# dafyomi

lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Is it normal to wear a shoe on top of a shoe? 
          (Tosfos - the Gemara often asks about unusual things. We 
          ask because Chalitzah requires a shoe worn normally.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Yes! Rav Yehudah walked in the market wearing 
          five pairs of cloth (felt) shoes.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> (Even) if a Yevamah grew up among the 
          Yevamim, she may do Yibum. We are not concerned lest she 
          took off the sandal of one of them
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Inference:</font></b> If we knew that she took off his sandal, we 
          would be concerned!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Beraisa):</font></b> Whether he intended for Chalitzah, 
          but she didn't; or if she intended for Chalitzah, but he 
          didn't - the Chalitzah is invalid until both have 
          intention.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> Rather, Rav Yehudah taught that even if we saw 
          that she took off his sandal, we are not concerned lest 
          they had intention.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> Indeed, if she took off a Yavam's sandal, we 
          are concerned!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The Beraisa teaches that Chalitzah without intent 
               does not permit her l'Shuk, but she is forbidden to 
               do Yibum.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>FROM WHAT MUST THE SHOE BE MADE?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> A sandal stitched with linen may not be 
          used for Chalitzah - 'I gave you shoes of Tachash'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, we should say that only Tachash may be 
          used!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The verse of Chalitzah says 'shoe' twice, to 
          include (leather of other animals).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, we should allow all materials!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> If so, what would we learn from the verse 'Shoes 
          of Tachash'?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (R. Elazar):</font></b> If a shoe is of leather and the 
          straps are of goats' hair, may it be used?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav):</font></b> Yes, this is like Tachash.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, even if the entire shoe is of hair, it 
          should be permitted!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> That is called Karka (like a Min'al - it is not 
          called a shoe).
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>5) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE MEANING OF 'CHALITZAH'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rav Kahana):</font></b> How do we know that 'Choltzah' 
          means that she removes?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Shmuel):</font></b> 'V'Choltzu (they will remove) the stones 
          in which there is a plague'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Perhaps it means to invigorate (i.e. put on the 
          shoe), like 'Hechaltzu (prepare) from yourselves men for 
          the army'!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> There also, it means to remove (men from their 
          houses to go to fight).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> It says 'Yechaletz (he will support) a poor 
          person in his poverty'!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> There also, his reward for bearing poverty will 
          be removal of punishments in Gehenom'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> It says 'Hashem's angel camps by those who fear 
          Him va'Ychaltzem (and will save them)'!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> A reward for fearing Hash-m will be exemption 
          from punishment in Gehenom.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> It says 'And your bones Yachalitz';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Elazar):</font></b> This is the greatest of the blessings.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rava):</font></b> This is strengthening of the bones.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Indeed, the word can mean to strengthen or to 
          remove. Regarding Chalitzah, had it meant strengthening 
          (putting on) it would have said 'On his foot'. (Note: It 
          seems that this is another answer for questions (e) and 
<br>      <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> Had it said 'On his foot', one might have 
          thought that it must be done on the foot, but not the 
          shin. 'Me'Al Raglo' teaches that the shin is also 
          acceptable!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Had it meant that she puts on his shoe, it would 
          have said 'b'me'Al' (to include the shin). 'Me'Al' 
          teaches that she removes the shoe.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  A heretic:</font></b> Hash-m cast off your nation - '... Cholatz 
          from them'!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  R. Gamliel:</font></b> Fool! It doesn't say 'Cholatz Lahem' (cast 
          them off), rather, 'Cholatz Mehem';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If a Yavam took a shoe off the Yevamah, this does 
               nothing!
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>6) </font></b><font color='blue'>'CHALITZAH' WITH AN 'ANPILYA'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> Chalitzah with an Anpilya (slipper or sock) is 
          invalid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Inference:</font></b> An Anpilya is not a Min'al.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (Mishnah):</font></b> One who comes to take Terumas 
          ha'Lishkah (Shekalim to buy Korbanos Tzibur) does not 
          enter the room wearing a cloak with a hem (lest people 
          suspect that he hid Shekalim for himself in the hem) nor 
          with Anpilya. We need not forbid with a Min'al or sandal, 
          since no one may enter the Mikdash wearing a Min'al or 
          sandal.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Contradiction (Beraisa):</font></b> A Min'al, sandal and Anpilya all 
          have the same law (on Yom Kipur). One may not walk in 
          them from house to house, nor from bed to bed.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Abaye):</font></b> The Anpilya in the Beraisa has soft 
          wads in it, and is forbidden because it is pleasurable.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Rava):</font></b> If it is not a Min'al, it is not 
          forbidden on Yom Kipur just because it is pleasurable!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Rabah bar Rav Huna went out with a turban wrapped on 
               his leg!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rava):</font></b> A cloth Anpilya is not like a shoe; a 
          leather Anpilya is.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support:</font></b> If we will not say so, there is a contradiction 
          between Beraisos about Yom Kipur!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> A person may not walk in Kordakisin 
               (undershoes worn to protect from water) in his 
               house, but he may walk in Anpilin in his house.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> We must say that cloth Anpilin are permitted and 
               leather Anpilin are forbidden.
