# snc

lvr: 32
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k67b_1:" Out of the charity funds. Lit., 'came to be married'."
,k67b_2:" Tosef. Keth. VI."
,k67b_3:" V. p. 409, n. 12."
,k67b_4:" Deut. XV, 8."
,k67b_5:" uk lit., 'unto him'."
,k67b_6:" Gen. II, 18, referring to a wife. Tosef Keth. VI."
,k67b_7:" Alfasi: he hired."
,k67b_8:" A town on one of the Upper Galilean mountains. It was called Sepphoris [H] (v. Meg. 6a) 'because it was perched on the top of a mountain like a bird', [H]. At one time it was the capital of Galilee and is identified (l.c.) with Kitron (Judges I, 30). V. Klein, S. [H], 54ff"
,k67b_9:" Tosef. <i>Pe'ah</i>. IV."
,k67b_10:" Which was very expensive."
,k67b_11:" [H], [G], is both a weight, the Roman libra, and a measure of capacity."
,k67b_12:" The meat was so expensive."
,k67b_13:" Lit., 'there'."
,k67b_14:" Where there are no buyers."
,k67b_15:" All the meat that remained after his one pound had been taken off had to be thrown away for lack of buyers and consumers."
,k67b_16:" Lit., 'came before'."
,k67b_17:" [H] (rt. [H], Pilp.), lit., 'roll', i.e., 'to put up with the inconvenience'."
,k67b_18:" Lit., 'came before'."
,k67b_19:" Ps. CXLV, 15. [H] lit., 'in his season'."
,k67b_20:" V. <i>supra</i> n. 3"
,k67b_21:" V. Rashi."
,k67b_22:" [H], lit., 'what is that before me?'"
,k67b_23:" So Rashi. Ar. reads, [H] ( = [H], 'which I said') i.e., the applicant remarked, 'This is just what I have said'. (Cf. Jast.)."
,k67b_24:" Lit., 'I humble myself'. Rashi: 'I spoke too much'. The rt. [H], may bear either meaning."
,k67b_25:" Lit., 'not'."
,k67b_26:" Lit., 'to Open'."
,k67b_27:" And thus leads a life of penury."
,k67b_28:" Lit., 'that his mind shall be elated or cheered'. By this offer he is made to feel that he is not treated as a pauper and he consents, therefore, ultimately to take the sum as a loan without a pledge."
,k67b_29:" [H], E.V., surely, Deut. XV, 8."
,k67b_30:" [H], ibid."
,k67b_31:" I.e., the repetition of the verb, in the Infinitive and Imperfect (v. <i>supra</i> nn. 2 and 3), from which R. Judah derived his ruling."
,k67b_32:" Lit., 'spoke in the language of men', who are in the habit of repeating their words. Hence no inference may be drawn from the repetition in the text cited."
,k67b_33:" Lit., 'one day'."
,k67b_34:" So MS.M., [H] Cur. edd. [H]."
,k67b_35:" Who, owing to the late hour, went to meet him."
,k67b_36:" Lit., 'his mind weakened'. He feared that he was not providentially protected from the heat of the furnace because he was not as worthy of divine protection as his wife."
,k67b_37:" So that the poor had easy access to her."
,k67b_38:" Lit., 'near'. She gave them gifts in kind and they could forthwith derive benefit from them. He, however, was not approachable at all times and the alms he gave to the poor were not in kind but in money which had first to be spent before the poor could derive any benefit from it. His benefits, therefore, were indirect."
,k67b_39:" Why did they make such an effort to escape from the attention of the poor man?"
,k67b_40:" Var Hana (v. B.M. 59a)."
,k67b_41:" To be burned (Gen. XXXVIII, 24)."
,k67b_42:" Ibid., 25. She chose to be burned rather than publicly put her father-in-law to shame. it was only through Judah's own confession (ibid. 26) after he received her private message (ibid 25) that she was saved."
,k67b_43:" Lit., 'day'."
,k67b_44:" [H] MS.M. Cur. edd., 'to him'."
,k67b_45:" Mar 'Ukba'."
,k67b_46:" Lit., 'when his soul was (about to) come to its rest'."
,k67b_47:" The name of a Persian town in the district of Shiraz, v. Fleischer to Levy's Worterbuch I, p. 560."
,k67b_48:" Lit., 'he arose'."
,k67b_49:" Distributing half his wealth."
,k67b_50:" V. <i>supra</i> 50a."
,k67b_51:" Lit., 'go down from his wealth'."
,k67b_52:" I.e., when one is on the point of dying as was the case with Mar 'Ukba."
,k67b_53:" [H] 'scarf' or 'turban', a cloth placed over, or wound round the head, hanging down loosely upon, the arms and shoulders."
,k67b_54:" Who undid the binding and shared the money among themselves."
,k67b_55:" He would nevertheless spare the poor the feelings of shame. "
}

txt:
<p>
applied for a marriage grant<a id="k67b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; the girl orphan is to be enabled to marry first and the boy orphan is married afterwards, because the shame of a woman is greater than that of a man.<a id="k67b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Our Rabbis taught: If an orphan applied for assistance to marry,<a id="k67b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; a house must be rented for him, a bed must be prepared for him and [he must also be supplied with] all [household] objects [required for] his use, and then he is given a wife in marriage, for it is said in Scriptures, Sufficient for his need in that which he wanteth:<a id="k67b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; 'sufficient for his need', refers to the house; 'in that which wanteth', refers to a bed and a table; 'he'<a id="k67b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; refers to a wife, for so it is said in Scripture, I will make him<a id="k67b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; a help meet unto him.<a id="k67b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Our Rabbis taught: 'Sufficient for his need' [implies] you are commanded to maintain him, but you are not commanded to make him rich; 'in that which he wanteth' [includes] even a horse to ride upon and a slave to run before him. It was related about Hillel the Elder that he bought<a id="k67b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; for a certain poor man who was of a good family a horse to ride upon and a slave to run before him. On one occasion he could not find a slave to run before him, so he himself ran before him for three miles.
</p><p>
	Our Rabbis taught: It once happened that the people of Upper Galilee bought for a poor member of a good family of Sepphoris<a id="k67b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; a pound of meat every day.<a id="k67b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; 'A pound of meat'! What is the greatness in this? &mdash; R. Huna replied: [It was] a pound of fowl's meat.<a id="k67b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; And if you prefer I might say: [They purchased] ordinary meat for a pound<a id="k67b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; [of money].<a id="k67b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Ashi replied: The place was<a id="k67b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; a small village<a id="k67b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; and everyday a beast had to be spoiled for his sake.<a id="k67b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>
</p><p>
	A certain man once applied to<a id="k67b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Nehemiah [for maintenance]. 'What do your meals consist of', [the Rabbi] asked him. 'Of fat meat and old wine', the other replied &mdash; 'Will you consent [the Rabbi asked him] to live<a id="k67b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; with me on lentils?' [The other consented,] lived with him on lentils and died. 'Alas', [the Rabbi] said, 'for this man whom Nehemiah has killed.' On the contrary, he should [have said] 'Alas for Nehemiah who killed this man'! &mdash; [The fact], however, [is that the man himself was to blame, for] he should not have cultivated his luxurious habits to such an extent.
</p><p>
	A man once applied to<a id="k67b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; Raba [for maintenance]. 'What do your meals consist of?' he asked him. 'Of fat chicken and old wine', the other replied. 'Did you not consider', [the Rabbi] asked him, 'the burden of the community?' 'Do I', the other replied, 'eat of theirs? I eat [the food] of the All-Merciful; for we learned: The eyes of all wait for Thee, and Thou givest them their food in due season,<a id="k67b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; this, since it is not said, 'in their season' but 'in his<a id="k67b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; season', teaches that the Holy One, blessed be He, provides for every individual his food In accordance with his own habits'.<a id="k67b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; Meanwhile there arrived Raba's sister, who had not seen him for thirteen years, and brought him a fat chicken and old wine. 'What a remarkable incident!'<a id="k67b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; [Raba]<a id="k67b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; exclaimed; [and then] he said to him, 'I apologize<a id="k67b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; to you, come and eat'.
</p><p>
	Our Rabbis taught: If a man has no means and does not wish to be maintained [out of the poor funds] he should be granted [the sum he requires] as a loan and then it can be presented to him as a gift; so R. Meir. The Sages, however, said: It is given to him as a gift and then it is granted to him as a loan. ('As a gift'? He, surely, refuses to<a id="k67b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; take [gifts]! Raba replied: It is offered to him in the first instance<a id="k67b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; as a gift.)
</p><p>
	If he has the means but does not want to maintain himself, [at his own expense],<a id="k67b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; he is given [what he needs] as a gift, and then he is made to repay it. (If 'he is made to repay it' he would, surely, not take again! &mdash; R. Papa replied: [Repayment is claimed] after his death.) R. Simeon said: If he has the means and does not want to maintain himself [at his own expense], no one need feel any concern about him. If he has no means and does not wish to be maintained [out of the poor funds] he is told, 'Bring a pledge and you will receive [a loan]' in order to raise thereby his [drooping] spirit.<a id="k67b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Our Rabbis taught: To lend<a id="k67b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; refers to a man who has no means and is unwilling to receive his maintenance [from the poor funds] to whom [the allowance] must be given as a loan and then presented to him as a gift. Thou shalt lend him<a id="k67b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; refers to a man who has the means and does not wish to maintain himself [at his own expense] to whom [the allowance] is given as a gift and repayment is claimed from his [estate] after his death, so R. Judah. The Sages, however, said: If he has the means and does not wish to maintain himself [at his own expense] no one need feel any concern about him. To what, however, is the text Thou shalt lend him<a id="k67b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; to be applied? The Torah employs ordinary phraseology.<a id="k67b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Mar 'Ukba had a poor man in his neighbourhood into whose door-socket he used to throw four <i>zuz</i> every day. Once<a id="k67b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; [the poor man] thought: 'I will go and see who does me this kindness'. On that day [it happened] that Mar 'Ukba was late at<a id="k67b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; the house of study and his wife<a id="k67b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; was coming home with him. As soon as [the poor man] saw them moving the door he went out after them, but they fled from him and ran into a furnace from which the fire had just been swept. Mar 'Ukba's feet were burning and his wife said to him: Raise your feet and put them on mine. As he was upset,<a id="k67b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; she said to him, 'I am usually at home<a id="k67b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; and my benefactions are direct'.<a id="k67b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; And what [was the reason for] all that?<a id="k67b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Because Mar Zutra b. Tobiah said in the name of Rab (others state: R. Huna<a id="k67b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; b. Bizna said in the name of R. Simeon the Pious; and others again state: R. Johanan said in the name of R. Simeon b. Yohai): Better had a man thrown himself into a fiery furnace than publicly put his neighbour to shame. Whence do we derive this? From [the action of] Tamar; for it is written in Scripture, When she was brought forth,<a id="k67b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; [she sent to her father-in-law].<a id="k67b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Mar 'Ukba had a poor man in his neighbourhood to whom he regularly sent four hundred <i>zuz</i> on the Eve of every Day of Atonement. On one occasion<a id="k67b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; he sent them through his son who came back and said to him, 'He does not need [your help]'. 'What have you seen?' [his father] asked. 'I saw [the son replied] that they were spraying old wine before him'.<a id="k67b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Is he so delicate?' [the father] said, and, doubling the amount, he sent it back to him.
</p><p>
	When he<a id="k67b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; was about to die<a id="k67b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; he requested, 'Bring me my charity accounts'. Finding that seven thousand of Sijan<a id="k67b_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; [gold] <i>denarii</i> were entered therein he exclaimed, 'The provisions are scanty and the road is long', and he forthwith<a id="k67b_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; distributed half of his wealth. But how could he do such a thing?<a id="k67b_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; Has not R. Elai stated: It was ordained at Usha that if a man wishes to spend liberally he should not spend more than a filth?<a id="k67b_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; This applies only during a man's lifetime, since he might thereby be impoverished<a id="k67b_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; but after death<a id="k67b_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; this does not matter.
</p><p>
	R. Abba used to bind money in his scarf,<a id="k67b_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; sling it on his back, and place himself at the disposal of the poor.<a id="k67b_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; He cast his eye, however, sideways [as a precaution] against rogues.<a id="k67b_55"><sup>55</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Hanina had a poor man to whom he regularly sent four <i>zuz</i> on the Eve of every Sabbath. One day he sent that sum through his wile who came back and told him [that the man was in] no need of it. 'What [R. Hanina asked her] did you see?' [She replied:] I heard that he was asked, 'On what will you dine;
</P>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k68a_1:" I.e., <i>white</i> linen (Rashi)."
,k68a_2:" Silk cloths dyed. (Rashi a.l.; cf. also Rashi on Ezek. XVI, 16). [H] or [H] may be compared with [G], cushion', 'pillow' (v. Levy); 'will you recline at dinner', he was asked, 'on the linen, or silken pillows?' The noun is also rendered, 'table outfit', the expressions, 'silver' and 'gold' being taker, literally; 'Will you dine with the silver outfit (i.e., with the outfit used in connection with silver vessels) or with the gold outfit?' (Jast.)."
,k68a_3:" Who do not always respond to every appeal for charity."
,k68a_4:" Deut. XV, 9."
,k68a_5:" Dibtha, below the Tigris."
,k68a_6:" In connection with the duty of assisting the poor."
,k68a_7:" [H]"
,k68a_8:" Deut. XV, 9."
,k68a_9:" Concerning idolatry"
,k68a_10:" Deut. XIII, 14, the expression base, [H] (v. <i>supra</i> n. 12), occuring in both cases."
,k68a_11:" It is only thanks to the rogues who claim charity under false pretences that we have an excuse for not responding to every appeal."
,k68a_12:" V. Rashi; 'a hump' (Jast.) [H] may be rendered 'leg', 'foreleg' or 'shoulder'. The rt. [H] in Piel is to be taken according to Rashi's interpretation in the sense of 'binding', 'forcing', or 'outraging'. It is taken by Jast. as denom. of [H] 'to make high and arched shoulders', 'to cause or pretend to be humpbacked'."
,k68a_13:" One who owns less than two hundred <i>zuz</i> and wishes to take a share in the poor man's gifts. The possessor of two hundred <i>zuz</i> is forbidden to participate in the poor man's gifts."
,k68a_14:" Though the proceeds of such a sale would raise the man's capital above the two hundred <i>zuz</i> limit. <i>Pe'ah</i> VIII, 8."
,k68a_15:" Lit., 'and not?'"
,k68a_16:" Which proves that a poor man is expected to sell his costlier goods before he is allowed to take alms. Why then was it stated here that he is not compelled to sell 'his artical of service'?"
,k68a_17:" The last mentioned Baraitha which orders the sale of 'articles of service'."
,k68a_18:" There can be no hardship in using instead of one made of a cheaper metal."
,k68a_19:" The Mishnah from <i>Pe'ah</i>, according to which one is not compelled to sell his articles of service."
,k68a_20:" I.e., if he possessed less than two hundred <i>zuz</i> and applied for assistance before receiving any help under false pretences. As there is no claim against him he is not to be compelled to sell his articles of service."
,k68a_21:" Who, being in possession of two hundred <i>zuz</i>, accepted alms under false pretences."
,k68a_22:" I.e., after it had been discovered that did not belong to the poor classes and was ordered by the court to refund all sums he had received unlawfully. In such a case, if he is unable to meet the claim otherwise, he is compelled to sell his costly articles and to content himself with the use of cheaper ones."
,k68a_23:" And much more so if without her consent."
,k68a_24:" Lit., 'wrote'."
,k68a_25:" As her share in the estate of her deceased father."
,k68a_26:" Though she had accepted the amount during her minority V. <i>supra</i> note 1."
,k68a_27:" Viz., a tenth of the estate."
,k68a_28:" Who marries after his death."
,k68a_29:" The amount he gives to his first daughter is, therefore, no criterion for his second"
,k68a_30:" The second daughter."
,k68a_31:" Of an orphan."
,k68a_32:" I.e., the amount to be given to the orphan on marriage out of her father's estate."
,k68a_33:" She is to receive a bigger or a smaller amount in accordance with her fathers reputation for generosity or niggardliness."
,k68a_34:" This is explained anon."
,k68a_35:" Lit., ['the parnasah of her husband', parnasah being a technical term to denote the estate set aside for the dowry of the orphaned daughter. Frankel <I>MGWJ</I> 1861, p. 119 connects it with the [G] cf. <i>supra</i> p. 408. n. 6]."
,k68a_36:" A contradiction against the ruling of Samuel."
,k68a_37:" Before marriage, while she is still with her brothers."
,k68a_38:" 'To be (a) maintained and (b) provided for'."
,k68a_39:" V. p. 416, n. 13."
,k68a_40:" V. p. 416, n. 15."
,k68a_41:" Lit., 'that'."
,k68a_42:" Niggardly; having the mind or disposition of a poor man."
,k68a_43:" Generous."
,k68a_44:" Who stated that the amount is determined by what is known of the disposition of her father. How, it is asked, could Samuel differ from a Mishnah?"
,k68a_45:" Samuel."
,k68a_46:" Which would have been a shorter statement and would have included the name of its author also."
,k68a_47:" <small>HIS FIRST DAUGHTER</small>."
,k68a_48:" Since his disposition had not beers revealed."
,k68a_49:" By his specific ruling."
,k68a_50:" HIS FIRST DAUGHTER."
,k68a_51:" The compiler of our Mishnah."
,k68a_52:" Lit., 'and that.'"
,k68a_53:" Lit., 'power'."
,k68a_54:" The Sages"
,k68a_55:" Or: Shall we state etc. (cf Rashi, s.v. [H] Bezah 28a)"
,k68a_56:" That the amount to be given to an orphan on marriage is determined, as R. Judah ruled, by the disposition of her father."
,k68a_57:" On marriage."
,k68a_58:" Ned. 39b."
,k68a_59:" I.e., that the amount the daughter is to receives is a legally, prescribed proportion. How then could he have said that the <i>halachah</i> was in agreement with R. Judah (v <i>supra</i> note 7)?"
,k68a_60:" Lit., that', the statement that the <i>halachah</i> follows R. Judah (v. <i>supra</i> note 7 )"
,k68a_61:" The orphan's father. Knowing his disposition it is possible to determine accordingly what amount his daughter shall be allowed on marriage."
,k68a_62:" Lit., 'that', the law that the proportion she is to receive is always a tenth of the estate."
,k68a_63:" If he was unknown to the court and no one is able to supply reliable information on the point."
,k68a_64:" An orphan on marriage."
,k68a_65:" According to the former statement Rabbi allowed only one tenth while according to the latter he allowed a twelfth."
,k68a_66:" To reconcile the contrary statements."
,k68a_67:" The case where a twelfth had been allowed."
,k68a_68:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 418, n. 13."
,k68a_69:" A citation from which has been discussed <i>supra</i>.."
,k68a_70:" The scholars at the college."
,k68a_71:" Lit.,'in the place of'."
,k68a_72:" It is at present assumed, 'the first to marry'. "
}

txt:
<p>
on the silver [coloured] cloths<a id="k68a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; or on the gold [coloured] ones?'<a id="k68a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; 'It is in view of such cases' [R. Hanina] remarked, 'that R. Eleazar said: Come let us be grateful to the rogues for were it not for then, we<a id="k68a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; would have been sinning every day, for it is said in Scripture, And he cry unto to the Lord against thee, and it be sill unto thee.<a id="k68a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; Furthermore, R. Hiyya b. Rab of Difti<a id="k68a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; taught: R. Joshua b. Korha said, Any one who shuts his eye against charity is like one who worships idols, for here<a id="k68a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; it is written, Beware that there be not a base<a id="k68a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; thought in thy heart etc. [and thine eye will be evil against thy poor brother]<a id="k68a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; and there<a id="k68a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; it is written, Certain base<a id="k68a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; fellows are gone out,<a id="k68a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; as there<a id="k68a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; [the crime is that of] idolatry, so here also [the crime is like that of] idolatry'.<a id="k68a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Our Rabbis taught: If a man pretends to have a blind eye, a swollen belly or a shrunken leg,<a id="k68a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; he will not pass out from this world before actually coming into such a condition. If a man accepts charity and is not in need of it his end [will be that] he will not pass out of the world before he comes to such a condition.
</p><p>
	We learned elsewhere: He<a id="k68a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; may not be compelled to sell his house or his articles of service'.<a id="k68a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; May he not indeed?<a id="k68a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; Was it not taught: If he was in the habit of using gold articles he shall now use copper ones?<a id="k68a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; R. Zebid replied. This is no difficulty. The one<a id="k68a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; refers to the bed and table: the other to cups and dishes. What difference is there in the case of the cups and dishes that they are not [to be sold]? Obviously because he can say, '[The inferior quality] is repulsive to me', [but then, in respect of] a bed and table also, he might say [the cheaper article] is unacceptable to me! &mdash; Raba the son of Rabbah replied: [This<a id="k68a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; refers] to a silver strigil.<a id="k68a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Papa replied: There is no difficulty: one<a id="k68a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; [refers to a man] before he came under the obligation of repayment,<a id="k68a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; and the other refers to a man<a id="k68a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; after he had come under the obligation of repayment.<a id="k68a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>
<P>
	<B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. IF AN ORPHAN WAS GIVEN IN MARRIAGE BY HER MOTHER OR HER BROTHERS [EVEN IF] WITH HER CONSENT<a id="k68a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; AND THEY ASSIGNED<a id="k68a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; TO HER A HUNDRED, OR FIFTY <I>ZUZ</I>,<a id="k68a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; SHE MAY, WHEN SHE ATTAINS HER MAJORITY,<a id="k68a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; RECOVER FROM THEM THE AMOUNT THAT WAS DUE TO HER.<a id="k68a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; R. JUDAH RULED: IF A MAN HAD GIVEN HIS FIRST DAUGHTER IN MARRIAGE, THE SECOND<a id="k68a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; MUST RECEIVE AS MUCH AS THE [FATHER] HAD GIVEN TO THE FIRST. THE SAGES, HOWEVER, SAID: SOMETIMES A MAN IS POOR AND BECOMES RICH OR RICH AND BECOMES POOR.<a id="k68a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; THE ESTATE SHOULD RATHER BE VALUED AND SHE<a id="k68a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; BE GIVEN [THE SHARE THAT IS HER DUE].
</p><p>
	<B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. Samuel stated: In respect of the marriage outfit<a id="k68a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; the assessment<a id="k68a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; is to be determined by [the disposition of] the father.<a id="k68a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>
</p><p>
	All objection was raised: 'The daughters are to be maintained and provided for<a id="k68a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; out of the estate of their father. In what manner? It is not to be said, "Had her father been alive he would have given her such and such a sum" but the estate is valued and she is given [her due share]'. Does not ['provided for' refer to] the marriage<a id="k68a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; outfit?<a id="k68a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; R. Nahman b. Isaac replied: No; [it refers to] her own maintenance.<a id="k68a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; But, surely, it was stated: 'Are to be maintained and provided for'; does not one [of the expressions]<a id="k68a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; refer to the marriage<a id="k68a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; outfit and the other to her own maintenance?<a id="k68a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; No; the one as well as the other refers to her own maintenance,<a id="k68a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; and yet there is no real difficulty, for one of the expressions<a id="k68a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; refers<a id="k68a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; to food and drink and the other<a id="k68a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; to clothing and bedding.
</p><p>
	We learned: THE SAGES, HOWEVER, SAID, SOMETIMES A MAN IS POOR AND BECOMES RICH OR RICH AND BECOMES POOR. THE ESTATE SHOULD RATHER BE VALUED AND SHE BE GIVEN [THE SHARE THAT IS HER DUE]. Now what is meant by POOR and RICH? If it be suggested that POOR means poor in material possessions, and RICH means rich in such possessions, the inference [should consequently be] that the first Tanna holds the opinion that even when a man was rich and became poor she is given as much as before; but, surely, [it may be objected] he has none [to give]. Must it not then [be concluded that] POOR means poor in mind<a id="k68a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; and RICH means rich in mind,<a id="k68a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; and yet it was stated, THE ESTATE SHOULD RATHER BE VALUED AND SHE BE GIVEN [THE SHARE THAT IS HER DUE]. from which it clearly follows that we are not guided by the assumed disposition [of her father], and this presents an objection against Samuel!<a id="k68a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; He<a id="k68a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; holds the same view as R. Judah. For we learned, R. JUDAH RULED: IF A MAN HAD GIVEN HIS FIRST DAUGHTER IN MARRIAGE, THE SECOND SHOULD RECEIVE AS MUCH AS THE [FATHER] HAD GIVEN TO THE FIRST. [Why], then, [did he not] say, 'The <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with R. Judah'?<a id="k68a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; If he had said, 'The <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with R. Judah', it might have been assumed [to apply] only [where her father had actually] given her<a id="k68a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; in marriage, since [in that case] he has revealed his disposition, but not [to a case where] he had not given her<a id="k68a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; in marriage,<a id="k68a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; hence he<a id="k68a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; taught us<a id="k68a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; that R. Judah's reason is that we are guided by our assumption [as to whit was her father's disposition], there being no difference whether he had already given her<a id="k68a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; in marriage or whether he had not given her in marriage; the only object he<a id="k68a_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; had<a id="k68a_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; in mentioning [the case where a father] gave her<a id="k68a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; in marriage was to let you know the extent of the ruling<a id="k68a_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; of the Rabbis<a id="k68a_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; [who maintain] that although he had already given her<a id="k68a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; in marriage and had thereby revealed his disposition, we are nevertheless not to be guided by the assumption [as to what may have been the father's disposition].
</p><p>
	Said Raba to R. Hisda: In our discourse we stated<a id="k68a_55"><sup>55</sup></a>&nbsp; in your name, 'The <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with R. Judah. The other replied: May it be the will [of Providence] that you may report in your discourses all such beautiful sayings in my name. But could Raba, however, have made such a statement?<a id="k68a_56"><sup>56</sup></a>&nbsp; Surely, it was taught: Rabbi said, A daughter who is maintained by her brothers is to receive<a id="k68a_57"><sup>57</sup></a>&nbsp; a tenth of [her father's] estate;<a id="k68a_58"><sup>58</sup></a>&nbsp; and Raba stated that the law is in agreement with Rabbi!<a id="k68a_59"><sup>59</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; This is no difficulty. The former<a id="k68a_60"><sup>60</sup></a>&nbsp; [is a case] where we have formed some opinion about him;<a id="k68a_61"><sup>61</sup></a>&nbsp; the latter<a id="k68a_62"><sup>62</sup></a>&nbsp; is one where we have not formed any opinion about him.<a id="k68a_63"><sup>63</sup></a>&nbsp; This explanation may also be supported by a process of reasoning. For R. Adda b. Ahaba stated: It once happened that Rabbi gave her<a id="k68a_64"><sup>64</sup></a>&nbsp; a twelfth of [her father's] estate. Are not the two statements contradictory?<a id="k68a_65"><sup>65</sup></a>&nbsp; Consequently<a id="k68a_66"><sup>66</sup></a>&nbsp; it must be inferred that the one<a id="k68a_67"><sup>67</sup></a>&nbsp; [refers to a father of whom] some opinion had been formed while the other<a id="k68a_68"><sup>68</sup></a>&nbsp; [refers to one of whom] we have formed no opinion. This is conclusive proof.
</p><p>
	[To turn to] the main text.<a id="k68a_69"><sup>69</sup></a>&nbsp; Rabbi said, A daughter who is maintained by her brothers is to receive a tenth of [her father's] estate. They<a id="k68a_70"><sup>70</sup></a>&nbsp; said to Rabbi: According to your statement, if a man had ten daughters and one son the sons should receive no share at all on account of<a id="k68a_71"><sup>71</sup></a>&nbsp; the daughters? He replied: What I mean is this: The first<a id="k68a_72"><sup>72</sup></a>&nbsp; [daughter] receives a tenth of the estate, the second [receives a tenth] of what [the first] had left, and the third [gets a tenth] of what [the second] had left, and then they divide again [all that they had received] into equal shares.
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k68b_1:" Of course she did. Each one is entitled to a tenth of the value of the estate as it stood at the time she married. Why then should there be a new division in equal shares, which would deprive those who married earlier from what was their due?"
,k68b_2:" Lit., 'came'."
,k68b_3:" After each in turn had received a tenth of the value of the estate as it stood at the moment her share was allowed to her. Since subsequently they will all pool their shares it does not matter which of them is given her share first. the only object of the allotment of the successive shares is to determine what part of the estate is to be left for the son. If there were three daughters for instance, the division would proceed as follows: One daughter would be allowed one tenth of the estate; the other 1/10 x 9/10; and the third 1/10 x 81/100. The son would, therefore, receive 1 - (1/10 - 9/100 - 81/1000) = 729/1000, and each daughter would ultimately get a 271 / (3 X 1000) of the entire estate."
,k68b_4:" Certainly not. If every daughter is entitled to a tenth of the estate, several daughters, surely, should receive more than one tenth."
,k68b_5:" Lit., 'but'."
,k68b_6:" The reading being [H] instead of [H] (one tenth). Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 9."
,k68b_7:" Of a man who left an estate and is survived by sons."
,k68b_8:" Because the terms of a <i>kethubah</i> provide for the maintenance of daughters only until adolescence (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a> s.v. bogereth) or marriage, whichever is the earlier."
,k68b_9:" The tenth of the estate to which, as stated <i>supra</i>, a daughter is entitled. In his opinion it is only one who is a minor, nacarah (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>), that receives such tenth, once she has reached her adolescence, or married as a nacarah, without claiming at the time her full marriage outfit, she loses her claim to it."
,k68b_10:" If they had not been married early and are desirous of securing their tenth before losing it through age."
,k68b_11:" [They hire men to declare that they would marry them (Strashun)]."
,k68b_12:" why she may recover the amount prescribed for her marriage outfit,"
,k68b_13:" At the time she married."
,k68b_14:" Even If she was still a nacarah at the time of marriage."
,k68b_15:" To her full claim."
,k68b_16:" And she would not be entitled to the balance of her marriage outfit. This anonymous Mishnah then is in agreement with the view of R. Simeon b. Eleazar. Now, since the <i>halachah</i> is usually in agreement with the anonymous Mishnah how could R. Nahman maintain that the <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with Rabbi?"
,k68b_17:" Rabbi's statement that she does not lose her marriage outfit."
,k68b_18:" When less than her due was assigned to her."
,k68b_19:" Our Mishnah."
,k68b_20:" Hence it is only a minor, who cannot surrender her rights, that may recover the balance when she becomes of age. One, however, who has passed her minority (cf. <i>supra</i> note 8) may well surrender her right. Her silence is regarded as consent."
,k68b_21:" Lit., 'for if so', that Rabbi maintains that in all cases a daughter on attaining adolescence does not lose the right to her marriage outfit,"
,k68b_22:" Lit., 'that of Rabbi against that of Rabbi'."
,k68b_23:" Lit., 'yes'."
,k68b_24:" Is she to receive a tenth of the whole."
,k68b_25:" She is to receive no such allowance."
,k68b_26:" I.e., after she had attained her adolescence, How then could Rabbi also have stated that a daughter always (v. <i>supra</i> n. 1) receives her outfit?"
,k68b_27:" Against the full, or partial loss of her marriage outfit allowance. Even without her protest she retains he right to the tenth of the estate that is due to her,"
,k68b_28:" Otherwise she loses her claim to the marriage outfit."
,k68b_29:" <i>Supra</i>. Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 420, notes 11 to 14. From which it follows that once she passes her minority, though she did not attain her adolescence, a daughter loses her full claim to an outfit allowance if she did not lodge her protest on marriage. How then could it be said that according to Raba, 'if she married (provided it was before attaining her adolescence) she need not lodge a protest'?"
,k68b_30:" Raba's ruling that 'if she married she need not lodge a protest'."
,k68b_31:" After her marriage."
,k68b_32:" Her brothers. In such a case it is to be presumed that her silence was not due to her consent to lose her outfit but to the belief that, as they continued to maintain her, they would also give her in due course the full amount of her outfit allowance."
,k68b_33:" The inference from our Mishnah according to which one who has passed out of her minority surrenders on marriage her right to the balance of her outfit."
,k68b_34:" Hence she loses the right to her outfit unless she lodged her protest."
,k68b_35:" Of a daughter."
,k68b_36:" Of a daughter's maintenance."
,k68b_37:" Cf. <i>supra</i> 52b."
,k68b_38:" As a point of difference between the two rights."
,k68b_39:" By the brothers (not by the father)."
,k68b_40:" Since it represents a fixed sum (one tenth of the estate) it had the validity of a debt incumbent upon the estate."
,k68b_41:" Even if it was only the brothers who pledged it (v. Git. 48b)"
,k68b_42:" As the amount is not a fixed quantity it has not the same force as a debt."
,k68b_43:" For maintenance as well as for marriage outfit."
,k68b_44:" And much more so for marriage outfit which has the validity of a debt of a debt (cf. <i>supra</i> nn. 6 and 8)."
,k68b_45:" On his death bed."
,k68b_46:" Since even a dying man, whose verbal instructions have the validity of a legal contract, cannot annul the undertaking to maintain his daughters which he entered in the <i>kethubah</i>."
,k68b_47:" While the latter is obligatory upon the deceased and upon his heirs, the firmer has to be provided by the heirs only where the deceased did not give specific instructions to the contrary. "
}

txt:
<p>
But did not each one receive what was hers?<a id="k68b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; It is this that was meant: If all of theme wish<a id="k68b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; to marry at the same time they are to receive equal shares.<a id="k68b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; This provides support for [the opinion] of R. Mattena; for R. Mattena has said: If all of them wish to marry at the same time they are to receive one tenth. 'One tenth'! Can you imagine [such a ruling]?<a id="k68b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; The meaning must consequently be that<a id="k68b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; they are to receive their tenths at the same time.<a id="k68b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Our Rabbis taught: The daughters,<a id="k68b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; whether they had attained their adolescence before they married or whether they married before they had attained their adolescence, lose their right to maintenance<a id="k68b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; but not to their allowance for marriage outfit; so Rabbi. R. Simeon b. Eleazar said: If they also attained their adolescence, they lose the right to their marriage outfit.<a id="k68b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; How should they proceed?<a id="k68b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; They hire for themselves husbands<a id="k68b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; and exact their outfit allowance. R. Nahman stated: Huna told me, The law is in agreement with Rabbi.
</p><p>
	Raba raised an objection against R. Nahman: IF AN ORPHAN WAS GIVEN IN MARRIAGE BY HER MOTHER OR HER BROTHERS [EVEN IF] WITH HER CONSENT, AND THEY ASSIGNED TO HER A HUNDRED, OR FIFTY <I>ZUZ</I>, SHE MAY, WHEN SHE ATTAINS HER MAJORITY, RECOVER FROM THEM THE AMOUNT THAT WAS DUE TO HER. The reason then<a id="k68b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; is because she was a minor;<a id="k68b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; had she, however, been older<a id="k68b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; her right<a id="k68b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; would have been surrendered!<a id="k68b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; This is no difficulty; the one<a id="k68b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; is a case where she protested;<a id="k68b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; the other,<a id="k68b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; where she did not protest.<a id="k68b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; This expla nation may also be supported by a process of reasoning. For otherwise<a id="k68b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; there would arise a contradiction between two statements of Rabbi.<a id="k68b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; For it was taught, 'Rabbi said, A daughter who is maintained by her brothers is to receive a tenth of [her father's] estate', [which implies] only when<a id="k68b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; she is maintained<a id="k68b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; but not<a id="k68b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; when she is not maintained.<a id="k68b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; Must it not in consequence be concluded that one [statement deals with one] who protested and the other [with one] who did not protest. This proves it.
</p><p>
	Rabina said to Raba: R. Adda b. Ahaba told us in your name, If she attained her adolescence she need not lodge a protest;<a id="k68b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; if she married she need not lodge a protest;<a id="k68b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; but if she attained her adolescence and was also married it is necessary for her to lodge a protest.<a id="k68b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; But could Raba have made such a statement? Surely, Raba pointed out an objection against R. Nahman [from the Mishnah of] AN ORPHAN, and the other replied that 'the one is a case where she protested, the other where she did not protest'!<a id="k68b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; This is no difficulty. One<a id="k68b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; is a case where she is maintained<a id="k68b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; by them;<a id="k68b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; the other,<a id="k68b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; where she is not maintained by them.<a id="k68b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Huna stated in the name of Rabbi: [The right<a id="k68b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; to] marriage outfit is not the same as that<a id="k68b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; conferred by a condition in a <i>kethubah</i>.<a id="k68b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; What is meant by 'is not the same as that conferred by a condition in a kethubah'? Should it be suggested<a id="k68b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; that whereas for the allowance for a marriage outfit even property pledged<a id="k68b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; may be seized,<a id="k68b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; [for the fulfilment of an obligation<a id="k68b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; under] the terms of a <i>kethubah</i> no pledged property<a id="k68b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; may be seized,<a id="k68b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; what [new point, it may be objected,] does this teach us? Surely it is a daily occurrence [that pledged property] is seized for marriage outfit but not for maintenance! [Should it], however, [be suggested that] whereas for a marriage outfit movable objects also may be seized, [for the fulfilment of an obligation under] a condition in a <i>kethubah</i> only real estate. but not movable objects, may be seized, [it may be objected that,] according to Rabbi, for the one as well as the other<a id="k68b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; [movable objects] may be seized. For it was taught: Both landed property and movable property may be seized for the maintenance of a wile or daughters;<a id="k68b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; so Rabbi! What, then, is meant by '[The right to] marriage outfit is not the same as that conferred by a condition in a kethubah'? &mdash; As it was taught: If a man<a id="k68b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; said that his daughters must not be maintained out of his estate he is not to be obeyed.<a id="k68b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; [If, however, he said, that] his daughters shall not receive their marriage outfit out of his estate he is obeyed, because [the right to] marriage outfit is not the same as that conferred by a condition in a <i>kethubah</i>.<a id="k68b_47"><sup>47</sup></a>
</P>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k69a_1:" Lit., 'suspended'."
,k69a_2:" [H] perhaps from [H] 'to dig'. 'scratch' hence a line drawn with a stylus (cf Rashi and last.). Aruk renders 'stitches' (cf [H] 'thread'), and this is apparently the interpretation adopted by Tosaf (s.v. [H] a.l.), the meaning being that 'among the documents that were sewn together one containing the enquiry was appended'; or, 'among the stitches holding the documents together the one containing the enquiry was inserted'."
,k69a_3:" A friendly,' letter (Rashi)."
,k69a_4:" May it be seized by the daughter for their marriage outfit?"
,k69a_5:" Lit.,'what goes out (results) from it?'"
,k69a_6:" Lit., 'thus'."
,k69a_7:" Sold or pledged. And should there be a difference in law between the two cases, Rabbi in his reply would naturally indicate it."
,k69a_8:" Which the brothers sold or pledged. Cf. <i>supra</i>."
,k69a_9:" I.e., maintenance or marriage outfit."
,k69a_10:" And the entire estate fell to the lot of the daughters."
,k69a_11:" Since she did not collect her tenth while the son was alive, i.e., before she and her sister became the sole heirs,"
,k69a_12:" A daughter may claim a tenth of the estate from a son only but not from a daughter whose rights are equal to hers."
,k69a_13:" Though it has been pledged or sold."
,k69a_14:" To her marriage outfit, even in an estate which had been neither sold nor pledged. The first sister, surely, cannot possess a stronger claim upon the estate than a buyer or a creditor, V. Git. 51a."
,k69a_15:" That R. Johanan never heard Rabbi's ruling."
,k69a_16:" R. Johanan."
,k69a_17:" Since he did not ask him this it may be inferred that R. Johanan did hear Rabbi's ruling but did not accept it. For this reason also he did not withdraw his ruling in the case of the two daughters."
,k69a_18:" Rabbi's ruling."
,k69a_19:" The case of the two daughters which was discussed after he had heard Rabbi's ruling and accepted it."
,k69a_20:" At first she was entitled to a tenth only and now she gets a half. In such circumstances she may well be expected to surrender her claim to the tenth. Rabbi, however, deals with a case where the brothers are alive, and the daughters ate entirely dependent on their tenths,"
,k69a_21:" If the argument of additional provision is admissible."
,k69a_22:" The second sister."
,k69a_23:" From which she was to receive her tenth."
,k69a_24:" In respect of her right to a tenth of her father's estate."
,k69a_25:" To the tenth of the estate. Lit., 'to remove her'."
,k69a_26:" Because she has the status of an heiress, Lit., 'thus also'."
,k69a_27:" As heiress she has the right to claim a share in the actual property her father left and in every portion of it."
,k69a_28:" In respect of her right to a tenth of her father's estate."
,k69a_29:" Her claim may, therefore, be met by a money payment or by the allotment of any plot of land of the value of a tenth of the estate that is due to her."
,k69a_30:" Lit., 'he would have removed (sc. dismissed) her',"
,k69a_31:" So MS.M. adding [H] after [H]."
,k69a_32:" Land is classified as [H] best [H], medium or [H] worst, and payments are made from these respective qualities in accordance with the strength and validity of any particular claim. Cf. e g., Git. 48b."
,k69a_33:" That she had never taken anything from the estate. This would be the law if she were regarded as the creditor of the brothers."
,k69a_34:" If she is regarded as the father's creditor. In the latter case she would be subject to the restrictions imposed on a creditor who claims his debt from the debtor's orphans (v. Get. 48b)."
,k69a_35:" Who survived his father and from whom his sister claimed a portion of her tenth."
,k69a_36:" Who predeceased R. Ashi and whose son, on the death of his grandfather (R. Ashi), inherited his father's (R. Sama's) share and was now sued by his aunt to give her the portion of her tenth that his father as a son of R. Ashi owed her (Rashi). [Ritba and others: R. Sama died shortly after R. Ashi, before his daughter managed to collect her tenth share in the estate]."
,k69a_37:" According to Rabina, then, the daughter was regarded as the debtor of her brothers (Mar and R. Sama). From the former, therefore, who was alive she consequently collected of the best and without an oath (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 425, n. 11). From the latter, however, she could only collect through his son as the creditor of has father's and was therefore subject to the restrictions of a creditor who collects from orphans (cf. <i>supra</i>. note I)."
,k69a_38:" <i>Var. lec</i>., 'Zuti' (cf. B.B. 66b)"
,k69a_39:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 222, n. 8."
,k69a_40:" The bearer, whose case R. Nehemiah had investigated."
,k69a_41:" The casing being regarded as landed estate from which her tenth may be collected."
,k69a_42:" The yield of the houses being legally regarded, like, the houses themselves, as landed property (cf. <i>supra</i> n. 8')."
,k69a_43:" Lit., 'peace."
,k69a_44:" To R. Shesheth."
,k69a_45:" Lit., 'say'."
,k69a_46:" To R. Anan."
,k69a_47:" I.e., 'If you do not deliver the message etc.', the third person being used for euphemism."
,k69a_48:" I.e., using exactly the same words, lit., 'say'."
,k69a_49:" R. Huna was apparently offended by the tone or wording of R. Anan's communication. Hence the abusive reply."
,k69a_50:" R. Anan."
,k69a_51:" A complimentary introduction to the unpleasant message that follows"
,k69a_52:" I.e., R. Anan. An excuse for carrying out his instructions though they were offensive to R. Anan."
,k69a_53:" Lit., 'say'."
,k69a_54:" Lit., 'to him'."
,k69a_55:" The seat of honour at the meal in a house of mourning was given to the greatest scholar in the company"
,k69a_56:" Lit., 'sent'."
,k69a_57:" Without the title of 'R.'"
,k69a_58:" [H], rendered <i>supra</i>, 'a house of mourning'. >"
}

