since the owner of a single tree does not own the land beneath it, just as he cannot read the Parshah of Bikurim he also should not have to bring Bikurim altogether, because this verse implies that one who does not own the land beneath the tree does not even <i>bring</i> Bikurim. The Gemara answers that there is a Safek whether one who buys one tree (or two trees according to the Chachamim) owns the land beneath it or not, and therefore out of doubt he must conduct himself stringently and bring Bikurim without reading the Parshah.
</p><p>
Why does the Rashbam there cite a different verse there (81b) from the one he cites here (81a) to explain that one who buys two trees according to the Chachamim is Mevi v'Eino Korei? (<b>RASHASH</b>)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER:</b> The Rashbam may understand the Gemara the way the <b>TOSFOS RID</b> explains earlier (27a). The Tosfos Rid explains that the requirements for <i>bringing</i> Bikurim differ from the requirements for <i>reading the Parshah</i> of Bikurim. Although a person cannot read the Parshah of Bikurim unless he actually owns the land beneath the tree, nevertheless he can <i>bring</i> Bikurim even though he does not own the land, since he has permission to keep his tree there. The reason for this is that the verses that discuss bringing Bikurim ('Artzecha' in Devarim 26:2, and 'Admascha' in Shemos 23:19) exclude only fruit brought from trees planted on land that he has no permission to use (see Sukah 9a). The verse that discusses <i>reading the Parshah</i> of Bikurim says 'ha'Adamah Asher Nasata Li' (Devarim 26:10), which implies that the land was actually given to him and he owns it. (See Insights to Bava Basra 27:1:b.)
</p><p>
The Tosfos Rid derives this from the words of Reish Lakish later in Bava Basra (136a) as well as from the reply of Rebbi Elazar in the Gemara here. When Rebbi Elazar was asked why a person must bring Bikurim when he owns two trees even though he does not read the Parshah, Rebbi Elazar replied that the 'early authorities did not tell the reason, and you are asking me to teach it in the Beis Midrash!' This implies that there <i>is</i> a reason to distinguish between bringing Bikurim and reading the Parshah of Bikurim, but Rebbi Elazar did not want to teach it publicly in the Beis Midrash. Even though Rabah explained that the Chachamim were uncertain about whether a person acquires the land beneath one tree and that is why one does not read the Parshah of Bikurim, Rebbi Elazar had a different explanation. His explanation was, as explained above, that the obligation to bring Bikurim is not comparable to the obligation to read the Parshah of Bikurim.
</p><p>
This also seems to be the opinion of the Rashbam later (136b, DH Mevi v'Eino Korei), who writes clearly that one does not need to own the land beneath the tree in order to bring Bikurim, but he does need to own the land in order to read the Parshah of Bikurim.
</p><p>
The Rashbam later (81b) is explaining the opinion of those who asked Rebbi Elazar why there should be a difference between bringing Bikurim and reading the Parshah of Bikurim. They followed the view of Rabah, who maintains that the two are indistinguishable. Therefore, the Rashbam explains that they learn from 'Artzecha' (Devarim 26:2) that one cannot even <i>bring</i> Bikurim if he does not actually own the land beneath the tree. Here (81a), however, the Rashbam is explaining the Mishnah according to the Halachic view, which is that of Rebbi Elazar, who maintains that only the verse of 'ha'Adamah Asher Nasata Li,' which pertains to reading the Parshah, requires that the person own the land beneath the tree, but in order to <i>bring</i> Bikurim one need not own the land.
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>ASKING QUESTIONS THAT THE REBBI MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO ANSWER</font></b>
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (a)</b>  Gemara</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question (R. Shimon ben Elyakim):</font></b> Why does R. Meir
               say that one who buys one tree brings Bikurim but
               does not recite, and why do Chachamim say so about
               one who buys two trees?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Elazar:</font></b> The reason was never explained. How
               should I know?! Your question embarrasses me!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Chulin 6a (R. Chiya - Beraisa):</font></b> 'When you sit to
               combat the ruler (to learn from your Rebbi),
               contemplate what is in front of you. Put a knife in
               your cheek, if you value your soul' - ask a question
               only if you think that your Rebbi can answer. If
               not, refrain from asking.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Bava Metzia 58b (Beraisa):</font></b> If donkey-drivers ask one
               for grain, he may not direct them to one whom he
               knows does not sell.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Horiyos 13b:</font></b> R. Meir suggested to R. Noson that they
               ask R. Shimon ben Gamliel to teach Uktzim (R. Shimon
               did not know Uktzim. This would be grounds to depose
               him. R. Noson would become the Nasi, and R. Meir
               would become the Av Beis Din.) R. Yakov ben Kodshi
               heard this. He was concerned lest R. Shimon be
               shamed. He hinted to him that he should learn
               Uktzim.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shabbos 3b - Question (Rav):</font></b> If Reuven loaded food
               and drink on Shimon's body, and Shimon went outside
               (to Reshus ha'Rabim), what is the law? Is Akirah of
               his own (laden) body like Akirah of an object?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer (Rebbi):</font></b> He is liable. Akirah of his body is
               not like Akirah of his hand.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Chiya (to Rav):</font></b> You should only ask about the
               tractate your Rebbi is teaching. If Rebbi were not a
               great Chacham, he might have answered incorrectly,
               and he would have been embarrassed! (Fortunately,) 
               Rebbi is a great Chacham, and he answered well.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> 114a (R. Yochanan):</font></b> A Chacham is qualified to be
               appointed over the Tzibur if people can ask him a
               Halachah in any place and he can answer, even
               'Kalah.'
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>10. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Yochanan):</font></b> A Chacham is one who can answer a
               question about any Halachah.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>11. </font></b></b> He teaches about being appointed over the Tzibur. If
               he knows one Maseches, he can be appointed where
               they are learning that Maseches. If he knows
               everything, he can be appointed Rosh Yeshivah.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>12. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Ta'anis 9b:</font></b> R. Simi bar Ashi regularly learned from
               Rav Papa, and asked many questions. Once, he saw Rav
               Papa fall on his face and say 'Heaven save me from
               embarrassment due to Simi!' Simi accepted to be
               quiet, and he did not ask any more questions.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (b)</b>  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rambam (Hilchos Talmud Torah 4:6):</font></b> One may not ask
               the Rav when he enters the Beis Medrash until his
               mind is settled. A Talmid may not ask when he
               enters, until he sits and rests. Two may not ask at
               once. We do not ask the Rav about a different
               matter, only about the matter being learned, so he
               will not be embarrassed. A Rav may deceive Talmidim
               through his questions and actions in front of them
               to sharpen them and to see whether or not they
               remember what they learned.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Kesef Mishneh:</font></b> We learn from Shabbos 3b.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rambam (7):</font></b>  We ask only b'Inyan (in the matter
               being learned).
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Kesef Mishneh:</font></b> In Halachah 6, the Rambam taught
                    that when they are learning laws of Shabbos,
                    one may not ask about Yom Tov. Here he teaches
                    that when they are learning about transferring
                    from one Reshus to another on Shabbos, one may
                    not ask about what one may do about a barrel
                    that broke on Shabbos, even though it also
                    pertains to Shabbos.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rada (in Likutim in Frankel Rambam):</font></b> In
                    Halachah 6, the Rambam discusses before they
                    started to learn. Then, one may ask about that
                    Maseches or those Halachos. Here he discusses
                    after they began learning. Then, one may ask
                    only about the Halachah being learned. This is
                    not due to embarrassment. Rather, there is no
                    reason to prefer learning the other Halachah to
                    what is being taught.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Chasam Sofer (Shabbos 3b DH Bar):</font></b> Surely, Rav
                    did not ask about Shabbos when Rebbi was
                    teaching a different matter! We must say that
                    at the time, Rebbi was engaged in Shabbos, just
                    that day he taught about something else. Rav
                    asked not at the time of Beis Medrash, about
                    Shabbos, and even so, R. Chiya was disturbed.
                    Why was he disturbed? A Chacham is qualified to
                    be appointed leader if one can ask him about
                    anything, and he can answer, even if he is not
                    engaged in it now! Also, why did R. Chiya say
                    'he might have answered incorrectly'? Rav did
                    not ask a difficulty. He asked about a ruling.
                    R. Chiya should have said ' he would have ruled
                    incorrectly'! It seems that had Rav explained
                    his Safek, that perhaps Akirah of his body is
                    like Akirah of his hand in the Mishnah, and he
                    is exempt, or perhaps it is different, then
                    Rebbi would have known from where the Safek
                    came. Since Rebbi knew all of Shas and could
                    answer anywhere, he would have thought about
                    every source to distinguish tem, and he would
                    answer correctly, even if he was engaged in a
                    different Maseches. However, Rav asked Stam 'is
                    Akirah of his body like Akirah of an object',
                    and since Rebbi was engaged in another
                    Maseches, if he were not a great Chacham, he
                    would not remember every contradiction to this
                    reasoning, he would have answered that they are
                    the same. Then, Rav would have asked from the
                    Mishnah, and Rebbi would have given a poor
                    answer to dispel the question, like the Gemara
                    often does. Since Rebbi was a great Chacham, he
                    understood the source of the question and
                    answered properly. Perhaps this is the Kesef
                    Mishneh's intent in Halachah 6. According to
                    what I said, we can answer differently what is
                    the Chidush of Halachah 7 (we ask only what is
                    being learned that day). The Yerushalmi says
                    that Rebbi did not answer Rav immediately,
                    until the next time he learned Shabbos.
<br>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rambam (Hilchos Mechirah 14:14):</font></b> If a matter of
               Chachmah was asked, one may not ask Ploni his
               opinion if Ploni does not know this Chachmah. The
               same applies to all similar cases.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Magid Mishneh:</font></b> The Gemara (Bava Metzia 58b) did
                    not mention this, but surely one may learn it
                    from what was taught there.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Gershom (Chulin 6a DH v'Im):</font></b> If you think that
               your Rebbi cannot answer, do not ask. If you are a
               Ba'al Nefesh and you want to learn, go to a
               different Rebbi!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rashi (Shabbos 114a DH b'Chol):</font></b> One may be appointed
               over the Tzibur if people can ask him any Halachah,
               even 'Kalah', a Beraisa (a minor found after
               Maseches Avodah Zarah) that most are not familiar
               with.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Teshuvas Chasam Sofer (7:4):</font></b> Even though Rebbi
                    was Rosh Yeshiva, and he was greater than all
                    other Chachamim of his generation (Gitin 59a),
                    surely it is a toil when he is asked about a
                    different matter. R. Chiya rebuked Rav that he
                    should not burden Rebbi.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (c)</b>  Poskim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (CM 228:4):</font></b> If a matter of Chachmah
               was asked, one may not ask Ploni his opinion if
               Ploni does not know this Chachmah. The same applies
               to all similar cases.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (YD 246:12):</font></b> One may not ask the Rav
               when he enters the Beis Medrash until he sits. A
               Talmid may not ask when he enters, until he sits and
               rests. Two may not ask at once. We do not ask the
               Rav about a different matter, only about the matter
               being learned, so he will not be embarrassed.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Prishah (30):</font></b> Two may not ask at once, lest the
                    Rebbi get mixed up.
<br>