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHICH SHOES ARE VALID FOR 'CHALITZAH'?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (for Rava - Beraisa):</font></b> In the following cases 
          Chalitzah is valid:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The shoe was a torn Min'al that covers most of the 
               foot, an incomplete sandal which holds most of the 
               foot, a sandal of rubber or bark, a false foot (in 
               which the leg rests), in a felt shoe, a carpet for 
               the legs of an amputee (his ligaments constricted
	       and he cannot straighten his legs; he propels
	       himself with his hands and drags his legs), or a
	       leather Anpilya;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> The Yavam is an adult;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> The Yavam was standing, sitting or leaning;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> The Yavam is blind.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b></b> In the following cases Chalitzah is invalid:
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  The shoe was a torn Min'al that does not cover 
                    most of the foot, an incomplete sandal that 
                    does not hold most of the foot, a carpet for an 
                    amputee's feet, or a cloth Anpilya;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> The Yavam is a minor.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> This Tana holds that a false foot is like a 
          shoe. Who is the Tana?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> It is R. Meir:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah - R. Meir):</font></b> A person with a false foot may 
               walk outside with it (on Shabbos);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Yosi forbids.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> The Beraisa invalidates Chalitzah with a cloth 
          Anpilya. This is like Chachamim (who argue with R. Meir, 
          and require leather)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Abaye):</font></b> Since the Seifa is Chachamim, also the 
          Reisha is. The case is, the false foot is covered with 
          leather.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Rava):</font></b> This implies that if it is not covered 
          with leather, it is invalid. If so, why does the Seifa 
          invalidate a cloth Anpilya? It should distinguish between 
          different kinds of false feet!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> It should say that a false foot is valid only if it 
               is covered with leather!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rava):</font></b> Rather, since the Reisha is R. Meir, 
          also the Seifa is. A false foot protects; a cloth Anpilya 
          does not protect.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Ameimar):</font></b> The Yavam must press his foot on the ground.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rav Ashi - Beraisa):</font></b> Chalitzah is valid whether 
          he stands, sits or leans.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Ameimar):</font></b> In all three cases, he presses his foot 
          down.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Ameimar):</font></b> If one's foot is reversed (his leg rests on 
          the front of his foot), he may not do Chalitzah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rav Ashi - Beraisa):</font></b> Chalitzah with a carpet 
          for an amputee's feet is valid.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> The amputee himself does Chalitzah 
               (even though his legs are bent)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> No, a healthy person may use the carpet for 
          Chalitzah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rav Ashi:</font></b> According to Ameimar, Bar Uva and Bar Kifuf 
          (men whose feet were reversed) may not do Chalitzah.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>ON WHICH PART OF THE LEG IS 'CHALITZAH' DONE?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> From the knee and below (the Chalitzah is 
          valid).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Contradiction (Beraisa):</font></b> 'Regalim' excludes one with a 
          false foot (from the obligation to enter the Mikdash on 
          festivals. This shows that the thigh is not called 
          'Regel'!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The leg is valid for Chalitzah, since the Torah 
          said 'me'Al (from above) his foot'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, even above the knee should be valid!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> It says 'me'Al', not 'me'Al of me'Al'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Papa):</font></b> This teaches that there is no bone below the 
          ankle. If there was, the ankle would be called 'me'Al', 
          and the entire leg would be 'me'Al of me'Al'!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection (Rav Ashi):</font></b> Even if there is a bone underneath, 
          whatever is even with the foot is considered part of the 
          foot.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> Above the knee (is Pasul).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rav Kahana):</font></b> 'And the fetal sac that comes out 
          from between Ragleha' (shows that 'Regel' extends above 
          the knee)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Abaye):</font></b> A woman puts her heels by her thighs when 
          giving birth.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> 'Lo Osah Raglav (he did not remove the hair by 
          the Ervah)'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> This is a euphemism (to avoid explicit mention of 
          the area. Normally, Regel does not include above the 
          knee.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> 'Va'Yavo Sha'ul Lehasech Es Raglav (to 
          defecate)'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> This is a euphemism.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> 'Ach Mesich Hu Raglav...'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> This is a euphemism.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE GOOD OF 'RESHA'IM' IS EVIL</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Yochanan):</font></b> Sisera had Bi'ah seven times - 'Between 
          Ragleha he crouched, he fell, he lied; between Ragleha he 
          crouched, he fell; where he crouched, he fell and was 
          killed.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Ya'el benefited from Bi'as Isur (why is she 
          blessed 'mi'Nashim ba'Ohel', i.e. the Imahos?)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (R. Yochanan):</font></b> The good that wicked do is bad for 
          Tzadikim. We learn from 'Beware, do not speak to Yakov 
          good nor evil';
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) RECEIVING BENEFIT FROM AN EVILDOER</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara teaches that Yael had relations with Sisera in order to make him weary. The Gemara asks on what grounds did she permit herself to derive pleasure from a transgression? The Gemara answers that a Tzadik abhors any benefit or pleasure he receives from a Rasha. The Gemara cites proof from the verse in which Hash-m warned Lavan not to speak to Yakov 'neither good nor bad' (Bereishis 31:24). It is clear why Hash-m warned Lavan not to say anything <i>bad</i> to Yakov, but why did He warn Lavan not to say anything <i>good</i> to Yakov? This verse proves that even the good words of a Rasha are considered bad to the Tzadikim.
</p><p>
The Gemara proceeds to ask what 'bad' would Yakov have endured had Lavan spoken good things to him. The Gemara answers that perhaps Lavan would have uttered the name of an Avodah Zarah while speaking to Yakov.
</p><p>
The Gemara asks what 'bad' was in the pleasure of the act that Yael did with Sisera? The Gemara answers that 'he infused her with Zuhama' (a form of spiritual contamination).
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> explains that the reason why any good of a Rasha is bad for a Tzadik is that the Tzadik despises the Rasha, and thus the Tzadik's sensitivities are disgusted by any benefit he receives from a Rasha. Therefore, the benefit is not at all pleasurable to him.
</p><p>
Rashi's comment is problematic. The Gemara itself gives entirely different reasons for why any good words of Lavan would have been bad for Yakov, and why the pleasure of the Yael's act with Sisera was abhorrent to her. The Gemara does not say, as Rashi explains, that Lavan's good words, and the pleasure from the act with Sisera, were detested by Yakov and Yael respectively, because Tzadikim despise Resha'im. Why does Rashi give a reason which the Gemara does not mention? (<b>CHESHEK SHLOMO</b>)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER: RASHI</b> is bothered by the wording of the Gemara. Rebbi Yochanan says that 'all of the good from the Resha'im is bad for the Tzadikim.' His statement is clearly a general rule which does not refer to any specific case. What reason explains why, in <i>every</i> situation of a benefit provided by a Rasha for a Tzadik, the benefit is considered bad for the Tzadik? If, as the Gemara says, it is because the Rasha might mention the name of an Avodah Zarah, or the Rasha might infuse the Tzadik with 'Zuhama,' those reasons are limited and do not apply in many situations, such as when a Rasha gives a present to a Tzadik without talking to him and without having any other interaction with him. Why should the good of a Rasha be bad for the Tzadik in <i>all</i> situations?
</p><p>
It must be that there is a general reason behind this principle. This reason is the one which Rashi gives -- Tzadikim are so disgusted by Resha'im that any good they receive from Resha'im is abhorrent to them. (See also <b>IYUN YAKOV</b>.)
</p><p>
However, according to this explanation, why does the Gemara itself ask what the bad was in the cases of Lavan and Sisera? Rashi's explanation makes it obvious why Yakov did not want to receive any good from Lavan, and why any pleasure derived from Sisera was not pleasurable to Yael.
</p><p>
The answer is that Rashi's logic explains only why the Tzadik does not experience <i>pleasure</i> from any benefit received from a Rasha. It does not explain why the Tzadik experiences <i>pain</i> from the benefit. As Rashi writes, since the Tzadik abhors any benefit from a Rasha, 'Lav Hana'ah Hi' -- it is not considered pleasure.
</p><p>
The Gemara asks why Hash-m commanded Lavan not to speak even good to Yakov. If Yakov simply would derive no pleasure from the good that Lavan would speak to him, why did Hash-m warn Lavan not to speak good? What <i>harm</i> would Yakov experience as a result of Lavan's good words? The Gemara answers that Lavan might mention the name of an Avodah Zarah and thereby pain the Tzadik by causing him to hear the name of an Avodah Zarah.
</p><p>
In the case of Yael, however, why does the Gemara ask what pain Yael experienced from the act with Sisera? Perhaps Yael suffered no pain; she merely did not derive pleasure from the act.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (103a, DH v'Ha) explains that when the Gemara asks on what grounds did Yael permit herself to derive pleasure from a transgression, its question is based on the Gemara in Nazir (23b) which lists Yael's act as the prototypical example of a 'transgression performed Lishmah.' The Gemara here asks that if Yael derived benefit and enjoyed the act, it was not an act of transgression performed 'Lishmah.'
</p><p>
 Consequently, when the Gemara answers that Sisera infused her with 'Zuhama,' the Gemara means that had Yael merely derived no pleasure from the act with Sisera, the act would not have been considered one done Lishmah. Her act would have been no more Lishmah than any other act done for a positive purpose. What made it Lishmah was that not only did she not derive pleasure, but she even <i>suffered</i> from the act for the sake of saving the Jewish people. The Gemara asks in what way did she suffer, and it answers that she suffered from the 'Zuhama' of the Rasha.