txt:
<p>
	Rah inserted<a id="k69a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; [the following enquiry] between the lines<a id="k69a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; [of a communication<a id="k69a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; he sent] to Rabbi: What [is the law] where the brothers have encumbered [the estate they inherited from their father]?<a id="k69a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; [When the enquiry reached him] R. Hiyya [who] was sitting before him asked, '[does he mean:] They sold it or pledged it?' &mdash; 'What difference call this make?'<a id="k69a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; the other retorted. Whether they sold it [he continued] or pledged it, [the estate] may he seized [to meet the obligation] of marriage outfit but may not be seized for that of maintenance
</p><p>
	As to Rab, however, if his enquiry [related to brothers] who sold [the estate], he should have written to him, 'sold'; and if his enquiry [related to brothers] who pledged it, he should have written to him, 'pledged'! &mdash; Rab wished to ascertain the law concerning both cases and he thought: If I write to him 'sold' [I shall get] satisfaction If he were to send [in reply] that 'the estate may be seized', since the same  ruling would apply with even greater force to the case where they pledged [the estate]. If, however, he were to send me in reply that 'it may not be seized', the question [in respect of brothers] who pledged [the estate] would still remain. If, [again]. I were to write to him, 'pledged' then if he sent in reply that 'the estate may not be seized' this ruling would apply with even greater force [to the case where] they sold it. Should he, however, send a reply that 'it may be seized', the question [in respect of brothers] who sold It would still remain. I will, therefore, write to him, 'encumbered' which might mean the one<a id="k69a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; as well as the other<a id="k69a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Johanan, however, ruled: [An estate]<a id="k69a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; may not be seized either [to meet the obligation of the] one or of the other.<a id="k69a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>
</p><p>
	The question was raised: Did not R. Johanan hear the ruling of Rabbi, but if he had heard it he would have accepted it? Or is it possible that he heard it and did not accept it? &mdash; Come and hear what has been stated: If a man died and left two daughters and one son, and the first forestalled [the others] and took a tenth of the estate while the other did not manage to collect [her share] before the son died,<a id="k69a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Johanan ruled: The second<a id="k69a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; has surrendered her right.<a id="k69a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; Said R. Hanina: Something that is even more striking than this has been said, [viz.. that an estate] may be seized<a id="k69a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; [to meet the obligation] of a marriage outfit though it may not be seized for that of maintenance, and you nevertheless state, 'The second has surrendered her right'?<a id="k69a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; Now, if that were the case,<a id="k69a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; he<a id="k69a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; should have asked him 'who said it?'<a id="k69a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>
</p><p>
	 &mdash; But is it not possible that he in fact did not hear it [at first]<a id="k69a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; and when he [finally] heard he accepted it, but there<a id="k69a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; [the circumstances are] different, since the house [of the second daughter] has now ample provisions?<a id="k69a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; Said R. Yemar to R. Ashi: Now then,<a id="k69a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; if she<a id="k69a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; found anything at all, so that her house is amply provided for, would we in such a case also not give her a tenth of the estate? &mdash; The other replied: I said, A house amply provided for from the same estate.<a id="k69a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Amemar ruled: A daughter<a id="k69a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; has [the legal status of] an heiress. Said R. Ashi to Amemar: Should it be desired to settle her claim<a id="k69a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; by means of a money payment such a settlement cannot be effected for the same reason?<a id="k69a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; 'Yes', the other replied. 'Should it be desired [the first asked] to settle her claim by [giving her] one plot of land, such a settlement cannot be effected for the same reason?'<a id="k69a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; 'Yes', the other replied.<a id="k69a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Ashi, however, ruled: A daughter<a id="k69a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; has [the legal status of] a creditor.<a id="k69a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; And Amemar also withdrew his former opinion. For R. Minyomi son of R. Nihumi stated: I was once standing before Amemar and a woman who claimed a tenth of [her deceased father's] estate appeared before him, and I observed [that it was his] opinion that if [her brothers] desired to settle with her by means of a money payment he would have agreed to the settlement.<a id="k69a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; For he heard the brothers say to her, 'If we had the money we would settle with you<a id="k69a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; by a cash payment', and he remained silent and told them nothing to the contrary.
</p><p>
	Now that it has been said that [a daughter in her claim to her tenth]<a id="k69a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; has the legal status of a creditor [the question arises whether she is the creditor] of the father or of the brothers. In what respect can this matter? &mdash; In respect [of allowing her] to collect [her tenth] either from their medium<a id="k69a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; land and without an oath,<a id="k69a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; or of their worst land with an oath.<a id="k69a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; Now what [is the law]? &mdash; Come and hear [of the decision] of Rabina: He allowed the daughter of R. Ashi to collect [her tenth] from Mar<a id="k69a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; the son of R. Ashi out Of his medium land, without an oath, but from the son of R. Sama<a id="k69a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; the son of R. Ashi out of his worst land with an oath.<a id="k69a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Nehemiah the son of R. Joseph sent the following message to Rabbah the son of R. Huna Zuta<a id="k69a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; of Nehardea:<a id="k69a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; When this woman<a id="k69a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; presents herself to you, authorize her to collect a tenth part of [her deceased father's] estate even from the casing of handmills.<a id="k69a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Ashi stated: When we were at the college of R. Kahana we authorized the collection [of a daughter's tenth] from the rent<a id="k69a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; of houses also.
</p><p>
	R. Anan sent [this communication] to R. Huna, '[To] our colleague Huna, greetings.<a id="k69a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; When this woman<a id="k69a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; presents herself before you, authorize her to collect a tenth part of [her father's] estate'. [When the communication arrived,] R. Shesheth was sitting before him. 'Go', [R. Huna] said to him,<a id="k69a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; 'and convey<a id="k69a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; to him<a id="k69a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; [the following message]-and he<a id="k69a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; who does not deliver the message<a id="k69a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; to him shall fall under the ban &mdash; "Anan, Anan, [is the collection to be made] from landed, or from movable property? And who presides at the meal in a house of mourning?"'<a id="k69a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Shesheth went to R. Anan and said to him: The Master<a id="k69a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; is a teacher,<a id="k69a_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; and R. Huna is a teacher of the teacher,<a id="k69a_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; and he pronounced the ban against anyone who would not convey<a id="k69a_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; [his message] to you;<a id="k69a_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; and had he not pronounced the ban I would not have said, 'Anan, Anan, [is the collection to be made] from landed, or movable property, and who presides at the meal in a house of mourning?'<a id="k69a_55"><sup>55</sup></a>&nbsp; Thereupon, R. Anan went to Mar 'Ukba and said to him: See, Master, how R. Huna addressed<a id="k69a_56"><sup>56</sup></a>&nbsp; me as 'Anan, Anan';<a id="k69a_57"><sup>57</sup></a>&nbsp; and, furthermore, I do not know what he meant by the message he sent me on marziha.<a id="k69a_58"><sup>58</sup></a>&nbsp; The other said to him: Tell me now
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k69b_1:" Lit., 'sent'."
,k69b_2:" [H], Heb. from Aram. [H]"
,k69b_3:" Jer. XVI, 5"
,k69b_4:" At the meal in a house of mourning."
,k69b_5:" E V., as chief. [H] may bear both renderings."
,k69b_6:" This is explained by R. Nahman anon."
,k69b_7:" Job. XXIX, 25."
,k69b_8:" [H] Imperf. Piel of [H]."
,k69b_9:" How then could the text be said to refer to the mourner who is himself to be comforted?"
,k69b_10:" [H], which may be vocalized as the Pus form Yenuham, 'one who is comforted'. Though the text must retain its obvious meaning with the M.T. vocalization of [H], the possibility of reading ojbh as ojbh also permits of the Midrashic exposition (Tosaf. s.v. [H])."
,k69b_11:" That the mourner is to sit at the head of the table at the meal in a house of mourning."
,k69b_12:" [H], Amos, VI, 7. Midrashically, rx = ra (chief, I.e., 'sits at the head'), jzrn is divided into [H] (bitter) and [H] (rt. [H] distracted), and [H] is taken to refer to the comforters who stretch themselves on their couches or on the ground at the feet of the mourner. (Cf. Golds.). E.V., And the revelry of men that stretched themselves shall pass away."
,k69b_13:" I.e., the mourner."
,k69b_14:" I.e., sits at the head of the table during the meal."
,k69b_15:" Before him, sc. those, who came to offer their condolence."
,k69b_16:" A Gaonite provision, [H], empowers also the seizure of movable property to meet any of these obligations (cf Tosaf. <i>supra</i> 51a. s.v. [H]). [This Takkanah has been ascribed to Hunai Gaon and dated 787, v. Epstein, L. The Jewish Marriage, p. 255 and Tykocinski, Die Gaonaischen Verordnungen, p. 35ff]."
,k69b_17:" Lit., 'he who made a third', i.e., appointed a third person as trustee."
,k69b_18:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 12, instructing him to use the money after his death for the benefit of his daughter, e.g., to buy for her a field."
,k69b_19:" So Tosaf (s.v. [H]) contrary to Rashi's 'married', v. Gemara <i>infra</i>."
,k69b_20:" 'And desire the money to be given to him',"
,k69b_21:" Lit., 'what was put in his hand as a third party'. The daughter's wish is to be disregarded and the trustee buys a field with it."
,k69b_22:" Lit., 'was not but'."
,k69b_23:" Not merely a sum of money with which to buy one."
,k69b_24:" Lit., 'behold it'."
,k69b_25:" Lit., 'from now', sc. from the moment she expressed her desire to sell it, and the same should apply where the trust consisted of a sum of money. The sum of money must consequently be at her disposal and she may gave it to her husband if she desires to do so."
,k69b_26:" The point of this limitation is discussed in the Gemara <i>infra</i>."
,k69b_27:" The assumption being that the father wished the trustee to act only until his daughter's marriage."
,k69b_28:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 428, n. 16."
,k69b_29:" Tosef. Keth. VI. Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 428, n. 16."
,k69b_30:" R. Meir and R. Jose, i.e., does R. Meir in the Baraitha refer to a minor also or only to one who is of age?"
,k69b_31:" Lit., 'yes'."
,k69b_32:" Lit., 'say'."
,k69b_33:" Of our Mishnah."
,k69b_34:" Since R. Jose gave as the reason for his ruling the consideration that she could have sold the field if she wished"
,k69b_35:" Lit., 'yes'."
,k69b_36:" The final clause, then, would be superfluous"
,k69b_37:" Lit., and thus he taught'."
,k69b_38:" Now, since R. Meir also admits that the act of a minor has no validity, his statement in the Baraitha cited that after marriage she is entitled to have her wish must refer to one who is of age and not to a minor. What, then, is the practical difference between R. Meir and R. Jose?"
,k69b_39:" According to R. Meir her wish is to be ignored; according to R. Jose it is to be granted. Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 428, n. 14. As to a minor both agree that bet request is not to be granted even if she makes it after her marriage."
,k69b_40:" Scholar and merchant, a contemporary of R. Johanan. When the latter was appointed to the presidency of the college the former was away from his home town, engaged in the pursuit of his commercial enterprises. What follows happened on his return when he was told that had he devoted more time to his studies and less to commerce the presidency would have been offered to him. V. Ta'an. 21a."
,k69b_41:" Lit., suspended himself' (cf. Rashi Git. 32b, s.v. [H] Pesah. 68b, s.v. [H] )."
,k69b_42:" Or sail-yard. Cf. Rashi. Other renderings: 'Sail, or mast of a boat', 'mastyard', [H], GR. [G], (perhaps from rt. [H], 'to espy', hence 'espying place') 'mast' or 'yard' (v. Jast.) [H] cf. Assyr. makua, a kind of 'boat', 'mast' or 'sail-yard' (v. Rashi, a.l. and Git. 36a, Rashb. B.B. 161b); 'a ship' (Aruk). In the parallel passage. Ta'an 21a, the reading for [H] is [H] (of a ship)."
,k69b_43:" To prove that despite has commercial undertakings he had not forgotten his studies."
,k69b_44:" These were regarded as the most authoritative of the Baraitha collections"
,k69b_45:" Cf. p 430, n. 9."
,k69b_46:" Demanding Mishnaic authority for its rulings V. <i>infra</i> note 12."
,k69b_47:" Lying on his death bed, or setting out on a long journey."
,k69b_48:" Out of the estate he leaves behind."
,k69b_49:" For their maintenance"
,k69b_50:" A <i>sela'</i> two <i>shekels</i>"
,k69b_51:" Their father's mention of the smaller coin. it is assumed, was not meant to exclude the bigger one. All that he implied was that his children should be given no more than their actual weekly requirements."
,k69b_52:" Though they may be in need of more."
,k69b_53:" Whom he named."
,k69b_54:" Because in this case it is evident that it was his intention to economize as much as possible on the weekly maintenance of his children in order that the heirs he nominated might in due course receive as large an inheritance as possible."
,k69b_55:" That, though the children need more than their father had allowed them, the instructions of the deceased must be carried out. "
}

txt:
<p>
how the incident actually occurred. 'The incident', the first replied, 'happened in such and such a way'. 'A man', the other exclaimed, 'who does not know the meaning of marziha should [scarcely] presume to address<a id="k69b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Huna as, "our colleague Huna".'
</p><p>
	What [is the meaning of] marziha. &mdash; Mourning; for it is written in Scripture, Thus saith the Lord: Enter not into the house of mourning<a id="k69b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; etc.<a id="k69b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Abbahu stated: Whence is it deduced that a mourner sits at the head [of the table]?<a id="k69b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; [From Scripture] wherein it is said, I chose out their way, and sat at the head,<a id="k69b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; and dwelt as a king in the army, as one that comforteth<a id="k69b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; the mourners.<a id="k69b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; But does not yenahem<a id="k69b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; mean [one who comforts] others?<a id="k69b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Nahman b. Isaac replied: The written form is YNHM.<a id="k69b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; Mar Zutra said: [The deduction<a id="k69b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; is made] from here: We-sar marzeah seruhim,<a id="k69b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; he who is in bitterness and distracted<a id="k69b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; becomes the chief<a id="k69b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; of those that stretched themselves.<a id="k69b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Raba stated: The law [is that payment may be exacted] from landed property, but not from movable property, whether in respect of maintenance, <i>kethubah</i> or marriage outfit.<a id="k69b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. IF A MAN DEPOSITED<a id="k69b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; A SUM OF MONEY FOR HIS [UNMARRIED] DAUGHTER WITH A TRUSTEE,<a id="k69b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; AND [AFTER SHE WAS BETROTHED]<a id="k69b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; SHE SAYS, 'I TRUST MY HUSBAND',<a id="k69b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; THE TRUSTEE MUST ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITION OF HIS TRUST;<a id="k69b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; SO R. MEIR. R. JOSE, HOWEVER, SAID: WERE [THE TRUST] ACTUALLY<a id="k69b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; A FIELD<a id="k69b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; AND SHE WISHED TO SELL IT, WOULD IT NOT BE DEEMED<a id="k69b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; SOLD FORTHWITH!<a id="k69b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; THIS APPLIES TO ONE WHO IS OF AGE.<a id="k69b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; IN THE CASE OF A MINOR, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO VALIDITY AT ALL IN THE ACT OF A MINOR.
</p><p>
	<B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. Our Rabbis taught: If a man deposited for his son-in-law with a trustee a sum of money wherewith to buy a field for his daughter, and she says, 'Let it be given to my husband', she is entitled [to have her wish fulfilled, if it was expressed] after her marriage<a id="k69b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; but if only after her betrothal the trustee must act according to the conditions of his trust;<a id="k69b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; so R. Meir. R. Jose, however, said: A woman who is of age has a right [to obtain her desire] whether [it was expressed] after her marriage or only after betrothal, but [in the case of] a minor [whether her wish was expressed] after marriage or after betrothal, the trustee must act in accordance with the conditions of his trust.<a id="k69b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; What is the practical difference between them?<a id="k69b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; If it be suggested that the practical difference between them is the case of a minor after her marriage, R. Meir holding the opinion that [even] she is entitled [to have her wish] and R. Jose comes to state that even after marriage [It is only] a woman who is of age that is entitled to have her wish<a id="k69b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; but not a minor, [in that case] what of<a id="k69b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; the final clause,<a id="k69b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; IN THE CASE OF A MINOR, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO VALIDITY AT ALL IN THE ACT OF A MINOR. Who [it might be asked] could have taught this? If it be suggested [that the author was] R. Jose, [it could be objected:] This, surely, could be inferred from the first clause; for, since R. Jose said, WERE [THE TRUST] ACTUALLY A FIELD AND SHE WISHED TO SELL IT, WOULD IT NOT BE DEEMED SOLD FORTHWITH! [it follows<a id="k69b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; that only] one that is of age, who is eligible to effect a sale, was meant,<a id="k69b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; but not a minor who is ineligible to effect a sale.<a id="k69b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; Consequently it must be R. Meir [who was the author of] it, and a clause is in fact missing [from our Mishnah], the proper reading being as follows:<a id="k69b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; 'THE TRUSTEE MUST ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF HIS TRUST. This applies only [to a woman whose desire was expressed] after her betrothal, but if after her marriage she is entitled [to have her wish]. THIS [furthermore] APPLIES TO ONE WHO IS OF AGE. IN THE CASE OF A MINOR, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO VALIDITY AT ALL IN THE ACT OF A MINOR.'<a id="k69b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; [The fact]. however, is that the practical difference between them is the case of one who is of age [whose wish was expressed] after her betrothal.<a id="k69b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>
</p><p>
	It was stated: Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel. The <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with R. Jose. Raba ion the name of R. Nahman said, The <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with R. Meir. Ilfa<a id="k69b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; reclined<a id="k69b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; upon a sail mast<a id="k69b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; and<a id="k69b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; said: 'Should any one come and submit to me any statement [in the Baraithoth] of R. Hiyya and R. Oshaia<a id="k69b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; which I cannot make clear to him [with the aid] of our Mishnah I will drop from the mast<a id="k69b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; and drown myself'. An aged man came and recited to him [the following Baraitha:]<a id="k69b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; If a man<a id="k69b_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; said, 'Give my children<a id="k69b_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; a <i>shekel</i> a week',<a id="k69b_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; and they require a <i>sela'</i>,<a id="k69b_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; a <i>sela'</i> is to he given to them.<a id="k69b_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; But if he said, 'Give them no more than a shekel', only a <i>shekel</i> is to he given to them.<a id="k69b_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; If, however, he gave Instructions that if these died others<a id="k69b_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; shall be his heirs in their stead, only one <i>shekel</i> [a week] is to be given to them, irrespective of whether he used the expression of 'give' or 'give no [more]',<a id="k69b_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; [Ilfa] said to him: [Do you wish to know] whose ruling this<a id="k69b_55"><sup>55</sup></a>&nbsp; is?
</P>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k71a_1:" V. Ned. Sonc. ed. p. 148f and notes."
,k71a_2:" Who also allowed a period of THIRTY DAYS."
,k71a_3:" R. Judah."
,k71a_4:" of which the first Tanna does not speak."
,k71a_5:" Consisting of thirty days."
,k71a_6:" Of twenty-nine days. According to R. Judah ONE MONTH is allowed irrespective of whether it is a full or a defective one. According to the first Tanna THIRTY DAYS are invariably allowed."
,k71a_7:" That for a period of thirty days a steward may be appointed."
,k71a_8:" Though his vow might be annulled by a competent authority by the end of the thirty days."
,k71a_9:" Lit., 'a door'."
,k71a_10:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 370. nn. 10-11."
,k71a_11:" Rab and Samuel."
,k71a_12:" <i>Supra</i> 61b."
,k71a_13:" Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel."
,k71a_14:" According to the opinion of both."
,k71a_15:" V. <i>supra</i> note 10."
,k71a_16:" V. <i>supra</i>. p. 370, n. 11"
,k71a_17:" Why then should Rab and Samuel be in dispute upon the same principle here also?"
,k71a_18:" The prohibition of intercourse."
,k71a_19:" The vow forbidding other benefits."
,k71a_20:" Forthwith."
,k71a_21:" Who draws a distinction between a specified and an unspecified period."
,k71a_22:" Between this ruling (immediate divorce) and the earlier Mishnah (allowing a certain period to pass)."
,k71a_23:" Lit., 'here'."
,k71a_24:" Who, contrary to the view of Rab (v. <i>supra</i> n. 4), draws no distinction."
,k71a_25:" Since if she is willing to accept her <i>kethubah</i> and leave him, she would not try to obtain the annulment of her vow. There is no advantage, therefore, in postponing the divorce. Where, however, he himself made the vow, the divorce is delayed in order to afford him an opportunity of discovering some ground for the remission of his vow."
,k71a_26:" Who is generally the author of an anonymous Mishnah."
,k71a_27:" By confirming her vow though he had the right to annul it."
,k71a_28:" V. Num. VI, 2ff."
,k71a_29:" Having once confirmed the vow."
,k71a_30:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 440, n. 10."
,k71a_31:" Having once confirmed the vow."
,k71a_32:" Which shews that R. Meir's view is that she and not he has put the finger between the teeth, where she makes the vow and he confirms it."
,k71a_33:" His finger between her teeth."
,k71a_34:" Her finger between her teeth."
,k71a_35:" That the husband must divorce her and give her the <i>kethubah</i>."
,k71a_36:" This referring (as has been explained <i>supra</i>) to a vow the woman had made, it follows that according to R. Jose it is the husband who puts his finger between her teeth."
,k71a_37:" But if for more than ONE DAY be must divorce her and give her the <i>kethubah</i>. This referring to a vow the woman has made, it follows that according to R. Judah also it is the husband who put his finger etc. (v. <i>supra</i> n. 7)."
,k71a_38:" Lit., 'to say: He taught in pairs'."
,k71a_39:" Her finger between her teeth."
,k71a_40:" V. <i>supra</i> note 3."
,k71a_41:" Which follows the principle that it is the husband who 'put his finger between her teeth'."
,k71a_42:" That a husband must divorce his wife and also give her the <i>kethubah</i> if he has not annulled a vow she has made against the use of a certain adornment."
,k71a_43:" Since the husband is penalized (v. <i>supra</i> n. 13) for not annulling the vow."
,k71a_44:" I.e., those relating to a woman's adornments."
,k71a_45:" So MS.M. and separate edd. of the Mishnah. Cur. edd., 'things'."
,k71a_46:" V. Num. XXX, 14."
,k71a_47:" 'Up to a certain time'."
,k71a_48:" Lit., 'if'."
,k71a_49:" Hence they may not be annulled by a husband. V. Ned. Mishnah 79a; cf. however next note. [The passage that follows does not occur in the Mishnah Ned. 79a and the source of the whole citation is consequently, according to some commentators, said to be a Baraitha (v. Shittah Mekubbezeth). Tosaf. however (s.v. [H]) on the basis of an entirely different text, omits this passage.] "
}

txt:
<p>
[a repetition of] the incident of Beth Horon.<a id="k71a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. JUDAH SAID: IF HE WAS AN ISRAELITE HE MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS WIFE, IF THE PROHIBITION WAS FOR] ONE MONTH etc. Is not this the same ruling as that of the first Tanna?<a id="k71a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Abaye replied: He<a id="k71a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; came to teach us [the law concerning] a priest's wife.<a id="k71a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; Raba replied: The difference between them is a full month<a id="k71a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; and a defective month.<a id="k71a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Rab stated: This<a id="k71a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; was taught only in the case of a man who specified [the period of the prohibition], but where he did not specify, he<a id="k71a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; must divorce her immediately and give her the <i>kethubah</i>. Samuel, however, stated: Even where the period was not specified [the husband] need not divorce her, since it is possible that he might discover some reason<a id="k71a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; for [the remission of] his vow.<a id="k71a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; But surely they<a id="k71a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; had once been in dispute upon this principle; for have we not learned, 'If a man forbade his wife by vow to have intercourse, Beth Shammai ruled: [She must consent to the deprivation for] two weeks; Beth Hillel ruled: [Only for] one week';<a id="k71a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; and Rab stated, 'They<a id="k71a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; differ only in the case of a man who specified [the period of abstention] but where he did not specify the period he<a id="k71a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; must divorce her forthwith and give her the kethubah', and Samuel stated, 'Even where the period had not been specified the husband need not divorce her, since it might be possible for him to discover some reason<a id="k71a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; for [the annulment of] his<a id="k71a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; vow'?<a id="k71a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; [Both disputes were] necessary. For if [their views] had been expressed in the former case<a id="k71a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; it might have been assumed that only in that case did Rab maintain his view, since [the appointment] of a steward is not possible, but that in the latter case<a id="k71a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; where [the appointment] of a steward is possible, he agrees with Samuel. And if [their views] had been stated in the latter case<a id="k71a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; it might have been assumed that only in that case did Samuel maintain his view, since the appointment of a steward is possible. but that in the former case<a id="k71a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; he agrees with Rab. [Hence both statements were] necessary.
</p><p>
	We learned: IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE BY VOW THAT SHE SHOULD NOT TASTE A CERTAIN FRUIT, HE MUST DIVORCE HER<a id="k71a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; AND GIVE HER THE <I>KETHUBAH</I>. Now according to Rab<a id="k71a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; [there is no contradiction<a id="k71a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; since] the latter<a id="k71a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; may apply to a man who did not specify [the period of the prohibition] and the former<a id="k71a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; to a man who did specify [the period]. According to Samuel,<a id="k71a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; however, a contradiction arises!<a id="k71a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Here we are dealing with a case, for instance, where the woman made the vow and he confirmed it;<a id="k71a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Meir<a id="k71a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; holding the opinion that [the husband]<a id="k71a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; had himself put his finger between her teeth. But does R. Meir hold the principle, 'He has himself put his finger between her teeth'? Surely it was taught: If a woman made the vow of a nazirite<a id="k71a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; and her husband heard of it and did not annul it, she, said R. Meir and R. Judah, has thereby put her own finger between her teeth. Therefore, if the husband wishes to annul her vow, he may do so. But if he<a id="k71a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; said, 'I do not want a wife who is in the habit of vowing'. she may be divorced without [receiving] her <i>kethubah</i>. R. Jose and R. Eleazar said: He<a id="k71a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; has put his finger between her teeth. Therefore, if the husband wishes to annul her vow, he may do so. But if he<a id="k71a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; said, 'I do not want a wife who is in the habit of vowing', he may divorce her but must give her the <i>kethubah</i>!<a id="k71a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Reverse [the views]: R. Meir and R. Judah said: 'He has put'<a id="k71a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; and R. Jose and R. Eleazar said: 'She has put'.<a id="k71a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; But is R. Jose of the opinion that it is she who put?<a id="k71a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; Have we not learned: R. Jose ruled: [THIS<a id="k71a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; APPLIES] TO POOR WOMEN IF NO TIME LIMIT IS GIVEN?<a id="k71a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Read: R. Meir and R. Jose said, 'He has put';<a id="k71a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Judah and R. Eleazar said, 'She has put'.<a id="k71a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; But does R. Judah uphold the principle of 'She put'?<a id="k71a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; Have we not learned: R. JUDAH RULED: IF HE WAS AN ISRAELITE HE MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS WIFE, IF THE VOW WAS FOR] ONE DAY?<a id="k71a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Read: R. Meir and R. Judah and R. Jose said, 'He put'.<a id="k71a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; and R. Eleazar said, 'She put'.<a id="k71a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; And should you find [some ground] for insisting that the names must appear in pairs,<a id="k71a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; then read: R. Meir and R. Eleazar said, 'She put',<a id="k71a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; and R. Judah and R. Jose said, 'He put';<a id="k71a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; and this anonymous Mishnah<a id="k71a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; is not in agreement with R. Meir.
</p><p>
	Is R. Jose, however, of the opinion that [THIS<a id="k71a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; APPLIES] TO POOR WOMEN IF NO TIME LIMIT IS GIVEN; from which<a id="k71a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; it is evident that a husband has the right to annul<a id="k71a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; [such vows]?<a id="k71a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; This, surely, is incongruous [with the following]. These are the vows<a id="k71a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; which a husband may annul: Vows which involve an affliction of soul<a id="k71a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; [as, for instance, if a woman said, 'I vow not to enjoy the pleasure of bathing] should I bathe'<a id="k71a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; [or] 'I swear that<a id="k71a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; I shall not bathe', [or again, 'I vow not to make use of adornments] should I make use of an adornment',<a id="k71a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; [or] 'I swear that<a id="k71a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; I shall not make use of any adornments'. R. Jose said: These are not regarded as vows involving an affliction of soul;<a id="k71a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; and the following are vows that involve an affliction of soul: '[I swear] that I shall not eat meat' or 'that I shall not drink wine' or 'that I shall not adorn myself
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k71b_1:" Such vows only may be annulled by a husband. Now, in view of this ruling of R. Jose (v. <i>supra</i> n. 5), how could it be said that according to his opinion a husband may annul vows against the use of any adornments?"
,k71b_2:" In the case of adornments referred to by R. Jose in our Mishnah."
,k71b_3:" Lit., 'things between him and her' (sc. husband and wife): a powder, for instance, for the removal of superfluous hair from unexposed parts of the body. A woman's abstention from the use of such kinds of cosmetics or adornments are regarded as things affecting their intimate relations and such vows may well be annulled by a husband, v. Ned. 79b."
,k71b_4:" Ned. 81a."
,k71b_5:" Proverb: i.e., one is not injured by an element to which one is accustomed. The husband being accustomed to his wife, cannot be harmed by her refusal to look after her body (as defined n. 8); 'pit' (Rashi) or 'rubble', 'loose ground' (Jast.). Since the intimate relations of husband and wife are not affected by such a vow, the husband has no right to invalidate them. How, then, can be be penalized in the case of the adornments spoken of in our Mishnah?"
,k71b_6:" The annulment of such a vow is within the right of a husband."
,k71b_7:" By a vow."
,k71b_8:" Because it is not within her power to make a vow against a duty that is incumbent upon her as a married woman."
,k71b_9:" By a vow."
,k71b_10:" Such a vow is within her power to make, since it relates to her own gratification."
,k71b_11:" Though he is under no obligation to respect it."
,k71b_12:" Cf. <i>supra</i> note 1."
,k71b_13:" If according to R. Jose the only reason why a husband has the right to annul his wife's vows in connection with adornments (v. our Mishnah) is because she has made her marital intercourse dependent upon them."
,k71b_14:" Why then is a husband entitled to annul such vows?"
,k71b_15:" If she were to dispense with her adornments."
,k71b_16:" An insult which she would not be able to bear, and in consequence of which she would resume the use of adornments and thus affect her marital relationship. Cf. <i>supra</i> note 1."
,k71b_17:" As in the case where a man forbade his wife by a vow to have intercourse with him (<i>supra</i> 61b)."
,k71b_18:" Why then has it been stated that HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE <I>KETHUBAH</I> forthwith?"
,k71b_19:" The respective rulings of Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel, which allow a certain period before a divorce can be enforced."
,k71b_20:" When he made his vow."
,k71b_21:" Lit., 'now'."
,k71b_22:" And seek the help of an authority in obtaining its disallowance."
,k71b_23:" And so confirmed it."
,k71b_24:" She is, therefore, anxious to leave him at once. Hence the ruling in our Mishnah (cf. p. 443, n. 13)."
,k71b_25:" During which a wife must put up with the deprivation of her adornments, and be unable to demand a divorce."
,k71b_26:" Only where the prohibition has been extended to a longer period can the husband be compelled to divorce his wife and to give her also her <i>kethubah</i>."
,k71b_27:" I.e., until the major festival next to the day on which the vow was made. The major festivals are Passover, Pentecost and Tabernacles."
,k71b_28:" Lit., 'for so'."
,k71b_29:" Lit., 'what is the difference?'"
,k71b_30:" If, therefore, the prohibition imposed upon her by the vow is for less than that period, she does not suffer much by the deprivation of her cosmetics."
,k71b_31:" He confirmed a vow she bad made to that effect. Though a husband has no right to impose such a vow upon his wife, be may confirm it by remaining silent when he hears that she has imposed such a vow upon herself; v. Num. XXX, 7ff; or, he vowed to abstain from his wife should she go to her father's house; cf. <i>supra</i> p. 433, n. 7."
,k71b_32:" Her father. [Var. lec. 'IF THEY', v. Rashi]."
,k71b_33:" It was customary for daughters to visit their parents living in another town on the occasion of each major festival (v. p. 444. n. 7), and it was laid down that no hardship was involved if one such visit was omitted."
,k71b_34:" The question of two is discussed <i>infra</i>."
,k71b_35:" V. p. 444, n. 11."
,k71b_36:" This is explained in the Gemara."
,k71b_37:" How then are the two clauses to be reconciled?"
,k71b_38:" In the Mishnah <i>supra</i> 70a."
,k71b_39:" Lit., 'here', the first clause which implies that if the prohibition is to last for two festivals the woman must be divorced and is to receive her <i>kethubah</i>."
,k71b_40:" [H], pass. particip. Kal of [H], 'to pursue', v. next note. In the first year of her married life a woman is anxious, as soon as the first festival after her marriage approaches, to pay a visit to her paternal home where she looks forward to the enjoyment of recounting her novel experiences in her husband's home. If she is prevented by a vow from paying the visit at the first festival she must be given the opportunity of paying a visit not later than at the second festival. Hence if the vow is for the first two festivals, she is entitled to a divorce and to her <i>kethubah</i> also."
,k71b_41:" Where she is homesick and always longing to visit her parents, two festivals are considered a hardship. If she shews no such signs of homesickness there is no hardship involved unless the inhibition is for at least three festivals (Rashi). Tosaf. s.v. itf explains differently: A woman who failed to visit her paternal home on the occasion of the first festival after her marriage is presumed to be fairly indifferent to such visits, and to be suffering no undue hardship by postponing her visit for another two festivals."
,k71b_42:" <i>Var. lec</i>., according to Tosaf. 'for it is written, l'hen'."
,k71b_43:" Cant. VIII, 10."
,k71b_44:" <i>Var. lec</i>., according to Tosaf. 'and R.' etc."
,k71b_45:" <i>Var. lec</i> 'Jonathan'."
,k71b_46:" Sc. a woman in the first year of her married life."
,k71b_47:" [H] (lit.. 'whole', 'perfect') is of the same root as [H] (peace) in the text cited."
,k71b_48:" Where she lives with her husband."
,k71b_49:" Lit., 'her praise'"
,k71b_50:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 445, n. 8."
,k71b_51:" [H], 'my husband', analogous to [H] 'matrimony', the term implying that the marital union between the parties is complete."
,k71b_52:" Hosea II, 18. [H] signifies 'my master', or 'my husband' in the sense that the man is lord over his wife."
,k71b_53:" I.e., after her marriage when her union with her husband is complete. (V. <i>supra</i> n. 10)."
,k71b_54:" When her future husband is still her ba'al (master) and not her Ish (husband). Israel's relation to God, the prophet assures the people, will be intimate like that of the first mentioned bride and not cautious, reserved and uncertain like that of the latter. >"
}

txt:
<p>
with coloured garments'!<a id="k71b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Here<a id="k71b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; we are dealing with matters affecting their intimate relations.<a id="k71b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; This explanation is satisfactory according to him who maintains that a husband may annul [vows on] matters affecting their intimate relations. &mdash; What, however, can be said [in explanation] according to him who maintains that a husband may not annul [such vows]? For it was stated:<a id="k71b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; [As to vows on] matters affecting their intimate relations, R. Huna ruled: A husband may annul them; R. Adda b. Ahabah ruled: A husband may not annul them, for we do not find that a fox should die of the dust of his den!<a id="k71b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; The fact, however, is that we are here<a id="k71b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; dealing with a case, for instance, where she made her marital intercourse dependent upon her use of adornments, by saying. 'The enjoyment of your intercourse shall be forbidden to me should I ever make use of any adornment.'<a id="k71b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; [This explanation] is in agreement with a ruling of R. Kahana. For R. Kahana ruled, [If a woman said to her husband]. 'The enjoyment of my intercourse [shall be forbidden]<a id="k71b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; to you', he may compel her to such intercourse;<a id="k71b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; [if, however, she vowed,] 'The enjoyment of your intercourse [shall be forbidden]<a id="k71b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; to me'<a id="k71b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; he must annul [her vow]<a id="k71b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; because no person is to be fed with a thing that is forbidden to him.<a id="k71b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; But let her<a id="k71b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; not adorn herself and consequently not be forbidden to him!<a id="k71b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; If so,<a id="k71b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; she would be called, 'The ugly woman'.<a id="k71b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; But then let her adorn herself and be forbidden [intercourse] either for two weeks, according to Beth Shammai<a id="k71b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; or for one week according to Beth Hillel!'<a id="k71b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; These<a id="k71b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; apply only to a case where he [the husband] has forbidden her by a vow [to have intercourse with him], because [in such circumstances] she thinks 'He may have been angry with me<a id="k71b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; and will later<a id="k71b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; calm down'.<a id="k71b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; Here, however, since she has made the vow and he remained silent,<a id="k71b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; she comes to the conclusion: 'Since he remained silent<a id="k71b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; he must indeed hate me'.<a id="k71b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. JOSE RULED: [THIS APPLIES] TO POOR WOMEN IF NO TIME LIMIT IS GIVEN. What is the TIME LIMIT?<a id="k71b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Rab Judah citing Samuel replied: Twelve months.<a id="k71b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; Rabbah b. Bar Hana citing R. Johanan replied: Ten years.<a id="k71b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Hisda citing Abimi replied: A festival;<a id="k71b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; for<a id="k71b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; the daughters of Israel adorn themselves on a festival.
</p><p>
	AND TO RICH WOMEN [IF THE TIME LIMIT IS] THIRTY DAYS. Why just<a id="k71b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; THIRTY DAYS? &mdash; Abaye replied: Because<a id="k71b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; a prominent woman enjoys the scent of her cosmetics for thirty days.<a id="k71b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE<a id="k71b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; BY VOW THAT SHE SHALL NOT GO TO HER FATHER'S HOUSE, AND HE<a id="k71b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; LIVES WITH HER IN THE SAME TOWN, HE MAY KEEP [HER AS HIS WIFE, IF THE PROHIBITION WAS FOR] ONE MONTH; BUT IF FOR TWO MONTHS HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER ALSO THE <I>KETHUBAH</I>. WHERE HE, HOWEVER, LIVES IN ANOTHER TOWN, HE MAY KEEP [HER AS HIS WIFE, IF THE PROHIBITION WAS FOR] ONE FESTIVAL,<a id="k71b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; [BUT IF FOR] THREE<a id="k71b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; FESTIVALS, HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER ALSO HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>. IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE BY VOW<a id="k71b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; THAT SHE SHALL NOT VISIT A HOUSE OF MOURNING OR A HOUSE OF FEASTING, HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER ALSO HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>, BECAUSE THEREBY HE HAS CLOSED [PEOPLE'S DOORS] AGAINST HER. IF HE PLEADS, HOWEVER, [THAT HIS ACTION] WAS DUE TO SOME OTHER CAUSE<a id="k71b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; HE IS PERMITTED [TO FORBID HER]. IF HE SAID TO HER: '[THERE SHALL BE NO VOW] PROVIDED THAT YOU TELL<a id="k71b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; SO-AND-SO WHAT YOU HAVE TOLD ME' OR 'WHAT I HAVE TOLD YOU' OR 'THAT YOU SHALL FILL<a id="k71b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; AND POUR OUT ON THE RUBBISH HEAP', HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER ALSO HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. This, surely, is self-contradictory. You said, HE MAY KEEP [HER AS HIS WIFE, IF THE PROHIBITION WAS FOR] ONE FESTIVAL, which implies that if it was for two festivals he must divorce her and give her also her <i>kethubah</i>. But read the concluding clause, [IF FOR] THREE FESTIVALS HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER ALSO HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>, from which it follows, does it not, that if it was for two only he may keep [her as his wife]?<a id="k71b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; Abaye replied: The concluding clause refers to a priest's wife, and it represents the view of R. Judah.<a id="k71b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; Rabbah b. 'Ulla said: There is no contradiction, for one<a id="k71b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; refers to a woman who was anxious [to visit her parents home]<a id="k71b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; and the other applies to one who was not anxious.<a id="k71b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Then<a id="k71b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; was I in his eyes as one that found peace,<a id="k71b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; R.<a id="k71b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; Johanan<a id="k71b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; interpreted: like a bride<a id="k71b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; who was found faultless<a id="k71b_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; in the house of her father-in-law<a id="k71b_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; and she is anxious to go and tell of her success<a id="k71b_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; at her paternal home.<a id="k71b_50"><sup>50</sup></a>
</p><p>
	And it shall be at that day, saith the Lord, that thou shalt call me Ishi,<a id="k71b_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; and shalt not call me Ba'ali,<a id="k71b_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Johanan interpreted: Like a bride in the house of her father-in-law<a id="k71b_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; and not like a bride in her paternal home.<a id="k71b_54"><sup>54</sup></a>
</p><p>
	IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE BY VOW etc. One can well understand that in respect [of her prohibition to enter] A HOUSE OF FEASTING
</P>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k72a_1:" By the confirmation of such a vow he deprives her of social enjoyments and relaxation."
,k72a_2:" As she had not participated in the mourning for others."
,k72a_3:" [H] v. Tosef. Keth. VII and cf. <i>supra</i> n. 1 <i>mutatis mutandis</i>. Aliter: 'And none will care for her' (Jast.) [H] (rt. [H] 'to hide', or 'to care for')."
,k72a_4:" Eccl. VII, 2."
,k72a_5:" Emphasis on it."
,k72a_6:" Lit. 'not as if all (the power) is from him'."
,k72a_7:" Lit., 'words of shame'."
,k72a_8:" Euphemism for vigorous exercise after intercourse in order to prevent conception."
,k72a_9:" Lit., 'let her do it'."
,k72a_10:" V. Num. XVIII, 21ff."
,k72a_11:" V. Lev. XVIII, 19."
,k72a_12:" V. Num. XV, 19ff."
,k72a_13:" V. Deut. XXIII, 22."
,k72a_14:" Aliter: With hair loose or unbound."
,k72a_15:" This is explained in the Gemara."
,k72a_16:" This is explained in the Gemara."
,k72a_17:" When the food is given to him."
,k72a_18:" Sc. be has received his priestly dues. Asheri, Tur and Shulhan 'Aruk omit 'priest'. Any person, by setting apart the priestly and Levitical dues, might ritually prepare the grain."
,k72a_19:" At the time."
,k72a_20:" The prescribed number of the days of her uncleanness."
,k72a_21:" [H]."
,k72a_22:" Lev. XV, 28."
,k72a_23:" I.e., she may be implicitly trusted to count correctly. What need was there for the ruling in our Mishnah?"
,k72a_24:" That it was not menstrual."
,k72a_25:" By her habit or the like."
,k72a_26:" If he had intercourse with her after he had been duly cautioned."
,k72a_27:" Kid. 80a. Our Mishnah would thus refer to a case where the neighbours informed the husband of the facts after the event."
,k72a_28:" Lit., 'kneader'."
,k72a_29:" I.e., he has duly set apart the dough offering."
,k72a_30:" And not fulfilling them nor applying for their disallowance."
,k72a_31:" Eccl. V, 5."
,k72a_32:" Var., 'R. Nahman b. Isaac' (Shab. 32b)."
,k72a_33:" The penalty for the sin of vows."
,k72a_34:" Jer. II, 30."
,k72a_35:" Vows made but not fulfilled."
,k72a_36:" The imposition of an additional vow would hardly induce her to fulfil her former vows or change her habits."
,k72a_37:" [H] (Hif. of [H] may bear this meaning, 'he shall cause her (by his provocation) to vow', as also the previously assumed meaning, 'he shall cause her to be under (sc. impose upon her) a vow'."
,k72a_38:" And so avoid the necessity of divorcing her."
,k72a_39:" Proverb; if it is the woman's habit to make vows and to break them it is practically impossible for her husband to be always on the look out to invalidate them. She would, despite all vigilance, manage to make vows of which he would remain ignorant. He is entitled, therefore, to insist on divorcing her."
,k72a_40:" Cf. p. 450, n. 12 mutatis mutandis."
,k72a_41:" R. Judah's ruling which aims at avoiding a divorce."
,k72a_42:" The dough offering."
,k72a_43:" Vows. A transgression in connection with these (which are not common) is much less likely than in connection with the dough offering which has to be given from every dough that is made. If, according to R. Judah, divorce should be avoided in the latter case how much more so in the former."
,k72a_44:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 4."
,k72a_45:" Owing to the frequency of bread baking."
,k72a_46:" Bread, the dough offering from which had not been set apart. As one is more likely to commit a transgression in this case R. Judah would not seek to avoid a divorce."
,k72a_47:" Why then is it here described as one of mere Jewish practice?"
,k72a_48:" Num. V. 18 (v. A.V.) R.V. and A.J.V. render 'And let the hair of the woman's head go loose'."
,k72a_49:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 9."
,k72a_50:" Why then was this described as traditional Jewish practice? "
}

