# dafyomi

lvr: 32
dfh: b
trd:
<b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>COLLECTION OF DEBTS</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b></b>  A man owed 1000 Zuz. He had two mansions, and sold each 
          for 500 Zuz (to the same man).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  The creditor took one mansion, and was about to take the 
          other. The buyer took 1000 Zuz cash and said 'if one 
          mansion is worth 1000 to you, consider one mansion full 
          collection. If not, take 1000 Zuz.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rami bar Chama):</font></b> This is like our Mishnah. If the 
          orphans offer to accept the value of the property above 
          its true value (we do not heed them).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Rava):</font></b> No. There, there is a loss (to the 
          children of the mother with the small Kesuvah). Here, the 
          creditor lent 1000 and receives 1000!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> (According to Rava, if the creditor accepted 
          one mansion as payment,) when we write a document saying 
          that the buyer's land was taken to pay the debt (and the 
          seller owes him for it), for how much do we write it?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Ravina):</font></b> We write for 1000 Zuz.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rav Avira):</font></b> We write for 500 Zuz.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b></b>  The Halachah is, we write for 500 Zuz.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b></b>  A man owed 100 Zuz, and had two small plots of land. He 
          sold each for 50 Zuz (to the same man).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b></b>  The creditor took one plot, and was about to take the 
          other. The buyer took 100 Zuz cash and told him, if one 
          plot is worth 100 to you, consider one plot full 
          collection; if not, take 100 Zuz.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yosef):</font></b> This is like our Mishnah. If the orphans 
          offer to accept the value of the property above its true 
          value (we do not heed them).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Abaye):</font></b> No. There, there is a loss (to the 
          children of the mother with the small Kesuvah). Here, the 
          creditor lent 100 and receives 100!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> (According to Abaye, if the creditor accepted 
          one plot as payment,) when we write a document saying 
          that the buyer's land was taken to pay the debt, for how 
          much do we write it?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Ravina):</font></b> We write for 100 Zuz.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rav Avira):</font></b> We write for 50 Zuz.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b></b>  The Halachah is, we write for 50 Zuz.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b></b>  A man owed 100 Zuz. He died, and the only land he left 
          was a plot worth 50 Zuz. The creditor took it as partial 
          payment. The orphans gave him 50 Zuz (and took the land 
          back); the creditor took it again for final payment.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Abaye):</font></b> It is a Mitzvah for orphans to pay the debt of 
          their father. The 50 Zuz they gave the creditor was 
          l'Shem Mitzvah. The creditor was entitled to take the 
          land again.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This is only if the orphans did not say that the 50 
               Zuz is the value of the land. If they said this, 
               they expel him from the land (and he cannot collect 
               any more, since the father didn't leave any other 
               land).
.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>FOR WHAT DOES A PERSON ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b></b>  Levi sold his mother's Kesuvah for Tovas Hana'ah (a small 
          amount, since the buyer does not get anything until she 
          is widowed or divorced, and gets nothing if she dies 
          before her husband or if Levi dies before her). Levi 
          stipulated that he will not give compensation if his 
          mother protests. (A second explanation in Rashi says that 
          after his father died, Levi sold land of his father that 
          had been designated to pay the Kesuvah, for Tovas 
          Hana'ah. The sale would be valid as long as his mother 
          did not take the land.)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> His mother never protested, and she died (after her 
               husband). The son protested (the buyer should not 
               collect).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rami bar Chama):</font></b> He is in place of his mother (and he 
          stipulated not to compensate if she protests).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Rava):</font></b> Granted, he did not accept Acharayos 
          (responsibility to compensate) for her protest, but for 
          his own, he certainly did!
<br>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAND TORN AWAY</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rami bar Chama):</font></b> Reuven sold a field to Shimon, without 
          Acharayos (in case the land is taken from him); Shimon 
          sold it back to Reuven, with Acharayos. Reuven's creditor 
          took the land. Shimon must compensate Reuven.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Rava):</font></b> Granted, Shimon accepted Acharayos for 
          others, but not for when the land is taken due to Reuven!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  Rava admits in the following case:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Reuven inherited a field from Yakov, and sold it to 
               Shimon, without Acharayos. Shimon sold it back to 
               Reuven, with Acharayos. Yakov's creditor took the 
               field from Reuven.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Shimon must compensate Reuven. The creditor of Yakov 
               is like a regular creditor (i.e. he is not like 
               Reuven's creditor).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rami bar Chama):</font></b> Reuven sold a field to Shimon with 
          Acharayos, and Shimon wrote a document saying that he 
          owes the money. Reuven died, and Reuven's creditor took 
          the field from Shimon. Shimon persuaded him to take the 
          money owed in place of the field.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Reuven's children can say that our father left 
               Metaltelim by you (a monetary debt), and a creditor 
               cannot take Metaltelim of orphans (i.e. the creditor 
               had no claim against us. You did not pay our debt, 
               therefore you still owe to us. Also, since we did 
               not inherit land, you cannot collect compensation 
               (for having lost the field) from us.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava):</font></b> If Shimon is clever, he will pay the orphans with 
          land, and he can collect compensation from it, like Rav 
          Nachman taught;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Nachman):</font></b> If orphans collected land for their 
               father's debt, a creditor can collect from it.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>A CREDITOR COLLECTS 'BEINONIS'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rabah):</font></b> If Reuven sold all his fields to Shimon, Shimon 
          sold one of them to Levi, and Reuven's creditor came to 
          take a field, he may collect from whomever he wants.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  This is only if Levi bought Beinonis (middle quality 
          land). If he bought high or low quality land, Levi can 
          say 'I toiled to buy land that you cannot collect!'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Even when he bought Beinonis, the creditor has a 
               choice from whom to collect, only if Levi bought all 
               the Beinonis that Shimon bought from Reuven. If he 
               left some over, he can say 'I left you land by 
               Shimon from which to collect!'
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) PAYING OFF THE DEBT OF ONE'S OWN CREDITOR</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> Rami bar Chama discusses a case where Reuven sold a field to Shimon, letting Shimon keep the money he owes for the field as a loan. Reuven passed away, and his property was inherited by his children. When Reuven's own creditor later came to collect the field from Shimon, Shimon did not give the field itself to the creditor, but instead he gave him the <i>value</i> of the field (in cash). Shimon then went to Reuven's heirs to demand repayment for paying off their father's debt. Reuven's heirs rightfully claimed that they were exempt from reimbursing Shimon, because only <i>land</i> that heirs inherit is Meshubad (earmarked) for the payment of their father's debt, but not mobile property or cash that they inherit. Shimon, therefore, lost his money.
</p><p>
Rava comments that if Shimon is cunning, he can avoid a loss by paying back his own debt to Reuven by giving back the land to Reuven's heirs. Once the heirs have land that belonged to Reuven, Shimon can collect that land as repayment for Reuven's debt to <i>him</i>!
</p><p>
Why does the Gemara mention that Shimon gave specifically <i>money</i> to Reuven's creditor? What difference does it make if Shimon gave to the creditor the land or if he gave him money? In either case, Reuven now has the responsibility to reimburse Shimon for the debt that Shimon paid for him! Whether Shimon gave land or cash, a mutual debt is created with Shimon owing money to Reuven and Reuven owing money to Shimon, and Rava's statement -- as to how Shimon can avoid a capital loss -- applies just the same!
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH u'Payesei) explains that Rami bar Chama is teaching an additional Chidush. If he would have taught that when Shimon paid Reuven's creditor with <i>land</i> he is not entitled to be compensated by Reuven's children (because they do not have any land to give to him), that would have been obvious -- Shimon cannot collect the 'Achrayus' from Reuven's children if they did not inherit land! Shimon's debt to Reuven, on the other hand, remains and he is obligated to pay the children the value of the field.
</p><p>
However, now that he pays the creditor with the <i>value</i> of the field (i.e. cash), we might have thought that he is not relying on being reimbursed due to the 'Achrayus' on his field, but rather he is giving the <i>original money</i> that he kept back when he purchased the field, which is Reuven's own money that Shimon happens to be holding in his hands. That is, he is paying Reuven's money to Reuven's creditor on Reuven's behalf, like a Shali'ach. Therefore, we might have thought that Shimon is exempt from paying his old debt to the children, since he just passed that money on to Reuven's creditors, as a middleman for Reuven, instead of giving it to the children, and he thus comes out even.
</p><p>
In fact, <b>TOSFOS</b> (91b, DH Reuven; Pesachim 31a, DH b'Achrayus) and other Rishonim point out that if -- at the time of the purchase of the land -- Shimon had not kept the money owed for the land as a loan (i.e. he had not <i>set a later time</i> for payment), but he had merely delayed paying Reuven, then the money which he would be holding would actually belong to Reuven, and the above ruling would then be true. After Reuven's death, he could give that money straight to the creditor as a way of giving the money to Reuven. However, now that he made the money owed for the field into a loan, he can no longer say that he has Reuven's money in his hands. Rather, he has a <i>debt</i> to Reuven. Therefore, Reuven's children can say to Shimon, 'We hereby demand the money that you owe us. You gave your own money to our father's creditor, and not our father's money, and we are not obligated to cover the guarantee for you, because we do not have any land.'
</p><p>
This also seems to be the intention of <b>RASHI</b>.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>MAHARAM CHALAVAH</b> (Pesachim 31a) says that if the money for the land was not made into a loan, but Shimon merely delayed paying Reuven, then the reason why Shimon could pay the creditor and thereby exempt himself from paying Reuven's children is <i>not</i> because he is simply holding on to Reuven's money, but because he still has the option to <i>withdraw</i> from the entire deal since he has not yet paid for the land and thus the deal has not been consummated. Shimon could say to Reuven's children, 'I do not have to pay you the value of the field anymore, because I am withdrawing from the deal and am not buying the land.' He keeps the land, though, as reimbursement for Reuven's debt that he paid to the creditor. 
</p><p>
If so, the Gemara mentions that he paid money to the creditor instead of giving the field itself only to show what the Halachah would have been had he <i>not</i> made the money he was keeping back for the field into a loan. If it was not a loan, then not only could Shimon go back on the deal and give the field to the creditor and not pay Reuven for the field, but he could even give the <i>value</i> of the field (in cash) to the creditor and claim that he never bought the field from Reuven, and that he thus owes nothing to the children. (Why, then, is he keeping the field? He states that when he paid Reuven's money to the creditor, it is as if he gave the field to the creditor and then bought it back.) This is what the Gemara is teaching when it says that Shimon paid Reuven's creditor with money; it is teaching what the Halachah would be if the Shimon had <i>not</i> made the value of the field into a loan.
</p><p>


<font><b>2) PAYING BACK A DEBT WITH LAND</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> Rava says that if Shimon is clever, he will pay back the debt he owes to the children of Reuven with land and not with money, and then they will have land with which to pay their debt to Shimon. What right does Shimon have to choose to pay back with land? The Gemara earlier (86a) says that when repaying a loan, one is not allowed to pay back with land but must give back cash, if he has any. If so, how can Shimon insist on paying back with land?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>RASHI</b> (Pesachim 31a, DH Iy Pike'ach) says that he could <i>claim</i> that he has no money but only land.
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Iy, see also <b>MAGID MISHNEH</b>, Hilchos Malveh v'Loveh 11:10) writes that if paying back one's debt with cash will cause the lender to incur a loss, then he <i>may</i> insist on paying back with land. Only when he will not suffer a loss by it, he must pay back with cash.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>RA'AVAD</b>, cited by <b>MAHARAM CHALAVAH</b> (Pesachim 31a) and others, explains that Rava holds that if Shimon gives back the <i>very land</i> that Reuven sold to him, even though he already made the money for the land into a loan, he may cancel the entire deal. Consequently, by returning the land he has canceled the loan and does not have to pay cash for any purchase; he merely gives back the land which he decided not to buy. By doing so, Shimon gets to take reclaim the land as reimbursement for paying money on Reuven's behalf to Reuven's creditor.
</p><p>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
trd:
<b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>DOES A CREDITOR'S SEIZRE OF LAND AFFECT THE BORROWER?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #1 (Abaye):</font></b> If Reuven sold a field to Shimon with 
          Acharayos, and Reuven's creditor comes to take it, Reuven 
          can claim in Beis Din to try to stop him;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The creditor cannot say 'you have no case with me', 
               since Reuven can say 'the one you take it from will 
               demand payment from me.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #2 (Abaye):</font></b> Even if the field was sold without 
          Acharayos, Reuven (can claim in Beis Din to try to stop 
          him, for he) can say 'I do not want Shimon to have 
          complaints against me.'
<br>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>SALE OF A CONTESTED FIELD</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #1 (Abaye):</font></b> If Reuven sold a field to Shimon 
          without Acharayos and people contested the sale, until 
          Shimon makes a Chazakah in the field he can retract (if 
          he did not yet pay). After this, he cannot retract;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Reuven can say to him 'you knowingly risked your 
               money.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is considered making a Chazakah?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> It is when he walks around the borders.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #2 (Abaye):</font></b> This is even if he sold the field 
          with Acharayos. Reuven can say 'if Beis Din rules that 
          they can take the field, I will compensate you.'
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>SPLITTING AN ESTATE TO PAY 'KESUVOS'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> A man married three women on the same day, and 
          died. Their Kesuvos are for 100, 200 and 300 (Zuzim). If 
          the estate is 100, they divide it equally;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If the estate is 200, the 'first' woman (whose Kesuvah is 
          100) receives 50. The others receive 75 each;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  If the estate is 300, they receive 50, 100 and 150, 
          respectively.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  The same applies to three people who invested money 
          together. If there was a loss or profit, they share this 
          way.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara) Question:</font></b> In case (b), why does the first woman 
          get 50? She deserves only 33 and a third (a share of the 
          first 100. She has no claim to the second 100!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Shmuel):</font></b> The case is, the second woman wrote 
          to the first, 'I have no claim with you in 100 Zuzim of 
          the estate' (so the first and third women share that 
          100).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, why do the second and third women both 
          receive 75? The third can tell the second, you forfeited 
          your share in the first 100!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> She responds 'I forfeited only the right to 
          quarrel with and decrease the share of the first woman. I 
          did not concede anything to you' (Tosfos does not 
          understand this answer. Some say that the third woman 
          consented to the second's waiving of her rights (Hagahah 
          in Targum of Rif, Sof 52a), or that her silence to the 
          waiving shows acceptance (Meiri)).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If the estate is 300, they receive 50, 100 and 
          150.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> The second woman should receive only 75 (since 
          she has no claim to the third 100, she should get the 
          same as when the estate was 200)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Shmuel):</font></b> The case is, (the second woman did 
          not write anything, and) the third woman wrote to the 
          first two 'I have no claim with you in 100 of the estate' 
          (so the first and second women share that 100).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (to questions (e) and (j) - Rav Yakov from 
          Nehar Pekod):</font></b> The women seized Metaltelim of the estate 
          at two times;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> In case (b) of the Mishnah, they first seized 75 
               (which was split equally), and then the last 125. 
               (The first woman took an equal share (a third) of 75 
               of the 125, since she still needed to be paid 75 
               from her Kesuvah);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> In case (c), they first seized 75 (all split it 
               equally), and then the last 225. The first woman 
               took a third of 75 from the 225, like above. The 
               second woman received as much as the third woman in 
               175 of the 225 (i.e. 75), since she still needed to 
               be paid 175 from her Kesuvah, and the third woman 
               took the last 50 herself).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> This Mishnah is like R. Nasan;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b></b>  Rebbi says, I disagree with R. Nasan. Rather, they split 
          equally (Rashi; Tosfos - they always receive proportional 
          to their Kesuvos).
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>PEOPLE WHO INVESTED MONEY TOGETHER</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> And similarly, three who invested...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Shmuel):</font></b> If two people invested money together, one put 
          in 100 and the other put in 200, they share the profits 
          equally.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) CHANGING ONE'S MIND WHEN BUYING A FIELD</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara says that when Shimon agrees to buy a field from Reuven and then complaints of claimants are heard about the field, Shimon may withdraw from purchasing the field as long as he has not yet taken ownership of it with a Chazakah. Once he has taken ownership, though, he cannot cancel the sale. <b>RASHI</b> explains that Shimon did not yet give any money to Reuven for the land. If Shimon did give money, then he has already performed an act of acquisition and he cannot rescind the Kinyan. 
</p><p>
The Gemara then asks what form of Chazakah constitutes the buyer's taking ownership of the field, and it answers that his Chazakah occurs from the time he treads upon the boundaries of the field ('Dayish a'Mitzri').
</p><p>
There are a number of unclear points in this Gemara. 
</p><p>
First, if Shimon did not yet perform an act of acquisition (such as giving money to Reuven), then it is obvious that he may cancel the sale, because he has not yet taken ownership!
</p><p>
Second, why is the Gemara here asking what constitutes a Chazakah? The Mishnah in Bava Basra (42a) clearly lists the forms of actions necessary to make a Chazakah of ownership on a field: 'Na'al' (locking), 'Gadar' (fencing in), and 'Paratz' (making a breach in a fence to create an entrance), or any act that is done to enhance the land such as digging. Moreover, why does our Gemara give a different form of Chazakah (treading on the boundaries, which is a lesser form of denoting taking title to the field) than the Mishnah in Bava Basra says? (<b>TOSFOS</b> DH ume'Eimas)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> answers that in the case to which our Gemara is referring, Shimon already gave money to Reuven for the field, but where they live it is the practice to transfer ownership of a field by writing a Shtar besides paying for the field. Even though paying for the field does not transfer ownership of a field in such a place (Kidushin 226a), it does enable the buyer to take possession by using a weaker form of Chazakah. Thus, the Gemara here is asking what forms of Chazakah are needed when a buyer <i>has already given money</i> for the field, whereas the Mishnah in Bava Basra is discussing the forms of Chazakah needed for someone who has not yet given money for the field.
</p><p>
(b) Tosfos cites the <b>RIVAM</b> who answers that our Gemara is not asking what form of Chazakah is needed in order to <i>take possession</i> of the field. Rather, the acquisition of the land has already taken place, but the buyer still has the right to cancel the sale. Our Gemara is asking what act demonstrates to us that the buyer is forfeiting his right to cancel the sale.
</p><p>
According to the Rivam, the acquisition of the field was not done with money and with a Shtar, because if it was, then the acquisition would have been complete and final, and the buyer would certainly not be able to change his mind and cancel the Kinyan. Rather, the acquisition of the field was done through a Kinyan Sudar, a.k.a. Chalifin (<b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b>). In such a case the Rabanan instituted that although the transfer of ownership occurred, the buyer may still back out of the sale upon hearing complaints of claimants ('Asikin') on the field, until a certain point. (Rivam compares this to the enactment of the Rabanan that after a Kinyan Sudar, a buyer is allowed to back out of a deal 'all the time that they are involved in the matter.') Kinyan Sudar is not a display of absolute intention to finalize the Kinyan under all circumstances, until it is followed by an act denoting some form of permanence. 
</p><p>
(c) The <b>RITVA</b> explains in a manner similar but not quite identical to the Rivam. He explains that regardless of what form of Kinyan is used to acquire the field, the buyer may revoke the sale upon hearing the complaints of claimants until a certain point. He explains that this is not because the buyer has not completely finalized the sale and may still back out. The reason the sale can be revoked is because if claims are made to the field before the purchaser even has a chance to tread the boundaries of the field, the purchase is like a 'Mekach Ta'os.' That is, the buyer can say that her certainly did not intend to buy the field under such circumstances, and the seller misled him about the details of the field. 
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> in Bava Kama (9a, DH mi'she'Hichzik) answers similarly to the Ritva, but Tosfos adds that if the buyer has not only made a Kinyan Shtar or Chazakah but has even given <i>money</i> to the seller, then he certainly cannot change his mind, even if he has not yet 'tread upon the boundaries.' The buyer can retain the right to revoke the Kinyan only until the entire process is complete -- which happens when the buyer gives the money to the seller and the seller is no longer dealing with the buyer. At that point, even if the buyer has not yet 'tread upon the boundaries,' he cannot revoke the Kinyan.
</p><p>


<font><b>2) RELINQUISHING ONE'S SHARE AT THE EXPENSE OF ANOTHER</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Mishnah discusses the case of a man who was married to three wives and died without enough money to pay each one her full Kesuvah. The Kesuvah of the first wife was 100 Zuz, the Kesuvah of the second wife was 200 Zuz, and the Kesuvah of the third wife was 300 Zuz. If the man died leaving only 100 Zuz, all three women divide it equally, each taking 33 1/3 Zuz. <b>RASHI</b> explains that they divide it equally because they each have a claim to that 100 Zuz.
</p><p>
If, however, he left 200 Zuz, the Mishnah says that the first wife receives 50, and the second and third wives each receive 75. If he left 300 Zuz, then the first wife receives 50, the second wife receives 100, and the third wife receives 150.
</p><p>
The Gemara immediately asks that it does not make sense to give the first wife 50 Zuz when the husband died leaving 200 Zuz. Since the Kesuvah of the first wife is only 100 Zuz, she only has a claim to the first 100 Zuz that her husband left (so that she receives 33 1/3 of that money); she has no claim to the second hundred Zuz that he left! Why, then does she receive 50 Zuz?
</p><p>
Shmuel answers that the Mishnah is referring to a case where the second wife relinquished her claim to the first one hundred Zuz. Hence, only the first and third wives divide it, so that each gets 50 (see Chart). The Gemara then asks that if the second wife relinquished her claim to the first one hundred Zuz, then why does the Mishnah say that when the husband left a total of 200 Zuz, both the second wife and the third wife receive 75 Zuz? The third wife should receive 100 (50 from the first hundred Zuz which she split with the first wife, and 50 from the second hundred Zuz which she split with the second wife), and the second wife should receive only 50! The Gemara answers that when the second wife relinquished her claim to the first one hundred Zuz, she did so only with regard to the first wife; she did not want the first wife's portion to be decreased because of her, and therefore she relinquished her claim. However, she does not want to relinquish her claim to that money when it comes to dividing it up with the third wife. Hence, of the remaining 50 Zuz (from the first hundred), she receives 25 and the third wife receives 25.
</p><p>
(a) It is not clear how the Gemara's answer works out mathematically. Since each woman is supposed to get an equal share of the first 100 Zuz, or 33 1/3 each, when the second wife relinquished her share with regard to the first wife, it should not affect the <i>third</i> wife's portion. She should still receive her 33 1/3 from the first 100 Zuz, leaving the second wife only 16 2/3 Zuz. Why do the second and third wives both receive 25 Zuz out of the first 100?
</p><p>
(b) Why does the Mishnah give such unusual cases to demonstrate the distribution of limited assets? The Mishnah should say the simple case where no one relinquished anything to anyone! 
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>RITVA</b> explains that the Gemara is giving the gist of the answer, but is leaving out a detail. Not only did the second wife relinquish her share of the first 100 Zuz to the first wife, the <i>third</i> wife <i>consented</i> to the second wife's statement, and agreed that the first wife should come away with an entire half of the first 100 Zuz. Because the third wife also agred to this, part of the amount that the first wife is getting beyond her due share is coming from the third wife's share. (That is, instead of the second wife giving the full 16 2/3 from her own share to the first wife, half of that (8 1/3) is coming from the third wife's share. Hence, out of the first 100 Zuz, the first wife gets 50 (33 1/3 + 8 1/3 + 8 1/3), the second wife gets 25 (33 1/3 - 8 1/3), and the third wife gets 25 (33 1/3 - 8 1/3).)
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RITVA</b> writes that the Mishnah prefers to list cases of distribution of limited assets where those assets are divided into <i>whole numbers</i>. The simple cases, where no wife relinquished her shares, involve divisions of the assets into non-integers (such as 33 1/3).
</p><p>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rabah):</font></b> Presumably, Shmuel said this only when they 
          bought an ox for plowing and it plows (for neither share 
          could plow without the other). If they bought it for 
          plowing and it is destined to be slaughtered, each 
          receives proportional to his investment.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Hamnuna):</font></b> Even if they bought it for plowing and it 
          stands to be slaughtered, they share the profits equally.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Beraisa):</font></b> If two people invested money 
          together, one put in 100, the other, 200 - they share the 
          profits equally.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> This is (even) if they bought it for 
               plowing and it is destined to be slaughtered, unlike 
               Rabah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> No, they bought it for plowing and it plows.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Inference:</font></b> If they bought it for plowing and it is 
          destined to be slaughtered, each receives proportional to 
          his investment.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Seifa):</font></b> If each bought (an ox) with his own 
          money and then they mixed them together, each receives 
          proportional to his investment.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The Beraisa should distinguish within the case of 
               pooling money! It should say 'this is when they 
               bought it for plowing and it plows, but if they 
               bought it for plowing and it is destined to be 
               slaughtered, each receives proportional to his 
               investment'!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The Beraisa means this! It is as if it says 'this 
          is when they bought it for plowing and it plows. If they 
          bought it for plowing and it is destined to be 
          slaughtered, it is as if each bought with his own money 
          and then they mixed them together, and each receives 
          proportional to his investment.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Mishnah):</font></b> Similarly, if three invested money 
          together, if it increased or decreased, they split this 
          way.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> The investment literally increased or 
               decreased! (This contradicts Shmuel, who said that 
               they share profits and losses equally.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Nachman):</font></b> No. 'Increase' refers to (the same 
          quantity of) newer coins. 'Decrease' refers to coins that 
          were disqualified; one puts them on a wound on a foot to 
          heal it.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE ORDER IN WHICH WOMEN COLLECT THEIR 'KESUVOS'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If a man married four women and he died, the 
          first receives her Kesuvah before the second; the second 
          before the third, and the third before the fourth. The 
          first woman must swear to the second (that she did not 
          already receive her Kesuvah), the second to the third, 
          and the third to the fourth. The fourth receives her 
          Kesuvah without swearing;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  Ben Nanas says, does she profit because she is last?! 
          Rather, also she does not collect without swearing.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  If all the Kesuvos have the same date, whichever comes 
          first, even by an hour, collects first. In Yerushalayim 
          they used to write the hour of the day.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  If all have the same hour and there is only 100 in the 
          estate, they share it equally.
<br>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>MUST THE LAST WOMAN SWEAR?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara) Question:</font></b> What is the basis of the argument 
          (about whether or not the last woman must swear)?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Shmuel):</font></b> The case is, (after three women 
          collected they found out that) one of the husband's 
          fields was not really his. They argue about whether or 
          not collection out of order (a later creditor before an 
          earlier creditor) is a valid collection;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The first Tana holds that the collection is invalid 
               (so there is no harm if the fourth woman collects 
               without an oath). Ben Nanas holds that the 
               collection stands.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rav Nachman):</font></b> (The case is, they found out 
          that one of the husband's fields was not really his.) All 
          agree that collection out of order is invalid. They argue 
          about whether or not we are concerned lest the fourth 
          woman decrease the value of the field.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The first Tana is not concerned. Ben Nanas is 
               concerned (for she expects that it will be taken 
               from her).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #3 (Abaye):</font></b> (The case is, adult orphans want the 
          fourth woman to swear.) They argue about Abaye Kashisha's 
          law.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Abaye Kashisha):</font></b> The orphans (to whom one must 
               swear to collect from them) are adults, and all the 
               more so, minors.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> The first Tana holds (that one need not swear to 
               adults,) unlike with Abaye Kashisha. Ben Nanas holds 
               like Abaye Kashisha.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Huna):</font></b> If two brothers or partners have a case 
          against someone, and one of them took him to Beis Din and 
          received a verdict, the other brother or partner cannot 
          say 'I was not party to that ruling.' Rather, his partner 
          acted on his behalf.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support  (Rav Nachman - Mishnah):</font></b> The first woman swears 
          to the second, and the second to the third, but the first 
          need not swear to the third.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> This is because when the second made the 
               first swear, she acted on behalf of the third woman.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> No, it is because an oath to one is like an 
          oath to 100;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> In Rav Huna's case, the partner could say that he 
               would have argued better.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> This is only if the partner was not in the city. If 
               he was in the city, he should have come to Beis Din. 
               (By not coming, he accepts whatever verdict his 
               partner receives.)
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>TWO DOCUMENTS WITH THE SAME DATE</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav):</font></b> If two documents (of sale (Tosfos - or gift) for 
          the same property) have the same date, the recipients 
          split the property.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Shmuel):</font></b> We apply Shuda (Rashi - we estimate to whom he 
          wanted to sell the property; Tosfos - the judges give it 
          to whichever they want).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Suggestion:</font></b> Rav holds like R. Meir, who says that the 
          witnesses who sign on a document empower it (therefore, 
          both documents take effect simultaneously from the date 
          written). Shmuel holds like R. Elazar, who says that the 
          witnesses who see a document given to the recipient 
          empower it (therefore, only the one that was given first 
          is valid).
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) 'SHUDA' VERSUS 'CHALUKAH'</b></font><b>
<br>OPINIONS:</b> The Gemara discusses a case where two people are each holding a Shtar Mechirah (deed of sale) for the purchase of the same field from the same person. Both Shtaros were written on the same day, and each person holding a Shtar claims that he is the recipient of the field. Obviously, though, the field was only sold to one of them. Rav and Shmuel dispute how Beis Din is to resolve the conflict. Rav says 'Cholkin' -- Beis Din is to split it up ('Cholkin') the property among the two claimants. Shmuel says that 'Shuda d'Dayanei' is preferable -- the judges decide to whom to give the entire field.
</p><p>
The Gemara concludes that the reason why Rav says that the field is divided is because he holds like Rebbi Meir, who says that 'Edei Chasimah Kartei,' the witnesses who sign the Shtar make the Shtar take effect. Shmuel holds that the field is given to whomever the judges decide because he holds like Rebbi Elazar, who says that 'Edei Mesirah Kartei,' the witnesses in front of whom the Shtar is delivered to the recipient make the Shtar take effect.
</p><p>
Shmuel's opinion is easy to understand. Since Shmuel holds 'Edei Mesirah Kartei,' only the Shtar which was delivered first to its recipient was a valid Shtar. When the second Shtar was given afterward to someone else, it was not a valid sale because the property no longer belonged to the original owner; it was no longer his to sell. However, it is not known which Shtar was given first, and there is no way to know from the text in the Shtaros themselves which of the two was given first. Since neither party can prove on his own which Shtar was given first, the judges must decide the case on their own. Their options are either to split the property between the two claimants out of doubt, or to choose one of the two claimants and give the entire field to him.
</p><p>
(The Rishonim disagree about how the judges 'choose' ('Shuda') one of the claimants to give him the entire field. Rashi explains that 'Shuda d'Dayanei' means that the judges choose to whom to give the property in question by trying to determine, based on logical considerations, to whom the seller would have preferred to give the field. Tosfos (85b, DH Shuda, and 94b, DH Leima) argues with Rashi and says that 'Shuda d'Dayanei' means that the judges give the field to whomever they please. They need not base their decision on whom they think the seller preferred, but rather they base their decision on whatever considerations they deem appropriate, such as which of the two claimants needs the property more, or which one is a Talmid Chacham.)
</p><p>
The Gemara holds, at this point, that in general it is preferable to resolve the case with 'Shuda d'Dayanei' rather than to split the property, because by using 'Shuda d'Dayanei' there is at least a possibility that the correct person will receive the entire field. Therefore, according to Shmuel, the judges give the entire field to one of the two claimants.
</p><p>
What, though, is the reasoning behind Rav's opinion, that the property is to be split because of 'Edei Chasimah Kartei?' 'Edei Chasimah Kartei' means that the primary testimony on a Shtar that effects the legal transfer of property are the witnesses signed on the Shtar. A Shtar that attests to the transfer of property but contains no signatures of witnesses is worthless. Why, though, should that affect the Halachah in this case? As far as the transfer of the property is concerned, the first Shtar that was actually delivered to the recipient should be the one that makes the sale take effect, just like according to Shmuel. Writing the Shtar alone does not cause the transferal of the ownership of the field. Besides, even if writing the Shtar alone would effect a transfer of ownership, in our case we have no idea which of the two Shtaros was written first, since the hour of the writing of the Shtar is not written in the Shtar. We should still have to decide the case with a Shuda d'Dayanei!
</p><p>
There are a number of approaches among the Rishonim to this question:
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI</b> explains that according to the opinion that 'Edei Chasimah Kartei,' any details of importance must be written in the Shtar. If the time of the Kinyan was omitted from the Shtar (that is, the witnesses who signed on it did not know the time of the Kinyan and are not testifying about it), then it shows that the time was not important to the buyer and seller. Therefore, the one who received the document first is not necessarily the true owner. 
</p><p>
Who, then, is the true owner? If the Shtaros were written and delivered on the same day, which of the two Shtaros take effect first? The answer is that there is no way to know. One of the Shtaros takes effect first, but there is no way for us to know which one.
</p><p>
Since Rashi explains that 'Shuda d'Dayanei' means that the judges determine to whom to give the field based on logical deduction, in this case 'Shuda d'Dayanei' does not apply, since there is no possible way of deducting who the logical owner should be. (It is comparable to a man who gives Kesef Kidushin simultaneously to five sisters and says, 'One of you five shall be Mekudeshes to me'; one of them becomes Mekudeshes but it is impossible for us to know which one.) Since 'Shuda d'Dayanei' cannot be done, the only option that remains according to Rav is to split the field.
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> (citing his Rebbi) and other Rishonim argue with Rashi, because they explain that 'Shuda d'Dayanei' means that the judges choose on their own, and not necessarily based on logical deduction. Therefore, 'Shuda d'Dayanei' is applicable even when we have no logical way to determine which Shtar took effect first.
</p><p>
Tosfos explains that those who say 'Edei Chasimah Kartei' maintain that if a document is lacking information that is vital to the Kinyan, then the Shtar cannot create a Kinyan. Even though the 'Edei Mesirah' know the information, since it is not written in the Shtar the property cannot be transferred with the Shtar. The Shtaros in the case of our Gemara did not have the time of day written in them, making it impossible to determine based on the Shtar whether the Kinyan was made earlier or later in the day. All we can determine based on what was written in the Shtar is that the Kinyan was made before the last second of the day. Therefore, the Shtar will create a valid Kinyan only at the end of the day, no matter at what point in the day it was actually delivered.