</p><p>
However, a different question remains. If Lavan's good words would have been painful to Yakov because he might have uttered the name of an Avodah Zarah, how can the Gemara prove from there that <i>all</i> benefits of Resha'im are bad for Tzadikim? Perhaps only benefits such as Lavan's 'good' words are bad for Tzadikim, because the Rasha might mention the name of an Avodah Zarah.
</p><p>
The answer is that if Yakov Avinu would have enjoyed a benefit that Lavan gave to him even though Lavan might have also mentioned the name of an Avodah Zarah, perhaps that benefit would have offset the detriment of hearing the name of an Avodah Zarah. However, if that would have been the case, Hash-m would not have commanded Lavan not to do or say anything good to Yakov. It must be that since Yakov Avinu would <i>only</i> be hurt by any benefit from Lavan, Hash-m warned Lavan not to speak 'good or bad' to Yakov. Accordingly, the Gemara proves from there that the Tzadik is disgusted by any benefit given to him by a Rasha. (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>


<font><b>2) HASHEM'S WARNING TO LAVAN</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara explains that Hash-m warned Lavan not to speak to Yakov 'either good or bad' (Bereishis 31:24) so that Yakov would not hear the name of an Avodah Zarah that Lavan might utter. (Similarly, <b>RASHI</b> in Horayos (10b) explains that Hash-m commanded Lavan not to speak at all to Yakov, 'either good or bad,' so that Yakov would not hear Lavan <i>swear</i> in the name of an Avodah Zarah.) <b>RASHI</b> gives an example of a statement spoken by Lavan in which he uttered the name of an Avodah Zarah: When Lavan accused Yakov of stealing his Terafim he said, 'Why did you steal my gods?' (Bereishis 21:20), referring to his Avodah Zarah. 
</p><p>
The <b>MAHARSHA</b> in Horayos asks that it does not seem reasonable that Hash-m commanded Lavan not to say the name of an Avodah Zarah. The Torah relates that Lavan was careful not to transgress Hashem's command; Lavan himself admitted that it was only because of Hashem's command to him that he did not harm Yakov (Bereishis 31:29). If, however, Lavan obeyed Hashem's command, why does the Gemara assert that Hash-m warned him not to say the name of an Avodah Zarah? The fact that Lavan <i>did</i> utter the name of an Avodah Zarah indicates that this was not what Hash-m commanded him not to do! He would <i>not</i> have uttered the name of an Avodah Zarah had Hash-m commanded him not to do so (since he obeyed Hashem's commands). (The same question may be asked according to Rashi in Horayos. The fact that Lavan <i>did</i> swear in the name of an Avodah Zarah, saying, 'May the... god of Nachor judge between us...' (Bereishis 31:53; see Rashi there), indicates that swearing in the name of an Avodah Zarah was not what Hash-m warned him against doing.)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>RAV YAKOV EMDEN</b> (in <b>HAGAHOS HA'YA'AVETZ</b>) explains that when Rashi says that Lavan said, 'Why did you steal my gods,' Rashi's intention is merely to demonstrate that Lavan was accustomed to mentioning the name of Avodah Zarah. However, this particular mention of Avodah Zarah was not 'good' or 'bad,' and thus Lavan did not transgress the command of Hash-m not to speak in this manner to Yakov Avinu.
</p><p>
This answer is difficult to understand. This statement of Lavan clearly <i>was</i> 'bad,' for he was accusing Yakov Avinu of stealing his gods. 
</p><p>
(b) The <b>ARUCH LA'NER</b> explains that the Maharsha's question on Rashi in Horayos is unfounded. Lavan did nothing wrong by swearing in the name of 'the god of Nachor,' because he did not swear <i>only</i> in the name of that god, but he also mentioned the name of Hash-m ('May the G-d of Avraham and the god of Nachor judge between us...'). <b>TOSFOS</b> in a number of places (see Bechoros 2b) writes that a Nochri is prohibited only from taking an oath in the name of Avodah Zarah alone. He is not prohibited from swearing in the name of Hash-m together with the name of an Avodah Zarah. Since Lavan mentioned the name of Hash-m with the name of his Avodah Zarah, he transgressed no command of Hash-m.
</p><p>
The Aruch la'Ner explains that when Rashi here writes that Lavan said, 'Why did you steal my gods,' he does not mean that Lavan uttered the name of an Avodah Zarah in his statement. Rather, Rashi means that Lavan was commanded not to <i>swear</i> in the name of Avodah Zarah (as Rashi in Horayos explains). Why, though, was Hash-m concerned that Lavan would do such a thing? What indication is there that Lavan served Avodah Zarah, or that he deified his Terafim as gods? Perhaps he considered them as mere symbolic figureheads. Rashi answers this question by quoting Lavan's statement, 'Why did you steal my gods,' to show that Lavan actually considered them gods, and therefore there was cause for concern that he might swear in the name of Avodah Zarah. 
</p><p>
(c) Another approach may be suggested as follows. Lavan apparently deluded himself into misconstruing Hashem's command to him. This is evident from a simple reading of the verses. Hash-m told Lavan, 'Do not <i>speak</i> to Yakov, either good or bad' (Bereishis 31:24). When Lavan justified his actions to Yakov he said, 'I have the power <i>to harm you</i>, but Hash-m told me last night, 'Be careful not to speak with Yakov good or bad'' (Bereishis 31:29). Lavan obviously convinced himself that when Hash-m told him not to 'speak' to Yakov good or bad, Hash-m meant that he should not 'speak <i>to do</i>' to Yakov good or bad (that is, he should not to threaten Yakov with physical harm or bribe him with financial gain). That is why Lavan was careful not to threaten to harm Yakov. However, he did <i>not</i> refrain from <i>speaking</i> good or bad to Yakov (as he accused him of stealing and other wrongs), and in that regard he did not fulfill the command of Hash-m.
</p><p>
The Gemara explains that Hashem's command was to be taken at face value: that Lavan was not to <i>speak</i> good or bad to Yakov. Lavan did not heed that part of the command. In his wickedness, he took the command of Hash-m out of its literal meaning and permitted himself to speak harshly to Yakov, and refrained merely from threatening to do harm to Yakov. (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>


<font><b>3) THE SHOE OF AN IDOL</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> Rava rules that one may not perform Chalitzah with a 'Sandal Shel Avodas Kochavim,' a shoe of an idol. However, if one performed Chalitzah with such a shoe, b'Di'eved the Chalitzah is valid.
</p><p>
The Gemara (104a) teaches that the shoe used for Chalitzah must be one made for walking. The shoe of an idol, however, obviously is not used for walking. Why, then, is the Chalitzah performed with such a shoe valid? 
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>RASHI</b> explains that the shoe indeed was placed on the foot of the idol and left there while the idol was moved from place to place. Even though the idol is just a carved piece of stone, the shoe is considered 'made for walking' since it protects the stone foot from being harmed by the ground as the idol is moved from place to place.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RITVA</b> rejects Rashi's explanation. He argues that being moved from place to place is not called 'walking.' Indeed, when the verse discusses the powerlessness of idols it explicitly states, 'They have feet but they do not walk' (Tehilim 115:7).