<p>


lvr: 43
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	R. Elazar:</font></b> The reason was never explained. How should I
          know?! Your question embarrasses me!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer (Rabah):</font></b> We can say that they are unsure whether
          or not one acquires land in these cases!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> R. Meir explicitly says in the Beraisa
          'because he did not acquire land'!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> It means <i>perhaps</i> he did not acquire land.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> We should be concerned lest (he did not
          acquire, so) the fruit is not really Bikurim, and the
          Kohen will eat it without separating Terumah and
          Ma'aseros!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> Indeed, Reuven tithes the fruit (on condition
          that it is not Bikurim) before giving it to the Kohen.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> This works for Terumah Gedolah, Ma'aser Sheni
          and Ma'aser Oni. These are (or may) be given to a (poor)
          Kohen;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> However, Ma'aser Rishon must be given to a Levi
               (and we cannot give it to a Levi, lest it is
               Bikurim)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> It may be given to a Kohen, according to R.
          Elazar ben Azaryah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Akiva):</font></b> Terumah Gedolah is given to
               a Kohen, and Ma'aser Rishon to a Levi;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Elazar ben Azaryah says, Ma'aser Rishon may be
               given to a Kohen.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> If it is really Bikurim, he must recite the
          declaration!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> It is valid Bikurim even if he does not recite.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> R. Zeira taught that if a Minchah is small
          enough that it could be kneaded, even if it was not
          kneaded, it is valid. However, if it is too big (i.e.
          more than 60 Esronim of flour, which is too much to knead
          (due to the size of the Kli, or because there is with
          only one Log of oil), it is invalid because it was not
          possible to knead it! (Here also, since he cannot recite,
          not reciting invalidates them!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> He does like R. Yosi b'Rebbi Chanina taught;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Yosi b'Rebbi Chanina):</font></b> If Yehudah harvested
               his fruits and sent them to Yerushalayim through a
               Shali'ach, and the Shali'ach died on the way,
               Yehudah brings them but does not recite;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> 'V'Lakachta... v'Heveisi' - the taking and
               bringing must be through the same person.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (Rav Acha brei d'Rav Avya):</font></b> Why doesn't he say
          the declaration? Even if they are not Bikurim, he merely
          recites verses!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #1 (Rav Ashi):</font></b> It is because it appears false.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #2 (Rav Mesharshiya brei d'Rav Chiya):</font></b> If he
          recites, onlookers will think that in such a case they
          are definitely Bikurim, and they will give such Bikurim
          to a Kohen without tithing them.
<br>

<p>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>3) BRINGING 'BIKURIM' OUT OF DOUBT</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara explains that in the case of a person who buys two trees in his neighbor's field, there is a doubt about whether he acquires the land beneath the trees or not. As a result of this doubt, he must bring Bikurim but he does not recite the Parshah of Bikurim ('Mevi v'Eino Korei').
</p><p>
The Mishnah, however, teaches that with regard to monetary law, the rule is that the buyer does <i>not</i> have rights to the land beneath the trees because of the principle of 'ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Re'ayah.' Because of the doubt, the seller is deemed to own the land such that he may use the land beneath the trees for his own purposes, such as to be Mekadesh a woman or to buy an Esrog. If the land beneath the trees is deemed to belong to the seller because of 'ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Re'ayah,' then why does the <i>buyer</i> need to bring Bikurim because of the Safek? Once the rule of 'ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro' is applied, the land is not the buyer's and he should not be obligated to bring Bikurim even out of doubt! (<b>SHA'AREI YOSHER</b> 5:6, <b>KOVETZ SHI'URIM</b> to Bava Basra #97)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER: RAV ELCHANAN WASSERMAN</b> Hy'd in <b>KOVETZ HE'OROS</b> (#71) explains that the principle of 'ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Re'ayah' does not entitle a person to the rights to an object that might not be his. Applying the principle of 'ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Re'ayah' does not cause the ownership of the object to change. Rather, 'ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Re'ayah' gives the person the rights to use the object and to act as though it belongs to him (such that he may be Mekadesh a woman with it, or buy an Esrog with it). The law of Bikurim, however, depends on whether the land actually belongs to the person or not, and that remains a doubt.
</p><p>
What is the difference between the case of Bikurim, and the cases of Kidushin and buying an Esrog? The Sha'arei Yosher (5:8) and Kovetz Shi'urim (#97) explain that there are two distinct definitions of ownership: the first is that the person <i>has title</i> to an object because he purchased it or acquired it in some other way; the second is that the person is given full rights of usage of the object according to monetary law, from a Halachic point of view. With regard to most Isurim (such as Kidushin and Esrog), the definition of ownership depends on whether he owns it with regard to its usage for monetary matters ('Mamonos'). If the object is considered his by monetary law, then it is then his for Kidushin and Esrog as well. With regard to Bikurim, however, the definition of ownership does not depend on his rights of usage with regard to 'Mamonos' but on having actual title to the property.
</p><p>
The Sha'arei Yosher explains the reason for this difference. His intention might be as follows. When a person uses an object to create Kidushin or for the Mitzvah of Esrog, he actually <i>uses</i> the object of doubtful ownership for the Mitzvah. In contrast, in the case of Bikurim, the person who has doubtful ownership of the land does not use the land for any Mitzvah at all. Rather, ownership of the land is a <i>precondition</i> for the Mitzvah; the <i>land</i> must belong to the owner of the fruit in order for him to be obligated to bring the <i>fruit</i> (which is certainly his) as Bikurim and read Parshas Bikurim. When the Torah requires ownership of an object that is not being used for the Mitzvah as a precondition for performing a Mitzvah, it is assumed that the Torah requires that he have the actual <i>title</i> to the object and not merely that he have rights of <i>usage</i>.
</p><p>
The Sha'arei Yosher adds that if the owner of the land purchases the fruit from the owner of the trees, he probably <i>would</i> be required to bring Bikurim and read the Parshah of Bikurim -- at least according to those who maintain that a Kinyan Peros (the right of usage) is like Kinyan ha'Guf with regard to Bikurim (see Bava Basra 136a). Since he has unquestionable rights to the use of the land, the land is considered his as far as Bikurim is concerned even if he is not the 'true' owner of the land.
</p><p>
(This approach is debatable if one suggests that there is a difference between one who has the rights of usage because he purchased those rights (as in the case of Kinyan Peros) and one who has rights of usage out of doubt, as in the case of the Gemara here. Perhaps one who uses the property out of doubt is still not the 'owner' of the rights of usage, but simply the default user of the object. Consequently, the object (the land, in this case) cannot be called 'his.')
</p><p>