</p><p>
Hence, if there are two Shtaros that have the same day written in them (with no time written in them), they both will take effect at the same moment (i.e. at the last moment of the day) no matter when they were delivered. Since they take effect at the same moment, each recipient legally owns half of the field and they become partners in the ownership of the field. This is why Rav says to split the property. We have no doubt whatsoever as to who owns the field. We know for certain that they <i>both</i> own the field!
</p><p>
The <b>RITVA</b> questions this approach of Tosfos based on the Gemara in Gitin (17b). The Gemara there clearly says that if a Get contains an ambiguous date (such as the month without the day of the month), the Get takes effect at the time at which it is given, and not at the last moment of the month. (Tosfos must be learning that the Gemara there follows the opinion of Rebbi Elazar, that 'Edei Mesirah Kartei.') 
</p><p>
(c) <b>RABEINU TAM</b>, also cited by Tosfos, gives an entirely different approach. Rabeinu Tam says that a 'Shuda' is better than splitting the property only in a case where it is impossible for the field to actually belong to both parties. In such a case, if the field is divided equally, then it will look strange for Beis Din to be splitting the property when everyone knows that it <i>cannot</i> belong to both parties. On the other hand, if there is even a remote possibility that the property belongs to both parties, then it is better to split the property than to give to one of them the entire property based on the judges' choice. People who see it split will assume that the judges investigated the matter and decided that that remote possibility was the truth. This is a better alternative than Shuda, which leaves the ownership of the field dependent upon the whims of the judges.
</p><p>
As we explained earlier, according to the opinion that 'Edei Mesirah Kartei,' the first one to receive the Shtar is the true owner. For all practical purposes it is impossible for the two Shtaros to have been delivered at the same moment to both parties. The seller, who is obviously trying to fool one of the recipients by selling or giving him a field that was not his, would not dare to give it to one party in front of the other, for they would immediately realize his treachery. Rather, he gives the first Shtar to one recipient, and then, at a later point and after the first one has left, he gives the second Shtar to the second recipient.
</p><p>
Since no possibility exists that the Shtaros were given at the same time, it is not possible that <i>both</i> recipients own the property. Only one recipient can own the property. Therefore, the preferred ruling is 'Shuda d'Dayanei.'
</p><p>
However, according to Rav, who holds 'Edei Chasimah Kartei,' since the writing and signing of the Shtar is the primary act accomplishing the Kinyan, when the seller delivers the Shtaros to the recipients, he probably has in mind at that time that they should only take effect in <i>the order in which they were written</i>. Even if the Shtar that was written second is given over first, it does not transfer the field to the recipient, because the seller intended that it take effect after the other Shtar, that was written <i>first</i>, takes effect. If the two Shtaros were written at the same moment (such as when they were signed by different witnesses), then no matter which one is delivered first, both Shtaros take effect at the same moment, and the property becomes acquired by both of the recipients, with each one receiving half of the property.
</p><p>
Rabeinu Tam asserts that there does exist a possibility that both Shtaros were signed by different witnesses in different places at the same moment, without revealing the seller's plot. Moreover, even if the second Shtar was signed by the <i>same</i> witnesses who signed the first Shtar, as long as they signed the second Shtar while the seller was still involved in the proceedings of the first Shtar ('Asukim b'Oso Inyan'), it is considered as if they were both signed at the same moment. Since there is a possibility that the Shtaros were signed simultaneously and that the property actually belongs to both recipients, it is better to split it than to leave it to the judges' discretion. 
</p><p>
(d) The <b>RITVA</b> explains that the question of whether 'Shuda d'Dayanei' is better or 'Chalukah'  is better is simply a matter of statistical probability. He explains that Rebbi Elazar ('Edei Mesirah Kartei') and Rebbi Meir ('Edei Chasimah Kartei') argue with regard to a Shtar that is delivered <i>on the day after</i> it is written. If 'Edei Mesirah Kartei,' then the date written in the Shtar is irrelevant to the Kinyan. The Kinyan takes place at the time at which the Shtar is delivered. Consequently, if the Shtar is delivered after the date written in the Shtar, the Shtar is invalid because it is a Shtar Mukdam (i.e. pre-dated; see Insights to Rosh Hashanah 2:2).
</p><p>
According to those who say 'Edei Chasimah Kartei,' the moment that the date of the Shtar arrives, the Shtar is considered to have been delivered through the principle of 'Edav b'Chasumav Zachin Lo' -- witnesses, through the act of signing the Shtar, make the Shtar take effect (Bava Metzia 13a). If the Shtar does not have the hour written in it but only the date, at the last moment of that day the Shtar takes effect, whether or not it has been delivered. Therefore, no matter when it is eventually delivered, it is not a Shtar Mukdam.
</p><p>
In short, if 'Edei Chasimah Kartei,' then there are two ways to transfer ownership through the Shtar: either by delivering the Shtar, or by writing the time in the Shtar and waiting for the time of the Shtar to arrive.
</p><p>
Now when two Shtaros are written with the same date, there exists four possibilities as to when they were delivered: (1) They could have been delivered to both recipients <i>simultaneously</i> on the <i>same</i> day they were written, or (2) they could have been delivered <i>one after the other</i> on the same day they were written. Alternatively, (3) they could have been delivered to both recipients <i>simultaneously</i> on a day <i>after</i> the day on which they were written, or (4) they could have been delivered <i>one after the other</i> after the day on which they were written.
</p><p>
If 'Edei Chasimah Kartei,' then in three of these four possibilities the field belongs to <i>both</i> of the claimants. Only if the Shtaros were delivered to the two claimants <i>one after the other</i> on the <i>same</i> day that they were written, does the first recipient acquire the field. If the Shtaros were delivered at the same time on the day they were written, or if they were delivered on a later day (whether at the same time or one after the other), then they both take effect at the same time, because 'Edav b'Chasumav Zachin Lo.' Therefore, it is better to split the field, since three out of the four possibilities point to splitting the field.
</p><p>
If, on the other hand, 'Edei Mesirah Kartei,' then if the Shtaros were given on a later day, they are invalid (so two of the four possibilities are not taken into consideration). Rather, we assume that the Shtaros were given on the day they were written, and thus there are two possibilities: (1) they were given to the recipients simultaneously (in which case they both own the field), or (2) one after the other (in which case the first recipient owns the field). Of the two possibilities, we consider it to be more probable that they were given one after the other. Therefore, 'Shuda d'Dayanei,' giving all of the property to one person, is preferable to splitting the property.
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> No, all hold like R. Elazar;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Rav holds that it is better to divide the property. 
               Shmuel holds that Shuda is better.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> Rav does not hold like R. Elazar!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Yehudah citing Rav):</font></b> The Halachah follows R. 
               Elazar in Gitin.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Shmuel):</font></b> The Halachah follows R. Elazar even 
               regarding monetary documents.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> Rav does not hold like R. Elazar 
               regarding monetary documents.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Conclusion:</font></b> We must say that Rav holds like R. Meir, and 
          Shmuel holds like R. Elazar.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (against Shmuel - Beraisa):</font></b> If two documents 
          have the same date, they divide the property!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> The Beraisa is like R. Meir. Shmuel holds like 
          R. Elazar.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Seifa):</font></b> If he wrote to Levi, and then wrote 
          and gave over to David, David acquires.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If it is like R. Meir, why does (only) David 
               acquire? He holds that the witnesses who sign 
               empower the document (both should acquire equally)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> (The Beraisa is like R. Elazar.) Tana'im argue 
          about whether division or Shuda is better;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - Chachamim):</font></b> (If Reuven sent a gift to 
               Shimon, and Shimon died before the gift reached him 
               and Reuven died before the gift returned,) the heirs 
               of Reuven and Shimon divide the property;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Here (in Bavel) they said the Shali'ach does as he 
               wants (i.e. Shuda).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b></b>  Rami bar Chama's mother wrote her property to him in the 
          morning. In the afternoon, she wrote it to Mar Ukva bar 
          Chama. Rami bar Chama went to Rav Sheshes, who ruled that 
          Rami bar Chama receives the property. Mar Ukva bar Chama 
          went to Rav Nachman, and he ruled in his favor.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Sheshes:</font></b> Why did you rule like you did?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Nachman:</font></b> Why did you rule like you did?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Sheshes:</font></b> Rami's document was written first.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Nachman:</font></b> We care which document was written 
               earlier in the day only in Yerushalayim (where they 
               write the hour in the document)!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Sheshes:</font></b> Why did you rule like you did?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Nachman:</font></b> The Halachah is Shuda. I ruled based on 
               my estimation (or preference).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Sheshes:</font></b> My ruling may also be considered Shuda!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Nachman:</font></b> No. Firstly, I am ordained to judge by 
               the Exilarch and the Yeshivah, and you are not.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  Secondly, your ruling was not intended to be 
                    Shuda.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>A DOCUMENT WITH A VAGUE DATE</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b></b>  Two sale documents for the same property came in front of 
          Rav Yosef. Reuven's was dated Nisan 5. Shimon's said only 
          'Nisan'. Rav Yosef gave the property to Reuven.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shimon:</font></b> Why should I lose?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Yosef:</font></b> You have the lower hand. Perhaps your 
               document was given on Nisan 29.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Shimon:</font></b> (I bought with Acharayos.) Write for me a 
          document authorizing me to take property (for 
          compensation) sold from Iyar and onwards.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rav Yosef:</font></b> Buyers can dispel you. Perhaps your document 
          is from Nisan 1, and you deserved the property given to 
          Reuven!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The solution is for Reuven to give to Shimon power 
               of attorney to collect from buyers.
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) WHO IS AUTHORIZED TO MAKE A 'SHUDA?'</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara shows that even according to Rebbi Elazar, who holds 'Edei Mesirah Kartei,' it is not obvious that 'Shuda d'Dayanei' is better than 'Chalukah.' There is a Tana who holds that whenever in doubt, it is preferable to split the property. The Gemara proves this from a Beraisa which discusses a case where a man sent a gift of money to his friend via a Shali'ach. The Shali'ach found that the friend had died, and upon returning with the money he found that the person who sent him had also died. The Gemara (Gitin 14b) asks who gets the money -- the heirs of the sender or the heirs of the recipient? 
</p><p>
In that case, there is no Shtar, and thus the factor of 'Edei Mesirah Kartei' or 'Edei Chasimah Kartei' is irrelevant. Nevertheless, there is a Machlokes Tana'im what should be done with the money. The Chachamim say that it should be divided among the heirs of both parties, and in Bavel they ruled that the Shali'ach may  give it to whomever he wants, which is comparable to 'Shuda.' (Rashi there explains that the Shali'ach does not give the money randomly to one or the other, but rather he gives it to the one to whom he thinks the sender would have most likely wanted the money to go; this is consistent with his explanation of 'Shuda' in our Sugya, see beginning of previous Insight.) Our Gemara says that this shows that there is a Machlokes Tana'im whether 'Shuda' is better or 'Chalukah' is better even in a case where 'Edei Chasimah Kartei' does not play a role.
</p><p>
The Gemara later discusses a dispute between Rav Sheshes and Rav Nachman regarding two Shtaros giving away the same field which were given to two recipients. Rav Nachman tells Rav Sheshes that he is not qualified to make a 'Shuda d'Dayanei,' 'because I (Rav Nachman) am a Dayan, and you (Rav Sheshes) are not a Dayan.'
</p><p>
It seems from Rav Nachman's statement that only a Dayan may make a 'Shuda.' If so, how could the Gemara say that the Shali'ach -- who obviously is not the Dayan -- is entrusted to make a 'Shuda' and distribute the money to whomever he deems appropriate?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>RITVA</b> and others prove from the case of the Shali'ach that it is not necessary to be a Dayan to perform a 'Shuda.' Rav Nachman is saying that he is the <i>local</i> Dayan, and his 'Shuda' may therefore override a visiting Dayan's 'Shuda.'
</p><p>
Similarly, the <b>HAGAHOS ASHIRI</b> says that Rav Nachman is saying that he is a greater, more expert Dayan, because he received authorization from the Reish Galusa to judge, and therefore his 'Shuda' should override Rav Sheshes' 'Shuda.' (See also Rashi DH Ana Dayana.)
</p><p>
(b) Other Rishonim (<b>RABEINU CHANANEL</b>, as cited by Tosfos DH Imei and by Tosfos Kidushin 74a, Dh Shuda) rule that only an established, expert Dayan like Rav Nachman may perform a 'Shuda.' (Rabeinu Chananel probably maintains that Shuda is not a logical means of determining who the true owner is, as Rashi suggested. Rather, it is a 'Dayan's choice,' allowing an expert Dayan to choose the winner based on considerations not directly related to the case at all.) Why, then, in the case of the Shali'ach, could the Shali'ach give the money to whomever he wants?
</p><p>
It seems that since the money was given to the Shali'ach willingly and is now in his hands, he has the authority to give it to whomever he deems appropriate. If, on the other hand, the money is not in the hands of a third party (e.g. in a dispute regarding the ownership of land, or if the two disputants are both holding the property), then Beis Din must decide what to do with it, and they must do justice and cannot give it to the wrong person. Consequently, the only thing they can do is 'Shuda d'Dayanei.' Since 'Shuda d'Dayanei' works through the mechanism of 'Hefker Beis Din Hefker,' only an expert Dayan can make a 'Shuda,' just as an expert Dayan is required to make something Hefker.
</p><p>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO PARDONED HER LIEN</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah #1):</font></b> A man was married to two women and sold his 
          field. His first wife wrote to the buyer 'I have no claim 
          against you.' The second wife may collect the field from 
          the buyer, the first wife collects from the second, and 
          the buyer from the first wife. This cycle continues ad 
          infinitum, until they reach a compromise;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  The same applies to a creditor, and to a woman who is a 
          creditor.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara) Question:</font></b> When she writes ('I have no 
          claim...'), this does not take effect!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> If a man wrote to his friend (Rashi - his 
               partner) 'I have no claim or dealings in this 
               field', 'I have no business in it', (or) 'my hand is 
               removed from it', these words are void.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The case is, they acquired the waiving of her 
          rights (through Chalipin, transferal of a garment).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> This does not help! She can say that she did so 
          only to placate her husband!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah #2):</font></b> If Reuven sold a field and the buyer 
               also bought the field from Reuven's wife, the sale 
               is void. (This refers to one of three special 
               fields, i.e. it was designated to pay her Kesuvah, 
               or was written in the Kesuvah, or was part of her 
               dowry.)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> She can say that she sold it to placate 
               her husband!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (R. Zeira):</font></b> Mishnah #2 is like R. Yehudah. 
          Mishnah is like R. Meir.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Meir):</font></b> If a man sold a field (one of 
               the three), and his wife did not sign on it, and he 
               sold a second field and she signed it, she lost 
               (rights to collect) her Kesuvah (from the second 
               field. She cannot collect from the first, for the 
               first buyer left the second field for her to collect 
               from.)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Yehudah says, she can say that she signed only to 
               placate her husband.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> Did Rebbi codify the Mishnah here like R. 
          Meir, and there like R. Yehudah?!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rav Papa):</font></b> Mishnah #1 discusses a divorcee who 
          signed. All Tana'im agree to it (she is not concerned for 
          placating her ex-husband).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #3 (Rav Ashi):</font></b> Also Mishnah #2 is like R. Meir;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Meir does not believe her to say that she signed 
               only to placate her husband only when he made two 
               sales, and she agreed only to the second.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  If she did so to placate her husband, she 
                    should have agreed to both of them!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> When there was only one sale, R. Meir agrees that 
               she can say that she signed only to placate him.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> In Mishnah #1, the husband previously sold another 
               field and she did not sign.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHEN ONE MAY COLLECT FROM SOLD PROPERTY</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> One may not collect from sold land when the 
          debtor still has Bnei Chorin (unsold property), even if 
          it is lowest quality land.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If the Bnei Chorin were flooded, may the 
          creditor collect from sold land?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Beraisa - R. Meir):</font></b> If a man sold two fields, 
          and his wife signed only on the second, she lost her 
          Kesuvah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If a creditor may collect from sold land when Bnei 
               Chorin are flooded, granted she cannot collect her 
               Kesuvah from the second buyer, but she should 
               collect from the first!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection #1 (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak):</font></b> The Beraisa says 
          that she lost her Kesuvah, i.e. the right to collect it 
          from the second buyer. She can collect from the first!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection #1 (Rava):</font></b> 'She lost her Kesuvah' connotes that 
          she lost it entirely.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection #2 (Rava - Beraisa):</font></b> A man borrowed from one 
          man, and sold property to two men. The creditor wrote to 
          the second buyer, I have no claim against you. He cannot 
          collect from the first buyer, for the first buyer can 
          tell him, I left for you property from which to collect!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #1 (Tosfos) Answer (to Objection #2):</font></b> That case 
          is different. The creditor caused himself to lose by 
          pardoning his lien! (We do not say so about a wife, for 
          it was not yet the time to collect her Kesuvah.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #2 (Rashi) Rejection #2 (Rava):</font></b> We cannot learn 
          to Bnei Chorin. There, the creditor or wife caused his or 
          her own loss by pardoning the lien! (end of Version #2)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rav Yemar):</font></b> In everyday practice, creditors 
          collect when the Bnei Chorin are flooded!
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) 'NACHAS RU'ACH ASISI L'BA'ALI'</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara explains that Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Meir argue regarding a woman who consents to her husband's sale of a field (that is a lien for her Kesuvah) whether her agreement is binding (and the sale valid) or whether she may claim that she did not really want the field to be sold and the only reason she agreed was 'Nachas Ru'ach Asisi l'Ba'ali,' to make her husband feel good.
</p><p>
The Gemara cites a Beraisa which discusses a man who sold two fields, one after the other. When he sold the first field, his wife did not consent to the sale. When he sold the second field, though, she did consent. Rebbi Meir says that the sale of the second field is valid, because a woman may not claim that 'Nachas Ru'ach Asisi l'Ba'ali.' Rebbi Yehudah argues and says that she may say 'Nachas Ru'ach Asisi' and thus the sale of the second field is not valid.
</p><p>
Clearly, the Gemara understands that according to Rebbi Meir, the woman can never say 'Nachas Ru'ach Asisi,' even when she consented to the sale of the <i>first</i> field (similar to the case of our Mishnah). Why, then, does the Beraisa bother to mention at all that the woman did not consent to the sale of the first field? The Beraisa should discuss only one sale of one field! From the fact that the Beraisa discusses two sales, it seems clear that Rebbi Meir only says that the second sale is binding when she did <i>not</i> consent to a prior sale, showing that she was not interested in making her husband feel good, as the Gemara itself concludes. If there was only one sale and the woman consented, then Rebbi Meir agrees that she may say 'Nachas Ru'ach Asisi.' What, then, did the Gemara initially think when it asked its question? (<b>TOSFOS</b> DH Ha)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> first suggests in the name of his Rebbi that the Gemara initially thought that when the wife does not consent to the first sale, it shows that she feels strongly against the sale of the field to <i>anyone</i>. Therefore, when she consents to the second sale, there is <i>more</i> reason to think that she is only consenting in order to make her husband feel good and not because she really wants the sale to take effect, because she already showed that she does not agree with selling the property. The Mishnah therefore teaches that despite this logic, Rebbi Meir holds that her consent to the second sale is viewed as genuine and the sale is binding, even though she showed earlier that she does not want her husband to sell the fields.
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> himself suggests that the Gemara initially thought that the Beraisa discusses a case of two sales in order to teach a Chidush according to Rebbi <i>Yehudah</i>, that even though she was not afraid to show that she did not agree to the husband's first sale, we still say that she is agreeing to the second sale only because of 'Nachas Ru'ach Asisi' and not because she really wants the sale to take effect. Rebbi Meir could have indeed expressed his opinion, that we never say that a woman agrees only because of 'Nachas Ru'ach Asisi,' in a case of a single sale, but the Beraisa discusses two sales in order to teach Rebbi Yehudah's Chidush.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b>, based on an inference from Rashi's words, proposes that the Gemara initially thought that the Beraisa mentions two sales in order to teach us that once the woman agrees to the sale of the second field, she loses not only the right to collect from the second field, but she loses the right to collect from the first field as well. The Gemara thought that if the 'Nechasim B'nei Chorin' -- the property that remains in the hands of the husband from which the woman could collect her Kesuvah -- becomes rotted or destroyed such that it cannot be collected as payment for her Kesuvah, then she may <i>not</i> collect from the first field (which is now in the hands of the buyer), as the Gemara discusses later.
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> A case occurred in which a lender took a vineyard 
               for 10 years (the produce would pay off the debt). 
               After five years, it stopped producing. Chachamim 
               ruled that he may take property that the borrower 
               had sold.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection (Rav Ashi):</font></b> There, the buyers caused their own 
          loss. They should have realized that a vineyard often 
          stops producing, and refrained from buying the other 
          property.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b></b>  The Halachah is, if the Bnei Chorin are flooded, the 
          creditor may take sold land.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>A GIFT WITH A CLAUSE</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Abaye):</font></b> If one told a woman 'I give my property to you. 
          After you, Ploni will get it' and she married, her 
          husband is like a buyer. After she dies her husband gets 
          the property, not Ploni.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  This is like R. Shimon ben Gamliel.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - Rebbi):</font></b> If one said 'I give my property 
               to you (Reuven). After you, Ploni will get it' and 
               Reuven sold the property, after Reuven dies, Ploni 
               takes the property from the buyer;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Shimon ben Gamliel says, Ploni gets only what 
               Reuven leaves over.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Did Abaye really say this?!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Abaye):</font></b> A cunning Rasha is one who counsels a 
               person to sell like in the above case of R. Shimon 
               ben Gamliel.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Abaye did not say she should get married. He said 
          that if she married, the husband keeps the property.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Abaye):</font></b> If one told a woman 'I give my property to you. 
          After you, Ploni will get it' and she sold the property 
          and died, her husband takes the property from the buyer. 
          Ploni takes the property from her husband; the buyer 
          takes it from Ploni, and it stays by him.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> The Mishnah says that the cycle continues ad 
          infinitum, until they reach a compromise. Why is Abaye's 
          case different?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> There, all three parties incurred a loss; here, 
          only the buyer loses.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rafram):</font></b> Elsewhere, Abaye taught differently!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Abaye):</font></b> If one told a woman 'I give my property to 
               you. After you, Ploni will get it', and she 
               remarried, the husband is like a buyer. After she 
               dies, he gets the property, not Ploni.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Ashi):</font></b> There, he said this to a single woman. 
          In Abaye's second teaching, he said that to her when she 
          was already married;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> When he said 'Ploni should get the property after 
               you', he meant 'Ploni, and not your husband.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> The same applies to a creditor (and to a woman 
          who is a creditor).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> The same applies to a creditor and two buyers 
          (the creditor waived rights to collect from the second 
          buyer). The same applies to a woman who is a creditor 
          (her husband owes her Kesuvah to her) and two buyers (she 
          waived rights to collect from the second).
<br>
<br><b>PEREK ALMANAH NIZONIS</b>
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>A WIDOW'S EARNINGS</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> A widow is fed from the property of the 
          orphans. They receive her earnings. They are not 
          obligated to bury her. Her heirs who inherit her Kesuvah 
          must bury her.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara) Question:</font></b> Is the text 'a widow is fed' or 'a 
          widow who is fed'?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> 'A widow is fed' is like in Galil, where the orphans 
               must feed her;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> 'A widow who is fed' is like in Yehudah, where the 
               orphans need not feed her (they can pay her Kesuvah 
               and exempt themselves from feeding her).
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) WHO IS OBLIGATED TO BURY THE DEAD</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Mishnah states that although the heirs of the husband (the Yesomim) must support the widow, they do not inherit her property, and therefore they are not obligated to bury her. Instead, after she dies, her own heirs (that is, whoever inherit her Kesuvah) are obligated to bury her.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> explains that the Gemara earlier (47b) states that the husband is obligated to bury his wife only because he inherits her Kesuvah (the 'Nichsei Tzon Barzel'). Now that the husband is dead, says Rashi, and he is not going to inherit her nor will his heirs keep the 'Nichsei Tzon Barzel, 'she must bury herself.'
</p><p>
Why does Rashi say that 'she must bury herself?' Rashi should have said that her heirs must bury her, as the Mishnah says! What does Rashi mean to tell us?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>HAFLA'AH</b> explains that in the <b>SHULCHAN ARUCH</b> (Choshen Mishpat 107:2, an Even ha'Ezer 118:18) we find that someone to whom the deceased person owes money may hold up the burial until his loan is repaid from the estate. The Shulchan Aruch continues and says that if the creditor's collection of his debt depletes the entire estate of the deceased person, then the deceased is buried with funds of Tzedakah (this is based on the Tosefta in Kesuvos 9:4). 
</p><p>
The Hafla'ah suggests that this applies only when the deceased person himself owed money and his creditor wants to collect before he is buried. However, if the <i>heirs</i> owe money and their creditor tries to hold up the burial and prevent them from spending their inheritance on the burial instead of giving it to him, we do not allow him to hold up the burial, because the money for the burial was designated for that purpose even before the money reached the hands of the heirs. It is as if the deceased is burying himself with his own funds. This is what Rashi is implying when he says 'she must bury herself.'
</p><p>
(b) His disciple, the <b>CHASAM SOFER</b>, suggests that Rashi writes that 'she must bury herself' because it is not necessarily her heir's obligation to bury her. An heir is only obligated to bury his relative by setting aside money that he receives from the deceased relative's inheritance for the burial. If the deceased did not leave enough money for the burial, then the heir has no obligation to pay from his own funds for the burial. When Rashi writes that the woman 'must bury herself,' he means that whatever money she leaves is used for her burial by whoever inherits it. If she leaves no money, then the heirs are not obligated to use their own money for the burial.
</p><p>
(Rashi might have learned this from the extra words in the Mishnah, 'Yorshei Kesuvasah' -- 'the heirs of her Kesuvah,' which the Mishnah used instead of simply saying, 'Yorshehah' -- her heirs (the Gemara itself makes such an inference earlier, Daf 81a). Rashi understands that the Mishnah did not want to say 'Yorshehah,' because that implies that her heirs -- whether or not they actually inherit anything from her -- are obligated to bury her. Rather, the Mishnah says that 'Yorshei Kesuvasah' are obligated to bury her, implying that only if they actually inherit her Kesuvah are they obligated to bury her.)
</p><p>
This question -- who is obligated to bury a dead person -- is a broad question which is discussed by a number of early Poskim.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> (89b, DH Metamei Lah, and elsewhere) writes that the obligation to bury a deceased person rests upon his or her seven close relatives ('Kerovim'). This is also the ruling of the <b>RA'AVAD</b> (Hilchos Avel 2:6) and most Rishonim (in contrast to the <b>RAMBAM</b> (see Sotah 3a) who says that it is only obligatory for <i>a male Kohen</i> to bury his seven close relatives).
</p><p>
However, that obligation does not necessarily entail spending one's own money to bury the relative. Perhaps it means only that the relatives are obligated to physically exert themselves to see to it that the relative is buried. The <b>NIMUKEI YOSEF</b> (Yevamos) writes that even for a Mes Mitzvah one is not obligated to spend one's own money for the burial, even though one is certainly obligated to involve himself in the burial. In fact, even for one's own parent, we know that during the parent's lifetime one is not obligated to spend his own money in order to fulfill the Mitzvah of Kibud Av va'Em (Kidushin 31b), so certainly after one's parent's death he should not be obligated to spend money for his parent's burial.
</p><p>
What do the Poskim write on this matter? 
</p><p>
The <b>SHULCHAN ARUCH</b> (YD 348:2) cites the <b>TESHUVOS HA'ROSH</b> (13:18) who writes that if a man says that he does not want his entire estate to be spent on his burial, his words are not binding, for he has no right to prevent his money from being used for his burial. His heirs are forced to pay for all the necessities of the burial in a manner consistent with the standard to which the family is accustomed.  However, he says, this applies only when the heirs inherited something from their father. If they inherited nothing, it seems, then they do not have to spend their own money on the burial.
</p><p>
The same can be implied from the Halachah in Choshen Mishpat and Even ha'Ezer (cited in (a) above) that states that if the inheritance is used to pay back a debt of the deceased person, then the deceased person is buried with funds from Tzedakah. This implies that his heirs are not obligated to spend their own money for the burial.
</p><p>
The <b>MAHARAM MINTZ</b> (#53, 55) cites the <b>RA'AVAN</b> who asks that if the relatives have to spend their own money on the burial, then why did the Chachamim have to institute that the husband is obligated to bury his wife (in return for the Nichsei Tzon Barzel), as Rashi mentions here? The husband is one of the seven close relatives and should already be obligated to spend his own money on her burial! If there is no obligation for a person to spend his own money on the burial of his close relative, it is clear what was gained by the Rabbinic institution. The Rabanan enacted that the husband must bury his wife from his own funds, regardless of what he inherits from her.
</p><p>
The <b>HAFLA'AH</b>, in his Kuntrus Acharon (EH 118:12) seems to come to a conclusion similar to that of the Chasam Sofer, pointing out that <b>RASHI</b> in Eruvin (17b, DH d'Is) seems to hold that the heirs are not obligated to spend their own money to bury their relative. Rashi, in turn, is simply paraphrasing the Gemara in Yevamos, end of 89b, which carries the same implication. On the other hand, the <b>CHAVAS YAIR</b> (#139), who also raises the possibility that the relatives do not have to pay for the burial if they do not inherit anything, remains in doubt and issues no affirmative ruling. 
</p><p>
However, the Maharam Mintz (loc. cit.), as cited by the <b>BEIS LECHEM YEHUDAH</b> (YD 348:2 and in a Teshuvah) rules that there is a Mitzvah for the relative to spend his own money for the burial. The Maharam Mintz cites proof for this from the Gemara earlier (8b) that says that the relatives of the deceased used to find the burial more difficult than their relative's death because they had to spend so much money to buy fancy shrouds (Tachrichin), until Raban Gamliel instituted that inexpensive shrouds be used. This implies that it was the relatives' obligation to spend their own money on the burial. The Hafla'ah (ibid.) points out that this indeed is the way the <b>PISKEI TOSFOS</b> here rules (#344 -- the <b>RASHBA</b> here also rules this way); the obligation to bury one's relative is not related to whether or not that relative left an inheritance that can be spent on the burial.
</p><p>
The Poskim (see Hafla'ah and Hagahos Rav Shlomo Eiger in YD 348) suggest that even if there is an obligation to bury a deceased relative from one's own funds, the Torah might only obligate the relatives to give a very basic burial to the deceased person. The Rabanan instituted that if the relatives receive an inheritance, then they are obligated to bury the deceased person according to the honor to which his family is accustomed. It was necessary for the Rabanan to institute that the husband bury his wife for the same reason -- so that she receive a proper, respectful burial and not just a basic one, regardless of whether she left an inheritance or not.
</p><p>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>A WIDOW'S EARNINGS (cont.)</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Shmuel taught that a widow keeps Metzi'os that 
          she finds.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> We understand this if the text of the Mishnah is 'a 
               widow who is fed' (Shmuel discusses a widow who is 
               not fed).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> But if the text is 'a widow is fed', the orphans are 
               like the husband. Just like a husband gets his 
               wife's Metzi'os, also they should get them!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> Really, the text can be 'is fed.' Chachamim 
          enacted that a husband gets her Metzi'os to avoid enmity. 
          We are not concerned for this regarding the orphans.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Yosi bar Chanina):</font></b> A widow does for the heirs all 
          tasks that a wife does for her husband, except for mixing 
          drinks, spreading the bed, and washing the hands, feet 
          and face.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Yehoshua ben Levi):</font></b> A Talmid does for his Rebbi all 
          tasks that a slave does for his master, except for 
          untying his shoe (lest people think that the Talmid is a 
          slave).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava):</font></b> This is only in a place where people do not 
          recognize him. Where people recognize him, it is no 
          problem (to untie his shoe).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Ashi):</font></b> Even where people do not recognize him, it is 
          only a problem if the Talmid is not wearing Tefilin 
          (slaves do not wear Tefilin).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Chiya bar Avin):</font></b> Anyone who prevents his Talmid from 
          serving him withholds from him Chesed - 'He withholds 
          Chesed from his friend'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak):</font></b> He removes fear of 
               Shamayim from him - 'he (causes that he) abandons 
               fear of Hash-m'.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>A WIDOW'S RIGHT TO BE FED</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Elazar, and also a Beraisa):</font></b> If a widow seized 
          Metaltelim to pay for her food, she keeps them.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Dimi):</font></b> A case occurred in which R. Shabtai's 
          daughter-in-law seized a sack of coins, and Chachamim 
          could not take it from her.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Ravina):</font></b> This applies only to food. If she seized 
          Metaltelim to collect her Kesuvah, we take them from her.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Mar bar Rav Ashi):</font></b> Surely, when she seized for 
          her Kesuvah we take from her because a Kesuvah is 
          collected only from land, not from Metaltelim;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Also food may be collected only from land!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Rather when she seizes for food, she keeps it. The 
               same applies when she seizes for her Kesuvah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Yitzchak bar Naftali):</font></b> Rava taught like Ravina.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Yochanan):</font></b> If a widow did not claim food for two or 
          three years, she lost rights to food.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If she loses after two years, why does he 
          mention three years?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> A poor woman loses after two, and a rich woman 
          after three.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> An immodest woman loses after two, and a 
          modest woman after three.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava):</font></b> She loses only for the past (for when she did not 
          claim), but she is entitled to receive food in the 
          future.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (R. Yochanan):</font></b> If the orphans say that they fed 
          her and she says that she did not receive, who must bring 
          a proof?
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE HEIRS' RESPONSIBILITY TO SUPPORT THEIR FATHER'S WIDOW</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Mishnah states that a widow who is supported by the Yesomim (the heirs of her deceased husband) must give her Ma'aseh Yadayim (earnings) to the Yesomim. The Gemara asks whether the Mishnah is relating the practice of Anshei Galil, the people of Galil who require that the Yesomim must support the widow until she asks for her Kesuvah, or whether it is relating the practice of Anshei Yehudah, the people of Yehudah who say that the Yesomim have the option of giving the widow her Kesuvah and sending her away without receiving any more Mezonos.