txt:
<p>
the reason, HE HAS CLOSED [PEOPLE'S DOORS] AGAINST HER, is applicable;<a id="k72a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; what [point, however,] is there [in the reason,] HE HAS CLOSED [PEOPLE'S DOORS] AGAINST HER, in the case of A HOUSE OF MOURNING? &mdash; A Tanna taught: To-morrow she might die and no creature would mourn for her.<a id="k72a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; Others read: And no creature would bury her.<a id="k72a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>
</p><p>
	It was taught: R. Meir used to say: What is meant by the Scriptural text, it is better to go to the house of mourning than to go to the house of feasting. for that is the end of all men, and the living will lay it to his heart,<a id="k72a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; what, [I say, is meant by] And the living will lay it<a id="k72a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; to his heart? The matters relating to death. [Let him realize] that if a man mourns for other people others will also mourn for him; if he buries other people others will also bury him; if he lifts up [his voice to lament] for others, others will [lift up their voices to lament] for him; if he escorts others [to the grave] others will also escort him; if he carries others [to their last resting place] others will also carry him.
</p><p>
	IF, HOWEVER, HE PLEADS [THAT HIS ACTION] WAS DUE TO SOME OTHER CAUSE HE IS PERMITTED. What is meant by SOME OTHER CAUSE? &mdash; Rab Judah citing Samuel replied: On account of dissolute men who frequent that place. Said R. Ashi: This applies only where [the place] has gained such a reputation; where, however, it has not gained such reputation it is not within the power of the husband [to veto it].<a id="k72a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>
</p><p>
	IF HE SAID TO HER: '[THERE SHALL BE NO VOW] PROVIDED THAT YOU TELL [etc.].' [Why indeed] should she [not] tell it? &mdash; Rab Judah citing Samuel replied: [This refers to] abusive language.<a id="k72a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>
</p><p>
	OR 'THAT YOU SHALL FILL AND POUR OUT ON THE RUBBISH HEAP'. [Why indeed] should she [not] do it? &mdash; Rab Judah citing Samuel replied: [Because the meaning of his request is] that she shall allow herself to be filled and then scatter it.<a id="k72a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; In a Baraitha it was taught: [The man's request is] that she shall fill ten jars of water and empty them on to the rubbish heap. Now according to [the explanation] of Samuel one can well see the reason why HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER ALSO HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>; according to the Baraitha, however, [the difficulty arises] what matters it to her if she does it?<a id="k72a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Rabbah b. Bar Hana citing R. Johanan replied: [She cannot be expected to do it] because she would appear like an imbecile.
</p><p>
	R. Kahana stated: If a man placed his wife under a vow that she shall neither borrow nor lend a winnow, a sieve, a mill or an oven, he must divorce her and give her also her <i>kethubah</i>, because [should she fulfil the vow] he would give her a bad name among her neighbours. So it was also taught in a Baraitha: If a man placed his wife under a vow that she shall neither borrow nor lend a winnow, a sieve, a mill or an oven, he must divorce her and give her also her <i>kethubah</i>, because [should she comply with his desire] he would give her a bad name among her neighbours. Similarly if she vowed that she shall neither borrow nor lend a winnow, a sieve, a mill or an oven, or that she shall not weave beautiful garments for his children, she may be divorced without a <i>kethubah</i>, because [by acting on her wishes] she gives him a bad name among his neighbours.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. THESE ARE TO BE DIVORCED WITHOUT RECEIVING THEIR KETHUBAH: A WIFE WHO TRANSGRESSES THE LAW OF MOSES OR [ONE WHO TRANSGRESSES] JEWISH PRACTICE. AND WHAT IS [REGARDED AS A WIFE'S TRANSGRESSION AGAINST] THE LAW OF MOSES? FEEDING HER HUSBAND WITH UNTITHED FOOD,<a id="k72a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; HAVING INTERCOURSE WITH HIM DURING THE PERIOD OF HER MENSTRUATION,<a id="k72a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; NOT SETTING APART HER DOUGH OFFERING,<a id="k72a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; OR MAKING VOWS AND NOT FULFILLING THEM.<a id="k72a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; AND WHAT [IS DEEMED TO BE A WIFE'S TRANSGRESSION AGAINST] JEWISH PRACTICE? GOING OUT WITH UNCOVERED HEAD,<a id="k72a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; SPINNING IN THE STREET<a id="k72a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; OR CONVERSING WITH EVERY MAN. ABBA SAUL SAID: [SUCH TRANSGRESSIONS INCLUDE] ALSO THAT OF A WIFE WHO CURSES HER HUSBAND'S PARENTS IN HIS PRESENCE. R. TARFON SAID: ALSO ONE WHO SCREAMS. AND WHO IS REGARDED A SCREAMER? A WOMAN WHOSE VOICE CAN BE HEARD BY HER NEIGHBOURS WHEN SHE SPEAKS INSIDE HER HOUSE.<a id="k72a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. FEEDING HER HUSBAND WITH UNTITHED FOOD. How are we to understand this? If the husband knows [the fact],<a id="k72a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; let him abstain; if he does not know [it],<a id="k72a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; how did he discover it? &mdash; [This ruling was] required in the case only where she told him, 'So-and-so the priest has ritually prepared for me the pile of grain',<a id="k72a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; and he went and asked him and her statement was found to be untrue.
</p><p>
	HAVING INTERCOURSE WITH HIM DURING THE PERIOD OF HER MENSTRUATION. How are we to understand this? If he was aware of her [condition] he could have abstained, if he was not aware [of it]<a id="k72a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; he should still rely upon her, for R. Hinena b. Kahana stated in the name of Samuel: Whence is it deduced that the menstruant herself may [be relied upon to] count [correctly]?<a id="k72a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; From the Scriptural statement, Then she shall number to herself<a id="k72a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; seven days,<a id="k72a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Lah means to herself.'<a id="k72a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; It was required in the case only where she said to her husband, 'So-and-so the sage told me that the blood was clean',<a id="k72a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; and when her husband went and asked him it was found that her statement was untrue. If you prefer I might reply on the lines of a ruling of Rab Judah who said: If a woman was known<a id="k72a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; among her neighbours to be a menstruant her husband<a id="k72a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; is flogged on her account for [having intercourse with] a menstruant.<a id="k72a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>
</p><p>
	NOT SETTING APART THE DOUGH OFFERING. How is this to be understood? If the husband was aware [of the fact] he should have abstained [from the food]; if he was not aware [of it at the time] how does he know it now? &mdash; [The ruling is to be understood as] required in the case only where she said to him. 'So-and-so the baker<a id="k72a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; has ritually prepared the dough<a id="k72a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; for me' and when the husband went and asked him her statement was found to be untrue.
</p><p>
	OR MAKING VOWS AND NOT FULFILLING THEM; for the Master stated: One's children die on account of the sin of making vows,<a id="k72a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; as it is said in Scripture. Suffer not thy mouth to cause thy flesh to sin etc. [wherefore should God be angry at thy voice, and destroy the work of thine hands];<a id="k72a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; and what is the work of a man's hands? You must say: His sons and his daughters. R. Nahman<a id="k72a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; said, [It<a id="k72a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; may be inferred] from the following: In vain have I smitten your children;'<a id="k72a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; 'In vain' implies, on account of vain utterances.<a id="k72a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>
</p><p>
	It was taught: R. Meir said, Any man who knows that his wife makes vows and does not fulfil them should impose vows upon her again. [You say] 'Should impose vows upon her [again]'? Whereby would he reform her?<a id="k72a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; But [say] he should provoke her again in order that she should make her vow in his presence<a id="k72a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; and he would [thus be able to] annul it.<a id="k72a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; They, however, said to him: No one can live with a serpent in the same basket.<a id="k72a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>
</p><p>
	It was taught: R. Judah said. Any husband who knows that his wife does not [properly] set apart for him the dough offering should set it apart again after her. They, however, said to him: No one can live with a serpent in the same basket.<a id="k72a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; He who taught it<a id="k72a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; in connection with this case<a id="k72a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; [would apply it] with even greater force to the other case;<a id="k72a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; he, however, who taught it in connection with the other case [applies it to that case only]<a id="k72a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; but [not to this one,<a id="k72a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; because]<a id="k72a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; it might sometimes happen that he would eat.<a id="k72a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>
</p><p>
	AND WHAT [IS DEEMED TO BE A WIFE'S TRANSGRESSION AGAINST] JEWISH PRACTICE? GOING OUT WITH UNCOVERED HEAD. [Is not the prohibition against going out with] an uncovered head Pentateuchal;<a id="k72a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; for it is written, And he shall uncover the woman's head,<a id="k72a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; and this, it was taught at the school of R. Ishmael, was a warning to the daughters of Israel that they should not go out with uncovered<a id="k72a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; head?<a id="k72a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Pentateuchally
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k72b_1:" [H] or [H] calathus, 'a woven vase-shaped basket'."
,k72b_2:" Lit., 'there is not in her'."
,k72b_3:" When her head is covered by her basket only."
,k72b_4:" Spoken of in our Mishnah. What need then was there for R. Johanan's statement?"
,k72b_5:" That otherwise the law of 'uncovered head' applies also in a court-yard."
,k72b_6:" Since all married women go about in their court-yards with uncovered heads."
,k72b_7:" Into which the two courts open out. An alley, since fewer people frequent it, would not have been included in the restrictions spoken of in our Mishnah in respect of a public street, yet it is not considered sufficiently private to allow the woman to go about there with 'uncovered head'. Hence the necessity for the specific ruling of R. Johanan."
,k72b_8:" That it might reflect the rose colour. [H] 'rose'. (V. Tosaf s.v. [H]). <i>Aliter</i>: 'Spins with a rose in her hair', reading [H] 'and a rose' (Maim.). <i>Aliter</i>: 'Spins with the thread lowered in front of her face' (euphemism), reading [H] rt. [H], 'to flatten', 'lower' (Rashi). <i>Var. lec</i>. [H] (rt. [H]) 'to go down', 'descend' (cf. Jast. and Golds.)."
,k72b_9:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 4."
,k72b_10:" Reading [H] (Aruch). Cur. edd., [H]."
,k72b_11:" Lit., 'on her' or 'it'. "
,k72b_12:" The expression [H] &hellip; [H] WHO CURSES. &hellip; IN HIS PRESENCE."
,k72b_13:" MS.M. [H] Cur. edd. [H]."
,k72b_14:" To aid in the recollection that one's offspring is like oneself."
,k72b_15:" Jacob's grandchildren."
,k72b_16:" His own children."
,k72b_17:" Gen. XLVIII, 5."
,k72b_18:" Var., 'Raba'."
,k72b_19:" The cursing of which Samuel spoke."
,k72b_20:" [V. Tosaf. s.v. [H] cur. edd. add 'to him']."
,k72b_21:" V. Rashi, and Tosaf. <i>loc. cit</i>."
,k72b_22:" Lit., 'makes her voice heard'."
,k72b_23:" Her screams of pain caused by the copulation."
,k72b_24:" Since her screaming is due to a bodily defect."
,k72b_25:" <i>Infra</i> 77a."
,k72b_26:" Of course it should. Such a case in our Mishnah is out of place."
,k72b_27:" That given in the name of Samuel."
,k72b_28:" Lit., and vows were found upon her'."
,k72b_29:" Lit., 'he took her, in (his house)'. It will be explained <i>infra</i> whether this does or does not refer to the preceding case."
,k72b_30:" From the Temple service (cf. Lev. XXI, 17ff)."
,k72b_31:" From marriage. If such a woman married she may be divorced without a <i>kethubah</i>."
,k72b_32:" In Kid. 50a."
,k72b_33:" Since our tractate is dealing with the laws of <i>kethubah</i>."
,k72b_34:" DIVORCED WITHOUT A KETHUBAH (bis)."
,k72b_35:" Plural of <i>kethubah</i>."
,k72b_36:" HER BETROTHAL IS INVALID."
,k72b_37:" In the tractate of Kid. 50a."
,k72b_38:" The Rabbis in our Mishnah."
,k72b_39:" The definition of vows given in the name of R. Simeon b. Jehozadak."
,k72b_40:" Where the husband explicitly expressed his objection to betroth a woman who was under a vow."
,k72b_41:" Lit., 'all words', 'things'."
,k72b_42:" Where the husband had made no conditions."
,k72b_43:" Such as those mentioned in R. Simeon b. Jehozadak's definition."
,k72b_44:" And the betrothal, therefore, is invalid."
,k72b_45:" If it was found that she was under a vow, and the man consequently refuses to live with her."
,k72b_46:" Cf. Yeb. 110a. "
}

txt:
<p>
it is quite satisfactory [if her head is covered by] her work-basket;<a id="k72b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; according to traditional Jewish practice, however, she is forbidden [to go out uncovered] even with her basket [on her head].
</p><p>
	R. Assi stated in the name of R. Johanan: With a basket [on her head a woman] is not guilty of<a id="k72b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; [going about with] an uncovered head. In considering this statement, R. Zera pointed out this difficulty: Where [is the woman assumed to be]?<a id="k72b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; If it be suggested, 'In the street', [it may be objected that this is already forbidden by] Jewish practice;<a id="k72b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; but [if she is] in a court-yard<a id="k72b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; [the objection may be made that] if that were so<a id="k72b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; you will not leave our father Abraham a [single] daughter who could remain with her husband!<a id="k72b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Abaye, or it might be said, R. Kahana, replied: [The statement refers to one who walks] from one courtyard into another by way of an alley.<a id="k72b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>
</p><p>
	SPINNING IN THE STREET. Rab Judah stated in the name of Samuel: [The prohibition applies only] where she exposed her arms to the public. R. Hisda stated in the name of Abimi: [This applies only] where she spins rose [coloured materials, and holds them up] to her face.<a id="k72b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>
</p><p>
	CONVERSING WITH EVERY MAN. Rab Judah stated in the name of Samuel: [This refers only to one] who jests with young men.
</p><p>
	Rabbah b. Bar Hana related: I was once walking behind R. 'Ukba when I observed an Arab woman who was sitting, casting her spindle and spinning a rose [coloured material which she held up] to her face.<a id="k72b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; When she saw us she detached the spindle [from the thread], threw it down and said to me, 'Young man, hand me my<a id="k72b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; spindle'. Referring to her<a id="k72b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; R. 'Ukba made a statement. What was that statement? &mdash; Rabina replied: He spoke of her as a woman SPINNING IN THE STREET. The Rabbis said: He spoke of her as one CONVERSING WITH EVERY MAN.
</p><p>
	ABBA SAUL SAID: [SUCH TRANSGRESSIONS INCLUDE] ALSO THAT OF A WIFE WHO CURSES HER HUSBAND'S PARENTS IN HIS PRESENCE. Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel: [This<a id="k72b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; includes also] one who curses his parents in the presence of his offspring;<a id="k72b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; and your mnemonic sign<a id="k72b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; is, <i>Ephraim and Manasseh,<a id="k72b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; even as Reuben and Simeon,<a id="k72b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; shall be mine</i>.<a id="k72b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; Rabbah<a id="k72b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; explained:<a id="k72b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; When she said<a id="k72b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; in the presence of her husband's son, 'May a lion devour your grandfather'.<a id="k72b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. TARFON SAID: ALSO ONE WHO SCREAMS. What is meant by a screamer? &mdash; Rab Judah replied in the name of Samuel: One who speaks aloud<a id="k72b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; on marital matters. In a Baraitha it was taught: [By screams was meant a wife] whose voice<a id="k72b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; during her intercourse in one court can be heard in another court. But should not this, then,<a id="k72b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; have been taught in the Mishnah<a id="k72b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; among defects?<a id="k72b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Clearly we must revert to the original explanation.<a id="k72b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. IF A MAN BETROTHED A WOMAN ON CONDITION THAT SHE WAS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY VOWS AND SHE WAS FOUND TO BE UNDER A VOW,<a id="k72b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; HER BETROTHAL IS INVALID. IF HE MARRIED HER<a id="k72b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; WITHOUT MAKING ANY CONDITIONS AND SHE WAS FOUND TO BE UNDER A VOW,<a id="k72b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; SHE MAY BE DIVORCED WITHOUT RECEIVING HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>.
</p><p>
	[IF A WOMAN WAS BETROTHED] ON CONDITION THAT SHE HAS NO BODILY DEFECTS, AND SHE WAS FOUND TO HAVE SUCH DEFECTS, HER BETROTHAL IS INVALID. IF HE MARRIED HER WITHOUT MAKING ANY CONDITIONS AND SHE WAS FOUND TO HAVE BODILY DEFECTS, SHE MAY BE DIVORCED WITHOUT A KETHUBAH. ALL DEFECTS WHICH DISQUALIFY PRIESTS<a id="k72b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; DISQUALIFY WOMEN ALSO.<a id="k72b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. We have [in fact] learned [the same Mishnah] also in [the Tractate] <i>Kiddushin</i>.<a id="k72b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; [But] here<a id="k72b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; [the laws]<a id="k72b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; were required [in respect of] <i>kethuboth</i>,<a id="k72b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; and the laws concerning betrothal<a id="k72b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; were stated on account of those of the <i>kethubah</i>; there<a id="k72b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; the laws in respect of betrothal were required, and those concerning <i>kethuboth</i><a id="k72b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; were stated on account of those of betrothal.
</p><p>
	R. Johanan said in the name of R. Simeon b. Jehozadak: They<a id="k72b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; spoke only of the following vows. That she would not eat meat, that she would not drink wine or that she would not adorn herself with coloured garments. So it was also taught elsewhere: They spoke of such vows as involve an affliction of the soul, [namely,] that she would not eat meat, that she would not drink wine or that she would not adorn herself with coloured garments.
</p><p>
	In dealing with this subject R. Papa raised this difficulty: What does it<a id="k72b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; refer to? If it be suggested [that it refers] to the first clause<a id="k72b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; [it might be retorted that] since the husband objects [to vows] even other kinds of vows<a id="k72b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; Should also be included! &mdash; [It refers] only to the final clause.<a id="k72b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Ashi said: It may in fact refer to the first clause,<a id="k72b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; but in respect of the vows to which people usually take exception<a id="k72b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; his objection is valid;<a id="k72b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; respect of vows to which people do not as a rule take exception his objection has no validity.
</p><p>
	It was stated: If a man betrothed a woman on condition [that she was under no vow] and married her without attaching any conditions, it is necessary, Rab ruled, that she<a id="k72b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; shall obtain from him a letter of divorce; and Samuel ruled: It is not necessary for her to obtain a letter of divorce from him.<a id="k72b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; Said Abaye:
</P>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k73a_1:" For regarding the marriage as valid."
,k73a_2:" And consequently he must not only divorce her but must give her her <i>kethubah</i> also."
,k73a_3:" The consummation of the marriage was, therefore, a legal act necessitating a divorce for its annulment. In respect of the monetary obligation, however, the man still adheres to his original condition which she did not fulfil, and be cannot consequently be expected to give her also her <i>kethubah</i>."
,k73a_4:" Rab and Samuel."
,k73a_5:" I.e., whether intercourse after a conditional betrothal (the case spoken of <i>supra</i> 72b), or a legally imperfect marriage or betrothal (the case cited <i>infra</i> from Yeb. 109b) has the force of a valid and proper marriage to require the divorce for its annulment."
,k73a_6:" Who was given in marriage by her mother or brothers."
,k73a_7:" While she was still in her minority."
,k73a_8:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k73a_9:" Lit., 'stood up'."
,k73a_10:" With whom she had intercourse after she had come of age."
,k73a_11:" Because, according to Rab, her second marriage was null and void owing to the <i>kinyan</i> (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>) effected by the intercourse of the first husband when she came of age. (V. <i>supra</i> n. 12). Being well aware that the original marriage which took place during the woman's minority had no legal force, the man is presumed to have intended his intercourse after she had attained her majority to effect the required legal <i>kinyan</i> of marriage."
,k73a_12:" Yeb. 109b; because any act of intercourse on the part of the first husband, even after the woman had attained her majority, was carried out in reliance on the original betrothal which, having taken place while she was a minor, had no validity. Her betrothal to the second is, therefore, valid and must be annulled by a proper divorce. Though it may be added, Samuel admits that she is prohibited to the second husband, having regard to the fact that she did not exercise her right until she reached her majority (v. Nid. 52a). This prohibition is nevertheless only Rabbinical and consequently has no bearing on the question of the divorce, the purpose of which is to sever a union which is Pentateuchally binding. According to Rab, however, (v. <i>supra</i> p. 455, n. 13) the prohibition of the woman to her second husband is not merely Rabbinical but is, in fact, Pentateuchal. Why then should Rab and Samuel dispute on the same principle twice?"
,k73a_13:" Lit., 'that', the dispute in the case of the minor, cited from Yeb. 109b."
,k73a_14:" That the intercourse of the first husband is regarded as a <i>kinyan</i>."
,k73a_15:" And the husband may, therefore, be presumed to be anxious to give to the union all the necessary validity of a proper marriage (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 455, n. 13)."
,k73a_16:" That stated <i>supra</i> 72b."
,k73a_17:" And the husband naturally believes that the woman, since she consented to the marriage, was in a position to fulfil it."
,k73a_18:" That, as it never occurred to the husband (v. <i>supra</i> n. 5) that his original betrothal was in any way invalid, and as he did not, therefore, betroth her by subsequent cohabitation, no divorce is required."
,k73a_19:" Since a condition was attached to the original betrothal."
,k73a_20:" That the marriage, owing to its dependence on the original condition, is invalid."
,k73a_21:" That, since no conditions were made, the intercourse of the first husband after her attaining majority has the validity of a <i>kinyan</i>, and no divorce from the second is required."
,k73a_22:" Since the <i>kethubah</i> was excluded and not the letter of divorce."
,k73a_23:" The second clause of our Mishnah."
,k73a_24:" I.e., the case spoken of in the first and previous clause, the second clause of the Mishnah being dependent on the first."
,k73a_25:" Which is the case in dispute between Rab and Samuel."
,k73a_26:" The answer being apparently in the affirmative, and the implication being that a divorce is required."
,k73a_27:" Who ruled (<i>supra</i> 72b ad. fin.) that no divorce is necessary. "
}

txt:
<p>
It must not be suggested that Rab's reason<a id="k73a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; is that, because the man has married her without attaching any conditions, he has entirely dispensed with his former condition.<a id="k73a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; Rab's reason rather is that no man treats his intercourse as a mere act of prostitution.<a id="k73a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Surely they<a id="k73a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; once disputed on such a principle.<a id="k73a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; For it was stated: Where [an orphan] minor<a id="k73a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; who did not<a id="k73a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; exercise her right of <i>mi'un</i><a id="k73a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; and who, when she came of age, left<a id="k73a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; [her husband]<a id="k73a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; and married [another man], Rab ruled: She requires no letter of divorce from her second husband,<a id="k73a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; and Samuel ruled: She requires a letter of divorce from her second husband!<a id="k73a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; [Both disputes were] necessary. For if the latter<a id="k73a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; only had been stated, it might have been assumed that Rab adhered to his opinion<a id="k73a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; in that case only because no condition was attached [to the betrothal],<a id="k73a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; but that in the former case,<a id="k73a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; where a condition was attached [to the betrothal],<a id="k73a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; he agrees with Samuel.<a id="k73a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; And if the former case<a id="k73a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; only had been stated, it might have been assumed that in that case only<a id="k73a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; did Samuel maintain his view<a id="k73a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; but that in the latter<a id="k73a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; he agrees with Rab.<a id="k73a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; [Hence both were] required.
</p><p>
	We have learned: IF HE MARRIED HER WITHOUT MAKING ANY CONDITION AND SHE WAS FOUND TO BE UNDER A VOW, SHE MAY BE DIVORCED WITHOUT RECEIVING HER <I>KETHUBAH</I> [which<a id="k73a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; implies that] it is only her <i>kethubah</i> that she cannot claim but that she nevertheless requires a letter of divorce. Now does not this<a id="k73a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; refer to one who has betrothed a woman on condition [that she was under no vow]<a id="k73a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; and married her without making any condition?<a id="k73a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; This then<a id="k73a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; represents an objection against Samuel!<a id="k73a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k73b_1:" The second clause of our Mishnah."
,k73b_2:" I.e., the second clause of our Mishnah is not dependent on the first one."
,k73b_3:" Lit., 'thus'."
,k73b_4:" This would seem to follow from the interpretation of our Mishnah just advanced on behalf of Samuel."
,k73b_5:" A form of expression which, omitting all reference to marriage, might imply that if she was subsequently married unconditionally a divorce is required."
,k73b_6:" That the betrothal is invalid and that consequently no divorce is required."
,k73b_7:" The case enunciated in the present form of our Mishnah where the betrothal was not followed by marriage."
,k73b_8:" Lit., 'thus also he said'."
,k73b_9:" Should be be ordered to pay the <i>kethubah</i>."
,k73b_10:" And her betrothal is, therefore, invalid as if the man had advanced such a plea at the actual time of the betrothal."
,k73b_11:" Cf. p. 457, n. 10. Rab's view that 'no man treats his intercourse as a mere act of prostitution' (<i>supra</i> 73a) cannot be advanced here in reply, since Samuel, whose views are the subject of the present discussion, does not admit it."
,k73b_12:" Of our Mishnah."
,k73b_13:" As to 'whether the presumption that, as a rule, one does not want to live with a wife who is in the habit of making vows is sufficient reason for regarding the betrothal of such a woman as null and void."
,k73b_14:" I.e., the <i>kethubah</i>. As the woman's claim to it is of a doubtful nature, her husband who is the possessor of the money cannot be made to pay it."
,k73b_15:" That a divorce is necessary if she wishes to remarry."
,k73b_16:" It is forbidden to live with another man's wife."
,k73b_17:" Rab and Samuel, <i>supra</i> 72b, ad fin."
,k73b_18:" I.e., the man believed that the woman was under no vow while in fact she was."
,k73b_19:" The first of whom a man betrothed on the condition that she was under no vow and the second of whom he afterwards married without making any condition and subsequently found that she was under a vow. Samuel regards the non-conditional marriage of the second as invalid because the man is presumed to have married her on the same condition as that on which he betrothed the first. Rab, however, maintains that it is quite possible that the man was so attracted by the second woman that he was willing to dispense with his terms."
,k73b_20:" Whom the man betrothed on a certain condition and afterwards married without making any condition."
,k73b_21:" Even Rab."
,k73b_22:" Since the man has made it clear at the betrothal that he objected to live with her if she were encumbered with any vows."
,k73b_23:" Rashal deletes 'to him', which appears in brackets in cur. edd."
,k73b_24:" <i>Supra</i> 73a ad fin."
,k73b_25:" Against Samuel (l.c.); which shews, contrary to Rabbah's assumption, that even in the case of a mistake in respect of one woman, some authorities maintain that a divorce is required."
,k73b_26:" Rab and Samuel, <i>supra</i> 72b ad fin."
,k73b_27:" One, for instance, who was betrothed on a certain condition, was then divorced and subsequently married with no condition. In such a case Rab maintains that a divorce is required as in the case of the second woman where two women were involved (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 458, n. 9), while Samuel maintains that no divorce is required because the man's condition at the betrothal is regarded as a permanent declaration that he would not live with a woman who was in the habit of making vows and, since this condition renders the marriage null and void, no divorce is required to annul such a marriage."
,k73b_28:" I.e., one whose marriage had followed her betrothal, and no divorce had intervened, so that the man may well be presumed to have consummated marriage on the same terms as those he laid down at the betrothal."
,k73b_29:" Even Rab."
,k73b_30:" In raising the objection against Samuel <i>supra</i> our Mishnah was assumed to deal with 'a woman who was in a position similar to that of two women' (cf. <i>supra</i> n. 1)."
,k73b_31:" Rabbah."
,k73b_32:" This, at present, is presumed to mean that the woman was under a vow and the man was at the time unaware of it."
,k73b_33:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k73b_34:" Sablonoth; v. Kid. Sonc. ed. p. 254, n. 4."
,k73b_35:" Although the presents, if specifically given as a token of betrothal, would effect a valid <i>kinyan</i> of betrothal."
,k73b_36:" And since that betrothal is invalid the gifts cannot effect the necessary <i>kinyan</i>."
,k73b_37:" Any of those mentioned whose betrothal is invalid."
,k73b_38:" Tosef. Kid. IV."
,k73b_39:" R. Ishmael and the first Tanna."
,k73b_40:" Cf. <i>supra</i> note 6. This proves that one authority at least (viz. the first Tanna) regards a non-conditional marriage as valid though it followed a conditional betrothal. How then could Rabbah maintain, according to the second version, that in such a case all agree that, as the marriage is invalid, no divorce is required."
,k73b_41:" The man, at the time of betrothal, having been under the erroneous impression that <i>kinyan</i> may be effected by such an insignificant sum. Since this law is generally known it may well be presumed that subsequent intercourse was intended as <i>kinyan</i>. In the case of an error in respect of vows, however, subsequent intercourse cannot alter the invalidity of the betrothal since during the performance of the latter act the man may still have been under the impression that his wife was not restricted by any vow. The general opinion, therefore, is, Rabbah may well maintain, that no divorce is in this case required."
,k73b_42:" Is it likely that the same law should be repeated in the same context?"
,k73b_43:" R. Ishmael and the first Tanna."
,k73b_44:" On the previous assumption (that the 'error' referred to the conditional betrothal of a woman who was under a vow) the principles underlying this dispute might be those upheld <i>supra</i> by Rab and Samuel respectively. On the present assumption, however, (that be 'error' refers to a betrothal attempted with less than a <i>perutah</i>) the difficulty arises (cf. <i>supra</i> note 1) 'on what principles do they differ?' sc. how could R. Ishmael maintain his view that 'even if they had cohabited they effect no kinyan'?"
,k73b_45:" The first Tanna."
,k73b_46:" R. Ishmael."
,k73b_47:" Which be believes to be a valid betrothal."
,k73b_48:" Which was in fact invalid and in consequence of which the cohabitation constitutes no <i>kinyan</i>."
,k73b_49:" Rabbah."
,k73b_50:" To the union."
,k73b_51:" Git. 25b."
,k73b_52:" Since in both cases a condition was attached to the betrothal, merely one woman is involved, and no divorce intervened between betrothal and intercourse."
,k73b_53:" R. Simeon and the first Tanna."
,k73b_54:" R. Simeon maintaining that the intercourse is a valid <i>kinyan</i>, and a divorce is consequently required. How then (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 459, n. 14 mutatis mutandis) could Rabbah assert that in such a case all agree that no divorce is necessary?"
,k73b_55:" Lit., 'there'."
,k73b_56:" Not on the principle underlying Rabbah's assertion."
,k73b_57:" The first Tanna."
,k73b_58:" R. Simeon."
,k73b_59:" Rabbah."
,k73b_60:" The reading in the parallel passage, Yeb. 109a, is 'Eleazar'."
,k73b_61:" Her father having received the letter of divorce on her behalf."
,k73b_62:" Like an orphan, she has no father to give her away in marriage, because though alive be has lost his right to do so after he has given her in marriage once."
,k73b_63:" Lit., 'he (the first husband from whom she was divorced) married her again'. While she was still in her minority when her actions have no legal validity."
,k73b_64:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k73b_65:" If her husband died childless and was survived by a brother."
,k73b_66:" And as the divorcee of his brother she is forbidden to the levir under the penalty of <i>kareth</i> (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>)."
,k73b_67:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 13."
,k73b_68:" That the Sages admit that the minor in question may not contract the levirate marriage."
,k73b_69:" Her first husband."
,k73b_70:" The validity of the divorce being due to the fact that her father has accepted the letter of divorce on her behalf."
,k73b_71:" When neither she nor her father (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 461, n. 12) had the right to contract the marriage; and her husband died while she was still in her minority so that no intercourse at all had taken place when she came of age."
,k73b_72:" Her first husband."
,k73b_73:" V. p. 461, n. 20."
,k73b_74:" So that it was possible for intercourse to take place when she was already in her majority."
,k73b_75:" Because the act of intercourse after she had come of age constituted a legal <i>kinyan</i> of marriage, and she became thereby the legally married wife of the deceased. "
}

txt:
<p>
 &mdash; No; [this<a id="k73b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; refers to one who] betrothed her without attaching a condition and also married her without attaching a condition.<a id="k73b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; If, however, one betrothed a woman on a certain condition and subsequently married her without attaching a condition would she, [according to our Mishnah], indeed<a id="k73b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; require no divorce?<a id="k73b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; If so, then, instead of stating, IF A MAN BETROTHED A WOMAN ON THE CONDITION THAT SHE WAS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY VOWS AND SHE WAS FOUND TO BE UNDER A VOW, HER BETROTHAL IS INVALID,<a id="k73b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; it should rather have been stated: If a man married a woman without attaching a condition and she was found to be under a vow, her betrothal is invalid, and [it would be evident, would it not, that this<a id="k73b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; applies] even more so to the former?<a id="k73b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; It is really this reading that was meant:<a id="k73b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; IF A MAN BETROTHED A WOMAN ON THE CONDITION THAT SHE WAS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY VOWS, and then he married her without making any conditions, AND SHE WAS FOUND TO BE UNDER A VOW, HER BETROTHAL IS INVALID; if, however, he betrothed her without making any conditions and also MARRIED HER WITHOUT MAKING ANY CONDITIONS, SHE MAY BE DIVORCED WITHOUT RECEIVING HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>; it is only her <i>kethubah</i> that she cannot claim but it is necessary for her to obtain a divorce. But why has she no claim to her <i>kethubah</i>? Because, [apparently], he<a id="k73b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; could plead, 'I do not want a wife that is in the habit of making vows',<a id="k73b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; but if that is the case there should be no need for her to obtain a divorce either!<a id="k73b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Rabbah replied: It is only according to Rabbinical law that she requires a divorce. So also said R. Hisda: It is only in accordance with the Rabbinical law that she requires a divorce. Raba replied: The Tanna<a id="k73b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; was really in doubt.<a id="k73b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; [Hence he adopted] the lenient view in monetary matters<a id="k73b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; and the stricter one<a id="k73b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; in the case of prohibitions.<a id="k73b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Rabbah stated: They<a id="k73b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; differ only in the case of an error<a id="k73b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; [affecting] two women,<a id="k73b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; but where an error [affects] one woman<a id="k73b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; all agree<a id="k73b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; that she requires no divorce from him.<a id="k73b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; Said Abaye:<a id="k73b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; But our Mishnah, surely, is one which [has been assumed<a id="k73b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; to refer to] an error [affecting] one woman but was nevertheless adduced as an objection!<a id="k73b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; If, however, such a statement was made at all it must have been made in this form: Rabbah stated: They<a id="k73b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; differ only in the case of an error [affecting] a woman [who is in a position] similar [to that of one of] two women,<a id="k73b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; but in the case of an error [affecting] merely one woman<a id="k73b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; all agree<a id="k73b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; that she requires no divorce from him.<a id="k73b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Abaye raised an objection against him:<a id="k73b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; If a man betrothed a woman in error<a id="k73b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; or [with something worth] less than a <i>perutah</i>,<a id="k73b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; and, similarly, if a minor betrothed a woman, even if any [of them] has subsequently sent presents<a id="k73b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; [to the woman], her betrothal is invalid,<a id="k73b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; because he has sent these gifts on account of the original betrothal.<a id="k73b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; If, however, they<a id="k73b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; had intercourse they have thereby effected legal <i>kinyan</i>. R. Simeon b. Judah in the name of R. Ishmael said: Even if they had intercourse they effect no <i>kinyan</i>.<a id="k73b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; Now here, surely, it is an error [affecting] only one woman and they<a id="k73b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; nevertheless differ. Would you not [admit that by 'error' is meant] an error in respect of vows?<a id="k73b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; No; [what was meant is] an error in respect of that which was worth less than a <i>perutah</i>.<a id="k73b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; But was not 'less than than a perutah' explicitly mentioned: 'If a man betrothed a woman in error or [with something worth] less than a perutah'?<a id="k73b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; [The latter part is] really an explanation [of the former:] What is meant by 'If a man betrothed a woman in error'? If, for instance, he betrothed her with 'something worth less than 'a perutah'.
</p><p>
	On what principle do they<a id="k73b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; differ?<a id="k73b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; One Master<a id="k73b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; holds the view that everyone is aware that with less than the value of a <i>perutah</i> no betrothal can be effected, and consequently any man having intercourse [after such an invalid act] determines [to do so] for the purpose of betrothal. The other Master,<a id="k73b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; however, holds the view that not everyone is aware that with less than the value of a <i>perutah</i> no betrothal can be effected, and when a man has intercourse [after such an act<a id="k73b_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; he does so] in reliance on his first betrothal.<a id="k73b_48"><sup>48</sup></a>
</p><p>
	He raised [another] objection against him:<a id="k73b_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; [If a man said to a woman,] 'I am having intercourse with you on the condition that my father will consent',<a id="k73b_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; she is betrothed to him even if his father did not consent. R. Simeon b. Judah, however, stated in the name of R. Simeon, If his father consented she is betrothed but if his father did not consent she is not betrothed.<a id="k73b_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; Now here, surely, it is a case similar to that of an error affecting one woman<a id="k73b_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; and they<a id="k73b_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; nevertheless differ!<a id="k73b_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; They differ in this case<a id="k73b_55"><sup>55</sup></a>&nbsp; on the following points.<a id="k73b_56"><sup>56</sup></a>&nbsp; One Master<a id="k73b_57"><sup>57</sup></a>&nbsp; holds the opinion that [the expression] 'On the condition that my father consents' implies, 'On condition that my father will remain silent', and [the betrothal is valid] because, surely, his father remained silent. And the other Master<a id="k73b_58"><sup>58</sup></a>&nbsp; holds the opinion [that the meaning of the expression is] that his father will say, 'yes', and [the betrothal is invalid] because his father in fact did not say, 'yes'.
</p><p>
	He raised [a further] objection against him.<a id="k73b_59"><sup>59</sup></a>&nbsp; The Sages agree with R. Eliezer<a id="k73b_60"><sup>60</sup></a>&nbsp; in respect of a minor whom her father had given in marriage and who was divorced,<a id="k73b_61"><sup>61</sup></a>&nbsp; [in consequence of which] she is regarded as an 'orphan' in her father's lifetime,<a id="k73b_62"><sup>62</sup></a>&nbsp; and who was then remarried,<a id="k73b_63"><sup>63</sup></a>&nbsp; that she must perform <i>halizah</i><a id="k73b_64"><sup>64</sup></a>&nbsp; but may not<a id="k73b_65"><sup>65</sup></a>&nbsp; contract the levirate marriage because her divorce was a perfectly legal divorce,<a id="k73b_66"><sup>66</sup></a>&nbsp; but her remarriage was not a perfectly legal remarriage.<a id="k73b_67"><sup>67</sup></a>&nbsp; This,<a id="k73b_68"><sup>68</sup></a>&nbsp; however, applies only where he<a id="k73b_69"><sup>69</sup></a>&nbsp; divorced her while she was a minor<a id="k73b_70"><sup>70</sup></a>&nbsp; and remarried her while she was still a minor;<a id="k73b_71"><sup>71</sup></a>&nbsp; but if he<a id="k73b_72"><sup>72</sup></a>&nbsp; divorced her while she was a minor<a id="k73b_73"><sup>73</sup></a>&nbsp; and remarried her while she was still a minor and she became of age while she was still with him, and then he died,<a id="k73b_74"><sup>74</sup></a>&nbsp; she must either perform <i>halizah</i> or contract the levirate marriage.<a id="k73b_75"><sup>75</sup></a>
</P>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k74a_1:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 461, n. 10."
,k74a_2:" Whom the first husband remarried 'while she was still a minor and she came of age while she was with him, and then be died' (cf. Rashi, second version, s.v. [H] a.l.). Aliter: Even if she was remarried after she came of age, or was divorced and remarried after she came of age, R. Eliezer's reason being that preventive measures were necessary against the possibility of erroneously allowing one who was an 'orphan in the lifetime of her father' to contract levirate marriage. If the former interpretation is adopted the author of the Baraitha here cited would be in disagreement with the one in Yeb. 109a (v. Rashi l.c.); if the latter interpretation is adopted, the reading of cur. edd. <i>infra</i> is to be emended (v. <i>infra</i> note 14)."
,k74a_3:" V. Yeb. 109a where this passage occurs with some slight variations."
,k74a_4:" Where remarriage took place 'while she was still a minor and she came of age while she was with him'."
,k74a_5:" The error of believing the betrothal of the minor to be valid."
,k74a_6:" The Sages and R. Eliezer."
,k74a_7:" The Sages maintaining that levirate marriage may be contracted; which proves that the intercourse that took place when she was of age is regarded as a valid <i>kinyan</i>. As the same principle applies also to the case of error in respect of a woman under a vow (<i>supra</i>) an objection arises against Rabbah (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 459, n. 14)."
,k74a_8:" Lit., 'there'."
,k74a_9:" If the second interpretation (<i>supra</i> note 7) is adopted the reading is to be emended to: Every one knows that the betrothal of a minor is invalid, but where one betrothed a woman on a certain condition and then had intercourse he does so in reliance on this condition (v. Rashi)."
,k74a_10:" Not on the one underlying the case of which Rabbah spoke."
,k74a_11:" The view expressed by the Sages."
,k74a_12:" Hence the validity of the marriage and the permissibility of a levirate marriage."
,k74a_13:" R. Eliezer."
,k74a_14:" Which be believes to be a valid betrothal."
,k74a_15:" Which in fact was invalid. Hence the invalidity of the marriage etc. (cf. <i>supra</i> note 1)."
,k74a_16:" In agreement with Rabbah who stated (<i>supra</i> 73b) that 'in the case of an error affecting merely one woman all agree that she requires no divorce from him'."
,k74a_17:" If the condition has not been fulfilled."
,k74a_18:" R. Aba b. Jacob's."
,k74a_19:" MS.M. reads 'son of the sister of Resh Lakish'."
,k74a_20:" [H] (rt. [H], Hof'al.) lit., 'misled'."
,k74a_21:" Resh Lakish. Cur. edd. omit 'to him' which is the reading of MS.M."
,k74a_22:" The levir."
,k74a_23:" When be submitted to <i>halizah</i>."
,k74a_24:" Lit., 'until'."
,k74a_25:" If the levir, according to the interpretation of Resh Lakish, performed the <i>halizah</i> in order to effect thereby a <i>kinyan</i> of marriage, he obviously did not intend to perform the commandment of <i>halizah</i> the very purpose of which is not the union of the woman with, but her separation from, the levir. And, since there was no intention to perform the commandment, how could such a <i>halizah</i> be valid?"
,k74a_26:" Of 'a <i>halizah</i> under a false pretext'."
,k74a_27:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a> Even if the promised sum was not paid to the levir the <i>halizah</i> is nevertheless valid. Tosef. Yeb. XII, Yeb. 106a."
,k74a_28:" Since the non-fulfilment of the condition does not invalidate the <i>halizah</i>."
,k74a_29:" [Without emphasizing at the time that he does so in reliance on the condition (v. Tosaf.).]"
,k74a_30:" And the woman should, therefore, become his lawful wife. How then could R. Aha b. Jacob maintain in the name of R. Johanan that a betrothal, on a certain condition that has not been fulfilled, is invalid and no divorce is required even if intercourse followed the betrothal?"
,k74a_31:" Lit., 'son of the school house'."
,k74a_32:" Lit., 'beautiful'."
,k74a_33:" V. Num. XXXII, 29, 30 and Kid. 61a."
,k74a_34:" Moses instructed Joshua to act, so to speak, as his agent in carrying out the condition he had made (v. Num. XXXII, 28ff)."
,k74a_35:" <i>Halizah</i>, for instance. The levir cannot instruct an agent to submit to <i>halizah</i> on his behalf when the sum promised shall have been handed to him."
,k74a_36:" As the condition is null and void the act of <i>halizah</i> remains valid despite the unfulfilled condition. Where, however, the condition was valid, as in the case of the betrothal spoken of by R. Aha b. Jacob, the non-fulfilment of the condition renders the betrothal null and void and no subsequent intercourse can be regarded as an annulment of the condition and confirmation of the betrothal."
,k74a_37:" When it was intended as a <i>kinyan</i> of marriage."
,k74a_38:" As was stated in the passage quoted from Git. 25b (<i>supra</i> 73b)."
,k74a_39:" For the validity of the condition."
,k74a_40:" [H] (rt. [H]) lit., 'beings'. 'becomings'. [H] is the rt. of [H] (Deut. XXIV, 2), and she becometh&nbsp;&hellip; wife. A woman may become a man's wife either by receiving from him (a) money (or its equivalent in kind) or (b) a deed or (c) by cohabitation (Kid. 2a)."
,k74a_41:" As a condition in connection with (a) and (b) (which may be performed through an agent) is valid, so also is one in connection with (<i>c</i>)."
,k74a_42:" Which she owed him. Such betrothal is invalid because loaned money may be spent, while a betrothal cannot be valid unless money or its equivalent (v. p, 464, n. 15) was actually given to the woman at the time of the betrothal (v. Kid. 6b)."
,k74a_43:" Which was not fulfilled."
,k74a_44:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a> The minimum sum for a betrothal to be valid is a <i>perutah</i>."
,k74a_45:" If the union is to be dissolved."
,k74a_46:" Because a man, it is assumed, would not allow his intercourse to deteriorate into a mere act of prostitution."
,k74a_47:" Betrothal with less than a <i>perutah</i>."
,k74a_48:" That the betrothal was valid. Knowing his act to be invalid be determines to effect the <i>kinyan</i> of the marriage through his subsequent intercourse. Hence the necessity for a divorce to dissolve it."
,k74a_49:" Betrothal by a loan or on a certain condition, spoken of <i>supra</i> in the name of R. Eleazar."
,k74a_50:" He might be under the impression that a loan may effect a valid betrothal or that the condition he had made had been fulfilled. As his intercourse would consequently be based on his erroneous presumption of the validity of the betrothal the union would have no validity and, contrary to the view expressed in the name of R. Eleazar (v. <i>supra</i> n. 8), no divorce to dissolve it would be required."
,k74a_51:" Lit., 'there was no power'."
,k74a_52:" Num. V, 13, E.V., neither she be taken in the act."
,k74a_53:" Only if she was 'not seized', i.e., she did not act under compulsion but willingly (cf. Yeb. 56b)."
,k74a_54:" To her husband."
,k74a_55:" I.e., if she acted under compulsion."
,k74a_56:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 1."
,k74a_57:" I.e., when a condition that was attached to it remained unfulfilled. In such a case the woman may leave her husband without a letter of divorce and is free to marry any other man. "
}