</p><p>


lvr: 43
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHAT IS INCLUDED WHEN TREES ARE SOLD?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Mishnah):</font></b> If the trees grew, Shimon may not cut the
          branches... (Reuven owns what grows from the stump, and
          Shimon owns what grows from the roots).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> What is considered from the stump, and what
          is considered from the roots?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer (R. Yochanan):</font></b> Whatever is above the ground is
          considered the stump. Whatever is below the ground is
          considered the roots.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> We should be concerned lest soil be deposited
          near the stump, making outgrowths look like independent
          trees (and the buyer will claim that he bought three
          trees, and acquired land! Chachamim should have said that
          the seller may cut the growths!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer (Rav Nachman and R. Yochanan):</font></b> Indeed, we cut
          the growths. The Mishnah teaches only that the wood
          belongs to Reuven.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rav Nachman):</font></b> The law of the stump does not apply to
          date trees.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rav Zvid):</font></b> This means that the buyer does not get what
          grows from the stump. Since it will be uprooted when it
          dies, he does not hope to get anything from it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rejection (Rav Papa):</font></b> If Reuven buys two trees, he gets
          what grows from the stumps, even though they will be
          uprooted when they die!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rav Papa):</font></b> Rather, he does not get what grows from the
          stump, because normally nothing grows from date stumps
          (therefore, he does not hope to get anything).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> How did Rav Zvid understand the Mishnah?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> The Mishnah discusses one who bought a tree for
          five years. (If it dies within this time, he may plant a
          new tree in its place, therefore he expects to benefit
          from the stump.)
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>HOW MUCH LAND DOES ONE ACQUIRE WITH TREES?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Mishnah):</font></b> If Reuven bought three trees, he acquires
          land.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> How much land does he acquire?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer (R. Chiya bar Aba):</font></b> He acquires the land under
          and between them, and the area around them for the
          harvester and his basket.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) SHOOTS THAT GROW FROM THE TRUNK OF A PALM TREE</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTIONS:</b> Rav Nachman taught a tradition that a date-palm tree 'has no Geza.' Rav Zevid thought that this meant that the owner of the tree does not receive the shoots that grow from the trunk, even though the owner of the tree normally receives such shoots, as the Mishnah says. A palm tree is different because it is more likely to be uprooted from the ground than are other trees. Therefore, the person who buys a palm tree has no intention to acquire any shoots that grow from the trunk.
</p><p>
The <b>RASHBAM</b> explains that a palm tree is different because it tends to dry out quickly. In the case of other trees, when their upper sections begin to dry out the upper sections can be cut off and their stumps will regenerate. Therefore, one who purchases a palm tree does not have in mind to purchase the shoots that grow from the trunk, since the tree might die soon and will not have time to produce offshoots. Other trees which live longer have a greater chance of producing offshoots and therefore the buyer has in mind to acquire those offshoots.
</p><p>
Rav Papa questions Rav Zevid's explanation from the Mishnah which says that the buyer <i>does</i> have the rights to the shoots that grow from the trunk. Rav Zevid answers that the Mishnah is discussing one who buys a tree for the rights to harvest it for five years. Even if the palm tree does die, the buyer may plant another tree in its place. Therefore, in that case, he <i>does</i> have in mind to acquire any shoots that might grow from the trunk within five years.
</p><p>
The Rashbam's explanation is difficult to understand.
</p><p>
The risk that the tree might die is not a reason for the buyer to not intend to acquire the shoots that grow from the trunk. Why should the buyer expect that he is buying a tree that is about to die? (<b>OHEL MOSHE</b>)
</p><p>
Moreover, why does Rav Papa question Rav Zevid from the Mishnah? The Mishnah might not be discussing palm trees, but rather other types of trees which live longer than palm trees!
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The answer to the first question may be as follows. A tree normally does not generate shoots from its trunk, but rather from the area of the foliage on top. The only time a tree generates shoots from the trunk is when the top of the tree cannot produce shoots, either because the top has dried out or because the top has been cut off. The difference between the two is that if the tree dries out on top, then the dryness will spread rapidly to the bottom of the tree, and the tree will not survive long enough to produce shoots from its trunk. In contrast, if a person cuts off the top of the tree, the bottom of the tree -- which is still healthy -- eventually will produce shoots and will not dry out.
</p><p>
This is what the Rashbam means. When a person buys a different type of tree, he has in mind to purchase the shoots that will grow from the trunk in the event that the tree starts to dry up (on top) and he has to cut the top off. A palm tree, in contrast, will not produce shoots if the top is cut off. It will produce shoots only if the top dries out and the bottom produces the shoots fast enough, before the dryness spreads to the bottom of the tree. Since it is unusual to produce shoots under such circumstances, the buyer does not have in mind to acquire them.
</p><p>
The Rashbam (DH Kashya) answers the second question by saying that the Mishnah implies that this Halachah, that one acquires the shoots that grow from the trunk, applies to <i>all</i> trees, including the palm tree.
</p><p>
The Rishonim question the Rashbam's explanation. The Gemara's answer is an 'Ukimta' which limits the Mishnah to a specific case in which a person sells a tree for five years. Since the Gemara already finds the need to limit the case of the Mishnah, it should say instead that the Mishnah is discussing other types of trees and not palm trees. Because of this question, the <b>RAMBAN</b> in the name of <b>RABEINU YEHUDAH BEN YAKAR</b> explains that Rav Zevid understood that it is not only in the case of a palm tree that the buyer does not acquire the shoots, but that this is the law in the case of all trees. The buyer does not acquire the shoots that grow from the trunk since the tree produces shoots from its trunk only under unusual circumstances (such as when the top of the tree dries out and the buyer does not cut off the top in time to save the bottom). Hence, the Gemara's question from the Mishnah is clear -- both Rav Zevid and the Mishnah are discussing <i>all</i> types of trees.
</p><p>
According to both explanations, the Gemara answers the question on Rav Zevid by saying that the Mishnah refers to a case in which one buys a tree for five years. Why does buying the tree for five years give him greater rights to the shoots that grow from the trunk? Perhaps the Gemara means (according to the Rashbam) that even if the original tree was a palm tree, if it dies within five years the buyer might plant <i>another</i> type of tree which does regenerate when the top is cut off. Consequently, the buyer has in mind to acquire all of the shoots that grow from the trunk.
</p><p>
(b) <b>RABEINU YONAH</b> cites <b>RABEINU CHANANEL</b> who explains the Gemara differently. When Rav Zevid says that the buyer of the palm tree does not receive the shoots that grow from it, he means that he does not have the shoots that the Mishnah discusses, but rather he has <i>more</i> -- he has all of the shoots, even those that grow from the roots. This is also the way the <b><b><b>RI</b></b> MI'GASH</b> explains the Gemara. (The Ri mi'Gash even amends the Girsa to read that 'the <i>owner of the land</i>' does not have the shoots, which is more consistent with this explanation).
</p><p>
These Rishonim explain that Rav Zevid refers to a case in which a person buys a palm tree in order to use its wood. The Gemara (80b) teaches that a palm tree, unlike other trees, may be uprooted entirely when it is sold for its wood and the buyer is not required to leave the seller a stump, since it cannot regenerate once its top is cut. Because of this law, the seller loses hope of receiving any shoots that grow from the roots, and he even grants those shoots to the buyer. Rav Papa challenges Rav Zevid from the Mishnah which says that when a person buys a single tree, the seller is entitled to the shoots that grow from the roots, even though the buyer can uproot the tree and take it all for himself (even if it is not a palm tree, since the tree was sold completely and not just for its wood). The Gemara answers that in the case of the Mishnah, the seller stipulated that the sale would be for only five years, and only for the fruit; he did not give the buyer the rights to uproot the tree itself.
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>MAY WE SAY VERSES WITHOUT NEED?</font></b>
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (a)</b>  Gemara</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> 81b (R. Yosi b'Rebbi Chanina):</font></b> If Levi picked
               Bikurim and sent them to Yerushalayim with a
               Shali'ach, and the Shali'ach died, Levi brings them
               without reciting. 'V'Lokachta... v'Heveisi' - the
               same person must take and bring them.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question (Rav Acha brei d'Rav Avya):</font></b> Why doesn't he
               say the declaration? Even if they are not Bikurim,
               he merely recites verses!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Megilah 23b (Mishnah):</font></b> At least 10 men are required
               to be Pores Al Shema (to say Kaddish, Borechu, and
               the first Berachah before Kri'as Shema).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Berachos 21b (Rav Huna):</font></b> If one entered a Beis
               ha'Keneses where people are praying, he may begin
               only if he will finish before the Shali'ach Tzibur
               (in Chazaras ha'Shatz, i.e. the repitition of
               Shemoneh Esreh) will reach Modim;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Yehoshua ben Levi):</font></b> He may begin if he will
               finish before the Shali'ach Tzibur reaches Kedushah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b></b> Rav Huna holds that an individual says Kedushah
               (therefore, he need not say it with the Tzibur). R.
               Yehoshua ben Levi disagrees.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Ada bar Ahavah):</font></b> An individual does not say
               Kedushah, for it says 'v'Nikdashti b'Soch Benei
               Yisrael' -- every matter of Kedushah needs 10.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (b)</b>  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rambam (Hilchos Tefilah 7:17):</font></b> One skips Kedushas
               Yotzer (i.e. in the first Berachah of Kri'as Shema),
               for an individual does not say Kedushah.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Hagahos Maimoniyos (90):</font></b> Rashi, Avi ha'Ezri and
                    my Rebbi permit, for he merely arranges (the
                    angels' praise). Some do not want to say it or
                    skip it, so they say 'Onim v'Omrim b'Yir'ah
                    Kadosh u'Baruch.' La'Kel...'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rosh (Berachos 3:18 b'Sof):</font></b> R. Yehoshua ben Levi and
               R. Yitzchak (our text - Rav Ada) hold that an
               individual may not say Kedushah (in Chazaras
               ha'Shatz). However, he may say 'Kadosh' in Kedushah
               d'Sidra (in u'Vo l'Tziyon), for he is like one who
               says a verse and translates it. Some say that an
               individual may not say Kedushas Yotzer, he says only
               'v'Omrim b'Yir'ah Kadosh u'Baruch.' Some say that an
               individual may say it. I agree, for we merely a
               recount how the angels sanctify. One may not say
               'Nakdishcha v'Na'aritzcha (<i>we</i> will sanctify and
               extol You) like the angels do' with less than 10.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  R. Yonah (Berachos 13a DH v'Nikdashti):
                    Meforshim argue about whether an individual may
                    say Kedushas Yotzer. Some include this in
                    'every matter of Kedushah needs 10.' When one
                    reaches 'b'Safah Berurah', he skips it.
                    Chachamim of France and some Ge'onim permit an
                    individual to say it. Only matters like
                    'Nakdishcha', in which <i>we</i> sanctify Hash-m,
                    require 10. In Kedushas Yotzer, we merely
                    mention what His servants say. U'Vo l'Tziyon is
                    not a problem, for we merely say verses. My
                    Rebbi says like this. Surely, Kri'as Shema is
                    included in 'matters of Kedushah'. Accepting
                    the yoke of Heaven is the ultimate matter of
                    Kedushah! Even so, an individual may say it.
                    The Mishnah requires 10 only to what was
                    initially enacted to say it with 10 due to
                    Kedushah. It was not enacted to say Shema only
                    with 10. The same applies to Kedushas Yotzer,
                    unlike the Kedushah of Na'aritzcha. In every
                    text of Tefilah we find Kedushas Yotzer in the
                    text for an individual, but we do not find
                    Nakdishcha in the text for an individual. This
                    shows that only the latter was enacted to be
                    said (only) with 10.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rosh (Megilah 3:7 b'Sof):</font></b> An individual may say
               Kedushas Yotzer, for it merely recounts how the
               angels sanctify, like reading verses in Yeshayah.
               Ten are needed for Kedushah Chazaras ha'Shatz, in
               which we say 'Nekadesh.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Teshuvas Rashba (1:7):</font></b> In a Teshuvah (Blau 313; in
               other editions 12 or 81), the Rambam says that an
               individual says this like the Shali'ach Tzibur. Some
               Ge'onim said oppositely. They hold that it just
               recounts what the angels say. Kedushah for an
               individual is to intend to sanctify, like a
               Shali'ach Tzibur says 'Nekadesh.' Rishonim argued
               about this. What the Rambam wrote in Mishnah Torah
               is primary. We learn from 'v'Nikdashti b'Soch Benei
               Yisrael.' Rav Huna and R. Yehoshua ben Levi argue
               about this. A Mishnah requires a Minyan to be Pores
               Al Shema! Rav Huna explains that is only when one
               will be Motzi others, like Kri'as ha'Torah and the
               Haftorah, which that Mishnah mentions. R. Yehoshua
               ben Levi requires 10 even if one is not Motzi
               others. They argue about all Kedushos. The Halachah
               follows R. Yehoshua ben Levi even against R.
               Yochanan, all the more so against Rav, or Rav's
               Talmid Rav Huna. Also, Rav Ada holds like R.
               Yehoshua ben Levi. They are a majority against Rav
               Huna. We do not rely on Maseches Sofrim (which
               permits) against our Gemara. Gedolim say that in
               Kedushas Yotzer we merely say what the angels say,
               so one may say it with the cantillation. We do not
               say it at all. In such matters, it is proper to be
               passive and refrain.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (c)</b>  Poskim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (OC 59:3):</font></b> Some say that an
               individual may say Kedushas Yotzer, for it is merely
               a recount. Some say that an individual skips it, and
               it is said only b'Tzibur. One should be concerned
               for their opinion, and an individual should be sure
               to say it with the cantillation like one who reads
               verses.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Beis Yosef (DH Kedushah):</font></b> R. Yerucham and
                    Mahari Avuhav say that the Rambam's son said
                    that the Rambam retracted in a Teshuvah, and
                    concluded like the Rosh who permits an
                    individual to say it. The Kolbo (8) says that
                    since the Rambam wrote so in a Teshuvah, but
                    not in the Mishnah Torah, he holds that this is
                    the Halachah, but we do not openly rule like
                    this. Orchos Chayim says that we rely on the
                    Rambam's son that he retracted and said that we
                    openly rule like this.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Beis Yosef (DH b'Perek):</font></b> The Ran (Megilah 13b
                    DH v'Sham'inan) learns from there that an
                    individual does not say Kedushas Yotzer, but he
                    may say Kedushah d'Sidra, for it is mere
                    verses. R. Yerucham, the Manhig and Rav
                    Natrunai Gaon agree. Shibolei ha'Leket says
                    that that R. Eliezer of Virona says that we say
                    'Omrim b'Yir'ah Kadosh u'Baruch.' R. Baruch
                    disagrees, for different angels say 'Baruch'!
                    Rather, he says 'Omrim b'Yir'ah Kadosh...
                    veha'Ofanim... Omrim Baruch', but he does not
                    finish the verses. This is primary.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Beis Yosef (DH v'Chosav):</font></b> The Tur says that
                    Maseches Sofrim permits an individual to say
                    Kedushas Yotzer and Kedushah d'Sidra. Mahari
                    Avuhav says that it permits only an adult. The
                    custom is like R. Yonah and the Rosh, who
                    permit even minors. However, the Zohar forbids
                    an individual to say Kedushas Yotzer and the
                    Lashon ha'Kodesh in Kedushah d'Sidra. We learn
                    from it that we say the Targum (in u'Vo
                    l'Tziyon) quietly, for we do not say things in
                    Aramaic b'Tzibur. Therefore, every individual
                    says it himself. The custom is for individuals 
                    to say Kedushas Yotzer. I say that since it is
                    not explicit in the Gemara, we should follow
                    the Zohar.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Darchei Moshe (3):</font></b> We rely on the Rambam's
                    retraction in the Teshuvah, R. Yonah and the
                    Rosh. We are not concerned for the Zohar
                    against our custom, which is based on what is
                    explicit in Maseches Sofrim.
<br>            <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rebuttal (Gra 5):</font></b> Maseches Sofrim (16:12)
                    requires 10 also to be Pores Shema, just it
                    suffices if six or seven did not hear it yet.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>vi. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Kaf ha'Chayim (21):</font></b> For Kedushas Yotzer or
                    Kedushah d'Sidra, we are not concerned if three
                    or four of the 10 lag behind and do not say it
                    with the Tzibur. For Kedushah of Chazaras
                    ha'Shatz, nine must be listening to the
                    Shali'ach Tzibur.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>vii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Beis Yosef (DH uv'Sefer):</font></b> Sefer ha'Pardes cites
                    a Ga'on who forbids an individual to say
                    Kedushah d'Sidra. Rather, a Chacham learns a
                    teaching of praise, such as 'three kinds of
                    angels sing Shirah every day.' If he is not a
                    Chacham, he learns verses with Kedushah
                    d'Sidra, such as 'Serafim stand.' Some say that
                    since they are verses, an individual says them
                    with the cantillation. Terumas ha'Deshen (8)
                    says that an individual says these Kedushos
                    with the cantillation, and all permit this. It
                    is proper to do so.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>viii.</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Gra (5):</font></b> Surely, Megilah 23b requires 10 for
                    Birkas Yozter due to the Kedushah. The Beis
                    Yosef (69 DH Tanan) and Darchei Moshe (69:1)
                    give an alternative answer (10 are needed to be
                    Motzi others), but this is very weak.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ix. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Mishnah Berurah (3):</font></b> All agree that one may say
                    it amidst a Tzibur, even if he prays alone
                    because he came late.
<br>            <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>x.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Kaf ha'Chayim (21):</font></b> Ma'amar Mordechai
                    disagrees.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>xi. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Mishnah Berurah (11):</font></b> One should be stringent
                    like the Gra to say it with the cantillation
                    when he is not in a Tzibur.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>xii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Kaf ha'Chayim (22):</font></b> It is good to always say it
                    with the cantillation, so he will be used to
                    this for when he is not in a Tzibur. The Ari 
                    Zal says to say all verses in prayer with the
                    cantillation.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rema:</font></b> The custom has spread like the first opinion.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rema (132:1):</font></b> The law of an individual saying
               Kedushah d'Sidra is like the law of Kedushas Yotzer.
               See Siman 59.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Mishnah Berurah (3):</font></b> One should try to say it
                    with the Tzibur. If he lags behind the Tzibur,
                    he says it with them, and afterwards Ashrei and
                    Lamnatze'ach and the two verses before the
                    Kedushah.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Kaf ha'Chayim (8):</font></b> According to the Ari Zal, it
                    must be said after Ashrei and Lamnatze'ach. One
                    may say it alone with the cantillation.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Tur (621:5):</font></b> In the Avodah on Yom Kipur, Rav Sadya
               Gaon says that we say 'Lifnei ha'Shem' and 'Ana
               ha'Shem' (just like this). The Ritz Ge'as says that
               there is no problem if one said 'Lifnei Hash-m'
               (i.e. Aleph-Dalet, the way we say in Berachos), for
               he reads a verse and does not pronounce Hashem's
               name like it is written.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Bach (5):</font></b> I say that Rav Sadya Gaon holds that
                    since we merely recount what was done, but we
                    do not request or praise Hash-m, if one says
                    His name it is Levatalah. The Ritz Ge'as is
                    lenient only about 'Lifnei Hash-m', for it is a
                    verse. One may say it 1000 times in a day! In
                    Bava Basra we permit to recite for Bikurim
                    mi'Safek, for he says verses.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Taz (2):</font></b> In Kedushas Yotzer we say 'Hash-m',
                    even though we merely recount the angels'
                    praise, for it is verses.
<br>