</p><p>
The Gemara attempts to prove from a statement of Shmuel that the Mishnah is discussing the practice of Anshei Yehudah. Shmuel says that a widow who finds a lost object ('Metzi'ah') may keep it for herself, even though, normally, when a married woman finds a Metzi'ah she must give it to her husband.
</p><p>
The Gemara says that it is not logical that Shmuel is making a statement about Anshei Galil, because there is no reason -- according to their practice that the Yesomim have the same obligation to support the widow as the husband had -- that the Yesomim should be different from the husband and not receive the Metzi'ah. Rather, Shmuel must be making a statement about Anshei Yehudah, and that is why he says that the Yesomim do not receive the Metzi'ah even though her husband would have received it -- according to Anshei Yehudah, the Yesomim do not have the same obligation as the husband to feed her.
</p><p>
How is the Gemara proving that the Mishnah is discussing Anshei Yehudah? Just because Shmuel is making a statement about Anshei Yehudah does not mean the Mishnah is! The Mishnah might be discussing Anshei Galil!
</p><p>
It is possible that the proof of the Gemara is based on the assumption that Shmuel is adding information to the Halachah in our Mishnah. Hence, he is discussing the same case as our Mishnah. If this is true, though, how can the Gemara then explain that Shmuel's statement can be referring even to Anshei Yehudah? As Rashi (DH Shapir) explains, since Shmuel is saying that the widow is not required to give her Metzi'ah to the Yesomim, Shmuel must be referring to a widow who is <i>not</i> receiving Mezonos from the Yesomim (an option which the Yesomim are entitled to choose in Yehudah, where they may give her the Kesuvah and send her away). If she is receiving Mezonos, her Metzi'ah should go to the Yesomim just like her Ma'aseh Yadayim. The Mishnah, though, is not discussing this case. It is discussing a widow who <i>is</i> receiving Mezonos in Yehudah.
</p><p>
If the Gemara considers Shmuel's case to be similar enough to the Mishnah's case that Shmuel could be adding to the Mishnah even though he is discussing a slightly different case, the same could be said if Shmuel is discussing Anshei Galil. Both Shmuel and the Mishnah might be dealing with Anshei Galil, but the Mishnah is discussing a widow who is receiving Mezonos from the Yesomim and Shmuel is discussing a widow who <i>asked to receive her Kesuvah and received it</i>, and thus is no longer receiving Mezonos from the Yesomim.
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b>  (DH Nizones and DH Ta Shema) explains the Gemara in an entirely different manner than Rashi because of these questions. Tosfos explains that the Gemara's question is not whether the Mishnah was written in Yehudah or in Galil. The question is whether according to Anshei Yehudah the Yesomim receive her Ma'aseh Yadayim even while they are giving the widow Mezonos. Perhaps they should <i>not</i> receive her Ma'aseh Yadayim, since they have the option of not feeding her and therefore they are not like the husband.
</p><p>
If the Mishnah is discussing Anshei Yehudah, then we could prove from the Mishnah that the Yesomim do receive her Ma'aseh Yadayim while they are feeding her. But if the Mishnah is discussing Anshei Galil, it is possible that according to Anshei Yehudah, the Yesomim do <i>not</i> receive her Ma'aseh Yadayim even when they are feeding her. The Gemara proves from Shmuel that in Yehudah the Yesomim do receive her Ma'aseh Yadayim when they feed her. The Gemara proves this from the fact that Shmuel says that the Yesomim who feed the widow do not receive her Metzi'ah, implying that they <i>do</i> receive her Ma'aseh Yadayim (for we find that the husband has a stronger right to receive her Ma'aseh Yadayim than to receive her Metzi'ah). The Gemara assumes that Shmuel cannot be discussing Anshei Galil, since the Yesomim in Galil have the same obligation as the husband, because they are obligated to feed her, so it is obvious that they receive her Metzi'ah. Shmuel must be saying that in <i>Yehudah</i>, the Yesomim receive Ma'aseh Yadeha while they feed her but they do not receive her Metzi'ah, since they are not <i>exactly</i> like the husband (because they have the option of not feeding her).
</p><p>
Rashi, though, clearly does not learn like Tosfos. Rather, Rashi explains that when Shmuel says that the Yesomim do not receive her Metzi'ah he is discussing Yesomim who are <i>not</i> feeding the widow. How, then, does Rashi answer our questions?
</p><p>
(b) The <b>PNEI YEHOSHUA</b> and <b>TIFERES L'MOSHE</b> explain that when Rashi says that the Yesomim are not feeding the widow and that is why they do not receive her Metzi'ah, he does not mean that the Yesomim already gave her the Kesuvah, because if they did, then it is obvious that they do not receive her Metzi'ah, nor do they receive even her Ma'aseh Yadayim (as Tosfos points out). Rather, Rashi means that the widow is not receiving the Mezonos because she said, 'Eini Nizones v'Eini Osah' -- 'I decline the right to receive the Mezonos [from the Yesomim], in order not to have to give them my Ma'aseh Yadayim.' Some Rishonim (see <b>ROSH</b> 6:1) write that when a woman says that to her husband, the husband still receives any Metzi'ah that she finds. Nevertheless, Shmuel is saying that the Yesomim do <i>not</i> receive her Metzi'ah if she says 'Eini Nizones v'Eini Osah.' Shmuel must be discussing Anshei Yehudah, because in Galil the Yesomim should have the same rights as the husband and they should receive her Metzi'ah even when she exempts them from giving her Mezonos.
</p><p>
How does the Gemara know that Shmuel is referring to the same case as our Mishnah? The <b>RAMBAN</b> explains that we find earlier (54a) that Shmuel rules like Anshei Galil. If Shmuel is issuing a ruling here regarding Anshei Yehudah, it means one of two things: either Shmuel changed his mind from his earlier ruling, or that he merely is explaining the Mishnah even though he does not rule like it. According to the second possibility, it is clear that Shmuel understands the Mishnah to be discussing Anshei Yehudah. According to the first possibility, also, Shmuel would not have changed his mind unless he had found an anonymous Mishnah discussing Anshei Yehudah.
</p><p>
Although it is clear that Rashi is learning like the Ramban, that Shmuel is explaining the Mishnah, nevertheless the Pnei Yehoshua's explanation that the woman is exempting the Yesomim from giving her Mezonos -- and not that they decided to give her the Kesuvah and are exempting themselves from giving her Mezonos -- is not entirely consistent with Rashi's words (in DH Ela Iy Amrit) as the Pnei Yehoshua himself points out.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> suggests that Shmuel means that the widow's Metzi'ah, and not her Ma'aseh Yadayim, goes to the Yesomim (like Tosfos and the Pnei Yehoshua explain). However, the Shitah learns that we might have thought that in Yehudah, even <i>after</i> the Yesomim choose to give her the Kesuvah and stop supporting her, they still keep her Metzi'ah, since she herself has not asked for her Kesuvah and has not shown signs of wanting to remarry. It is still considered as if she is in their home with the status of their father's widow, and thus they receive her Metzi'ah. (The logic behind this needs further elucidation.) 
</p><p>
In Galil, on the other hand, after the woman asks for her Kesuvah, we assume that she is planning on getting remarried, and therefore she no longer has the status of a widow entitled to support and the Yesomim do not receive even her Metzi'ah. 
</p><p>
(See also <b>HAFLA'AH</b> for a different explanation of Rashi.)
</p><p>
(d) Perhaps Rashi means to explain that Shmuel is referring to a case in Yehudah where the Yesomim say that they are going to give her the Kesuvah (and thereby exempt themselves from giving her Mezonos and no longer receive her Ma'aseh Yadayim), but they did <i>not yet</i> give it to her. Since they still might change their minds before the end of the day, or year, for which they have already paid for her Mezonos -- see next Insight), we might have thought that the Yesomim receive her Metzi'ah. They do not get the Ma'aseh Yadayim because she may use it to feed herself, since she is not sure that she will be fed by the Yesomim (i.e. they might reclaim the money they gave her for that purpose, and give her the Kesuvah). Shmuel teaches that the Metzi'ah of a widow is not given to the Yesomim from the moment that they <i>say</i> they are going to give her the Kesuvah. 
</p><p>
In Galil, though, if she asked for her Kesuvah (or she received the Kesuvah, according to those who say that she receives Mezonos if she only <i>asks</i> for the Kesuvah outside of Beis Din; see 54a), then it is obvious that the Yesomim have no right to the Metzi'ah, because there is no reason to think that she will change her mind about the Kesuvah since it is up to her and not up to the Yesomim, and she is the one who found the Metzi'ah (and she knows that if she changes her mind she will have to give it to the Yesomim). Hence, with regard to Yesomim in Galil, Shmuel would not have to teach us that the widow keeps her Metzi'ah. (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>


<font><b>2) CLAIMING MEZONOS FOR THE COMING YEAR</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTIONS:</b> Rebbi Yochanan asks who is believed in a case where the widow claims that she did not receive Mezonos from the Yesomim, and the Yesomim claim that they gave it to her. Do we consider the Yesomim to be in possession ('Muchzak') of the property from which Mezonos is given, because the property is presently in their hands, or do we consider the widow to be in possession of the property because of the Tenai Beis Din giving her the right to collect Mezonos?
</p><p>
The Gemara cites a Beraisa of Levi in which Levi says that as long as the widow has not yet remarried, she is considered in possession of the property, and thus the burden of proof is on the Yesomim to prove that they already gave her the Mezonos.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> (end of 96a, DH Nasanenu) explains that the case in question involves a case where the Yesomim say that they paid Mezonos for the <i>coming</i> year, and the widow says that she did not receive any Mezonos for the coming year. Rebbi Yochanan is asking whether the Yesomim are believed and are exempt from giving her Mezonos, or the widow is believed and the Yesomim must give her Mezonos.
</p><p>
There are a number of problems with Rashi's explanation.
</p><p>
(a) How could the Gemara propose that we believe the Yesomim when they say that they gave her Mezonos for the coming year? The Rabanan instituted an obligation upon the Yesomim to give Mezonos to their father's widow. If the Yesomim can claim that they gave her Mezonos and thereby exempt themselves, what, then, did the Rabanan accomplish by making such a Tenai Beis Din of paying Mezonos? Whenever the widow comes to ask for Mezonos the Yesomim will say that they already gave it to her; they will be believed, and she will not be able to prove that they did not give it to her! (<b>TOSFOS</b>, DH Yesomim)
</p><p>
(b) It is clear from the Beraisa of Levi that the if the widow is considered to be in possession of the property and is believed, then even if she submits a claim for Mezonos from previous years, she is also believed, because Levi himself is discussing a claim for previous years and says that as long as she has not remarried she is believed (Rashi 96b, DH Nises)! Rashi (96b, DH Mai Lav) indeed implies that the question of Rebbi Yochanan applies to <i>past</i> Mezonos as well. If so, what forces Rashi to explain that Rebbi Yochanan's question involves Mezonos for the coming year? Why does Rashi not explain like all of the other Rishonim, that Rebbi Yochanan is asking about a dispute for the Mezonos of <i>previous</i> years, and that with regard to Mezonos of the coming year it is obvious that the widow is believed (for the reason mentioned above in question (a))?
</p><p>
(c) If the question of Rebbi Yochanan applies to Mezonos of coming years, then when a widow sells the Nechasim of the Yesomim in order to receive Mezonos, how does she protect her rights (as the Gemara says later on 96b) to collect the Kesuvah by writing in the Shtar that she is selling the property only for Mezonos and not for the Kesuvah? At any later date the Yesomim can say that they already paid her Mezonos and she had no right to sell their property, and they can reclaim the money from her! 
</p><p>
According to the other Rishonim, who say that she is believed when she claims that she has not received the Mezonos for the coming weeks, we can understand how it helps to write in the Shtar that she is selling the land for Mezonos; had she not written it in the Shtar, the Yesomim would be believed to claim, after a few weeks have passed, that they already gave her the Mezonos (for those past weeks) and that the sale must have been for her Kesuvah. Now that it is written in the Shtar, she has claimed the <i>coming</i> Mezonos and not past Mezonos, so she is believed (<b>TOSFOS</b> 96b, DH d'Rebbi Yehudah). According to Rashi, though, it should not help to write in the Shtar that she is selling the property for her Mezonos!
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>PNEI YEHOSHUA</b> explains that it was customary for the Yesomim to sell property at the beginning of the year in order to supply the widow with Mezonos for the year (or for six months), as the Gemara says later (beginning of 97a). The Yesomim are believed when they say that they sold the property in order to raise money to give to the widow as her Mezonos only when the widow submits a claim for the Mezonos <i>after</i> the beginning of the new year, because we assume (i.e. there is a Chazakah) that the Yesomim, at the beginning of the year, sold enough property for the Mezonos of the entire year. However, if, <i>immediately</i> at the beginning of the new year, the widow claims that she did not receive the Mezonos for the coming year, then she <i>is</i> believed since the Yesomim did not have time to sell the property yet. This explains how the enactment of the Rabanan obligating the Yesomim to give Mezonos to the widow will be upheld -- whenever she submits her claim at the beginning of the new year, she is believed, since she is able to avoid the deceit of the Yesomim (who might claim that they paid her already when they really did not).
</p><p>
(The <b>CHASAM SOFER</b> and <b>TIFERES L'MOSHE</b> suggest that Rashi might mean to explain like Tosfos and the other Rishonim. Rashi is not saying that the Yesomim claim that they paid for the coming year, but rather that they claim <i>at the end of the year</i> that they gave her the Mezonos at the beginning of the <i>past</i> year for the entire year. 
</p><p>
Tosfos explains that the only reason we believe the Yesomim is since she delayed claiming her Mezonos for so long, we have strong reason to believe the Yesomim that she really did receive Mezonos. Rashi is saying that she is claiming Mezonos for the entire past year for the same reason. Since such a long period of time passed and she did not claim her Mezonos, there is a Chazakah that the Yesomim are telling the truth. 
</p><p>
This explanation answers all of the questions, since it is saying that Rashi holds just like Tosfos. However, it does not fit well with the words of Rashi. All of the Rishonim understand that Rashi is explaining that the Almanah's claim, indeed, is referring to the coming year.)
</p><p>
(b) Regarding why Rashi explains that the dispute involves the coming year and not the past year, the <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> points out that this might be inferred from the sequence of the claims as the Gemara records them: 'the Yesomim say, 'We gave [the Mezonos],' and she says, 'I did not receive it.'' This implies that the Yesomim initiated the dispute with their claim. If the dispute was over the Mezonos for the previous year, then <i>she</i> would have been the one to complain first and they would be responding to her claim. Why are the Yesomim speaking first? If the dispute involves whether the Yesomim already paid the Mezonos for the coming year, that explains why the Yesomim are speaking up first.
</p><p>
We might add that Rashi seems to understand that this Gemara is a continuation of the previous one. In the previous Gemara, Rebbi Yochanan said that if a widow waits two or three years without claiming her Mezonos, she may no longer claim them. The Gemara explains that she is only restricted from claiming the Mezonos for the previous years; she may claim, however, the Mezonos for the coming years. 
</p><p>
Rebbi Yochanan now continues to ask about such a case what happens if, after two years, she claims her Mezonos and the Yesomim say that they gave her Mezonos. If Rebbi Yochanan is discussing a case where the woman did not claim her Mezonos for two years, his question now <i>must</i> be referring to where she claims for the <i>coming</i> year, since she has already forfeited her claim to the previous years.
</p><p>
If this is true, then we can answer the first question on Rashi as well. Certainly, in a case where the widow did not forfeit her right to the Mezonos, if she says that the Yesomim did not give her Mezonos for the coming year she is believed, for otherwise the enactment to give her Mezonos does not accomplish anything, as explained above, since the Yesomim can always avoid paying her Mezonos by claiming that they paid already. However, when she demonstrates that she does not view the Mezonos to be important to her because she did not claim them for two years, perhaps in such a situation the Rabanan did <i>not</i> institute to trust her in order to uphold to their enactment of Mezonos, and indeed the Yesomim are believed (since the money is presently in their hands). Although the Yesomim might actually owe her Mezonos because it is promised to her in the Kesuvah, she does not have the special assistance of the enactment that gives her trustworthiness, because she shows that the Mezonos are not so important to her. In this sense, Rebbi Yochanan's question about believing the Yesomim for the coming year after the Almanah forfeited her Mezonos of past years is identical to the question of whether the Yesomim will be believed over payments for past years of Mezonos when the widow never forfeited them.
</p><p>
Tosfos (96b, DH d'Rebbi Yehudah) explains that the reasoning to believe the Yesomim in the latter case is because we always believe the borrower (who owes money) when he says that he paid it back in a case of a 'Milveh Al Peh,' a loan conducted verbally and not recorded in a written contract. Only when the lender is in possession of a Shtar is the borrower not believed to say that he paid it back (unless, of course, he has witnesses). The only reason the Rabanan gave the woman trustworthiness to say that she did not receive Mezonos is because, otherwise, their enactment that the Yesomim give her Mezonos would not accomplish anything since the Yesomim can circumvent the enactment by claiming that they paid. Once the Rabanan instituted to believe the woman when she claims the Mezonos <i>before</i> the time has come to pay them, the Almanah's rights are protected. If she lets time pass before claiming the Mezonos and later claims that she was not paid for <i>past</i> Mezonos, it is not necessary to trust her. 
</p><p>
Similarly, it may be suggested that when an extended period of time has passed without her receiving Mezonos, and the Almanah thereby forgoes her Mezonos of the past years, the Rabanan no longer felt a need to give her the exclusive trustworthiness, even for <i>future</i> Mezonos, since she it was the Almanah's own choice (or mistake) to forgo the past Mezonos. Consequently, the Yesomim are believed like any borrower who owes money in a case of a 'Milveh Al Peh.' (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>
(c) We asked that according to Rashi when the woman sells property for her Mezonos, why is she believed more when she writes in the Shtar that she is selling the property for her Mezonos. The Yesomim can still claim that she received her Mezonos from them and had no right to sell the land for her Mezonos. According to what we have said -- that Rashi agrees that, normally, when the widow says that they did not pay her Mezonos for the coming year she is believed -- the Gemara is easily understood, since we are not discussing a widow who forfeited her Mezonos for the past two or three years.
</p><p>
If we accept the Pnei Yehoshua's explanation (see (a), above), that according to Rashi a widow is only believed when she claims immediately, at the beginning of the year, that she was not paid her Mezonos, perhaps her deed of sale of the land was written <i>at the beginning of the year</i>. Alternatively, if she writes in the Shtar that she is selling the land for her Mezonos and she thereby publicizes that she sold it for Mezonos, and the Yesomim do not submit complaints at the time, then it is as if they are agreeing that they owe her the Mezonos and they may no longer claim afterwards that they paid her already.
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Do we consider the property to be in the possession 
               of the orphans, and she must bring a proof?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Or, is the property Muchzak by her, and the orphans 
               must bring a proof?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> Levi taught that as long as a widow did not 
          remarry, the orphans must bring proof that she collected. 
          After she married, she must bring proof.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rav Simi bar Ashi):</font></b> Tana'im argue about who is 
          Muchzak in the property:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Yehudah):</font></b> She sells and writes 'this 
               was sold for food, and this was sold for payment of 
               the Kesuvah';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Yosi says, she does not specify for what she 
               sold. This gives to her greater power of collection.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> R. Yehudah requires her to specify 
               because he holds that the orphans are Muchzakim, and 
               she must bring proof. R. Yosi does not require her 
               to specify, since he holds that she is Muchzekes, 
               and the orphans must bring proof.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection #1:</font></b> Perhaps all agree that she is Muchzekes, 
          and the orphans must bring proof;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Yehudah merely counsels her to write that some 
               property was sold for the Kesuvah, so people will 
               not think that she eats a lot.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support:</font></b> This must be correct. If not, R. Yochanan would 
          have settled his question from a Mishnah!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> She may sell for food outside of Beis 
               Din, and she writes 'I sold this for food.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Rather, we must say that there is no proof from the 
               Mishnah, for perhaps it is merely good counsel.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> There is no proof about R. Yehudah's opinion for the 
               same reason!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection #2:</font></b> Perhaps all hold that the orphans are 
          Muchzakim, and R. Yosi holds like Abaye Kashisha. (When 
          selling for food she tells witnesses, so the orphans 
          cannot say that it was for the Kesuvah. She does not 
          write specify in the document, lest buyers will be able 
          to show when she collected her entire Kesuvah, and stop 
          her from collecting from Bnei Chorin afterwards.)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Abaye Kashisha):</font></b> A parable for R. Yosi is a dying 
               man who said 'give 200 Zuz to Ploni my creditor.' 
               Ploni can take (from Bnei Chorin) for his debt, or 
               for a gift.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Surely, it is better to take it for the gift! 
               (Tosfos - in either case he is entitled to get both. 
               It is better to take the gift from Bnei Chorin, so 
               he can collect the debt from sold property!)
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>3) A WIDOW WHO SELLS PROPERTY IN ORDER TO COLLECT HER MEZONOS AND KESUVAH</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara cites a Beraisa that discusses a woman who sells property of the Yesomim in order to collect from the proceeds both her Mezonos and her Kesuvah. Rebbi Yosi in the Beraisa says that it is advantageous for her <i>not</i> to specify which property she is selling for her Mezonos and which for her Kesuvah. By not specifying, she will be able, later, to claim that what she sold was for Mezonos, and thus she will be able to collect the Kesuvah from the property in the possession of the buyers.
</p><p>
Why should we advise the woman not to announce why she is selling the property? Let her announce outright that she is selling the property for her Mezonos, since that way she will still be able to collect her Kesuvah. Even if the Mezonos that the Yesomim owe her is worth <i>less</i> than the sum of the property that she is selling, she still has nothing to lose by announcing that she is selling the property for the Mezonos and the surplus is towards the payment of her Kesuvah. She stands to lose nothing, for she is still able to collect the remainder of the Kesuvah from the property in the hands of the buyers. What, then, does she gain by not disclosing her intentions? If anything, she loses by making herself look like a gluttonous woman, since people will think that she is selling <i>all</i> of the property for her Mezonos!
</p><p>
True, by not disclosing why she sold the property, she can claim later that she sold it for her <i>Kesuvah</i> and not for her Mezonos. What will she gain, though, by such a claim?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER:</b> There are several advantages to having the Yesomim owe her the Mezonos rather than the Kesuvah, and thus she might want to reserve for herself the ability to say that what she collected was the Kesuvah rather than the Mezonos, for the following reasons:
</p><p>
(a) The Gemara earlier (96a) says that a woman who forcefully takes possession (without permission) of Metaltelin from the Yesomim for her Mezonos may keep it. If, on the other hand, she forcefully takes possession of Metaltelin for her Kesuvah, Beis Din forces her to give it back.
</p><p>
(b) The Yerushalmi, cited by the <b>RE'AH</b> and Rishonim, explains that an advantage to selling the property for the Kesuvah (and thus having the Yesomim owe her Mezonos rather than the Kesuvah) exists where another creditor of the deceased husband comes to collect a 'Milveh Al Peh' (a loan made with a verbal, and not written, agreement) which preceded the marriage. 
</p><p>
The debt of the Yesomim to give the widow her Mezonos is also considered a 'Milveh Al Peh,' since she is not entitled to collect it from Nechasim Meshubadim, property purchased by buyers from the husband or from his estate. The Halachah is that when two creditors make a claim to collect the land of the person who owes money to both of them, the one with the earlier debt gets the land. Therefore, in our case, the husband's earlier creditor is able to take the money that the widow made from the sale of the land away from the widow. However, the Yerushalmi says that a 'Milveh b'Shtar,' a loan made with a <i>Shtar</i>, has precedence over a 'Milveh Al Peh' even if the 'Milveh b'Shtar' occurred at a later date. 
</p><p>
Hence, if the widow is collecting her <i>Kesuvah</i> by selling this property, she may keep the money from the sale even when confronted by an earlier creditor who has an earlier 'Milveh Al Peh.' The creditor cannot take it away from her, because the Kesuvah has the status of a 'Milveh b'Shtar,' which precedes any 'Milveh Al Peh.' That is an advantage in being able to say that the sale was made for the Kesuvah, and not for the Mezonos. 
</p><p>
(c) Tosfos (DH v'Rebbi Yosi) explains that even if it is always better for her to claim that the property was sold for Mezonos, if the profits from the sale are <i>greater</i> than the value of the Mezonos owed to her, and thus part of the profits are paying for part of the Kesuvah, it is advantageous to her to hide the fact that some of it is going towards her Kesuvah and to leave herself the option of claiming that it was all for Mezonos, even though they did not owe her that much for the Mezonos. 
</p><p>
The reason for this is because perhaps later she will decide to delay collecting the rest of her Kesuvah and she will need more money for Mezonos to support herself. When she wants to collect those Mezonos later, if she already announced at the time of the previous sale that part of the sale was towards the payment of the Kesuvah, then when she collects her Mezonos she may only collect from 'Nechasim B'nei Chorin,' property that is not in the hands of any buyers, and not from 'Nechasim Meshubadim.' 
</p><p>
If, on the other hand, she did not say that she was collecting any money from the sale for her Kesuvah, then the buyers -- who do not know how much money she was owed for the Mezonos -- think that perhaps she sold the previous field only for her Mezonos, and thus they think that she still has her full Kesuvah to collect. Hence, it is the buyers' responsibility to be wary that she might one day reclaim the land from them for the full amount of her Kesuvah. She will be able to collect from them the <i>entire</i> value of the Kesuvah, because the Chachamim established that whenever the buyer knows to beware, then one is permitted to collect from him (see end of Bava Basra). Therefore, even though she really did collect part of the money for her Kesuvah (for example, 50 Zuz out of 200) from the previous sale, and she knows that when she takes the full 200 Zuz from the buyers at a later date, 50 of those 200 Zuz are for a new debt of Mezonos that accrued, nevertheless she is able to collect it all from the buyers, since it was their responsibility to be careful.
</p><p>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>A WIDOW'S RIGHT TO FOOD</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> How much does a widow sell at one time for 
          food?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rav Huna):</font></b> She sells for 12 months at a time. 
          The buyer gives to her money for a month's food at a time
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> She sells for six months at a 
          time. The buyer gives to her money for a month's food at 
          a time.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (for Rav Huna - Beraisa #1):</font></b> She sells for 12 
          months at a time. The buyer gives to her money for a 
          month's food at a time.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (for Rav Yehudah - Beraisa #2):</font></b> She sells for six 
          months at a time. The buyer gives to her money for a 
          month's food at a time.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Ameimar):</font></b> The Halachah is, she sells for six months at a 
          time. The buyer gives to her money for a month's food at 
          a time.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rav Ashi):</font></b> This is unlike Rav Huna!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Ameimar:</font></b> I disagree with Rav Huna.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If a widow sold land for food, can she take the 
          land from the buyers to collect her Kesuvah?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This question pertains to Rav Yosef's law.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Yosef):</font></b> If a widow sold land, the Acharayos (to 
               compensate the buyer if it is taken) is against the 
               orphans. The same is true when Beis Din sells the 
               orphans' land.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  Do we say that since the Acharayos is on the 
                    orphans, she can take the land?
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> Or, even though she is not responsible if 
                    others take the land, she is responsible if she 
                    herself takes it!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Sheshes - Beraisa):</font></b> She sells land (for 
          food), and leaves a remnant on which she can rely to 
          collect her Kesuvah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This shows that she must leave over land. She cannot 
               take what she sold for food!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> Perhaps she can take it, but the Beraisa 
          counsels her not to, lest people call her a wavering 
          person.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection - Question:</font></b> If so, it would have said that she 
          collects from the rest. Why does it say that she leaves a 
          remnant on which she can rely?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> This teaches that if she did not leave over, 
               she cannot collect from what she sold.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO SOLD AND DID NOT NEED THE MONEY</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If a man sold land because he needed money, 
          then found that he did not need the money, can he retract 
          the sale?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> A man sold land to Rav Papa, because he needed 
          to by oxen. In the end, he did not need the oxen. Rav 
          Papa returned the land to him.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> Perhaps Rav Papa was not required to do so. He 
          went beyond the letter of the law.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> There was an inflation in Nehardai. Everyone 
          sold their houses. In the end, wheat came;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Nachman):</font></b> The Halachah is, everyone gets his 
               house back.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> There, the sale was a mistake. Ships with 
          wheat had already come (but were not in the standard part 
          of the river, so people did not know about them).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #1 (Rashi) Support:</font></b> This explains Rami bar 
          Shmuel's objection (this is prone to happen again).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #2 (Tosfos) Question:</font></b> If so, how do we understand 
          Rami bar Shmuel? (This is a rare case!) (end of Version 
          #2)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rami bar Shmuel (to Rav Nachman):</font></b> Your ruling will 
               prevent people from buying in the future!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Nachman:</font></b> Are famines everyday occurrences?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rami bar Shmuel:</font></b> In Nehardai they are!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b></b>  The Halachah is, if one sold and in the end he did not 
          need the money, he may retract the sale.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>MUST A WIDOW SELL PROPERTY IN 'BEIS DIN'?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> A widow, whether from Eirusin or Nisu'in, may 
          sell outside of Beis Din;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  R. Shimon says, a widow from Nisu'in may sell outside of 
          Beis Din. A widow from Eirusin, she must sell in Beis 
          Din;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This is because from Eirusin she is not fed, and 
               anyone who is not fed must sell in Beis Din.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara) Question:</font></b> Granted, a widow from Nisu'in may sell 
          outside of Beis Din for food (she cannot wait to go to 
          Beis Din when she needs to eat).
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) ONE WHO SOLD HIS PROPERTY UNNECESSARILY</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTIONS:</b> The Gemara discusses the Halachah of a person who sells his property in order to use the proceeds to purchase a specific item, and after selling his property he discovers that he no longer needs the money for his intended purchase (for example, the buyer of the item decided not to sell it). Is he permitted to retract the sale of his property, since it turned out to be a mistaken sale? (That is, is it as if there was an unspoken condition at the time of the sale that if the money from the sale is not needed, then the sale will be annulled?) Or is the sale final and irrevocable, because he did not expressly articulate such a stipulation at the time of his sale?
</p><p>
The Gemara attempts to prove that the seller may retract the sale from a ruling of Rav Nachman. It happened that there was a sudden, extreme increase in the price of wheat in Neharda'a due to a drastic decrease in the supply of wheat. All of the residents of the city sold their houses in order to be able to buy food. Suddenly, boats arrived carrying wheat and the price normalized. Rav Nachman ruled that the sales of the houses may be retracted, and everyone may return the money he received for his house and get his house back.
</p><p>
The Gemara refutes this proof, saying that perhaps in a case where one does not need the money from the sale, the sale may not be retracted, and the case of Rav Nachman was different. In the case of Rav Nachman, the sales were revoked because there really was wheat on the way to the city at the time that the sales were made, and therefore the sales were mistaken and based on a lack of knowledge of the <i>present</i> situation. If the wheat, on the other hand, had been shipped <i>after</i> the houses were sold, then the case would have been similar to the case of the Gemara's question and we would have been able to bring proof from Rav Nachman's ruling that the sale is revocable.
</p><p>
The Gemara (according to Rashi's explanation) then brings a dialogue between Rami bar Shmuel and Rav Nachman to support the refutation of the proof from Rav Nachman's ruling. Rami bar Shmuel said to Rav Nachman, 'If you let them retract the sales, then in the future, the next time there is a famine, no one will buy the houses, out of fear that the seller will retract the sale!' Rav Nachman replied that such famines are so uncommon that we do not have to be concerned for what potential buyers will think. Rami bar Shmuel responded that in Neharda'a, such famines <i>are</i> relatively common, and thus there is a fear that potential buyers will refrain from purchasing houses if we let the sales be retracted.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> explains that had the situation in Neharda'a been that the ships with wheat 'came from a nearby place' and thus embarked <i>after</i> the sales were made, or that even if the wheat embarked <i>before</i> the sales were made but the wheat 'came only to these certain people alone (and not to others),' then the case would indeed be similar to the case of the Gemara's question. However, if that had been the case, it would indeed have been a very unusual situation even in Neharda'a, and Rav Nachman would have been correct. Since Rami bar Shmuel criticized Rav Nachman, saying that the situation that arose from the famine of Neharda'a was relatively common in Neharda'a, it must be that the wheat was already on its way and was held up by coves and inlets in the river, which is relatively common and could easily occur again.
</p><p>
There are a number of points in Rashi's explanation that are difficult to understand.
</p><p>
(a) Rashi differentiates between a case of a 'Mekach Ta'us' (a sale made in error) -- where the people sold their houses not knowing that wheat was already on the way (which is not the same as the case of the Gemara's question), and the case of the Gemara's question where either the wheat was shipped <i>after</i> the sale, or it was shipped before the sale but only a few people in the city received it. 
</p><p>
If the wheat was shipped before the sale, though, what difference does it make if it was enough to supply the whole city, or just enough to supply a few people (who, as a result, now want to revoke their sales)? In either case, the food was on its way already and it was their lack of knowledge that caused them to sell! What does Rashi mean? (<b>RASHASH</b>)
</p><p>
(b) Rashi writes that if the case in Neharda'a was one in which the food was shipped <i>after</i> the people sold their houses, then we would have no concern that potential buyers might refrain from buying houses in the future during times of famine, since the only time we revoke a sale is under this highly unusual circumstance. 
</p><p>
Why is that? The Gemara says that we certainly revoke the sale when the wheat is already on the way, which is a common occurrence, and it is only questioning whether we <i>also</i> revoke the sale when the wheat embarked <i>after</i> the sale, for that might also be considered a 'Mekach Ta'us.' If we do revoke the sale under such circumstances, as well as when the wheat was already on the way, then it is even <i>more</i> common for a situation to arise that will cause the sale to be revoked! How, then, can Rashi say that if we revoke the sale because the person ended up not needing the money (i.e. the boats were not yet on the way), than the sale is only revoked in an uncommon situation? On the contrary, it makes the revocation of sales even more common if the sale is revoked whether the boats left before <i>or</i> after the sale! (<b>TOSFOS</b> DH Iy Hachi)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) When only enough food for some of the people was on the way, then no particular person in Neharda'a could be certain that he would be the one to receive the food. Therefore, even had he known that food was on the way at the time of the sale, he still would have sold his house, not being certain that he would receive the wheat that was on the way. The sale did not take place due to a lack of knowledge about the present situation.