txt:
<p>
In the name of R. Eliezer,<a id="k74a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; however, it was stated: She<a id="k74a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; must perform <i>halizah</i> but may not contract the levirate marriage.<a id="k74a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; Now, here,<a id="k74a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; surely, it is a case similar to that of an error<a id="k74a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; affecting merely one woman and they<a id="k74a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; nevertheless differ!<a id="k74a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; In that case<a id="k74a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; also [it may be said that]<a id="k74a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; they<a id="k74a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; differ on the following principles.<a id="k74a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; One Master<a id="k74a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; maintains that everyone is aware that there is no validity in the betrothal of a minor and, consequently, any man having intercourse [after such an invalid act] determines that his intercourse shall serve the purpose of a betrothal.<a id="k74a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; The other Master,<a id="k74a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; however, maintains that not everyone is aware that there is no validity in the betrothal of a minor, and when a man has intercourse [after such an act<a id="k74a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; he does so] in reliance on his original betrothal.<a id="k74a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>
</p><p>
	[So]<a id="k74a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; it was also stated: R. Aha b. Jacob stated in the name of R. Johanan. If a man betrothed a woman on a certain condition and then had intercourse with her, she,<a id="k74a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; it is the opinion of all, requires no letter of divorce from him.
</p><p>
	R. Aha the son of R. Ika, his<a id="k74a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; sister's son<a id="k74a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; raised an objection against him: A <i>halizah</i> under a false pretext<a id="k74a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; is valid; and what is 'a <i>halizah</i> under a false pretext'? Resh Lakish explained: Where a levir is told, 'Submit to her <i>halizah</i> and you will thereby wed her'. Said R. Johanan to him:<a id="k74a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; I am in the habit of repeating [a Baraitha,] 'Whether he<a id="k74a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; had the intention<a id="k74a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; [of performing the commandment of <i>halizah</i>] and she had no such intention, or whether she had such intention and he had not, her <i>halizah</i> is invalid, it being necessary<a id="k74a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; that both shall [at the same time] have such intention', and you say that her <i>halizah</i> is valid?<a id="k74a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; But, said R. Johanan, [this is the meaning:]<a id="k74a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; When a levir is told, 'Submit to her <i>halizah</i> on the con dition that she gives you two hundred zuz'.<a id="k74a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; Thus<a id="k74a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; it clearly follows that as soon as a man has performed an act<a id="k74a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; he has thereby dispensed with his condition, [why then should it not be said] here also that as soon as the man has intercourse he has thereby dispensed with his condition?<a id="k74a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; The other replied: Young hopeful,<a id="k74a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; do you speak sensibly?<a id="k74a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; Consider: Whence do we derive [the law of the validity of] any condition? [Obviously] from the condition in respect of the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuben;<a id="k74a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; [hence it is only] a condition that may be carried out through an agent, as was the case there,<a id="k74a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; that is regarded as a valid condition; but one which cannot be carried out through an agent,<a id="k74a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; as was the case there, is not regarded as a valid condition.<a id="k74a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; But is not intercourse<a id="k74a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; an act which cannot be performed through an agent as was the case there<a id="k74a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; and yet a condition in connection with it is valid?<a id="k74a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; The reason<a id="k74a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; there is because the various forms of betrothal<a id="k74a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; were compared to one another.<a id="k74a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. 'Ulla b. Abba in the name of 'Ulla in the name of R. Eleazar stated: If a man betrothed a woman by a loan<a id="k74a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; and then had intercourse with her, or on a certain condition<a id="k74a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; and then had intercourse with her, or with less than the value of a <i>perutah</i><a id="k74a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; and then had intercourse with her, she,<a id="k74a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; it is the opinion of all, requires from him a letter of divorce.<a id="k74a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Joseph b. Abba, in the name of R. Menahem in the name of R. Ammi stated: If a man betrothed a woman with something worth less than a <i>perutah</i> and then had intercourse with her, she<a id="k74a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; requires a letter of divorce from him.<a id="k74a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; It is only in this case<a id="k74a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; that no one could be mistaken,<a id="k74a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; but in the case of the others<a id="k74a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; a man may be mistaken.<a id="k74a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Kahana stated in the name of 'Ulla: If a man betrothed a woman on a certain condition<a id="k74a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; and then had intercourse with her, she<a id="k74a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; requires a divorce from him.<a id="k74a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; Such a case once occurred and the Sages could find no legal ground<a id="k74a_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; for releasing the woman without a letter of divorce. [This is meant] to exclude [the ruling] of the following Tanna. For Rab Judah stated in the name of Samuel in the name of R. Ishmael: And she be not seized<a id="k74a_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; [only then<a id="k74a_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; is she] forbidden;<a id="k74a_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; if, however, she was seized<a id="k74a_55"><sup>55</sup></a>&nbsp; she is permitted.<a id="k74a_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; There is, however, another [kind of woman] who is permitted<a id="k74a_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; even though she was not seized.<a id="k74a_56"><sup>56</sup></a>&nbsp; And who is she? A woman whose betrothal was a mistaken one<a id="k74a_57"><sup>57</sup></a>&nbsp; and who may, even if her son sits riding on her shoulder,
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k74b_1:" I.e., she requires no formal letter of divorce."
,k74b_2:" V. <i>supra</i> 51b. The practical ruling of the Sages, as reported by R. Kahana in the name of 'Ulla, shews that the ruling of R. Ishmael was not adopted."
,k74b_3:" The woman who was under a vow at the time of her betrothal."
,k74b_4:" The woman who was afflicted with a bodily defect at the time of her betrothal."
,k74b_5:" I.e., why is the betrothal valid in the case of the former and not in that of the latter?"
,k74b_6:" Lit., 'uproots'."
,k74b_7:" So that the woman, at the time of her betrothal, was virtually under no vow. Hence the validity of the betrothal."
,k74b_8:" Since the woman at the time of the betrothal was still suffering from her affliction the betrothal was effected under a false assumption and is therefore invalid."
,k74b_9:" V. <i>supra</i> note 8."
,k74b_10:" How is this statement to be reconciled with the previous one according to which disallowance of a vow by a Sage renders the preceding betrothal valid?"
,k74b_11:" V. Marg. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">glos.</a> Cur. edd. [H], 'Raba'."
,k74b_12:" The ruling that the betrothal is valid if a Sage disallowed the vow."
,k74b_13:" That even where a Sage had disallowed the vow the betrothal is invalid."
,k74b_14:" Lit., 'Is willing'."
,k74b_15:" [H], lit., 'that she shall be disgraced'."
,k74b_16:" By applying in person to the Sage for the disallowance of her vow. It is assumed, therefore, that a man has no objection to betrothing a woman who is under a vow, since she may subsequently apply to a Sage for a disallowance."
,k74b_17:" V. p. 466, D. 20."
,k74b_18:" Consequently, if he had known that she was under a vow he would not have betrothed her. Hence the invalidity of the betrothal."
,k74b_19:" Lit., 'it'."
,k74b_20:" Attributed to R. Meir and R. Eleazar respectively."
,k74b_21:" Because, according to one opinion (v. Git. 45b), it is possible that after the woman had obtained from a Sage the disallowance of her vow and had married another man, her first husband might regret his action in divorcing her and, advancing the plea that he would not have divorced her had he known that her vow could be disallowed, might impair thereby the validity of her second marriage. By the enactment that 'he may not re-marry her' a husband is naturally induced to institute all the necessary enquiries and to consider very carefully his course before he decides upon divorce, and should he nevertheless divorce her and then plead that he was unaware that her vow could be disallowed, his plea might well be disregarded. According to another opinion (Git. l.c.) the prohibition to marry a woman in the circumstances mentioned is a penalty, and a warning to women to abstain from making vows."
,k74b_22:" Immoral conduct. For the reason cf. <i>supra</i> note 6 mutatis mutandis. As a vow may be disallowed so may a bad name turn out to be unfounded, and the first husband might then try to impair the validity of the second marriage. According to the second opinion (v. <i>supra</i> note 6 ad fin.) the prohibition is a penalty for, and a warning against, lax morality and ill-reputed associations."
,k74b_23:" Lit., 'of which many knew', cf. <i>infra</i> 75a ab init."
,k74b_24:" Since such a vow can never be disallowed (v. <i>infra</i> p. 468, n. 6 and text). R. Judah adopts the second reason (<i>supra</i> note 6)."
,k74b_25:" Because, since the disallowance of such a vow is permitted, no penalty has been imposed upon the woman."
,k74b_26:" I.e., if it is of the class of vows which a husband is not entitled to invalidate."
,k74b_27:" R. Meir, maintaining that a husband does not mind his wife's being exposed to the publicity of a court of law forbids remarriage on account of the first reason <i>supra</i> p. 467, n. 6, since the first husband might plead that if he had known that the vow could be disallowed by a Sage he would not have consented to give a divorce."
,k74b_28:" I.e., if the vow was of a class the invalidation of which is within the husband's rights."
,k74b_29:" Because in this case the husband cannot advance the plea that the divorce was due to a misunderstanding (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 467, n. 6 and note 12)."
,k74b_30:" Cur. edd. insert in parentheses, 'Whether it requires or whether it does not require he may not remarry her' (cf. the reading in Git. 45b, Rashal and Asheri)."
,k74b_31:" V. p. 467, n. 11."
,k74b_32:" V. <i>supra</i> note 1. Since in the latter case the husband might plead that he was not aware that he had the right to disallow the vow. In the former case, however, no such plea can be advanced because no man would consent that his wife should be exposed to the publicity of a court of law. V. Git. 45b."
,k74b_33:" For ruling that a vow that was made in public (v. <i>supra</i> p. 467, nn. 8 and 9) may not be disallowed. "
}

txt:
<p>
make a declaration of refusal<a id="k74b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; [against her husband] and go away.<a id="k74b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Our Rabbis taught: If she<a id="k74b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; went to a Sage [after her betrothal] and he disallowed her vow her betrothal is valid. [If one<a id="k74b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; went] to a physician who cured her, her betrothal is invalid. What is the difference between the act of the Sage and that of the physician?<a id="k74b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; A Sage annuls<a id="k74b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; the vow retrospectively<a id="k74b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; while a physician effects the cure only from that moment onwards.<a id="k74b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; But was it not, however, taught, [that if she<a id="k74b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; went] to a Sage and he disallowed her vow or to a physician and he cured her, her betrothal is invalid?<a id="k74b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Rabbah<a id="k74b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; replied: There is no contradiction. The former<a id="k74b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; represents the view of R. Meir; the latter<a id="k74b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; represents that of R. Eleazar. 'The former represents the view of R. Meir', who holds that a man does not mind<a id="k74b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; his wife's being exposed to the publicity<a id="k74b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; of a court of law.<a id="k74b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; 'The latter represents that of R. Eleazar' who holds that no man wants his wife to be exposed to the publicity<a id="k74b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; of a court of law.<a id="k74b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; What is the source<a id="k74b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; [of these statements]?<a id="k74b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; [The following] where we learned: If a man divorced his wife on account of a vow [she had made] he may not remarry her,<a id="k74b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; nor may he remarry his wife [if he divorced her] on account of a had name.<a id="k74b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Judah ruled: In the case of a vow that was made in the presence of many people<a id="k74b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; he may not remarry her,<a id="k74b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; but if it was not made in the presence of many people he may remarry her.<a id="k74b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Meir ruled: In the case of a vow [the disallowance of which] necessitates the investigation of a Sage<a id="k74b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; her husband may not remarry her,<a id="k74b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; but if it does not require the investigation of a Sage<a id="k74b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; he may remarry her.<a id="k74b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Eleazar said:<a id="k74b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; The prohibition against [remarriage where the disallowance of the vow] required [the investigation of a Sage]<a id="k74b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; was ordained only on account [of a vow] which requires [no such investigation].<a id="k74b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; (What is R. Judah's reason?<a id="k74b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; Because it is written in Scripture,
</P>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k75a_1:" Josh. IX, 28; the oath could not be annulled because it was taken in public."
,k75a_2:" Referring to Lev. XV, 25. Cf. Nid. 73a."
,k75a_3:" [H] (Josh. ibid.)."
,k75a_4:" And a congregation consists of not less than ten men."
,k75a_5:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 467, nn. 11ff."
,k75a_6:" R. Meir and R. Eleazar. Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 466, nn. 29ff."
,k75a_7:" The source of the statements (v. <i>supra</i> p. 467, n. 5) has thus been shewn. For further notes on the passage v. Git. (Sonc. ed.) pp. 200ff."
,k75a_8:" In explanation of the contradiction pointed out <i>supra</i> 74b."
,k75a_9:" The second Baraitha which rules that the betrothal is invalid even if a Sage has disallowed the vow."
,k75a_10:" Even according to R. Meir who maintains that a husband does not mind his wife's appearance before a court of law one may still be objecting to live with a wife who is restricted by a vow."
,k75a_11:" In his desire to avoid a divorce and to obtain the retrospective annulment of his betrothal (v. following note)."
,k75a_12:" Her mother and sister who are forbidden to marry the man who divorced her. He may insist that he wishes to retain the privilege of marrying these women members of a noted family though he objected to the particular one who restricted herself by a vow. By obtaining the annulment of the betrothal he does not place his wife under the category of a divorcee and he retains, in consequence, the right of marrying her relatives. Hence the ruling (even according to R. Meir) that the betrothal is invalid."
,k75a_13:" If Raba's explanation is to be accepted."
,k75a_14:" A man who betrothed a woman on the condition that he was under no vow or that he suffered no bodily defects."
,k75a_15:" After the betrothal"
,k75a_16:" In order to reconcile the two clauses."
,k75a_17:" On the lines followed by Raba in the first clause."
,k75a_18:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 3 <i>mutatis mutandis</i>."
,k75a_19:" Cf. <i>mutatis mutandis</i>, <i>supra</i> nn. 4 and 5."
,k75a_20:" Or 'together', 'as husband and wife'. V. following note."
,k75a_21:" Yeb. 118b. This is a woman's maxim. She prefers a married life of unhappiness and misery to a happy and prosperous life in solitude. [H] (adv.) 'with a load of grief', 'in trouble' (Jast.) Aliter: (Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 13) us iy 'two bodies' (Rashi); 'two persons' (Levy)."
,k75a_22:" A woman's opinion of a married life (v. Yeb. l.c.) [H] pl. of [H], 'a free woman'."
,k75a_23:" [H], 'flax-beater' (Rashi), a watchman of vegetables' (Aruch.), i.e., of a poor and humble occupation."
,k75a_24:" To shew her friends that she is a married woman. She is proud to be in the company of a husband however humble his occupation and social status."
,k75a_25:" [H], i.e., 'dull', 'ugly' (v. Jast.): 'of a tainted family' (Rashi)."
,k75a_26:" I.e., even a cheap vegetable."
,k75a_27:" A woman is content to dispense even with the cheapest enjoyments for the sake of a married life."
,k75a_28:" Who marry the unlovely types enumerated."
,k75a_29:" Lit., 'and hang on'."
,k75a_30:" The defects that disqualify priests (v. Bek. 43a)."
,k75a_31:" In the case of women (v. our Mishnah)."
,k75a_32:" Lit., 'smell of the mouth'."
,k75a_33:" In respect of defects that render animals unfit for the altar (Bek. 41a)."
,k75a_34:" Under which term, it is at present assumed, excessive perspiration and offensive breath are included."
,k75a_35:" Sc. priests."
,k75a_36:" Bek. 43a. How then could it be said <i>supra</i> that excessive perspiration and offensive breath are not included among those that disqualify a priest?"
,k75a_37:" By the application of water (v. Tosaf. s.v. itf). Aliter: That may be cured (v. Tosaf. <i>loc. cit</i>.)."
,k75a_38:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 14 <i>mutatis mutandis</i>."
,k75a_39:" Who were not described as 'filthy', but as suffering from excessive perspiration or offensive breath. R. Ashi, contrary to the previous assumption (v. <i>supra</i> note 11), draws a distinction between 'filthy' which implies a chronic state of the body and the two others which are only minor defects."
,k75a_40:" Even if water could not remove it."
,k75a_41:" With whom a husband is constantly in contact."
,k75a_42:" Hence the ruling that even such minor defects render a betrothal invalid."
,k75a_43:" Lit., 'here and here', in the case of a priest and in that of a wife."
,k75a_44:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos</a>. The question then arises: What kind of a mole was meant in the Baraitha <i>supra</i> where it is mentioned among the three defects of a wife that do not disqualify a priest."
,k75a_45:" And is small in size and without hair."
,k75a_46:" The man who betrothed her."
,k75a_47:" How then could a mole in such circumstances be regarded as a defect that causes the invalidity of the betrothal?"
,k75a_48:" Any woman."
,k75a_49:" Cant. II, 14."
,k75a_50:" This is explained anon."
,k75a_51:" But if it was bigger or smaller it is to be regarded as a defect."
,k75a_52:" R. Nathan's statement."
,k75a_53:" Lit., 'is there such a kind'."
,k75a_54:" The following paragraph, though irrelevant to the subject under discussion, is inserted here because of its author, R. Meyasha, who is also the author of the previous statement."
,k75a_55:" [H], lit., 'man and man'."
,k75a_56:" Ps. LXXXVII, 5."
,k75a_57:" The inference is derived from the repetition of man (v. <i>supra</i> n. 3)."
,k75a_58:" Will be acclaimed as a son of Zion."
,k75a_59:" The man of Zion, i.e., the Palestinians (Rashi)."
,k75a_60:" Babylonians."
,k75a_61:" To Palestine."
,k75a_62:" In Babylon."
,k75a_63:" Cf. Men. 42a."
,k75a_64:" A betrothed woman."
,k75a_65:" I.e., before she married and went to live with her husband."
,k75a_66:" If his daughter is to be entitled to her <i>kethubah</i> from the man who betrothed her and refused to marry her on account of her defects."
,k75a_67:" Metaph. It is the husband's misfortune that the woman who had no such defects prior to her betrothal is now afflicted with them."
,k75a_68:" I.e., if the defects were discovered after the marriage."
,k75a_69:" Should be, on account of her defects, desire to divorce her and to deny her the <i>kethubah</i>."
,k75a_70:" The validity of a husband's plea that HIS BARGAIN WAS MADE IN ERROR. "
}

txt:
<p>
And the children of Israel smote them not, because the princes of the congregation had sworn unto them.<a id="k75a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; And what is considered 'many'? R. Nahman b. Isaac said: Three [men]; [for the expression of] 'days'<a id="k75a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; implies two [days] and 'many'<a id="k75a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; three. R. Isaac replied: Ten; [for the term] congregation<a id="k75a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; was applied to them.)<a id="k75a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; [Now] 'R. Meir ruled: In the case of a vow [the disallowance of which] necessitates the investigation of a Sage he may not remarry her' [and] 'R. Eleazar said: The prohibition [against remarriage where the disallowance of the vow] required [the investigation of a Sage] was ordained only on account [of a vow] which required [no such investigation]'.<a id="k75a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; on what principles do they<a id="k75a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; differ? &mdash; R. Meir holds the view that 'a man does not mind his wife's being exposed to the publicity of a court of law' and R. Eleazar holds the view that 'no man wants his wife to be exposed to the publicity of a court of law'.<a id="k75a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Raba replied:<a id="k75a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; Here<a id="k75a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; we are dealing with the case of a woman from a noted family in which case the man<a id="k75a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; could say,<a id="k75a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; 'I have no wish to be forbidden to marry her relatives'.<a id="k75a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; If so,<a id="k75a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; [consider] the final clause where it is stated, 'But if he<a id="k75a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; went<a id="k75a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; to a Sage who disallowed his vow or to a physician who cured him, his betrothal of the woman is valid', [why, it may be asked, was it not] stated, 'the betrothal is invalid' and<a id="k75a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; explained,<a id="k75a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Here we are dealing with the case of a man from a noted family concerning whom the woman<a id="k75a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; might plead. 'I have no wish to be forbidden to marry his relatives'?<a id="k75a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; A woman is satisfied with any sort [of husband] as Resh Lakish said. For Resh Lakish stated: 'It is preferable to live in grief<a id="k75a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; than to dwell in widowhood'.<a id="k75a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; Abaye said: With a husband [of the size of an] ant her seat is placed among the great.<a id="k75a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Papa said: Though her husband be a carder<a id="k75a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; she calls him to the threshold and sits down [at his side].<a id="k75a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Ashi said: Even if her husband is only a cabbage-head<a id="k75a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; she requires no lentils<a id="k75a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; for her pot.<a id="k75a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>
</p><p>
	A Tanna taught: But all such women<a id="k75a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; play the harlot and attribute the consequences<a id="k75a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; to their husbands.
</p><p>
	ALL DEFECTS WHICH DISQUALIFY etc. A Tanna taught: To these<a id="k75a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; were added<a id="k75a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; [excessive] perspiration, a mole and offensive breath.<a id="k75a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; Do these, then, not cause a disqualification in respect of priests? Surely we have learned,<a id="k75a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; 'The old, the sick and the filthy'<a id="k75a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; and we have also learned, 'These defects whether permanent or transitory, render human beings<a id="k75a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; unfit [for the Temple service]!<a id="k75a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; R. Jose b. Hanina replied: This is no contradiction. The former refers to perspiration that can be removed;<a id="k75a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; the latter, to perspiration that cannot be removed.<a id="k75a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Ashi said [in reply]: You are pointing out a contradiction between 'perspiration' and 'one who is filthy' [which in fact are not alike, for] there, in the case of priests,<a id="k75a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; it is possible to remove the perspiration<a id="k75a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; by the aid of sour wine, and it is also possible [to remove] an offensive breath by holding pepper in one's mouth and thus performing the Temple service, but in the case of a wife<a id="k75a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; [such devices are for all practical purposes] impossible.<a id="k75a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>
</p><p>
	What kind of a mole is here meant? If one overgrown with hair, it would cause disqualification in both cases; if one with no hair, [then, again], if it is a large one it causes disqualification in both cases<a id="k75a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; and if it is a small one it causes no disqualification in either; for it was taught: A mole which is overgrown with hair is regarded as a bodily defect; if with no hair it is only deemed to be a bodily defect when large but when small it is no defect; and what is meant by large? R. Simeon b. Gamaliel explained: The size of an Italian issar!<a id="k75a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; R. Jose the son of R. Hanina said: One which is situated on her forehead.<a id="k75a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; [If it was on] her forehead he<a id="k75a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; must have seen it and acquiesced!<a id="k75a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; R. Papa replied: It is one that was situated under her bonnet and is sometimes exposed and sometimes not.
</p><p>
	R. Hisda said: I heard the following statement from a great man (And who is he? R. Shila). If a dog bit her<a id="k75a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; and the spot of the bite turned into a scar [such a scar] is considered a bodily defect.
</p><p>
	R. Hisda further stated: A harsh voice in a woman is a bodily defect; since it is said in Scripture, For sweet is thy voice, and thy countenance is comely.<a id="k75a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Nathan of Bira learnt: [The space] of one handbreadth between a woman's breasts.<a id="k75a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Aha the son of Raba intended to explain in the presence of R. Ashi [that this statement meant that '[the space of] a handbreadth' is to [a woman's] advantage,<a id="k75a_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; but R. Ashi said to him: This<a id="k75a_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; was taught in connection with bodily defects. And what space [is deemed normal]? Abaye replied: [A space of] three fingers.
</p><p>
	It was taught: R. Nathan said, It is a bodily defect if a woman's breasts are bigger than those of others. By how much? &mdash; R. Meyasha the grandson of R. Joshua b. Levi replied in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi: By one handbreadth. Is such a deformity, however, possible?<a id="k75a_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Yes; for Rabbah b. Bar Hana related, I saw an Arab woman who flung her breasts over her back and nursed her child.
</p><p>
	But<a id="k75a_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; of Zion it shall be said: 'This man and that<a id="k75a_55"><sup>55</sup></a>&nbsp; was born in her; and the Most High Himself doth establish her;<a id="k75a_56"><sup>56</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Meyasha, grandson of R. Joshua b. Levi, explained: Both<a id="k75a_57"><sup>57</sup></a>&nbsp; he who was born therein and he who looks forward to seeing it.<a id="k75a_58"><sup>58</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Said Abaye: And one of them<a id="k75a_59"><sup>59</sup></a>&nbsp; is as good as two of us.<a id="k75a_60"><sup>60</sup></a>&nbsp; Said Raba: When one of us, however, goes up there<a id="k75a_61"><sup>61</sup></a>&nbsp; he is as good as two of them. For [you have the case of] R. Jeremiah who, while here,<a id="k75a_62"><sup>62</sup></a>&nbsp; did not understand what the Rabbis were saying, but when he went up there he was able to refer to us as 'The stupid Babylonians'.<a id="k75a_63"><sup>63</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. IF SHE<a id="k75a_64"><sup>64</sup></a>&nbsp; WAS AFFLICTED WITH BODILY DEFECTS WHILE SHE WAS STILL IN HER FATHER'S HOUSE,<a id="k75a_65"><sup>65</sup></a>&nbsp; HER FATHER<a id="k75a_66"><sup>66</sup></a>&nbsp; MUST PRODUCE PROOF THAT THESE DEFECTS AROSE AFTER SHE HAD BEEN BETROTHED AND [THAT, CONSEQUENTLY, IT WAS THE] HUSBAND'S FIELD THAT WAS INUNDATED.<a id="k75a_67"><sup>67</sup></a>&nbsp; IF SHE CAME UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HER HUSBAND,<a id="k75a_68"><sup>68</sup></a>&nbsp; THE HUSBAND<a id="k75a_69"><sup>69</sup></a>&nbsp; MUST PRODUCE PROOF THAT THESE DEFECTS WERE UPON HER BEFORE SHE HAD BEEN BETROTHED AND [THAT CONSEQUENTLY] HIS BARGAIN WAS MADE IN ERROR. THIS IS THE RULING OF R. MEIR. THE SAGES, HOWEVER, RULED: THIS<a id="k75a_70"><sup>70</sup></a>&nbsp; APPLIES ONLY TO CONCEALED BODILY DEFECTS;
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k75b_1:" Since he was in a position to see them."
,k75b_2:" That he was not aware of these defects."
,k75b_3:" He must have known, therefore, of the defects, and acquiesced."
,k75b_4:" Why in the first clause of our Mishnah the woman who was divorced after a betrothal is entitled to her <i>kethubah</i>."
,k75b_5:" So that it is unknown when the defects first arose."
,k75b_6:" If he pleads that the woman was afflicted with the defects prior to her betrothal; and he, as the possessor of the money, is consequently exempt from paying the <i>kethubah</i> as is the law in respect of all monetary claims where the possessor cannot be deprived of his money without legal proof of the claim advanced against him."
,k75b_7:" In the implication that the law is to be decided in favour of the husband who is the possessor of the money and not in favour of the woman who, since she was born without bodily defects, has the claim of presumptive soundness of body."
,k75b_8:" I.e., we do not rely on the woman's assertion, <i>supra</i> 12b, where the time she had been outraged is a matter of dispute between her and her husband. Though the woman has in her favour the claim of the presumptive chastity of her body she, nevertheless, cannot obtain her <i>kethubah</i> because of her husband's stronger claim as the possessor of the amount of the <i>kethubah</i>."
,k75b_9:" Why the woman does not receive her <i>kethubah</i>."
,k75b_10:" So that it is unknown when the defects first arose."
,k75b_11:" Cf. <i>supra</i> note 7 <i>mutatis mutandis</i>; the woman's presumptive soundness of body being regarded as a superior claim to that of the husband possessor of the amount of the <i>kethubah</i>."
,k75b_12:" <i>Supra</i> 12b. Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 473, n. 9 <i>mutatis mutandis</i> and p. 473, n. 12. A contradiction thus arises between the first and the second clause of our Mishnah."
,k75b_13:" [H]. Aliter: (rt. [H], 'to break') Divide or sever (the two clauses). R. Han. (v. Tosaf. s.v. [H],). regards[H], as an imprecation."
,k75b_14:" The first clause represents the view of R. Joshua who maintains the same view in the case spoken of in the second clause, while the second clause expresses the view of R. Gamaliel who maintains it in the case of the first clause also, neither of them drawing a distinction between a woman who was still in her father's house and one who was already under the authority of her husband."
,k75b_15:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 473, nn 7-8."
,k75b_16:" Lit., 'but'."
,k75b_17:" Lit., 'presumptive possession of the money'."
,k75b_18:" In leprosy. V. Lev. XIII, 2-4."
,k75b_19:" The man afflicted."
,k75b_20:" Neg. IV, 11."
,k75b_21:" Cf. Lev. XIII, 6: If the plague be dim (or dark)&nbsp;&hellip; then the priest shall pronounce him clean."
,k75b_22:" Thus it has been shewn that R. Joshua, since be ruled that a doubtful case of leprosy is clean, is guided by the principle of the presumptive soundness of the human body wherever it is not opposed by the principle of possession."
,k75b_23:" The apparent contradiction between the first and the second clause of our Mishnah (cf. <i>supra</i> note 1)."
,k75b_24:" In the FATHER'S HOUSE."
,k75b_25:" The BODILY DEFECTS of the woman."
,k75b_26:" And it is owing to this principle only that the onus of producing proof was thrown upon the father. Otherwise, he would have been believed without proof, in agreement with the view of R. Gamaliel, which is the adopted <i>halachah</i> (v. <i>supra</i> 12b), because his claim is supported by the principle of his daughter's presumptive soundness of body."
,k75b_27:" In the husband's house."
,k75b_28:" The BODILY DEFECTS of the woman."
,k75b_29:" The two clauses of our Mishnah thus present no contradiction, both expressing the view of R. Gamaliel (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 474, n. 15)."
,k75b_30:" Raba."
,k75b_31:" [H]. The reading in our Mishnah is [H] a change of tense and form that does not materially affect the meaning of the phrase."
,k75b_32:" Lit., 'yes'."
,k75b_33:" Although she was still in her father's house."
,k75b_34:" If Raba's explanation is correct."
,k75b_35:" Since this principle, however, is not adopted in the final clause, how could Raba's explanation be upheld?"
,k75b_36:" 'Here they were found etc.'."
,k75b_37:" Euphemism."
,k75b_38:" Since he had married the woman."
,k75b_39:" Hence the inadmissibility of the principle, 'Here they were found etc.'."
,k75b_40:" If the principle of the 'presumptive examination of the cup' is the determining factor in favour of the woman."
,k75b_41:" In the final clause where the proof established the existence of the defects after betrothal while the woman was still in her father's house."
,k75b_42:" Lit. 'place the body upon its strength'."
,k75b_43:" Against deciding, on the basis of the two principles, in favour of the woman. "
}

txt:
<p>
BUT IN RESPECT OF DEFECTS THAT ARE EXPOSED HE<a id="k75b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; CANNOT ADVANCE ANY VALID PLEA.<a id="k75b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; AND IF THERE WAS A BATH-HOUSE IN THE TOWN HE CANNOT ADVANCE ANY VALID PLEA<a id="k75b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; EVEN AGAINST CONCEALED BODILY DEFECTS, BECAUSE HE [IS ASSUMED TO HAVE HAD HER] EXAMINED BY HIS WOMEN RELATIVES.<a id="k75b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. The reason then<a id="k75b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; is because the father produced proof, but if he produced no proof,<a id="k75b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; the husband is believed.<a id="k75b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; Whose [view consequently is here<a id="k75b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; expressed]? [Obviously] that of R. Joshua who stated, 'Our life is not dependent on her statement'.<a id="k75b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; Now read the final clause: IF SHE CAME UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE HUSBAND, THE HUSBAND MUST PRODUCE PROOF, the reason then<a id="k75b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; is because the husband produced proof, but if he produced no proof,<a id="k75b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; the father is believed,<a id="k75b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; a ruling which expresses the view of R. Gamaliel who stated that the woman is believed!<a id="k75b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; R. Eleazar replied: The contradiction<a id="k75b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; [is evident]; he who taught the one did not teach the other.<a id="k75b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Raba said: It must not be assumed that R. Joshua<a id="k75b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; is never guided by the principle of the presumptive soundness of the body, for the fact is<a id="k75b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; that R. Joshua is not guided by that principle only where it is opposed by the principle of possession.<a id="k75b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; Where, however, the principle of possession is not applicable R. Joshua is guided by that of the soundness of the body; for it was taught: If the bright spot<a id="k75b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; preceded the white hair, he<a id="k75b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; is unclean; if the reverse, he is clean. [If the order is in] doubt, he is unclean; but R. Joshua said: It darkened.<a id="k75b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; What is meant by 'It darkened'? Rabbah replied: [It is as though the spot] darkened<a id="k75b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; [and, therefore,] he is clean.<a id="k75b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Raba explained:<a id="k75b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; The first clause [is a case of] 'Here<a id="k75b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; they<a id="k75b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; were found and here they must have arisen'<a id="k75b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; and so is the final clause: Here<a id="k75b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; they<a id="k75b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; were found and here they must have arisen.<a id="k75b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; Abaye raised an objection against him:<a id="k75b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; IF SHE CAME UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE HUSBAND, THE HUSBAND MUST PRODUCE PROOF THAT THESE DEFECTS WERE UPON HER BEFORE SHE HAD BEEN BETROTHED<a id="k75b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; AND [THAT, CONSEQUENTLY,] HIS BARGAIN WAS MADE IN ERROR; [Thus only if she had the defects] BEFORE SHE HAD BEEN BETROTHED [is the husband's plea] accepted,<a id="k75b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; [but if they were seen upon her] only after she had been betrothed<a id="k75b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; [his plea would] not [be accepted]. But why? Let it be said,<a id="k75b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Here they were found and here they must have arisen'!<a id="k75b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; The other<a id="k75b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; replied: [The principle<a id="k75b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; cannot be applied if the defects were discovered] after she had been betrothed because it may be taken for granted that no man drinks out of a cup<a id="k75b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; unless he has first examined it; and this man<a id="k75b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; must consequently have seen [the defects] and acquiesced.<a id="k75b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; If so,<a id="k75b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; [the same principle should apply] also to one [who had defects] prior to her betrothal. [Since,] however, [it is not applied], the presumption must be that no man is reconciled to bodily defects, [why then is it not presumed] here<a id="k75b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; also that no man is reconciled to bodily defects? &mdash; This, however, is the explanation: [The principle<a id="k75b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; cannot be applied to defects discovered] after she had been betrothed because two [principles] are [opposed to it:] The presumptive soundness of the woman's body<a id="k75b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; and the presumption that no man drinks out of a cup unless he has first examined it and that this man must, consequently, have seen [the defects] and acquiesced. What possible objection can you raise?<a id="k75b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; Is it the presumption that no man is reconciled to bodily defects? [But this] is only
</P>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k76a_1:" In favour of the man. The principle of possession is of no consequence here because it is completely disregarded when opposed by that of the presumptive soundness of the body."
,k76a_2:" Which are in favour of the woman."
,k76a_3:" Hence the ruling in her favour."
,k76a_4:" Since proof was adduced that she was afflicted with the defects prior to her betrothal."
,k76a_5:" Lit. 'what is there?' in favour of the woman's claim."
,k76a_6:" In the absence of the presumption of the soundness of body (cf. <i>supra</i> n. 5) the principle of possession is a determining factor (cf. <i>supra</i> note 2), and thus, being added to that of a man's irreconcilableness to bodily defects, two principles in favour of the man are opposed to one in favour of the woman. Hence the ruling in favour of the man."
,k76a_7:" The apparent contradiction between the first and second clause of our Mishnah (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 474, n. 1)."
,k76a_8:" Since the <i>kethubah</i> of a betrothed woman, as a na'arah (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>), unlike that of a married one, belongs to her father and not to herself."
,k76a_9:" Where the presumptive soundness of the claimant's daughter's body, not being that of the claimant herself, cannot override the principle of possession which is in favour of the husband. Hence the necessity for the father to produce the proof."
,k76a_10:" Dealing with a married woman."
,k76a_11:" In which case (cf. <i>supra</i> note 9 mutatis mutandis), the presumptive soundness of the body of the woman who is herself the claimant is sufficient to establish her claim. Hence it is for the husband to produce the necessary proof. Thus it is possible to assume that both the clauses of our Mishnah under discussion represent the view of R. Gamaliel who ruled that the presumptive soundness of body overrides the principle of possession."
,k76a_12:" Though he stated in our Mishnah that if the defects were discovered after the woman CAME UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HER HUSBAND it is the latter that MUST PRODUCE PROOF."
,k76a_13:" The reference is at present assumed to be to any kind of defect."
,k76a_14:" Lit., 'that are likely to come'."
,k76a_15:" Tosef. Keth. VII."
,k76a_16:" Should the father have to produce the proof."
,k76a_17:" According to R. Ashi's explanation."
,k76a_18:" The woman being married and the <i>kethubah</i> belonging to her, the presumptive soundness of her body should be sufficient to establish her claim."
,k76a_19:" Not, as has been presumed by R. Aha, with one who was afflicted with any defect. A superfluous limb does not grow after betrothal. Being a congenital defect, the principle of the presumptive soundness of the body cannot be applied."
,k76a_20:" Which is obviously congenital."
,k76a_21:" In support of her claim to her <i>kethubah</i>."
,k76a_22:" Prior to betrothal or marriage."
,k76a_23:" Pulling, <i>meshikah</i> (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>) is one of the forms of acquiring legal possession."
,k76a_24:" While the ass still remained on his premises."
,k76a_25:" To take it to his premises."
,k76a_26:" If such proof is produced the former owner of the cow must bear the loss, because the legal acquisition by one of the parties of one of two objects exchanged places upon the other party the responsibility for any accident that might happen to the other object even though he did not himself formally acquire it (v. Kid. 28a)."
,k76a_27:" Concerning whose defects a similar doubt exists. In the case of the exchanged animals it is uncertain whether the ass died before or after the acquisition of the cow; in the case of the bride it is uncertain whether she had her defects before or after her betrothal."
,k76a_28:" Provides the support. "
}

txt:
<p>
one principle<a id="k76a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; against two principles,<a id="k76a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; and one against two cannot be upheld.<a id="k76a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; [But where the defects were discovered] before betrothal, the principle of the presumptive soundness of her body cannot be applied,<a id="k76a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; and all that remains is<a id="k76a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; the presumption that no man drinks out of a cup unless he has first examined it and that this man must consequently have seen [the defects] and acquiesced, [but to this it can be retorted:] On the contrary, the presumption is that no man is reconciled to bodily defects, and consequently the money is to remain in the possession of its holder.<a id="k76a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Ashi explained:<a id="k76a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; The [claim in the] first clause<a id="k76a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; [is analogous to the claim] 'You owe my father a maneh',<a id="k76a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; but that in the final clause<a id="k76a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; [is analogous to the claim] 'You owe me a maneh'.<a id="k76a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Aha the son of R. Awya raised an objection against R. Ashi: R. Meir<a id="k76a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; admits that in respect of bodily defects<a id="k76a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; likely to have come<a id="k76a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; with her from her father's house it is the father who must produce the proof.<a id="k76a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; But why?<a id="k76a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; Is [not this<a id="k76a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; analogous to the claim,] 'You owe me a maneh'?<a id="k76a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Here<a id="k76a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; we are dealing with the case of a woman who had a superfluous limb.<a id="k76a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; [But if] she had a superfluous limb<a id="k76a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; what proof could be brought?<a id="k76a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Proof that the man has seen it<a id="k76a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; and acquiesced.
</p><p>
	Rab Judah stated in the name of Samuel: If a man exchanged a cow for [another man's] ass, and the owner of the ass pulled<a id="k76a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; the cow<a id="k76a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; but the owner of the cow did not manage to pull<a id="k76a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; the ass before the ass died, it is for the owner of the ass to produce proof that his ass was alive at the time the cow was pulled.<a id="k76a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; And the Tanna [of our Mishnah who taught about] a bride<a id="k76a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; supports this ruling. Which [ruling concerning the] bride?<a id="k76a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; If it be suggested:
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k76b_1:" In the first clause; the assumption being that, in agreement with R. Eleazar (<i>supra</i> 75b), it represents the view of R. Joshua, and that the father must produce the proof even where the defects were discovered after marriage and the doubt did not arise until after the bride had come under the authority of her husband. (Cf. Rashi, a.l. and <i>infra</i> s.v. [H], ad fin.). Similarly in the case of the exchange of the animals the owner of the ass must produce proof though the doubt occurred after his <i>meshikah</i> of the cow had transferred the ass to the responsibility of the other party."
,k76b_2:" The claimant."
,k76b_3:" Lit., 'brings out'."
,k76b_4:" Which is the usual rule: The claimant produces the proof and receives his due."
,k76b_5:" The defendant."
,k76b_6:" Contrary to the usual rule (v. <i>supra</i> n. 4). How then could it be asserted that the latter is supported by the former?"
,k76b_7:" I.e., the second clause of our Mishnah provides the support; the assumption being with R. Eleazar (<i>supra</i> 75b), that it represents the view of R. Gamaliel and that the husband must produce the proof even where the defects were discovered prior to marriage, while the bride was still in her parental home, and her <i>kethubah</i> still belonged to her father. (Cf. Rashi a.l. and <i>infra</i> s.v. [H] ad fin.). The support is adduced thus: If in this case where the doubt first arose while the bride was still under her father's authority (i.e., in the claimant's possession) it is the husband, who is the defendant, that must produce the proof, how much more so in the case of the exchange of the animals where the doubt arose In the house of the defendant (the owner of the ass) that the latter must produce the proof."
,k76b_8:" That she had the defects prior to her betrothal."
,k76b_9:" The presumption of the woman's soundness of body."
,k76b_10:" That the ass was alive at the time the cow was acquired by him."
,k76b_11:" The presumption that the ass that was alive prior to the acquisition of the cow was also alive during the time the cow was acquired. How then could a case in which the proof rightly serves the purpose of impairing a presumptive right be taken as support to one in which the proof is adduced to confirm a presumptive right?"
,k76b_12:" In the first clause of our Mishnah where the proof must be produced by the father (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 478, n. 1 <i>mutatis mutandis</i>) though it serves also the purpose of enabling him to retain the money, or object of value, that was given as the token of the betrothal of the bride. Similarly in the case of the exchange of the animals, the owner of the ass produces the proof and retains the cow."
,k76b_13:" That proof is required to enable the father to retain the token of betrothal."
,k76b_14:" Lit., 'given for sinking', i.e., that it is not returned under any conditions whatsoever (v. B.B. 145a). Since it is 'not unreturnable', it is not in the father's full possession and he might well he expected to have to produce the proof."
,k76b_15:" Lit., 'yes'."
,k76b_16:" Lit., 'if not, not'."
,k76b_17:" The inner side of the stomach. Owing to the thickness of its folds it is quite possible that the needle merely pricked, but did not pierce through the stomach wall."
,k76b_18:" Since the wound caused by the needle was not fatal."
,k76b_19:" <i>Trefa</i> (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>). A perforation of the stomach is a fatal wound which renders the afflicted animal unfit for human consumption even if it was ritually killed before it could die of the wound."
,k76b_20:" And the beast is, therefore, unfit for human consumption (cf. <i>supra</i> n. 8)."
,k76b_21:" When it could not affect the life of the beast which, in consequence, remains fit for consumption."
,k76b_22:" Lit., 'mouth'."
,k76b_23:" And should a butcher buy the beast within the three days it is a bargain made in error which he may cancel and claim the refunding of his purchase money."
,k76b_24:" And the vendor pleads that the wound was made after the sale when the beast was in the possession of the buyer, while the buyer insists that it was made prior to the sale when it was still in the vendor's possession."
,k76b_25:" Hul. 50b."
,k76b_26:" Sc. the buyer."
,k76b_27:" Being the claimant."
,k76b_28:" As in the case spoken of by Samuel (<i>supra</i> 76a), where the owner of the ass produces the proof and retains the cow. Since, however, the law here is not so, an objection arises against Samuel's ruling."
,k76b_29:" So that the vendor is the claimant. Hence it is for the butcher, who is the defendant, to produce the proof and thus retain his money."
,k76b_30:" That the butcher always buys on credit and that he is, therefore, always the defendant."
,k76b_31:" A butcher, surely, does not always buy on credit and our Baraitha does not mention buyer at all but claimant, irrespective of whether he happens to be the buyer or the vendor."
,k76b_32:" I.e., the owner of the cow, since the doubt first arose after the owner of the ass had acquired the cow and thereby transferred the responsibility for the ass to the former owner of the cow."
,k76b_33:" That if the doubt concerning the first appearance of her defects arose while she was in her paternal home her father must produce the proof, and that if it arose when she was already under the authority of her husband it is the husband who must produce the proof."
,k76b_34:" Samuel, according to the present explanation, would hold the same opinion as Raba who stated (<i>supra</i> 75b) that the first as well as the second clause of our Mishnah represents the view of one Tanna, viz. that of R. Joshua."
,k76b_35:" <i>Supra</i>, cited from Hul. 50b."
,k76b_36:" Since it has been laid down that the claimant must produce the proof."
,k76b_37:" Of course it has, since the needle could not have been found before the beast had been killed. Now if Rami b. Ezekiel's report in the name of Samuel is to be regarded as authentic, the butcher should have been the party to produce the proof."
,k76b_38:" And it is the butcher in fact from whom the proof is expected."
,k76b_39:" That the butcher invariably buys for cash and that he is therefore always the claimant."
,k76b_40:" Does not a butcher sometimes take on credit? "
}