</p><p>
The Ritva explains instead that the shoe of an idol refers to a shoe that was used originally by a person for walking, and then was donated to the idol and placed upon the idol's foot. Since, until now, it was used for walking, it is called 'made for walking.'
</p><p>
Rashi apparently does not accept this explanation because he maintains that as long as a shoe is not presently used for walking, it is not valid for Chalitzah. A shoe that was once used by a person for walking and then was donated to the idol is not considered 'made for walking'; its original use is irrelevant. If, on the other hand, a person would remove the shoe from the foot of the idol and walk in it, he would thereby annul its use for Avodah Zarah (a concept called 'Bitul') and it would no longer be considered a shoe of Avodah Zarah.
</p><p>
Perhaps the underlying dispute between Rashi and the Ritva is the definition of a shoe made for walking. Does 'made for walking' describe the <i>usage</i> of the shoe, or does it describe the <i>type</i> of shoe?
<br> 
<br>Rashi apparently maintains that 'made for walking' means that the shoe is <i>used</i> for walking. Therefore, it actually must be used for walking in order to qualify as a valid shoe for Chalitzah. The fact that it was <i>once</i> used for walking does not give it the status of a shoe made for walking. 
</p><p>
The Ritva disagrees and maintains that 'made for walking' refers to the <i>type</i> of shoe normally worn for walking. As long as the shoe was once worn by a person and used for walking, it is a <i>type</i> of walking shoe and may be used for Chalitzah. Although now it has been placed on the idol, a general rule teaches that an object does not lose its original status unless a physical change is made in the composition of the object. (For example, a utensil that becomes Tamei does not lose its status as a utensil and become Tahor unless a 'Shinuy Ma'aseh,' a physical change, is made in the utensil; see Shabbos 52b.) If a person merely decides to use the object for a different purpose, its status does not change. Accordingly, the shoe remains a shoe 'made for walking' even though it is placed on the foot of an idol and is no longer used for walking.
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> Granted, Lavan should not speak evil to 
               him. But why shouldn't he speak (about doing) good 
               to him?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> The good of Resha'im is bad for Tzadikim.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Granted, if Lavan would speak of good, he would 
          mention idolatry. But what was bad about Sisera's Bi'ah 
          with Ya'el?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> He cast filth into her;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Yochanan):</font></b> When the Nachash had Bi'ah with 
               Chavah, he cast filth into her. When Yisrael stood 
               on Har Sinai, the filth left them. Nochrim did not 
               stand on Har Sinai, so they still have the filth.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE SHOE FOR 'CHALITZAH'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If she did Chalitzah with a shoe that is not 
          the Yavam's ...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> 'Na'alo' teaches only the Yavam's shoe. 
          'Na'al' is repeated to include any man's shoe.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, what do we learn from 'Na'alo'?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The shoe must be fitting for him. This excludes a 
          big shoe that he cannot walk in, a small shoe that does 
          not cover the majority of his foot, and a shoe missing 
          the heel.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  A Yevamah came to do Chalitzah. Rav Yosef told Abaye to 
          give the Yavam his shoe; Abaye gave him his left shoe.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Yosef:</font></b> Chalitzah with a left shoe is valid 
               b'Di'eved. It may not be used l'Chatchilah!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Abaye:</font></b> The same applies to a shoe that is not the 
               Yavam's!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Yosef:</font></b> I intended that you should let the Yavam 
               acquire your shoe.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> A wooden sandal (is valid for Chalitzah).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Who is our Tana, who holds that a shoe can be 
          of wood?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Shmuel):</font></b> It is R. Meir.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah - R. Meir):</font></b> An amputee may walk outside on 
               Shabbos with a false foot;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Yosi forbids this.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Shmuel's father):</font></b> Our Mishnah discusses a 
          wooden sandal covered with leather. All agree that it is 
          a shoe.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Papi citing Rava):</font></b> A shoe with Tzara'as that is 
          Musgar (it has not brought Simanim of absolute Tum'ah) 
          may not be used for Chalitzah. If it was used, the 
          Chalitzah is valid;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> A shoe that (brought Simanim and) was Muchlat may 
               not be used for Chalitzah. If it was used, the 
               Chalitzah is invalid. (Since it must be burned, it 
               is considered to be too small.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Papa citing Rava):</font></b> In either case it may not be used 
          for Chalitzah, but if it was used, the Chalitzah is 
          valid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Mishnah):</font></b> A Musgar house is Metamei whatever 
          touches it internally. A Muchlat house is Metamei even 
          what touches it externally. One who enters either of them 
          becomes Tamei.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> According to Rav Papi, here also we should say that 
               (a Muchlat house is not the proper size so) we 
               cannot apply 'One who enters the house (becomes 
               Tamei)'!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> There is different. 'He will take apart the 
          house' teaches that even when it is being destroyed it is 
          called a house.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (against Rav Papi - Beraisa):</font></b> If a rag with 
          Tzara'as is (at least) three fingers by three fingers, 
          even if its volume is less than a k'Zayis (olive), once 
          the majority enters the house, it is Metamei all Kelim in 
          the house.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> This discusses a Muchlat rag.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> No, it was only Musgar.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Seifa):</font></b> If its volume was several k'Zeisim, 
          once a k'Zayis enters the house, it is Metamei Kelim in 
          the house.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Granted, if it is Muchlat, it is equated to a Mes (a 
               k'Zayis of a corpse is Metamei).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> But if it is only Musgar, why is it equated to a 
               Mes?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> Indeed, it was Muchlat. 'He will burn the 
          garment' teaches that even when it is being burned, it is 
          called a garment.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why don't we learn from this (that a Muchlat 
          shoe is called a shoe and is valid for Chalitzah)?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(s)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> We do not learn about Isurim from laws of Tum'ah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(t)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava):</font></b> If a shoe was Musgar or Muchlat or of idolatry 
          (people put it on an idol), it may not be used for 
          Chalitzah. If it was used, the Chalitzah is valid.
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>SHOES INVALID FOR 'CHALITZAH'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava):</font></b> If a shoe was offered to idolatry or is of an Ir 
          ha'Nidachas (a city condemned because its majority served 
          idolatry), or is for a Chacham's honor, it may not be 
          used. If it was used, the Chalitzah is invalid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Ravina):</font></b> Chalitzah with a shoe for a Chacham's 
          honor is invalid because it was not made for walking. The 
          same should apply to the shoe of Beis Din (for 
          Chalitzah)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Ashi):</font></b> If a messenger of Beis Din would walk 
          in it, the judge would not mind (therefore it is 
          considered fit to walk in).
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>'CHALITZAH' AT NIGHT OR WITH THE LEFT FOOT</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If Chalitzah was done at night, it is valid;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  R. Elazar says, it is invalid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  If Chalitzah was done with the left foot, it is invalid;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  R. Elazar says, it is valid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara) Suggestion:</font></b> R. Elazar equates conflicts (in Beis 
          Din, which includes Chalitzah) to Tzara'as (rulings about 
          it must be done by day), and Chachamim do not equate 
          them.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> No. All agree that we do not equate them. If 
          we did, even a final verdict could not be at night!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  Rather, R. Elazar holds that Chalitzah is like the 
          beginning of judgment (which must be during the day), and 
          Chachamim hold that it is like the end of judgment (which 
          may be at night).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b></b>  Rabah bar Chiya Ketosfa'ah oversaw a Chalitzah with a 
          felt shoe, without other judges, at night.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Shmuel (sarcastically):</font></b> He is so great, to follow an 
          individual's opinion!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What did Shmuel object to?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> We cannot say that he objected to using a felt shoe, 
               for a Stam Beraisa permits this!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> We cannot say that he objected to Chalitzah at 
               night, for our Stam Mishnah says that it is valid!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> He objected to Chalitzah without other judges. 