</p><p>
(b) Rashi is assuming that it is more common for a famine to end due to food that was already en route than for a famine to end due to food that was shipped from a nearby place <i>after</i> people sold their houses. If the sale is not revoked when the food was shipped after the sale, then the only situation in which the sale will be revoked is when the food was already en route at the time of the sale. The Gemara says that this is a fairly common situation, and therefore we should be concerned that it might happen again in the future and thus we should not revoke the sale so that buyers will not refrain from buying houses. 
</p><p>
If, on the other hand, the Halachah is that the deal is revoked even when the shipment of the wheat embarked <i>after</i> the sale took place, then it must be that such a sale is considered a 'Mekach Ta'us,' because people do take such things into consideration when they make a sale, despite its being relatively uncommon. If so, when people sell their houses when boats are already on the way, which is a more common situation, then they must <i>certainly</i> realize at the time that boats might be on the way, and even so they want to make the sale. As such, the sale will not be a 'Mekach Ta'us' at all, since it is something that people consider when they are selling their property and yet they take the risk of selling anyhow. Therefore, they will not be able to revoke the sale because of the boats being held up. That is why the Gemara says that the situation for revoking the sale when the boats embarked after the sale is uncommon, because the sale will <i>only</i> be revoked in that situation and not when the boats had already embarked before the sale was made. (M. Kornfeld) 
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> But why do Chachamim permit a widow from Eirusin to 
               sell outside Beis Din?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Ula):</font></b> This is to encourage marriage.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (R. Yochanan):</font></b> A man does not want his wife to 
          be disgraced by having to go to Beis Din.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  These answers argue about a divorcee;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If we want to encourage marriage, we should be 
               lenient regarding a divorcee as well.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If the husband wanted to spare his wife disgrace, he 
               is concerned only for his widow, not for a woman he 
               divorced.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Seifa (the coming Mishnah)):</font></b> A divorced woman 
          must sell in Beis Din.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This is like R. Yochanan. He is not concerned for 
               disgrace of his ex-wife.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> But according to Ula, we should be lenient regarding 
               a divorcee as well, to encourage marriage!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The Seifa is R. Shimon.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> But R. Shimon already taught that a widow from 
          Eirusin must sell in Beis Din (and the same applies to a 
          divorcee)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> One might have thought that there is more need to 
          encourage marriage regarding a divorcee, and she may sell 
          outside of Beis Din. The Seifa teaches that this is not 
          so.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Mishnah - R. Shimon):</font></b> Anyone who is not fed 
          must sell in Beis Din.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> This is to include a divorcee!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> No, it includes a woman who is doubtfully 
          divorced. (Rashi - she is not feed from the orphans after 
          her husband dies; Tosfos - she receives food in her 
          husband's lifetime, and may sell outside of Beis Din.)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Zeira):</font></b> Wherever Chachamim said that 'She is 
               divorced and not divorced', the husband must feed 
               her.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Beraisa):</font></b> Just like she sells outside of Beis 
          Din, also her heirs who inherit her Kesuvah may sell 
          outside of Beis Din.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This is like the opinion that her husband wanted to 
               spare his wife disgrace. He is also concerned for 
               her heirs.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> But according to the opinion that it is to encourage 
               marriage, we need not be lenient for her heirs!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Ula):</font></b> The case is, her daughter or sister 
          inherited her. (Rashi - if it is humiliating for her heir 
          to collect, her heir will not want to marry.)
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO SOLD PART OF HER 'KESUVAH'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Mishnah:</font></b> In the following cases a woman may sell to 
          collect the rest of her Kesuvah only in Beis Din:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> She sold her Kesuvah, or part of it;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> She gave her Kesuvah for collateral, or part of it;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> She gave her Kesuvah as a gift, or part of it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  Chachamim say that she may sell even four or five times, 
          and she may sell outside of Beis Din for food, and she 
          writes 'I sold this for food'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  A divorcee must sell in Beis Din.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara):</font></b> The Mishnah is like R. Shimon.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Meir):</font></b> If she sold her (entire) 
               Kesuvah, or gave her Kesuvah for collateral, or 
               designated her Kesuvah to repay a loan, she is not 
               fed;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Shimon says, even if she sold or gave for 
               collateral only half her Kesuvah, she forfeits being 
               fed.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Inference:</font></b> Chachamim say that (being owed) part is like 
          (being owed) the entire amount, and R. Shimon disagrees.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> They hold the opposite!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Meir):</font></b> '(A Kohen Gadol) will marry a 
               woman bi'Vsuleha (with her tokens of virginity)' - 
               this excludes a Bogeres, whose Besulim are 
               (partially) depleted;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Elazar and R. Shimon permit a Bogeres.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> There, they argue about how to expound the verse;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> R. Meir says that 'Besulah' connotes having 
               some Besulim. 'Besulehah' connotes having all of 
               them. 'Bi'Vsuleha' connotes virginity in the place 
               of normal Bi'ah, but not necessarily in the place of 
               Lo k'Darkah (the anus);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Elazar and R. Shimon say that 'Besulah' connotes 
               all the Besulim. 'Besulehah' connotes even some. 
               'Bi'Vsuleha' mandates virginity even in the place of 
               Lo k'Darkah.
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) A HUSBAND'S OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT HIS DIVORCED WIFE</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTIONS:</b> The Tana Kama of the Mishnah says that a widow may sell the property of her husband's heirs (the Yesomim) outside of Beis Din, to raise proceeds to buy Mezonos for herself or even to collect her Kesuvah. Rebbi Shimon does not permit her to sell their property outside of Beis Din in order to collect her Kesuvah.
</p><p>
The Amora'im give two reasons why, according to the Tana Kama, the widow is permitted to sell the property of the Yesomim outside of Beis Din in order to collect her Kesuvah. Ula says that the Chachamim enacted, for the woman's benefit, that it be easier for her to collect her Kesuvah even after her husband dies so that women will not refrain from marrying because of the potential difficulties that they might encounter when trying to collect the Kesuvah ('Mishum Chen'). Rebbi Yochanan says that it is because a man does not want his wife to be disgraced by having to go to Beis Din to collect her Kesuvah, and thus the husband married her with the condition in mind that she may sell his property after his death to collect her Kesuvah without having to go to Beis Din.
</p><p>
The Gemara says that the following Mishnah -- which says that a Gerushah (a divorced woman) cannot sell the property of Yesomim outside of Beis Din in order to collect her Kesuvah -- is expressing the view of Rebbi Shimon, who says that a widow cannot sell the property to collect her Kesuvah outside of Beis Din. The Gemara asks how can that Mishnah be expressing the view of Rebbi Shimon? Rebbi Shimon already says in our Mishnah that a Gerushah cannot sell property to collect her Kesuvah outside of Beis Din, because he says 'Kol she'Ein Lah Mezonos' cannot collect outside of Beis Din, and this must be referring to a Gerushah!
</p><p>
The Gemara answers that the Mishnah, when it says 'Kol she'Ein Lah Mezonos' is not referring to a Gerushah, but to a <i>Safek Gerushah</i> (where the husband threw a Get to his wife and there is a doubt whether it was closer to her or closer to him). Rebbi Zeira says that in such a case the husband is obligated to give her Mezonos while she is married (before he gives her a full divorce).
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> (DH Megureshes) says that according to the Gemara's answer, our Mishnah is teaching that when a woman's husband dies during Erusin, the woman does not receive Mezonos from the Yesomim if she was a Safek Gerushah. 
</p><p>
Rashi's words are difficult to understand.
</p><p>
(a) How can Rashi say that our Mishnah is saying that a woman who is a Safek Gerushah from <i>Erusin</i> does not receive Mezonos after her husband's death, implying that as long as her husband is alive she <i>does</i> receive Mezonos from him? A husband during Erusin is not obligated to feed his Arusah! Only after Nisu'in does a husband become obligated to feed his wife! If he gives her a Safek Get during Erusin, why should he suddenly become obligated to feed her? Only a husband during <i>Nisu'in</i> who gives his wife a Safek Get should have to continue feeding his wife since he did not give her a full divorce and he was already obligated to feed her! (<b>MAHARSHA</b>)
</p><p>
(b) Why does Rashi explain the Gemara in such a forced way by saying that the Mishnah is referring to a Safek Gerushah from Erusin? Rashi should have said that it is referring to a Safek Gerushah from Nisu'in!
</p><p>
(c) Rashi says that the Mishnah is teaching that the husband during Erusin must give Mezonos to his Arusah who is a Safek Gerushah only while he is alive. After his death, the Yesomim do not have to feed her. Why should the Mishnah have to teach us that? The only reason a husband must give Mezonos to a Safek Gerushah is because she cannot remarry because of him, but now that he is dead she can get remarried! Hence, it is obvious that the Yesomim should not be obligated to give her Mezonos! (<b>TOSFOS</b> DH la'Asuyei)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>TOSFOS HA'ROSH</b> (see also <b>PNEI YEHOSHUA</b>) discusses our first point. He explains that Rashi apparently holds that even a husband during Erusin must feed his Arusah if he makes her into a Safek Gerushah, even though he is not obligated to feed her when she is fully his Arusah and not a Safek Gerushah. 
</p><p>
The reason the Chachamim enacted that he must feed her when she becomes a Safek Gerushah is because he is the one preventing her from getting married to anyone else. Normally, a husband during Erusin cannot indefinitely prevent his wife from marrying someone else. After a certain period of time, he must either marry her himself, or she can demand that he free her from her commitment by divorcing her. However, the Safek Gerushah from Erusin has no assurance that her husband will ever marry her; her husband can say that since she is a Safek Gerushah, he does not want to perform Nisu'in because perhaps she is actually divorced from him (and since Nisu'in involves a monetary obligation, 'ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Ra'ayah'). On the other hand, she cannot marry anyone else because she is prohibited as a Safek Eshes Ish. Therefore, the husband must give her Mezonos right away during Erusin, since he is preventing her from getting married with no other options for her to follow.
</p><p>
The Tosfos ha'Rosh adds that a Safek Gerushah during Erusin is comparable to a situation where a husband refuses to marry his Arusah after twelve months, in which case he is then obligated to give her Mezonos (or divorce her).
</p><p>
(b) The <b>TOSFOS HA'ROSH</b> (see also <b>PNEI YEHOSHUA</b>) answers the second question as well. Rashi is forced to explain that the Mishnah is discussing a Safek Gerushah during Erusin, because if the Mishnah is saying that a Safek Gerushah cannot collect her Kesuvah nor her Mezonos from the Yesomim, then why would the following Mishnah have to tell us that a <i>definite</i> Gerushah cannot collect her Kesuvah from the Yesomim (according to Rebbi Shimon)? It is already implied by the previous Mishnah!
</p><p>
This is why Rashi explains that the first Mishnah is discussing a Safek Gerushah during <i>Erusin</i>, who does not have a claim to 'Chen,' as the Gemara explained. The next Mishnah tells us that a <i>definite</i> Gerushah from <i>Nisu'in</i> also may not sell property for her Kesuvah outside of Beis Din, even though she does have a claim to 'Chen.'
</p><p>
(c) Rashi holds that there is a reason to suggest that a Safek Gerushah should be able to collect her Mezonos from the Yesomim even after her husband's death. The reasoning for this is that when a man gives his wife a Safek Get, the Chachamim want to give the husband an incentive to give her a valid Get as soon as possible. We might have thought that to this purpose the Chachamim enacted that if he does not give her a Get before he dies, she may continue to collect Mezonos from his estate even after his death, until the Yesomim give her the Kesuvah, just like an widow. Hence, the Mishnah is teaching that the Chachamim did not impose such a penalty on the husband and did not have such considerations. (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>SELLING OUTSIDE OF BEIS DIN</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b></b>  A woman seized a silver cup towards payment of her 
          Kesuvah, and demanded food.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava):</font></b> The orphans must feed her. No one rules like R. 
          Shimon, who says that being owed part of the Kesuvah is 
          unlike being owed the entire Kesuvah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rabah brei d'Rava):</font></b> If a widow sells outside of 
          Beis Din, must she swear?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question (Rav Yosef):</font></b> Why don't you ask if she must 
               announce for a month that the property is being sold 
               before she may sell it?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer (Rabah brei d'Rava):</font></b> I know that she need not 
               announce before selling;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Zeira):</font></b> If a widow evaluated property and 
                    took it herself towards payment of her Kesuvah, 
                    it is not hers.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> If she announced that the property is 
                    for sale, why can't she keep it?
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>Answer:</font></b> We must say that she did not announce.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> If she took the property herself, it 
                    is void. Had she sold it to others, the sale 
                    would stand!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> Really, she did announce. She may not 
               keep the property because Beis Din did not empower 
               her to take it.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> This is like the case of a man that was watching 
               fodder (or wood) of orphans. He evaluated that it is 
               worth 400 Zuz, and took it for himself. It rose in 
               value to 600 Zuz;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Ami:</font></b> Who empowered you to take it? (I.e. it is 
               not yours).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  The Halachah is, she must swear. She need not announce 
          that the property is for sale.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>A WIDOW THAT SOLD ORPHANS' PROPERTY</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If a widow's Kesuvah was 200 Dinarim and she 
          sold property of the orphans which was worth 100 for 200, 
          or property worth 200 for 100, in either case she has 
          received her full Kesuvah;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If her Kesuvah was 100, and she sold property worth 101 
          for 100, the sale is void, even if she says that she will 
          return the extra Dinar;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  R. Shimon ben Gamliel says, the sale stands unless the 
          extra land sold is a field fitting to sow nine Kavim of 
          seed, or a garden fitting to sow half a Kav;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  According to R. Akiva, the excess must be a quarter Kav 
          (to invalidate the sale).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  If her Kesuvah was 400, and she sold 100, and another 
          100, and the last sale was worth 101 and she sold it for 
          100 - the last sale is void, the other sales stand.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara) Question:</font></b> When she sells land worth 200 for 100, 
          the orphans tell her that she lost 100. When she sells 
          land worth 100 for 200, why can't she say that she 
          profited?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Nachman):</font></b> In our Mishnah, Rebbi taught us 
          that the owner of the property receives the profits.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) WHERE 'HA'MOTZI ME'CHAVEIRO ALAV HA'RA'AYAH' DOES NOT APPLY</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Beraisa discusses a situation in which a person gives money to a Shali'ach and instructs him to buy a certain item, and the seller gives the Shali'ach a good deal and sells him more of the item than the amount of money usually buys. Who profits from the seller's beneficence, the Shali'ach or the buyer who sent him? Rebbi Yosi rules that it depends upon whether the purchased item is a type of item that always has a set price, or a type of item for which the price varies from item to item. If the item has a set price, then the Shali'ach and the sender split the gain. If the item does not have a set price, then the buyer who sent the Shali'ach with the money to buy the item keeps everything.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> explains that the reason for this distinction is as follows. If the item has no set price, then whatever the seller gave is considered to have been worth the money given. If, on the other hand, the item has a set price, then when the seller threw in extra items knowing that the money paid is not enough to cover the extra items, he must have thrown them in as a gift -- either as a gift to the Shali'ach or to the one who sent the Shali'ach. Since we are not sure to whom the gift was sent, they split it.
</p><p>
Why should this uncertainty be reason to split the extra items? Normally, in a case of doubtful ownership, the rule is that 'ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Ra'ayah,' and thus the Shali'ach -- who is presently in possession of the extra items -- should be able to keep them! (<b>MITZPEH EISAN</b>)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) Most Rishonim suggest a different explanation for why the gain is divided between the Shali'ach and sender. We do not consider the extra merchandise to be a gift intentionally given to either the sender or the Shali'ach, but rather it is either a mistake of the seller or the seller simply decided to give them an unusually good deal. If such is the case, it is justified to split the money between the Shali'ach and the sender because, as the <b>RIF</b> writes (cited by the <b>ROSH</b> 11:15 and others, and based on the words of the Yerushalmi in Demai 6:9), they are both responsible for the profit --  the Shali'ach because he negotiated the deal with the seller, and the sender because it was his money with which the deal was made.
</p><p>
In a similar vein, the <b>MORDECHAI</b> cited by the <b>HAGAHOS ASHIRI</b> writes in the name of his father that the reason the money is divided is because the seller either made a mistake or decided to give them an unusually good deal. If so it was neither the sender's money that made the profit nor the Shali'ach's skills of negotiation, but rather just plain luck. The combined luck of the Shali'ach and the sender is assumed to have caused the gain, and therefore they split it since they both have a part in causing it.
</p><p>
However, this does not clarify Rashi's explanation.
</p><p>
(b) The principle of 'ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Ra'ayah' is not an absolute rule. There is a Machlokes between the Chachamim and Sumchus (Bava Kama 46a) regarding whether, in a case of monetary dispute, we rule 'ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Ra'ayah,' or we rule 'Cholkin' (divide the money between the two). Although Tosfos (Bava Basra 35a, DH u'Mai) and other Rishonim rule that the Halachah does not follow Sumchus, some Rishonim do seem to rule like Sumchus, at least in certain situations. They rule like this because in many places, the Gemara seems to rule like Sumchus, that money in dispute is divided. This appears to be the opinion of the <b>RASHBAM</b> (Bava Basra 63a DH Tenu), who rules 'Cholkin' like Sumchus at least in some cases, as Tosfos (ibid.) says.
</p><p>
According to this, it could be that Rashi holds that the Shali'ach and the sender divide the gain because of the ruling of Sumchus (i.e., since there is no clear Chazakah here, because we are in doubt whether the Shali'ach was given the object to <i>hold for the sender</i> or <i>to hold for himself</i>, we rule like Sumchus in such a case).
</p><p>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Yehudah):</font></b> If a Shali'ach bought 
               something, and the seller gave one extra, the 
               Shali'ach keeps it;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Yosi says, he shares it with the one he bought 
               for.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Contradiction (Beraisa - R. Yosi):</font></b> The one who sent 
               him keeps the extra one.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer (Rami bar Chama):</font></b> If the sold item has a 
               fixed price, they share the extra one. If the price 
               varies, the one who sent him keeps it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Papa):</font></b> The Halachah is, if the sold item has a fixed 
          price, they share it. If the price is variable, the one 
          who sent him keeps it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What does Rav Papa teach (that Rami bar Chama 
          did not teach)?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> He teaches that Rami bar Chama's answer is 
          correct.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>A 'SHALI'ACH' WHO SOLD TOO MUCH</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #1 - Question:</font></b> If Reuven told a Shali'ach to sell 
          for him (land fitting to sow) 15 Sa'im and the Shali'ach 
          sold 30, what is the law?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Do we say that he fulfilled his mission and added to 
               it, and the sale of 15 stands?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Or, do we say that he deviated from his mission, and 
               the sale is totally void?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (R. Yakov - Mishnah):</font></b> If Reuven told his 
          servant to give one piece of meat to each guest; the 
          servant told the guests to take two each and the guests 
          took three each (and the meat was found to be Hekdesh), 
          all transgressed Me'ilah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This connotes the Shali'ach fulfilled his mission 
               and added to it. Since Reuven's command was 
               fulfilled, he transgressed Me'ilah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> But if we say that he changed his mission, 
               why does Reuven transgress?
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> The sender transgresses Me'ilah only 
                    if the Shali'ach fulfilled his mission.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> The case is, the servant said 'take one like 
          my master said, and a second on my authorization', and 
          they took three.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Mishnah):</font></b> If her Kesuvah was 100, and she sold 
          property worth 101 for 100, the sale is void.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> The case is, she sold property worth 101 
               for 101.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> The Mishnah says 'for 100', i.e. for the 100 she was 
               entitled to. It continues 'even if she says that she 
               will return the extra Dinar', i.e. she offers to buy 
               back the extra land sold and return it. The Halachah 
               is, the sale is void.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection (Rav Huna brei d'Rav Nasan):</font></b> No, the case is, 
          she sold the land for less than its value (i.e. for 100).
<br>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>A 'SHALI'ACH' WHO SOLD THE WRONG AMOUNT</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> Since the Seifa discusses selling too cheaply, 
          surely the Reisha teaches something else!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Seifa):</font></b> If her Kesuvah was 400, and she sold 100, 
               and another 100, and the last sale was worth 101 and 
               she sold it for 100, the last sale is void and the 
               other sales stand.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Both the Reisha and Seifa discuss selling too 
          cheaply;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The Seifa teaches that the sale is void only because 
               she sold the orphans' property (i.e. the last Dinar, 
               which she was not entitled to) too cheaply, We infer 
               that when she sells her property (what she is 
               entitled to) too cheaply, the sale stands.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> The Reisha teaches this!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> If a widow's Kesuvah was 200 Dinarim and 
               she sold property of the orphans which was worth 100 
               for 200, or property worth 200 for 100, in either 
               case she has received her full Kesuvah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> One might have thought that the sale stands (when 
          she sold too cheaply) only when the sale completes 
          payment of her Kesuvah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> However, when she is still entitled to collect more, 
               we would decree that the sale is void, lest people 
               say that the sale stands even when she sold more 
               than she was entitled to!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> The Seifa teaches that there is no such decree.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #2:</font></b> If a man told a Shali'ach 'Sell for me (land 
          fitting to sow) 15 Sa'im' and the Shali'ach sold 30, 
          clearly he fulfilled his mission and added to it. (The 
          sale of 15 stands.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If a man told a Shali'ach 'Sell for me 30' and 
          the Shali'ach sold 15, what is the law?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Can the Shali'ach say 'I did even better than you 
               requested! Had I sold the full amount, and you did 
               not need the money, you would not be able to 
               retract. (But now, you will retain half the land!)'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Or, can the owner say 'I do not want (to sell to two 
               people because this will cause) that there will be 
               many documents saying that I sold land'?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (R. Chanina from Sura - Mishnah):</font></b> Reuven gave 
          to Shimon a gold Dinar and asked him to buy a cloak. 
          Shimon spent half the money for a cloak, and half for a 
          Talis. If the money was found to be Hekdesh, both 
          transgressed Me'ilah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If buying less than one was told is considered 
               fulfilling the mission, we understand why Reuven 
               transgressed Me'ilah. (Shimon fulfilled his mission, 
               and he himself added to it the purchase of a Talis.)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> If it is considered changing the mission, 
               why did Reuven transgress?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> Shimon spent half the Dinar and bought a cloak 
          worth a full Dinar.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, why did Shimon transgress Me'ilah?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> He bought a Talis with the rest of the money.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Seifa - R. Yehudah):</font></b> Even here Reuven did not 
          transgress Me'ilah, for he can say 'I wanted a big cloak, 
          and you brought me a small, bad one.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If it is worth a Dinar, why does he call it bad?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> It is 'bad' in price!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Reuven says 'had you spent the full Dinar on a 
               cloak, you would have gotten one worth (more than) 
               two Dinarim.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (Beraisa):</font></b> R. Yehudah admits that both 
          transgressed Me'ilah if he was sent to buy pulse (a 
          legume, and spent half the money on pulse and half on 
          something else), for pulse is sold at the same rate 
          whether one buys a lot or a little.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) A SHALI'ACH WHO SELLS A FIELD TO MORE THAN ONE PERSOIN</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara earlier (99a) discusses a case where a person sends a Shali'ach to sell a 'Kur' of his land, and the Shali'ach sells it in two installments, half a 'Kur' at a time. In such a case, asks the Gemara, has the Shali'ach violated his mission (since the owner does not want to have so many Shetaros to deal with) and the sale is not valid, or is his action considered to be acceptable to the sender? The Gemara there does not reach a conclusion.
</p><p>
The Gemara here asks another question, seemingly beginning a new Sugya altogether. The Gemara says that it is clear that when a landowner tells a Shali'ach to sell a field 'to one person but not to two,' if the Shali'ach sells it to two, the sale is invalid. The Gemara asks whether the sale is valid or not in a case where the landowner tells a Shali'ach to sell a field 'to one person' and he does not specifically state 'but not to two.' The Gemara cites a Machlokes among Amora'im whether the sale is valid or not when the Shali'ach sold the field to more than one person. The Gemara concludes that the sale is valid and the Shali'ach may sell the field to as many people as he wants.
</p><p>
Why is the Gemara here asking whether the Shali'ach may sell the field to more than one person? This should depend on the answer to                  the Gemara's previous question! If a landowner does not want the Shali'ach to sell his field in two parts so that he not have so many Shetaros to deal with, then for the same reason he does not want the Shali'ach to sell the field to more than one person! The previous question was left unresolved, yet now, when the Gemara seems to ask the same question again, suddenly a number of Amora'im express their opinions on the matter! 
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Amar) explains in the name of Rav <b>HAI GAON</b> that the second Gemara is actually a continuation of the first. It is as if the Gemara is saying, 'Now that we have shown that no proof can be adduced from a Mishnah or Beraisa to resolve our question, what did the Amora'im decide was the Halachah based on their own logic?'
</p><p>
This answer is slightly problematic. Why does the Gemara later bring a proof from our Mishnah that the Shali'ach may sell the field to more than one buyer? The Gemara cited the same proof earlier and refuted it (the same way the Gemara here is going to refute it)! If this Sugya is a continuation of the previous Sugya, then there is no reason to repeat the proof (and the refutation)!
</p><p>
(b) Rashi seems to be explaining in a similar manner to Rav Hai Gaon, except that he explains that the first question of the Gemara involves a case where the landowner says to the Shali'ach, 'Sell a Kur of the land,' <i>without</i> specifying that he should sell it to only one person. Even though the question was not resolved, the Gemara assumes that the Shali'ach <i>may</i> sell the land to two people. 
</p><p>
Now the Gemara asks what the Halachah is when the owner <i>specifies</i> to the Shali'ach that he should sell it to one person. Should the owner's specific instructions be interpreted to mean that he has an interest not to sell it to two people and not have too many Shetaros, or is he still not particular about how many people buy the land? 
</p><p>
The Gemara adduces proof again from our Mishnah to the second question. Even though in the case of the Mishnah, the Yesomim did not say expressly to sell the land to one person, nevertheless since Beis Din looks out for the benefit of the Yesomim, if it is commonly considered beneficial not to have too many Shetaros, it is as if they specified to sell it to one person. (Rav Hai Gaon could not learn like this, because according to his Girsa, the second question was not when the owner specified to sell the field to one person, but when the owner told the Shali'ach to sell it <i>without</i> specifying to how many people it should be sold.)
</p><p>
(c) The <b>BA'AL HA'ME'OR</b>, too, explains that the second question of the Gemara is like an 'Im Timtzi Lomar' to the first question. The Gemara is assuming -- with regard to the first question -- that a person normally <i>does not care</i> if his field is sold to <i>one</i> person in two separate purchases with two separate Shetaros. He is not concerned with the fact that when there are more Shetaros more people will hear that he is selling his fields (which will cause the price of his fields to drop). Nevertheless, the Gemara considers that perhaps the same person <i>does</i> care if his land is sold to <i>two</i> different people, because that raises a new consideration. When the land is sold to two people, the original owner will have to deal with two different court cases if the buyers find problems with the fields (for example, if the creditors of the seller appropriate the fields from them).
</p><p>
(d) <b>TOSFOS</b>, the <b>RAMBAN</b> (in Milchamos) and other Rishonim explain that the two questions of the Gemara need not be connected at all. The first question of the Gemara, like the Ba'al ha'Me'or explains, is referring to where the field is sold to <i>one</i> person in two different purchases and with <i>two</i> different Shetaros. The second question of the Gemara is not concerned with the extra Shetaros at all, but only with the fact that the field was sold to <i>two</i> people, and therefore the seller is concerned that he will have to be brought to court twice.
</p><p>
If the field was sold to two people, then why is there not the additional concern that the seller would have wanted to avoid multiple Shetaros? The answer is either that both sales were written in a single Shtar (Tosfos). Alternatively, the problem with having two Shetaros is not that it will become publicly known that he is selling his fields, but simply that the seller is lazy and does not want to have to look again for a scribe and witnesses to write a second Shtar. This is only a consideration when the Shali'ach who sold the field promised to the buyer that the <i>seller</i> (and not the Shali'ach) would write him a Shtar, in which case the seller is the one who will have to find the scribe and witnesses for the additional Shtar. The Gemara in its second question is not worried about the presence of the second Shtar, because it is discussing a case where the <i>Shali'ach</i> wrote the Shetaros himself, and thus the seller will not be have to worry about having to write more Shetaros (Rabeinu Tam in Tosfos). 
</p><p>


<font><b>2) AN ERROR OF BEIS DIN IN APPRAISING THE VALUE OF A FIELD</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Mishnah states that if Beis Din, when evaluating the property of Yesomim in order to sell it, errs by a sixth (an 'external' sixth, meaning twenty percent) in evaluating the value of the land, then the sale is revoked. This is a stringency unique to Beis Din, because we know that with regard to Metaltelin, when a seller overcharges by a sixth, or when a buyer underpays by a sixth, the sale is not revoked, but rather the seller (or buyer) has to return the extra money. And when a person sells land, even if he overcharges by more than a sixth, the sale remains valid and is not revoked (nor does any money need to be returned), because of the rule that 'Ein Ona'ah l'Karka'os' ('there is no Ona'ah for land'). Even though our Mishnah is discussing the sale of land, nevertheless, since the property is being evaluated by Beis Din for the benefit of the Yesomim, the Chachamim were more stringent and said that the sale should be revoked if Beis Din under-evaluates and undersells the land by a sixth of its value.
</p><p>
However, the Mishnah also says that if Beis Din <i>overprices</i> the land and the Yesomim profit more than a sixth, then the sale is also revoked! Why is the sale revoked if the Yesomim <i>benefit</i> from the error of Beis Din?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>ROSH</b>, <b>RAN</b> and other Rishonim explain that since the Chachamim made a rule that when Beis Din under-evaluates the land of Yesomim the sale is revoked, they had to make a reciprocal rule that if Beis Din overprices the land, the sale is also revoked. Without such a reciprocal rule, nobody would buy the property of Yesomim because the downside to the buyer would be too great (that is, the sale might be revoked if Beis Din under-evaluates the land, and if they overpriced the land, then the buyers will lose out by being overcharged).
</p><p>
The Rosh says that this seems to be the opinion of <b>RASHI</b>, while the Ran cites this as the opinion of <b>TOSFOS</b>. 
</p><p>
(b) The <b>ROSH</b>, in the name of <b>RABEINU YONAH</b> and the <b>RA'AVAD</b> (Hilchos Mechirah 13:9), writes that since it is Beis Din who is appraising the land, the buyers rely on Beis Din to make a proper appraisal. They trust Beis Din, and they do not make their own independent appraisal of the value of the land. Therefore, if Beis Din overprices the land, Beis Din is causing the buyer to lose, and therefore the Chachamim instituted that the sale is revoked in such a case as well.
</p><p>
A difference between these two approaches might be according to the view (100a, according to Rashi's explanation of the Gemara) that maintains that a Shali'ach who sells the property of Yesomim has the same status as Beis Din who sells the property of Yesomim. According to the first approach above, when the Shali'ach overestimates the value of the field and overcharges the buyer, the sale should be revoked, just like when he undercharges. According to the second approach, since it is the Shali'ach making the appraisal and not Beis Din (or the Shali'ach of Beis Din), the buyers do not trust his appraisal and they make their own independent appraisal of the field and do not rely on the Shali'ach, and thus if they overpay the sale should not be revoked.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>RAMBAN</b> explains that when the Mishnah says that when Beis Din overprices the field the sale is revoked, the Mishnah is not discussing a case where Beis Din sold the field of Yesomim in order to raise money to pay their debts. Rather, the Mishnah is discussing a case where Beis Din attempted to sell the fields of the Yesomim but was unsuccessful, and therefore Beis Din told <i>the creditor himself</i> that he must accept the fields as repayment of the debt for the value that Beis Din attributes to the fields. Since the creditor who receives the fields has no choice in the matter and must accept the fields at the value determined by Beis Din, if Beis Din mistakenly overprices the field, the transfer of the property is revoked.
</p><p>
The <b>RAN</b> questions this explanation. If this is what the Mishnah means, then why does the Mishnah conclude that if Beis Din makes an 'Igeres Bikores' -- they announce that people should come and visit the field --then even if they overprice or underprice the field, the sale is valid? What difference does it make to the creditor if people visited and saw the field? Beis Din still decided on the price, and if Beis Din's price was exaggerated, then the transfer of property should still be revoked! 
</p><p>
The Ramban must mean that if Beis Din had people visit the field, we assume that the appraisal Beis Din made was correct. Even if it now seems to be inaccurate, there must be an external reason causing the value to seem higher or lower, but at the time of Beis Din's appraisal the price they arrived at was accurate. (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> What is the case?
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  If it is where pulse is sold by estimation, one 
                    receives a better rate when buying in quantity!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer (Rav Papa):</font></b> Rather, it is in a place where 
               one receives a fixed measure for each Perutah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (to Question (f) - Mishnah):</font></b> If her Kesuvah was 
          400, and she sold 100, and another 100, and the last sale 
          was worth 101 and she sold it for 100 - the last sale is 
          void, the other sales stand. (This shows that a smaller 
          sale is valid.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> The case is like Rav Shisha brei d'Rav Idi 
          said (below), the orphans inherited small plots of land 
          that are not normally sold to one buyer.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>SELLING TO TOO MANY BUYERS</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b></b>  Obviously, if he said 'sell to one buyer, not to two', a 
          sale to two is invalid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If he said only 'sell to one person', if he 
          sold to two what is the law?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rav Huna):</font></b> Here also, he meant 'sell to one 
          buyer, not to two.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rav Chisda and Rabah bar Rav Huna):</font></b> He meant 
          'sell to one, or even to two, or even to 100.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rav Chisda and Rabah bar Rav Huna to Rav 
          Nachman):</font></b> How do you hold in such a case?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Nachman):</font></b> He meant 'sell to one, or even to 
          two, or even to 100.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rav Chisda and Rabah bar Rav Huna):</font></b> Is the sale 
          valid even if the Shali'ach erred?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Nachman):</font></b> No.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rav Chisda and Rabah bar Rav Huna):</font></b> But it was 
          taught (Rashi; Tosfos - you yourself said), the sale of 
          land is not subject to the law of overcharging!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Nachman):</font></b> That is when the owner sells. If a 
          Shali'ach sells, the owner says 'I authorized you to help 
          me, not to harm me!'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b></b>  The following shows that we distinguish between the owner 
          and a Shali'ach.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> If Reuven told a Shali'ach to take 
               Terumah, the Shali'ach should take like Reuven 
               wants. If he does not know, he should take like an 
               average person, one part in 50. If he took one in 40 
               or one in 60, the separation is valid.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> Even if he (the owner himself) took one 
               in 20 (by mistake), the separation is valid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (for Rav Nachman - Mishnah):</font></b> If her Kesuvah was 
          400, and she sold 100, and another 100, and the last sale 
          was worth 101 and she sold it for 100, the last sale is 
          void and the others stand. (Even though the orphans did 
          not say anything, we must ensure that they are not 
          harmed. If selling to too many buyers invalidates a sale, 
          her sale should be void!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection (Rav Shisha brei d'Rav Idi):</font></b> This is no proof. 