txt:
<p>
The one concerning a bride IN HER FATHER'S HOUSE,<a id="k76b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; are the two cases [it may be objected] alike? There it is the father<a id="k76b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; who produces the proof and receives<a id="k76b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; [the <i>kethubah</i> from the husband]<a id="k76b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; while here it is the owner of the ass<a id="k76b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; who produces the proof and retains [the cow],<a id="k76b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; R. Abba replied: [The ruling concerning a] bride in her father-in-law's house.<a id="k76b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; But [the two cases] are still unlike, for there it is the husband who produces the proof<a id="k76b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; and thereby impairs the presumptive right of the father,<a id="k76b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; while here it is the owner of the ass who produces the proof<a id="k76b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; and thereby confirms his presumptive right!<a id="k76b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; R. Nahman b. Isaac replied: [The support is derived from the case of the] bride IN HER FATHER'S HOUSE in respect of her token of betrothal.<a id="k76b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; And, furthermore, it need not be said [that this<a id="k76b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; applies only] in accordance with him who holds [that a token of] betrothal is not unreturnable<a id="k76b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; but [it holds good] even according to him who maintains [that a token of] betrothal is unreturnable, since his ruling relates only to certain betrothal, but [not] to doubtful betrothal [where the father may retain the token] only<a id="k76b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; if he produces proof but not otherwise.<a id="k76b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>
</p><p>
	An objection was raised: If a needle was found in the thick walls of the second stomach [of a ritually killed beast, and it protrudes only] from one of its sides,<a id="k76b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; the beast is fit [for human consumption,<a id="k76b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; but if it protruded] from both sides, the beast is unfit for human consumption.<a id="k76b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; If a drop of blood was found on [the needle] it is certain that [the wound was inflicted] before the ritual killing;<a id="k76b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; if no drop of blood was found on it, it is certain that [the wound was made] after the killing.<a id="k76b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; If the top<a id="k76b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; of the wound was covered with a crust, it is certain that [the wounding occurred] three days prior to the killing;<a id="k76b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; if the top<a id="k76b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; of the wound was not covered with a crust,<a id="k76b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; it is for the claimant to produce the proof.<a id="k76b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; Now if the butcher<a id="k76b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; had already paid the price he<a id="k76b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; would have to produce the required proof and so obtain the refund [of his money]; but why? Let the owner of the beast rather produce the proof and retain [the purchase money]!<a id="k76b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; [This is a case] where the butcher<a id="k76b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; has not yet paid the price.<a id="k76b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; But how can such an absolute assertion<a id="k76b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; be made?<a id="k76b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; [This] however, [will dispose of the difficulty:] For when Rami b. Ezekiel came he said, 'Pay no regard to those rules which my brother Judah laid down in the name of Samuel; for thus said Samuel: He in whose domain the doubt first arose<a id="k76b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; must produce the proof; and the Tanna [of our Mishnah who taught about] the bride<a id="k76b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; provides support for this ruling.<a id="k76b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>
</p><p>
	An objection was raised: If a needle was found in the thick walls of the second stomach etc.<a id="k76b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; Now,<a id="k76b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; if the butcher<a id="k76b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; has not yet paid the purchase price it would be the owner of the beast<a id="k76b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; who would have to produce the proof and so obtain [its price] from [the butcher]; but why? [Has not] the doubt arisen [when the beast was already] in the possession of the butcher?<a id="k76b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; [This is a case] where the butcher has already paid the price.<a id="k76b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; But how can such a categorical statement<a id="k76b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; be made?<a id="k76b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; It is the usual practice that so long as one man does not pay the price the other does not give his beast.
</p><p>
	THE SAGES, HOWEVER, RULED: THIS APPLIES ONLY TO CONCEALED BODILY DEFECTS. R. Nahman stated:
</P>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k77a_1:" vpfb, 'one who is epileptic'. [H] in Nif. 'to be overtaken by a demon'."
,k77a_2:" Because a woman may conceal her epilepsy by remaining indoors when the attack comes on."
,k77a_3:" In such a case she can avoid appearing in public when she feels the approach of the attack."
,k77a_4:" V. Our Mishnah."
,k77a_5:" The nature of these is explained in the Gemara."
,k77a_6:" I.e., that the husband's defects spoken of in our Mishnah arose after he married the woman."
,k77a_7:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 10, i.e., the man was afflicted with the defects before his marriage."
,k77a_8:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 481, n. 10. In this case the woman might well plead that had she known that the man would later develop bodily defects she would never have consented to marry him."
,k77a_9:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 481, n. 10."
,k77a_10:" Since it is reasonable to expect a woman to object to the former but not to the latter."
,k77a_11:" Of course she was, the defects having arisen prior to her marriage."
,k77a_12:" Hence her right to claim a divorce."
,k77a_13:" This paragraph appears in old edd. and Alfasi (cf. BaH a.l.) as a Mishnah."
,k77a_14:" Which implies that only in this particular case is the <i>halachah</i> in agreement with R. Simeon b. Gamaliel."
,k77a_15:" V. B.B. 174a."
,k77a_16:" V. Git. 74a."
,k77a_17:" V. Sanh. 31a."
,k77a_18:" Rabbah b. Bar Hana maintaining that a general rule had been laid down whilst R. Abba b. Jacob disputes this."
,k77a_19:" Cf. [G] and v. Gemara <i>infra</i>."
,k77a_20:" This is explained in the Gemara."
,k77a_21:" Lit., 'to receive', 'accept'."
,k77a_22:" Without leaving any issue."
,k77a_23:" It is the duty of the surviving brother to contract the levirate marriage with the widow (v. Deut. XXV, 5ff)."
,k77a_24:" The widow."
,k77a_25:" Lit., 'smell of the mouth'."
,k77a_26:" Attributing to Samuel the definition given in the Baraitha and vice versa."
,k77a_27:" Mouth in association with the name of Samuel suggesting that it was Samuel who interpreted POLYPUS as offensive breath from the mouth (cf. <i>supra</i> note 7)."
,k77a_28:" Used for tanning."
,k77a_29:" Tosef. Keth. VII, which is contradictory to the definition given here by Rab Judah."
,k77a_30:" That 'one who gathers' means a tanner."
,k77a_31:" Which shews that 'tanner' and 'one who gathers' are two distinct occupations."
,k77a_32:" Against the Baraitha which defines 'one who gathers' as a 'tanner'."
,k77a_33:" Lit., 'here', the term TANNER specifically mentioned."
,k77a_34:" Who does not himself gather the excrements."
,k77a_35:" 'One WHO GATHERS'."
,k77a_36:" Who must himself gather the excrements needed for his work."
,k77a_37:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 483, n. 11."
,k77a_38:" Of 'one who GATHERS'."
,k77a_39:" Rab Judah, in differing from the Baraitha, adopted this latter definition."
,k77a_40:" <i>Var. lec</i>. Rab (Aruch.)."
,k77a_41:" [H], pl. of [H]j, 'smith'; hsus, pl. of [H] (Bib. Heb. sus), 'pot', 'kettle'."
,k77a_42:" Lit., 'cuts&nbsp;&hellip; from its root', sc. source'."
,k77a_43:" Like an animal, since he, by being so credulous as to accept an absurd statement, displayed no higher intelligence."
,k77a_44:" Why does he order divorce rather than maintenance?"
,k77a_45:" Metaph. Divorce is, therefore, preferable."
,k77a_46:" From Babylon to Palestine."
,k77a_47:" Rab's ruling <i>supra</i>."
,k77a_48:" I.e., that R. Johanan also was of the same opinion as Rab."
,k77a_49:" <i>Var. lec</i>., Rab (Asheri), R. Ashi (Alfasi)."
,k77a_50:" I.e., those who are disqualified to their husbands as priests or from marrying into the congregation of Israel. [Var. lec., 'We compel in the case of tainted (women)'. A man who married a woman disqualified to him is compelled to put her away (v. Shittah Mekubbezeth). According to our text it might be suggested that Samuel's dictum is restricted to cases where the defect resides in the woman and does not exclude the cases of blemishes dealt with in our Mishnah, where the defect is in the man]."
,k77a_51:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k77a_52:" Because propagation of the species is one of the 613 commandments."
,k77a_53:" The omission from this list in our Mishnah of the tainted persons enumerated by Samuel."
,k77a_54:" As these are obvious."
,k77a_55:" Who, unlike R. Assi, included the man, whose wife had no child after living for ten years with him, among those who are compelled to divorce their wives."
,k77a_56:" Since compulsion in this case is only a Rabbinical ordinance."
,k77a_57:" Lit., 'that', the man whose wife had no child for ten years (v. <i>supra</i> n. 6)."
,k77a_58:" Those enumerated in our Mishnah."
,k77a_59:" As the compulsion in the latter case is merely in the nature of persuasion it could not be included among the others."
,k77a_60:" Prov. XXIX, 19. How then would a man who refuses to carry out a decision of a court of law be moved by mere persuasion?"
,k77a_61:" The man whose wife had no child as well as those enumerated in our Mishnah. Lit., 'that and that'. "
}

txt:
<p>
Epilepsy<a id="k77a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; is regarded as [one of the] concealed bodily defects.<a id="k77a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; This, however, applies only to attacks which occur at regular periods,<a id="k77a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; but if they are irregular [epilepsy is regarded] as [one of the] exposed bodily defects.<a id="k77a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. A MAN IN WHOM BODILY DEFECTS HAVE ARISEN CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO DIVORCE [HIS WIFE]. R. SIMEON B. GAMALIEL SAID: THIS APPLIES ONLY TO MINOR DEFECTS, BUT IN RESPECT OF MAJOR DEFECTS<a id="k77a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; HE CAN BE COMPELLED TO DIVORCE HER.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. Rab Judah recited: 'HAVE ARISEN';<a id="k77a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; Hiyya b. Rab recited: 'Were'.<a id="k77a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; He who recited 'HAVE ARISEN' [holds that the ruling applies] with even more force [where the defects] 'were',<a id="k77a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; since [in the latter case the woman] was aware of the facts and acquiesced. He, however, who recited 'Were' [holds that the ruling does] not [apply where the defects] 'have arisen'.<a id="k77a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>
</p><p>
	We learned: R. SIMEON B. GAMALIEL SAID: THIS APPLIES ONLY TO MINOR DEFECTS BUT IN RESPECT OF MAJOR DEFECTS HE CAN BE COMPELLED TO DIVORCE HER. Now, according to him who reads, 'HAVE ARISEN<a id="k77a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; it is quite proper to make a distinction between major defects and minor defects.<a id="k77a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; According to him, however, who reads, 'were', what [it may be asked] is the difference between major defects and minor ones? Was she not in fact aware [of their existence] and acquiesced?<a id="k77a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; She may have thought that she would be able to tolerate them but now she finds that she is unable to tolerate them.<a id="k77a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>
</p><p>
	These,<a id="k77a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Simeon b. Gamaliel explained, are major defects: If, for instance, his eye was blinded, his hand was cut off or his leg was broken.
</p><p>
	It was stated: R. Abba b. Jacob said in the name of R. Johanan: The <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with R. Simeon b. Gamaliel. Raba said in the name of R. Nahman: The <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with the Sages. But could R. Johanan, however, have made such a statement?<a id="k77a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; Surely Rabbah b. Bar Hana stated in the name of R. Johanan: Wherever R. Simeon b. Gamaliel taught in our Mishnah, the <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with his ruling except [in the cases of] 'guarantor',<a id="k77a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Zidon'<a id="k77a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; and the 'latter proof'!<a id="k77a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; There is a dispute of Amoraim as to what was R. Johanan's view.<a id="k77a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. THE FOLLOWING ARE COMPELLED TO DIVORCE [THEIR WIVES]: A MAN WHO IS AFFLICTED WITH BOILS, OR HAS A POLYPUS,<a id="k77a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; OR GATHERS [OBJECTIONABLE MATTER]<a id="k77a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; OR IS A COPPERSMITH<a id="k77a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; OR A TANNER,<a id="k77a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; WHETHER THEY WERE [IN SUCH CONDITIONS OR POSITIONS] BEFORE THEY MARRIED OR WHETHER THEY AROSE AFTER THEY HAD MARRIED. AND CONCERNING ALL THESE R. MEIR SAID: ALTHOUGH THE MAN MADE A CONDITION WITH HER [THAT SHE ACQUIESCES IN HIS DEFECTS] SHE MAY NEVERTHELESS PLEAD, 'I THOUGHT I COULD ENDURE HIM,<a id="k77a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; BUT NOW I CANNOT ENDURE HIM.'<a id="k77a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; THE SAGES, HOWEVER, SAID: SHE MUST ENDURE [ANY SUCH PERSON] DESPITE HER WISHES, THE ONLY EXCEPTION BEING A MAN AFFLICTED WITH BOILS, BECAUSE SHE [BY HER INTERCOURSE] WILL ENERVATE HIM.
</p><p>
	IT ONCE HAPPENED AT ZIDON THAT THERE DIED<a id="k77a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; A TANNER WHO HAD A BROTHER<a id="k77a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; WHO WAS ALSO A TANNER. THE SAGES RULED: SHE<a id="k77a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; MAY SAY, 'I WAS ABLE TO ENDURE<a id="k77a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; YOUR BROTHER BUT I CANNOT ENDURE YOU'.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. What [is meant by one] WHO HAS A POLYPUS? &mdash; Rab Judah replied in the name of Samuel: [One who suffers from an offensive] nasal smell. In a Baraitha it was taught: [One suffering from] offensive breath.<a id="k77a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Assi learnt in the reverse order<a id="k77a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; and supplied the mnemonic, 'Samuel did not cease [studying] all our chapter [with] his mouth'.<a id="k77a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>
</p><p>
	WHO GATHERS. What [is meant by one] WHO GATHERS? &mdash; Rab Judah replied: One who gathers dogs' excrements.<a id="k77a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>
</p><p>
	An objection was raised: 'One who gathers' means a tanner!<a id="k77a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; But even according to your own view,<a id="k77a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; would not a contra diction arise from our Mishnah [which specifies] OR GATHERS OR IS A COPPERSMITH OR A TANNER?<a id="k77a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; One may well explain why our Mishnah<a id="k77a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; presents no contradiction<a id="k77a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; because the latter<a id="k77a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; refers to a great tanner<a id="k77a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; whilst the former<a id="k77a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; refers to a small tanner;<a id="k77a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; but according to Rab Judah the contradiction remains?<a id="k77a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; [The definition]<a id="k77a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; is [a matter in dispute between] Tannaim. For it was taught: 'One who gathers' means a 'tanner'; and others say: It means 'one who gathers dogs' excrements'.<a id="k77a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>
</p><p>
	OR IS A COPPERSMITH OR A TANNER. What is meant by A COPPERSMITH? &mdash; R. Ashi<a id="k77a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; replied: A kettle-smith.<a id="k77a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; Rabbah b. Bar Hana explained: One who digs copper from the mine.<a id="k77a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; It was taught in agreement with Rabbah b. Bar Hana: What is meant by a coppersmith? One who digs copper from the mine.<a id="k77a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Rab stated: If a husband says, 'I will neither maintain nor support [my wife]', he must divorce her and give her also her <i>kethubah</i>. R. Eleazar went and told this reported statement to Samuel [who] exclaimed, 'Make Eleazar eat barley;<a id="k77a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; rather than compel him to divorce her let him be compelled to maintain her'. And Rab?<a id="k77a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; No one can live with a serpent in the same basket.<a id="k77a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; When R. Zera went up<a id="k77a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; he found R. Benjamin b. Japheth sitting [at the college] and reporting this<a id="k77a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; in the name of R. Johanan.<a id="k77a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; 'For this statement', he said to him, 'Eleazar was told in Babylon to eat barley'.
</p><p>
	Rab Judah stated in the name of R. Assi:<a id="k77a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; We do not compel divorce except [in the case of] those who are tainted.<a id="k77a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; When I mentioned this in the presence of Samuel he remarked, 'As, for instance, a widow [who was married] to a High Priest, a divorced woman or a <i>haluzah</i><a id="k77a_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; to a common priest, a bastard or a nethinah<a id="k77a_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; to an Israelite, or the daughter of an Israelite to a nathin<a id="k77a_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; or a bastard; but if a man married a woman and lived with her ten years and she bore no child he cannot be compelled [to divorce her]'. R. Tahlifa b. Abimi, however, stated in the name of Samuel: Even the man who married a woman and lived with her ten years and she bore no child may be compelled [to divorce her].<a id="k77a_52"><sup>52</sup></a>
</p><p>
	We learned, THE FOLLOWING ARE COMPELLED TO DIVORCE [THEIR WIVES]: A MAN WHO IS AFFLICTED WITH BOILS OR HAS A POLYPUS. This<a id="k77a_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; is quite justified according to R. Assi, since only Rabbinically forbidden cases were enumerated whilst those which are Pentateuchally forbidden were omitted.<a id="k77a_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; According to R. Tahlifa b. Abimi<a id="k77a_55"><sup>55</sup></a>&nbsp; however, our Mishnah should also have stated: If a man married a woman and lived with her for ten years and she bore no child he may be compelled [to divorce her].<a id="k77a_56"><sup>56</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; R. Nahman replied: This is no difficulty. For in the latter case<a id="k77a_57"><sup>57</sup></a>&nbsp; [compulsion is exercised] by words; in the former<a id="k77a_58"><sup>58</sup></a>&nbsp; cases, by whips.<a id="k77a_59"><sup>59</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Abba demurred: A servant will not be corrected by words!<a id="k77a_60"><sup>60</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; The fact, however, explained R. Abba, is that in all these cases<a id="k77a_61"><sup>61</sup></a>&nbsp; [compulsion is exercised] by means of whips
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k77b_1:" Lit., 'here'. V. <i>supra</i> p. 485, n. 9."
,k77b_2:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 485, n. 3."
,k77b_3:" An objection against R. Abba's explanation."
,k77b_4:" In the case just cited."
,k77b_5:" Sc. only to attend on him, while refraining from intercourse."
,k77b_6:" The case of the man whose wife had no child for ten years after their marriage."
,k77b_7:" Lit., 'stricken with boils'."
,k77b_8:" Tosef. Keth. VII, ad fin. [H] (cf. [H] 'trembling'), one of the skin diseases causing nervous trembling and extreme debility of the body (v. Jast.). <i>Aliter</i>: A person having an insect in his brain (cf. Rashi)."
,k77b_9:" Or 'nervous'. [H] 'to unnerve'."
,k77b_10:" Lit., 'both of them'."
,k77b_11:" The warning against intercourse after being bled."
,k77b_12:" Lit., 'we have nothing against it'."
,k77b_13:" Lit., 'his', of the man suffering from ra'athan."
,k77b_14:" A fragrant plant (v. Jast.). <i>Aliter</i>: polion (Rashi). <i>Aliter</i>: Penny royal (cf. Golds. 'Polei')."
,k77b_15:" Or 'labdanum', [G], a soft black or dark brown resinous exudation from the Cistus or rock rose."
,k77b_16:" These fall off when the hide is being smoothed."
,k77b_17:" Sweet scented clover."
,k77b_18:" [H] (cf. [H], half-ripe date), the calyx of the date when it is in its early unripe condition."
,k77b_19:" To shut out all draughts."
,k77b_20:" [H] is of the size of half a brick, the size of the brick being three handbreadths."
,k77b_21:" The sufferer from <i>ra'athan</i>."
,k77b_22:" Of the insect (cf. Rashi's interpretation, <i>supra</i> p. 486, n. 9)."
,k77b_23:" Thus preventing the insect from burying its feet in the brain when lifted out."
,k77b_24:" The insect."
,k77b_25:" Which are infectious."
,k77b_26:" Prov. V, 19, a reference to the Torah."
,k77b_27:" R. Joshua b. Levi."
,k77b_28:" Of Paradise."
,k77b_29:" [H] (rt. [H] 'to ask' in Ithpa'el) 'to ask a competent authority for absolution from an oath or a vow'."
,k77b_30:" His present oath can also be annulled."
,k77b_31:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k77b_32:" Lit., 'creatures'"
,k77b_33:" Elijah, the prophet who went up by a whirlwind into heaven (II Kings II, 11)."
,k77b_34:" R. Joshua b. Levi."
,k77b_35:" [H] (v. Levy and Jast.). A more acceptable rendering might be: Sitting at thirteen tables of fine gold (cf. [H] 'a table')."
,k77b_36:" I.e., the saintly man concerning whom Elijah made his proclamation. The rainbow being a token of the covenant (Gen. IX, 12) that, though the people deserved destruction, the waters shall no more become a flood to destroy all flesh (ibid. 15), should not appear in the lifetime of a saint whose merit alone is sufficient to save the world from destruction (v. Rashi)."
,k77b_37:" Lit., 'and this is not (so)'."
,k77b_38:" R. Joshua b. Levi."
,k77b_39:" The pronoun refers to the Angel of Death (Rashi) or to R. Joshua b. Levi (according to a MS.)."
,k77b_40:" In the world to come (cf. B.B. 10b)."
,k77b_41:" Cf. p. 488, nn. 11 and 12."
,k77b_42:" Sc. he was not even as pious and staunch in his faith as R. Joshua b. Levi to trust in the power of the Torah to protect him from all evil. If the latter, despite his extreme piety, did not hesitate to outwit the Angel of Death, how much more likely was he to do so."
,k77b_43:" Head and shoulders above them in learning and piety."
,k77b_44:" From attending on the deceased."
,k77b_45:" 'Even&nbsp;&hellip; letter' is deleted by Rashal. [On this reading render: 'Who has failed to observe (the Torah as he did)', v. Rashi]."
,k77b_46:" Which is a contravention of Deut. XXII, 8."
,k77b_47:" Lit., 'and this is not (so)'."
,k77b_48:" Aliter: Tomatoes."
,k77b_49:" Instead of the usual hops."
,k77b_50:" Prob. Spira Regia (Jast.); [G] is also suggested as a probable derivation. >"
}

txt:
<p>
but in the former, if she said, 'I wish to be with him', she is allowed [to live with him] whilst in the latter,<a id="k77b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; even if she said, 'I wish to be with him', she is not allowed [to continue to live with him].<a id="k77b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; But behold [the case of the man who was] afflicted with boils with whom the woman is not allowed to live even if she said, 'I wish to be with him', for we learned: THE ONLY EXCEPTION BEING A MAN AFFLICTED WITH BOILS BECAUSE SHE [BY HER INTERCOURSE] WILL ENERVATE HIM, and this case was nevertheless enumerated!<a id="k77b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; There,<a id="k77b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; if she were to say. 'I will live with him under [the supervision of] witnesses',<a id="k77b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; she would be allowed [to remain with him] but here,<a id="k77b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; even if she were to say, 'I will live with him under [the supervision of] witnesses,' she would not be allowed to do so.
</p><p>
	It was taught: R. Jose related, An old man of the inhabitants of Jerusalem told me, 'There are twenty-four [kinds of] skin disease,<a id="k77b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; and in respect of all these the Sages said, "Intercourse is injurious", but most of all is this the case with those afflicted with ra'athan'.<a id="k77b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; What is the cause of it? &mdash; As it was taught: If a man had intercourse immediately after being bled, he will have feeble<a id="k77b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; children; if intercourse took place after the man and the woman<a id="k77b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; had been bled they will have children afflicted with ra'athan. R. Papa stated: This<a id="k77b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; has been said only in the case where nothing was tasted [after the bleeding] but if something was tasted there can be no harm.<a id="k77b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>
</p><p>
	What are the<a id="k77b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; symptoms? &mdash; His eyes tear, his nostrils run, spittle flows from his mouth and flies swarm about him. What is the cure?<a id="k77b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Abaye said: Pila,<a id="k77b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; ladanum,<a id="k77b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; the rind of a nut tree, the shavings of a dressed hide,<a id="k77b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; melilot<a id="k77b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; and the calyx<a id="k77b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; of a red date-tree. These must be boiled together and carried into a house of marble,<a id="k77b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; and if no marble house is available they may be carried into a house [the walls of which are of the thickness] of seven bricks and a half.<a id="k77b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; Three hundred cups [of the mixture] must then be poured upon his<a id="k77b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; head until his cranium is softened, and then his brain is cut open. Four leaves of myrtle must be brought and each foot<a id="k77b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; [in turn] lifted up and one [leaf] placed [beneath it].<a id="k77b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; It<a id="k77b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; is then grasped with a pair of tweezers and burned; for otherwise it would return to him.<a id="k77b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Johanan issued the announcement: Beware of the flies of the man afflicted with ra'athan.<a id="k77b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Zera never sat [with such a sufferer] in the same draught. R. Eleazar never entered his tent. R. Ammi and R. Assi never ate any of the eggs coming from the alley in which he lived. R. Joshua b. Levi, however, attached himself to these [sufferers] and studied the Torah; for he said, A lovely hind and a graceful doe,<a id="k77b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; if [the Torah] bestows grace upon those who study it, would it not also protect them?
</p><p>
	When he<a id="k77b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; was about to die the Angel of Death was instructed, 'Go and carry out his wish'. When he came and shewed himself to him the latter said, 'Shew me my place [in Paradise]'. &mdash; 'Very well', he replied. 'Give me your knife', the other demanded, '[since, otherwise], you may frighten me on the way'. He gave it to him. On arriving there he lifted him up and shewed him [his place]. The latter jumped and dropped on the other side [of the wall].<a id="k77b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; He seized him by the corner of his cloak; but the other exclaimed, 'I swear that I will not go back'. Thereupon the Holy One, blessed be He, said, 'If he ever had an oath of his annulled<a id="k77b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; he must return;<a id="k77b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; but if not, he need not return'. 'Return to me my knife', he said to him; but the other would not return it to him. A <i>bath kol</i><a id="k77b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; went forth and said to him, 'Return the thing to him, for it is required for the mortals'.<a id="k77b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Elijah<a id="k77b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; heralded him<a id="k77b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; proclaiming. 'Make room for the son of Levi, make room for the son of Levi'. As he<a id="k77b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; proceeded on his way he found R. Simeon b. Yohai sitting on thirteen stools<a id="k77b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; of gold. 'Are you', the latter asked him, 'the son of Levi?' &mdash; 'Yes', he replied. 'Has a rainbow [the latter asked again] ever appeared in your lifetime?' &mdash; 'Yes', he replied. 'If that is so [the other said] you are not the son of Levi'.<a id="k77b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; The fact, however, is<a id="k77b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; that there was no such thing [in his lifetime], but he<a id="k77b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; thought, 'I must take no credit for myself'.
</p><p>
	R. Hanina b. Papa was his<a id="k77b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; friend, and when he was about to die the Angel of Death was commanded, 'Go and carry out any wish of his'. He went to his house and revealed himself to him. 'Allow me', the latter said to him, 'thirty days in which to revise my studies', for it was said,<a id="k77b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Happy is he who comes here in full possession of his learning'. He left him, and after thirty days he appeared to him again. 'Shew me', the latter said to him 'my place [in Paradise]'. 'Very well', he replied. 'Give me your knife', the other said to him, [since otherwise], you may frighten me on the way'. 'Do you wish to treat me as your friend<a id="k77b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; has done?' he asked. 'Bring', the other replied, 'the Scroll of the Law and see if anything that is written therein has not been observed by me'. 'Have you attached yourself', he asked 'to the sufferers of ra'athan and engaged thus in the study of the Torah?'<a id="k77b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; Nevertheless when his soul passed to its eternal rest, a pillar of fire formed a partition between him and the world; and we have it as a tradition that such a partition by a pillar of fire is made only for a person who is unique in his generation<a id="k77b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; or [one] of the two [outstanding men] in his generation. R. Alexandri approached him and said, 'Do it for the honour of the Sages', but he disregarded him. 'Do it [he said] for the honour of your father's house', but he again disregarded him. 'Do it [he finally requested] for your own honour's sake' [and the pillar of fire] departed.
</p><p>
	Abaye remarked: [The purpose of the pillar of fire was] to keep away<a id="k77b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; anyone who had failed to observe even a single letter<a id="k77b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; [of the Torah]. Said R. Adda b. Mattena to him: [This then would also] exclude the Master, since he has no battlement to his roof.<a id="k77b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; The fact, however, was<a id="k77b_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; that he did have one, but the wind had thrown it down at that moment.
</p><p>
	R. Hanina said: Why are there no sufferers from ra'athan in Babylon? &mdash; Because they eat beet<a id="k77b_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; and drink beer containing cuscuta<a id="k77b_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; of the hizme<a id="k77b_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; shrub.
</p><p>
	R. Johanan stated: Why are there no lepers in Babylon? &mdash; Because they eat beet,<a id="k77b_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; drink beer, and bathe in the waters of the Euphrates.
</P>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k79a_1:" Of the gift which the daughter produced."
,k79a_2:" Who was Ab <i>Beth Din</i> (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>). [The reference is to Mar 'Ukba II, v. Funk, Die Juden in Babylonian I, notes p. XIV.]"
,k79a_3:" [H], lit., 'field-labourer'; 'uncultured fellow'."
,k79a_4:" [H] (Hif. of [H]), lit., 'one who causes to flee' or 'to escape'."
,k79a_5:" He was appointed to that office by the Resh Galutha or Exilarch (v. Sanh. 5a). [H], lit., 'guide for ruling', one who gives directions or decisions on questions of ritual and legal practice."
,k79a_6:" When he tore up the deed of gift which the daughter produced."
,k79a_7:" Why Samuel (upon whose ruling R. Nahman relied) did not recognize the validity of a deed that was intended as a means of evasion."
,k79a_8:" On what authority then did R. Nahman tear up the deed which had been produced by the woman's daughter?"
,k79a_9:" And it may safely be assumed, therefore, that the gift was intended as a temporary one which was to revert to the donor as soon as the cause that impelled her to make the gift had been removed."
,k79a_10:" Prior to her marriage."
,k79a_11:" [H] (or [H] cf. Aruch and last.), a deed of a feigned sale or gift with which one person entrusts (cf. [H] 'trust') another in order to make people believe (in the interests of one of the parties) that a proper sale or presentation had actually taken place."
,k79a_12:" Lit., to another', so MS.M. Cur. edd. 'to others'."
,k79a_13:" Who, maintaining that such a deed has no legal validity, the holder of the deed having no claim whatever upon the property specified in it, considers the fictitious transaction as a safe protection for the woman."
,k79a_14:" The holder of the deed."
,k79a_15:" I.e., he may retain possession of the property by virtue of the deed; and thus refuse to return it to her."
,k79a_16:" At any time in the future."
,k79a_17:" Tosef. Keth. IX. In this case only is the woman protected against the holder of the deed as well as against her husband. For should the latter claim the property she can evade him by expressing consent to its acquisition by the stranger; and should the stranger claim possession she can exercise her right of refusing to give her consent."
,k79a_18:" Why the holder of the deed cannot claim possession of the property in the case mentioned."
,k79a_19:" Lit., 'thus'."
,k79a_20:" This, then, is in contradiction to the ruling of Samuel <i>supra</i>."
,k79a_21:" Lit., 'that', Samuel's view."
,k79a_22:" Since no person would give away all his property to a stranger it is pretty obvious that the deed related to a fictitious transaction."
,k79a_23:" The ruling of the Sages in the Baraitha cited."
,k79a_24:" Where the woman's entire property had been assigned to him."
,k79a_25:" In consequence of which the woman remains Its legal possessor."
,k79a_26:" Who is entitled to the usufruct of his wife's possessions during her lifetime and to her capital also after her death."
,k79a_27:" Why should the property be awarded to the woman?"
,k79a_28:" Property fictitiously transferred by a woman prior to her marriage."
,k79a_29:" Since he believes the transaction to have been a genuine one, the husband does not expect ever to enjoy the use of the property in question."
,k79a_30:" Our Mishnah ad fin."
,k79a_31:" The land itself remaining in the possession of the woman."
,k79a_32:" I.e., after being harvested."
,k79a_33:" Which remains the property of the woman."
,k79a_34:" Which, having grown before the land came into possession of the woman, remains her property, in the opinion of R. Meir, like the land itself."
,k79a_35:" Lit., 'remainder', i.e., the value of the attached produce which is the property of the woman (v. <i>supra</i> note 7) and not of the husband who, according to R. Meir, is entitled only to such produce of his wife's land as grows after, but not before he had become entitled to the usufruct."
,k79a_36:" Thus turning the proceeds of the produce into capital."
,k79a_37:" The purchased land remaining the property of the wife (cf. <i>supra</i> note 4)."
,k79a_38:" Even if it grew before he had become entitled to the usufruct of the land."
,k79a_39:" At the time he marries the woman, when he acquires the right to the usufruct."
,k79a_40:" Cf. <i>supra</i> note 4."
,k79a_41:" Lit., 'in the place'."
,k79a_42:" Lit., 'at her entrance', sc. into her married state."
,k79a_43:" Lit., 'at her going out'."
,k79a_44:" If at that time they were still attached. This is in agreement with the view of the Sages <i>supra</i> and the point of difference between them and R. Simeon is discussed <i>infra</i>."
,k79a_45:" A divorced woman being entitled not only to the land (which was hers all the time) but also to all produce of such land that had not been detached prior to her divorce."
,k79a_46:" It is consequently turned into capital by purchasing therewith land to the usufruct of which the husband is entitled while the land itself remains in the possession of the woman."
,k79a_47:" All detached fruit belonging to the husband who is entitled to the usufruct of his wife's land."
,k79a_48:" When A MARRIED WOMAN CAME INTO THE POSSESSION OF MONEY which, as stated in our Mishnah, is to be invested in LAND, sc. a reliable profit yielding security."
,k79a_49:" Each insisting on his or her choice."
,k79a_50:" Land being a safer and better investment than houses both as regards durability (which is an advantage to the wife who remains the owner of the capital) and yield (which is an advantage to the husband who has the right of usufruct)."
,k79a_51:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 9 mutatis mutandis."
,k79a_52:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 7. This is the interpretation of R. <i>Tam</i> and R. Han. (V. Tosaf. s.v. [H]) contrary to Rashi."
,k79a_53:" Which can only be used for the cutting of its wood and which is valueless after the wood has been cut."
,k79a_54:" That loses all its value after the fish have been removed."
,k79a_55:" Lit., 'they say concerning it'."
,k79a_56:" Since no capital remains (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 498, nn. 12 and 13) for the woman. Hence it is her right to veto such a purchase."
,k79a_57:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 14."
,k79a_58:" Because the land of the thicket and the pond respectively remain after the sorb had been cut or the fish had been removed. Against such a purchase, therefore, the woman may not exercise her veto."
,k79a_59:" Laid down by the authors of the first ruling."
,k79a_60:" I.e., if after the first yield had been disposed of the capital continues to yield further produce or profit."
,k79a_61:" So R. Han. (v. Tosaf. a.l. s.v. [H]). Cur. edd., followed by Rashi, read produce'."
,k79a_62:" V. <i>supra</i> n. 5. Cur. edd., followed by Rashi, read, 'capital'. As a thicket of sorb or a fish pond produces only one yield (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 498. on. 12 and 13) it may not be purchased (v. <i>supra</i> p. 498, n. 7) if the woman objects (cf. <i>supra</i> n. 15). "
}

txt:
<p>
she came before R. Nahman [to claim the return of her estate]. R. Nahman tore up the deed.<a id="k79a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Anan, thereupon, went to Mar 'Ukba<a id="k79a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; and said to him, 'See, Master, how Nahman the boor<a id="k79a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; tears up people's deeds'. 'Tell me', the other said to him, 'how exactly the incident occurred'. 'It occurred', he replied,' in such and such a manner'. 'Do you speak', the other exclaimed, 'of a deed a woman intended as a means of evasion?<a id="k79a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; Thus said R. Hanilai b. Idi in the name of Samuel: I am an officially recognized judge,<a id="k79a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; and should a deed which a woman intended as a means of evasion<a id="k79a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; come into my hand I would tear it up.
</p><p>
	Said Raba to R. Nahman:<a id="k79a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; What in fact is the reason?<a id="k79a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; [Obviously] because no man would neglect himself and give his property away to others. But this would apply to strangers only, whilst to a daughter one might well give!<a id="k79a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Even in the case of a daughter a woman gives preference to her own person.<a id="k79a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>
</p><p>
	An objection was raised: If a woman desires to keep her property from her husband, how is she to proceed? She writes out<a id="k79a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; a deed of trust<a id="k79a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; to a stranger;<a id="k79a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; so R. Simeon b. Gamaliel.<a id="k79a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; But the Sages said: If he<a id="k79a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; wishes he may laugh at her<a id="k79a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; unless she wrote out for him: '[You shall acquire possession] from this day whenever I shall express<a id="k79a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; my consent',<a id="k79a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; The reason then<a id="k79a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; is because she wrote out for him in the manner prescribed;<a id="k79a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; but had she not done so, the [fictitious] buyer would have acquired [would he not] possession of it?<a id="k79a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; R. Zera replied: There is no difficulty. One ruling<a id="k79a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; refers to [a woman who has assigned to the stranger] all her property;<a id="k79a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; the other,<a id="k79a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; to [a woman who assigned to a stranger] a part of her property. But if the buyer does not<a id="k79a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; acquire her property<a id="k79a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; the husband<a id="k79a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; should acquire it!<a id="k79a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Abaye replied: It<a id="k79a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; was treated as property WHICH IS UNKNOWN TO THE HUSBAND<a id="k79a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; in accordance with the view of R. Simeon.<a id="k79a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. [IF A MARRIED WOMAN] CAME INTO THE POSSESSION OF MONEY, LAND SHOULD BE BOUGHT THEREWITH AND THE HUSBAND IS ENTITLED TO THE USUFRUCT.<a id="k79a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; [IF SHE CAME INTO THE POSSESSION OF] PRODUCE THAT WAS DETACHED FROM THE GROUND,<a id="k79a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; LAND SHOULD BE BOUGHT THEREWITH AND THE HUSBAND IS ENTITLED TO THE USUFRUCT. [IF IT WAS] PRODUCE ATTACHED TO THE GROUND, THE LAND,<a id="k79a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; R. MEIR RULED, IS TO BE VALUED AS TO HOW MUCH IT IS WORTH WITH THE PRODUCE<a id="k79a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; AND HOW MUCH WITHOUT THE PRODUCE, AND WITH THE DIFFERENCE<a id="k79a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; LAND SHOULD BE BOUGHT<a id="k79a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; AND THE HUSBAND IS ENTITLED TO ITS USUFRUCT.<a id="k79a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; THE SAGES, HOWEVER, RULED: ALL PRODUCE ATTACHED TO THE GROUND BELONGS TO THE HUSBAND<a id="k79a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; AND ONLY THAT WHICH IS DETACHED FROM IT<a id="k79a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; BE LONGS TO THE WIFE; [WITH THE PROCEEDS OF THE LATTER] LAND IS TO BE BOUGHT AND THE HUSBAND IS ENTITLED TO THE USUFRUCT.<a id="k79a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. SIMEON SAID: IN RESPECT OF THAT<a id="k79a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; WHEREIN THE HUSBAND IS AT AN ADVANTAGE WHEN HE MARRIES HIS WIFE<a id="k79a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; HE IS AT A DISADVANTAGE WHEN HE DIVORCES HER<a id="k79a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; AND IN RESPECT OF THAT WHEREIN HE IS AT A DISADVANTAGE WHEN HE MARRIES HER HE IS AT AN ADVANTAGE WHEN HE DIVORCES HER. HOW SO? PRODUCE WHICH IS ATTACHED TO THE GROUND IS THE HUSBAND'S WHEN HE MARRIES HIS WIFE<a id="k79a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; AND HERS WHEN HE DIVORCES HER,<a id="k79a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; WHILST PRODUCE THAT IS DETACHED FROM THE GROUND IS HERS WHEN SHE MARRIES<a id="k79a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; BUT THE HUSBAND'S WHEN SHE IS DIVORCED.<a id="k79a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. It is obvious<a id="k79a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; [that if husband and wife differ on the choice of purchase between] land and houses,<a id="k79a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; land [is to receive preference].<a id="k79a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; [If they differ on the choice between] houses and date-trees, houses [are to receive preference].<a id="k79a_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; [If they insist respectively on] date-trees and other fruit trees, date-trees [are to receive preference].<a id="k79a_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; [If their dispute is on] fruit trees and vines, fruit trees [are to receive preference].<a id="k79a_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; [What, however, is the ruling if the husband desires to purchase]<a id="k79a_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; a thicket of sorb<a id="k79a_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; or a fish pond?<a id="k79a_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Some maintain that it is regarded as<a id="k79a_55"><sup>55</sup></a>&nbsp; produce;<a id="k79a_56"><sup>56</sup></a>&nbsp; and others maintain that it is regarded as<a id="k79a_57"><sup>57</sup></a>&nbsp; capital.<a id="k79a_58"><sup>58</sup></a>&nbsp; This is the general rule:<a id="k79a_59"><sup>59</sup></a>&nbsp; If the stump grows new shoots<a id="k79a_60"><sup>60</sup></a>&nbsp; it is regarded as capital,<a id="k79a_61"><sup>61</sup></a>&nbsp; but if the stump grows no new shoots it is regarded as produce.<a id="k79a_62"><sup>62</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Zera stated in the name of R. Oshaia in the name of R. Jannai (others say, R. Abba stated in the name of R. Oshaia in the name of R. Jannai), If a man steals
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k79b_1:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k79b_2:" V. Ex. XXII, 6ff."
,k79b_3:" And not to the husband. Since a beast dies, and its yield ceases, the young must replace it as capital and is consequently the property of the wife. It may not be consumed by the husband but may be sold, and a produce-yielding object purchased with the proceeds."
,k79b_4:" In the statement made in the name of R. jannai."
,k79b_5:" And belongs to the husband."
,k79b_6:" Both with that of the Rabbis and that of Hananiah."
,k79b_7:" The young is the 'produce' of the beast but the 'double' that the thief pays as restitution is the produce of that young and consequently the 'produce of the produce' of the beast. This belongs to the wife."
,k79b_8:" Lit., 'that is'."
,k79b_9:" Either of the bondwoman or of the beast."
,k79b_10:" Hence his ruling that the child of the bondwoman, as well as the young of the beast, are to be regarded as produce which belongs to the husband, the bondwoman or the beast being regarded as the 'capital' which remains in the possession of the wife."
,k79b_11:" As implied by their ruling that 'the child of the <i>melog</i> bondwoman belongs to the wife' (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 499 n. 9 mutatis mutandis) and not to the husband."
,k79b_12:" As their ruling that 'the young of a <i>melog</i> beast belongs to the husband' seems to imply."
,k79b_13:" How then can the two rulings be reconciled?"
,k79b_14:" And constitutes a small capital which remains the possession of the woman so that the young is treated as 'produce'."
,k79b_15:" Cf. Yeb. 66b."
,k79b_16:" On marriage."
,k79b_17:" Since milk, wool, eggs and fruit are the 'produce' of the goat, the ewe, the hen and the tree respectively and, even when the yield ceases, the woman is still left with some capital such as the skin of the goat and the ewe, the feathers of the hen or the wood of the date-tree."
,k79b_18:" As <i>melog</i> property."
,k79b_19:" The shreds being regarded as the woman's capital."
,k79b_20:" Of R. Nahman that even shreds constitute capital."
,k79b_21:" Sc. the Rabbis, <i>infra</i>, who differ from R. Meir."
,k79b_22:" Of <i>melog</i> property situated on the sea shore."
,k79b_23:" Since the yield is continual. It may, therefore, be used up by the husband."
,k79b_24:" The supplies of which gradually come to an end."
,k79b_25:" The quarry or the mine must he sold, and a constantly produce-yielding object is to he acquired with the proceeds."
,k79b_26:" Which may he used up by the husband. The quarry or mine constitute in their opinion the capital which remains the property of the woman. Cf. <i>supra</i> note 2."
,k79b_27:" The Sages, cf. <i>supra</i> p. 498, n. 3."
,k79b_28:" Of which the Sages did not speak in our Mishnah. While according to R. Simeon such produce belongs to the woman, the Sages assign it to the husband because it grew prior to the divorce when he was still entitled to usufruct. That produce detached at the time of divorce belongs to the husband, as R. Simeon stated, cannot, of course, be a matter in dispute."
,k79b_29:" A married woman."
,k79b_30:" Even if her husband desires it (cf. Rashi)."
,k79b_31:" Which she is entitled to retain."
,k79b_32:" 'As wood' (so the separate edd. of the Mishnah)."
,k79b_33:" The first Tanna and R. Judah in our Mishnah."
,k79b_34:" I.e., if she came into the possession of the trees together with land in which they grew."
,k79b_35:" If, for instance, her father from whom she inherited them did not own the soil and was only entitled to the trees alone until they withered."
,k79b_36:" In order that land or any other produce-yielding capital might be acquired with the proceeds."
,k79b_37:" Which should remain the permanent possession of the woman."
,k79b_38:" When the trees withered."
,k79b_39:" After whose death no capital whatsoever remains."
,k79b_40:" Cf. <i>supra</i> note 6."
,k79b_41:" Though the capital is destroyed."
,k79b_42:" Attributed to Rab."
,k79b_43:" The first Tanna and R. Judah in our Mishnah."
,k79b_44:" V. <i>supra</i> note 3."
,k79b_45:" V. <i>supra</i> note 2."
,k79b_46:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k79b_47:" By virtue of his right to its usufruct."
,k79b_48:" He has no claim for compensation upon his wife should he divorce her."
,k79b_49:" V. Kid. 45b. "
}