          An individual permits this:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> If Chalitzah was done with two judges, or 
               with three and one was found to be a relative or 
               invalid, the Chalitzah is invalid;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Shimon and R. Yochanan ha'Sandlar say, it is 
               valid;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> It once occurred that a Yavam and Yevamah did 
               Chalitzah by themselves in jail. R. Akiva said, it 
               is valid.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Yosef bar Minyomi):</font></b> The Halachah does not 
               follow R. Shimon and R. Yochanan ha'Sandlar.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> All three aspects of the Chalitzah were like 
          an individual's opinion:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Yishmael b'Rebbi Yosi):</font></b> I saw R. 
               Yishmael ben Elisha oversee a Chalitzah with a felt 
               shoe, without other judges, at night.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If Chalitzah was done with the left foot ...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why do Chachamim invalidate this?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Ula):</font></b> They learn a Gezeirah Shavah 'Regel-Regel' 
          from a Metzora.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Just like there, we need (to put blood and oil on) 
               the right foot, also for Chalitzah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> R. Elazar also learns this Gezeirah Shavah!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Elazar):</font></b> We pierce the right ear of an 
               Eved Ivri who wants to remain a slave - it says 
               'Ozen' regarding the slave and regarding a Metzora.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Just like we put blood and oil on the right ear of a 
               Metzora, the right ear of the slave is pierced.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (R. Yitzchak bar Yosef):</font></b> The opinions (in the 
          Mishnah) should be reversed.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rava):</font></b> We need not switch the opinions. R. 
          Elazar learns from 'Ozen-Ozen' because the words are 
          extra (they are only for the Gezeirah Shavah). He does 
          not learn from 'Regel-Regel' because these words are not 
          free.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(s)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Even if they are not extra, he should learn 
          unless there is a reason not to!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(t)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> We have a reason not to learn. Taharas Metzora 
          requires cedar wood, hyssop and scarlet wool (and 
          therefore, the Torah requires the right foot). Chalitzah 
          does not require these, so perhaps the Torah does not 
          require the right foot!
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>IS RECITING THE VERSES ESSENTIAL?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If she took off his shoe and spat, but did not 
          recite the verses, the Chalitzah is valid. If she recited 
          and spat but did not take off the shoe, it is invalid;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  R. Eliezer says, if she took off his shoe and recited, 
          but did not spit, the Chalitzah is invalid;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  R. Akiva says, it is valid.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE CHALITZAH OF A KETANAH</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Mishnah lists different types of invalid Chalitzos, such as the Chalitzah performed by a Cheresh (a deaf Yavam), a Chareshes (a deaf Yevamah), and a Katan (minor). The Mishnah adds that if a Ketanah performs Chalitzah, her Chalitzah is invalid and she must perform Chalitzah again when she reaches adulthood. 
</p><p>
Why does the Mishnah not include a Ketanah's Chalitzah in the list of invalid Chalitzos? Moreover, once the Mishnah teaches that a Ketanah's Chalitzah is invalid, why does it need to add that 'she must perform Chalitzah when she reaches adulthood'? Since the Chalitzah she performs as a Ketanah is invalid, it is obvious that she must perform Chalitzah again when she reaches adulthood.
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (105b) explains that the reason why the Chalitzah of a Katan is invalid is, as the Gemara explains, that the Torah uses the term 'Ish' (Devarim 25:7) with regard to Chalitzah. Since the Torah does not mention the word 'Ishah' with regard to Chalitzah, one might have thought that a woman does not need to be an adult in order to do Chalitzah. However, a Hekesh is made between an 'Ish' and an 'Ishah,' and thus the woman also must be an adult in order to do Chalitzah.
</p><p>
Tosfos points out that one might have thought that the comparison of 'Ish' and 'Ishah' is only mid'Rabanan, since the Torah itself does not explicitly compare the two. Accordingly, when the Mishnah states that a Ketanah's Chalitzah is invalid, one might have thought that it is invalid only mid'Rabanan, but mid'Oraisa it is valid. The Mishnah therefore adds the extra words, 'she must perform Chalitzah when she reaches adulthood,' in order to show that a Ketanah's Chalitzah is completely invalid, even mid'Oraisa.
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> (ibid.) in his second answer, the <b>RAMBAM</b> (Perush ha'Mishnnayos) cited by the <b>RASHBA</b>, and the <b>RASHBA</b> in the name of the Rishonim explain that the proper text of the Mishnah should read, 'If she does not perform Chalitzah [later when she reaches adulthood], her Chalitzah [performed when she was a Ketanah] is <i>Kesherah</i>' -- and not 'Pesulah.' According to this Girsa, the comparison between 'Ish' and 'Ishah' -- which teaches that a Ketanah's Chalitzah is invalid -- is a comparison only mid'Rabanan. Mid'Oraisa, the Ketanah's Chalitzah <i>is</i> valid. Therefore, if, b'Di'eved, she does not perform another Chalitzah when she reaches adulthood, the Chalitzah she performed as a Ketanah is effective. This is the intention of the Mishnah when it lists the Chalitzah of a Ketanah separate from the other types of invalid Chalitzos.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>TIFERES YISRAEL</b> suggests that even according to the Girsa (as it appears in our text of the Mishnah) that reads, 'If she does not perform Chalitzah [later when she reaches adulthood], her Chalitzah [performed when she was a Ketanah] is <i>Pesulah</i>,' the Mishnah may mean that the Chalitzah of a Ketanah is Pesulah only mid'Rabanan and not mid'Oraisa.
</p><p>
He bases this assertion on the Gemara in the beginning of Sukah (2a) which teaches that when the Mishnah discusses an invalid attempt to fulfill a Mitzvah d'Oraisa, it calls the act 'Pasul.' In contrast, when the Mishnah discusses an invalid attempt to fulfill a Mitzvah d'Rabanan, the Mishnah does not call the act 'Pasul,' but rather it describes how to rectify the invalid act.
</p><p>
The Mishnah here states that the Ketanah should perform Chalitzah again when she reaches adulthood -- that is, it teaches how to rectify the invalid act of Chalitzah which she did as a Ketanah. The Mishnah's description of how to rectify the invalid act indicates that the Mishnah maintains that the Chalitzah of a Ketanah is invalid only mid'Rabanan. (If the Mishnah would maintain that the act is invalid mid'Oraisa, it would say simply that the act is 'Pesulah' and not describe how to rectify it.)
</p><p>
(Apparently, the reason why Tosfos reaches the opposite conclusion -- that the Mishnah implies that the Chalitzah of a Ketanah is invalid mid'Oraisa -- is that he follows his own reasoning there in Sukah. Tosfos in Sukah explains that the Mishnah's style of describing how to rectify an invalid act of a Mitzvah d'Rabanan applies only where the Mishnah mentions <i>only</i> the way to rectify it and does not add that the act is 'Pasul' if it is not rectified.)