          The case is, the orphans inherited small plots of land 
          that are not normally sold to one buyer.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>IF 'BEIS DIN' ERRED</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If Beis Din assessed property (to sell to feed 
          the orphans or widow) for a sixth more or less than the 
          actual value, the sale is void;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  R. Shimon ben Gamliel says, the sale stands. If it were 
          void, Beis Din would be weak!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  If a letter of announcement (that the property is for 
          sale) was made, even if property was sold for double or 
          half the value, the sale stands.
<br>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>A 'SHALI'ACH' WHO ERRED</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara) Question:</font></b> Whom does a Shali'ach resemble?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rava):</font></b> He is like Beis Din (if he errs less 
          than a sixth, the sale stands).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rav Shmuel bar Bisna):</font></b> He is like a widow (any 
          error invalidates the sale).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Rava said that he is like Beis Din because he does 
               not sell for himself, similar to Beis Din. A widow 
               sells for herself!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Rav Shmuel bar Bisna said that he is like a widow, 
               since also he is an individual. Beis Din is a Rabim.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  The Halachah is, a Shali'ach is like a widow.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why is this different than the following?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> If a Shali'ach was told to take Terumah, 
               he should take like the owner wants. If he does not 
               know, he should take like an average person, one 
               part in 50. If he took one in 40 or one in 60, the 
               separation is valid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Some people take Terumah generously (one in 40) 
          and some take stingily (one in 60). The Shali'ach can say 
          that he estimated that this is what the owner wanted to 
          give. Regarding a sale it is a pure error. The owner can 
          say 'you should not have erred.'
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>A MISTAKE OF 'BEIS DIN'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Nachman):</font></b> The Halachah follows Chachamim.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Elsewhere Rav Nachman is concerned for the 
          power of Beis Din!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Nachman citing Shmuel):</font></b> If orphans come to 
               divide their father's property, Beis Din appoints an 
               overseer for them and they select a nice portion for 
               them. When the orphans grow up, they can demand a 
               new division;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Nachman himself):</font></b> They cannot demand a new 
               division. If they could, Beis Din would be weak!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Rav Nachman is concerned for the power of Beis 
          Din only when they did not err.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If they did not err, why can the orphans 
          protest (according to Shmuel)?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> (They did not err about the value.) They erred 
          about location (e.g. an orphan received a portion far 
          from property that he inherited from his mother's 
          father).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #1 (Rav Dimi):</font></b> A case occurred, and Rebbi ruled 
          like Chachamim.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Parta:</font></b> If so, Beis Din is weak!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Rebbi reversed his ruling.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #2 (Rav Safra):</font></b> A case occurred, and Rebbi was 
          about to rule like Chachamim.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Parta:</font></b> If so, Beis Din is weak!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Rebbi ruled like R. Shimon ben Gamliel. (end of 
               Version #2)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> Rav Dimi holds that if one erred in 
               Devar Mishnah (a clearly decided Halachah) we 
               retract the ruling. Rav Safra holds that we do not 
               retract the ruling.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> No, all hold that we retract the ruling. 
               They argue about the case that occurred.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yosef):</font></b> When a widow sells property, the orphans 
          have Acharayos (to compensate the buyer if the land turns 
          out to be stolen if a creditor takes it). The same 
          applies when Beis Din sells property.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> This is obvious!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The case of the widow is obvious, but the case of 
          Beis Din is a Chidush;
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) REDEEMING ONE'S WIFE WHO IS PROHIBITED TO HIM</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Mishnah teaches that a 'Mema'enes,' a 'Sheniyah,' and an 'Aylonis' do not have rights to receive their Kesuvah, Peros, or Mezonos. However, an Almanah who marries a Kohen Gadol, and a Gerushah who marries a normal Kohen, do have rights to receive their Kesuvah, and they presumably have rights to receive Peros and Mezonos as well, since the Chachamim did not penalize those women.
</p><p>
The Gemara earlier (52a) records a Machlokes between Rava and Abaye regarding whether a Kohen who is married to a Gerushah, or a Kohen Gadol married to an Almanah, is obligated to redeem his wife from captivity. Abaye says that he does have to redeem her, since the stipulation for redemption that the Kohen wrote in the Kesuvah states, 'If you are captured, I will redeem you and <i>bring you back to your [father's] house</i>,' and it does not say, 'If you are captured, <i>I will redeem you and </i>take you back as my wife.' Therefore, it makes no difference whether his wife is permitted to him or not, and the Kohen must redeem his wife.
</p><p>
Rava argues and says that he does not have to redeem her, because he intends to obligate himself to redeem her if she is captured and to divorce her and bring her to her father's house <i>only</i> if it was the captivity that made her Asur to him, but not if she was already Asur to him. 
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> explains that when the Mishnah mentions the right to receive Peros, it is referring to the husband's obligation to redeem his wife. If so, since the Mishnah says that an Almanah who married a Kohen Gadol <i>is</i> entitled to Peros, meaning that she is entitled to be redeemed, why does the Gemara not bring proof from our Mishnah for Abaye's opinion that a Kohen Gadol <i>is</i> obligated to redeem his wife who is an Almanah? If, on the other hand, there is a principle than any man -- who is married to a woman who is prohibited to him -- is not obligated to redeem her, then why does the Mishnah have to mention that a 'Sheniyah' does not get Peros (i.e. redemption) because of a special penalty imposed upon her? It has nothing to do with the penalty, but rather he does not have to redeem her because there is no obligation to redeem her as specified in the conditions set forth in the Kesuvah!
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER: TOSFOS</b> (52a, DH Mamzeres) answers that Rava and Abaye are arguing over how to interpret the word 'Peros' in the Mishnah. They are arguing whether to interpret the Mishnah like Rashi's first explanation here or like his second explanation. 
</p><p>
Rava understands the Mishnah like Rashi's second explanation, that not only is the husband of a 'Sheniyah' not obligated to redeem her (and he is not entitled to receive her Peros), but even if the husband takes the Peros when he is not supposed to and he eats them thinking that he is entitled to receive them because of the Tenai Kesuvah, then b'Di'eved he does not have to compensate her. In the case of an Almanah married to a Kohen Gadol, the husband does have to repay her if he eats her Peros unjustly. However, the husband is exempt from the obligation to redeem her in all cases, according to Rava's understanding of the Mishnah.
</p><p>
Abaye explains the Mishnah like Rashi's first explanation, that the husband of a 'Sheniyah' has no obligation to redeem her, whereas a Kohen Gadol married to an Almanah <i>is</i> obligated to redeem her. (Abaye agrees that the husband of a Mamzeres or Nesinah is not obligated to redeem her.)
</p><p>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> One might have thought that one who buys from Beis 
               Din assumes that there has been enough publicity 
               (and it would have become known if the land was 
               stolen or has a lien against it), and buys without 
               Acharayos. Rav Yosef teaches that this is not so.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - R. Shimon ben Gamliel):</font></b> The sale stands.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Up to how much of a mistake can Beis Din make 
          (and the sale stands)?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Huna bar Yehudah):</font></b> They can err up to half 
          the value.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Support (Beraisa - R. Shimon ben Gamliel):</font></b> If Beis 
               Din sold a field worth 200 for 100, or a field worth 
               100 for 200, the sale stands.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE AUCTION OF 'BEIS DIN'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Ameimar):</font></b> If Beis Din sold property without announcing, 
          this is like a clear mistake, and the sale is invalid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> This is not just <i>like</i> a clear mistake. It is 
          a clear mistake!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> The auction of the property of orphans is 
               30 days. The auction of Hekdesh property is 60 days. 
               Announcements are made morning and evening.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> One might have thought that the Mishnah discusses 
          only a Shali'ach who sells, but Beis Din does not need to 
          announce. Ameimar teaches that this is not so.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rav Ashi - Mishnah):</font></b> If an assessment of Beis 
          Din was a sixth too little or too much, the sale is 
          invalid.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> If the property was sold for the correct 
               price, the sale would stand.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> The case is, no announcement was made.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> No, the property was auctioned.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> Since the Seifa discusses when it was 
          auctioned, the Reisha discusses when it was not 
          auctioned!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Seifa):</font></b> If a letter of investigation was done, even 
               if they sold a field worth 100 for 200, or worth 200 
               for 100, the sale stands.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> Really, there was no auction. The Reisha 
          discusses property that is not auctioned. The Seifa 
          discusses property that is auctioned.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> The following are not auctioned:</font></b> slaves, Metaltelim, 
               and documents.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> We do not auction slaves, lest they run away. We do 
               not auction Metaltelim and documents, lest people 
               steal them.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #3:</font></b> The Reisha discusses a time when property is 
          not auctioned; the Seifa discusses a time when it is 
          auctioned.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Nehardai):</font></b> We do not auction to pay for head-tax, 
               food or burial.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #4:</font></b> The Reisha discusses a place where property is 
          not auctioned; the Seifa discusses a place where it is 
          auctioned.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Nachman):</font></b> Property was never auctioned in 
               Nehardai.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Assumption:</font></b> This is because they were expert 
               assessors.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection (Rav Yosef bar Minyomi citing Rav 
               Nachman):</font></b> No, it is because people who bought 
               auctioned property were scorned (for capitalizing on 
               the plight of orphans).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> We assess and sell Metaltelim of orphans 
          immediately.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Chisda):</font></b> We (wait to) sell it in the markets.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> They do not argue. We wait only if the market day is 
               coming soon.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b></b>  Rav Kahana had beer of an orphan; he waited to sell it 
          until the festival.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Even though it would soon turn to vinegar, it was 
               better to sell at the festival, when people pay cash 
               (as opposed to credit).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b></b>  Ravina was overseeing wine of an orphan. He was taking 
          his own wine abroad (to sell it).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Ravina):</font></b> May I take the orphan's wine also?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Ashi):</font></b> Yes. You need not be more careful with 
          it than with your own.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>WOMEN WHO HAVE NO 'KESUVAH'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> The following have no Kesuvah, Peiros, food, 
          or Bala'os (remnants (Rashi) or compensation for 
          depreciation (Tosfos) of property she brought into the 
          marriage):
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> A minor who did Mi'un (decided to leave her 
               mid'Rabanan marriage);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> A Sheniyah (a relative forbidden mid'Rabanan);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> An Ailonis (a girl who does not develop like a 
               normal female).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> If he knew that she was an Ailonis when he married 
               her, she receives a Kesuvah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  The following have a Kesuvah:</font></b> a widow married to a Kohen 
          Gadol, a divorcee or Chalutzah to a regular Kohen, a 
          Mamzeres or Nesinah to a Yisrael, and a Bas Yisrael to a 
          Nasin or Mamzer.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara - Rav):</font></b> The text of the Mishnah says that a minor 
          (who was married mid'Rabanan) has no Kesuvah if she was 
          divorced. All the more so one who does Mi'un has no 
          Kesuvah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Shmuel):</font></b> The Mishnah says that one who did Mi'un has no 
          Kesuvah. If she was divorced, she gets a Kesuvah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  This is like Shmuel taught elsewhere.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Shmuel):</font></b> A Mema'enes gets no Kesuvah. A minor 
               (married mid'Rabanan) who was divorced receives a 
               Kesuvah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If she did Mi'un, she is not disqualified from 
               marrying the brothers or a Kohen. If she was 
               divorced, she is disqualified from marrying them.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> If she did Mi'un, she need not wait three months 
               before remarrying. If she was divorced, she must 
               wait three months before remarrying.
<br>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE RABBINICAL MARRIAGE OF A MINOR</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What does Shmuel teach? We know all of these 
          laws from (our Mishnah and) another Mishnah!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> A Mema'enes is permitted to her 
               ex-husband's relatives, and he is permitted to hers. 
               She remains permitted to Kehunah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If he divorced her, she is forbidden to his 
               relatives, and he is forbidden to hers, and she is 
               disqualified from Kehunah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Shmuel teaches that if he divorced her she must 
          wait three months before remarrying. This was not taught 
          in a Mishnah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Suggestion:</font></b> Rav and Shmuel argue like the following 
          Tana'im.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Eliezer):</font></b> The actions of a minor are 
               void. Her husband does not receive her Metzi'os or 
               earnings, he cannot annul her vows, he does not 
               inherit her, and he does not become Tamei to engage 
               in her burial;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  The rule is, she is not like his wife in any 
                    respect, except that she must do Mi'un to leave 
                    him.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Yehoshua says, a minor's actions take effect. Her 
               husband receives her Metzi'os and earnings, he can 
               annul her vows, he inherits her, and he becomes 
               Tamei to engage in her burial;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  The rule is, she is like his wife in all 
                    respects, except that she can do Mi'un.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> Rav holds like R. Eliezer and Shmuel 
               holds like R. Yehoshua.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> Granted, Shmuel cannot hold like R. Eliezer, 
          but Rav can hold like R. Yehoshua;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Yehoshua said only that her husband receives 
               things from her as if she is his wife. He did not 
               say that she receives anything from him!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> She does not receive Bala'os (remnants or 
          compensation for depreciation of her property).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Kahana):</font></b> This applies only to Melug property (i.e. 
          for which her husband took no Acharayos). She receives 
          Bala'os of Tzon Barzel (property for which the husband 
          must compensate her for any decrease in its value, and if 
          it increases he keeps the gain).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rav Papa):</font></b> Which case does he discuss?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> He discusses a Mema'enes.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> If the remnants are around, she receives them 
          in either case (Melug or Tzon Barzel property, for there 
          is no reason to fine her). If the remnants are not 
          around, she is not compensated in either case (for he did 
          not divorce her. Perhaps he would have inherited her!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> He discusses an Ailonis.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> If the remnants are around, she receives them 
          in either case (we do not fine her);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If they are not around, the law should be the 
               opposite! Melug property was in her jurisdiction, he 
               (should be fined for consuming it and) should 
               compensate her for it. Tzon Barzel was in his 
               jurisdiction, he (was entitled to use it and) should 
               not need to compensate her for it!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #3:</font></b> Rather, he discusses a Sheniyah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Version #1 (our text, Rashi):</font></b> Chachamim fined her to 
               lose what she should have received from him 
               (Kesuvah, Peiros, food, and Bala'os of Nichsei 
               Melug). They fined him to compensate for what he 
               should have been exempt (Tzon Barzel).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Version #2 (R. Chananel):</font></b> Chachamim fined him (to 
               pay for) what is his (Tzon Barzel, it is in his 
               Reshus). They fined her with what is hers (Nichsei 
               Melug).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Simi bar Aba):</font></b> From Rav Kahana, we learn that if she 
          brings clothing in as Tzon Barzel, it is considered 
          principal, and she does not wear it until it wears out! 
          (Rather, it is sold to buy land, and he eats the Peiros.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Rav Nachman said that it may be worn!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Rav Nachman argues with Rav Kahana.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>WOMEN THAT HAVE NO 'KESUVAH'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> They have no Kesuvah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Shmuel):</font></b> This only to the basic Kesuvah (100 or 200). 
          They receive Tosefes (additions to the Kesuvah).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (Beraisa):</font></b> When Chachamim said 'she has no 
          Kesuvah', such as a Mema'enes and the accompanying cases, 
          she does not receive 100 or 200, but she receives 
          Tosefes;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> When they said 'she leaves without a Kesuvah', such 
               as one who transgresses Das (Moshe or Yehudis) and 
               accompanying cases, she does not receive Tosefes, 
               all the more so not 100 or 200.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> One who is divorced due to ill repute (Znus) 
               receives what remains (of her Melug property).
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  This supports Rav Huna, who said that one who 
                    was Mezanah does not lose the intact remnants.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE 'BELA'OS' OF THE MISHNAH</b></font><b>
<br>OPINIONS:</b> The Mishnah (100b) teaches that in the case of a man who married a Mema'enes, Sheniyah, or Aylonis, the man has no obligation to pay the woman the money of the Kesuvah, Peros, Mezonos, or Bela'os. 'Bela'os' refers to the clothing which the woman brought into the marriage for the husband to wear, and which subsequently became worn out. The husband is not obligated to reimburse her for that clothing.
</p><p>
Shmuel asserts that the Mishnah refers only to Bela'os of Nichsei Milug, the property of the wife for which the husband is not responsible and which he returns as is, regardless of any appreciation or depreciation in value (or deterioration) over the years. The husband <i>is</i> obligated to reimburse his wife for the Bela'os of Nichsei Tzon Barzel, the property of the wife for which the husband is responsible (the value of which was estimated and written in the Kesuvah to be returned to her in full upon divorce or upon the husband's death).
</p><p>
The Gemara seeks to clarify the exact case in the Mishnah to which Shmuel refers. He cannot be referring to the case of Mema'enes, because in that case if the clothing still exists it should be given to her, and if it no longer exists nothing should be given to her, whether the clothing was Nichsei Milug or Nichsei Tzon Barzel.
</p><p>
He cannot be referring to the case of Aylonis, because if the clothing no longer exists the opposite of Shmuel's ruling applies: the husband <i>should</i> be required to pay her the value of the Bela'os of Nichsei Milug (because she is the full owner), while he should <i>not</i> be required to pay her the value of the Bela'os of Nichsei Tzon Barzel (because he acquired a degree of ownership over them).
</p><p>
The Gemara answers that Shmuel must be referring to the case of Sheniyah. The Chachamim penalized her (for marrying a man to whom she was prohibited) by revoking her right to receive the Bela'os of Nichsei Milug to which she is entitled. They penalized him (for marrying a woman to whom he was prohibited) by revoking his right to keep the Bela'os of Nichsei Tzon Barzel.
</p><p>
According to Shmuel, the Mishnah's law that the woman loses her rights to receive Bela'os of Nichsei Milug applies only in the case of Sheniyah.
</p><p>
However, the Mishnah itself clearly refers to all three types of wives -- Mema'enes, Sheniyah, and Aylonis -- when it says that she loses the right to receive Bela'os. Although Shmuel explains that it is only the Sheniyah who loses the right to receive the Bela'os of Nichsei Melug, what type of Bela'os do the other women lose?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>RIF</b> (quoted by the <b>RAN</b>) understands that the Mishnah means that each woman loses a different type of Bela'os. A Mema'enes loses both types of Bela'os (as the Gemara mentions earlier), Nichsei Milug and Nichsei Tzon Barzel. An Aylonis loses only Bela'os of Nichsei Tzon Barzel (as the Gemara mentions earlier). A Sheniyah loses Bela'os of Nichsei Milug (as Shmuel explains).
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAN</b> explains that when the Gemara says that an Aylonis should lose only the Bela'os of Nichsei Tzon Barzel but not Bela'os of Nichsei Milug, it means that <i>if</i> Shmuel refers to Aylonis when he differentiates between the different types of Bela'os, this is the type she loses and this is the type she receives. However, once the Gemara concludes that Shmuel is referring to Sheniyah and not to Aylonis, it is understood that both a Mema'enes and an Aylonis lose <i>all</i> forms of Bela'os. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  A reciter of Beraisos:</font></b> If she was Mezanah, she lost the 
          intact remnants.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Rav Nachman):</font></b> If she had adultery, did her 
          property have adultery?!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rav Nachman):</font></b> Rather, the text should say that 
          she does not lose the intact remnants.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rabah bar bar Chanah):</font></b> (The text need not be 
          changed.) The Stam Beraisa is like R. Menachem, but 
          Chachamim say that if she was Mezanah, she does not lose 
          the intact remnants.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If he initially married her (aware that she is 
          an Ailonis)...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Huna):</font></b> An Ailonis is sometimes a wife, sometimes 
          not. A widow (who married a Kohen Gadol) is always a 
          wife.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> An Ailonis is a wife only if he knew that she was an 
               Ailonis.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> A widow is a wife whether or not he knew she is a 
               widow, and she has a Kesuvah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> Both an Ailonis and a widow (to a Kohen 
          Gadol) are sometimes married, sometimes not.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> She has a Kesuvah only if he knew her status.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #1 (against Rav Huna - Beraisa #1):</font></b> If he 
          married her with this Chazakah (she told him that she is 
          a widow), and she was found to be so, she has a Kesuvah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> If he married her Stam, she has no 
               Kesuvah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> No, we infer that if he married her with the 
          Chazakah that she is not a widow, and she was found to be 
          a widow, she has no Kesuvah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> You hold that if he married her Stam, she has a 
          Kesuvah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If so, why does it say 'if he married her with this 
               Chazakah, and it was found to be true, she has a 
               Kesuvah'? Rather it should say that if he married 
               her Stam she has a Kesuvah, and we would know all 
               the more so if she had told him!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #2 (against Rav Huna - Beraisa #2):</font></b> If he 
          married her knowing (that she is a widow), and she was 
          found to be so, she has a Kesuvah. If he married her Stam 
          (and she was found to be a widow), she has no Kesuvah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b></b>  Rav Huna is refuted.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b></b>  The Mishnah caused Rav Huna to err.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Regarding an Ailonis the Mishnah distinguishes 
               whether or not he knew her status. It did not 
               distinguish regarding a widow. Rav Huna inferred 
               that a widow has a Kesuvah in either case.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> This is wrong. The Mishnah teaches that a widow has 
               a Kesuvah, i.e. in the same case as an Ailonis (when 
               he knew her status when he married her).
<br>
<br><b>PEREK HA'NOSEI</b>
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO AGREES TO FEED HIS WIFE'S DAUGHTER</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If Levi married Leah and agreed to feed her 
          daughter Dinah for five years, he must feed her for five 
          years. If Leah married David (after Levi divorced her) 
          and made the same arrangement with the new husband, Levi 
          must still feed Dinah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> He cannot say 'I will only feed her as long as her 
               mother is married to me.' Rather, he sends food to 
               where her mother is.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Similarly, Levi and David cannot say 'we will feed 
               her together.' Rather, one feeds her, and the other 
               pays her the monetary equivalent.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If Dinah married, her husband feeds her, and Levi and 
          David pay her the monetary equivalent.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  If Levi and David die, their own daughters are fed from 
          Bnei Chorin. Dinah is fed even from property sold (after 
          they accepted to feed her), because she is like a 
          creditor.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  Clever men would write 'I will feed your daughter as long 
          as you are married to me.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara - R. Yochanan):</font></b> If Reuven tells Shimon 'I owe you 
          100', he must pay;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  Reish Lakish says, he need not.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is the case?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If Reuven said (to witnesses) 'you are witnesses 
               against me', why would Reish Lakish exempt?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If Reuven did not say 'you are witnesses against 
               me', why would R. Yochanan say that he must pay?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> He did not say this. Rather, he said 'I owe you 
          100 in a document (and gave him an unsigned document)';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Yochanan says, the matter of a document is 
               potent. It is as if he said 'you are witnesses 
               against me';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Reish Lakish says, the matter of a document is not 
               potent.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (against Reish Lakish - Mishnah):</font></b> If a man 
          married a woman and agreed to feed her daughter for five 
          years, he must feed her for five years.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> The case is like above (he gave her an 
               unsigned document).
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) A PROMISE OF SUPPORT FOR FIVE YEARS</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Mishnah teaches that when a man marries a woman who stipulates that he must feed her daughter (from her prior marriage) for five years, the obligation to do so is fully binding.
</p><p>
Why does the Mishnah teach this law specifically for the case of five years and not for any other period of time?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>TOSFOS YOM TOV</b> answers that in an ordinary situation a woman worries about providing for her daughter until she is seven years old. Since a woman who became widowed or divorced with a baby is not permitted to remarry until her child is two years old, when she remarries she generally will ask her new husband to provide support for her daughter until her daughter reaches the age of seven -- five years from the time of the marriage.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>HAFLA'AH</b> points out that the Gemara later (102b) infers from the Mishnah's requirement that the man bring the food to the girl 'at the place of her mother' that a daughter stays with her mother and cannot be forced to stay anywhere else. (The practical ramification of this law exists in a case in which a girl's brothers are supporting her after the death of their father. They cannot demand that she live in their house. Rather, they must bring food to her at the house of her mother even though she is not living with them.)
</p><p>
The Hafla'ah asserts that this Halachah (that a girl cannot be forced to live away from her mother) cannot be derived from the fact that a daughter normally lives with her mother until the age of six. Until that age, every child <i>needs</i> her mother, as the Gemara earlier says (65b). (Consequently, the father is obligated to feed the child until that age, and the child is included in any Eruv that her mother might make.) The fact that it is the normal manner for a daughter to stay with her mother even after the age of six (when she no longer needs her mother) can be proven only from the case of a seven year-old. Accordingly, the Mishnah refers to a case of supporting one's step-daughter for <i>five</i> years in order to show that <i>even</i> at the age of <i>seven</i> the daughter lives with her mother (the mother waits the mandatory two years before she remarries, and there are five years until the daughter turns seven). The Gemara later infers from the fact that the Mishnah states that a seven year-old receives her Mezonos at her mother's home that it indeed is the normal manner for a girl to stay with her mother until that age (even though she no longer needs her mother) and her brothers cannot demand that she live with them. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)
</p><p>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO OBLIGATES HIMSELF WITH A DOCUMENT</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> No, it discusses a document of committal (signed 
          by witnesses. The Chidush is that no acquisition is 
          needed), like Rav Gidal taught.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav):</font></b> If Yakov agreed to marry his son to Moshe's 
               daughter, each father agreed to give a certain 
               amount to his child, and the children became 
               Mekudeshos right then, the verbal promises are 
               binding.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Mishnah):</font></b> If Reuven has a firstborn son to 
          redeem and he wrote to a Kohen 'I owe you five Sela'im' 
          he must pay him, and his son is not redeemed (This shows 
          that the document obligates him!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> That case is different, since the Torah obligated 
          him.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, why did he bother writing a document?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> It clarifies to which Kohen he will give the 
          redemption money.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, why isn't his son redeemed?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> This is like Ula taught:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Ula):</font></b> Mid'Oraisa, his son is redeemed when he gives 
               the money;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Chachamim said that he is not redeemed, lest people 
               say that one can redeem with documents.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Suggestion (Rava):</font></b> R. Yochanan and Reish Lakish argue 
          like the following Tana'im.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> If it is written 'Ploni is an Arev' below 
               the signatures on a document (and Ploni agree to 
               this), the lender may collect from Ploni's Bnei 
               Chorin, but not from property he sold;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> A case came in front of R. Yishmael. He authorized 
               collection from Ploni's Bnei Chorin.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Ben Nanas:</font></b> He cannot even collect from Bnei Chorin!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question (R. Yishmael):</font></b> What is the reason?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer (Ben Nanas):</font></b> Ploni saw the lender choking the 
               borrower. He told him 'leave him, and I will give 
               you.' Ploni is exempt, since the money was not lent 
               on expectation to collect from Ploni.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> R. Yochanan holds like R. Yishmael, and 
               Reish Lakish holds like Ben Nanas.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> Granted, R. Yochanan cannot hold like Ben 
          Nanas;
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE COMPARISON BETWEEN 'HODA'AS BA'AL DIN' AND 'HIS'CHAYEVUS'</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara (101b) records a dispute between Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish about the law in the case of a person who writes in a Shtar that he owes money to another person. The Gemara there explains that the question involves whether or not one's act of writing an admission of debt in a Shtar is akin to admitting to a debt in the presence of witnesses, in which case he may not say later that he was joking. Does such an admission written in a Shtar constitute a 'Hoda'as Ba'al Din' which obligates him like a hundred witnesses or not? 
</p><p>
The Gemara suggests that the Machlokes between Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish is actually a Machlokes Tana'im. In the last Mishnah in Bava Basra (175b), Rebbi Yishmael and Ben Nanas disagree about the law in the case of a person who saw his friend in trouble when he was unable to repay a loan. In order to help his friend he told the creditor, 'I will pay back [his debt].' Rebbi Yishmael rules that he is obligated to pay the debt, and Ben Nanas rules that he is not obligated to pay the debt. Rebbi Yochanan, who says that a written admission of debt is considered 'Hoda'as Ba'al Din,' follows the view of Rebbi Yishmael. Reish Lakish follows the view of Ben Nanas.
</p><p>
The Gemara's comparison of the two cases is difficult to understand. It is clear that in Rebbi Yishmael's case there is <i>no</i> 'Hoda'as Ba'al Din' at all. In that case, the benefactor's obligation to pay the debt is not due to any admission of debt, but rather it is due to his accepting upon himself the obligation of responsibility for the loan ('His'chayevus'). Why does the Gemara say that Rebbi Yochanan's opinion is consistent with that of Rebbi Yishmael, and Reish Lakish's with that of Ben Nanas?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH k'Tenai) explains that Rebbi Yishmael and Ben Nanas actually argue about two points. Their first argument involves the status of a written admission. Their second argument involves the status of a written obligation. The Mishnah which records their dispute describes the case with the words, 'An Arev (guarantor) who is signed below the signatures of the witnesses....' Clearly, the case in which they argue is one in which the guarantor signed his name at the end of the loan contract and no witnesses signed in attestation to his declaration. Accordingly, that case is one of a written admission, 'Hoda'as Ba'al Din,' the same case in which Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish argue.
</p><p>
When Ben Nanas argues with Rebbi Yishmael and says that the guarantor who signed the contract after the signature of the witnesses is <i>not</i> obligated, Rebbi Yishmael responds, 'Why?' ('Lamah?'). Rebbi Yishmael's response expresses two points. The first is that the guarantor should be obligated because of 'Hoda'ah.' The second is that even if the guarantor's acceptance of responsibility is not considered 'Hoda'ah,' he still should be obligated because of 'His'chayevus' -- he obligated himself to pay. Ben Nanas answers by stating that certainly the guarantor is exempt in a case in which the guarantor obligates himself <i>after</i> the time of the loan (without signing the contract). That case, however, is unrelated to admission, 'Hoda'ah.' Clearly, Ben Nanas argues both when the guarantor's 'Hoda'ah' is written in the contract, and when his verbal acceptance of responsibility is not a 'Hoda'ah' but 'His'chayevus.'
</p><p>
(b) Tosfos cites another explanation in the name of <b>RABEINU TAM</b>. Rabeinu Tam understands that Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish actually argue only in the case of 'His'chayevus' and <i>not</i> in the case of 'Hoda'ah.' When the person writes in a Shtar that he owes money to someone, his intent is to <i>obligate himself</i> through the medium of the Shtar, and not necessarily to <i>admit</i> to a debt. This indeed is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Ben Nanas.
</p><p>
How, though, can a person create a monetary obligation through the use of a Shtar? A Shtar is not a valid Kinyan for Metaltelin (Kidushin 26a)! Tosfos answers that the fact that he exerted the effort to write his obligation in a Shtar shows that he has conclusive intent to obligate himself. Such a display of intent is a valid way to create an obligation. (This is similar to the Gemara here which says, 'These are the things which are acquired through speech alone,' in reference to the conclusive intent (to become obligated) which the parties have due to the joy of the Shiduch.) Generally, a formal act of Kinyan is necessary to show one's conclusive intent to effect the transaction. When, however, the person's conclusive intent is evident in a different way, the Kinyan is valid without a formal act of Kinyan. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> However, Reish Lakish can hold like R. Yishmael;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Yishmael obligates a guarantor to pay, for the 
               Torah obligates guarantors. He could agree that one 
               who obligates himself through an unsigned document 
               is exempt!
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>AN ACQUISITION THROUGH WORDS</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav):</font></b> If Yakov agreed to marry his son to Moshe's 
          daughter, each father agreed to give a certain amount to 
          his child, and the children became Mekudeshos right then, 
          the verbal promises are binding.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava):</font></b> Logically, this is only when Moshe's daughter is 
          a Na'arah, and Moshe benefits (he gets the Kidushin 
          money), but not if she is a Bogeres.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> However, I swear that Rav said this even regarding a 
               Bogeres. This shows that Reuven's promise is 
               binding, even though he gets no benefit.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> We must say that through the happiness that they are 
               marrying their children to each other, they decide 
               absolutely to give like they promised, and this is 
               binding.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Ravina):</font></b> Are these promises destined to be 
          written in a document? (Rashi - if they are written, may 
          the recipient collect from land sold afterwards? Tosfos 
          (DH Nisnu) - must witnesses consult the parties before 
          writing a document? Tosfos (DH Hacha) - are these 
          promises binding even if a document is not written?)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Ashi):</font></b> They are not.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Mishnah):</font></b> Clever men would write 'I will feed 
          your daughter for five years as long as you are with me'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> This was said. It was not written.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> Would the Tana say 'They write' if they 
               only say it?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Yes! The following is an example.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If one wrote to his wife 'I have no 
                    claim to your property...'
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Chiya's Beraisa):</font></b> The case is, he said 
                    this.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Mishnah):</font></b> Documents of Kidushin and marriage 
          may be written only if both parties agree.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Inference:</font></b> If they agree, they may be written.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> 'Documents of Kidushin' refers to 
               documents of committal.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> No. It literally means documents of Kidushin, 
          like Rav Papa and Rav Sharbiya;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rava and Ravina):</font></b> If a document of Kidushin was 
               written in order to be Mekadesh Leah, without her 
               consent, it is valid;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Papa and Rav Sharbiya):</font></b> It is invalid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Mishnah):</font></b> If the husbands die, their daughters 
          are fed from Bnei Chorin, and Leah's daughter Dinah is 
          fed even from sold property, since she is like a 
          creditor.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The case is, the commitment was acquired through 
          Chalipin.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> If so, also their daughters should be fed from 
          sold property!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The acquisition was made only for Dinah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If the Tana discusses such a case, why didn't 
          he specify? Why should we assume that each man acquired 
          only for Dinah?!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> Since Dinah was alive when he commits himself, 
          acquisition helps for her. His daughters (that he will 
          have from Leah) were not yet born (when they married 
          her), so acquisition would not help for them.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> Doesn't the Mishnah include the case when his 
          daughters were already born, i.e., he divorced Leah and 
          now remarries her?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> Rather, Dinah is not fed by an enactment of 
          Beis Din, so an acquisition helps for her. His daughters 
          are fed by an enactment of Beis Din, so an acquisition 
          does not help for them.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> This is illogical. Why should the enactment of 
          Beis Din weaken his daughters?!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(s)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #3:</font></b> Rather, his daughters cannot collect from sold 
          property because we are concerned lest he set aside money 
          for their food, because they are fed by an enactment of 
          Beis Din (and he wants to ensure that he fulfills it).