txt:
<p>
the young of a <i>melog</i><a id="k79b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; beast he must pay double<a id="k79b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; its value to the woman.<a id="k79b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; In accordance with whose [view has this ruling<a id="k79b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; been laid down]? Is it in agreement with neither that of the Rabbis nor with that of Hananiah? For it was taught: The young of a <i>melog</i> beast belongs to the husband; the child of a <i>melog</i> bondwoman belongs to the wife; but Hananiah the son of Josiah's brother ruled, The child of a <i>melog</i> bondwoman has been given the same legal status as the young of a <i>melog</i> beast!<a id="k79b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; It may be said to agree even with the opinion of all,<a id="k79b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; for it is the produce alone that the Rabbis in their enactment have assigned to the husband but not the produce that accrues from this produce.<a id="k79b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>
</p><p>
	[The view] of Hananiah is quite logical on the assumption<a id="k79b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; that death<a id="k79b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; is not to be taken into consideration,<a id="k79b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; but [what principle is followed by] the Rabbis? If they do take into consideration the possibility of death,<a id="k79b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; even the young of a <i>melog</i> beast also should not [belong to the husband], and if they do not take the possibility of death into consideration,<a id="k79b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; then even the child of a bondwoman also [should belong to the husband]!<a id="k79b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; They do in fact take the possibility of death into consideration,<a id="k79b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; but the case of the beast is different [from that of a bondwoman] since its skin remains.<a id="k79b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Huna b. Hiyya stated in the name of Samuel: The <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with Hananiah. Said Raba in the name of R. Nahman: Although Samuel said, 'The <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with Hananiah', Hananiah admits that if the woman is divorced she may pay the price [of the bondwoman's children] and take them because [they constitute] the pride of her paternal house [which she is entitled to retain].<a id="k79b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Raba stated in the name of R. Nahman: If a woman brought to her husband<a id="k79b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; a goat for milking, a ewe for shearing, a hen for laying eggs, or a date-tree for producing fruit, he may go on eating [the yield of any of these]<a id="k79b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; until the capital is consumed.
</p><p>
	R. Nahman stated: If a woman<a id="k79b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; brought to her husband a cloak<a id="k79b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; [its use] is [to be regarded as] produce and he may continue to use it as a covering until it is worn out.<a id="k79b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>
</p><p>
	In accordance with whose view [has this statement<a id="k79b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; been made]? &mdash; In agreement with the following Tanna,<a id="k79b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; for it has been taught: Salt or sand<a id="k79b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; is regarded as produce;<a id="k79b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; a sulphur quarry or an alum-mine<a id="k79b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; is regarded, R. Meir said, as capital,<a id="k79b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; but the Rabbis said, As produce.<a id="k79b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. SIMEON SAID: IN RESPECT OF THAT WHEREIN THE HUSBAND IS AT AN ADVANTAGE. [Is not this view of] R. Simeon identical [with that of] the first Tanna?<a id="k79b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Raba replied: The difference between them is [the case of produce that was] attached at the time of the divorce.<a id="k79b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. IF AGED BONDMEN OR BONDWOMEN FELL TO HER<a id="k79b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; [AS AN INHERITANCE] THEY MUST BE SOLD, AND LAND PURCHASED WITH THE PROCEEDS, AND THE HUSBAND CAN ENJOY THE USUFRUCT THEREOF. R. SIMEON B. GAMALIEL SAID; SHE NEED NOT SELL THEM,<a id="k79b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; BECAUSE THEY ARE THE PRIDE OF HER PATERNAL HOUSE.<a id="k79b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; IF SHE CAME INTO THE POSSESSION OF OLD OLIVE-TREES OR VINES THEY MUST BE SOLD,<a id="k79b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; AND LAND PURCHASED WITH THE PROCEEDS, AND THE HUSBAND CAN ENJOY THE USUFRUCT THEREOF. R. JUDAH SAID: SHE NEED NOT SELL THEM, BECAUSE THEY ARE THE PRIDE OF HER PATERNAL HOUSE.<a id="k79b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. R. Kahana stated in the name of Rab: They<a id="k79b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; differ only where [the olive-trees or vines] fell [to the woman] in her own field,<a id="k79b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; but [if they were] in a field that did not belong to her<a id="k79b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; she must, according to the opinion of all, sell them;<a id="k79b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; because [otherwise] the capital<a id="k79b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; would be destroyed.<a id="k79b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; To this R. Joseph demurred: Are not BONDMEN OR BONDWOMEN<a id="k79b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; the same as [trees in] a field that does not belong to her<a id="k79b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; and there is nevertheless a dispute?<a id="k79b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; The fact is, if the statement<a id="k79b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; has at all been made it must have been made in the following terms: R. Kahana stated in the name of Rab, They<a id="k79b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; differ only where [the olive-trees and vines] fell [to the woman] in a field that did not belong to her<a id="k79b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; but [if they were] in her own field<a id="k79b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; it is the opinion of all that she need not sell them because [she is entitled to retain] the pride of her paternal house.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. HE WHO INCURRED EXPENDITURE IN CONNECTION WITH HIS WIFE'S [<I>MELOG</I>]<a id="k79b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; PROPERTY, WHETHER HE SPENT MUCH AND CONSUMED<a id="k79b_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; LITTLE, [OR SPENT] LITTLE AND CONSUMED MUCH, WHAT HE HAS SPENT HE HAS SPENT, AND WHAT HE HAS CONSUMED HE HAS CONSUMED.<a id="k79b_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; IF HE SPENT BUT DID NOT CONSUME HE MAY TAKE AN OATH AS TO HOW MUCH HE HAS SPENT AND RECEIVE COMPENSATION.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. How much is considered LITTLE? &mdash; R. Assi replied: Even one dried fig; but this applies only where he ate it in a dignified manner.<a id="k79b_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; Said
</P>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k80a_1:" [H] (rt. [H] 'to flow', 'to cast')."
,k80a_2:" After all the juice and sweetness has been pressed out, when they are practically valueless."
,k80a_3:" V. Jast. s.v. [H]."
,k80a_4:" <i>Teku</i>, v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k80a_5:" The 'dried fig', <i>supra</i>."
,k80a_6:" I.e., what minimum quantity must one eat in such a case to he regarded as having CONSUMED LITTLE?"
,k80a_7:" Palestine."
,k80a_8:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k80a_9:" The reference is to R. Papa b. Samuel (v. Sanh. 17b)."
,k80a_10:" In favour of the wife who was divorced."
,k80a_11:" Of his wife's <i>melog</i> property, with which he fed his cattle. Though the shoots were hardly suitable for the purpose, Rab Judah regarded their consumption as sufficient reason for denying the husband all rights to compensation for his expenses."
,k80a_12:" A person who occupied a field for three years."
,k80a_13:" <i>'Orlah</i> (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a> and cf. Lev. XIX, 23)."
,k80a_14:" I.e., the shoots, since the fruits of <i>'Orlah</i> are forbidden for all uses."
,k80a_15:" Which is common property and the consumption of which is no proof of ownership."
,k80a_16:" Kil'ayim (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a> and cf. Lev. XIX, 19 and Deut. XXII, 9). Only the shoots are permitted in this case also (cf. <i>supra</i> n. 15)."
,k80a_17:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a> This shews that right of ownership may be established not only by the consumption of proper produce but also by that of mere shoots. Similarly, here, the improper feeding of one's cattle with vine-shoots is also regarded as proper consumption to exempt the woman from all responsibility for the expenses her husband had incurred on her <i>melog</i> property."
,k80a_18:" Who might leave him at any time by exercising her right of <i>mi'un</i> (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>)."
,k80a_19:" The minor on exercising <i>mi'un</i> must compensate her husband for any improvements he may have effected in her property, paying him at the rate given to an <i>aris</i> (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>) in that country."
,k80a_20:" Conferring upon the husband of a minor the rights of an <i>aris</i> in respect of any expenses on her <i>melog</i> property that he may incur."
,k80a_21:" Had no provision been made for enabling him to recover his expenses he, knowing that the minor might leave him at any moment by exercising her right of <i>mi'un</i>, would exploit her property to the full, spending nothing on its improvement."
,k80a_22:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k80a_23:" A town in Khuzistan, S.W. Persia."
,k80a_24:" Claiming his expenses."
,k80a_25:" Cf. our Mishnah. The benefit he has derived from the one <i>zuz</i> ('CONSUMED LITTLE') deprives him of the right to recover the six hundred <i>zuz</i> for his expenses ('HE SPENT MUCH')."
,k80a_26:" That If HE HAS SPENT MUCH AND CONSUMED LITTLE he cannot recover his expenses."
,k80a_27:" So BaH."
,k80a_28:" Lit., 'concerning what'."
,k80a_29:" Of R. Assi, i.e., does he lay the emphasis on TAKE AN OATH or on RECEIVE? In other words: Is it implied that the husband must swear Only where the appreciation just corresponds with his outlay, hut is to receive his outlay without any oath where the appreciation exceeds the outlay; or is the implication that he is to receive for his outlay no more than the value of the appreciation, and where the former exceeds the latter, he is not entitled to receive the difference even though he is willing to swear?"
,k80a_30:" That in the circumstances mentioned one may obtain a sum of money without affirming his claim by an oath."
,k80a_31:" However small the outlay, one might claim the full value of appreciation minus a fraction, and receive it for the mere asking."
,k80a_32:" Confirming the amount he claims."
,k80a_33:" Into his wife's <i>melog</i> lands."
,k80a_34:" Pl. of <i>aris</i> (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>)."
,k80a_35:" Do these arisin, when the woman is divorced, receive the full value of their amelioration?"
,k80a_36:" Where, e.g., he consumed any part of the produce."
,k80a_37:" If they consumed any of it."
,k80a_38:" Had not the husband sent them, the wife would have done it herself. The arisin should consequently he entitled to the full refund of their share."
,k80a_39:" Of the appreciation."
,k80a_40:" B.M. 101a. He is repaid the amount he spent or is allowed the value of the appreciation whichever is the less. The two cases being essentially analogous, why was the question of the arisin at all raised?"
,k80a_41:" That of the man who entered his neighbour's field."
,k80a_42:" Of planting the field. The man who undertook the work in the absence of other cultivators, and thus benefited the owner, is therefore, justly entitled to some compensation."
,k80a_43:" And since he would not have been entitled to any compensation if he consumed anything of the produce so also, it may well he argued, should not the arisin, who stepped into his place, be entitled to any compensation. Hence the enquiry."
,k80a_44:" Capable of attending to the field himself as any experienced <i>aris</i>."
,k80a_45:" Since the wife might well plead that, if they had not interfered, her husband would himself have done the work. As they have only done what the husband would have done they cannot expect any higher privileges."
,k80a_46:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 505, n. 9."
,k80a_47:" Sc. that the buyer cultivated the land and enjoys its produce while the land itself remains the property of its original owner."
,k80a_48:" [H] of cur. edd. in brackets is wanting in Alfasi. Cf. Asheri. >"
}

txt:
<p>
R. Abba: At the school of Rab it was stated, Even the refuse<a id="k80a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; of dates.<a id="k80a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Bibi enquired: What [is the ruling in respect of] a mash of pressed dates?<a id="k80a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; This stands undecided.<a id="k80a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>
</p><p>
	What [is the ruling if] he did not eat it<a id="k80a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; in a dignified manner?<a id="k80a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Ulla replied: On this there is a difference of opinion between two Amoraim in the West.<a id="k80a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; One says, The value of an issar;<a id="k80a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; and the other says, The value of a <i>denar</i>.<a id="k80a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>
</p><p>
	The judges of Pumbeditha<a id="k80a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; stated: Rab Judah gave a practical decision<a id="k80a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; in [a case where the husband used up some] bundles of vine-shoots,<a id="k80a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; Rab Judah acting here in accordance with his own principle; for Rab Judah ruled: If he<a id="k80a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; ate thereof [during one of the three years] only 'uncircumcised'<a id="k80a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; produce,<a id="k80a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; [the produce of] the Sabbatical year,<a id="k80a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; or the produce of mingled seed,<a id="k80a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; this counts [towards the three years of] <i>hazakah</i>.<a id="k80a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Jacob stated in the name of R. Hisda: If a man has incurred expenses on the <i>melog</i> property of his wife who was a minor<a id="k80a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; [he is in the same legal position] as one who incurred expenses on the property of a stranger.<a id="k80a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; What is the reason? &mdash; The Rabbis have enacted this measure<a id="k80a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; in order that he should not allow her property to deteriorate.<a id="k80a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>
</p><p>
	A woman once came into the possession of four hundred <i>zuz</i><a id="k80a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; at Be-Hozae.<a id="k80a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; Her husband went thither, spent six hundred [on his journey] and brought with him the four hundred. While he was on his way back he required one <i>zuz</i> and took it out of these. When he came before R. Ammi<a id="k80a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; the latter ruled: What he has spent he has spent and what he used he has used.<a id="k80a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; Said the Rabbis to R. Ammi: Does not this<a id="k80a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; apply only where he consumes the produce, whilst here he used up the capital which [constituted a part of] the expenditure? &mdash; If so, he replied,<a id="k80a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; he is one who SPENT BUT DID NOT CONSUME, then HE MAY TAKE AN OATH AS TO HOW MUCH HE HAS SPENT AND RECEIVE HIS COMPENSATION. 
</p><p>
	HE MAY TAKE AN OATH AS TO HOW MUCH HE HAS SPENT AND RECEIVE COMPENSATION. Said R. Assi: This applies only where the appreciation corresponds to the expenditure. What exactly is the object of this<a id="k80a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; law?<a id="k80a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Abaye replied: That if the appreciation exceeded the expenditure be receives the sum of his outlay without an oath. Said Raba to him: If so,<a id="k80a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; one might be induced to act cunningly!<a id="k80a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; [The object of the law] however, said Raba, was that if the outlay exceeded the appreciation he is only entitled to receive that amount of his outlay which corresponds to the appreciations and [even this can be obtained only] by an oath.<a id="k80a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>
</p><p>
	The question was raised: What is the legal position where a husband has sent down<a id="k80a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; arisin<a id="k80a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; in  his place?<a id="k80a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; Does [an <i>aris</i>] go down [into <i>melog</i> fields] in his reliance on the rights of the husband, [and, consequently,] when the husband forfeits his claim<a id="k80a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; they also<a id="k80a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; lose theirs, or does an <i>aris</i> possibly go down [into the <i>melog</i> fields] in his reliance on the [yield of] the land, and land, surely is usually entrusted to arisin?<a id="k80a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; To this Raba son of R. Hanan demurred: Wherein does this case essentially differ from that of a man who went down into a neighbour's field and planted it without the owner's authority where an assessment<a id="k80a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; is made and he is at a disadvantage?<a id="k80a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; In that case<a id="k80a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; there was no other person to take the trouble;<a id="k80a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; but here there is the husband who should have taken the trouble.<a id="k80a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; What then is the decision on the matter? &mdash; R. Huna the son of R. Joshua replied: We must observe [the conditions of each case]: If the husband is an <i>aris</i>,<a id="k80a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; the arisin lose all claim to compensation wherever the husband loses his claim;<a id="k80a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; if the husband is not an <i>aris</i> [they are entitled to compensation, since] all land is usually entrusted to arisin.<a id="k80a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>
</p><p>
	The question was raised: What is the ruling where a husband sold [his wife's <i>melog</i>] land for usufruct?<a id="k80a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; Do we say that whatever he possesses<a id="k80a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; he may transfer to others, or is it possible that the Rabbis have by their enactment granted the usufruct to the husband only
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k80b_1:" So MS.M. and Bail. Cur. odd., 'Papa'."
,k80b_2:" Lit., 'that'."
,k80b_3:" By Raba."
,k80b_4:" On marriage."
,k80b_5:" As <i>melog</i> property."
,k80b_6:" Even if he sold moles property."
,k80b_7:" Hence the statement of Judah Mar."
,k80b_8:" A husband has no right to sell such property. It was only in that particular case that the husband acted within his rights for the reason that follows."
,k80b_9:" Since the bondwoman would even now attend to general household duties."
,k80b_10:" V. <i>supra</i> note 4."
,k80b_11:" Lit., 'we fear lest it will deteriorate'. The buyer of the usufruct, having no interest in the land itself, would exploit it to the full, neglecting its proper cultivation and use. The husband, however, who, in addition to his right to usufruct, might also, in the event of his surviving his wife, become the owner of the land itself, may well be relied upon to give it proper attention."
,k80b_12:" The sale of the usufruct to a stranger would deprive the household of the enjoyment of it."
,k80b_13:" Abaye and Raba. Is not the sale of the usufruct equally forbidden whatever the reason?"
,k80b_14:" Where it is possible to watch the treatment meted out to the land by the buyer and to take in good time the necessary steps for its protection. In such a ease Raba's reason is applicable; Abaye's is not. According to the latter the husband would he entitled to sell the usufruct."
,k80b_15:" He himself was looking after the land, delivering to the buyer the harvested produce. In this case also Raba's reason is applicable, but not Abaye's (cf. <i>supra</i> note 4)."
,k80b_16:" From the buyer."
,k80b_17:" In this case Abaye's reason applies: but not Raba's, since the income from the trading provides for the comfort of the house. According to Raba the sale of usufruct in such a case is permitted."
,k80b_18:" [H] the widow of a deceased brother during the period intervening between the death of her husband and her <i>halizah</i> or marriage with the levir."
,k80b_19:" During this waiting period (Rashi. Cf., however, Rashi on the parallel Mishnah s.v. [H] Yeb. 38a)."
,k80b_20:" As <i>melog</i> property (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>) she has the right to dispose of it in the way she thinks fit."
,k80b_21:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a> Here it denotes the sum corresponding in value to the wife's dowry which is conveyed under terms of tenancy to the husband, who enters it in the marriage contract and accepts full responsibility: v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a> s.v. zon barzel."
,k80b_22:" I.e., her <i>melog</i> property, the capital of which remains in the legal possession of the wife, the husband, who enjoys Only the usufruct, accepting no responsibility for it."
,k80b_23:" Who is heir to his wife. 'Husband' in this context _ levir."
,k80b_24:" I.e., the <i>melog</i> property, not the <i>kethubah</i> concerning which Beth Shammai are of the same opinion as Beth Hillel that follows. The discrepancy between the first clause in the Mishnah, where the <i>melog</i> property is declared definitely hers, whereas in this second clause it is considered doubtfully so, is explained in Yeb. 38a."
,k80b_25:" Since it is a matter of doubt whether the marital bond with the levir constitutes such a close relationship as that of actual marriage, the right of heirship as between her husband's heirs and her father's cannot he definitely determined. The property must, therefore, he equally divided between them."
,k80b_26:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k80b_27:" The question whether these are the heirs of the husband who had undertaken responsibility for the property, or the heirs of the wife whose capital it was originally, is dealt with 10 B.B. 158b."
,k80b_28:" Here (unlike <i>supra</i> p. 507, n. 11) it has its usual connotation; (a) the statutory sum of a hundred <i>zuz</i> for a widow and two hundred <i>zuz</i> for a virgin which is entered in all marriage contracts irrespective of any property that the wife may bring with her on marriage and (b) the amount which the husband adds to it over and above the value of the property which she brought to him."
,k80b_29:" V. <i>supra</i> note 1,"
,k80b_30:" The levir's (v. <i>supra</i> p. 507, n. 11)."
,k80b_31:" The deceased (v. l.c.)."
,k80b_32:" The levir, if he contracted the levirate marriage with the widow."
,k80b_33:" The capital being pledged to the woman for her <i>kethubah</i> which remains a charge upon the estate of her first husband, the deceased. According to this opinion even movable possessions, such as money. are also pledged for the <i>kethubah</i>."
,k80b_34:" Read [H] with BaH a.l. Cur. edd. [H] refers to [H] and conveys no sense."
,k80b_35:" [H] (so BaH). Cur. edd. [H] (cf. previous note)."
,k80b_36:" R. Meir holding the view that whatever the land yielded while it was in the possession of the deceased (i.e.. during his lifetime) is mortgaged for the wife's <i>kethubah</i>."
,k80b_37:" The levir, if he contracted the levirate marriage with the widow."
,k80b_38:" This is discussed in the Gemara <i>infra</i>."
,k80b_39:" [H] lit., 'whoever is first gains possession'. The same ruling applies also to money, since movables, in the opinion of the Sages, are not pledged for the <i>kethubah</i> unless the wife had seized them (cf. <i>Infra</i> 84b)."
,k80b_40:" Which he inherited from his deceased brother."
,k80b_41:" I.e., he cannot pay her out her <i>kethubah</i> and sell the rest, hut must hold the whole of the deceased brother's estate as mortgaged to her <i>kethubah</i>; v. <i>infra</i> p. 512, n. 21."
,k80b_42:" After he had duly consummated the levirate marriage."
,k80b_43:" And he is at liberty to dispose of the rest of the property (v. <i>supra</i> n. 6) as he may desire."
,k80b_44:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 507, n. 8."
,k80b_45:" Which should compensate for burial expenses (cf. <i>supra</i> 47b). "
}

txt:
<p>
in order to provide for the comfort of his home but not so that he should sell it? &mdash; Judah Mar b. Meremar replied in the name of Raba: Whatever he has done is done. R. Papi<a id="k80b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; in the name of Raba replied: His act has no validity. Said R. Papa: The ruling reported<a id="k80b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; by Judah Mar b. Meremar was not explicitly stated<a id="k80b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; but was arrived at by inference. For a woman once brought to her husband<a id="k80b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; two bondwomen,<a id="k80b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; and the man went and married another wife and assigned to her one of them. [When the first wife] came before Raba and cried, he disregarded her. One who observed [the incident] formed the opinion [that Raba's inaction] was due to his view that whatever the husband did<a id="k80b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; is valid;<a id="k80b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; but in fact, it is not so.<a id="k80b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; [Usufruct has been allowed to a husband] in order to provide for the comfort of his house and here, Surely, comfort was provided.<a id="k80b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>
</p><p>
	And the law is that if a husband sold [his wife's <i>melog</i>] field for its usufruct<a id="k80b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; his act has no legal validity. What is the reason? Abaye replied: Provision must be made against the possible deterioration of the land.<a id="k80b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; Raba explained: In order [to safeguard] the comfort of his house.<a id="k80b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; What is the practical difference between them?<a id="k80b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; The practical difference between them is the case of land that was adjoining a town;<a id="k80b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; or else where the husband [himself] was [acting as] <i>aris</i>,<a id="k80b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; or else where [the husband] receives money<a id="k80b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; and trades therewith.<a id="k80b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. IF A WOMAN AWAITING THE DECISION OF THE LEVIR<a id="k80b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; CAME<a id="k80b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; INTO THE POSSESSION OF PROPERTY, BETH SHAMMAI AND BETH HILLEL AGREE THAT SHE MAY SELL IT OR GIVE IT AWAY, AND THAT HER ACT IS LEGALLY VALID.<a id="k80b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; IF SHE DIED, WHAT SHALL BE DONE WITH HER <I>KETHUBAH</I><a id="k80b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; AND WITH THE PROPERTY THAT COMES IN AND GOES OUT WITH HER?<a id="k80b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; BETH SHAMMAI RULED: THE HEIRS OF HER HUSBAND<a id="k80b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; ARE TO SHARE IT<a id="k80b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; WITH THE HEIRS OF HER FATHER;<a id="k80b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; AND BETH HILLEL RULED: THE [ZON BARZEL]<a id="k80b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; PROPERTY IS TO REMAIN WITH THOSE IN WHOSE POSSESSION IT IS,<a id="k80b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; THE <I>KETHUBAH</I><a id="k80b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; IS TO REMAIN IN THE POSSESSION OF THE HEIRS OF THE HUSBAND, AND THE PROPERTY WHICH GOES IN AND COMES OUT WITH HER<a id="k80b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; REMAINS IN THE POSSESSION OF THE HEIRS OF HER FATHER.
</p><p>
	IF HIS<a id="k80b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; BROTHER<a id="k80b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; LEFT MONEY, LAND SHALL BE BOUGHT THEREWITH AND HE<a id="k80b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; SHALL ENJOY ITS USUFRUCT.<a id="k80b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; [IF THE DECEASED LEFT] PRODUCE THAT WAS DETACHED FROM THE GROUND, LAND SHALL BE BOUGHT [OUT OF THE PROCEEDS] AND HE<a id="k80b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; SHALL ENJOY ITS USUFRUCT. [IF IT WAS STILL] ATTACHED TO THE GROUND, THE LAND<a id="k80b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; IS TO BE ASSESSED, SAID R. MEIR, AS TO HOW MUCH IT IS WORTH<a id="k80b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; TOGETHER WITH THE PRODUCE AND HOW MUCH IT IS WORTH WITHOUT THE PRODUCE, AND WITH THE DIFFERENCE LAND SHALL BE BOUGHT,<a id="k80b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; AND HE<a id="k80b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; SHALL ENJOY ITS USUFRUCT. THE SAGES, HOWEVER, RULED: PRODUCE WHICH IS [STILL] ATTACHED TO THE GROUND BELONGS TO HIM,<a id="k80b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; BUT THAT WHICH IS DETACHED FROM THE GROUND PASSES INTO THE OWNERSHIP OF HIM WHO SEIZES IT FIRST.<a id="k80b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; IF HE [SEIZED IT] FIRST HE ACQUIRES OWNERSHIP; AND IF SHE [SEIZED IT] FIRST LAND SHALL BE BOUGHT THEREWITH AND HE<a id="k80b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; SHALL ENJOY ITS USUFRUCT. IF [THE LEVIR] MARRIED HER SHE IS REGARDED AS HIS WIFE IN ALL RESPECTS<a id="k80b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; SAVE THAT HER <I>KETHUBAH</I> REMAINS A CHARGE ON HER FIRST HUSBAND'S ESTATE. HE CANNOT SAY TO HER, 'BEHOLD YOUR <I>KETHUBAH</I> LIES ON THE TABLE', BUT ALL HIS PROPERTY<a id="k80b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; IS PLEDGED TO HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>.<a id="k80b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; SO, TOO, A MAN MAY NOT SAY TO HIS WIFE, BEHOLD YOUR <I>KETHUBAH</I> LIES ON THE TABLE, BUT ALL HIS PROPERTY IS PLEDGED TO HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>. IF HE DIVORCED HER<a id="k80b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; SHE IS ENTITLED ONLY TO HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>.<a id="k80b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; IF HE SUBSEQUENTLY REMARRIED HER SHE IS [TO ENJOY THE SAME RIGHTS AS] ALL OTHER WIVES, AND IS ENTITLED ONLY TO HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>.<a id="k80b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. The question was raised: If a woman awaiting the decision of a levir<a id="k80b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; died, who is to bury her? Are her husband's heirs to bury her because they inherit her <i>kethubah</i><a id="k80b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; or is it possibly the heirs of her father who must bury her because they inherit the property that comes in and goes out with her? &mdash; R. Amram replied, Come and hear what was taught: If a woman awaiting the decision of a levir died,
</P>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k81a_1:" <i>Supra</i> 43a, <i>infra</i> 95b."
,k81a_2:" The expression 'her heirs, even those who inherit her kethubah' implies that there exists also another class of heirs who do not inherit her <i>kethubah</i>."
,k81a_3:" Lit., 'be saying'."
,k81a_4:" [The last clause is to be taken independently of the first, which cannot refer to such a widow since it speaks of orphans, v. Tosaf.]."
,k81a_5:" The levir who, in fact, inherits only the statutory <i>kethubah</i> and the additional jointure, which are the property of his brother, and not the zon barzel, the original property of the woman. Cf. however, Tosaf. s.v. [H] a.l."
,k81a_6:" It was only his brother's duty to bury his wife in return for her <i>kethubah</i> which he inherits (cf. <i>supra</i> 47b) but not his duty, since he does not inherit from the widow but from his brother."
,k81a_7:" Lit., 'they come to him from two sides'."
,k81a_8:" As his brother would have done had he survived her."
,k81a_9:" To her heirs. Which is conceded to a husband in return for his wife's burial expenses."
,k81a_10:" Cf. note 10."
,k81a_11:" And he, representing her husband, since it was his intention to consummate levirate marriage, is still alive."
,k81a_12:" The exposition being: Since the <i>kethubah</i> contains the proviso, 'When thou wilt be married to another man, thou wilt receive what is prescribed for thee', it may be inferred that, except in the case of divorce, the <i>kethubah</i> is not payable during the lifetime of the husband, when his wife cannot 'be married to another man."
,k81a_13:" V. Yeb. 117a."
,k81a_14:" Yeb. 38b, Sol. 25a. The amount of the debt is deemed to he in the virtual possession of the creditor. So, too, with the amount of the <i>kethubah</i> which is deemed to he in the virtual possession of the widow. The levir is consequently inheriting it not from his brother but from the widow, in return for which he must incur the obligation of burying her."
,k81a_15:" Of women suspected of illicit intercourse with strangers after they had been warned by their husbands."
,k81a_16:" The water of bitterness. (V. Num. V, 24)."
,k81a_17:" Yeb. 38b. Sol. 24a."
,k81a_18:" Num. V, 15, emphasis on man."
,k81a_19:" The water of bitterness (v. Num. V, 24.)"
,k81a_20:" Of course it is."
,k81a_21:" In the former case she loses her right to her <i>kethubah</i>; in the latter case she does not."
,k81a_22:" That of her claim (v. <i>supra</i> n. 10)."
,k81a_23:" It is certain that the husband's heirs are the rightful owners of his estate."
,k81a_24:" So that the woman (and not the heirs) being regarded as the virtual possessor of the amount of her <i>kethubah</i>, no certainty is here overridden by an uncertainty."
,k81a_25:" Since one awaiting the decision of a levir is not permitted to marry any stranger. How, then, could it he said <i>supra</i> that the <i>kethubah</i> is collected in the levir's lifetime?"
,k81a_26:" At the moment her husband's death had set her free to marry the levir the proviso of her <i>kethubah</i> was fulfilled, and her <i>kethubah</i> is payable."
,k81a_27:" Who maintained <i>supra</i> that the <i>kethubah</i> is payable even during the lifetime of the levir."
,k81a_28:" Of a woman awaiting the decision of the levir."
,k81a_29:" I.e., R. Abba Arika or Rab."
,k81a_30:" A levir who married his deceased brother's widow for whose <i>kethubah</i> (v. our Mishnah) all the property he inherited from his deceased brother is mortgaged."
,k81a_31:" Who is forbidden to marry a divorced woman (v. Lev. XXI, 7)."
,k81a_32:" For his wife, his former sister-in-law."
,k81a_33:" To secure her consent to sell so much of the property (v. <i>supra</i> note 6) as is in excess of the amount of her <i>kethubah</i>. If her consent cannot he obtained and he wishes to live with her he has no redress. He cannot divorce and remarry her as an Israelite may (v. <i>infra</i>) since his priesthood (v. <i>supra</i> note 7) would preclude him from marrying a woman he has once divorced."
,k81a_34:" Who may marry a divorced woman."
,k81a_35:" Adopting this course, he may either (a) pay her the amount of her <i>kethubah</i> as soon as she is divorced and, after selling all the property which is in excess of it, marry her again (on the condition of the first <i>kethubah</i>, v. <i>infra</i> 80b) or (b) he may remarry her before paying to her the amount of her <i>kethubah</i> and on remarriage give her a new one which, as all ordinary <i>kethuboth</i>, is secured not only on his present possessions but also on his future acquisitions. It is only a levir whose future acquisitions are not pledged for the <i>kethubah</i> of his deceased brother's widow (whom he marries and whose only security is the property left by her deceased husband) that is forbidden to sell the property he has inherited from that brother. Any other husband, including a levir who remarried his sister-in-law after he consummated levirate marriage and after he divorced her, since such a <i>kethubah</i> is secured by present possession and future acquisition, may well sell all his property even without his wife's consent. "
}

txt:
<p>
it is the duty of her heirs, even those who inherit her <i>kethubah</i>, to bury her. Said Abaye, We also have learned a [similar Mishnah]: A widow is to be maintained out of the estate of [her deceased husband's] orphans, and her handiwork belongs to them. It is not their duty, however, to bury her; it is the duty of her heirs, even those who inherit her <i>kethubah</i>, to bury her.<a id="k81a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; Now, what widow is it that has two kinds of heirs?<a id="k81a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; Obviously<a id="k81a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; she who is awaiting the decision of a levir.<a id="k81a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Said Raba: But could<a id="k81a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; he not plead, 'I am only heir to my brother; it is not my duty to bury his wife'!<a id="k81a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Abaye replied: [Such a plea would be untenable] because he is approached by two alternative demands:<a id="k81a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; If he is heir to his brother he should bury his wife;<a id="k81a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; if he does not bury his wife he should return her <i>kethubah</i>.<a id="k81a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; [Raba] retorted, it is this that I mean: [Might he not plead], 'I am only heir to my brother; it is not my duty to bury his wife; and if [I am expected to bury her] on account of the <i>kethubah</i><a id="k81a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; [I may point out that] a <i>kethubah</i> is not payable during [the husband's] lifetime'?<a id="k81a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Who is it that was heard to admit the <i>kethubah</i> as a text for legal exposition?<a id="k81a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; Beth Shammai, of course.<a id="k81a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; But Beth Shammai have also been heard to lay down the rule that a note of indebtedness which is due for payment is regarded as repaid.<a id="k81a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; For we have learned: If their husbands<a id="k81a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; died before they drank,<a id="k81a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; Beth Shammai rule that they are to receive their <i>kethubah</i> and that they need not drink,<a id="k81a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; and Beth Hillel rule that they either drinks or they do not receive their <i>kethubah</i>.<a id="k81a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; [Now how could it be said,] 'They either drink', when the All-Merciful said, Then shall the man bring his wife to the priest,<a id="k81a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; and he is not there? [The meaning must] consequently be: As they do not drink<a id="k81a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; they are not to receive their <i>kethubah</i>. Again 'Beth Shammai rule that they are to receive their <i>kethubah</i> and that they need not drink', but why [should they receive their <i>kethubah</i>]? Is not their claim of a doubtful nature,<a id="k81a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; it being uncertain whether she had committed adultery or not;<a id="k81a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; then how could an uncertainty<a id="k81a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; override a certainty?<a id="k81a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; Beth Shammai [must consequently] hold the view that 'a note of indebtedness that is due for payment is regarded as repaid'.<a id="k81a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; But is it not required [that the proviso], 'When thou wilt be married to another man thou wilt receive what is prescribed for thee' [be complied with], which is not the case here?<a id="k81a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; R. Ashi replied: A levir is also regarded as 'another man'.<a id="k81a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Raba addressed [the following message] to Abaye<a id="k81a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; through R. Shemaya b. Zera: Is a <i>kethubah</i><a id="k81a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; indeed payable during [the levir's] lifetime? Has it not, in fact, been taught: R. Abba<a id="k81a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; stated, 'I asked Symmachus, "How is a man<a id="k81a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; who desires to sell his brother s property to proceed" [and he replied,] "If he is a priest,<a id="k81a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; he should prepare a banquet<a id="k81a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; and use persuasive means;<a id="k81a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; if he is an Israelite<a id="k81a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; he may divorce her and then marry her again".'<a id="k81a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k81b_1:" What need then was there for persuasion or divorce and remarriage?"
,k81b_2:" 'Since you can see no reason against the sale of the property in excess of the <i>kethubah</i> except that a <i>kethubah</i> is not payable during the levir's lifetime'."
,k81b_3:" Against Abaye, <i>supra</i>."
,k81b_4:" In our Mishnah."
,k81b_5:" In the interests of the woman; but not a legal ruling. Hence no objection can arise from it."
,k81b_6:" Of course he could sell, since his future acquisitions are also pledged for the <i>kethubah</i> (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 512, n. 11)."
,k81b_7:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 6."
,k81b_8:" As shewn <i>supra</i>."
,k81b_9:" Between husband and wife. Were he allowed to set aside a particular part of his property as surety for her <i>kethubah</i> she might misinterpret his action to be a preliminary to a permanent divorce. By adopting the measures described <i>supra</i> he makes it clear to all that the only motive for his action was his desire to sell the property."
,k81b_10:" The woman's husband died without issue and the duty of marrying her or submitting to her <i>halizah</i> fell upon that man who was the eldest surviving brother of the deceased."
,k81b_11:" His eldest brother."
,k81b_12:" A divorce by one of the surviving brothers causes the widow to be forbidden to all the brothers (v. Yeb. 50a)."
,k81b_13:" Of the deceased."
,k81b_14:" The brother who marries the widow inherits also the estate of the deceased (v. Yeb. 40a)."
,k81b_15:" A levir for whose marriage (or <i>halizah</i>) a sister-in-law is waiting."
,k81b_16:" The estate of his deceased brother, which he inherits."
,k81b_17:" Similarly, here, the share promised to the younger brother under a legal <i>kinyan</i> is deemed to be a sale which is invalid."
,k81b_18:" Cf. <i>infra</i> n. 10."
,k81b_19:" Without issue."
,k81b_20:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 507, n. 8."
,k81b_21:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k81b_22:" Which proves that the levir who is responsible far his sister-in-law's <i>kethubah</i> may not sell any of his deceased brother's property which he inherits."
,k81b_23:" R. Joseph."
,k81b_24:" A wife who came into the possession of property."
,k81b_25:" <i>Supra</i> 78a; which proves that a sale ex post facto is valid even though it was not originally permitted."
,k81b_26:" [H] (H 'stone') 'precious stones'."
,k81b_27:" He has not. His ruling is no more supported by proof or reason than that of R. Joseph, and may he equally disregarded."
,k81b_28:" That the sale is valid."
,k81b_29:" Cf. MS.M. which inserts, 'and he (also) sent (word) to them'."
,k81b_30:" Without issue."
,k81b_31:" I.e., the debtor who, as brother of the deceased, marries his widow and also inherits his estate (v. <i>supra</i> p. 514, n. 4)."
,k81b_32:" The debt in this case is similar to a sale ex post facto, and nevertheless it is invalid; which proves the correctness of R. Joseph's ruling."
,k81b_33:" Lit., 'that which was good for him they did for him'; it is more advantageous for a person when his money is invested than when it is spent."
,k81b_34:" Implying forcible action against his will."
,k81b_35:" The Baraitha discovered by R. Joseph."
,k81b_36:" It is spurious and not to be relied upon."
,k81b_37:" V. previous note."
,k81b_38:" And a statement that regards them as pledged to a <i>kethubah</i> must consequently be spurious."
,k81b_39:" Cf. Yeb. 99a, Kid. 68b."
,k81b_40:" As a reason why the statement under discussion must be considered spurious."
,k81b_41:" The levir."
,k81b_42:" He is the debtor of the deceased but not hers. Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 8 <i>mutatis mutandis</i>. "
}

txt:
<p>
Now if it could be assumed that a <i>kethubah</i> is payable during the lifetime [of the levir] why should he not set aside exclusively for her some property equal in value to the amount of the <i>kethubah</i>, and then sell the rest?<a id="k81b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; 'But according to your argument<a id="k81b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; [it might be asked] why should not the same objection<a id="k81b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; be raised from our Mishnah [where it was stated,] HE CANNOT SAY TO HER, "BEHOLD YOUR <I>KETHUBAH</I> LIES ON THE TABLE", BUT ALL HIS PROPERTY IS PLEDGED FOR HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>?' &mdash; 'There<a id="k81b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; we might merely have been given a piece of good advice;<a id="k81b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; for, were you not to admit this, [how would you] read the final clause where it is stated, So, TOO, A MAN MUST NOT SAY TO HIS WIFE, "BEHOLD YOUR <I>KETHUBAH</I> LIES ON THE TABLE", BUT ALL HIS PROPERTY IS PLEDGED FOR HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>, would he here also [it may be asked] not be able to sell if he wished to do so?<a id="k81b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; Consequently [it must be agreed that] he was there merely giving a piece of good advice;<a id="k81b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; and similarly here also we might merely be given a piece of good advice;<a id="k81b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; the statement of R. Abba, however, does present an objection!'<a id="k81b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; 'R. Abba's statement also does not give rise to any objection [because the restrictions on the man's liberty to sell] are due to [the desire of avoiding] hatred.'<a id="k81b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>
</p><p>
	A sister-in-law once fell to the lot of a man<a id="k81b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; at Pumbeditha, and his [younger] brother wanted to cause her to be forbidden to marry him<a id="k81b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; by [forcing upon her] a letter of divorce.<a id="k81b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; 'What is it', [the eldest brother] said to him, 'that you have in your mind? [Are you troubled] because of the property<a id="k81b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; [that I all, to inherit]?<a id="k81b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; I will share the property with you'. R. Joseph [in considering this case] said: Since the Rabbis have laid down that he<a id="k81b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; may not sell,<a id="k81b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; his sale is invalid even if he had already sold it.<a id="k81b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; For it was taught:<a id="k81b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; If a man died<a id="k81b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; and left a widow who was awaiting the decision of a levir<a id="k81b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; and also left a bequest of property of the value of a hundred <i>maneh</i>,<a id="k81b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; [the levir] must not sell the property although the widow's <i>kethubah</i> amounts only to one <i>maneh</i>, because all his property is pledged to her <i>kethubah</i>.<a id="k81b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; Said Abaye to him:<a id="k81b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; Is it so that wherever the Rabbis ruled that one must not sell, the sale is invalid, even after it had taken place? Did we not, in fact, learn: Beth Shammai said, She<a id="k81b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; may sell it, and Beth Hillel said, She may not sell it; but both agree that if she had sold it or given it away her act is legally valid?<a id="k81b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; The case was sent to R. Hanina b. Papi who sent [the same reply] as that of R. Joseph. On this Abaye remarked: Has R. Hanina b. Papi, forsooth, hung jewels<a id="k81b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; upon it?<a id="k81b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; It was then sent to R. Minyomi the son of R. Nihumai who sent [the same reply] as Abaye<a id="k81b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; [and added:]<a id="k81b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Should R. Joseph give a new reason report it to me. R. Joseph thereupon went out, investigated, and discovered that it was taught: If a man who had a monetary claim against his brother died,<a id="k81b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; and left a widow who had to await the decision of a levir, [the latter]<a id="k81b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; is not entitled to plead, 'Since I am the heir I have acquired [the amount of the debt]', but it must be taken from the levir and spent on the purchase of land and he is only entitled to its usufruct.<a id="k81b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; But 'is it not possible', said Abaye to him, 'that provision was made in his own interests?'<a id="k81b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; 'The Tanna stated', the other replied, 'that it must be "taken" from him,<a id="k81b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; and you say that "provision was made in his own interests"'! The case was again sent to R. Minyomi the son of R. Nihumai who said to then: Thus said R. Joseph b. Minyomi in the name of R. Nahman, 'This<a id="k81b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; is not an authentic teaching'.<a id="k81b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; What is the reason?<a id="k81b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; If it be Suggested, 'Because money is a movable thing and movables are not pledged to a kethubah',<a id="k81b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; is it not possible [it might be retorted] that the statement represents the view of R. Meir who holds that movables are pledged to a <i>kethubah</i>?<a id="k81b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; [Should it be suggested,] however,<a id="k81b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Because he<a id="k81b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; could say to her: You are not the party I have to deal with',<a id="k81b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>
</P>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k82a_1:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k82a_2:" Num. V, 7."
,k82a_3:" Emphasis on the last five words which refer to the first, who is the person against whom the trespass had been committed, and not to the second who is merely an intermediary who, even if the debt had been repaid to him, would also have had to transfer it to the first. Similarly in the statement under discussion the debt which the deceased claims from the levir might well be regarded as a debt due to the widow who has a claim upon the deceased."
,k82a_4:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 515, n. 10."
,k82a_5:" That of R. Meir as well as that of R. Nathan."
,k82a_6:" Which is only a Rabbinical institution."
,k82a_7:" But not with both. Since the statement under discussion does impose both restrictions it must be considered spurious."
,k82a_8:" Lit., 'that is'."
,k82a_9:" A suburb of Sura. It was an important seat of learning in the days of Rab, and attained even greater fame in the first two decades of the fifth century under the guidance of R. Ashi."
,k82a_10:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 523, n. 10."
,k82a_11:" Cf. <i>loc. cit</i>. n. 11."
,k82a_12:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 513, n. 12."
,k82a_13:" Cf. p. 514, n. 1."
,k82a_14:" Cf. <i>loc. cit</i>. n. 2."
,k82a_15:" He did not keep the promise he made (<i>supra</i> Rib). Pumbeditha was notorious for its sharpers (cf. B.E. 46a, Hul. 127a)."
,k82a_16:" Though legal acquisition could not be effected until the consummation of the levirate marriage."
,k82a_17:" From Palestine to Babylon."
,k82a_18:" Pulling, <i>meshikah</i> (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>) is one of the forms of <i>kinyan</i>."
,k82a_19:" From the moment he pulled it."
,k82a_20:" Sc., not in the possession of the buyer."
,k82a_21:" In the case of the cow,"
,k82a_22:" Hence he may legally transfer possession even after thirty days."
,k82a_23:" In the case of the share of the younger brother. The elder brother cannot possibly convey possession of the deceased brother's estate before performing the levirate marriage, when it then passes into his possession. Hence also the invalidity of the <i>kinyan</i>."
,k82a_24:" From Palestine to Babylon."
,k82a_25:" In the case of the deferred acquisition of a cow, just cited."
,k82a_26:" Which presents a contradiction between the two rulings attributed to R. Johanan."
,k82a_27:" The first cited ruling."
,k82a_28:" After the thirty days."
,k82a_29:" I.e., retrospective possession which is valid."
,k82a_30:" Between the levir who married the widow and any other of the brothers."
,k82a_31:" Is the brother entitled to retain the property the levir has allotted to him?"
,k82a_32:" Sc. the division by which the levir deprives the widow whom he married of a security for her <i>kethubah</i>."
,k82a_33:" And the property remains in the possession of the levir, the <i>kethubah</i> of the widow being secured on it."
,k82a_34:" If the division is invalid in the first case, where the <i>kinyan</i> might be immediate, how much more so in the second case where the <i>kinyan</i> can only be retrospective."
,k82a_35:" The second enquiry was addressed by those who did not hear of the first mentioned ruling."
,k82a_36:" The deceased."
,k82a_37:" Including whatever is attached to it."
,k82a_38:" The Sages' dispute being limited to detached produce and money which, they maintain, as movables are not pledged to a <i>kethubah</i>."
,k82a_39:" Not by <i>halizah</i> (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>) by which the bond between a levir and his sister-in-law is severed where no levirate marriage is consummated."
,k82a_40:" Though prior to the levirate marriage a divorced sister-in-law is forbidden to marry any of the brothers."
,k82a_41:" Deut. XXV, 5."
,k82a_42:" Since the expression of levirate marriage (duty of a husband's brother) is specifically mentioned in addition to the expression of marriage (And take her to him to wife, ibid.)."
,k82a_43:" Even after the consummation of the levirate marriage. "
}