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Eliezer:</font></b> 'So will be done' - every action is 
               Me'akev (essential for Chalitzah).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Akiva:</font></b> 'So will be done to the man' - (only) 
               actions to the Yavam are essential.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  If the Yavam or Yevamah was deaf (i.e. a deaf-mute), or 
          he was a minor, the Chalitzah is invalid;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  If she was a minor, she does Chalitzah again when she 
          becomes an adult. If not, the Chalitzah was invalid;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  If Chalitzah was done with two judges, or with three and 
          one was found to be a relative or invalid, the Chalitzah 
          is invalid;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  R. Shimon and R. Yochanan ha'Sandlar say, it is valid;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> It once occurred that a Yavam and Yevamah did 
               Chalitzah by themselves in jail. R. Akiva said that 
               it is valid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara - Version #1 - Rava):</font></b> Since reciting the verses 
          is not Me'akev, even if he or she is mute, the Chalitzah 
          is valid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Mishnah):</font></b> If he or she was deaf, or he was a 
          minor, the Chalitzah is invalid.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> It is invalid because they cannot recite 
               the verses.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> No, it is because they lack understanding.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, the same should apply if he or she is 
          mute!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rava):</font></b> A mute person has knowledge, just his 
          mouth cannot speak.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> D'Vei R. Yanai taught that (when he or she is 
          deaf) it is invalid because he or she cannot recite the 
          verses!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Retraction:</font></b> Rather, we must say that Rava taught about 
          the Seifa.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #2 (Mishnah):</font></b> If he or she was deaf, or he was a 
          minor, the Chalitzah is invalid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava):</font></b> Since reciting the verses is Me'akev, if he or 
          she is mute, the Chalitzah is invalid;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b></b>  The Mishnah says that reciting is not Me'akev (if he and 
          she can speak). This is like R. Zeira:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Zeira):</font></b> If a Minchah is small enough to be 
               mixed, it is valid even if it was not mixed. If it 
               is too big to be mixed (one Log of oil cannot be 
               mixed with more than 60 Esronim of flour. 
               Alternatively, the Keli is too small) it is invalid 
               because it was not mixed.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>A 'YEVAMAH' WHO SPAT</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #1 - Rabanan (to Shmuel's father):</font></b> If a Yevamah 
          spat (at her Yavam), she must do Chalitzah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Inference:</font></b> Spitting disqualifies her from doing Yibum.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> According to which Tana is this?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> It is like R. Akiva.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> It is plausible to compare spitting to Eimurim 
          (parts of a Korban burned on the Mizbe'ach). When the 
          Eimurim are not around, offering them is not Me'akev 
          (requisite for) eating the meat, but when they are 
          around, they are Me'akev (one may not eat the meat before 
          offering them);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Akiva does not equate them, and says that failure 
               to spit does not invalidate the Chalitzah (even 
               though it is possible). Surely, spitting alone does 
               not forbid doing Yibum!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> Rather, it is like R. Eliezer.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> He holds that two things permit her (removing 
          the shoe and spitting). In such a case, one does not 
          permit without the other!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #3:</font></b> Rather, it is like Rebbi:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - Rebbi):</font></b> The two loaves brought on 
               Shavu'os become Kodesh only through Shechitah of the 
               lambs offered with them;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If Shechitah and Zerikah (throwing the blood on the 
               Mizbe'ach) of the lambs was done Lishman (intending 
               for the Mitzvah), the loaves become Kodesh. If 
               Shechitah was Lo Lishma and Zerikah was Lishman, the 
               loaves are not Kodesh. If Shechitah was Lishmah but 
               Zerikah was not Lishman, the loaves are Kodesh and 
               not Kodesh;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon says, they are not Kodesh 
               unless the slaughter and throwing were Lishman.
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>IS SPITTING ESSENTIAL?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> R. Akiva holds that spitting forbids Yibum!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> If she removed the shoe but did not spit 
               or recite the verses, the Chalitzah is valid. If she 
               spit but did not remove the shoe or recite, the 
               Chalitzah is Pasul. If she recited but did not spit 
               or remove the shoe, there is nothing to be concerned 
               for.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> Who taught this Beraisa?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #1:</font></b> It is R. Eliezer.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> It says that if she removed the shoe but 
               did not spit or recite the verses, the Chalitzah is 
               valid. R. Eliezer learns from 'So will be done' that 
               every action is Me'akev!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #2:</font></b> Rather, it is like R. Akiva.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> It says that if she spit but did not 
               remove the shoe or recite the verses, the Chalitzah 
               is Pasul. To whom is it Pasul?
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  It cannot mean that it is Pasul to permit her 
                    to strangers. Obviously, such a Chalitzah does 
                    not permit her!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b></b> Rather, it is Pasul and forbids her to the brothers.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> According to R. Akiva, why is she disqualified 
          when she just spits, but not for just reciting the 
          verses?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Verses are recited both before and after removing 
          the shoe, so one who sees her reciting will not assume 
          that she already removed the shoe;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Spitting is done only after removing the shoe. One 
               who sees her spit will assume that she already took 
               off the shoe, and (if she would do Yibum) they will 
               think that one may do Yibum after Chalitzah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #2 - Rabanan (to Shmuel's father):</font></b> If a Yevamah 
          spat she takes off the shoe, and she need not spit again.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  A Yevamah came in front of R, Ami. She spit before taking 
          off the shoe.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Ami:</font></b> She should take off the shoe, and she will 
               be finished.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Aba:</font></b> But she must spit!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Ami:</font></b> She already spit!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Aba:</font></b> Let her spit again. It can't hurt!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Ami:</font></b> A calamity may result if she spits again. 