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHO RAISES A DAUGHTER?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> The first husband cannot say... (he sends her 
          food to where her mother is).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Chisda):</font></b> This teaches that a daughter is raised by 
          her mother.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> How do we know that the Mishnah discusses 
          (even) an adult? Perhaps it discusses (only) a minor, and 
          it is due to the incident that occurred!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> If a man died leaving a minor son and the 
               father's heirs and the child's mother both want to 
               raise him, we let her raise him.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> A case occurred (in which he was left by the 
               father's heirs) and they slaughtered him (so his 
               inheritance will not reduce their shares. Here also, 
               we are concerned lest the father's heirs kill a 
               minor daughter lest her Parnasah reduce their 
               inheritance!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> If so, the Mishnah should have said that he sends 
          food to where she is.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Rather, it says 'to where her mother is' to teach 
               that a daughter, minor or adult, is by her mother.
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) WHEN IS THERE A SUSPICION OF 'TZERORI'?</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Mishnah (101b) teaches that when a man married a woman and agreed to support her daughter (from a previous marriage) for five years and he died, the daughter may collect her Mezonos even from Nechasim Meshubadim. The Gemara explains that this applies when a Kinyan was made on the agreement to support her. In contrast, the man's own daughter may not collect her Mezonos from Nechasim Meshubadim even when there was a Kinyan.
</p><p>
The Gemara explains the difference as follows. Since a man is obligated to provide for his own daughter not only by his Kinyan but also by a Tenai Beis Din, we must suspect that before he died he left a bundle of money ('Tzerori') for her. Consequently, his daughter may not collect from Nechasim Meshubadim. In contrast, he is not obligated by a Tenai Beis Din to support his wife's daughter, and thus we do not suspect that he left 'Tzerori' for her.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Eimar) asks that if there is a suspicion of 'Tzerori' when a Tenai Beis Din obligates a man to pay, why is a woman permitted to collect her Kesuvah from Nechasim Meshubadim? A Kesuvah certainly is a Tenai Beis Din!
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> answers that a man is more concerned about the financial welfare of his daughter than of his wife, as the Gemara earlier (43a) states. Accordingly, the concern for 'Tzerori' exists only for the support of one's daughter, but not for the payment of the Kesuvah of one's wife.
</p><p>
(b) Tosfos answers further than the Gemara does not mean that a Tenai Beis Din alone is cause for concern for 'Tzerori.' Rather, the Gemara means that since the man made a <i>Kinyan</i> in addition to the existing Tenai Beis Din, this is cause for concern for 'Tzerori.'
</p><p>
(c) The <b>TOSFOS HA'ROSH</b> in Gitin (51a) seems to differentiate between the obligation to pay the Kesuvah to one's wife and the obligation to pay Mezonos to one's daughter. The money of a woman's Kesuvah is a <i>debt</i> which the man <i>owes</i>. She has the status of a creditor. Therefore, a suspicion of 'Tzerori' cannot stop her from collecting her Kesuvah from Nechasim Meshubadim, since the debt owed to her preceded the sale of the property to the buyers. In contrast, he does not <i>owe</i> anything to his daughter; his daughter is not a creditor per se. Rather, he merely is obligated to provide support for her because of a Tenai Beis Din. Accordingly, when there is a suspicion of 'Tzerori' they may not collect from Nechasim Meshubadim, since they have no 'debt' that preceded the buyer's purchase of his property. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)
<br> 
</p><p>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO DOES NOT NEED LIKE HE STIPULATED</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> Both husbands cannot say...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  A case occurred in which Reuven rented a mill to Shimon. 
          They agreed that in lieu of paying, Shimon would grind 
          Reuven's grain. Reuven waxed rich, and bought a mill and 
          a donkey to grind.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Reuven:</font></b> Until now, you were grinding for me. Now (I 
               do not need this, so) pay me money.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shimon:</font></b> No, I will continue to grind for you.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Ravina):</font></b> This is like our Mishnah. The husbands cannot 
          say 'we will feed her together.' Rather, one feeds her, 
          and the other gives to her the monetary equivalent.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection (Rav Avira):</font></b> The cases are different! A girl 
          has no use for two portions of food. Shimon can tell 
          Reuven, use your grinder to grind and sell to others, and 
          I will grind for you!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This is only if Shimon cannot find people who will 
               pay him to grind for them. If he could find such 
               people, we do not allow Midas Sedom. (He can help 
               Reuven without losing himself by grinding for others 
               instead of for Reuven, so we force him to do so.)
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE WIDOW REMAINS WHERE SHE WAS LIVING</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If a widow does not want to leave the house of 
          her deceased husband, the orphans cannot say 'Return to 
          your father's house; and we will feed you there.' Rather, 
          they feed her, and give to her living quarters according 
          to her honor;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If she says 'I want to stay in my father's house' the 
          orphans can say 'we will feed you only if you are by us';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If she claims that she must stay in her father's 
               house (to avoid suspicion) because both she and they 
               are young, they feed her in her father's house.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara - Beraisa):</font></b> She lives in the house like in her 
          husband's lifetime. The same applies to using slaves, 
          pillows and blankets, and gold and silver Kelim.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Her husband wrote in the Kesuvah 'You will live in 
               my house and be fed from my property your entire 
               widowhood.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yosef - Beraisa):</font></b> He wrote 'in my house' - not in my 
          hut. (If his dwelling was small, he did not write that 
          she will expel his children to live there.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Nachman):</font></b> If orphans sold a widow's quarters, the 
          sale is invalid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why is this different than R. Asi's law?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Asi):</font></b> If orphans sold property of a small estate 
               (i.e. the estate will not suffice to feed the 
               children until the daughters grow up), the sale is 
               valid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> There, there was no lien on the property in the 
          father's lifetime. Here, there was.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Abaye):</font></b> The Halachah is, if a widow's quarters fell, the 
          heirs need not rebuild it.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Support (Beraisa):</font></b> If a widow's quarters fell, the 
               heirs need not rebuild it. Further, if she wants to 
               rebuild it herself, they can stop her.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Abaye):</font></b> If she strengthened it before it fell, 
          what is the law? (Rashi; Tosfos - may she strengthen it 
          before it falls?)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This question is unresolved.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If she said (... they need not feed her unless 
          she is with them).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> The orphans should feed her there!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The Mishnah supports Rav Huna:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Huna):</font></b> (More) Berachah rests on a bigger 
               household.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> They should feed her and deduct the loss due to 
          the smaller household!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Indeed, they do.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Huna):</font></b> Chachamim teach how to obtain Berachah (like 
          we taught), wealth, and cures;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Wealth - (Mishnah):</font></b> If Reuven is buying produce and 
               he took it to his Reshus but did not measure it, he 
               acquired it. If he measured it but did not pull it, 
               he did not acquire it.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  If he is clever, he rents the place where the 
                    produce is (and acquires it right away).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Cures - (Mishnah):</font></b> A person may not chew wheat on 
               Pesach and put it on a wound, because the wheat will 
               become Chametz.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>REBBI'S PASSING</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> When Rebbi passed away, he instructed his 
          sons: be careful to honor your mother, and leave a light 
          burning in my place, and the table and bed set. Yosef of 
          Chaifa and Shimon of Efrat served me in my lifetime; they 
          will serve me in my death.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> Why did he need to tell them to honor 
               their mother? This is mid'Oraisa!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> He referred to his wife (she was not their 
               mother).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> This is also mid'Oraisa!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> 'Kaved <i>Es</i> Avicha <i>v'Es</i> Imecha 
                    l'Ma'an Ya'arichu Yamecha' - the first 'Es' 
                    includes your father's wife. The second 
                    includes your mother's husband. The 'Vav' (in 
                    <i>v</i>'Es) includes your older brother.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> The Torah commands to honor a parent's 
               spouse in the parent's lifetime.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> Leave a light burning in my place, and the 
          table and bed set.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why did Rebbi request this?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Every week, when Shabbos entered, Rebbi returned 
          to his house.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Once, a neighbor called on the porch and Rebbi's 
               slave asked her to be quiet, lest she disturb Rebbi.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Rebbi stopped coming, lest (it become known that he 
               was returning and) people look down on previous 
               Tzadikim who did not return.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> Yosef of Chaifa and Shimon of Efrat served me 
          in my lifetime; they will serve me in my death.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  People thought that Rebbi meant that they would serve him 
          in this world (in his burial). When they saw that Yosef 
          and Shimon died before Rebbi, they realized that he meant 
          that they will serve him in the world to come.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> He knew that they would die before him. He feared 
               lest people suspect that Yosef and Shimon did not 
               have merits of their own and lived only in Rebbi's 
               merit (and therefore they did not merit to engage in 
               his burial).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> To disprove this, he made it known that they would 
               serve him in the next world.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  Rebbi charged Chachamim 'Do not eulogize me in medium 
          cities. Thirty days after my death, people should learn. 
          My son Shimon is the Chacham, my son Gamliel will be the 
          Nasi, and Chanina bar Chama will head the academy.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR THE WIDOW WHEN SHE LEAVES HIS HOME</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Mishnah teaches that a man's widow may remain in her late husband's home and receive support from his property until she remarries. This entitlement is a Tenai Beis Din and does not depend on whether or not he accepted upon himself this obligation. If the widow chooses to live on her own, the man's heirs are not obligated to provide her with support. The Gemara explains that the reason for this is that while she remains in her husband's home, 'Birkas ha'Bayis b'Rubah,' the more people in the house, the greater the productivity and blessing (see following Insight), and thus when she leaves the house she forfeits the right to receive support.
</p><p>
The Gemara concludes that when the widow chooses to live elsewhere, the heirs are not absolved from the entire sum of the Mezonos. They remain obligated to give her the amount less the loss due to the reduced blessing to the smaller household.
</p><p>
What is the difference between the case of the Mishnah here and the case of the previous Mishnah (101b)? In the case of the previous Mishnah, a man obligated himself to support his wife's daughter, and then he divorced his wife and she remarried. The Mishnah states that he is obligated to bring Mezonos to wherever her mother lives. The Mishnah there, which rejects the man's claim that 'when she comes to live with me I will support her,' implies that he must provide the complete amount of Mezonos and may not deduct the loss of Birkas ha'Bayis.
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>RAN</b> answers that in the Mishnah here, the condition in the Kesuvah (the Tenai Beis Din) which obligates the husband's estate to provide for his wife after his death reads, 'You will dwell in my home and be supported from my property.' His estate's obligation is limited to the amount that it would cost to support his widow while she dwells in his home. If she leaves his home, his household is obligate to provide her only an amount adjusted for the loss of the Birkas ha'Bayis. 
</p><p>
In contrast, in the case of the previous Mishnah the man accepted upon himself 'to support her' and did not specify <i>where</i> he would support her. Consequently, he must provide her with her needs wherever she is.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>TOSFOS YOM TOV</b> is not satisfied with this answer. He argues that if the words of the Tenai Beis Din are to be understood so literally, then the heirs should be absolved completely when the widow does not live with them; the condition which states, 'You will dwell in my home and be supported from my property,' should exempt the heirs entirely when the widow chooses to live elsewhere.
</p><p>
The Tosfos Yom Tov instead explains that in the case of the Mishnah here, it is Beis Din that obligates the heirs to support their father's widow. Beis Din decreed that if she is not living in their home, they may reduce the amount that they give to her. In the case of the previous Mishnah, the man's obligation to support his wife's daughter originates not with Beis Din but with his own words. Since he did not stipulate that he will not support her daughter if she no longer lives in his house, he is obligated by his original words to provide her with the full amount of support.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>BEIS AHARON</b> points out that <b>RASHI</b> here interprets the previous Mishnah differently. According to Rashi's understanding of the earlier case, the man's step-daughter also does not receive the full amount of Mezonos when she is not living in his house. Rashi explains that when the Mishnah there says that the husband's demand that 'when she comes to live with me I will support her' is not accepted, it means that he may not say that 'only while I am still married to the mother will I support the daughter.' That is, he wants to absolve himself completely from his obligation of Mezonos. The Mishnah rejects his demand, and he is obligated to support the daughter even though he is no longer married to her mother. The question of Birkas ha'Bayis is not discussed in that Mishnah. Accordingly, she receives only what it would have cost him to support her in his home. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)
</p><p>


<font><b>2) WHAT IS 'BIRKAS HA'BAYIS'?</b></font><b>
<br>OPINIONS:</b> The Gemara concludes that when a widow leaves the home of her deceased husband, his heirs are obligated to give her only the amount of support that it would have cost them had she remained together with them in their home, because 'Birkas ha'Bayis b'Rubah,' the more people in the house, the greater the productivity and blessing.
</p><p>
Why does it cost the heirs <i>less</i> to support the widow when she lives with them? After all, she does not eat any less because she is in their home.
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI</b> (DH Birkas ha'Bayis) explains that 'Birkas ha'Bayis b'Rubah' refers to the general state of the economy of the household. It does not refer to the actual cost of the food itself. When more people are present in the household, they help each other and thus are more productive, and their combined 'Mazal' is greater. When the widow leaves the house, the heirs may subtract from the Mezonos which they owe the <i>loss</i> which the household suffers as a result of her departure. (Obviously, there is no simple formula to determine this amount. Moreover, <b>TOSFOS</b> in Bava Basra (144b, DH Birkas) asks that since the 'Mazal' of each year is different, it is actually <i>impossible</i> to determine this value.)
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> here cites <b>RABEINU CHANANEL</b> who explains that when the widow lives in the same house as her husband's children, the various 'overhead' costs of living are shared. For example, one lamp suffices for everyone, and no extra fuel or oil for the oven needs to be purchased. (See <b>RAN</b> to Bava Basra 144b.)
</p><p>
(c) Other Rishonim explain that the cost of the food indeed is less in a household with many members, because five people can eat from four portions, because not everyone finishes a whole portion. If she would live alone, she would need a full portion purchased for her. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> People thought that Rebbi did not want to exert them 
               to eulogize him in medium cities (rather, in 
               villages).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> When they saw that he was eulogized in the great 
               cities and everyone came, they realized that he 
               intended to make it more honorable.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b></b>  'Thirty days after my death, people should learn.' He 
          reasoned that people should not mourn over him longer 
          than over Moshe Rabeinu - 'Bnei Yisrael cried over 
          Moshe... for 30 days'.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> For 30 days, they eulogized Rebbi day and night. 
               After that, he would be eulogized by day and they 
               learned at night, or vice-versa.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> This continued for 12 months.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b></b>  The day Rebbi passed away, a voice from Shamayim 
          proclaimed that all who were at the passing of Rebbi are 
          prepared for the world to come.(without any punishment).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> There was a launderer who used to come in front of 
               Rebbi every day. The day Rebbi expired, he did not 
               come. When he heard, he jumped off the roof out of 
               anguish.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> A voice from Shamayim declared that also the 
               launderer is prepared for the world to come.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What did Rebbi mean when he said 'My son Shimon 
          is the Chacham'?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Even though Shimon is the bigger Chacham, Gamliel 
          will be the Nasi.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Levi):</font></b> Did Rebbi really need to say this?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Shimon):</font></b> Yes!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why? 'He gave the kingship to Yehoram, since he 
          was the firstborn'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Yehoram replaced his father (he was as qualified 
          as any of his brothers), but Gamliel did not.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, why did Rebbi make him Nasi?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Gamliel did not replace his father regarding 
          Chochmah, but regarding fear of sin, he did.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE LEADERS AFTER REBBI</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b></b>  Rebbi said 'Chanina bar Chama will head the academy', but 
          Chanina refused, because R. Efes was two and a half years 
          older.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  R. Efes led the academy, and R. Chanina sat outside (he 
          did not want to be inside and need to be submissive to R. 
          Efes). Levi learned with R. Chanina outside.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  R. Efes died. R. Chanina then led the academy, and Levi 
          had no one to learn with (Levi did not want to be inside 
          and need to be submissive to R. Chanina), so he went to 
          Bavel.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  They told Rav 'a great Chacham arrived in Nehardai. He 
          limps, and he permits wearing a Kalah's crown outside on 
          Shabbos. (Only distinguished women wear it, so we are not 
          concerned lest she take it off to show others.) '
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav:</font></b> It must be that R. Efes died, R. Chanina led 
               the academy, and Levi had no one to learn with, so 
               he came to Bavel.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> How did Rav know this? Perhaps R. Chanina 
               died, and Levi had no one to learn with, so he came 
               to Bavel!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #1:</font></b> Levi would sooner have been submissive to 
               learn in the academy under R. Efes rather than come 
               to Bavel.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #2:</font></b> Since Rebbi said that R. Chanina would 
               head the academy, it had to happen - '(A Tzadik) 
               decrees and it will be fulfilled.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> R. Chiya was around. Why didn't Rebbi appoint 
          him to lead the academy?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> R. Chiya had already died.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> But R. Chiya said 'I saw Rebbi's coffin and 
          cried over it'!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> We must switch that (Rebbi cried over R. Chiya's 
          coffin).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> R. Chiya said 'The day Rebbi died, Kedushah 
          ended!'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> We must switch that.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Beraisa):</font></b> When Rebbi got sick, R. Chiya came 
          to visit him and found him crying.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Chiya:</font></b> Why are you crying?!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> If one dies amidst laughter, it is a 
                    good sign. If he dies amidst crying, it is a 
                    bad sign.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> If his face is up, it is a good sign. If his 
                    face is down, it is a bad sign.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b></b>If he is facing the people, it is a good sign. 
                    If he is facing the wall, it is a bad sign.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv. </font></b></b> If his face is green, it is a bad sign. If his 
                    face is radiant and red, it is a good sign.
<br>            <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>v.  </font></b></b> If he dies on Erev Shabbos, it is a good sign; 
                    after Shabbos is a bad sign;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>vi. </font></b></b> If he dies on Erev Yom Kipur, it is a bad sign; 
                    after Yom Kipur is a good sign;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>vii. </font></b></b>If he dies from stomach sicknesses, it is a 
                    good sign, since most Tzadikim die from stomach 
                    sicknesses.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rebbi:</font></b> I am crying because of the Torah and Mitzvos 
               I will no longer have.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The Beraisa must be switched.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (to Question (e)):</font></b> We need not switch anything. 
          Rebbi did not appoint R. Chiya to lead the academy, lest 
          it distract him from Mitzvos.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Chanina claimed precedence over R. Chiya, because 
               he was learned enough to return Torah to Yisrael if 
               it would be forgotten;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Chiya claimed precedence over R. Chanina, because 
               he ensured that Torah would not be forgotten!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  R. Chiya planted flax, set traps, caught deer, 
                    fed the meat to orphans, made parchments from 
                    the skin, and he went to a city without 
                    teachers for children. He wrote each Sefer of 
                    the Torah on a parchment. He took five 
                    children, and taught to each one Sefer. He took 
                    six children, and taught one Seder of the 
                    Mishnah to each.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> He told each child to teach what he knew to the 
                    others.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rebbi:</font></b> How great are the deeds of R. Chiya!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shimon (Rebbi's son):</font></b> Are they greater even than 
               your deeds?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rebbi:</font></b> Yes.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Yishmael b'Rebbi Yosi:</font></b> Are they greater than my 
               father's deeds?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rebbi:</font></b> That will never happen.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b></b>  Before he died, Rebbi taught to Shimon how Chachamim 
          should act.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b></b>  Before he died, Rebbi taught Gamliel how the Nasi should 
          act:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Sit among the great Chachamim, and instill fear in 
               the Talmidim.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Objection:</font></b> We learned that 'He will honor those who 
               fear Hash-m' refers to Yehoshafat, who would rise 
               from his throne to hug and kiss Chachamim, and would 
               greet them 'Rebbi, Rebbi, my teacher, my teacher'!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> That was in private. In public, one instills 
               fear in them.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> Rebbi was in Tzipori, and his grave was 
          prepared in Beis She'arim.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Beraisa):</font></b> 'Pursue justice' - go to (an expert 
          judge, like) Rebbi in Beis She'arim.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Rebbi was in Beis She'arim. When he got sick, 
          they took him to Tzipori, since it is elevated and has 
          good air.
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>3) EULOGIES IN THE CITY</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara relates that Rebbi requested that after his death, the eulogies be delivered only in the large cities and not in the small ones. The people initially thought that this request was made to spare the residents of small cities from the trouble of coming to the eulogies. However, when Rebbi died and the people saw how all of the residents of small cities came to the large cities for the eulogies, they understood that the intent behind his request was to provide greater honor ('b'Rov Am') to him.
</p><p>
What does the Gemara mean? How is it possible that Rebbi -- who is referred to as the paradigm of humility (Sotah 49a) -- sought to increase his own honor? (<b>MAHARSHA</b>)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>MAHARSHA</b> answers that Rebbi had no choice but to increase the honor at his funeral, since the eulogies would involve Kavod ha'Torah, the honor of the Torah. Although one may (and should) forgo his own honor, he is not permitted to forgo the honor of the Torah.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>BEIS AHARON</b> explains that when the Gemara says 'it was for the sake of honor,' it does not mean that it was for the sake of the honor of the deceased. Rather, it was for the sake of the honor of the people who would attend the eulogies.
</p><p>
The Gemara in Sanhedrin (46b) asks whether the purpose of a eulogy is to give honor to the deceased ('Yakra d'Meisei') or to give honor to the living ('Yakra d'Chayei'). 'Yakra d'Chayei' means that when people see the great honor afforded to Talmidei Chachamim they will seek to become Talmidei Chachamim themselves. 'Yakra d'Meisei' means that when people see the great honor given to the deceased, they will have remorse if they hurt him in any way and they will repent and seek forgiveness. Accordingly, in any case -- whether the eulogies are for 'Yakra d'Meisei' or for 'Yakra d'Chayei' -- the honor given to the deceased is for the purpose of the people who attend the funeral, and thus Rebbi's request did not conflict with his trait of humility.
</p><p>
(c) The Yerushalmi (Kil'ayim 9:3) gives a different reason for Rebbi's request that his eulogies be delivered only in the large cities. Rebbi's intent was to prevent discord after his death. If there would be many eulogies in many different places, people might argue with each other about where the best eulogy was delivered. By delivering eulogies only in large and central cities, the people in the vicinity would unite and not argue. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)
</p><p>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE DAY REBBI EXPIRED</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b></b>  The day that Rebbi expired, Chachamim had decreed a fast 
          and were praying for him;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> They said that anyone who will say that Rebbi died 
               will be put to death.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  Rebbi's maid shouted from the roof, 'The higher beings 
          and the lower beings both want Rebbi. May it be Hashem's 
          will that the lower beings' request is done!'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  After she saw how often Rebbi had to relieve himself, and 
          how painful it was for him to remove his Tefilin and put 
          them on again, she said, 'It should be His will that the 
          higher beings' request is done.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  Chachamim continued to pray that Rebbi live. The maid 
          took pottery and threw it to the ground. Chachamim 
          stopped praying, and Rebbi died.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  Chachamim told Bar Kapara to check how Rebbi was. He 
          found that he had died. He tore his clothes and folded 
          them back so they would not appear torn.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Bar Kapara:</font></b> Angels and Tzadikim grabbed the Holy 
               Ark. The angels overpowered, and took the Ark.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Chachamim:</font></b> Did Rebbi die?!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Bar Kapara:</font></b> You said it. I did not.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  When Rebbi died, he stuck his 10 fingers towards Heaven. 
          'Hashem, you know that I toiled with all 10 fingers in 
          Torah, and did not enjoy even as much as I toiled with my 
          pinkie. May it be Your will that I will have Shalom in my 
          eternal rest!'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> A voice from Shamayim:</font></b> 'He will come to Shalom, they 
               will rest on their beds.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> It should say that 'On your bed'!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> This supports R. Chiya bar Gamda.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Chiya bar Gamda):</font></b> When a Tzadik leaves this 
                    world, angels tell Hash-m that he is coming. 
                    Hash-m commands the Tzadikim to greet him. 
                    Afterwards, they return to their beds.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Elazar):</font></b> When a Tzadik leaves this world, three 
          groups of angels greet him. One group says 'Come in 
          Shalom'; one group says 'He goes straightly', and the 
          third says 'He will come to Shalom, they will rest on 
          their beds';
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b></b>  When a Rasha leaves this world, three groups of damaging 
          angels greet him. One group says 'Hash-m said to the 
          wicked 'there is no Shalom''; one says 'In sadness you 
          will lie down'; the third says, 'Descend and lie with the 
          uncircumcised.'
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>HOW LONG MAY A WIDOW COLLECT HER 'KESUVAH'?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - R. Meir):</font></b> As long as a widow is in her 
          father's house, she may always collect her Kesuvah. If 
          she is in her (late) husband's house, she can collect 
          until 25 years, for in 25 years, she does favors (for 
          neighbors with the orphans' money) equivalent to her 
          Kesuvah;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  Chachamim say that as long as she is in her husband's 
          house, she may always collect her Kesuvah. If she is in 
          her father's house, she can collect until 25 years;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If she died, her heirs mention her Kesuvah within 25 
               years.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  (Gemara - Abaye) Question Does the poorest Yisrael do 
          favors equal to her Kesuvah in 25 years, and also the 
          richest?!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Yosef):</font></b> Yes! People give proportional to 
          their wealth.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> According to R. Meir, if she requests her 
          Kesuvah within 25 years, do we deduct proportionally for 
          the favors she has done?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This question is unresolved.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - Chachamim):</font></b> As long as...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Abaye):</font></b> Do we say that if she requests her 
          Kesuvah before dark (on the last day of the 25 years), 
          she collects, and if she comes after dark she does not 
          collect?!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Yosef):</font></b> All measures of Chachamim are that 
          way!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> (We expound that a Mikvah must be big enough for a 
               person to immerse his entire body.) It is true that 
               a person can immerse in 40 Sa'im of water, but if a 
               tiny amount is lacking from this, his body will not 
               fit?!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> R. Yishmael b'Rebbi Yosi testified that 
          the 25 year limit is only if she does not have her 
          Kesuvah (the document). If she has her Kesuvah, she can 
          always collect;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Elazar):</font></b> Even if she has her Kesuvah, she can collect 
          only until 25 years.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rav Sheshes - Beraisa):</font></b> A creditor collects 
          even if he never mentioned the debt.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> What is the case?
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  If he has no document, with what does he 
                    collect?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Rather, he has a document. Only a creditor 
               collects without having mentioned the debt, since he 
               would not pardon the debt, but we assume that a 
               widow pardoned the Kesuvah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Sheshes):</font></b> Really, the creditor has no 
          document. The case is, the borrower agrees that he never 
          paid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> R. Ilai said that a Beraisa says that a 
          divorcee is like a creditor!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> What is the case?
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  If she does not have her Kesuvah, with what 
                    does she collect?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Rather, she has her Kesuvah. Only a divorcee 
               collects, since she would not pardon the Kesuvah, 
               but we assume that a widow pardoned the Kesuvah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Here also, she does not have the Kesuvah. The 
          case is, her husband agrees that he never paid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Nachman - Beraisa):</font></b> If she demanded payment of the 
          Kesuvah, she gets another 25 years. If she has her 
          Kesuvah, she can always collect.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) 'WHOEVER SAYS 'REBBI HAS DIED' WILL BE STABBED BY A SWORD'</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara relates that on the day that Rebbi died, his students declared, 'Whoever says that Rebbi has died will be stabbed by a sword.'
</p><p>
What was the intent behind this declaration? Why should one be liable for death for relating the bad news about Rebbi's death? While it is true that the Gemara (Pesachim 3b) derives from the verse (Mishlei 10:18) that one who relates bad news is a fool, it does not say that he is liable for death for doing so.
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>MAHARSHA</b> explains that Rebbi reached such a high level of holiness that his body became completely pure. (Indeed, he is referred to as 'Rabeinu ha'Kodesh.') A person who reaches such a level -- a completely pure body in this world -- is actually ready for Olam ha'Ba even without death. Therefore, 'whoever says that Rebbi has died' belittles Rebbi's level of holiness. Rebbi indeed did not leave this world with an ordinary death. As Rebbi himself said (103a), after his death he would continue to come to this world on the holy day of Shabbos.
</p><p>
Rebbi, or Rabeinu ha'Kodesh, emulated Yakov Avinu's great degree of holiness. The Gemara (Ta'anis 5b) states that 'Yakov Avinu did not die,' for his body, too, was so holy that he was able to experience Olam ha'Ba without death. Yakov Avinu was the symbol of Kedushah in this world. (Indeed, the third blessing in the Shemoneh Esreh, the blessing of 'Atah Kadosh,' corresponds to Yakov Avinu. See <b>SEFER HA'KADISH</b>.) This attribute of Yakov Avinu is reflected in Rebbi's full title, Rebbi Yehudah <i>ha'Nasi</i>. The word 'Nasi' is an acronym for the phrase, 'Neshamah Shel Yakov Avinu.'
</p><p>
Based on this approach, the Maharsha explains the cryptic words of Rebbi's maidservant who shouted from the roof, 'The higher beings and the lower beings both want Rebbi. May it be Hashem's will that the lower beings' request is fulfilled!' After she saw how often Rebbi had to relieve himself due to his stomach ailment and how painful it was for him to remove his Tefilin and put them on again, she said, 'It should be His will that the higher beings' request is fulfilled.' The 'higher beings' ('Elyonim') refer to the soul of Rebbi which sought to be separated from his body in order to achieve an even loftier level of holiness, a level which cannot be reached while it is still restricted by the body. The 'lower beings' ('Tachtonim') refers the body which wanted Rebbi to stay alive so that he could perform more Mitzvos and purify his body even more. When she saw that he could not reach the ultimate level of holiness in his body through Mitzvos (he had to remove his Tefilin repeatedly), she asked that his soul's request be granted.
</p><p>
(b) <b>THE DIVREI TORAH</b> (Munkatcz) cited by the <b>SEFER HA'KADISH</b> explains the words of Rebbi's students as follows. Rebbi was the redactor of the Mishnah, which he composed in order to prevent Torah she'Ba'al Peh from being forgotten. All of the Gemara and Torah she'Ba'al Peh is based on the Mishnah. Anyone who learns Torah she'Ba'al Peh, therefore, learns the teachings of Rebbi. The Gemara (Yevamos 97a) teaches that when one learns the teachings of the deceased, the lips of the deceased 'quiver in the grave.' Accordingly, one who says that Rebbi has died implies that he has no more life at all and that his teachings are no longer being learned. One who says Rebbi has died denies the truth of Torah she'Ba'al Peh and thus is deserving of death.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>MAHARIVATZ</b> explains that Rebbi's students did not want anyone to know about Rebbi's death. When Hash-m would see that his death would not be known and no one would know that his body needed to be cared for, He certainly would not allow him to die. Only when it was absolutely necessary that he die did his maidservant cause them to allow Rav Sheshes to discover that he had died. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Questions (Rav Nachman bar Rav Chisda):</font></b> Do the Tana'im 
          argue when she has the Kesuvah, or when she doesn't? Like 
          whom is the Halachah?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Nachman):</font></b> They argue when she does not have 
          the Kesuvah. The Halachah follows Chachamim.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Dimi):</font></b> The 25 year limit applies only to the basic 
          Kesuvah (100 or 200). She may always collect any Tosefes 
          (addition) to the Kesuvah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(s)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Avahu):</font></b> Even the Tosefes may be collected only until 
          25 years;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Aibo):</font></b> Stipulations of the Kesuvah are like the 
               Kesuvah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(t)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Aba citing Rav Huna citing Rav):</font></b> The 25 year limit is 
          only for the basic Kesuvah. She may always collect 
          Tosefes.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Aba:</font></b> Did Rav really say that?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Huna:</font></b> Do you argue with me or commend me?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Aba:</font></b> I argue with you.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>OTHER CASES WHEN THE 'KESUVAH' IS PARDONED</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b></b>  The mother-in-law of R. Chiya Arichta married his 
          brother. The brother died, and she lived by her father. 
          He fed her there for 25 years; she demanded that he still 
          feed her.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Chiya Arichta:</font></b> You are no longer entitled to 
               food.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> The widow:</font></b> Give me my Kesuvah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Chiya:</font></b> You are not entitled to food, nor the 
               Kesuvah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  They came in front of Rabah bar Shila.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Chiya:</font></b> I fed her for 25 years. I swear that I 
               personally carried the food on my shoulder!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rabah bar Shila:</font></b> Chachamim say that she may always 
               collect in her husband's house because she is too 
               embarrassed to demand the Kesuvah. The same applies 
               here (because you showed such honor to her). Go pay 
               her!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  Rav Chiya Arichta did not comply. Rabah bar Shila wrote 
          an Adrachta (a document authorizing her to collect from 
          his property). They came in front of Rava.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Chiya Arichta:</font></b> Do you see how he judged me!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rava:</font></b> He judged you properly.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> The widow:</font></b> If so, he should return the Peiros of the 
               property from the time the Adrachta was written.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> Rava noticed that the Adrachta did not say 'It 
               became known to us that this property belonged to 
               the deceased.' He ruled that it was invalid.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> The widow:</font></b> At least give me Peiros from the end of 
               the auction of the property until now.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rava:</font></b> You would be entitled to them if the Adrachta 
               was valid. Here it was mistaken, so you do not 
               receive the Peiros!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> The widow:</font></b> You yourself hold that if a sale document 
               does not mention Acharayos (a commitment to 
               compensate the buyer if a creditor will take the 
               land), we say that this was a mistake of the scribe, 
               and it is as if Acharayos is written in it! (Here 
               also, the scribe should have written a proper 
               Adrachta!)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rava:</font></b> Here, it was not the scribe's oversight. Rabah 
               bar Shila himself thought that it makes no 
               difference which property of Rav Chiya is used to 
               pay the Kesuvah (even though there was a lien only 
               on what he inherited from his brother).