txt:
<p>
is it not possible [it might be retorted] that the statement represents the view of R. Nathan, since it was taught: R. Nathan stated, 'Whence is it deduced that if a man claims a <i>maneh</i><a id="k82a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; from another, and this one [claims a similar sum] from a third, the sum is to be collected from the last [named] and handed over to the first? From Scripture, which stated,<a id="k82a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; And give unto him against whom he hath trespassed'?<a id="k82a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; [This], however, [is the reason:]<a id="k82a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; We find nowhere a Tanna who imposes two restrictions<a id="k82a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; in the matter of a <i>kethuboth</i>;<a id="k82a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; we only find agreement either with R. Meir or with R. Nathan.<a id="k82a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; Raba remarked: If so, I can well understand<a id="k82a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; what Abaye meant when I heard him say, 'This is not an authentic teaching' and [at the time] I did not understand what [his reason] was.
</p><p>
	A sister-in-law at Matha Mehasia<a id="k82a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; once fell to the lot of a man<a id="k82a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; whose [younger] brother wanted to cause her to be forbidden to marry him<a id="k82a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; by [forcing upon her] a letter of divorce.<a id="k82a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; 'What is it', [the eldest brother] said to him, 'that you have in your mind? If it is on account of the property<a id="k82a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; [that you are troubled]<a id="k82a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; will share the estate with you'. 'I am afraid', the other replied, 'that you will treat me as the Pumbedithan rogue [has treated his brother]'.<a id="k82a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; 'If you wish', the first said to him, 'take your half at once'.<a id="k82a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; Said Mar son of R. Ashi: Although when R. Dimi came<a id="k82a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; he stated in the name of R. Johanan, If a man said to another, 'Go and pull<a id="k82a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; this cow, but it shall pass into your legal possession only after thirty days', he legally acquires it after thirty days,<a id="k82a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; even if it stands at the time in the meadow,<a id="k82a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; [in this case the younger brother cannot acquire possession of the promised share]; for there<a id="k82a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; it was in his power [to transfer possession at once]<a id="k82a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; but here<a id="k82a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; it is not in his power [to transfer immediate possession]. But, surely, when Rabin came<a id="k82a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; be stated in the name of R. Johanan<a id="k82a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; that 'he does not acquire possession'!<a id="k82a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; This is no difficulty: One<a id="k82a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; refers to a case where the seller said, 'Acquire possession<a id="k82a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; from now';<a id="k82a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; the other, where he did not say, 'Acquire from now'.
</p><p>
	'Ulla was asked: What is the ruling where levirate marriage was consummated first and the division of the property<a id="k82a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; took place afterwards?<a id="k82a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; The act<a id="k82a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; is null and void<a id="k82a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; [he replied]. What is the ruling [he was asked] if the division<a id="k82a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; took place first and the levirate marriage afterwards?<a id="k82a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp;&mdash; The act<a id="k82a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; [he replied] is null and void.<a id="k82a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Shesheth demurred: Now [that it has been said that where] levirate marriage took place first and the division<a id="k82a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; afterwards the act<a id="k82a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; is null and void, was it at all necessary [to ask the question where] the division took place first and the levirate marriage afterwards?<a id="k82a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; [The respective enquiries related to] two independent incidents that occurred [at different times].<a id="k82a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>
</p><p>
	When Rabin came<a id="k82a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; he stated in the name of Resh Lakish: Whether levirate marriage was consummated first and the division took place afterwards, or whether the division took place first and the levirate marriage afterwards, the act is null and void. And [in fact] the law is that the act is null and void.
</p><p>
	THE SAGES, HOWEVER, RULED: WHAT IS STILL ATTACHED TO THE GROUND BELONGS TO HIM. But why? Is not all his<a id="k82a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; landed estate<a id="k82a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; a pledge and a guarantee for her <i>kethubah</i>? &mdash; Resh Lakish replied: Read, 'Belongs to her'.<a id="k82a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>
</p><p>
	IF [THE LEVIR] MARRIED HER SHE IS REGARDED AS HIS WIFE. In what respect? &mdash; R. Jose the son of R. Hanina replied: By this is meant that her separation from him is effected by a letter of divorce<a id="k82a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; and that he may marry her again.<a id="k82a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; [You say,] 'Her separation from him is effected By a letter of divorce'; [but] is not this obvious? &mdash; It might have been assumed that since the All-Merciful said, And perform the duty of a husband's brother unto her,<a id="k82a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; she<a id="k82a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; is still subject to the original levirate obligations<a id="k82a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; and a letter of divorce should not be enough unless [the separation had been effected] by <i>halizah</i>, hence we were taught [that only a letter of divorce is required].
</p><p>
	[You say,] 'He may marry her again'; [but] is not this obvious?
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k82b_1:" Lev. XVIII, 16."
,k82b_2:" That <i>halizah</i> is required and that he may not remarry her."
,k82b_3:" Lit., 'thus also'."
,k82b_4:" Deut. XXV, 5; where only the latter part of the verse, And perform the duty of a husband's brother unto her, would have been sufficient."
,k82b_5:" I.e., why should not the levir, her present husband, assume responsibility for her <i>kethubah</i>."
,k82b_6:" Lit., 'they caused him to acquire'."
,k82b_7:" She was not chosen by him but was imposed upon him by the Divine law of the levirate marriage. He cannot, therefore, be expected to undertake any monetary obligations in respect of her <i>kethubah</i>."
,k82b_8:" The levir who married her."
,k82b_9:" Lit., 'that it may not be easy in his eyes to cause her to go out'."
,k82b_10:" In the case of a wife. Is it not obvious that a husband's obligation towards a wife he himself has chosen cannot possibly be less than those he incurs in respect of a sister-in-law he married only in obedience to a commandment?"
,k82b_11:" The marriage of a sister-inlaw."
,k82b_12:" 'Shall be pledged to the kethubah'. So that the woman, having her security limited to the levir's possessions that were inherited from her deceased husband, would naturally suspect that by 'putting her <i>kethubah</i> on the table' the levir intends to escape his full responsibility and desires to deprive her of the possibility of collecting her <i>kethubah</i> when the occasion arises. This, as might well be expected, would create animosity between husband and wife (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 513, n. 9)."
,k82b_13:" So that the <i>kethubah</i> is well secured."
,k82b_14:" And no animosity would ensue despite his 'putting of the <i>kethubah</i> on the table'."
,k82b_15:" Lit., 'yes'."
,k82b_16:" Which he inherited from the deceased and which is in excess of the amount of the <i>kethubah</i>."
,k82b_17:" <i>Supra</i> 81a, that unless the woman can be persuaded to consent to the sale of the property it may be sold only after she had been divorced."
,k82b_18:" By specifying the law in the case of a sister-in-law whom the levir had married."
,k82b_19:" I.e., she cannot claim a second <i>kethubah</i>, <i>infra</i> 89b; And this law one would expect to apply also to a sister-in-law. What need then was there to specify it in the case of the latter. (V. <i>Supra</i> n. 1)?"
,k82b_20:" But her first husband."
,k82b_21:" Lit., 'they would write'. No clause pledging the husband's landed property being inserted in the <i>kethubah</i>."
,k82b_22:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k82b_23:" Women refusing to marry under such precarious conditions, (v. <i>supra</i> note 4)."
,k82b_24:" Lit., 'until he came'."
,k82b_25:" V. <i>supra</i> note 4."
,k82b_26:" Lit., 'it'."
,k82b_27:" I.e., he could easily get rid of her since the amount of her <i>kethubah</i> was at hand and there was no need for him to make any efforts to find the money."
,k82b_28:" Sc. husband."
,k82b_29:" The amount of whose <i>kethubah</i> was high. In addition to the statutory sum the <i>kethubah</i> also contains additional obligations on the part of the husband corresponding to the amount the wife brought to him on marriage."
,k82b_30:" So Tosaf. s.v. [H]. Cur. edd. 'urine'."
,k82b_31:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 520, n. 10."
,k82b_32:" V. l.c. n. 7."
,k82b_33:" So MS.M. Cur. edd., 'to her kethubah'. [For a full discussion of this passage v. Epstein, L., <i>op. cit</i>. pp. 19ff.] "
}

txt:
<p>
 &mdash; It might have been assumed that since he has already performed the commandment that the All-Merciful has imposed upon him she shall again resume towards him the prohibition of [marrying] a brother's wife,<a id="k82b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; hence we were informed [that he may remarry her]. But might it not be suggested that the law is so<a id="k82b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; indeed?<a id="k82b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Scripture stated, And take her to him to wife,<a id="k82b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; as soon as he has taken her she becomes his wife [in all respects].
</p><p>
	SAVE THAT HER <I>KETHUBAH</I> REMAINS A CHARGE ON HER FIRST HUSBAND'S ESTATE. What is the reason?<a id="k82b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; A wife has been given<a id="k82b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; to him from heaven.<a id="k82b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; If, however, she is unable to obtain her <i>kethubah</i> from her first husband [provision was made by the Rabbis that] she receives it from the second<a id="k82b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; in order that It may not be easy for bin, to divorce her.<a id="k82b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>
</p><p>
	HE CANNOT SAY TO HER, BEHOLD YOUR <I>KETHUBAH</I> [etc.]'. What [need was there for stating] SO, TOO?<a id="k82b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; It might have been suggested [that the restriction mentioned applies only] in the former case<a id="k82b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; because the levir does not insert [in her <i>kethubah</i> the clause] 'That which I possess and that which I will acquire',<a id="k82b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; but that in the latter case, where he does insert [the pledge clause,] 'That which I possess and that which I will acquire',<a id="k82b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; she relies upon this guarantee,<a id="k82b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; hence we were told [that the ruling applies in both cases].
</p><p>
	IF HE DIVORCED HER SHE IS ENTITLED ONLY TO HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>. Only<a id="k82b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; IF HE DIVORCED HER [may he sell the property],<a id="k82b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; but if he did not divorce her he may not. Thus we were informed in agreement with the ruling of R. Abba.<a id="k82b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>
</p><p>
	IF HE SUBSEQUENTLY REMARRIED HER SHE IS [TO ENJOY THE SAME RIGHTS AS] ALL OTHER WIVES, AND IS ENTITLED ONLY TO HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>. IF HE SUBSEQUENTLY REMARRIED HER'! What does he thereby<a id="k82b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; teach us? Have we not learned: If a man divorced his wife and then remarried her, his second marriage is contracted on the terms of her first <i>kethubah</i>?<a id="k82b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; It might have been assumed that the law applied only to his wife since it was he himself who wrote the <i>kethubah</i>; in the case of his sister-in-law, however, since it was not he<a id="k82b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; who wrote the <i>kethubah</i> for her, it might well have been assumed that where he divorced, and then remarried her the <i>kethubah</i> must come from himself, hence we were taught [that in this case also she is entitled only to the first <i>kethubah</i>].
</p><p>
	Rab Judah stated: At first they used to give merely a written undertaking<a id="k82b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; in respect of [the <i>kethubah</i> of] a virgin for two hundred <i>zuz</i><a id="k82b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; and in respect of that of a widow for a <i>maneh</i>,<a id="k82b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; and consequently<a id="k82b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; they grew old and could not take any wives, when Simeon b. Shetah took the initiative<a id="k82b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; and ordained that all the property of a husband is pledged for the <i>kethubah</i> of his wife. So it was also taught elsewhere: At first they used to give merely a written undertaking<a id="k82b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; in respect of [the <i>kethubah</i> of] a virgin for two hundred <i>zuz</i><a id="k82b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; and in respect of that of a widow for a <i>maneh</i>,<a id="k82b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; and consequently<a id="k82b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; they grew old and could not take any wives. It was then ordained that the amount of the <i>kethubah</i><a id="k82b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; was to be deposited in the wife's father's house. At any time, however, when the husband was angry with her he used to tell her, 'Go to your kethubah'.<a id="k82b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; It was ordained, therefore, that the amount of the <i>kethubah</i><a id="k82b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; was to be deposited in the house of her father-in-law.<a id="k82b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; Wealthy women<a id="k82b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; converted it into silver, or gold baskets, while poor women converted it into brass<a id="k82b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; tubs. Still, whenever the husband had occasion to be angry with his wife he would say to her, 'Take your <i>kethubah</i> and go'.<a id="k82b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; It was then that<a id="k82b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; Simeon b. Shetah ordained that the husband must insert the pledging clause, 'All my property is mortgaged to your kethubah'.<a id="k82b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>
</P>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k84a_1:" Because the condition is contrary to the Pentateuchal injunction of [H] (Lev. XXV, 24)."
,k84a_2:" Now, since Rab recognizes the invalidity of a condition that is contrary to Pentateuchal law of overreaching, how could he be said to regard a similar condition elsewhere as valid?"
,k84a_3:" The condition being 'and because a husband's right of heirship is, in Rab's opinion, a Rabbinical enactment which has not the same force as that of a Pentateuchal law."
,k84a_4:" I.e., that a condition which is contrary to a Pentateuchal law is null."
,k84a_5:" That WHEN SHE DIES HE IS HER HEIR. The answer being in the affirmative, the facts are directly opposite to the statement made <i>supra</i> by Rab."
,k84a_6:" Such, e.g. as a renunciation by a husband of his rights to the usufruct of his wife's property."
,k84a_7:" Because in his opinion the Sages have impaired to their enactments the same force as that of a Pentateuchal law."
,k84a_8:" V. <i>supra</i> note 2."
,k84a_9:" Cf. <i>supra</i> note 3."
,k84a_10:" Viz., and extending R. Gamaliel's principle to a Rabbinic enactment applies it also to the usufruct. This being the case, how is Rab's statement <i>supra</i> to be understood?"
,k84a_11:" Bek. 52b."
,k84a_12:" Cf. Lev. XXV, 8ff."
,k84a_13:" This, it is at present assumed, is the meaning of [H]."
,k84a_14:" R. Johanan b. Beroka."
,k84a_15:" An inheritance to which one is Pentateuchally entitled does not return in the Jubilee Year (cf. Bek. 52b)."
,k84a_16:" R. Johanan b. Beroka."
,k84a_17:" By the members of the wife's family. Lit., 'what is their doing?' Since the husband's right is only in Rabbinic law the members of the wife's family, who are the original owners Pentateuchally, should be entitled to the return of the inheritance to them without any monetary payment on their part."
,k84a_18:" In explanation of the difficulty as to why such all inheritance should be restored in the Jubilee Year."
,k84a_19:" It is derogatory for a family that strangers should be interred in their graveyard while their own members should have to seek burial in another family's graveyard."
,k84a_20:" Lit., 'and what?'"
,k84a_21:" Since it is a husband's duty to bury his dead wife."
,k84a_22:" The place where, on returning from burial, the funeral escort halts to offer, with due ceremonial, consolation to the mourners. On returning from a burial the funeral escort halted on the way at a certain station where seven times they stood up and sat down on the ground, to offer comfort and consolation to the mourners or to weep and lament for the departed."
,k84a_23:" They may force the buyer to take back the purchase price and so cancel the sale."
,k84a_24:" B.B. 100b, Bek. 52b. Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 530. n. 9. Now since Rab specifically stated here that 'a husband's right of inheritance is Pentateuchal' how could he be said to hold that such a right is only Rabbinical."
,k84a_25:" Who claims her <i>kethubah</i>."
,k84a_26:" Claiming the repayment of his debt."
,k84a_27:" Expecting their inheritance."
,k84a_28:" This is explained <i>infra</i>."
,k84a_29:" The deposit or the loan"
,k84a_30:" Widows and creditors."
,k84a_31:" Before they are authorized to seize any portion of the estate."
,k84a_32:" The inheritance passes into their possession as soon as the parson whose heirs they are dies. Since they are the legal possessors, the others, whose claims have yet to be substantiated by an oath, cannot deprive them of their possessions, for the movables of orphans are not pledged to the creditors of their father."
,k84a_33:" The heirs, the widow or the creditor."
,k84a_34:" This is explained <i>infra</i>."
,k84a_35:" Could not the law of the one be inferred from the other?"
,k84a_36:" The amount of the loan not being in existence at the time the man died it cannot pass into the possession of his heirs before it had been collected from the debtor."
,k84a_37:" At the time the depositor died, since a deposit must never be spent by the bailee."
,k84a_38:" That, since it is in existence, it passes into the possession of the heirs."
,k84a_39:" A DEPOSIT."
,k84a_40:" Cf <i>supra</i> note 4."
,k84a_41:" A loan."
,k84a_42:" Cf. <i>supra</i> note 2."
,k84a_43:" Sc. the holder of the last dated bond by which such landed estate only may be seized as had been sold after that date."
,k84a_44:" Who, being unable to exert herself like a man in the search for any possible possessions of her husband, is regarded as 'THE ONE WHO IS UNDER THE GREATEST DISADVANTAGE'."
,k84a_45:" [H], lit., 'grace'."
,k84a_46:" While he is alive. Her uncertainty in respect of her settlement after his death might have led to quarrels and strife. Aliter; That women may readily consent to marriage. Had they not been assured that they would have the first claim upon their husband's estate they might refuse all offers of marriage (cf. Rashi). Aliter; That women may be attractive to their husbands by their attachment and devotion which would result from the sense of security they would feel in the provision of their future (cf. T.J., Aruch and R. Han. in Tosaf. s.v. [H] a.l.)."
,k84a_47:" Who regards the heirs as the possessors because WHEREAS OTHERS MUST TAKE AN OATH THE HEIRS NEED NOT."
,k84a_48:" For the very same reason (cf. previous note)."
,k84a_49:" The seizure on the part of the widow or a creditor of any movable portion of such property would consequently be invalid."
,k84a_50:" Lit., yes, so also', even if the creditor or the widow has seized any portion of the estate the heirs' right to it is in no way affected and the seized property must be returned to them in its entirety. "
}

txt:
<p>
could Rab, however, [it may be retorted,] hold the opinion that one's condition [though contrary to what is written in the Torah] is valid? Has it not in fact been stated: If a man says to another, '[I sell you this object] on condition that you have no claim for overreaching against me' [the buyer]. Rab ruled, has nevertheless a claim for overreaching against him,<a id="k84a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; and Samuel ruled, He has no claim for overreaching against him?<a id="k84a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; [It is this] then [that was meant;] 'The <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with the ruling of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel' who laid down that IF A MAN MAKES A CONDITION WHICH IS CONTRARY TO WHAT IS WRITTEN IN THE TORAH, HIS CONDITION IS NULL AND VOID, 'but not because of the reason he gave', for whereas R. Simeon b. Gamaliel is of the opinion that WHEN SHE DIES HE IS HER HEIR, Rab maintains that when she dies he is not her heir.<a id="k84a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; But is not this in agreement with his reason<a id="k84a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; and not with his ruling?<a id="k84a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; This then [it is that was meant:] 'The <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with the ruling of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel' who laid down that WHEN SHE DIES HE IS HER HEIR, but not 'because of the reason he gave' for, whereas R. Simeon b. Gamaliel is of the opinion that only a condition that is contrary to a Pentateuchal law is null but one that is contrary only to a Rabbinic law<a id="k84a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; is valid, Rab maintains that even a condition contrary to a Rabbinic law<a id="k84a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; is also null.<a id="k84a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>
</p><p>
	But this would be in agreement, would it not, with both his reason<a id="k84a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; and his ruling.<a id="k84a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; Rab only adding [greater force to it]?<a id="k84a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; This then [it is that was meant:] 'The <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with R. Simeon b. Gamaliel' who laid down that WHEN SHE DIES HE IS HER HEIR, but not 'because of the reason he gave', for, whereas R. Simeon b. Gamaliel holds that a husband's right of heirship is Pentateuchal and that [it is invalid because] WHEREVER A MAN MAKES A CONDITION WHICH IS CONTRARY TO WHAT IS WRITTEN IN THE TORAH, HIS CONDITION IS NULL AND VOID, Rab maintains that a husband's right of heirship is only a Rabbinic enactment and [that the condition is nevertheless null because] the Sages have imparted to their enactments the same force as that of Pentateuchal laws.
</p><p>
	But [could it be said,] that Rab is of the opinion that a husband's right of heirship is only Rabbinical when in fact we have learned:<a id="k84a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Johanan b. Beroka ruled, 'If a husband is the heir of his wife he must [when the Jubilee year<a id="k84a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; arrives] return [the inheritance] to the members of her family and allow them a reduction of price';<a id="k84a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; and, in considering this statement, the objection was raised: What is really his<a id="k84a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; opinion? If he holds that a husband's right of heirship is Pentateuchal, why [it may be asked] should he return [the inheritance at all]?<a id="k84a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; And if [he<a id="k84a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; holds it to be only] Rabbinical, why [it may be objected] should [even a part of] its price be paid?<a id="k84a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; And Rab explained: He<a id="k84a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; holds in fact the opinion that a husband's right of heirship is Pentateuchal but<a id="k84a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; [here it is a case of a man], for instance, whose wife bequeathed to him a [family] graveyard, [and it is] in order [to avoid] a family taint<a id="k84a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; that the Rabbis have ruled, Let him take the price and return it; and by<a id="k84a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; 'allow them a reduction in price' [was meant a deduction of] the cost of his wife's grave;<a id="k84a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; [the return of a family graveyard being] in agreement with what was taught: If a person has sold his [family] grave, the path to this grave, his halting place.<a id="k84a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; or his place of mourning, the members of his family may come and bury him perforce,<a id="k84a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; in order [to avert] a slight upon the family!<a id="k84a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Rab spoke here in accordance with R. Johanan b. Beroka's point of view but he himself does not uphold it.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. IF A MAN DIED AND LEFT A WIFE,<a id="k84a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; A CREDITOR,<a id="k84a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; AND HEIRS<a id="k84a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; AND HE ALSO HAD A DEPOSIT OR A LOAN IN THE POSSESSION OF OTHERS, THIS, R. TARFON RULED, SHALL BE GIVEN TO THE ONE WHO IS UNDER THE GREATEST DISADVANTAGE.<a id="k84a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; R. AKIBA SAID: NO PITY IS TO BE SHEWN IN A MATTER OF LAW; AND IT<a id="k84a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; SHALL RATHER BE GIVEN TO THE HEIRS, FOR WHEREAS ALL THE OTHERS<a id="k84a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; MUST TAKE AN OATH<a id="k84a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; THE HEIRS NEED NOT TAKE ANY OATH.<a id="k84a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; IF HE LEFT PRODUCE THAT WAS DETACHED FROM THE GROUND, THEN WHOEVER<a id="k84a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; SEIZES IT FIRST ACQUIRES POSSESSION. IF THE WIFE TOOK POSSESSION OF MORE THAN THE AMOUNT OF HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>, OR A CREDIT OR OF MORE THAN THE VALUE OF HIS DEBT, THE BALANCE, R. TARFON RULED, SHALL. BE GIVEN TO THE ONE WHO IS UNDER THE GREATEST DISADVANTAGE.<a id="k84a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; R. AKIBA SAID: NO PITY IS TO BE SHEWN IN A MATTER OF LAW; AND IT SHALL RATHER BE GIVEN TO THE HEIRS, FOR WHEREAS ALL THE OTHERS<a id="k84a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; MUST TAKE AN OATH<a id="k84a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; THE HEIRS NEED NOT TAKE ANY OATH.<a id="k84a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. What was the object of specifying both A LOAN and a DEPOSIT?<a id="k84a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; [Both were] required. For if A LOAN only had been mentioned it might have been presumed that only in that case did R. Tarfon maintain his view, because a loan is intended to be spent,<a id="k84a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; but that in the case of a deposit which is in existence<a id="k84a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; he agrees with R. Akiba.<a id="k84a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; And if the former<a id="k84a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; only had been mentioned it might have been assumed that only in that case did R. Akiba maintain his view<a id="k84a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; but that in the other case<a id="k84a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; he agrees with R. Tarfon.<a id="k84a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; [Hence both were] necessary.
</p><p>
	What is meant by TO THE ONE WHO IS UNDER THE GREATEST DISADVANTAGE? &mdash; R. Jose the son of R. Hanina replied: To the one who is under the greatest disadvantage in respect of proof.<a id="k84a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Johanan replied: [The reference is] to the <i>kethubah</i> of the wife<a id="k84a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; [who was given this privilege] in order to maintain pleasantness<a id="k84a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; [between her and her husband].<a id="k84a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; [This dispute is the same] as that between the following Tannaim: R. Benjamin said, To the one who is under the greatest disadvantage in respect of proof.<a id="k84a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; and this is the proper [course to take]; R. Eleazar said.[The reference is] to the <i>kethubah</i> of the wife<a id="k84a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; [who was given this privilege] in order to maintain pleasantness<a id="k84a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; [between her and her husband].<a id="k84a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; IF HE LEFT PRODUCE THAT WAS DETACHED. As to R. Akiba,<a id="k84a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; what was the point in discussing the BALANCE when<a id="k84a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; the entire estate belongs to the heirs?<a id="k84a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; The law is so indeed,<a id="k84a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; but since R. Tarfon spoke of the BALANCE, he also mentioned the BALANCE.
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k84b_1:" V. <i>supra</i> note 1."
,k84b_2:" Cf. note 3."
,k84b_3:" This is a mere enquiry (v. Rashi). R. Tan, regards it as an objection. the assumption of the invalidity of seizure being contradictory to the Mishnah <i>supra</i> 80b, where the woman awaiting levirate marriage, who was first to take possession of the detached produce, is declared to have acquired it; (v. Tosaf. s.v. [H] a.l.)."
,k84b_4:" Of chattels."
,k84b_5:" So that the chattels had never for one moment passed into the possession of the heirs."
,k84b_6:" Who maintains that WHOEVER SEIZES IT FIRST ACQUIRES POSSESSION, because the heirs do not become its possessors as soon as the man dies."
,k84b_7:" That the seizure should be valid."
,k84b_8:" Which is frequented by few people. In such a spot where <i>meshikah</i> (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>) is valid (cf. B.B. 84b) the produce, even according to R. Tarfon, passes into the possession of the heirs as soon as its original owner dies, and seizure by any other person is invalid."
,k84b_9:" Who follows the ruling of R. Akiba."
,k84b_10:" An expression of disapproval. Only a decision which is contrary to the Torah must be reversed. A Rabbinical ruling, however, has no such force, and though a judge may be expected to act according to a certain ruling, his decision must not be reversed if he differed from it."
,k84b_11:" R. Johanan and Resh Lakish."
,k84b_12:" Though R. Akiba's ruling is not explicitly contained in a Mishnah, but reported by Amoraim, it is considered a Mishnaic ruling since the law is in agreement with his opinion whenever it is opposed by no more than one individual. Cf. Sanh. 33a."
,k84b_13:" Is it likely, however, that any authority would uphold the latter view?"
,k84b_14:" R. Johanan and Resh Lakish."
,k84b_15:" R. Tarfon was sometimes regarded as the master of R. Akiba (v. <i>infra</i>)."
,k84b_16:" Since the last mentioned view seems unlikely."
,k84b_17:" R. Akiba's."
,k84b_18:" R. Tarfon."
,k84b_19:" R. Akiba's."
,k84b_20:" R. Johanan and Resh Lakish."
,k84b_21:" On the reliability of R. Akiba's rulings."
,k84b_22:" Hence the action of Resh Lakish in reversing the decision of the judges mentioned."
,k84b_23:" I.e., a ruling of his has not the force of an <i>halachah</i> though a judge is expected to follow it rather than that of any other individual who is opposed to it. Since, however, a decision has been given to the contrary the decision must stand. Hence R. Johanan's objection to the action of Resh Lakish (v. <i>supra</i> n. 11)."
,k84b_24:" In agreement with R. Akiba that seizure of movables for debt after the death of the original owner is invalid, the property having passed, at the moment he died, into the possession of his heirs."
,k84b_25:" V. Rashi. Lit., 'who is corresponding to me'."
,k84b_26:" So that it never came into the possession of the orphans."
,k84b_27:" Cf. <i>supra</i> note 3 mutatis mutandis."
,k84b_28:" And his statement could not be disproved on account of the absence of witnesses to testify to the seizure."
,k84b_29:" [H] lit., 'those kept In the fold', since (a) they stray into other people's folds and (b) are sometimes taken accidentally from the pasture lands by a shepherd to whom they do not belong. (v. B.B. 36a. Cit. 20b). Now, since the creditor's right to the retention of the animal can only be based on that of presumptive possession, which is here inapplicable, why did Rash Lakish allow the creditor to retain it?"
,k84b_30:" A herdsman is presumed to take good care that his flock stray not into other people's folds, or be seized by other shepherds."
,k84b_31:" Judah II."
,k84b_32:" The people of the Nasi's household."
,k84b_33:" R. Abbahu and his colleagues."
,k84b_34:" <i>Supra</i>."
,k84b_35:" Other creditors. "
}

txt:
<p>
But would R. Akiba<a id="k84b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; maintain that seizure<a id="k84b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; is never legally valid?<a id="k84b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; Raba replied in the name of R. Nahman: Seizure<a id="k84b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; is valid where it took place during the lifetime [of the deceased].<a id="k84b_5"><sup>5</sup></a> 
</p><p>
	Now according to R. Tarfon,<a id="k84b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; where [must the produce] be kept?<a id="k84b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Both Rab and Samuel replied: It must be heaped up and lie in a public domain, but [if it was kept] in an alley<a id="k84b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; no [seizure is valid]. Both R. Johanan and Resh Lakish, however, said: Even [if the produce lay] in an alley [seizure is valid].
</p><p>
	Certain judges once gave their decision in agreement with R. Tarfon, and Resh Lakish<a id="k84b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; reversed their verdict. Said R. Johanan to him, 'You have acted as [if R. Akiba's ruling were a law] of the Torah'!<a id="k84b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; May it be assumed that they<a id="k84b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; differ on this principle; One Master upholds the view that if [in giving a decision] a law cited in a Mishnah had been overlooked the decision must be reversed<a id="k84b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; and the other Master upholds the view that if a law cited in a Mishnah had been overlooked the decision need not be reversed?<a id="k84b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; No; all agree that if [in giving a decision] a law cited in a Mishnah had been overlooked the decision must be reversed, but this is the point at issue between them:<a id="k84b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; One Master holds that the <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with the opinion of R. Akiba [only when he differs] from a colleague of his but not from his master,<a id="k84b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; while the other Master holds that the <i>halachah</i> [is in agreement with him] even [if he differs] from his master. If you prefer<a id="k84b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; I might say; All agree that the <i>halachah</i> agrees with R. Akiba [only when he differs] from a colleague of his but not from his master. Here, however. the point at issue is this: One Master holds R. Tarfon to have been his<a id="k84b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; master and the other Master holds him to have been his colleague. Alternatively it might be said: All agree that he<a id="k84b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; was his<a id="k84b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; colleague; but the point at issue between them<a id="k84b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; is this: One Master maintains that the statement<a id="k84b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; was that 'The <i>halachah</i> [agrees with R. Akiba]'<a id="k84b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; and the other Master maintains that the statement<a id="k84b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; was that 'one should be inclined [in favour of a ruling of R. Akiba]'.<a id="k84b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Johanan's relatives seized in an alley a cow that belonged to orphans. When they appeared before R. Johanan, he said to them, 'Your seizure is quite lawful'. R. Simeon b. Lakish, however, before whom they subsequently appeared, said to them. 'Go and return it'.<a id="k84b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; 'What can I do', said R. Johanan to whom they came again, 'when one of equal authority<a id="k84b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; differs from me?'
</p><p>
	[A creditor] once seized an ox from the herdsman of [his debtor's] orphans. The creditor said, 'I seized it during the lifetime [of the debtor]'<a id="k84b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; and the herdsman said, 'He seized it after the debtor's death'.<a id="k84b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; They appeared before R. Nahman who asked the herdsman, 'Have you witnesses that [the creditor] has seized it?' &mdash; 'No', the other replied. [R. Nahman thereupon] said to him: Since he could have said, 'It came into my possession through purchase'<a id="k84b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; he is also entitled to say. 'I seized it during the lifetime [of the debtor]'. But did not Resh Lakish state; The law of presumptive possession is inapplicable to living creatures?<a id="k84b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; The case of an ox that was entrusted to a herdsman is different [from that of other living creatures].<a id="k84b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>
</p><p>
	The people of the Nasi's<a id="k84b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; household once seized in an alley a bondwoman belonging to orphans. At a session held by R. Abbahu, R. Hanina b. Papi and R. Isaac Nappaha in whose presence sat also R. Abba they<a id="k84b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; were told, 'Your seizure is quite lawful'. 'Is it', said R. Abba to them,<a id="k84b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; 'because these people are of the Nasi's household that you are favouring them? Surely, when certain judges once gave a decision in agreement with R. Tarfon Resh Lakish reversed their decision'.<a id="k84b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Yemar b. Hashu had a money claim against a certain person who died and left a boat. 'Go', he said to his agent, 'and seize it'. [The latter] went and seized it, but R. Papa and R. Huna the son of R. Joshua met him and told him, 'You are seizing [the ship] on behalf of a creditor and thereby you are causing loss to others,<a id="k84b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; and R. Johanan ruled: He who seizes [a debtor's property] on behalf of a creditor and thereby causes loss to others<a id="k84b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>
</P>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k85a_1:" One has no right to acquire a benefit for one man at the expense of another, v. Git. 11b."
,k85a_2:" Who were also among the deceased's creditors."
,k85a_3:" A form of acquisition."
,k85a_4:" Rowing being in his opinion the proper form of acquiring legal possession of a ship."
,k85a_5:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 6 mutatis mutandis."
,k85a_6:" <i>Supra</i> 84b, <i>infra</i> 86b. The boat presumably lying at the river bank which, not being frequented by many boats, has the status of an alley, could not, therefore, be lawfully seized and acquired."
,k85a_7:" On which many boats ply and which has the status of a public thoroughfare where seizure is legal."
,k85a_8:" Metaph., 'old men'."
,k85a_9:" By giving a decision in their own favour and thus robbing the other creditors."
,k85a_10:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 504, n. 5. "
,k85a_11:" Lit., 'these are (from other) sides'."
,k85a_12:" In the absence of witnesses to testify that the debt had been paid."
,k85a_13:" [H] lit., 'the things never were'."
,k85a_14:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 536, n. 23."
,k85a_15:" The man who sent him."
,k85a_16:" The agent."
,k85a_17:" [H] (rt. [H] 'to pluck'), a bag made of skins from which the hair has been plucked."
,k85a_18:" The bonds."
,k85a_19:" 'In payment of the debt he owed me'."
,k85a_20:" The case of bonds."
,k85a_21:" As long as he was alive the bonds were held by her as a deposit which was virtually in the possession of the depositor."
,k85a_22:" Since at the death of the depositor the bonds had passed directly into the possession of his heirs."
,k85a_23:" Lit., 'became liable'."
,k85a_24:" To confirm her denial of a monetary claim that had been advanced against bet."
,k85a_25:" Raba's wife."
,k85a_26:" The claimant who in such a case (cf. Shebu. 44b) is entitled to the sum claimed on confirming it by an oath"
,k85a_27:" [Asheri, Alfasi and Isaiah Trani omit 'No&nbsp;&hellip; one witness'. According to this reading Raba required the confirmation by another person because R. Papa was related to one of the parties, v. Tosaf, and Strashun]."
,k85a_28:" Whose testimony was regarded by Raba, <i>supra</i>, as sufficient to disqualify the defendant from taking an oath."
,k85a_29:" That I can rely upon her evidence."
,k85a_30:" [Did he mean to imply that he suspected R. Papa of lying? This is unlikely in view of the discussion that follows in which R. Papa seemed to betray no resentment at the affront. Yet this is the only meaning which can be attached to the text of cur. edd. Preference is consequently to be given to the reading of Asheri and Alfasi (v. n. 1); and what Raba meant was that, as a relative, R. Papa's evidence could not be accepted]."
,k85a_31:" Even though no other witness is available Lit.. 'It is a thing'."
,k85a_32:" In money matters, surely, the evidence of two witnesses is required."
,k85a_33:" Sc. the holder would have to confirm the statement in the bond by an oath before an order for repayment could he issued (Tosaf.)."
,k85a_34:" Lit., 'become liable'."
,k85a_35:" So BaH. Cur. edd. omit 'our'."
,k85a_36:" [H] pl. of [H], 'favourable judgment'."
,k85a_37:" Abaye was a descendant of the house of Eli who were condemned to die young (cf. I Sam. II, 32). [H] and [H] (rt. [H] 'to crush') 'frail things', 'frail words', 'frail or short-lived people'. A similar expression in Arabic means 'to be foolish'. Cf. B.B. 137b, Sone. ed. p. 582, n. 6."
,k85a_38:" Of a document, confirming the signature of the witnesses."
,k85a_39:" Git 26b, <i>supra</i> 21b."
,k85a_40:" Which the woman requested and the wording of which would have implied that when it was written she had already taken the oath."
,k85a_41:" That a document containing a statement which at the time of writing was not yet true is invalid even after the act it mentions has materialized."
,k85a_42:" Lit., 'and it is not'."
,k85a_43:" A letter of divorce he has prepared for his wife."
,k85a_44:" Who denied the validity of the document."
,k85a_45:" That the validity of the document (cf. <i>supra</i> n. 4) is not affected."
,k85a_46:" On the same day that he borrowed. Though the bond in such a case is not antedated it may not be used again."
,k85a_47:" Viz., the right to seize the debtor's property."
,k85a_48:" When it was repaid. The second loan, since no new bond was issued in connection with it, has only the force of a loan by word of mouth which does not entitle the creditor to seize any of the debtor's sold property. Should the first bond, however, be used for the second loan, the lender might unlawfully seize property to which he is not legally entitled. B.M. 17a. "
}

txt:
<p>
does not legally acquire it'.<a id="k85a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; Thereupon they<a id="k85a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; seized it themselves, R. Papa rowing<a id="k85a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; the boat while R. Huna the son of R. Joshua pulled it by the rope. One Master then declared, 'I have acquired all the ship'<a id="k85a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; and the other similarly declared, 'I have acquired all of it'.<a id="k85a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; They were met by R. Phinehas b. Ammi who said to them: Both Rab and Samuel ruled that '[Seizure is valid] only if [the produce] was piled up and lay in a public domain'.<a id="k85a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; 'We too', they replied, 'have seized it at the main current of the river'.<a id="k85a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; When they appeared before Raba he said to them, 'Ye white geese<a id="k85a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; that strip the people of their cloaks;<a id="k85a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; thus ruled R. Nahman; [The seizure is valid] only if it took place during the lifetime [of the original owner].
</p><p>
	The men of Be-Hozae<a id="k85a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; once claimed a sum of money from Abimi the son of R. Abbahu, who sent it to them by the hand of Hama the son of Rabbah b. Abbahu. He duly went there and paid them, but when he asked them, 'Return to me the bond', they replied. 'This payment was made in settlement of some other claims'.<a id="k85a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; He came before R. Abbahu [to complain] and the latter asked him, 'Have you witnesses that you have paid them?' &mdash; 'No', he replied. 'Since', the former said to him, 'they could plead<a id="k85a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; that the payment was never made,<a id="k85a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; they are also entitled to plead that the payment was made in settlement of some other claims'.<a id="k85a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>
</p><p>
	What is the law in respect of the agent's liability to refund? &mdash; R. Ashi replied; We have to consider the facts. If he<a id="k85a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; said to him. 'Secure the bond and pay the money' he<a id="k85a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; must refund it; [but if he<a id="k85a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; said.] 'Pay the money and secure the bond', he is under no obligation to refund it. The law, however, is not so. He<a id="k85a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; must refund it in either case, because the other<a id="k85a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; may well say. 'I deputed you to improve my position, not to make it worse
</p><p>
	There was a certain woman with whom a case<a id="k85a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; of bonds was once deposited and when the heirs [of the depositor] came to claim it from her she said, 'I seized them<a id="k85a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; during [the depositor's] lifetime'.<a id="k85a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Nahman to whom she came said to her, 'Have you witnesses that it<a id="k85a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; was claimed from you during [the depositor's] lifetime and that you refused to return it?' &mdash; 'No', she replied. 'If so', he said to her, 'your seizure is one that took place after [the owner's] death,<a id="k85a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; and such a seizure is invalid.<a id="k85a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>
</p><p>
	A woman was once ordered<a id="k85a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; to take an oath<a id="k85a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; at the court of Raba, but when R. Hisda's daughter<a id="k85a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; said to him, 'I know that she is suspected of [taking false] oaths', Raba transferred the oath to her opponent.<a id="k85a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>
</p><p>
	On another occasion R. Papa and R. Adda b. Mattena sat in his presence when a bond was brought to him. Said R. Papa to him. 'I know that this bond is paid up'. 'Is there, [Raba] asked him, 'any other man with the Master [to confirm the statement]?' 'No', he replied. 'Although', the other said to him, 'the Master is present [to give evidence] there is no validity [in the testimony of] one witness'.<a id="k85a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; Said R. Adda b. Mattena to him, 'Should not R. Papa be [deemed as reliable] as the daughter of R. Hisda?'<a id="k85a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; 'As to the daughter of R. Hisda [he replied] I am certain of her;<a id="k85a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; I am not sure, however, about the Master'.<a id="k85a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; Said R. Papa: Now that the Master has stated [that a judge who can assert,] 'I am certain of a person', may rely upon that person's evidence,<a id="k85a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; I would tear up a bond on the evidence of my son Abba Mar of whose reliability I am certain. 'I would tear up'! Is such an act conceivable?<a id="k85a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; He rather [meant to say,] 'I would impair a bond<a id="k85a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; on his evidence'.
</p><p>
	A woman was once ordered to take<a id="k85a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; an oath at the court of R. Bibi b. Abaye, when her opponent suggested to them, 'Let her rather come and take the oath in our town,<a id="k85a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; where she might possibly feel ashamed [of her action] and confess'. 'Write out said she to them, 'the verdict in my favour<a id="k85a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; so that after I shall have taken the oath it may be given to me'. 'Write it out for her', ordered R. Bibi b. Abaye. 'Because', said R. Papi. 'you are descendants of short-lived people you speak frail words;<a id="k85a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; surely Raba stated, 'An attestation<a id="k85a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; by judges that was written before the witnesses have identified their signatures is invalid',<a id="k85a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; from which it is evident [that such an attestation] has the appearance of a false declaration, and so here also [the verdict]<a id="k85a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; would appear to contain a false statement'. This conclusion,<a id="k85a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; however, is futile<a id="k85a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; [as may be inferred] from a statement of R. Nahman, who said; R. Meir ruled that even if [a husband] found it<a id="k85a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; on a rubbish heap, and then signed and gave it to her, it is valid; and even the Rabbis<a id="k85a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; differ from R. Meir only in respect of letters of divorce where it is necessary that the writing shall be done specifically in her name, but in respect of other legal documents they agree with him,<a id="k85a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; for R. Assi stated in the name of R. Johanan, 'A man may not borrow again on a bond on which he has once borrowed and which he has repaid.<a id="k85a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; because the obligation [incurred by the first loan]<a id="k85a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; was cancelled;<a id="k85a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; the reason then is because 'the obligation was cancelled', but that [the contents of the document] have the appearance
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k85b_1:" The bond having been written not for the second but for the first loan."
,k85b_2:" Lit., 'he did not order'. And his heirs maintained that the pearls might have belonged to the deceased from whom they inherited them."
,k85b_3:" To obtain his ruling on the ownership of the deposit."
,k85b_4:" And he could not consequently have been the owner of costly objects."
,k85b_5:" The depositor."
,k85b_6:" That the pearls were (a) wrapped up in a sheet and (b) their number was seven (Rashi. Cf., however, Tosaf. s.v. [H])."
,k85b_7:" Lit.,' that be was not in the habit of entering and going out from there'."
,k85b_8:" He was accidentally drowned (v. Yeb. 121b)."
,k85b_9:" That it was a silver cup."
,k85b_10:" [H] cf. [G], silk or silk cloth."
,k85b_11:" To the heirs."
,k85b_12:" While he was on his death bed."
,k85b_13:" Lit., 'to them'."
,k85b_14:" Sc. the estate must be given to this man."
,k85b_15:" I.e., if he assigned his estate to a person whom he named without describing him by the title by which he is usually known."
,k85b_16:" A scholar of the name of Tobiah who bears the title 'R(abbi)'."
,k85b_17:" The testator."
,k85b_18:" Claiming the estate."
,k85b_19:" Of the deceased."
,k85b_20:" A person is assumed to be more favourably disposed towards a scholar than towards any other person. On the merit and heavenly reward of him who benefits scholars, v. Bet. 34b."
,k85b_21:" Prov. XXVII, 10."
,k85b_22:" Who claim the estate."
,k85b_23:" [H] = [H] 'choice', 'singling out', 'discretion' (Jast.). Aliter. 'Favour', 'gift'. i.e., the judges in their verdict may favour, or make a gift of the estate to any of the claimants they prefer (cf. R. <i>Tam</i> in Tosaf. s.v. [H] and Levy s.v.). Aliter: [H] = [H] 'to throw', i.e., the judges must cast about for (gauge) the opinion of the testator to determine which of the claimants he preferred (Rashi). Cf. Golds. [H] ist unverkennbar das syn. [H] (confabulatio, colloquium) Rat, Beschluss der Richter'."
,k85b_24:" Lit., 'which your father said'."
,k85b_25:" This is the reading in the parallel passage elsewhere (cf. B.B. 147b). The reading here is [H], lit., 'that', 'as to that'."
,k85b_26:" The seller."
,k85b_27:" Because the buyer of a bond is entitled only to the same rights as those of the seller and since the latter, by his release of the creditor, has forfeited his claims upon the debt, the former also forfeits them; v. Kid., Sonc. ed. p. 239. n. 1."
,k85b_28:" When he inherits the estate of the creditor."
,k85b_29:" On marriage."
,k85b_30:" Lit., 'his hand is like her hand'; hence it is not within her power to remit the debt without her husband's consent."
,k85b_31:" Cf. Rashi. [H] lit., 'the goodness of a favour' (cf. the English idiom, 'a game for love'), i.e., receiving no full price for her <i>kethubah</i> from the buyers, who purchase it as a speculation in case her husband dies first it divorces her. Should she die first, they have no claim to the <i>kethubah</i>."
,k85b_32:" Who was the heir to her mother's <i>kethubah</i>."
,k85b_33:" Lit., 'to them'. "
}