               People will say that the first spitting has no 
               effect, and they will permit a Chalutzah to do 
               Yibum!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Aba:</font></b> The events must be done in order!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Ami:</font></b> The order is not essential.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  R. Aba thought that R. Ami was pushing him off (with a 
          false answer). He later found that the answer was 
          correct.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> Whether the shoe was removed before she 
               spit or afterwards, what was done, was done.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>CAN A DECREE BE REPEALED?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #1:</font></b> Can a woman without hands do Chalitzah?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #2:</font></b> If a Yevamah spit blood, was she Yotzei?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #3:</font></b> '... That is written in truth' - is there 
          writing (in Shamayim) which is not truthful?!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Levi could not answer. He asked in the Beis Medrash.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Beis Medrash):</font></b> It doesn't say that she will 
          take off his shoe with her hand (therefore, a woman 
          without hands can do Chalitzah).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> It doesn't say that she will spit saliva (so 
          if she spit blood, she was Yotzei)?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #3:</font></b> 'That is written in truth' refers to a decree 
          about which Hash-m swore; it cannot be repealed. A decree 
          He did not swear about can be repealed.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Shmuel bar Ami):</font></b> A decree with an oath is not 
               torn up - 'Therefore I swore to the house of Eli, 
               their sin will never be atoned with animal or flour 
               offerings'.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rabah):</font></b> It will never be atoned with animal or 
               flour offerings, but it may be atoned through Torah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Abaye):</font></b> It will never be atoned with animal or 
               flour offerings, but it may be atoned through 
               bestowing Chesed.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  Rabah and Abaye were from the house of Eli. Rabah engaged 
          in Torah and lived 40 years; Abaye engaged in Torah and 
          Chesed, and lived 60 years.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> There was a family in Yerushalayim in which 
          people were dying at the age of 18.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  R. Yochanan ben Zakai:</font></b> Perhaps you are from the house of 
          Eli - 'V'Chol Marbis Beischa Yamusu Anashim'. Go engage 
          in Torah, and live!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> They engaged in Torah and lived - they called the 
               family Yochanan.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rav Shmuel bar Unya):</font></b> What is the source that a 
          decree against a Tzibur is not sealed?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Objection:</font></b> This cannot be! It says 'Ki Im 
               Techabsi...Nichtam Avonech Lefanai'!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Correction:</font></b> Rather, what is the source that even if 
               a decree is sealed, it can be torn up?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> 'Who is like Hash-m Elokeinu, whenever we call to 
          Him'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Contradiction:</font></b> But it also says 'Seek Hash-m when He is 
          to be found' (this implies that sometimes we cannot find 
          Him)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Resolution:</font></b> An individual cannot always find Him, but a 
          Tzibur can.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> When can an individual find Him?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rabah bar Avuha):</font></b> This is during the 10 days 
          between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kipur.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>A 'YEVAMAH' WHO SPAT BLOOD</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rabanan):</font></b> If a Yevamah spat blood she must do Chalitzah 
          (and not Yibum). Certainly, there were drops of saliva 
          with the blood.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Beraisa) Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps blood that comes 
          from a Zav's mouth or Ever is Tamei!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> 'His flow (is Tamei)', but not blood 
               which comes from his mouth or Ever. (If the blood 
               contains saliva, it should be Tamei!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> If she draws the spit from her throat, there will 
          be saliva in the blood. If it flows from her mouth, there 
          might not be.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>'CHALITZAH' OF A MINOR</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If the Yavam was deaf (...or a minor, the 
          Chalitzah is invalid, and disqualifies her from doing 
          Yibum).
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) FOCUS DURING PRAYER</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara cites two verses which discuss the proper focus a person should have during prayer. The two verses, however, seem to contradict each other. One verse teaches that a person should direct his eyes and heart towards Yerushalayim and the Beis ha'Mikdash when he prays, because the Shechinah dwells there. Hash-m told Shlomo ha'Melech, '... My eyes and My heart shall be there forever' (Melachim I 9:3). Another verse teaches that a person should lift his heart heavenwards when he prays: 'We shall lift our hearts with our hands to Hash-m in heaven' (Eichah 3:41).
</p><p>
Rebbi Yishmael b'Rebbi Yosi explains that both verses are correct. When one prays, he should direct his eyes downward, in the direction of the dwelling place of the Shechinah in Eretz Yisrael, and he should direct his heart upward towards heaven.
</p><p>
The Gemara here seems to contradict the Gemara in Berachos (30a). The Mishnah (28b) and Gemara (30a) there state clearly that when a person prays, he should 'direct his heart' towards Eretz Yisrael (and not heavenward). Not only should his eyes be directed towards Eretz Yisrael, his heart should be as well. (<b>MAHARSHA</b>)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>ARUCH LA'NER</b> writes that <b>RABEINU YONAH</b> in Berachos (22b of the pages of the Rif) addresses this question. Rabeinu Yonah quotes the Gemara here in Yevamos and explains that when the Gemara says that one should direct his eyes downward and his heart upward, it means that he should visualize himself as though he is standing in Shamayim and has no desire whatsoever for the pleasures of this world. Once he achieves that focus, he is ready to pray to Hash-m, and then, while he is praying, he should visualize himself as though he is standing in the Beis ha'Mikdash, in this world. With that form of concentration, he will merit that his Tefilah will be accepted.
</p><p>
The words of Rabeinu Yonah imply that a person should have two Kavanos. He first should direct his heart towards heaven and visualize himself as though he is in Shamayim and has no connection to the physical desires and pleasures of this world. Afterward, he should direct his heart towards the Beis ha'Mikdash. Accordingly, both the Gemara here and in Berachos are correct and do not contradict each other.
</p><p>
Rabeinu Yonah adds that focused concentration to remove all physical pleasures from one's consciousness is the intent of the Mishnah in Berachos when it says that the Chasidim ha'Rishonim would prepare for one hour to 'focus their hearts to Hash-m' before they stood up to pray. They would focus their hearts so that the only desire they had was to fulfill the will of Hash-m, with absolutely no desire for the pleasures of this world.
</p><p>
An allusion to this form of concentration may be found in the verse cited by the Gemara here. The verse says that Hashem's 'eyes and heart shall be there forever' (Melachim I 9:3). The fact that Hash-m focuses His eyes and heart towards the Beis ha'Mikdash, as it were, is a sign that man, too, should focus his eyes and heart towards the Beis ha'Mikdash. Not only should one's <i>eyes</i> be directed towards the Beis ha'Mikdash, but his <i>heart</i> as well. The other verse says that 'we shall lift our hearts with our hands to Hash-m in heaven.' This verse emphasizes directing the <i>heart</i> heavenward. Together, the verses teach that the eyes should be directed towards the dwelling place of the Shechinah in this world (the Beis ha'Mikdash), while the heart should be directed towards <i>both</i> -- first, towards Shamayim, so that one remove any desire for worldly pleasures from his heart, and second, towards the Beis ha'Mikdash and the Kodesh ha'Kodashim.
</p><p>


<font><b>2) AGADAH: AVDAN'S PUNISHMENT</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara relates that because Avdan belittled Rebbi Yishmael b'Rebbi Yosi and then walked slowly through the ranks of students seated before Rebbi, he suffered three severe punishments. He became plagued with Tzara'as, his sons drowned at sea, and his daughters-in-law left their husbands through Mi'un.
</p><p>
In what way were those three punishments fitting penalties for Avdan's transgression?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>RASHI</b> (DH Nitztare'a) explains that Avdan's unjust criticism of Rebbi Yishmael b'Rebbi Yosi constituted the sin of Lashon ha'Ra, for which one is punished with Tzara'as (Erchin 16b).
</p><p>
Rashi explains only why Avdan was punished with Tzara'as. Why was he punished with the death of his sons and the Mi'un of his daughters-in-law?
</p><p>
(b) The <b>MAHARSHA</b> explains that the death of his sons and the Mi'un of his daughters-in-law were two parts of a single punishment. Two of his sons died childless, leaving their wives bound to perform Yibum with the surviving sons. Their wives, however, were minors who performed Mi'un and thereby severed the bond of marriage with their husbands, and thus the surviving sons were not able to 'build the family' of their deceased brothers. This was an appropriate punishment for Avdan's offense, for he criticized Rebbi Yishmael during a case in which a Yevamah Ketanah (who did <i>not</i> perform Mi'un) came before the court of Rebbi to perform Chalitzah.
</p><p>
This answer is not clear. The Gemara does not mention that the Yevamah who came before the court of Rebbi was married only mid'Rabanan and could perform Mi'un. Moreover, even if Avdan's daughters-in-law had not performed Mi'un, they would not have been bona fide Yevamos since their Kidushin was only mid'Rabanan. Also, even when they did Mi'un, their act retroactively removed any bond of marriage, and thus there never was a house to build in the first place.