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  This is a mistake. If she collects from his own 
                    property, she may improve the property, and he 
                    will let his brother's property depreciate, and 
                    later he will take back his improved property, 
                    and give to her the depreciated property on 
                    which her lien was!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> This will cause people to scorn Beis Din (for 
                    not protecting the widow).
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) A WIDOW WHO DOES NOT CLAIM HER KESUVAH FOR TWENTY-FIVE YEARS</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Mishnah (104a) teaches that a widow who does not claim her Kesuvah for twenty-five years loses the right to claim her Kesuvah. Rebbi Meir and the Chachamim disagree about the reason for this twenty-five-year limit. Rebbi Meir maintains that since the widow lived with the Yesomim and gave charity to poor people from their property, she presumably used up the amount of her Kesuvah. The Chachamim maintain that since she did not ask for her Kesuvah for twenty-five years, she presumably did not want to collect it and was Mochel it.
</p><p>
Rav Nachman asks whether the argument between Rebbi Meir and the Chachamim applies when the widow has a Shtar Kesuvah or when she has no such Shtar. He asks further whether the Halachah follows the view of Rebbi Meir or the Chachamim. The Gemara explains that their argument applies only when she is holding no Shtar Kesuvah, and the Halachah follows the view of the Chachamim. 
</p><p>
The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> asks two questions on the Gemara's explanation. According to the Chachamim who maintain that the twenty-five-year limit is because of Mechilah, whether or not she is holding a Shtar Kesuvah makes a difference: her possession of the Kesuvah shows that she was not Mochel it. However, according to Rebbi Meir's reasoning (that the widow presumably gave away -- from the property of the Yesomim -- the value of her Kesuvah to poor people), there is no basis for differentiating between when she is holding the Shtar Kesuvah and when she is not holding it. Why, then, does Rav Nachman not ask his question specifically on the view of the Chachamim?
</p><p>
Moreover, why does Rav Nachman ask whom the Halachah follows? The Halachah always follows the majority opinion, and thus it should be obvious that the Halachah follows the view of the Chachamim and not Rebbi Meir.
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER:</b> The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> answers that although Rav Nachman's first question applies only to the view of the Chachamim, it nevertheless is relevant to whether the Halachah follows their view or the view of Rebbi Meir. The Halachah that a widow loses her Kesuvah after twenty-five years have passed is based on a Kabalah, a tradition, from earlier generations. According to Rebbi Meir, the Halachah applies under all circumstances, both when she is holding a Shtar Kesuvah and when she is not. According to the Chachamim, however, there may be a situation in which this Halachah does <i>not</i> apply, such as when she is holding the Kesuvah, which shows that she was never Mochel it. 
</p><p>
Since the Halachah does not apply under all circumstances according to the Chachamim but it <i>does</i> apply under all circumstances according to Rebbi Meir, one might have thought that the Halachah follows the view of Rebbi Meir. The logic that the Halachah should apply unconditionally may even override the general principle that the Halachah follows the majority. However, if the Chachamim do <i>not</i> differentiate and apply the Halachah even when she is holding the Kesuvah, then the Halachah certainly should follow the view of the Chachamim.
</p><p>
When Rav Nachman asks whom the Halachah follows, his question refers to the possibility that the Chachamim differentiate between when she is holding the Kesuvah and when she is not holding it, in which case there is reason to say that the Halachah follows the view of Rebbi Meir. The Gemara answers that although the Chachamim indeed differentiate between when she is holding the Kesuvah and when she is not holding it, the Halachah nevertheless follows their view. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)
</p><p>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>JUDGES WHO MADE DECREES</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> There were two judges in Yerushalayim who made 
          decrees, Admon and Chanan ben Avishalom. Chanan said two 
          laws. Admon said seven.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If a man went overseas and his wife demands food, Chanan 
          says that she swears when she collects the Kesuvah in the 
          end, not at the beginning;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  The sons of Kohanim Gedolim said that she swears at the 
          beginning and the end;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  R. Dosa ben Harkinas agrees with the sons of Kohanim 
          Gedolim;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  R. Yochanan ben Zakai says, Chanan is correct. She swears 
          only at the end.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara - Beraisa) Contradiction:</font></b> There were three judges 
          of burglaries in Yerushalayim: Admon ben Gedai, Chanan 
          ha'Mitzri, and Chanan ben Avishalom.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> There is a contradiction about the number of judges, 
               and also about whether they made decrees or judged 
               burglaries.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Resolution - part 1 (regarding the numbers):</font></b> The Tana of 
          the Mishnah listed only the most important judges (Rashi; 
          Tosfos - the judges who taught laws in our Perek).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Resolution - part 2 (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak):</font></b> They made 
          decrees about burglaries;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Yosi):</font></b> For cutting down a sapling, the 
               judges who made decrees in Yerushalayim ruled that 
               one pays two silver coins for a first year sapling, 
               and four silver coins for a second year sapling. 
               (Rashi explains that the Beraisa discusses an animal 
               that cut down a tree, because 'Kitmah' is feminine. 
               Our Gemara calls this burglary, for it knows that 
               the same fine applies to a person who cut down a 
               tree. Chachamim do not decree solely for unusual 
               cases.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Contradiction (Beraisa #1):</font></b> There were three judges in 
          Yerushalayim who made decrees: Admon, Chanan, and Nachum.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Papa):</font></b> The Tana of Beraisa #1 is R. Nasan.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Nasan):</font></b> Also Nachum ha'Midi made 
               decrees in Yerushalayim;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Chachamim did not agree.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> There were more judges!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Pinchas):</font></b> There were 394 Batei Din in 
               Yerushalayim, and the same number of Batei 
               Kenesiyos, Batei Medrash, and schools for children.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> There were many other judges. Only these made 
          decrees.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> The judges who made decrees in 
          Yerushalayim received stipends from the coins brought to 
          buy Korbanos, 9900 Zuz in all. If they were unhappy with 
          this, they received more.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> Do we discuss wicked judges (who take more 
          money than they need)?!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Correction:</font></b> Rather, if this was not enough they received 
          more, even if they didn't want more.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>MAY JUDGES RECEIVE MONEY FOR JUDGING?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b></b>  Karna used to receive a Selah from both parties when he 
          judged a case.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> It says, 'Don't take a bribe'!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps that is only when a judge takes 
               only from one party, lest it bias his judgment. 
               Karna took from both parties, so he would be 
               unbiased.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> Even a bribe to give an unbiased judgment 
               is forbidden!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> 'Do not take a bribe' does not 
                    discuss one who intends to acquit the guilty 
                    and convict the innocent. It already says 'Do 
                    not pervert judgment'!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> Rather, bribes are forbidden even with intent 
                    to acquit the innocent and convict the guilty!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> Karna did not take the money as a bribe, 
          rather for wages.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> Even for wages, it is forbidden!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> If one receives wages for judging, his 
               judgments are void.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> That refers to one who takes wages for the ruling 
          itself. Karna took compensation for what he could have 
          earned in the time he judged.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Is such compensation really permitted?!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> A judge who takes wages to judge is 
               repulsive, but his ruling is valid.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> What is the case?
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  If the wages are for the ruling, the ruling is 
                    void!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Rather, he takes compensation for what he 
               could have earned. The Beraisa calls this repulsive!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> It is repulsive when it is unclear what he could 
          have earned in the time. People used to pay Karna a Zuz 
          to smell wine and evaluate it (how long it will be before 
          it spoils), so it was clear what he could have earned in 
          the time.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> When people would come to Rav Huna for judgment, he 
               would ask them to get someone to draw water in his 
               stead.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE HAZARD OF BRIBES</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Avahu):</font></b> See how much bribes blind the eyes of those 
          who take them!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> A person whose eyes hurt him pays a doctor, even 
               though he is unsure whether or not he will cure 
               them. One who takes a bribe of a Perutah blinds his 
               own eyes!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> 'Bribery blinds the eyes of Chachamim', all 
          the more so, of fools. 'And it perverts the words of 
          Tzadikim', all the more so, of the wicked.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> Fools and the wicked may not be judges!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Rather, 'bribery blinds the eyes of Chachamim', 
          even a great Chacham. If he takes a bribe, his heart will 
          be blinded before he dies;
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) ACCEPTING MONEY FOR TEACHING TORAH</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara relates that the 'Gozrei Gezeiros,' those who were responsible for making Halachic enactments in Yerushalayim, received remuneration from the funds of the Terumas ha'Lishkah.
</p><p>
The Rishonim ask that the Gemara in Nedarim (37a) prohibits one from taking payment in return for teaching Torah, except for 'Sechar Batalah,' the amount he would have been paid for working, which one may take only when it is clear that he would have earned that money had he not been involved in teaching Torah. When it is not clear that he would have earned that money by working, he should not accept money for teaching Torah. Why were the Gozrei Gezeiros permitted to take money if there was no certainty that they would have earned money through working?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> explains that since they had no work at all due to their exclusive involvement in teaching Torah, they certainly were entitled to Sechar Batalah. Only one who is only occasionally involved in teaching Torah (such as Karna) must incur a definite loss from not working in order to receive Sechar Batalah. 
</p><p>
(b) Tosfos answers further that the Heter of Sechar Batalah was not necessary in the case of the Gozrei Gezeiros. The public needed scholars to be involved in full-time Halachic research without being encumbered by the burden of Parnasah. Therefore, the public is obligated to support them. Only one who is not involved in Halachic study at all times (such as Karna) needs the Heter of Sechar Batalah.
</p><p>
The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Talmud Torah 3:10) writes that one who learns Torah exclusively and, instead of working, receives his Parnasah from the public funds, commits a Chilul Hash-m and disgraces the Torah, and he transgresses the prohibition against gaining monetary benefit from the Torah in this world. How does the Rambam justify the conduct of the Gozrei Gezeiros, who were supported by public funds?
</p><p>
Apparently, the Rambam follows the second answer of Tosfos. Since the community needed the Gozrei Gezeiros, their involvement in learning was for the sake of the wellbeing of the community and not with intent to make money. Therefore, the community was obligated to support them.
</p><p>
This approach answers the question of the <b>KESEF MISHNEH</b>, who asks that the Rambam's opinion is clearly contradicted by the widespread practice of Talmidei Chachamim dedicating their lives exclusively to Torah study and receiving support from the community. The Rambam earlier (Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:9) writes that the 'greatest of the sages' worked for a living and at the same time reach the loftiest levels of Torah scholarship. In a society where the environment is conducive to such accomplishment, it is not necessary for the community to support Talmidei Chachamim who learn Torah exclusively. On the contrary, one who insists on receiving funds from charity in order not to work disgraces the Torah. However, in today's environment (and in the times of the Kesef Mishneh as well) it is not possible to reach a high level of Torah scholarship unless one devotes himself exclusively to Torah study. Accordingly, the community certainly needs people devoted exclusively to learning Torah and it is the community's responsibility to provide for them. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> 'And it perverts the words of Tzadikim', even a 
               total Tzadik. If he takes a bribe, he will go crazy 
               before he dies.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Dimi):</font></b> 'A king will establish the land in judgment; 
          a man of Terumos will ravage it' - if a judge is like a 
          king, who does not need anyone, he will establish the 
          land. If he is like a Kohen who runs to granaries to 
          collect Terumah, he will demolish it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rabah bar Rav Shila):</font></b> A judge who often borrows things 
          may not judge.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This is only if he has nothing to lend in return. If 
               he has, there is no problem.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> Rava often borrowed from Rebbi bar Meryon, and 
          didn't lend to him!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Rava only borrowed from him to elevate Rebbi bar 
          Meryon's reputation.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava):</font></b> The Torah forbids bribery, because one who 
          receives a bribe feels close to the giver, like to 
          himself, and a person does not see that he himself is 
          guilty.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> 'Shochad' (bribe) is like 'Shehu Chad (he is like 
               one with the giver).'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Papa):</font></b> One may not judge someone he loves or someone 
          he hates;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If he loves Ploni, he will not see that Ploni is 
               guilty;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If he hates Ploni, he will not see that Ploni is 
               innocent.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Abaye):</font></b> If a Chacham sees that people of his city love 
          him, this does not show that he is praiseworthy. Rather, 
          he does not rebuke them in spiritual matters.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava):</font></b> I used to think that everyone in my city loved 
          me. When I became a judge, I thought that the ones I 
          convicted hate me, and the ones I acquitted love me.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> When I saw that the same people I convict today, I 
               acquit tomorrow, I concluded that either they all 
               love me, or all hate me.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> 'Do not take a bribe.' Clearly, one cannot 
          take money! The verse forbids even non-monetary bribes.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b></b>  Shmuel was walking on a bridge, and a man lent to him a 
          hand. The man had a case; Shmuel disqualified himself 
          from judging him.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b></b>  A feather blew onto Ameimar's head, and a man removed it. 
          Ameimar disqualified himself from judging his case.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b></b>  Mar Ukva spit, and a man covered the spit. Mar Ukva 
          disqualified himself from judging his case.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b></b>  R. Yishmael b'Rebbi Yosi's sharecropper used to bring to 
          him a basket of produce from R. Yishmael's orchard every 
          Erev Shabbos. Once he brought it on Thursday.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Yishmael:</font></b> Why did you bring it early?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> The sharecropper:</font></b> I had to come for judgment anyway.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> R. Yishmael refused to take the produce and 
               disqualified himself from judging him. R. Yishmael 
               got other judges to judge him. He heard the case, 
               and kept thinking how his sharecropper should claim 
               in order to win.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Yishmael:</font></b> Cursed are those who take bribes! I did 
               not take, and had I took, it would have been my own, 
               and still, I was biased. Those who take bribes, how 
               much the more so!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b></b>  A man who came for judgment brought the first shearings 
          of his flock (which must be given to a Kohen) to R. 
          Yishmael bar Elisha. When R. Yishmael heard that the man 
          was from far away and could have given them to other 
          Kohanim, he refused to take them and disqualified himself 
          from judging him.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Yishmael got other judges to judge him; he heard 
               the case, and kept thinking how this man should 
               claim in order to win.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Yishmael:</font></b> Cursed are those who take bribes! I did 
               not take, and had I took, it would have been my own, 
               and still, I was biased. Those who take bribes, how 
               much the more so!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(s)</font></b></b>  Ploni came for judgment and brought fish to Rav Anan. Rav 
          Anan refused to take them and disqualified himself from 
          judging him.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Ploni:</font></b> You need not judge me, but take the fish, or 
               else you will stop me from bringing Bikurim.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa) Question:</font></b> 'A man brought... Bikurim 
                    (to Elisha)' - did Elisha eat Bikurim?! (He was 
                    not a Kohen. He was from Shevet Gad!)
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Rather, if one gives a gift to a 
                    Chacham, it is as if he brought Bikurim.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Anan:</font></b> I was not going to accept the fish. Now, I 
               will accept them.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Rav Anan sent Ploni to Rav Nachman. He enclosed a 
               note saying that he himself could not judge him. Rav 
               Nachman assumed that this was because they were 
               relatives. Rav Nachman also had a case of orphans to 
               judge.
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) THE REASONING FOR THE PROHIBITION OF 'SHOCHAD'</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara explains that the reasoning behind the prohibition of 'Shochad' is that the judge who accepts a bribe becomes like the litigant himself, and a person is unable to see himself as guilty.
</p><p>
The Gemara implies that a judge certainly may not rule in a case in which he is an actual litigant. However, there is no such Halachah; rather, a Chacham <i>is</i> permitted to rule for himself. Why is he permitted to rule for himself, but he is not permitted to rule when he accepts a bribe?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER:</b> The <b>CHAZON ISH</b> addresses this question (in <b>SEFER EMUNAH U'BITACHON</b>). He writes that a Chacham certainly is not suspected of following his personal interest when he rules, and therefore he may rule for himself. Why, then, does the Torah prohibit him from ruling when he accepts a bribe? Just as a Chacham may rule for himself and is not suspected of altering the ruling for his benefit, he should not be suspected of altering the ruling for the benefit of a litigant who gives him a bribe. 
</p><p>
The answer is that by prohibiting a judge from taking a bribe, the Torah introduced a special Yetzer ha'Ra into the world, affecting everyone. One who transgresses the prohibition of Shochad will find that he uncontrollably wants to help the litigant who gave him the bribe. The prohibition of Shochad is not a 'Mishpat,' a law that has logical basis, but rather a 'Chok,' a law whose reasoning is beyond human comprehension, because a Shochad blinds a person regardless of his level of Chochmah.
</p><p>
However, a Chacham is blinded only if he transgresses the prohibition against taking a bribe. If he takes no bribe, he may rule for himself and he is not suspected of altering the ruling for his benefit. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)
</p><p>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE RESULT OF RAV ANAN'S MISTAKE</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rav Nachman:</font></b> It is a Mitzvah to judge either case. It is 
          better to judge this Ploni's case first, since this 
          honors the Torah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> When Ploni's opponent saw the honor given to Ploni 
               he was befuddled, and was unable to argue his case 
               well.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  Eliyahu used to teach Rav Anan. After this episode, he 
          stopped coming. Rav Anan fasted and prayed until Eliyahu 
          returned. He was frightened, and had to sit in a box.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> What he learned before this episode is called Seder 
               Eliyahu Rabah. What he learned afterwards is called 
               Seder Eliyahu Zuta.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  There was a famine in the days of Rav Yosef; they asked 
          him to request mercy.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Yosef:</font></b> When the Talmidim rose to leave after 
               Elisha's lesson, 2200 remained (i.e. he supported 
               2200 Talmidim), and he did not request mercy at a 
               time of anger. How can I?!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> How do we know that Elisha supported 2200 
          Talmidim?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer - Question:</font></b> What was the question 'should I give 
          this before 100 men?'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If he refers to giving 22 loaves (for 100 men), at a 
               time of hunger receiving over a fifth of a loaf is a 
               lot!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Rather, he asked how each loaf will satisfy 
               100 men.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  Rav supported 1200 Talmidim. Rav Huna supported 800 
          Talmidim.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Thirteen men used to broadcast Rav Huna's lessons 
               (because there were so many Talmidim).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> When the Talmidim rose to leave after the lesson (in 
               Bavel), they shook their cloaks, and the dust 
               blocked out the sun. Even people in Eretz Yisrael 
               could tell when the lesson ended!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  Rabah and Rav Yosef supported 400 Talmidim. Abaye (others 
          say that Rav Papa or Rav Ashi) supported 200 Talmidim.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> They called themselves 'orphans of orphans' 
               (compared to their predecessors).
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>SOME USES OF 'TERUMAS HA'LISHKAH'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Yitzchak bar Radifa):</font></b> Chachamim who checked Korbanos 
          for blemishes in Yerushalayim received stipends from 
          Terumas ha'Lishkah (money taken from a chamber of 
          half-Shekalim that Yisraelim give every year to buy 
          Korbanos of the Tzibur).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> Chachamim who taught to the Kohanim laws 
          of slaughter received stipends from Terumas ha'Lishkah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Gidal):</font></b> Chachamim who taught to the Kohanim laws of 
          Kemitzah (taking a handful of a flour-offering) received 
          stipends from Terumas ha'Lishkah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rabah bar bar Chanah):</font></b> Chachamim who checked the 
          accuracy of Sefarim received stipends from Terumas 
          ha'Lishkah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Nachman citing Rav):</font></b> Women who wove Parochos 
          (curtains, for in front of the Kodesh ha'Kodoshim) 
          received stipends from Terumas ha'Lishkah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Nachman himself):</font></b> They received stipends from 
               Bedek ha'Bayis (Hekdesh funds used for upkeep of the 
               Mikdash), since the Parochos (in the second Mikdash) 
               were in place of a wall (in the first Mikdash).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Beraisa):</font></b> Women that wove Parochos, Beis Garmo 
          (who made the Lechem ha'Panim (showbread), and Beis 
          Avtinas (who made the incense) received stipends from 
          Terumas ha'Lishkah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> That refers to other curtains, which were not in 
          place of a wall;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Zeira):</font></b> There were 13 Parochos in the second 
               Mikdash. Seven were for the seven gates, one for the 
               opening of the Heichal, one for the opening of the 
               Ulam, two between the Kodesh and the Kodesh 
               ha'Kodashim, and two in the corresponding place in 
               the second story.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> Women who raised their children in Taharah to 
          engage in Parah Adumah received stipends from Terumas 
          ha'Lishkah;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b></b>  Aba Sha'ul says, rich women would supply them with food 
          and clothing.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) MAY THE COURT GIVE PRECEDENCE TO A TALMID CHACHAM'S CASE?</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara relates an incident in which Rav Anan referred a court case to Rav Nachman because he was concerned that he would not be able to judge it impartially. In the message he sent to Rav Nachman, Rav Anan asked, 'Please preside over this case because I, Anan, am disqualified from being a judge for this case.' Rav Nachman mistakenly understood that Rav Anan meant that the plaintiff in the case was a relative of his, and therefore Rav Nachman postponed a case which involved orphans and presided over Rav Anan's case first in order to give honor to the Torah. When the plaintiff's opponent saw the honor which Rav Nachman gave to the plaintiff, he became befuddled and forgot his arguments, and the plaintiff won the case. As punishment for the error which Rav Anan caused, Eliyahu stopped visiting him.
</p><p>
The Gemara here seems to contradict the Gemara in Shevuos (30a) which relates that Rav Yosef sent a message to Rav Nachman in which he told him that Ula was a Talmid Chacham, so that Rav Nachman would preside over his case first. Why was Rav Yosef not concerned that Ula's opponent would forget his arguments upon seeing the honor afforded to Ula? (<b>RITVA</b>)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>RITVA</b> answers that in the case in Shevuos, Ula's opponent knew that Ula was a great Talmid Chacham worthy of honor, and he would understand why his case would be given top priority. He would not mistakenly assume that it is because the Beis Din is siding with Ula. In contrast, in the case of the Gemara here, the plaintiff was not a Talmid Chacham (and not even a relative of a Talmid Chacham), and thus his opponent did not understand why Beis Din gave precedence to his case if not because his plaintiff had some influence with Beis Din, and he forgot his arguments.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>LECHEM MISHNEH</b> (Hilchos Sanhedrin 21:6) explains that the misdeed which Rav Anan caused was that the Beis Din of Rav Nachman presided over the case of a Talmid Chacham before that of an <i>orphan</i>. An orphan's case has precedence because of the verse, 'Judge the orphan, argue for the widow' (Yeshayah 1:17). When the opponent in the case which Rav Anan sent to Rav Nachman saw that his plaintiff's case was given precedence even over the case of an orphan, he assumed that it was because the plaintiff had considerable influence with the Beis Din, and thus he forgot his arguments. In the case in Shevuos, however, Ula's case was given precedence over that of an Am ha'Aretz, and thus it was clear to everyone that the case was given precedence because of the honor of the Torah. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rav Huna):</font></b> May Klei Shares (Kelim used to serve 
          in the Mikdash) be bought with money of Bedek ha'Bayis?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Are they a need of the outer Mizbe'ach (it is of 
               stone and is like part of the Mikdash), are 
               therefore they are bought from Bedek ha'Bayis funds?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Or, are they a need of the Korbanos, and therefore 
               they are bought from Terumas ha'Lishkah?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav):</font></b> They are bought only from Terumas 
          ha'Lishkah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rav Huna):</font></b> '... The rest of the money (given 
          for Bedek ha'Bayis) was used for Kelim'.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Counter-question (Rav):</font></b> Did you learn only Kesuvim, 
               but not Nevi'im?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Contradiction:</font></b> 'The money will not be used for 
               bowls...'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer to both questions (Rav):</font></b> Bedek ha'Bayis money may 
          not be used for Kelim. If they collected and there was 
          extra money, the excess may be used for Kelim.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If the money may not be used for Kelim (because 
          it is a different Kedushah), this applies even to the 
          excess!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (R. Avahu):</font></b> Beis Din stipulates that if the money 
          will not be needed for Bedek ha'Bayis, (it will not 
          receive Kedushas Bedek ha'Bayis, rather) it will be used 
          for Kelim.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Tana d'Vei R. Yishmael):</font></b> We buy Klei Shares with money 
          of Terumas ha'Lishkah - 'the remaining money';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> Which money has a remainder?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> it is Terumas ha'Lishkah (they do not take 
               all the money in the chamber).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> We should say the money left in the chamber is 
          for Klei Shares!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> '<i>The</i> remaining money' refers to the first money 
          taken. This is like Rava taught;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rava):</font></b> '<i>The</i> Olah' refers to the first to be 
               offered (each day, the morning Tamid).
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>USES OF 'HEKDESH' MONEY</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Beraisa):</font></b> Incense, and all communal Korbanos 
          come from Terumas ha'Lishkah. The golden Mizbe'ach, 
          frankincense and service Kelim come from Mosar Nesachim 
          (profits from the purchase of flour for offerings. 
          Hekdesh gets a heaping measure and a good price.) The 
          outer Mizbe'ach, the chambers and the courtyards come 
          from Shirei ha'Lishkah (what remains in the chamber after 
          taking Terumas ha'Lishkah).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This is like it was taught, that the city wall, its 
               towers, and all needs of the city come from Shirei 
               ha'Lishkah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Tana'im argue about which money is used to buy 
          Klei Shares:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> Mosar Terumah (what is left from Terumas 
               ha'Lishkah after all Korbanos for the year were 
               bought) was used to make a gold plating for the 
               Kodesh ha'Kodoshim;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Yishmael says, profits from Peiros (this will be 
               explained) are used for Kitz ha'Mizbe'ach (Olah 
               offerings brought when the Mizbe'ach is idle);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> R. Akiva says, Mosar Terumah is used for Kitz 
               ha'Mizbe'ach. Mosar Nesachim is used for Klei 
               Shares;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> R. Chanina the vice-Kohen Gadol says, Mosar Nesachim 
               is for Kitz ha'Mizbe'ach. Mosar Terumah is for Klei 
               Shares;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b></b> R. Akiva and R. Chanina did not agree to profits 
               from Peiros.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What are 'profits from Peiros'?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Beraisa):</font></b> Mosar Terumah was used to buy produce 
          cheaply. The produce was sold when the price went up. The 
          profits were used for Kitz ha'Mizbe'ach.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What does it mean 'they did not agree to 
          profits from Peiros'?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Mishnah - R. Yishmael):</font></b> Mosar Shirei ha'Lishkah 
          was used to buy wine, oil and flour. The profits go to 
          Hekdesh;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Akiva says, we do not invest Hekdesh or money for 
               the poor in order to reap profits.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  We do not invest Hekdesh, because the rich 
                    should not appear poor (i.e. like one who seeks 
                    every chance to profit).
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> We do not invest money for the poor, lest a 
                    poor person comes, and there will not be what 
                    to give him.
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) WITH WHAT MONEY MAY 'KLEI SHARES' BE PURCHASED?</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> Rav Huna asked Rav whether the Klei Shares are purchased with money of Bedek ha'Bayis, funds allocated for the upkeep of the Beis ha'Mikdash, or with money of the Terumas ha'Lishkah. Perhaps the Klei Shares are purchased with money of Bedek ha'Bayis because they are used for the Mizbe'ach, which is made of stone and is considered part of the Beis ha'Mikdash. On the other hand, perhaps they are purchased with money of the Terumas ha'Lishkah, since they are used for Korbanos.
</p><p>
Rav answered that the Klei Shares are purchased only with the money of the Terumas ha'Lishkah. Rav Huna questioned Rav's ruling (according to the <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b>) from the verse in Divrei ha'Yamim II (24:14) which discusses the collection of funds for Bedek ha'Bayis and how the leftover money was used. The verse says that the leftover money was used for the purchase of Klei Shares. Rav responded with a different verse which states that money of Bedek ha'Bayis may not be used for the purchase of Klei Shares (Melachim II 12:14-15). The Gemara addresses the apparent contradiction in the verses and says that money of Bedek ha'Bayis <i>may</i> be used for Klei Shares only when that money is leftover and is not needed for any other purpose of Bedek ha'Bayis, because 'Lev Beis Din Masneh Aleihen.' 
</p><p>
If Rav Huna knew that the verse in Divrei ha'Yamim states that Klei Shares may be purchased with money leftover from the funds of Bedek ha'Bayis, why did he ask Rav in the first place whether Klei Shares may be purchased from such money? (<b>TALMID HA'RASHBA</b> cited by the <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b>)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>TALMID HA'RASHBA</b> answers that Rav Huna knew that money leftover from the funds of Bedek ha'Bayis may be used for the purchase of Klei Shares. His question was whether Klei Shares may be made directly from material donated to Bedek ha'Bayis. Rav answered that Klei Shares may <i>never</i> come from Bedek ha'Bayis; they may not be purchased from funds of Bedek ha'Bayis or crafted from material donated to Bedek ha'Bayis. Rav Huna questioned Rav's ruling from the verse which says that at least the leftover money of Bedek ha'Bayis may be used for the purchase of Klei Shares. Rav defended his ruling from the verse in Melachim, which he interpreted to mean that money of Bedek ha'Bayis may <i>never</i> be used to purchase Klei Shares.
</p><p>
When the Gemara reconciles the two verses and distinguishes between ordinary money of Bedek ha'Bayis and leftover money of Bedek ha'Bayis, it is explaining the verses only according to Rav Huna. Rav maintains that even leftover money from Bedek ha'Bayis may not be used to purchase Klei Shares.
</p><p>
How, then, does Rav reconcile the apparent contradiction in the verses? How does he understand the verse in Divrei ha'Yamim?
</p><p>
The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> answers that Rav follows the view of Tana d'Vei Rebbi Yishmael (later on 106b) who interprets the verse in Divrei ha'Yamim as a reference to the funds of the Terumas ha'Lishkah and <i>not</i> as a reference to the funds of Bedek ha'Bayis. The word '<i>u'She'ar</i>' in the verse does not mean 'the <i>remaining</i> money,' but rather it refers to the Terumas ha'Lishkah which is called 'u'She'ar' since it has Shirayim. Accordingly, Rav ruled that the Klei Shares may be purchased only from funds of the Terumas ha'Lishkah.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> writes that <b>RASHI</b> has a different approach. Rashi understands that Rav <i>does</i> distinguish between ordinary money of Bedek ha'Bayis and leftover money of Bedek ha'Bayis. According to Rashi, when the Gemara questions Rav's ruling from the verse in Divrei ha'Yamim, it is not Rav Huna speaking, because if Rav Huna would have known that the verse states that Klei Shares may be purchased from the leftover funds of Bedek ha'Bayis he would not have asked Rav his question. Rather, Rav Huna was unsure how to interpret that verse. Rav answered that under normal circumstances money of Bedek ha'Bayis may not be used to purchase Klei Shares. However, leftover money from Bedek ha'Bayis <i>may</i> be used to purchase Klei Shares, as the Gemara proceeds to explain. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)
</p><p>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>FEEDING A WIFE WHOSE HUSBAND IS AWAY</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> One who went overseas...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav):</font></b> We allot food to a woman whose husband is away.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Shmuel):</font></b> We do not allot food to a woman whose husband 
          is away.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shmuel:</font></b> Rav agrees that we do not allot food in the 
               first three months, since a man does not leave his 
               house empty.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  If we heard that the husband died, all agree that we 
          allot food. They argue about when we did not hear that he 
          died;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Rav says that we allot food, since he is obligated 
               to feed his wife.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why does Shmuel disagree?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rav Zevid):</font></b> We are concerned lest he left 
          money for her food.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rav Papa):</font></b> We are concerned lest she accepted 
          to feed herself from her earnings.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> These opinions argue about an adult wife whose 
               earnings do not suffice to feed herself. (Rav Papa 
               holds that Shmuel agrees that we feed her. She would 
               not consent to feed herself.)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> They also argue about a minor whose earnings suffice 
               for her food (Rav Zevid holds that Shmuel agrees 
               that we feed her. A man would not leave money with a 
               minor.) (The following seven questions are against 
               Shmuel.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #1 (Mishnah - Chanan):</font></b> If a man went overseas 
          and his wife requests food, she swears only at the end;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The sons of Kohanim Gedolim say that she swears also 
               at the beginning.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> They only argue about the oath, but all 
               agree that she is fed!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Shmuel):</font></b> The case is, we heard that he died.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #2 (Beraisa):</font></b> If a man went overseas and his 
          wife requests food, the sons of Kohanim Gedolim say that 
          she swears;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Chanan says, she does not swear;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If he came and said that he left her money for food, 
               he is believed.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Shmuel):</font></b> Here also, we heard that he died.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> It says 'if he came... ' This shows that he 
          did not die!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> We heard that he died. It was a false report.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #3 (Beraisa):</font></b> If a man went overseas and his 
          wife requests food, if he comes, he may say that she 
          should pay for her for food with her earnings;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If Beis Din allotted food for her, this stands.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Shmuel):</font></b> Here also, we heard that he died.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>OTHER ATTEMPTS TO REFUTE SHMUEL</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #4 (Beraisa):</font></b> If a man went overseas and his 
          wife requests food, Beis Din takes from his property to 
          feed his wife, but not his sons and daughters, and not 
          another matter (this will be explained).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rav Sheshes):</font></b> The case is, he appointed 
          someone to feed his wife.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, his children should also be fed!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> He appointed someone to feed his wife, but not 
          his children.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> The Tana did not specify. Why should we assume 
          that this is the case?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rav Papa):</font></b> The case is, one witness said that 
          he died;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Since she may remarry based on one witness, she also 
               receives food;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Since his children do not inherit his property based 
               on one witness, they are not fed.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is the 'other matter'?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rav Chisda):</font></b> It is Cosmetics.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rav Yosef):</font></b> It is Tzedakah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Rav Chisda says that we do not give to her for 
               cosmetics. All the more so, we do not give Tzedakah 
               from his money!