txt:
<p>
of a false statement<a id="k85b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; is a matter which need not be taken into consideration.
</p><p>
	A certain man once deposited seven pearls, wrapped in a sheet, with R. Miasha the son of the son of R. Joshua h. Levi. As R. Miasha died intestate<a id="k85b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; they came to R. Ammi.<a id="k85b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; 'In the first instance', he said to them, 'I know that R. Miasha the son of the son of R. Joshua b. Levi was not a wealthy man,<a id="k85b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; and secondly. does not the man<a id="k85b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; indicate the marks?'<a id="k85b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; This ruling, however, applies only to a man who was not a frequent visitor at the bailee's house,<a id="k85b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; but if he was a frequent visitor there [the marks he indicates are no evidence of ownership since] it might well be assumed that another person has made the deposit and he happened to see it. A certain man once deposited a silver cup with Nasa; and Hasa died intestate.<a id="k85b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Nahman before whom [the heirs] appeared said to them, 'I know that Hasa was not a wealthy man? and, furthermore, does he<a id="k85b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; not indicate the mark?'<a id="k85b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; This, however, applies only to a man who was not an habitual visitor at the bailee's house,<a id="k85b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; but if he was a frequent visitor there [the mark he indicates is no valid proof since] it might be said that another person had deposited [the cup] and he happened to see it.
</p><p>
	A certain man once deposited a silk cloth<a id="k85b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; with R. Dimi the brother of R. Safra, and R. Dimi died intestate.<a id="k85b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Abba, to whom [the depositor] came [to submit his claim.] said to them,<a id="k85b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; 'In the first place I know that R. Dimi was not a wealthy man<a id="k85b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; and, secondly, the man is here indicating the distinguishing mark.' This, however, applies only to a man who was not a frequent visitor<a id="k85b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; at the bailee's house, but if he was a frequent visitor there [the indication of the mark is no valid proof since] it might well be suggested that another man deposited the object and he happened to see it. 
</p><p>
	A man once said<a id="k85b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; to those around him,<a id="k85b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Let my estate be given to Tobiah', and then he died. [A man named] Tobiah came [to claim the estate]. 'Behold', said R. Johanan. 'Tobiah has come'.<a id="k85b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; Now if he said, 'Tobiah'<a id="k85b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; and 'R. Tobiah'<a id="k85b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; came, [the latter is not entitled to the estate, since] he said 'To Tobiah' but not 'To R. Tobiah'. If he,<a id="k85b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; however, was on familiar terms with him<a id="k85b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; [the estate must be given to him, since the omission of title might have been due to] the fact that he was on intimate terms with him. If two Tobiahs appeared,<a id="k85b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; one of whom was a neighbour<a id="k85b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; and the other a scholar, the scholar is to be given precedence.<a id="k85b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; If one [of the Tobiahs] is a relative and the other a scholar, the scholar is given precedence.<a id="k85b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; The question was asked: What is the position where one is a neighbour<a id="k85b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; and the other a relative? &mdash; Come and hear; Better is a neighbour that is near than a brother far off<a id="k85b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; if both<a id="k85b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; are relatives, or both are neighbours. or both are scholars the decision is left to the discretion<a id="k85b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; of the judges.
</p><p>
	Come, said Raba to the son of R. Hiyya b. Abin, I will tell you a fine saying of your father's:<a id="k85b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; Although<a id="k85b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; Samuel said, 'If a man sold a bond of indebtedness to another person and then he<a id="k85b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; released the debtor, the latter is legally released;<a id="k85b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; and, moreover, even [a creditor's] heir may<a id="k85b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; release [the debtor]' Samuel, nevertheless, admits that, where a wife brought in to her husband<a id="k85b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; a bond of indebtedness and then remitted it, the debt is not to be considered remitted, because her husband's rights are equal to hers.<a id="k85b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>
</p><p>
	A relative of R. Nahman once sold her <i>kethubah</i> for the goodwill.<a id="k85b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; She was divorced and then died. Thereupon [the buyers] came to claim [the amount of the <i>kethubah</i>] from her daughter.<a id="k85b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Is there no one', said R. Nahman to those around him,<a id="k85b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; 'who can tender her advice?
</P>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k86a_1:" Lit., 'let her go and remit'."
,k86a_2:" Since, as has been stated (<i>supra</i> 85b ad fin.), even a creditor's heir may release the debtor'. The daughter is in this case the heir to a debt (the <i>kethubah</i>) which her father owed her mother who sold it to others who, like the buyers of a bond, lose all their claims upon it as soon as the heir has remitted it."
,k86a_3:" Upon whom the buyers have no claim."
,k86a_4:" [H], lit., 'those who arrange (the pleas) before the judges'. A judge is forbidden to act even indirectly as legal adviser to one of the parties. Cf. Aboth I, 8, Sonc. ed. p. 6. n. 1."
,k86a_5:" When he tendered advice."
,k86a_6:" Lit., 'and in the end what did he think?' sc. why did he finally reproach himself for acting as 'legal adviser'?"
,k86a_7:" Isa. LVIII, 7, implying that it is one's duty to come to the assistance of one's relative."
,k86a_8:" A judge, in order to be free from all suspicion of partiality, must subject himself to greater restrictions and must consequently tender no legal advice whatever to line of the parties in a lawsuit, even in cases where the action is not to be tried by him, v. <i>supra</i> 52b."
,k86a_9:" V. p. 541, nn. 15ff."
,k86a_10:" The buyer."
,k86a_11:" As soon as he buys the bond and before the creditor has had time to think of remitting it to the debtor."
,k86a_12:" The debtor."
,k86a_13:" Being naturally in need of ready money."
,k86a_14:" For the amount involved. As soon as he buys the bond and before the creditor has time to think of remitting it to the debtor."
,k86a_15:" The buyer's."
,k86a_16:" I.e., R. Meir (cf. B.K. 100a f)."
,k86a_17:" Lit., 'by it'; in the case of a bond the debt in which had been remitted to the debtor after the creditor had sold the bond of indebtedness."
,k86a_18:" In favour of the buyer."
,k86a_19:" The creditor who was the cause of the damage must compensate the buyer for his loss."
,k86a_20:" As to the dispute on this point v. B.K. 116b."
,k86a_21:" On which the bond is written, since the creditor might plead that he is only liable for the piece of paper which he sold. For the debt itself he is not liable since it was only indirectly that he caused the loss of it."
,k86a_22:" Cf.. however, <i>Infra</i> n. 17."
,k86a_23:" By his legal and scholastic arguments."
,k86a_24:" Who was the adjudicator in the action (cf however, <i>infra</i> n. 17)."
,k86a_25:" From, the creditor who remitted the debt. According to another interpretation (cf. Rashi on the parallel passage, B.K. 98b) R. Ashi in his childhood had destroyed a bond of indebtedness, and Rafram made him pay for it in accordance with the ruling of R. Meir (v. <i>supra</i> note 8)."
,k86a_26:" Metaph. As the beam is smooth and straight and of the best quality of wood so was the collection made to the full extent of the damage and of the best of the creditor's estate."
,k86a_27:" As he advanced ready money he is justly entitled to ready money."
,k86a_28:" As her statutory <i>kethubah</i> is secured on the husband's lands she is entitled to his land only. The amount (if the <i>kethubah</i> corresponding to the on barzel (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>) property, though this might have consisted of ready money, is, like the statutory <i>kethubah</i> with which it is amalgamated, also secured on the husband's lands only."
,k86a_29:" If the bond of indebtedness and the <i>kethubah</i> bear the same date. Otherwise, the holder of the document bearing the earlier date takes precedence."
,k86a_30:" For the preference of the creditor where the documents were issued on the same date."
,k86a_31:" And the disadvantage in respect of the collection of her <i>kethubah</i> would not in any way deter her from marriage. If a creditor, on the other hand, were to experience undue difficulty in the collection of his debt he might decide to turn away from his door all future borrowers."
,k86a_32:" Is it possible that a debtor would be expected to go to all this trouble when the creditor's security was not that of ready money but of land?"
,k86a_33:" That gave rise to the erroneous report."
,k86a_34:" Lit., 'attached his money to'."
,k86a_35:" By attempting to deprive his creditor from his due."
,k86a_36:" In being ordered to find a buyer for his land, though elsewhere (cf. <i>supra</i> n. 6) it is the task of the creditor to do so."
,k86a_37:" V. 'Ar. 22a."
,k86a_38:" [Since, that is to say, the payment of a debt is a religious obligation, where is the sanction for the employment of compulsory measures to make one pay his debts? Others connect the question with the preceding case of one who ascribes his money to a non-Jew so as to evade payment, v. Tosaf. s.v. [H]]."
,k86a_39:" That flogging is administered and the sinner is thereby purged."
,k86a_40:" The festive booth for the Feast of Tabernacles (cf Lev. XXIII, 34ff)."
,k86a_41:" 'Palm-branch', the term applied to the festive wreath used in the Tabernacles ritual and consisting of four species of which the palm-branch is one (cf. Lev. XXIII, 40). "
}

txt:
<p>
She might remit<a id="k86a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; her mother's <i>kethubah</i> in favour of her father,<a id="k86a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; and then she may inherit it frons him'.<a id="k86a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; When she heard this she went and remitted it [in her father's favour]. Thereupon R. Nahman said: 'We have put ourselves in the [unenviable] position of legal advisers'.<a id="k86a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; What was the opinion that he held at first<a id="k86a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; and what made him change it afterwards?<a id="k86a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; At first he thought [of the Scriptural text.] And that thou hide not thyself from thine own flesh,<a id="k86a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; but ultimately he realized that [the position of] a noted personality is different [from that of the general public].<a id="k86a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>
</p><p>
	[Reverting to] the main text; Samuel said, 'If a man sold a bond of indebtedness to another person, and then he released the debtor, the latter is released; and, moreover, even [a creditor's] heir may release [the debtor].'<a id="k86a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; Said R. Huna the son of R. Joshua; But if he<a id="k86a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; is clever he<a id="k86a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; rattles some coins in his<a id="k86a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; face and [the latter]<a id="k86a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; writes the bond<a id="k86a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; in his<a id="k86a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; name.
</p><p>
	Amemar said; He<a id="k86a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; who adjudicates [liability] in an action [for damage] caused indirectly would here also<a id="k86a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; adjudge damages<a id="k86a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; to the amount [recoverable] on a valid bond,<a id="k86a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; but he who does not adjudicate [liability] in an action for damage caused indirectly<a id="k86a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; would here adjudge damages only to the extent of the value of the mere scrap of paper.<a id="k86a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; Such<a id="k86a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; an action was [once tried] when through Rafram's insistence<a id="k86a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Ashi<a id="k86a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; was compelled to order the collection [of damages]<a id="k86a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; in the manner of a beam that is fit for decorative mouldings.<a id="k86a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Amemar stated in the name of R. Hama; If a man has against him, the claim of his wife's <i>kethubah</i> and that of a creditor, and he owns a plot of land and has also ready money, the creditor's claim is settled by means of the ready money while the woman's claim is settled by means of the land, the creditor being treated in accordance with his rights,<a id="k86a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; and the wife in accordance with her rights.<a id="k86a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; If, however, he owns only one plot of land and it suffices to meet the claim of one only, it is to be given to the creditor;<a id="k86a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; it is not to be given to the wife. What is the reason?<a id="k86a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; More than the man's desire to marry is the woman's desire to be married.<a id="k86a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Said R. Papa to R. Hama, Is it a fact that you have stated in the name of Raba; If a man, against whom there was a monetary claim owned a plot of land, and who, when his creditor approached hini with the claim for repayment, replied, 'Collect your loan from the land', he is to be ordered [by the court,] 'You must yourself go and sell it, bring [the net proceeds] and deliver it to him'?<a id="k86a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>
</p><p>
	'No', the other replied. 'Tell me then', [the first said to him,] 'how the incident<a id="k86a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; had actually occurred'. '[The debtor]' the other replied, 'alleged that his money belonged to<a id="k86a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; an idolater; and since he acted in an improper manner<a id="k86a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; he was similarly treated in an improper manner'.<a id="k86a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Said K. Kahana to R. Papa; According to the statement you made that the repayment of [a debt to] a creditor is a religious act,<a id="k86a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; what is the ruling where [a debtor] said, 'I am not disposed to perform a religious act'?<a id="k86a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; 'We', the other replied. 'have learned: This<a id="k86a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; applies only to negative precepts, but in the case of positive precepts, as for instance, when a man is told, 'Make a sukkah'<a id="k86a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; and he does not make it [or, 'Perform the commandment of the] lulab'<a id="k86a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; and he does not perform it
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k86b_1:" In an endeavour to coerce him to perform the precept."
,k86b_2:" Hul. 132b; if he persists in his refusal. Thus it follows that no one is at liberty to declare, 'I am not disposed to perform a religious act'."
,k86b_3:" Where fewer people walk, and where it remained intact until the lapse of the thirty days. Is the letter of divorce, it is asked, regarded as being still in the possession of the woman, despite its place of deposit, and the woman is consequently legally divorced, or is the spot, being at the side of a public domain, subject to the same restrictions in respect of <i>kinyan</i> as the public domain itself."
,k86b_4:" <i>Supra</i> 84b, 85a, q.v., from which it follows that an object in a public domain cannot be acquired except by a specific act of <i>kinyan</i>."
,k86b_5:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 9. The woman cannot consequently he regarded as being in possession of the letter of divorce and her divorce is, therefore, invalid."
,k86b_6:" <i>Supra</i> 82a q.v. for notes."
,k86b_7:" As the cow is acquired after the specified period, though stationed in a meadow', so should the woman be deemed to be in the possession of the letter of divorce, though it lies at the side of a public domain."
,k86b_8:" Hence the validity of a deferred <i>kinyan</i> if at the specified period the object was within its boundaries."
,k86b_9:" No deferred <i>kinyan</i> being effective within such a spot."
,k86b_10:" R. Hisda."
,k86b_11:" Rami b. Hama."
,k86b_12:" The woman to whom her husband gave a letter of divorce stipulating that it shall take effect only after the lapse of thirty days."
,k86b_13:" V. <i>supra</i>."
,k86b_14:" That she should sell his wares"
,k86b_15:" That she has not dealt fraudulently with anything that had been put in her charge."
,k86b_16:" Sc. not only when she is engaged in commercial transactions, but also when she is occupied with her domestic affairs only. (V. Gemara <i>infra</i>)."
,k86b_17:" He has spoken of in our Mishnah."
,k86b_18:" [H], lit., 'rolling'. sc only where the wife has to take an oath in respect of her commercial transactions may an oath in respect of her domestic occupations be added."
,k86b_19:" Sc. even if she is attending to her domestic occupations only."
,k86b_20:" The Rabbis who differed from him."
,k86b_21:" Proverb. Serpent _ cantankerous husband."
,k86b_22:" A wife could justly object to live with a cantankerous man who does not trust her in her domestic responsibilities."
,k86b_23:" The oath by implication."
,k86b_24:" When she has in any case to take an oath in respect of her business transactions."
,k86b_25:" Her refusal to live with him is not due to the actual oath but to his mistrust of her integrity."
,k86b_26:" An answer to the question <i>supra</i> as to what was R. Eliezer's meaning."
,k86b_27:" By a formal declaration."
,k86b_28:" E.g., 'may all the produce of the world be forbidden to me if I misappropriated any of your goods or money' (cf. Git. 34b)."
,k86b_29:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 546. n, 10."
,k86b_30:" V. p. 547. n. 10."
,k86b_31:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 546, n. 20."
,k86b_32:" The nature of this oath is explained <i>infra</i>."
,k86b_33:" If, having been divorced by him, she died and they claim from him the amount of her <i>kethubah</i>. The oath they take affirms that the deceased had not enjoined upon them either while, or before, she was dying, not did they find any entry among her papers that the <i>kethubah</i> was paid (v. Shebu. 45a)."
,k86b_34:" People who bought her <i>kethubah</i> from her. Cf. n. 4, mutatis mutandis."
,k86b_35:" If on the death of their father the widow, her heirs or lawful successors claim from them the payment of her <i>kethubah</i>."
,k86b_36:" The purchasers of his estate from whom the <i>kethubah</i> is claimed in the absence of unencumbered property."
,k86b_37:" The woman whom her husband had granted exemption from vow and oath (v. <i>supra</i>)."
,k86b_38:" Sc. she severed all connection with her husband's business affairs as soon as he was buried."
,k86b_39:" Even in respect of the period between her husband's death and burial."
,k86b_40:" Lit., 'for that which is to come', the exemption having expired at the moment the estate passed into the possession of the heirs."
,k86b_41:" The period of her administration prior to their father's death, when she was protected by his exemption."
,k86b_42:" The exemption from which is discussed in the first clause of our Mishnah. "
}

txt:
<p>
he is flogged<a id="k86b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; until his soul departeth.<a id="k86b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Rami b. Hama enquired of R. Hisda: What is the ruling where [a husband said to his wife,] 'Here is your letter of divorce but you shall be divorced thereby only after [the lapse of] thirty days'. and she went and laid it down at the side of a public domain?<a id="k86b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; 'She', the other replied, 'is not divorced, by reason of the ruling of Rab and Samuel, both of whom have stated, 'It must be heaped up and lie in a public domain'<a id="k86b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; and the sides of a public domain are regarded as the public domain itself.<a id="k86b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; On the contrary! She should be deemed divorced by reason of a ruling of R. Nahman, who stated in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha, 'If a man said to another, "Pull this cow, but it shall pass into your possession Only after thirty days", he legally acquires it even if it stands at the time in the meadow';<a id="k86b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; and a meadow presumably has, has it not, the same status as the sides of a public domain?<a id="k86b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; No; a meadow has a status of its own<a id="k86b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; and the sides of a public domain, too, have a status of their own.<a id="k86b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; Another version: He<a id="k86b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; said to him,<a id="k86b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; 'She<a id="k86b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; is divorced by reason of a ruling of R. Nahman,<a id="k86b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; the sides of a public domain having the same status as a meadow'. &mdash; 'On the contrary! She should not be regarded as divorced by reason of a ruling of Rab and Samuel.<a id="k86b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; for have not the sides of a public domain the same status as a public domain?' &mdash; 'No; a public domain has a status of its own<a id="k86b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; and the sides of a public domain, too, have a status of their own'.<a id="k86b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. IF A HUSBAND SET UP HIS WIFE AS A SHOPKEEPER<a id="k86b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; OR APPOINTED HER AS HIS ADMINISTRATRIX HE MAY IMPOSE UPON HER AN OATH<a id="k86b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; WHENEVER HE DESIRES TO DO SO. R. ELIEZER SAID; [SUCH AN OATH<a id="k86b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; MAY BE IMPOSED UPON HER] EVEN IN RESPECT OF HER SPINDLE AND HER DOUGH.<a id="k86b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. The question was asked; Does R. Eliezer mean [that the oath<a id="k86b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; is to be imposed] by implication<a id="k86b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; or does he mean that it may be imposed directly?<a id="k86b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; Come and hear: They<a id="k86b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; said to R. Eliezer, 'No one can live with a serpent in the same basket'.<a id="k86b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; Now if you will assume that R. Eliezer meant the imposition of a direct oath<a id="k86b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; one can well understand the argument;<a id="k86b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; but if you were to suggest [that he meant the oath to be imposed] by implication only, what [it may be objected] could this<a id="k86b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; matter to her?<a id="k86b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; She might tell him, 'Since you are so particular with me I am unable to live with you'.<a id="k86b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Come and hear:<a id="k86b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; If a man did not exempt his wife<a id="k86b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; from a vow<a id="k86b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; and from an oath<a id="k86b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; and set her up as his saleswoman or appointed her as his administratrix, he may impose upon her an oath<a id="k86b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; whenever he desires to do so. If, however, he did not set her up as his saleswoman and did not appoint her as his administratrix, he may not impose any oath upon her. R. Eliezer said: Although he did not set her up as his saleswoman and did not appoint her as his administratrix, he may nevertheless impose upon her an oath wherever he desires to do so, because there is no woman who was not administratrix for a short time, at least, during the lifetime of her husband, in respect of her spindle and her dough. Thereupon they said to him: No one can live with a serpent in the same basket. Thus you may infer that [R. Eliezer meant that the oath<a id="k86b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; may he imposed] directly. This is conclusive.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. [IF A HUSBAND] GAVE TO HIS WIFE AN UNDERTAKING IN WRITING, 'I HAVE NO CLAIM UPON YOU FOR EITHER VOW<a id="k86b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; OR OATH',<a id="k86b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; HE CANNOT IMPOSE AN OATH<a id="k86b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; UPON HER. HE MAY, HOWEVER, IMPOSE AN OATH UPON HER HEIRS<a id="k86b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; AND UPON HER LAWFUL SUCCESSORS.<a id="k86b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; [IF HE WROTE,] I HAVE NO CLAIM FOR EITHER VOW<a id="k86b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; OR OATH<a id="k86b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; EITHER UPON YOU, OR UPON YOUR HEIRS OR UPON YOUR LAWFUL SUCCESSORS', HE MAY NOT IMPOSE AN OATH EITHER UPON HER OR UPON HER HEIRS OR UPON HER LAWFUL SUCCESSORS. HIS HEIRS, HOWEVER, MAY<a id="k86b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; IMPOSE AN OATH UPON HER, UPON HER HEIRS OR UPON HER LAWFUL SUCCESSORS. [IF THE WRITTEN UNDERTAKING READ.] 'NEITHER I NOR MY HEIRS NOR MY LAWFUL SUCCESSORS<a id="k86b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; SHALL HAVE ANY CLAIM UPON YOU OR UPON YOUR HEIRS OR UPON YOUR LAWFUL SUCCESSORS FOR EITHER VOW OR OATH', NEITHER HE NOR HIS HEIRS NOR HIS LAWFUL SUCCESSORS MAY IMPOSE AN OATH EITHER UPON HER OR UPON HER HEIRS OR UPON HER LAWFUL SUCCESSORS.
</p><p>
	IF SHE<a id="k86b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; WENT FROM HER HUSBAND'S GRAVE TO HER FATHER'S HOUSE,<a id="k86b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; OR RETURNED TO HER FATHER-IN-LAW'S HOUSE BUT WAS NOT MADE ADMINISTRATRIX, THE HEIRS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO IMPOSE AN OATH UPON HER;<a id="k86b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; BUT IF SHE WAS MADE ADMINISTRATRIX THE HEIRS MAY IMPOSE AN OATH UPON HER IN RESPECT OF [HER ADMINISTRATION] DURING THE SUBSEQUENT PERIOD<a id="k86b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; BUT NOT IN RESPECT OF THE PAST.<a id="k86b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. What is the nature of the oath?<a id="k86b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Rab Judah replied in the name of Rab:
</P>


lvr: 32
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k87a_1:" It is from such an oath only that a husband exempts his wife, but not from one which a woman incurs when she impairs her <i>kethubah</i> (v. <i>infra</i>). A husband, according to this view, only exempts his wife from an obligation which is in his power to impose upon her but not from one which she has brought upon herself."
,k87a_2:" By admitting that part of it has been paid to her. A woman who makes such an admission while her husband pleads that he has paid her the full amount is not entitled to receive the balance she claims except on oath, and it is the opinion of the authority cited by R. Nahman that a husband's general exemption extends to such an oath also, much more so to that required from her as administratrix (cf. <i>supra</i> note 2)."
,k87a_3:" And while asking for exemption from this particular oath she might at the same time ask for an exemption from both oaths."
,k87a_4:" Cf. <i>supra</i> note 2."
,k87a_5:" As she cannot be assumed to divine her husband's thoughts and intentions, the desire for such a request could naturally never arise."
,k87a_6:" Rab Judah's, (<i>supra</i> 86b f)."
,k87a_7:" The case dealt with in the first clause of our Mishnah (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 549. n. i)."
,k87a_8:" I.e., you assume that R. Judah and R. Nahman refer to one and the same clause."
,k87a_9:" The final clause dealing with the oath of an administratrix."
,k87a_10:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 548, n. 11. Whereas R. Nahman refers to the first clause, Rah Judah refers to the case of an administratrix in the last clause, and so R. Mordecai's objection does not arise."
,k87a_11:" Differing from Rab Judah."
,k87a_12:" The administratrix whom her husband has exempted from oath."
,k87a_13:" This period also coming under the term of THE PAST."
,k87a_14:" On behalf of orphans."
,k87a_15:" Of one's widow or daughter."
,k87a_16:" A bequest now belonging to the orphans of the deceased."
,k87a_17:" Because in all these cases money is urgently needed and there is no time for the public announcement that must precede all sales effected on the order of a court. The urgency of the sale must inevitably lead to some undercutting of prices which the widow cannot possibly avoid (v. Git. 52b). It would consequently be an act of injustice to impose upon her an oath in respect of her administration during the period between her husband's death and burial."
,k87a_18:" Omitting the demonstrative pronoun 'these'."
,k87a_19:" V. B.B. 5b."
,k87a_20:" The ruling cited in the name of Abba Saul."
,k87a_21:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 3."
,k87a_22:" This is explained anon."
,k87a_23:" The balance she claims."
,k87a_24:" Affirming her claim."
,k87a_25:" In full (v. <i>infra</i>)."
,k87a_26:" Mortgaged or sold."
,k87a_27:" Lit., 'and not in his presence', i.e., if a husband who was abroad sent a divorce to his wife and she claims her <i>kethubah</i> in his absence."
,k87a_28:" Which is imposed upon her by the court even if the respective defendants mentioned do not demand it."
,k87a_29:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k87a_30:" Lit., 'how'."
,k87a_31:" Lit., 'how'."
,k87a_32:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 552, n. 6. "
}

txt:
<p>
[It is one that is incumbent] upon a woman who during the lifetime of her husband was made administratrix [of his affairs].<a id="k87a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Nahman replied in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha: [It is one that is incumbent] upon a woman who impairs her <i>kethubah</i>.<a id="k87a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Mordecai went to R. Ashi and submitted to him this argument: One can well imagine [the origin of the exemption], according to him who holds [that the oath is one incumbent] upon a woman who impairs her <i>kethubah</i> [by assuming that] it occurred to the woman that she might sometime be in need of money and would draw it from her <i>kethubah</i> and would, therefore, tell her husband, 'Give me an undertaking in writing that you will impose no oath upon me'.<a id="k87a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; According to him, however, who holds [that the oath is one incumbent] upon a woman who during the lifetime of her husband was made administratrix [of his affairs],<a id="k87a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; did she know [it may be objected] that he would set her up as administratrix that she should say to him, 'Give me a written undertaking that you will impose no oath upon me'?<a id="k87a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; The other replied: You taught this statement<a id="k87a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; in connection with that clause;<a id="k87a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; we teach it<a id="k87a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; in connection with this:<a id="k87a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; IF SHE WENT FROM HER HUSBAND'S GRAVE TO HER FATHER'S HOUSE, OR RETURNED TO HER FATHER-IN-LAW'S HOUSE BUT WAS NOT MADE ADMINISTRATRIX, THE HEIRS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO IMPOSE AN OATH UPON HER, BUT IF SHE WAS MADE ADMINISTRATRIX THE HEIRS MAY IMPOSE AN OATH UPON HER IN RESPECT OF [HER ADMINISTRATION] DURING THE SUBSEQUENT PERIOD BUT NOT IN CONNECTION WITH THE PAST, [and, in reply to the question as to] what exactly was meant by THE PAST, Rab Judah stated in the name of Rab: [The period] during the lifetime of her husband for which she was made administratrix [of his affairs], but in respect of [the period intervening] between death and burial an oath may be imposed upon her.<a id="k87a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Mattena, however,<a id="k87a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; maintained that no oath may be imposed upon her<a id="k87a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; even in respect of [the period between] death and burial;<a id="k87a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; for the Nehardeans laid down: For poll-tax,<a id="k87a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; maintenance<a id="k87a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; and funeral expenses. an estate<a id="k87a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; is sold without public announcement.<a id="k87a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Said Rabbah in the name of R. Hiyya: [If in giving exemption to his wife a husband wrote,] 'Neither vow nor oath' it is only he who cannot impose an oath upon her, but his heirs may impose an oath upon her. [If he wrote, however,] 'Free from vow, free from oath', neither he nor his heirs may exact an oath from her, [since by this expression] he meant to say to her: 'Be free from the obligation of an oath'.
</p><p>
	R. Joseph. however, stated in the name of R. Hiyya: [If in giving exemption to his wife a husband writes,] 'Neither vow nor oath' it is only he who cannot impose an oath upon her but his heirs may; [but if he wrote,] 'Free from vow, free from oath', both he and his heirs may exact an oath from her [since by such an expression] he thus meant to say to her: 'Clear yourself by means of an oath'.
</p><p>
	R. Zakkai sent to Mar 'Ukba the following message: Whether [the husband wrote,] 'Neither oath' or 'Free from oath', or whether [he wrote.] 'Neither vow', or 'Free from vow', [and he used the expression] 'In respect of my estates',<a id="k87a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; he cannot impose an oath upon her, but his heirs may. [If he wrote, however,] 'In respect of these estates', neither he nor his heirs may exact an oath from her.
</p><p>
	R. Nahman stated in the name of Samuel in the name of Abba Saul the son of Imma Miriam: Whether [the husband wrote,] 'Neither oath' or 'Free from oath'' whether [he wrote,] 'Neither vow' or 'Free from vow, or whether [he used the expression,] 'In respect of my<a id="k87a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; estates' or 'In respect of these estates', neither he nor his heirs may exact an oath from her; but what can I do in view of a ruling of the Sages that anyone who comes to exact payment out of the property of orphans is not to be paid unless he first takes an oath.<a id="k87a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Others read this<a id="k87a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; as a Baraitha: Abba Saul the son of Imma Miriam stated; Whether [the husband wrote.] 'Neither oath' or 'Free from oath', whether [he wrote,] 'Neither vow' or 'Free from vow, or whether [he used the expression,] 'In respect of my<a id="k87a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; estates, or 'In respect of these estates'. neither he nor his heirs may impose, an oath upon her; but what can I do in view of a ruling of the Sages that anyone who comes to exact payment out of the property of orphans need not be paid unless he first takes an oath. [It was in connection with this Baraitha<a id="k87a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; that] R. Nahman said in the name of Samuel: The <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with the ruling of the son of Imma Miriam.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. A WOMAN WHO IMPAIRS<a id="k87a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; HER <I>KETHUBAH</I> IS NOT PAID<a id="k87a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; UNLESS SHE FIRST TAKES AN OATH.<a id="k87a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; IF ONE WITNESS TESTIFIES AGAINST HER THAT [HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>] HAS BEEN PAID,<a id="k87a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; SHE IS NOT BE PAID UNLESS SHE FIRST TAKES THE OATH. FROM THE PROPERTY OF ORPHANS, FROM ASSIGNED PROPERTY<a id="k87a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; AND [FROM THE PROPERTY OF] AN ABSENT HUSBAND<a id="k87a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; SHE MAY NOT RECOVER [THE PAYMENT OF HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>] UNLESS SHE FIRST TAKES AN OATH.<a id="k87a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>
</p><p>
	HOW [ARE WE TO UNDERSTAND THE STATEMENT,] 'A WOMAN WHO IMPAIRS HER KETHUBAH'? IF HER <I>KETHUBAH</I> WAS FOR A THOUSAND <I>ZUZ</I><a id="k87a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; AND [HER HUSBAND] SAID TO HER, 'YOU HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED [THE FULL AMOUNT OF] YOUR KETHUBAH', AND SHE SAYS, 'I RECEIVED ONLY A MANEH',<a id="k87a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; SHE IS NOT PAID [THE BALANCE] UNLESS SHE TAKES AN OATH. WHAT IS MEANT BY<a id="k87a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; 'IF ONE WITNESS TESTIFIES AGAINST HER THAT [HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>] HAS BEEN PAID'? IF HER <I>KETHUBAH</I> WAS FOR A THOUSAND <I>ZUZ</I><a id="k87a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; AND WHEN [HER HUSBAND] SAID TO HER, 'YOU HAVE RECEIVED [THE FULL AMOUNT OF] YOUR KETHUBAH', SHE REPLIED, 'I HAVE NOT RECEIVED IT WHILE ONE WITNESS TESTIFIES AGAINST HER THAT [THE <I>KETHUBAH</I>] HAS BEEN PAID<a id="k87a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; SHE IS NOT PAID UNLESS SHE FIRST TAKES AN OATH. WHAT IS MEANT BY THE EXPRESSION,<a id="k87a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; 'FROM ASSIGNED PROPERTY'? IF [HER HUSBAND] HAD SOLD HIS PROPERTY TO OTHERS AND SHE SEEKS TO RECOVER PAYMENT FROM THE BUYERS, SHE IS NOT PAID UNLESS SHE FIRST TAKES AN OATH. WHAT IS THE EXPLANATION OF THE EXPRESSION,<a id="k87a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; FROM THE PROPERTY OF ORPHANS'? IF [HER HUSBAND] DIED AND LEFT HIS ESTATE TO HIS ORPHANS AND SHE SEEKS TO RECOVER PAYMENT FROM THE ORPHANS, SHE IS NOT PAID UNLESS SHE FIRST TAKES AN OATH. WHAT IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD BY<a id="k87a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; 'AN ABSENT HUSBAND'? IF HER HUSBAND WENT TO A COUNTRY BEYOND THE SEA AND SHE SEEKS TO RECOVER PAYMENT IN HIS ABSENCE,<a id="k87a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; SHE IS NOT PAID UNLESS SHE FIRST TAKES AN OATH.
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 32
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k87b_1:" Lit., 'all the time'."
,k87b_2:" The Gemara <i>infra</i> explains what R. Simeon refers to."
,k87b_3:" Which A WOMAN WHO IMPAIRS HER <I>KETHUBAH</I> must take."
,k87b_4:" On the difference between a Rabbinical oath and one imposed by the Torah v. Shebu. 41a."
,k87b_5:" [Read with MS.M.: for she claims of him two hundred (<i>zuz</i>) and he admits to her one hundred, so that he is admitting part of the claim]."
,k87b_6:" Pentateuchally."
,k87b_7:" That he has repaid the difference. The woman, having admitted receipt of a part of her <i>kethubah</i>, must consequently be in a similar position."
,k87b_8:" I.e., it is the defendant, not the claimant, who takes the oath."
,k87b_9:" The woman who impaired her <i>kethubah</i> and claims the balance."
,k87b_10:" As is a <i>kethubah</i>."
,k87b_11:" V. Shebu. 42b, B.M. 57b."
,k87b_12:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 553, n. 11."
,k87b_13:" As he did in the case of the first payment. The woman would consequently be entitled to payment without taking the oath."
,k87b_14:" And since the man was not particular to secure witnesses on the first occasion, he might have been equally indifferent on the second occasion, and the woman would consequently have to take an oath."
,k87b_15:" V. Mishnah Shebu. 44b."
,k87b_16:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 553, n. 10."
,k87b_17:" Who swears that he has not received his wages."
,k87b_18:" Witnesses testifying that they saw the robber emerging from that person's house carrying an object which they could not identify."
,k87b_19:" The evidence shewing that the wound had been inflicted while the two men were alone in a particular spot, though no third party had witnessed the actual wounding."
,k87b_20:" I.e., if the defendant is known to have once before sworn falsely."
,k87b_21:" Who was given an order by an employer to supply a certain amount of goods to his workmen on account of their wages."
,k87b_22:" If the book shews that the goods had been duly supplied and the workmen deny receiving them, the shopkeeper, like the workmen, is ordered to take an oath (the former that he supplied the goods and the latter that they had Dot received them) and both receive payment from the employer."
,k87b_23:" [Add with MS.M. 'and she who impairs her <i>kethubah</i> without witnesses']. These last two mentioned cases are not found in the Mishnah (v. <i>supra</i> n. 11 ad fin.) and their source is a Baraitha (cf. Tosaf. s.v. [H] a.l.)."
,k87b_24:" Lit., 'yes'."
,k87b_25:" Must the claimant take the oath."
,k87b_26:" The woman, in the case under discussion, would consequently be entitled to collect the balance she claims without taking an oath."
,k87b_27:" Lit., 'he implied (the formula).”It is not required” (to say etc.)'."
,k87b_28:" Lit., it is not required (to say that)'."
,k87b_29:" In such a case a person is not expected to take an oath that he had returned all that he had found. His honesty is taken for granted in view of the fact that a dishonest man would have kept the object entirely to himself. Similarly with the impaired <i>kethubah</i>. Had the woman been dishonest she need not have admitted the receipt of an instalment at all and could have collected the full amount of her <i>kethubah</i> by virtue of the written document she possesses."
,k87b_30:" Lit., 'less less'."
,k87b_31:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k87b_32:" By including even small and insignificant payments."
,k87b_33:" And should, therefore, be exempt from an oath in respect of the balance."
,k87b_34:" In mentioning insignificant payments."
,k87b_35:" She mentioned the small sums in order to give the impression of being a careful and scrupulous person while in fact the instalment or instalment she received were substantial sums. Consequently an oath should be imposed upon her."
,k87b_36:" Teku, v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k87b_37:" And she claims that amount; while her husband states that he had paid her all her <i>kethubah</i>."
,k87b_38:" The husband asserting that he paid the full amount and she admitting the receipt of a part of it. In such a case an oath may justly be imposed upon the woman."
,k87b_39:" Since according to her statement the <i>kethubah</i> never amounted to more than the sum she now claims."
,k87b_40:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k87b_41:" The amount entered in the document."
,k87b_42:" While the document contains a larger sum."
,k87b_43:" This solves the problem."
,k87b_44:" The <i>kethubah</i> she holds."
,k87b_45:" Sc. of no legal value, since she herself admits that the amount it records is fictitious."
,k87b_46:" They agreed, she states, that she would claim the smaller sum only despite the entry in the <i>kethubah</i> which shewed a larger one. This verbal agreement does not in any way affect the validity of the <i>kethubah</i> which, having been written and signed in a proper manner and attested by qualified witnesses, is a valid document on the strength of which a legal claim may well be founded; cf. <i>supra</i> 19b."
,k87b_47:" Deut. XIX. 15."
,k87b_48:" As two witnesses would have caused the woman to lose her <i>kethubah</i> entirely, one witness may rightly cause an oath to be imposed upon her. V. Shebu. 40a."
,k87b_49:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 553, n. 10ff. "
}</sc

txt:
<p>
R. SIMEON RULED: WHENEVER<a id="k87b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; SHE<a id="k87b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; CLAIMS HER <I>KETHUBAH</I> THE HEIRS MAY IMPOSE AN OATH UPON HER BUT WHERE SHE DOES NOT CLAIM HER <I>KETHUBAH</I> THE HEIRS CAN NOT IMPOSE AN OATH UPON HER.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. Rami b. Hama wished to assume that the OATH<a id="k87b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; was Pentateuchal,<a id="k87b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; since [it is a case where] one [of two persons] claims two hundred [<i>zuz</i>] and the other admits one hundred [the defence] being an admission of a part of the claim,<a id="k87b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; and whoever admits part of a claim must<a id="k87b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; take an oath.<a id="k87b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; Said Raba: There are two objections to this assumption: In the first place, all who take an oath in accordance with Pentateuchal law take the oath and do not pay,<a id="k87b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; while she<a id="k87b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; takes the oath and receives payment. And, secondly, no oath may be imposed<a id="k87b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; in respect of the denial of [a claim that is] secured<a id="k87b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; on landed property.<a id="k87b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; [The fact,] however, is, said Raba, [that the oath is only] Rabbinical. As it is the person who pays that is careful to remember the details while he who receives payment is not, the Rabbis have imposed an oath upon her<a id="k87b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; that she might be careful to recollect the details.
</p><p>
	The question was raised; What if a woman impaired her <i>kethubah</i> by [admitting that she received part payment in the presence of] witnesses? [Is it assumed that] were [her husband] to pay her [the balance] he would do it in the presence of witnesses,<a id="k87b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; or [is it rather assumed that] it was a mere coincidence [that witnesses were present when the first payment was made]?<a id="k87b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Come and hear;<a id="k87b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; All who take an oath in accordance with Pentateuchal law, take the oath and do not pay,<a id="k87b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; but the following take an oath and receive payment; A hired labourer,<a id="k87b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; a man who was robbed<a id="k87b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; or wounded,<a id="k87b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; [any claimant] whose opponent is suspected of [taking a false] oath<a id="k87b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; and a shopkeeper<a id="k87b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; with his [accounts] book,<a id="k87b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; and also [a creditor] who impaired his bond [the first instalment of which had been paid] in the absence of witnesses.<a id="k87b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; Thus only<a id="k87b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; [where the first instalment was paid] 'in the absence of witnesses'<a id="k87b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; but not where it was paid in the presence of witnesses!<a id="k87b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; This is a case of 'there is no question&nbsp;&hellip;'<a id="k87b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; There is no question<a id="k87b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; that [when the first instalment was paid] in the presence of witnesses she must take an oath; when, however, [it was paid] in the absence of witnesses, it might be assumed that she has [the same privilege] as one who restores a lost object [to its owner]<a id="k87b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; and should, therefore, receive payment without taking an oath. It was, therefore, taught [that the oath is nevertheless not to be dispensed with].
</p><p>
	The question was raised: What if a woman impaired her <i>kethubah</i> [by including in the amount she admitted] sums amounting to<a id="k87b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; less than the value of a <i>perutah</i>?<a id="k87b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; Is it assumed that since she<a id="k87b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; is so careful in her statements she must be speaking the truth<a id="k87b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; or is it possible that she<a id="k87b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; is merely acting cunningly?<a id="k87b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; This remains unsolved.<a id="k87b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>
</p><p>
	The question was raised: What if a woman declares her [original] <i>kethubah</i> to have been less [than the amount recorded in the written document]?<a id="k87b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; Is it assumed that such a woman is in the same position as the woman who impaired [her <i>kethubah</i>] or is it possible [that the two cases are unlike, since] the woman who impairs [her <i>kethubah</i>] admits a part [of the sum involved]<a id="k87b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; while this one does not admit a part [of the sum involved]?<a id="k87b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Come and hear: A woman who declares that her [original] <i>kethubah</i> was less [than the amount recorded in the document] receives payment without an oath. How [is this to be understood]? If her <i>kethubah</i> was for a thousand <i>zuz</i><a id="k87b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; and when her husband said to her, 'You have already received your <i>kethubah</i>,'<a id="k87b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; she replies. 'I have not received it,<a id="k87b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; but [the original <i>kethubah</i>] was only for one <i>maneh</i>,'<a id="k87b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; she is to receive payment without an oath.<a id="k87b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Wherewith, however, does she collect [the amount she claims]? Obviously with that document.<a id="k87b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; But is not that document a mere potsherd?<a id="k87b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Raba the son of Rabbah replied: [This is a case] where she states, 'There was an arrangement of mutual trust between me and him'.<a id="k87b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>
</p><p>
	IF ONE WITNESS TESTIFIES AGAINST HER THAT [HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>] HAS BEEN PAID [etc.]. Rami b. Hama wished to assume that the OATH was Pentateuchal, for it is written In Scripture, One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for any sin;<a id="k87b_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; it is only for ally iniquity or for any sin that he may not rise up, but he may rise up [to cause the imposition upon one of the obligation] of an oath. And, furthermore, a Master has laid down: In all cases where two witnesses render a man liable to pay money, one witness renders him liable to take an oath.<a id="k87b_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; Said Raba: There are two objections to this assumption. In the first place, all who take an oath in accordance with Pentateuchal law, do so and do not pay,<a id="k87b_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; while she takes an oath and receives payment; and, secondly, no oath may be imposed in respect of the denial of [a claim that is] secured on landed property. [The fact], however, is, said Raba [that the oath is only] Rabbinical, [having been enacted] to appease the mind of the husband.
</p><p>
	R. Papa said:
</P>