<p>


lvr: 43
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (R. Elazar):</font></b> The buyer does not own a path to
          his trees (according to Chachamim, who say that one sells
          stingily). All the more so he does not get land around
          them!
<br>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> The seller does not give a path, for this is
          different land. He does give area around them; it goes
          with the land between them.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(R. Zeira):</font></b> According to R. Elazar, if Reuven bought
          two trees, (he does not acquire the land between them,
          but) he acquires a path to them. (Rashbam - just like
          Shimon lets Reuven use the land they are on, he also
          allows use of a path; Tosfos - R. Elazar holds that it is
          more reasonable to get a path than the surrounding land.
          When Reuven buys two trees, he acquires the surrounding
          land. Shimon cannot cut them if they grow!)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Reuven can say 'they are on your land!'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Suggestion (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak):</font></b> R. Elazar argues
          with Shmuel, his Rebbi.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Shmuel):</font></b> The Halachah follows R. Akiva, who says
               that one sells generously.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rejection (Rava):</font></b> No. R. Elazar explains our Mishnah,
          which cannot be like R. Akiva.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> Why can't the Mishnah be like R. Akiva?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> It says that if the trees grew, Shimon may cut
          the branches;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> According to R. Akiva, one sells generously, so
               Shimon may not cut the branches!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak):</font></b> R. Akiva said that
          Shimon sells generously only regarding a pit and cistern,
          for these do not damage his land;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> He would not say that he sells generously
               regarding a tree, for (if it is not pruned) it will
               damage his land!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Support (for R. Chiya bar Aba - Beraisa):</font></b> He acquires
          the land under and between them, and the area around them
          for the harvester and his basket
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (Abaye):</font></b> Who has the right to seed the area
          (needed to harvest) around the trees? (Does the buyer
          totally own them, or only for needs of harvesting?)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #1 (Rav Yosef - Mishnah):</font></b> (If Levi owns a garden
          inside Yehudah's garden, and may use a path to his
          garden,) Yehudah has the right to seed the path.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Rejection (Abaye):</font></b> There is different, for Levi does
          not lose if Yehudah seeds the path;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Here, if Shimon seeds the surrounding area,
               Reuven's fruit will get dirty (when it falls)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #2 (Abaye - Seifa of that Mishnah):</font></b> If Levi
          received a path on the side (of Yehudah's garden),
          neither may seed it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Support (for Abaye - Beraisa):</font></b> He acquires the land
          under and between them, and the area around them needed
          for the harvester and his basket. Neither may sow the
          surrounding area.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE SPACING OF THE TREES</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> What must be the spacing between the trees in
          order that Reuven acquires land?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #1 (Rav Yosef citing Shmuel):</font></b> It must be between
          four and eight Amos.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #2 (Rava citing Rav Nachman citing Shmuel):</font></b> It
          must be between eight and 16 Amos.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (against Rav Yosef - Abaye - Mishnah):</font></b> If rows
          of a vineyard are 16 Amos apart, one may seed other
          things in between;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Yehudah:</font></b> A case occurred in which a man spaced
               the rows of his vineyard 16 Amos apart. He would
               lean the vines of rows one and two towards each
               other, and also of rows three and four,... and sow
               in the spaces not covered by vines (between two and
               three, between four and five,...);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> The next year, he would lean the vines to where
               he sowed the previous year (between two and
               three,...), and sow where the vines were leaning the
               previous year (between one and two,...)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Chachamim approved of this. (It was permitted
               only because he leaned the vines away, to leave 16
               Amos in between rows of vines. If it were less than
               16, the rows would join, and he would need to
               distance like from a vineyard!)
<br>