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR A WOMAN WHOSE HUSBAND TRAVELED ABROAD AND DIED</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> Rav and Shmuel disagree about whether Beis Din may provide material support for the wife of a man who traveled abroad by appropriating the possessions of his estate. Shmuel rules that Beis Din may not appropriate his possessions. The Gemara suggests two possible reasons for Shmuel's ruling. The first reason is that Beis Din must suspect that her husband left a bundle of money ('Tzerori') for her in the event that he does not return as planned. The second reason is that Beis Din must suspect that he told her before he departed, 'Your earnings should be in place of your support [from me].' Instead of the husband keeping her earnings in return for providing her support, he told her that she should keep her earnings and thus he does not have to provide her with support.
</p><p>
The Gemara continues and says that if word arrived that her husband died while abroad, even Shmuel agrees that Beis Din provides support for her from his estate. This make sense according to the Gemara's second reason for Shmuel's ruling; after her husband dies, a woman receives support from his estate even if he had declared during his lifetime that 'your earnings should be in place of your support [from me].' However, according to the Gemara's first reason for Shmuel's ruling (that Beis Din must suspect that the husband left a bundle of money for her), why is Beis Din not concerned for 'Tzerori'? The fact that he died while abroad does not mitigate the concern that he left her a bundle of money before he departed.
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>RASHI</b> writes that if her husband died, the woman eventually will collect her Kesuvah. At that time, she will make an oath that she is not withholding anything that belongs to her husband (including 'Tzerori').
</p><p>
However, as <b>TOSFOS</b> asks, the Gemara later clearly says that Shmuel does not let the woman collect Mezonos even with an oath. Why, then, does the oath that she makes for her Kesuvah enable her to collect Mezonos from her husband's estate?
</p><p>
Moreover, why is it assumed that she eventually will collect her Kesuvah and make an oath, such that she may take Mezonos now? Perhaps she will die before she collects her Kesuvah, and no oath will ever be made, in which case her consumption of the Mezonos from his estate will turn out to have been unlawful. (<b>PNEI YEHOSHUA</b>)
</p><p>
(b) The <b>PNEI YEHOSHUA</b> asserts that Rashi's intention is to explain the Gemara as the <b>RAMBAN</b> explains it. The Ramban quotes the Gemara earlier (96b) which discusses the case of a dispute between the widow and the orphans about whether or not the widow already collected the Mezonos. Although logic should dictate that the orphans should win the case due to the principle of 'ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Re'ayah,' in that case the widow wins the case because at the moment her husband died, all of his possessions enter her possession due to the Tenai Beis Din that entitles her to receive Mezonos. This obligation to provide her with Mezonos is so strong that it makes <i>her</i> the 'Machzik,' the one who is in possession of the property in dispute.
</p><p>
The same approach may be applied to the Gemara here. Since her husband's property is now in her possession, the concern for 'Tzerori' cannot prevent her from collecting her Mezonos from that property. The concern for 'Tzerori' prevents her from collecting her Mezonos only when her husband is still alive, in which case the property is still in his possession (and if she wants to collect Mezonos she must prove that he did not leave 'Tzerori' with her, because 'ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Re'ayah').
</p><p>
(c) <b>TOSFOS</b> answers that the concern for 'Tzerori' applies only when there is a strong reason to suspect that he left money for her. If a man went abroad and did not overtly leave her with Mezonos or send her anything from abroad, it is assumed that he left 'Tzerori' for her. However, if he died while abroad, there is no reason to suspect that he left 'Tzerori.' Perhaps he planned to send her money but he died before he was able to carry out his plan. Beis Din does not suspect that the husband left 'Tzerori' when there are no grounds for such a concern. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Rav Yosef says that we do not give Tzedakah from his 
               money, but we do give to her for cosmetics, for he 
               does not want his wife to become repulsive.
<br>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #5 (Mishnah):</font></b> The first three months after a 
          woman falls to Yibum, she is fed from her husband. After 
          this, she is not fed from her husband, and not from the 
          Yavam;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If Beis Din told him to do Yibum or Chalitzah and he 
               fled, she is fed from the Yavam.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> This does not oppose Shmuel. According to either 
          explanation, there is no concern here!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> A Yavam does not care for the Yevamah so much that 
               he would leave money for her food;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> A Yavam is not entitled to her earnings.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #6 (Beraisa):</font></b> If a woman went with her husband 
          overseas and returned and said that he died, she chooses 
          to receive food or her Kesuvah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If she says that he divorced her, she is fed, up to 
               the value of her Kesuvah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Here also, we heard that he died.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, why does she receive only up to the 
          value of her Kesuvah?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Since she said that she was divorced, she 
          admitted that she does not deserve more than this.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #7 (Beraisa) Question:</font></b> In what case was it 
          taught that a Mema'enes does not receive food?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> It cannot be when she is still married, for then he 
               must feed her!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Rather, her husband went overseas. She 
               borrowed money for food, and then did Mi'un.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> Had she not done Mi'un, he would have to 
               pay!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> This does not oppose Shmuel. According to either 
          explanation, there is no concern here!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> A man does not leave money (for food) with a minor.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> A minor would not consent to feed herself from her 
               earnings. (Normally, she does not earn enough.)
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE FINAL RULING</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What was the final ruling?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rav Dimi):</font></b> Cases arose, and Rebbi ruled that 
          she is fed, and R. Yishmael ruled that she is not fed.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (R. Yochanan):</font></b> How could R. Yishmael say that 
          she is not fed?!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The sons of Kohanim Gedolim argue with Chanan only 
               about the oath, but all agree that she is fed!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Shemen bar Aba):</font></b> Shmuel already answered 
          this. The case is, we heard that he died.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Yochanan did not accept the answer.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Ravin):</font></b> Cases arose, and Rebbi ruled that she 
          is not fed, and R. Yishmael ruled that she is fed.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  R. Yochanan challenged Rebbi's opinion like above. Rav 
          Shemen bar Aba gave Shmuel's answer, but R. Yochanan did 
          not accept it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #3:</font></b> The Halachah follows Rav. She is fed.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b></b>  The Halachah follows Rav Huna;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Huna citing Rav):</font></b> A woman may tell her husband 
               'do not feed me, and I will keep my earnings.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b></b>  The Halachah follows Rav Zevid regarding glazed pottery:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Zevid):</font></b> If Glazed pottery is white or black, it 
               does not become forbidden due to absorptions. If it 
               is green, it becomes forbidden;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If they have cracks, even black and white Kelim 
               become forbidden.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO FEEDS ANOTHER MAN'S WIFE</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - Chanan):</font></b> If David went overseas and Reuven fed 
          David's wife, he is not reimbursed;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  The sons of Kohanim Gedolim say that he swears how much 
          he spent, and he is reimbursed.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  R. Dosa ben Harkinas agrees with the sons of Kohanim 
          Gedolim;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  R. Yochanan ben Zakai holds like Chanan. Reuven threw 
          away his money.
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) A WOMAN WHO CLAIMS THAT HER HUSBAND DIVORCED HER</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara quotes a Beraisa which states that a woman is not believed to say that she was divorced in order to collect her Kesuvah. Nevertheless, she may collect Mezonos, because even if she is not divorced she is entitled to Mezonos. However, she may not collect Mezonos when the value of the Mezonos exceeds the value of her Kesuvah, since her testimony of her divorce is an admission that she is not entitled to more than the value of her Kesuvah (since a divorcee does not collect Mezonos). Although she is not believed when she says that she is divorced, her own admission is accepted like one hundred witnesses against her with regard to the value of the Mezonos which she may collect.
</p><p>
If the Beraisa refers to a case in which the husband might still be alive, it makes sense that she receives only Mezonos and she is not believed to say that she was divorced. If it is known that her husband died, she should receive her Kesuvah whether or not she is believed to say that she was divorced. Shmuel says that the Beraisa refers to a case in which word arrived that her husband died. Accordingly, she should be given the entire amount of her Kesuvah. However, the Beraisa allows her only to receive an occasional stipend of Mezonos. Why, according to Shmuel, is she not entitled to receive her Kesuvah?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>RASHI</b> (DH Ihi) writes that although she indeed may collect her Kesuvah in such a case, she chooses not to collect it but to collect only Mezonos, because she is afraid that the rumor about her husband's death will be proven false.
</p><p>
(The <b>MAHARSHA</b> points out that Rashi must understand that 'they heard that he died' means hearsay, and not that two witnesses testified that he died as Tosfos explains.)
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> also explains that if she wants, she may collect her entire Kesuvah at once. This, however, is not the intent of the Beraisa. The intent of the Beraisa is to teach that she may not collect Mezonos indefinitely. One might have thought that if witnesses testify that her husband died before the date on which she claims that she was divorced, her claim should be disregarded and she should receive Mezonos indefinitely (like a widow, and not like a divorcee). The Beraisa teaches that her admission is accepted such that she may not collect Mezonos indefinitely, but only up to the value of her Kesuvah.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>RITVA</b> explains that the woman indeed is not eligible to receive her Kesuvah, for the following reason. The witnesses say that her husband died on a certain date and thus she deserves her Kesuvah. She claims that she was divorced on a later date. Accordingly, her statement that 'I was divorced' is akin to saying, 'I was not widowed [at the time the witnesses say] and I do not deserve the Kesuvah.' This is similar to the principle that when one says, 'I did not borrow [money from you],' it is as though he says, 'I did not pay back' (and if there are witnesses that he borrowed money, he must pay), because one who did not borrow obviously did not pay back (see Bava Basra 6a). Since she opposes the witnesses, her word is accepted against theirs with regard to matters that obligate her monetarily. Her word is not believed against the witnesses' with regard to the divorce, and thus she does not receive her Kesuvah.
</p><p>
<b>REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b> (in <b>DERUSH V'CHIDUSH</b>) questions the logic of the Ritva. He asserts that even though the woman's testimony contradicts that of the witnesses, she still should receive her Kesuvah because <i>both</i> sets of testimony <i>agree</i> that she is entitled to the Kesuvah. If the witnesses are telling the truth, she should receive her Kesuvah because her husband died, and if they are not telling the truth, then she should receive her Kesuvah because he divorced her.
</p><p>
(In the case of one who says, 'I did not borrow [money from you],' which is equated with saying, 'I did not pay back,' the witnesses testify about two things: he borrowed money, and he paid back the money. He now claims that he did not borrow money, which means that he did not pay back. Accordingly, he is obligated to pay due to the testimony of the witnesses (who say that he borrowed). Even though the witnesses also say that he paid back, his 'Hoda'as Ba'al Din' that he did not pay back is like a hundred witnesses and overrides the witnesses' testimony that he paid back, and thus he remains obligated to pay. However, if the witnesses testify only that 'he paid back' (and not that 'he borrowed money'), and he contradicts them and says 'I never borrowed,' perhaps he is not obligated, because both his testimony and the witnesses' testimony are absolving him from payment. There is no separate testimony from the witnesses that he borrowed (although it may be inferred from their testimony that he paid back). Following this understanding, in the case of the woman who testifies that she is divorced, the witnesses testify about only one thing: her husband died (and not that she was not divorced, although that fact may be inferred). That testimony, if it is true, will grant her the Kesuvah. In this case, there is no testimony against her; rather, according to the testimony of the woman alone she is entitled to the Kesuvah, and according to the testimony of the witnesses alone she is entitled to the Kesuvah.) (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)
</p><p>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO RETRACTS HIS PROMISE TO GIVE A DOWRY</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If Levi promised to give a certain amount to 
          his son-in-law, and before the Nisu'in he said that he 
          will not (or cannot) give the money; his son-in-law can 
          say that he will not make Nisu'in until Levi gives the 
          money, and Levi's daughter will be unable to marry anyone 
          else;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  Admon says, she can claim 'had I promised myself, this 
          would be proper. My father promised. What should I do? 
          Have Nisu'in with me, or divorce me!'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  R. Gamliel:</font></b> I agree with Admon.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara):</font></b> Our Mishnah is unlike the following Tana:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah):</font></b> Admon and 
               Chachamim didn't argue about a man who promised 
               money to his son-in-law, and then retracted. All 
               agree that she can say 'my father promised. What 
               should I do?'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> They argue when she promised, and then retracted.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Chachamim say that her husband can say 'I will not 
               make Nisu'in until you give the money';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> Admon says, she can say 'I thought that my father 
               would give. Now that I see that he will not (or 
               cannot), what can I do? Have Nisu'in with me, or 
               divorce me!'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Gamliel:</font></b> I agree with Admon.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> This (Rashi - the law of this Beraisa; Tosfos 
          - our Mishnah) applies when she is an adult. If she is a 
          minor, we force.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Whom do we force?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> We force her father.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> It is more reasonable to force him if she 
               is an adult!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rava):</font></b> We force her husband to divorce her.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Yitzchak ben Elazar):</font></b> Wherever R. Gamliel agreed with 
          Admon, the Halachah follows Admon.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rava):</font></b> Does this even apply to the Beraisa?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Nachman):</font></b> He did not say 'in the Mishnah.' He 
          said 'wherever'!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Zeira):</font></b> Regarding the two laws that Chanan said, the 
          Halachah is k'Yotzei Bo (Rashi - like the one who agrees 
          with him; Tosfos - the same applies in similar cases). 
          Regarding the seven laws that Admon said, the Halachah is 
          not k'Yotzei Bo.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What does this mean?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> The Halachah follows Chanan's two laws 
               and k'Yotzei Bo. The Halachah does not follow 
               Admon's seven laws, nor k'Yotzei Bo.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> R. Yitzchak ben Elazar said that wherever 
               R. Gamliel agreed with Admon, the Halachah follows 
               Admon!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> Rather, the Halachah follows Chanan's two laws 
          and k'Yotzei Bo. Regarding Admon's seven laws, the 
          Halachah does not follow k'Yotzei Bo.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> This implies that the Halachah follows 
               Admon in all seven.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> R. Yitzchak ben Elazar taught that wherever R. 
          Gamliel said that he agrees with Admon, the Halachah 
          follows Admon;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> Where R. Gamliel did not say this, the 
               Halachah does not follow Admon!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> Rather, the Halachah follows Chanan's two laws 
          and k'Yotzei Bo. Regarding Admon's seven laws, sometimes 
          the Halachah follows him and k'Yotzei Bo. Sometimes, it 
          is not like him, but it is (Tosfos - and it is not) 
          k'Yotzei Bo;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Wherever R. Gamliel agreed with Admon, the Halachah 
               follows Admon. In all other places, it does not.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>A TACIT ADMISSION</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - Admon):</font></b> If Reuven claims that Shimon stole a 
          field from him, and Reuven signed on the document in 
          which Levi bought this field from Shimon. Reuven did not 
          forfeit his claim. He signed the document, because he 
          would rather take Levi to trial than Shimon;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  Chachamim say, he forfeited his claim.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  If a sale document delineates an adjacent field by saying 
          that it borders on Shimon's field, and Reuven signed this 
          document, he forfeits his claim that Shimon stole the 
          field from him.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara - Abaye):</font></b> This applies only to a witness who 
          signs. If a judge signed (validated) such a document, he 
          does not forfeit his claim.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Chiya bar Aba):</font></b> Witnesses may not sign a 
               document unless they read it, but judges may sign a 
               document even without reading it.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) 'SHE MUST WAIT UNTIL HER HAIR TURNS WHITE'</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> In the Mishnah (end of 108b), Admon and the Chachamim disagree about the law in a case in which a man promised to give his daughter's Chasan a certain sum of money and he does not fulfill his promise ('Pashat Lo Es ha'Regel'). According to the Chachamim, his daughter 'must wait until her hair turns white,' and her Chasan is obligated neither to marry her nor to give her a Get (to divorce her from the Erusin). Admon agrees that this would have been the law had <i>she</i> been the one to make the promise (and renege). However, since it was her father who promised to give the money, she is not required to suffer as a result of his dishonesty, and thus the Chasan must either marry her or give her a Get. (The <b>REMA</b> (EH 52:1) points out that this dispute applies only after Kidushin and before Nisu'in. After Nisu'in, however, the husband must fulfill all of his obligations to his wife even if he did not get what he was promised.)
</p><p>
What is the logic behind the ruling of the Chachamim? Why does the Chasan have the right to make the woman an Agunah until he receives the money that he was promised? If the Mishnah would refer only to a case in which the woman or her daughter acted maliciously, there would be grounds to cause the woman to suffer. However, the Mishnah refers even to a case in which the father is <i>unable</i> to pay the money (see second explanation of Rashi to 'Pashat Lo Es ha'Regel') or died. Although Beis Din cannot force the Chasan to marry her (since the condition of a monetary payment was not fulfilled by the bride's side), Beis Din should force him to divorce her if she can prove that she does not have the means with which to pay him.
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER:</b> The <b>TIFERES YAKOV</b> (to EH 52:1) explains that the ruling of the Mishnah applies only in a case in which there was negligence or deception on the part of the father (for example, he did not have any money at the time that he promised to give the money to the Chasan, or now he has the money and he refuses to give it). If the father had the money at the time that he made his promise and then he lost it, Beis Din forces the Chasan to give the woman a Get.
</p><p>
This is also the approach of the <b>ME'IRI</b> on the Mishnah. He adds that although it was the father, and not the bride, who promised to give the money, the Chachamim nevertheless rule that since she is an adult (as the Gemara says) she bears some responsibility for the deception, which she certainly saw and did not prevent.
</p><p>
The Tiferes Yakov uses this approach to answer the question of <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH v'Afilu) on the Sugya that follows. The Gemara asks whether the Halachah follows Admon 'even in the case of the Beraisa.' Tosfos understands that this refers to the Beraisa cited earlier in which Admon rules that the Chasan must give his wife a Get even when <i>she</i> promised to give him money. Tosfos asks that in the Mishnah, Admon forces the Chasan to give his wife a Get only when the <i>father</i> promised to give money, but not when the bride herself promised, in which case Admon agrees that she must wait 'until her hair turns white.' It is clear that the Beraisa disagrees with the Mishnah. Why, then, does the Gemara ask whether the Halachah follows Admon 'even' in the case of the Beraisa? If the Halachah follows Admon in the case of the Beraisa, then the Halachah is <i>not</i> like Admon as quoted in the Mishnah.
</p><p>
The Tiferes Yakov answers that the Beraisa clearly says that the woman prevails because she may claim that she thought that her father would give the money on her behalf. Admon maintains that this is a valid claim, and there is no negligence on her part. However, this claim is valid only when she obligated herself in the presence of her father. The Mishnah refers to when she obligated herself <i>not</i> in the presence of her father, in which case she cannot blame her father for not paying, and thus Admon agrees with the Chachamim that the Chasan is not forced to marry her or divorce her.
</p><p>
The Beraisa, therefore, does not contradict the Mishnah, but rather it adds an additional detail to the case -- if she promised in the presence of her father to give her Chasan money, she may claim that she relied on her father, and her Chasan must either marry her or give her a Get. The Gemara asks whether the Halachah follows Admon even in this case. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
trd:
<p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If this field was used to delineate an 
          adjacent field...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Abaye):</font></b> This is only if the adjacent field was sold to 
          someone else. If it was for himself (Reuven bought 
          (Rashi) or sold (Tosfos) the field from or to Shimon), he 
          does not forfeit his claim;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Had Reuven objected to calling the adjacent field 
               Shimon's, the sale would not have gone through.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> Reuven should have told witnesses that he 
               does not agree that the field is Shimon's!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Everyone has friends. Had Reuven done so, 
               word would have spread, Shimon would have heard and 
               cancelled the sale.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  David signed a document selling the field north of Levi's 
          field, and later claimed that Levi stole the field (to 
          the south). David died. An Apotropos was appointed for 
          the orphans.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Abaye:</font></b> David forfeited his claim to the field.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  The Apotropos:</font></b> If David was alive, he would claim that 
          Levi only owns one furrow's width of the south field, and 
          this was used to delineate the north field. The rest of 
          the south field is mine!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Abaye:</font></b> Excellent! We make this claim for the orphans!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Yochanan):</font></b> If David claims that Levi owns only 
               one furrow's width of the south field, and this was 
               used to delineate the north field, he is believed.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Abaye:</font></b> Give to Shimon a furrow's width of the field.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b></b>  There was a row of date trees on the furrow (making the 
          furrow very valuable).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  The Apotropos:</font></b> If David was alive, he would claim that 
          later he bought back the furrow!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Abaye:</font></b> Excellent! We make this claim for the orphans!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Yochanan):</font></b> If Reuven claims that later he bought 
               it back, he is believed.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Abaye:</font></b> One who appoints an Apotropos should appoint a man 
          like this, who knows how to argue for the orphans!
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO LOST THE PATH TO HIS FIELD</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - Admon):</font></b> If Levi went overseas, and the path to 
          his field was lost field (it was annexed to the adjacent 
          field, he does not know where), he receives a short path 
          to his field;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  Chachamim say, he must pay whatever his neighbor charges 
          for a path, or else he must fly (i.e. he may not walk) to 
          his field.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> We understand Admon (surely, Levi used to have 
          a path, and the neighbor took it). Why do Chachamim 
          argue?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> The case is, he was surrounded by 
          four neighbors on the four sides of his field.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, what is Admon's reason? (He has no Vadai 
          claim against any neighbor!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rava):</font></b> If every neighbor owned his land (when 
          Levi left), or if all bought from one person who used to 
          own all the property surrounding the field, all agree 
          that they can push off Levi;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> They argue when Levi was surrounded by four 
               neighbors, and one person bought all their land.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Admon says, in any case the path to his field is by 
               the buyer!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Chachamim say, the buyer says, accept my terms. If 
               you protest, I will return the deeds to the original 
               owners (undo the sales), and you will be unable to 
               force them to give you a path.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  A dying man said that his daughter should receive a date 
          tree; he died. His sons divided the estate, and did not 
          give to her a tree.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yosef):</font></b> This is just like our Mishnah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Abaye):</font></b> No! In the Mishnah, each neighbor can 
          dispel him and say 'your path is not by me.' Here, the 
          sons divided her tree among themselves!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> They must give to her a tree, and make a new 
               division.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b></b>  A dying man said that his daughter should receive a date 
          tree. He died, leaving two trees in which he was a 
          half-owner.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rav Yosef):</font></b> Are two halves of a tree called a 
          tree?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Mordechai):</font></b> Yes.
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) ONE WHO CLAIMS THAT HE BOUGHT BACK HIS FIELD</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara relates an incident in which a person said that the field in the possession of another person (the 'Machzik') actually belongs to him, and that it was stolen from him and sold to the Machzik. However, the claimant's signature appeared in the bill of sale of the field to the Machzik. His signature in the Shtar is proof that the Machzik's purchase of the field was legitimate.
</p><p>
The Gemara continues and says that after the claimant died, the manager of his estate (Apotropos) attempted to reclaim the field for the orphans with various claims. One claim was that if the father of the orphans would have been alive, he would have said that it is true that he sold the field to the Machzik, but that he bought it back from him. Based on this claim, the Apotropos wins the case.
</p><p>
The Rishonim ask that after the claimant has admitted (through his signature on the bill of sale) that the field belonged to the Machzik, why is he believed to say that he bought it back? <b>RASHI</b> (DH Ne'eman) writes that since the claimant did not need to sign the Shtar, his subsequent claim that he bought back the field should be believed because of 'Peh she'Asar Hu ha'Peh she'Hitir.' The Rishonim do not accept Rashi's approach, because the claimant did not make this claim at the time that he signed the Shtar. Tosfos (DH Im) asserts that 'Peh she'Asar' applies only when the 'Heter' is articulated immediately ('Toch Kedei Dibur') after the 'Isur.' Why, then, should the claimant be believed to say that he bought back the field?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b> 
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> answers that the Shtar on which the claimant's signature is found was never authenticated (with 'Kiyum') in Beis Din. Accordingly, the claimant could have said that he bought back the field and he would have been believed with a Migu that he could have said that the Shtar is forged. With this Migu he would have been believed because at that moment he has the opportunity to claim that the Shtar is forged. This is why the Apotropos wins the case with this claim.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RA'AVAD</b> (cited by the <b>ROSH</b>) answers that the Gemara refers to a case in which the claimant had already repossessed the field from the Machzik before his death. It stayed in the possession of his heirs for three years. Now, the Machzik wants to get it back based on the argument that the claimant lied when he said that the field belonged to him, an argument which is supported by the claimant's signature in the bill of sale to the Machzik. However, since the orphans have a Chazakah of three years, they (or their Apotropos) are believed to say that their father bought back the field.
</p><p>
The <b>HAFLA'AH</b> questions the Ra'avad's explanation. The Chazakah of three years of possession cannot be utilized in this case. Since the Machzik claims that the claimant stole the field from him, a Chazakah of three years cannot prove that the claimant bought it ('Gazlan Ein Lo Chazakah'). 
</p><p>
The Hafla'ah cites the <b>RIF</b> who, like the Ra'avad, writes that the case involves a field which is now in the possession of the claimant. However, the Rif makes no mention of a Chazakah of three years. The Hafla'ah infers that the Rif maintains that even without a Chazakah of three years, the field remains in the hands of the present possessor. This is because both the claimant and the Machzik were found to have made false claims. The Machzik claimed that the field was always his, a claim which was refuted by the claimant's witnesses who testified that the field once belonged to the claimant. The claimant, on the other hand, claimed that he never sold the field, a claim which was refuted by his signature on a bill of sale naming the Machzik as the owner of the field. Since both parties have made false claims, Beis Din leaves the field wherever it is. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)
</p><p>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO SELLS TO ONE WHO OWES HIM MONEY</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - Admon):</font></b> If Reuven shows a document saying that 
          Shimon owes him money and Shimon shows a document that 
          Reuven sold him a field, Shimon can say 'if I owed you 
          money, you should have kept the money as repayment, and 
          not sold to me a field!'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Chachamim:</font></b> Reuven was clever to sell to him land. Now he 
          will be able to collect his debt!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara) Question:</font></b> Admon's law is reasonable. Why do 
          Chachamim argue?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> In a place where people pay for a field before 
          the document is written, all agree that Shimon can say 
          'if I owed you money, you should have kept the money as 
          repayment';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> They argue in a place where people pay for a field 
               after the document is written.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Admon holds that Reuven should have told witnesses 
               why he is selling.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Chachamim say that everyone has friends. Had Reuven 
               done this, Shimon would have heard and would not 
               have bought the field.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO LENT TO HIS CREDITOR</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - Admon):</font></b> If Reuven shows a document saying that 
          Shimon borrowed from him and Shimon shows a document that 
          Reuven subsequently borrowed from him, Shimon can say 'if 
          I truly owed you money, why did you borrow from me? You 
          should have collected the debt!'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  Chachamim say, each collects what the other owes him.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara - Rav Nachman):</font></b> If Reuven and Shimon both show 
          documents saying that the other borrowed from him, each 
          collects what is owed to him.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Sheshes):</font></b> There is no point in paying money and 
          returning it. Rather, each keeps his own.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  All agree that if Reuven and Shimon have the same quality 
          land (both have Idis (top quality), or both Beinonis 
          (medium), or both Ziburis (inferior)), each keeps what he 
          has;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> They argue about when one has Beinonis and the other 
               has Ziburis.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Rav Nachman holds that each collects, because he 
               says that a creditor collects from subjective 
               Beinonis (the borrower's middle quality land).
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  The one with Ziburis receives the other's 
                    Beinonis. He then pays with his Ziburis. (He 
                    need not return the Beinonis he received, since 
                    it is his Idis.)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Rav Sheshes holds that each keeps his property, 
               because he says that a creditor collects objective 
               Beinonis (medium quality land based on the world 
               standard).
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  If he would collect Beinonis, he would have to 
                    return it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> According to Rav Nachman, why does the owner of 
          the Ziburis collect first?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> We should let the owner of the Beinonis first 
               collect Ziburis, and he can then return the Ziburis!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The case is, the owner of the Ziburis was the 
          first to demand payment.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> But still, they come to collect at the same 
          time!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Retraction:</font></b> Rather, they argue when one has Idis and 
          Beinonis, and the other has Ziburis.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Rav Nachman holds that a creditor collects from 
               subjective Beinonis. Rav Sheshes holds that he gets 
               objective Beinonis.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (against Rav Sheshes - Mishnah):</font></b> Chachamim say 
          that each collects...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rav Nachman on behalf of Rav Sheshes):</font></b> The 
          case is, one loan was for 10 years, and the other was for 
          five years.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> When were the loans made?
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  If the first was for 10 years, and the second 
                    for five, why would Admon say that he should 
                    have collected his loan? The collection time 
                    didn't come yet!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Rather, the first loan was for five years, 
               and the second was for 10.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> When was the second loan made?
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  If the first loan was already due to be 
                    collected, Chachamim should agree to Admon that 
                    if he really owed him, he should have collected 
                    the loan!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> If the first loan was not yet due, why does 
                    Admon say he should have collected it?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> The case is, the second loan was made on the 
               day the first loan was due,
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  Chachamim hold that a person would take a loan 
                    for one day (i.e. rather than wait to collect 
                    his loan at the end of the day). Admon holds 
                    that a person would not take a loan for one 
                    day.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rami bar Chama):</font></b> The case is, one party died, 
          leaving no land.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> His orphans collect, but a creditor cannot collect 
               from them.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> The Mishnah says that each side collects!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> It means, this one collects, and this one 
          deserves to collect.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection #1 (Rava):</font></b> The Mishnah says that each collects!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection #2 (Rava):</font></b> The living creditor can pay land, 
          and collect it again!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Nachman):</font></b> If orphans collect land for a debt 
               owed to their father, a creditor of the father can 
               collect that land.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b></b>  These are left difficult.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #3:</font></b> The orphans have Ziburis, and the other party 
          has (Idis and) Beinonis. The orphans collect Beinonis, 
          and pay back Ziburis!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Even if Beinonis is defined objectively, only 
               Ziburis is collected from orphans!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(s)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> That is only if the creditor did not seize 
          Beinonis. If he seized Beinonis, he keeps it.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>FORCING ONE'S WIFE TO MOVE</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> There are three regions (of Eretz Yisrael) 
          regarding marriage: Yehudah, east of the Yarden, and 
          Galil. One cannot force his wife to move to a different 
          region.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  Within a region one can force his wife to move from one 
          city to another, or from a large city to another large 
          city;
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) ONE WHO BORROWS MONEY FROM HIS BORROWER</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> In the Mishnah, Admon and the Chachamim disagree about the law in a case in which a borrower says that the person from whom he borrowed money had actually borrowed money from him. Admon rules that he is not believed, because if he indeed had lent money to the other person, he would have collected his debt from him instead of borrowing money from him. The Chachamim rule that each person may collect his debt from the other.
</p><p>
In the Gemara, Rav Nachman explains that the Mishnah refers to a case in which the first borrower owns fields that are Idis (high quality) and Beinonis (average quality), and the second borrower owns only fields that are Ziburis (low quality). It is in this case that the Chachamim maintain that each borrower collects from the other, and an actual exchange of fields takes place. The first borrower collects his debt by taking the other person's Ziburis field, and the second borrower collects his debt by taking the first person's Beinonis field. In any other case (where both borrowers have the same type of field), however, the Chachamim's ruling does not apply (because 'Hapuchei Matarasa Lamah Li').
</p><p>
If it would be known for certain that both loans actually occurred, it is clear that the Halachah would be as the Chachamim rule. However, in the case of the Mishnah, Admon asserts that the second loan did not occur, because if it did occur, why did the second person borrow money from the first when he could have simply collected his debt? How do the Chachamim answer Admon's proof?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>BA'AL HA'ME'OR</b> explains that the Chachamim maintain that the second person, when he needed money, did not collect his debt from the first but rather borrowed money from him because he wanted to exchange fields and replace his Ziburis field with a Beinonis field.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAMBAN</b> (in Milchamos) rejects the Ba'al ha'Me'or's explanation. He asserts that had the second person wanted to replace his Ziburis field with a Beinonis field, he would not have borrowed money from his own debtor. Rather, he simply would have collected the Beinonis field from his debtor and sold his Ziburis field. Nobody would borrow money in order to get rid of a field he does not want.
</p><p>
The Ramban therefore explains that the dispute between Admon and the Chachamim in the Mishnah here is identical to the dispute in the previous Mishnah. There, the Chachamim said to Admon that the reason why a person sells his field to one who owes him money is to insure that the debtor will have property from which to collect the debt. Similarly, in the case of the Mishnah here, the lender borrows money from his own debtor in order to take possession of the money of his debtor so that he will have something from which to collect his debt. Admon disagrees because he maintains that a Moda'ah should have been proclaimed, while the Chachamim maintain that 'Chavrach Chavra Is Lei' ('your friend has a friend') -- the owner of the field who borrowed money would find out about the lender's intention and would not sell his field to him (or lend him money). The reason why this dispute is repeated is merely to teach the Chachamim's ruling that 'this one collects from this one, and this one collects from this one,' and that there is an exchange of fields in this particular case.
</p><p>
The Ramban's explanation is problematic because this Chidush is unrelated to the dispute between Admon and the Chachamim. In fact, this Chidush could have been taught even if there was no dispute at all between the litigants and everyone agreed that both loans had occurred.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>CHEMDAS SHLOMO</b> follows the approach of the Ramban, but he adds that the words of the Chachamim in the Mishnah here teach another Chidush.
</p><p>
To take a loan from one's debtor is far more problematic than selling him a field. When one sells his debtor a field, the question arises, why did he sell his field to the debtor if he could have collected the money that was owed to him without parting with his field? This question can be answered with the explanation that the creditor wanted to insure that the debtor would have property from which he could collect the debt. In contrast, there is no answer to why a lender would borrow money from his own debtor. Once each person owes money to the other, neither one effectively owes any money! How can a Shtar Chov be written on such a loan?
</p><p>
The answer must be that the case to which the Mishnah refers is a case in which an exchange of fields will take place when each one collects from the other. Accordingly, the debts are not identical and it does make sense to write a Shtar Chov on the second loan. This Chidush in the opinion of the Chachamim is what the Mishnah here adds.
</p><p>
The Chemdas Shlomo supports this explanation from an inference in the wording of the Mishnah. In the earlier Mishnah, Admon asks 'why did you (the lender) sell your field to me (the borrower),' a logical question which demands an answer. In the Mishnah here, Admon asks 'how could you borrow money from me,' a rhetorical question which means that the loan makes no sense at all. This is why the Chachamim respond that the loans are not identical, and the second loan makes sense because of the exchange of fields. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)
</p><p>
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