<p>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) LETTING THE BRANCHES GROW</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara attempts to prove that the Mishnah does not follow the opinion of Rebbi Akiva who maintains that a seller sells 'b'Ayin Yafah.' The Mishnah states that the seller is permitted to trim the branches of the buyer's trees that extend over his property beyond the original extent of the branches (at the time the trees were bought). Rebbi Akiva, who maintains that the seller sells 'b'Ayin Yafah,' presumably would say that the seller sold to the buyer the rights for his branches to grow more and hang over his property. Accordingly, the Mishnah does not follow the opinion of Rebbi Akiva.
</p><p>
How does the Gemara prove that the Mishnah maintains that a seller does not sell 'b'Ayin Yafah'? Perhaps he <i>does</i> sell 'b'Ayin Yafah,' and the only reason why the branches may be cut is that if they are left on the tree, the buyer might claim later that this was the extent of the branches of the tree when he originally purchased it. As a result, he will claim that the land beneath the branches belongs to him, since the Halachah is that the buyer owns all of the land beneath the trees that he buys. The Gemara (82a) mentions a similar logic when it says that the buyer must cut down branches that grow out of its trunk because perhaps the earth will cover the bottom of the branch and he will claim that he bought three trees and not two, and he will thereby be entitled to the land beneath the trees.
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>RAMBAN</b> writes that the possibility that the buyer will make such a claim -- that the land beneath the outgrowth of the branches is his -- cannot be the cause to force the buyer to cut the branches. In order to prevent the buyer from making such a claim, the Chachamim could require simply that the seller make a border fence to demarcate the edge of the buyer's land. In the case of the Gemara earlier (the shoots that grow from the trunk), building such a fence is not a solution because, in that case, the buyer has no land at all. There is no way for the seller to show that the buyer has no land, and thus the buyer is forced to cut the offshoots.
</p><p>
(b) However, <b>RABEINU YONAH</b> (cited by the <b>TUR</b>) indeed rules that the buyer must cut the branches that grow from his trees, even if they are within the radius of the space of 'Oreh v'Salo,' so that he will not be able to claim that this was the original extent of the tree's foliage and he is entitled to the space of 'Oreh v'Salo' beneath the additional growth of the branches. Apparently, he rules that the problem cannot be solved by a simple fence, and therefore the branches must be cut. Why, then, is this not also the reason for why Rebbi Akiva requires the branches to be cut?
</p><p>
The <b>RASHBA</b> writes that, indeed, the Gemara could have given this reason for why Rebbi Akiva requires the branches to be cut, but it chose a better way of refuting the assertion that the Mishnah does not follow the opinion of Rebbi Akiva.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>PNEI SHLOMO</b> suggests that if the seller sells 'b'Ayin Yafah,' then he would allow the buyer even to grow his branches, even though letting them grow might eventually be to the seller's detriment in that the buyer will claim that the land beneath the branches belongs to him. Even though the seller might suffer such a loss, since he has the option of building a fence it is possible that he sold the trees 'b'Ayin Yafah' and he is relying on building a fence to prevent such a loss.
</p><p>
However, according to the Gemara's conclusion that the seller does not sell 'b'Ayin Yafah' when doing so will cause him considerable loss, the seller will not sell 'b'Ayin Yafah' to allow the buyer to keep his branches and to claim that the land is his. Rabeinu Yonah, who rules that the buyer must cut the branches, follows the conclusion of the Gemara which maintains that the rights to keep branches are not included in the 'Ayin Yafah' element of the sale.
</p><p>



</p><p>


lvr: 43
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE SPACING OF THE TREES (cont.)</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer (Rav Yosef):</font></b> I base my ruling (which is like R.
          Shimon, as we shall see) on the following case.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Version #1 (Rashbam):</font></b> A case came in front of Rav
               Yehudah, and he ruled that the buyer receives the
               land in between, even though they were separated
               only by the amount needed for an ox and its Kelim
               (four Amos, like we will explain).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Version #2 (Tosfos):</font></b> A case came in front of Rav
               Yehudah, and he ruled that the buyer receives the
               land in between, because for each pair of trees, the
               separation was no more than the amount needed for an
               ox and its Kelim for each tree (i.e. eight Amos).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Yosef:</font></b> I did not know what is the amount 
               needed for an ox and its Kelim until I heard the
               Beraisa explaining the following Mishnah.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> One may not plant a tree near
                    another's field, unless there are four Amos in 
                    between.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> Four Amos is the area needed to
                    tend to a vineyard.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b></b>  This teaches that the amount needed for an
                    ox and its Kelim is four Amos.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> Rav Yosef also holds like an opinion in that
          Mishnah! (Why did Abaye say that the Mishnah supports Rav
          Nachman?)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> (Seifa of that Mishnah - R. Meir and R. Shimon):
               If rows of a vineyard are eight Amos apart, one may
               seed other things in between.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> The case R. Yehudah brought in the Mishnah
          supports the first Tana. Presumably, the Halachah follows
          him.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  	We understand Rav Yosef's source (to say between four
          and eight), according to R. Shimon:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Shimon says in the Mishnah, eight Amos (or
               more) is considered too far apart;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> We learn what is too close from the following
               Mishnah.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - R. Shimon):</font></b> If rows of a vineyard are
                    less than four Amos apart (people do not plant
                    vineyards like this), it is not considered a
                    vineyard;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b>  Chachamim say, we ignore those vines that
                    are too close together, and (if enough trees
                    remain) it is considered a vineyard.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> Granted, we understand Rav Nachman's source
          to say that more than 16 is too sparse, according to
          Chachamim;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> What is his source that less than eight is too
               dense?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> Presumably, just like the amount that R. Shimon
          considers too sparse is twice the amount that is too
          dense, also according to Chachamim.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rava himself):</font></b> The Halachah is, between four and 16
          Amos (is the proper spacing).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Support (Beraisa):</font></b> If one bought trees spaced between
          four and 16 Amos apart, he acquires land and the trees in
          between;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Therefore, if a tree dried up or was cut, he may
               plant another.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If they were less than four or more than 16 Amos
               apart, or if he bought them one at a time, he does
               not acquire land nor the trees in between;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  Therefore, if a tree dried up or was cut, he may
                    not plant another.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (R. Yirmiyah):</font></b> Do we measure the spacing
          between the thick part of the trunks or the thin part?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b></b>  	Version #1 - Rashbam - Answer (Rav Gavihah - Mishnah):
          If one grafts a young vine onto a mature vine, we measure
          (four Amos, to determine if this joins with other vines
          to make a vineyard) from the second joint (i.e. from the
          place of medium thickness).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b></b>  	Version #2 - Tosfos - Answer (Rav Gavihah - Mishnah):
          If one bends a vine back into the ground, we measure
          (four Amos) from the base of the second place it leaves
          the ground (i.e. where it is thick).
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHEN DOES THE BUYER ACQUIRE LAND?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (R. Yirmiyah):</font></b> If Reuven bought a tree with
          shoots that were covered with dirt, and they are more
          than four Amos apart (so it looks like three trees), what
          is the law?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer (Rav Gavihah - Mishnah - R. Eliezer b'Rebbi
          Tzadok):</font></b> If one bends three vines back into the ground,
          and they grew out again, they (join and) are considered a
          vineyard only if and they are spaced between four and
          eight Amos apart. (Also regarding trees, it is like
          buying three trees, and he acquires land.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question #1 (Rav Papa):</font></b> If Shimon sold two trees in his
          field and one on the border, what is the law?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  	Question #2 (Rashbam - If he acquires land in the above
          case,) if he sold two trees in his field and one (which
          he owned) in another's field, what is the law?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  	These questions are not resolved.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) WHO IS 'HILLEL' QUOTED BY THE GEMARA?</b></font><b>
<br>OPINIONS:</b> The Gemara cites Hillel who asked a question to Rebbi. This Hillel cannot be the same Hillel as the leader of the academy of Beis Hillel, because that Hillel preceded Rebbi by six generations (Rebbi was his great-great-great-great grandson). Who is the Hillel quoted by the Gemara?
</p><p>
(a) <b>RAV YAKOV EMDEN</b> writes that this Hillel may be Rebbi's great-great-grandson (who was the son of Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah the son of Raban Gamliel the son of Rebbi). Rav Yakov Emden mentions incidentally that the Hillel mentioned in the Gemara here is the last known direct paternal descendant of the house of the original Hillel. However, he mentions that in <b>SEFER SIVUV REBBI PESACHYAH</b> it is recorded that there was a man in Eretz Yisrael named Rebbi Nehora'i who claimed that he was a direct paternal descendant of the house of Hillel.
</p><p>
(b) <b>RAV YITZCHAK ISAAC CHAVER</b> explains that the correct text must read that Hillel asked <i>Rava</i> a question, not Rebbi. He appears to reject the possibility that Rebbi lived long enough to have his great-great-grandson ask him a question.
</p><p>
Historical records support Rav Yitzchak Isaac Chaver's explanation. According to <b>HA'LEVI</b>, Rebbi died in the year 3940 (192 <b><b><b>CE</b></b></b>). The great Hillel (who calculated and established the Jewish calendar used today) to whom Rav Yakov Emden refers was still alive in the year 4119 (359 <b><b><b>CE</b></b></b>; see ArtScroll's 'History of the Jewish People: From Yavneh to Pumbedisa,' pages 108 and 194). Even if Hillel was a young child and asked Rebbi his question on the day Rebbi died, this means that Hillel lived at least 167 years (and longer, since he presumably lived beyond the year 359 <b><b><b>CE</b></b></b>), and this is unlikely. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'> WHO CAN RETRACT FROM A MISTAKEN SALE?</font></b>
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (a)</b>  Gemara</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> There are four laws of (retraction from)
               a sale. If Reuven sold to Shimon (what was
               understood to be) good wheat, and it was found to be
               bad, Shimon can retract. If he sold bad wheat, and
               it was found to be good, Reuven can retract. If it
               was like it was understood to be, neither can
               retract.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> In the following cases, either can retract. He sold
               red wheat, and it was found to be white, or olive
               wood, and it was found to be sycamore, or wine, and
               it was found to be vinegar, or (in any of these
               cases) vice-versa.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Chisda):</font></b> If Levi sold to Yehudah something
               worth five for six, and its value increased to
               eight, only Yehudah can retract, for he was
               overcharged. He can say 'had you not overcharged me,
               you could not retract. Now that you overcharged me,
               can you retract?!'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Support (Mishnah):</font></b> If Reuven sold good wheat, and it
               was found to be bad, Shimon can retract.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Bava Metzia 50b (Beraisa - R. Noson):</font></b> If the Ona'ah
               is more than a sixth, the sale is void.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b></b> Rebbi says, whoever was deceived has the upper hand.
               He can void the sale, or demand payment of the
               Ona'ah.
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (b)</b>  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The Rif and Rosh (5:13) bring the Mishnah.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Ran (DH Yafos):</font></b> When it was good (or bad) like
                    he sold, what is the Chidush that neither can
                    retract? Rav Hai Gaon says that even if they
                    were found to be the best that there are, the
                    seller cannot say that he was underpaid, since
                    he sold good. Even if they were found to be the
                    worst that there are, the buyer cannot say that
                    he overpaid, since he bought bad. The Rambam
                    says that the Chidush is, even if it was not
                    the worst or best that there is, neither can
                    retract. Both of these are true.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rambam (Hilchos Mechirah 17:1):</font></b> There are four laws
               of sales. If Reuven sold good wheat, and it was
               found to be bad, Shimon can retract. If he sold bad
               wheat, and it was found to be good, Reuven can
               retract. If he sold bad wheat and it was found to be
               bad, or he sold good wheat and it was found to be
               good, even if it was not the worst or best that
               there is, and there is Ona'ah of a sixth, neither
               can retract. He acquires, and the Ona'ah is
               returned.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Hagahos Maimoniyos (1):</font></b> The same applies if he
                    sold Stam (neither can retract, even if it was
                    found to be good or bad).
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Magid Mishneh:</font></b> If he sold good and it was found
                    to be bad, even if the difference in value is
                    less than the Shi'ur of Ona'ah, Shimon can
                    retract, for this is Shinuy Shem; it is like a
                    small change in the item. Reuven cannot
                    retract, for it is not a totally different
                    item. Reuven can retract if he sold wheat and
                    Shimon told him that it is bad, and it was
                    found to be good.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rambam (2):</font></b> However, in the following cases, either
               can retract. He sold red wheat, and it was found to
               be white, or olive wood, and it was found to be
               sycamore, or wine, and it was found to be vinegar,
               or vice-versa. Either can retract, for it is not the
               species he sold. The same applies to all similar
               cases.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Hagahos Ashri (Bava Metzia 2:9):</font></b> A case
                    occurred in which Levi bought (what was assumed
                    to be) tin from a Nochri smith, in order to
                    cover his roof. He sold it to David. It was
                    found to be silver covered with tin. The Re'em
                    exempted David, for Levi did not acquire the
                    silver, since he did not know about it. R. Tam
                    agreed.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Mordechai (Bava Metzia 291):</font></b> Reuven claims that
                    Shimon sold him a golden item and said that it
                    is gold, and he broke it and found that it is
                    of tin. He demands his money back, for the
                    Ona'ah is above the Shi'ur and it is Bitul
                    Mekach. Shimon says 'I did not promise anything
                    to you. I sold to you like I bought it. Also,
                    when I bought it from the Nochri who swindled
                    me, you wanted to buy it. When I sold it to
                    you, I did not know that I swindled you. If you
                    will swear that I promised that it is of gold,
                    I will return your money.' Rabbeinu Meir said,
                    even though he did not promise that it is of
                    gold, since externally it looks like gold, and
                    the price proves that he paid for gold, it is a
                    Mekach Ta'os. Even though Devarim sheb'Lev
                    (unspoken intentions) have no effect, and he
                    did not say that it is gold, it is as if he
                    said it, for we know that the sale was based on
                    the assumption that it is gold. This is like
                    one who sold, and he did not need the money.
                    Even though he sold Stam, it is a Mekach Ta'os
                    and the item and money are returned. In many
                    such cases, Devarim sheb'Lev count. However, if
                    Shimon does not believe that the inside was
                    tin, he swears that he does not know that there
                    was tin inside, and he is exempt. Even though
                    the Gemara did not answer whether there is a
                    time limit to claim Bitul Mekach due to Ona'ah
                    above a sixth, here it is surely Mekach Ta'os,
                    like one who bought red and it was found to be
                    white. There, some prefer white. Here, all
                    prefer gold!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b></b>Poskim
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (CM 233:1):</font></b> If Reuven sold a kind of
               Peros and gave a different kind, there is no sale.
               Either can retract. E.g. if he sold white wheat, and
               it was found to be red, or wine, and it was found to
               be vinegar, or olive wood, and it was found to be
               sycamore, or vice-versa.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  SMA (1):</font></b> Even if what he received is worth more
                    or less than what was supposedly sold, either
                    can retract, for it is a different species.
                    However, if he sold good and it was found to be
                    bad, since it is the same species and all
                    prefer good, only the buyer can retract. If he
                    sold bad and it was found to be good, only the
                    seller can retract.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</font></b> However, if he sold good
               wheat, and it was found to be bad, Shimon can
               retract, even if there was no Ona'ah regarding the
               amount. Reuven cannot retract, even if the price
               rose.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  SMA (2):</font></b> This is because some want to buy only
                    good, even if it is expensive, and not bad,
                    even if it is cheap.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (ibid):</font></b> If he sold bad wheat, and it
               was found to be good, even if there was no Ona'ah
               regarding the amount, Reuven can retract. Shimon
               cannot retract, even if the price dropped. If he
               sold bad wheat and it was found to be bad, or he
               sold good wheat and it was found to be good, even if
               it was not the worst or best that there is, and
               there is Ona'ah of a sixth, neither can retract. He
               acquires, and the Ona'ah is returned.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> SMA (4):</font></b> When worse ones are found, one might have
               thought that the buyer can retract and say 'since
               these are not the ones I bought, I retract', for any
               reason that he wants to retract. We learn that this
               is not so.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Nesivos ha'Mishpat (Bi'urim 2):</font></b> When worse ones are
               found, one might have thought that the <i>seller</i> can
               retract!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rema:</font></b> If he sold meat assumed to be from a castrated
               ram, and it was found that it was not castrated, the
               sale stands and he returns the Ona'ah, unless it is
               known that the buyer is finicky and eats ram meat
               only if it was castrated. The same applies to all
               similar cases.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Source:</font></b> Terumas ha'Deshen 322, cited in Beis
                    Yosef DH Kasuv.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Gra (3):</font></b> This is even though most people have
                    no preference, like we find in Bava Basra 23a
                    (the Halachah is concerned for what finicky
                    people are concerned for).
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>10. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rema:</font></b> If he sold refined silver, and it was found to
               have impurities, the sale stands and he returns the
               Ona'ah, for it is all the species of silver.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Beis Yosef (DH v'Chosav):</font></b> Avi'asaf says that he
                    cannot retract unless there is a Shi'ur of
                    Ona'ah (for Bitul Mekach).
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question (Shach 1):</font></b> Why is this different than
                    a sale of good, and it was found to be bad?
                    Perhaps the Rema means 'do not say that either
                    can retract, rather, only the the buyer can
                    retract.' Perhaps the text should say 'the
                    seller cannot retract.' Ra'avan explicitly says
                    so. Rashdam says that Avi'asaf is a lone
                    opinion.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Answer (Gra 4):</font></b> Avi'asaf holds that in our
                    Mishnah, the buyer can retract due to Ona'ah.
                    This is like R. Noson (it seems that this
                    should say 'Rebbi', or 'Rebbi, who argues with
                    R. Noson'), who says that he has the upper
                    hand. Rav Chisda supports this, but the Rashbam
                    says that all agree to our Mishnah, and the
                    Rambam says that our Mishnah is even when there
                    is no Ona'ah.
<br>
<font color='darkblue'>Other Halachos relevant to this Daf:
<br><b><b>WHO MAY RETRACT WHEN THERE WAS ONA'AH? </b></b>(</font><font color='darkblue'>


lvr: 43
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (Rav Ashi):</font></b> (Rashbam - If in those cases he
          acquires,) do the following interrupt between the trees
          (and therefore, he did not acquire land): a pit; an
          irrigation ditch; a Reshus ha'Rabim; or a row of date
          trees?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  	These questions are not resolved.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (Hillel):</font></b> If a cedar tree grew (afterwards)
          between the trees, what is the law?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Objection:</font></b> This is obvious! Since there was no
          separation when Reuven bought them, he acquired land!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Correction:</font></b> Rather, if a cedar tree was between the
          trees (at the time of the sale), what is the law?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer (Rebbi):</font></b> He acquires land.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> How must the trees be positioned in order
          that the buyer acquires land?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #1 (Rav):</font></b> They are in a line.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer #2 (Shmuel):</font></b> They form a triangle.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Rav would say that all the more so he acquires
               land if they form a triangle;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Shmuel would say that he does not acquire land if
               they are in a line.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> What is the reason?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> The seller wants the area in between,
               because it can be sown.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Objection (Rav Hamnuna):</font></b> If he acquires when they
               are in a triangle, because the seller cannot sow the
               area in between, he should also acquire when he buys
               three prickly shrubs, because the area in between
               will not be sown!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Trees are important, so the land between
               them is included. Shrubs are not important.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHAT IS INCLUDED WITH AN ANIMAL THAT IS SOLD</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Mishnah):</font></b> If one sells the head of a large animal, the
          legs are included;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If he sells the legs, the head is not included.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If he sells the Kaneh (lung), the liver is not
               included. If he sells the liver, the Kaneh is not
               included.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  	Regarding a small animal, if he sells the head, the
          legs are included;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If he sells the legs, the head is not included.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If he sells the Kaneh, the liver is included. If
               he sells the liver, the Kaneh is not included.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHO CAN RETRACT FROM A MISTAKEN SALE?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b></b>  	There are four laws of (retraction from) a sale. If
          Reuven sold (what was understood to be) good wheat, and
          it was found to be bad, the buyer (Shimon) can retract;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If he sold bad wheat, and it was found to be
               good, Reuven can retract;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If it was found to be like it was understood to
               be, neither can retract;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  	In the following cases, either can retract. He sold red
          wheat, and it was found to be white, or vice-versa. He
          sold olive wood, and it was found to be sycamore, or
          vice-versa. He sold wine, and it was found to be vinegar,
          or vice-versa.
<br>

<p>

sjt:
</p><p>
<font><b>2) MAY THE BUYER CANCEL THE TRANSACTION WHEN HE WAS OVERCHARGED BY ONE SIXTH?</b></font><b>
<br>OPINIONS:</b> The Mishnah teaches that when a seller told a buyer that he is selling him good wheat, and he actually sold him bad wheat, the buyer may cancel the entire sale. This law seems to be in accordance with the Mishnah earlier (51a). However, in the Gemara earlier (50b), Rava states that when a buyer is overcharged by one sixth of the fair market value of the merchandise, the sale is binding, but the seller must give back the amount of money which he inappropriately overcharged. Does the Mishnah here contradict Rava's statement?
</p><p>
The <b>RASHBAM</b> (DH Machar) explains that Rava understands that the Mishnah earlier (51a) follows the view of Rebbi Yehudah ha'Nasi, which is not the Halachic opinion. Rava rules like the opinion of Rebbi Nasan. However, Rava still agrees with the Halachah stated in the Mishnah, even when the amount overcharged is one sixth. This is because there is a fundamental difference between the typical case of Ona'ah and the case of the Mishnah. In an ordinary case of Ona'ah there is only one element of fraud: the price is one sixth higher than the fair value. As long as the price is rectified, there is nothing wrong with the sale. In the case of the Mishnah, there are two elements of fraud: the price, and the fact that the merchandise is not the type of merchandise the buyer expected. In such a case, Rava agrees that the buyer has the right to invalidate the sale altogether.
</p><p>
This is how the Rishonim understand the Mishnah. However, the Gemara opens with a general statement of Rav Chisda that when a seller sells an object for six when it is really worth five, and then the object increases in value to eight, the only person who may invalidate the original sale is the buyer, not the seller. The seller's act of cheating certainly should not allow him to revoke the profit of the buyer. Rav Chisda seems to refer to an ordinary case of overcharging, since he does not mention anything about the quality of the merchandise. Accordingly, his view conflicts with Rava's opinion that a buyer may not invalidate a sale in a case of ordinary Ona'ah, but he may merely demand the amount that he was cheated from the seller. Does Rav Chisda argue with Rava?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>RASHBAM</b> (DH Amar Rav Chisda) explains that Rav Chisda indeed argues with Rava and rules like the Mishnah earlier (51a), which, according to Rava, expresses the view of Rebbi Yehudah ha'Nasi. This is also the opinion of the <b>RIF</b>.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RASHBA</b> and <b>RA'AVAD</b> quote the <b>GA'ON</b> who explains that Rava and Rav Chisda do not argue. Rav Chisda refers to a case in which the buyer did not yet do an act of Meshichah on the merchandise; he merely paid money for it. The Halachah is that if a buyer pays money but does not accept the goods, he technically is allowed to cancel the deal; he merely is subject to a curse of 'Mi she'Para' (see Bava Metzia 44a). Rav Chisda is teaching that even though this is the Halachah in most cases, in a case where the seller cheated the buyer by the amount of one sixth the buyer may revoke the sale as long as he did not yet do Meshichah, and there is no curse of 'Mi she'Para.' Rava, on the other hand, refers to a case in which the buyer already did a proper Meshichah. Rav Chisda agrees that in such a case the buyer cannot retract the sale. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>



</p><p>


lvr: 43
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHO CAN RETRACT FROM A SALE?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Gemara - Rav Chisda):</font></b> If Levi sold to Yehudah
          something worth five (e.g. Zuz) for six, and its value
          increased to eight, Yehudah can retract, but Levi cannot,
          since Yehudah was overcharged;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Yehudah can say 'had you not overcharged me, you
               could not retract. Now that you overcharged me, can
               you retract?!'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Support (Mishnah):</font></b> If Reuven sold good wheat, and it
          was found to be bad, Shimon can retract.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Rav Chisda):</font></b> If Levi sold something worth six for
          five, and its value decreased to three, Levi can retract,
          but Yehudah cannot, since Levi was underpaid;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> He can say 'had you not underpaid me, you could
               not retract. Now that you underpaid me, can you
               retract?!'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Support (Mishnah):</font></b> If Reuven sold bad wheat, and it was
          found to be good, Reuven can retract.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> What does Rav Chisda teach that we do not
          know from the Mishnah?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> One might have thought that either can retract
          in Rav Chisda's case (when the price was too high or
          low);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The Mishnah is when the price is correct, but the
               quality was not as stated;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Version #1 (Rashi):</font></b> When he sold good and it was
               found to be bad, Reuven cannot retract, because
               Shimon can say that there was no mistake. 'Ra Ra
               Yomar ha'Koneh' (the buyer always claims that the
               merchandise is bad, even if he knows that it is not,
               and likewise, the seller always claims that it is
               good).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Version #2 (Ri):</font></b> When he sold good and it was
               found to be bad, the Mishnah teaches that Shimon can
               retract;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  One might have thought that Reuven can say that
                    there was no mistake, for 'Ra Ra...' (you knew
                    that the seller always claims that the
                    merchandise is good, even when it is not).
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE COLOR OF THE SUN</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Mishnah):</font></b> He sold Shechamtis (wheat), and it was found
          to be white...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Inference (Rav Papa):</font></b> Since it was <i>found</i> to be white,
          this teaches that (Shechamtis is red (the only other
          color of wheat. It is called SheCHAMtis, for it looks
          like the Chamah (sun), i.e.) the sun is red.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Support:</font></b> The sun appears red in the morning and
          evening;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> It does not appear so the rest of the day because
               our eyes cannot see so clearly because it is so
               bright.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question (Beraisa):</font></b> 'The appearance (of Tzara'as) Amok
          Min ha'Or' is like the sun appears, deeper than the
          shade.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Tzara'as appears white!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> It is like the sun appears regarding deepness,
          but not regarding color (really, the sun is red).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Question:</font></b> The one who asked the question understood
          that the sun is white. How did he understand why it
          appears red in the morning and evening?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Answer:</font></b> In the morning its rays pass through the roses
          of Gan Eden; in the evening, its rays pass through the
          entrance of Gehinom;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Some say, vice-versa.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>WINE IN PLACE OF VINEGAR</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	(Mishnah):</font></b> If he sold wine, and it was found to be
          vinegar, either can retract.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  	Suggestion:</font></b> Our Mishnah is like Rebbi, and unlike
          Chachamim.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) MAY A SELLER CANCEL THE TRANSACTION WHEN HE OVERCHARGED THE BUYER BY ONE SIXTH?</b></font><b>
<br>OPINIONS:</b> Rav Chisda states that when a seller sells an object for six when it is really worth five, and then the object increases in value to eight, the only person who may invalidate the original sale is the buyer, not the seller. The seller's act of cheating certainly should not allow him to revoke the profit of the buyer. According to this logic, the same Halachah should apply in a case where the seller overcharges the buyer by more than one sixth of the fair value. There, too, he should not be allowed to benefit from his act of cheating by canceling the sale and profiting from the object's increased value. However, the Gemara in Bava Metzia (50b) states that if a seller overcharges more than one sixth of the object's fair value, the sale is invalid. This implies that the sale is automatically invalid, even in a case where the dishonest seller stands to profit as a result. What is the Halachah in such a case?
</p><p>
(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Iy Lav) explains that the sale indeed is automatically invalid when the seller overcharges by more than one sixth, even though the seller benefits as a result. In order to be considered a sale, there must be some validity to the price. The Chachamim consider such a gross overcharge as beyond the range of a valid price, and thus the sale is invalid.
</p><p>
(b) Tosfos quotes the <b>RIVAM</b> who explains that the Gemara's logic applies even when the overcharge is more than one sixth. Accordingly, only when the buyer demands his money back is the sale invalidated. The seller cannot invalidate the sale against the will of the buyer. Presumably, the Gemara in Bava Metzia (50b) does not mention this case as an exception to the rule that the sale is invalid, because it is uncommon that a buyer will be overcharged by such a large amount and then the object will suddenly increase in value, and the buyer will end up profiting (and thus will not want to invalidate the sale).
</p><p>
The <b>ROSH</b>, who agrees with the Rivam, cites proof for this explanation. If the sale is invalidated automatically when the overcharge is more than a sixth, then essentially a seller who cheats someone by more than a sixth is better off than one who cheats by only one sixth. If a seller cheats a buyer by one sixth, the buyer cannot invalidate the sale, but can only demand that the amount of money he was cheated be returned. On the other hand, if a seller cheats a buyer by more than one sixth, there is no option for the buyer to demand the amount he was overcharged without the seller being able to invalidate the entire sale. Does this mean that the seller who cheats a buyer by more than one sixth has more rights? The Rosh writes that this obviously cannot be so. A transaction in which a buyer was overcharged by more than one sixth of the fair price is not considered a sale at all (similar to the logic of the first opinion in Tosfos cited above). However, only the buyer has the right to decide whether or not the transaction is considered a sale. (The Rosh adds that this is also the opinion of the <b>RIF</b>.)
</p><p>
The Rosh apparently understands that from the perspective of the seller, who has profited significantly (albeit unlawfully), there is no reason why the transaction should not be considered a sale (on the contrary, the seller would prefer that all of transactions be so profitable) as long as the buyer does not complain. (Y. Montrose)
</p><p>
<br>

loi:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHERE DO THE BUYER'S KELIM ACQUIRE?</font></b>
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (a)</b>  Gemara</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Asi citing R. Yochanan):</font></b> If he measured and put
               it in a Simta (a shoulder of Reshus ha'Rabim), he
               acquires.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>(Rav and Shmuel):</font></b> The buyer's Kelim acquire for him
               everywhere, except for in a Reshus ha'Rabim;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Yochanan and Reish Lakish):</font></b> They acquire even in
               a Reshus ha'Rabim.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Papa):</font></b> They do not argue: Rav discusses a
               proper Reshus ha'Rabim, and R. Yochanan discusses a
               Simta. He calls it a Reshus ha'Rabim, for it is not
               a Reshus ha'Yachid.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Support (R. Avahu citing R. Yochanan):</font></b> The buyer's
               Kelim acquire anywhere he is allowed to place them.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> They do not acquire where he may not
               place them (i.e. a Reshus ha'Rabim).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> 85b - Question (Rav Sheshes):</font></b> Does a buyer acquire
               with his Kelim in the seller's premises?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #1 (Rav Huna - Mishnah):</font></b> If a man threw a Get
               into his wife's garment or basket (in his premises),
               she is divorced.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Objection (Rav Nachman):</font></b> Many rejected that proof!
               The case is, the basket was hanging on her, or it
               was tied to her but dragging on the ground, or it
               was between her legs, or he sells baskets, or a man
               allows his wife to use the place of her garment and
               basket. (Therefore, we cannot learn to a regular
               case.)
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>10. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> 86a - Answer #2 (Ravina):</font></b> Rav and Shmuel taught that
               the buyer's Kelim acquire for him everywhere (except
               for in a Reshus ha'Rabim).
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Suggestion:</font></b> 'Everywhere' includes the seller's
                    premises!
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>11. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection (Rav Ashi):</font></b> The case is, the seller told
               him to acquire. (It is as if the seller lent his
               premises to the buyer in order to acquire.)
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (b)</b>  Rishonim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rif:</font></b> Rav Huna answered Rav Sheshes that the buyer's
               Kelim acquire in the seller's Reshus only if the
               seller said 'acquire in this way.' Some say that
               Ravina tried to learn from Rav and Shmuel, who
               taught that the buyer's Kelim acquire for him
               everywhere, i.e. even in the seller's premises. Rav
               Ashi rejected this; there, the seller told him to
               acquire.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rosh (5:15):</font></b> In Rav Ashi's rejection, we say that
               the seller acquired his premises to the buyer to
               enable him to acquire. The Chidush is that it helps
               to lend the Reshus for this through mere words.
               Normally, a loan or rental of land requires money or
               Chazakah. In order that the land will acquire
               without Kelim, one must truly acquire the land. This
               is why Chachamim rented R. Gamliel's land to acquire
               tithes (Kidushin 27a). To enable the buyer's Keli to
               acquire, it suffices for the seller to give
               permission. I did not find any text like the Rif
               says.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rosh (ibid):</font></b> Rav Asi said in the name of R. Yochanan
               that if he measured and put it in a Simta, he
               acquires. Rav Papa does not require that he
               measured! Rav Papa discusses when the seller said
               'go acquire.' Also in a joint Reshus, the buyer's
               Kelim acquire only if he measures or the seller says
               'go acquire'. This is not needed in the buyer's
               Reshus, for this is no worse than Meshichah.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Tosfos (85a DH Kol):</font></b> Measuring helps like
                    saying 'go acquire.' The two teachings of R.
                    Yochanan teach the same thing. Perhaps he said
                    only one, and the other was derived from it.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Beis Yosef (CM 200 DH Kosav):</font></b> The Rif and
                    Rambam hold that Rav Asi discussed a typical
                    case. He did not mean that he acquires only if
                    he measured.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Beis Yosef (DH v'Heilach):</font></b> Later, the Rif
                    brings Rav's law that what was measured out
                    acquires, i.e. in a Simta, or in the seller's
                    Kelim in the buyer's Reshus. This contradicts
                    what he said that the buyer's Kelim do not
                    acquire in the seller's Reshus unless the
                    seller said 'go acquire'! Perhaps measuring
                    helps like 'go acquire.' Or, saying 'I sell a
                    Se'ah for a Sela' is like saying 'go acquire',
                    and this helps also for the seller's Kelim in
                    the buyer's Reshus, unlike R. Yonah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rambam (Hilchos Mechirah 4:1):</font></b> One's Kelim acquire
               anywhere he may put them. Once the Metaltelim are in
               the Keli, neither can retract. It is as if Hagbahah
               was done or they were put in the buyer's house.
               Therefore, one's Kelim do not acquire in Reshus
               ha'Rabim or in the seller's Reshus, unless the
               seller said 'go acquire in this Keli.' Similarly, if
               one acquired the Keli first and lifted it, then put
               it in the seller's Reshus, and later bought the
               Peros, once they are in the Keli he acquires them.
               Since the seller benefits from the sale, he is not
               particular about the place (that the buyer's Keli
               occupies).
<br><b><font color='darkgreen'> <b>    (c)</b>  Poskim</font></b>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (CM 200:3):</font></b> One's Kelim acquire
               anywhere he may put them. Once the Metaltelim are in
               the Keli, neither can retract. It is as if Hagbahah
               was done or they were put in the buyer's house.
               Therefore, one's Kelim do not acquire in Reshus
               ha'Rabim or in the seller's Reshus, unless the
               seller said 'go acquire in this Keli.' Then, he
               acquires if it is in the seller's Reshus.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  SMA (9):</font></b> The Shulchan Aruch rules like the Rif
                    and Rambam, that he definitely does not
                    acquire.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shach (7):</font></b> In the seller's Reshus, the buyer's
                    Keli acquires also if he received permission to
                    put the Keli there.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rema:</font></b> Some distinguish and say that if it is not the
               buyer's Reshus, rather, a Simta or something
               similar, his Kelim acquire only if he measured or he
               said 'go acquire.'
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  SMA (8):</font></b> This means that the seller measured
                    and put in the buyer's Kelim in a Simta. If the
                    buyer measured, he acquired through this even
                    without his Kelim, for he did Meshichah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (4):</font></b> Similarly, if one acquired the
               Keli first and lifted it, then put it in the
               seller's Reshus, and later bought the Peros, once
               they are in the Keli he acquires them. Since the
               seller benefits from the sale, he is not particular
               about the place.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Gra (15):</font></b> We must say that he lifted it, for if
                    not, it is still the seller's Keli.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question (Bedek ha'Bayis):</font></b> The Tur cited this
                    in the name of the Ri mi'Gash. He brought the
                    Ramah, who said that lending the Reshus helps
                    only if he says 'go acquire.' Why did the Tur
                    say that they disagree? They discuss different
                    laws!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Answer (Bach 8 DH u'Mah):</font></b> The Ramah holds that
                    'go acquire' helps, but lending the Reshus does
                    not. The Ri mi'Gash holds oppositely, that 'go
                    acquire' helps only because this shows that he
                    lent the Reshus to him!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Beis Yosef (DH v'Ein):</font></b> Rav Dimi rejected the
                    proof from Gitin by saying that her husband
                    sells baskets. Rashi explains that he has a
                    house for baskets, therefore he is not
                    particular about the place of her basket. The
                    Rambam and Ri mi'Gash hold that he sold the
                    basket to her, therefore, hnc for its place.
                    The Magid Mishneh says that even though the
                    conclusion is like R. Yochanan, that no man is
                    concerned for the place of his wife's basket,
                    we learn about other cases from Rav Dimi.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shulchan Aruch (EH 139:9):</font></b> If a man threw a Get into
               his wife's basket in his Reshus, she is not
               divorced, for her Keli acquires in his Reshus only
               if he is not particular about its place.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Taz (12):</font></b> The Ran says that in Gitin, we
                    resolved that the buyer's Keli does not acquire
                    in the seller's Reshus. The Beis Yosef said
                    that it is a Safek, for the Gemara did not
                    explicitly resolve this. He should have said
                    here in the Shulchan Aruch that it is a Safek,
                    like he says in Sa'if 10!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Beis Shmuel (14):</font></b> These are the words of the
                    Rambam. The Rambam holds that we settled the
                    question; the buyer's Kelim do not acquire in
                    the seller's Reshus. She is not even Safek
                    divorced. However, the Shulchan Aruch (Sa'if
                    10) says that she is Safek divorced! Also here,
                    he means Safek divorced. We cannot distinguish
                    Get from Kinyan. The <b>SMA</b> said that the Shulchan
                    Aruch rules like the Rambam. This is wrong.
<br>
<font color='blue'><i>See also:</i>
<br><b><b>HOW CAN ONE ACQUIRE THROUGH THE SELLER'S KELIM? </b></b>(</font><font color='blue'>