</p><p>
A further difficulty is that according to the Maharsha the dead sons must have been adults (since they married their wives with Kidushei Mi'un, which a minor boy cannot do). Although under certain circumstances young children may be punished for the sins of their parents (see Shabbos 32b), there is no source that <i>adult</i> children should be punished for the sins of their parents.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>AHAVAS EISAN</b> in the Ein Yakov explains the Gemara based on the verse in Koheles (5:5): 'Do not let your mouth bring sin upon your flesh (i.e. your children), and do not say before the messenger that it was a mistake; why should the Almighty be angry at your voice and destroy the work of your hands?' The Gemara in Shabbos (32b) expounds this verse and explains that certain sins committed with the mouth can cause the death of one's minor children. The Midrash (Devarim Rabah 6, Tanchuma Metzora 1) explains that the sin to which the verse refers is Lashon ha'Ra. Accordingly, it was appropriate that Avdan's children died due to his sin of Lashon ha'Ra.
</p><p>
The <b>CHAFETZ CHAIM</b> (Shemiras ha'Lashon, Sha'ar ha'Tevunah, chapter 17) expounds on this approach. He explains that Avdan's transgression constituted Ona'as Devarim, a verbal insult. He demeaned Rebbi Yishmael b'Rebbi Yosi for stepping over the heads of the students, and he further acted improperly when he questioned whether Rebbi Yishmael was fit to learn Torah from Rebbi. Although his speech constituted Ona'as Devarim, had his motivation been pure and for the sake of heaven, he would not have been subject to punishment. In order to determine the sincerity of Avdan's words, Hash-m tested him. Hash-m caused a Yevamah Ketanah to come before them at that moment, necessitating analysis into the law. When Avdan stepped over the heads of the students on his way back to the study hall, he showed that his words of rebuke to Rebbi Yishmael were not the result of zealousness but merely words of Lashon ha'Ra. He therefore was punished with Tzara'as for speaking Lashon ha'Ra, and his sons died specifically through drowning, because drowning is a from of asphyxiation which resembles the disease of Askarah (Kesuvos 30b), one of the punishments for speaking Lashon ha'Ra (Shabbos 33a). His assertion that Rebbi Yishmael was unfit to learn Torah from Rebbi was also proven to be unfounded, as ultimately Rebbi needed to rely on the teaching which Rebbi Yishmael related in the name of his father, Rebbi Yosi.
</p><p>
The Chafetz Chaim explains that this principle applies to any similar case in which a person attempts to rebuke or punish his fellow man without pure intentions. If a person harmed another in any way, even in a way in which he was allowed to do so, he must remember that if he ever does the same action for which he punished his fellow man, he will be considered to have harmed an innocent person and he will be punished accordingly. Accordingly, one who speaks Lashon ha'Ra about another person or causes him any form of anguish or pain should be filled with trembling, because if he delves into his deeds he may find that he transgressed in the same manner as the person whom he disgraced. Even if he finds no such misdeed in his past, he should be aware that -- after he has spoken Lashon ha'Ra -- if in the future he ever transgresses in a similar manner as the person whom he disgraced, his rebuke will be considered a sin retroactively. (See Insights to Pesachim 87:1.)
</p><p>
(c) The Mi'un of Avdan's daughters-in-law was a fitting punishment for his offense for the following reason. Avdan criticized Rebbi Yishmael, and he walked slowly through the ranks of students, while Rebbi was deliberating in a case of a Yevamah Ketanah. Avdan thought that such a Yevamah could not perform Chalitzah. Avdan was on his way to check whether the Yevamah was an adult (and not a minor) when Rebbi Yishmael corrected Rebbi in the matter and proved to him that a Ketanah may perform Chalitzah. Avdan's punishment -- his daughters-in-law performed Mi'un, an act performed only by a Ketanah -- was related to his criticism of Rebbi Yishmael in the case of a Yevamah Ketanah. Hash-m punished Avdan by causing him to suffer as a result of an act which <i>only</i> a Ketanah may do. (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> This is like R. Meir, but Chachamim say, 
          the Chalitzah of a minor has no effect.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If a Ketanah did Chalitzah (it is Pasul).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> This is like R. Meir, who learns from 
          'Ish' that the Yavam must be an adult, and he equates her 
          law to his. Chachamim say, 'Ish' teaches that he must be 
          an adult, but she may be an adult or minor.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Who are the Chachamim?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> They hold like R. Yosi (who does not learn 
          similar matters from each other);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Chiya and R. Shimon bar Rebbi were sitting. One 
               said that one who prays must look down (towards the 
               Shechinah in Eretz Yisrael) - 'My eyes and heart 
               will always be there';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> The other said, his eyes should face up - 'We will 
               lift our hearts to our hands'.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Yishmael bar R. Yosi:</font></b> My father said, his eyes 
               should be down, and his heart up, to fulfill both 
               verses.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  Rebbi came to the Beis Medrash. R. Yishmael bar R. Yosi 
          walked slowly to his place.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Avdan (a Talmid of Rebbi):</font></b> Who is this, who (looks 
               like he) steps on the heads of the Holy nation?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Yishmael bar R. Yosi:</font></b> It is me, R. Yishmael bar 
               R. Yosi. I came to learn Torah from Rebbi.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Avdan:</font></b> Are you fitting to learn Torah from Rebbi?!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Yishmael bar R. Yosi:</font></b> Was Moshe fitting to learn 
               from Hash-m?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Avdan:</font></b> Are you Moshe?!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Yishmael bar R. Yosi:</font></b> Is your Rebbi Hash-m?!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yosef):</font></b> Rebbi (did not object to Avdan's treatment of R. Yishmael, and) received his punishment. He was called <i>your</i> Rebbi, i.e. but not my Rebbi.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b></b> A Yevamah came before Rebbi. He told Avdan to check 
               whether or not she is an adult. Avdan left.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Yishmael bar R. Yosi:</font></b> My father said that the 
               Torah requires him to be an adult, but she may be an 
               adult or minor.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rebbi:</font></b> There is no need to check her. The elder has 
               already ruled.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>10. </font></b></b> Avdan was returning to his place.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>11. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Yishmael bar R. Yosi:</font></b> One who is needed by the 
               Holy nation, may step on the heads of the Holy 
               nation. One who is not needed by the Holy nation, 
               how can he step on the heads of the Holy nation?!
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>12. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rebbi (to Avdan):</font></b> Stay in your place.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> Just then, Avdan became a Metzora, his two 
          sons drowned, and his two daughters-in-law did Mi'un.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak:</font></b> Blessed is Hash-m, Who 
          embarrassed Avdan in this world (so he will not be 
          embarrassed in the world to come),
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Ami):</font></b> From R. Yosi, we learn that a Yevamah may do 
          Chalitzah is she reached the age of Pa'utos (six to 10, 
          depending on how sharp she is).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava):</font></b> She must have reached the age of vows (one year 
          before adulthood, if she understands vows her vows take 
          effect).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b></b>  The Halachah is, she must bring two hairs (of adulthood).
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>5) </font></b><font color='blue'>HOW MANY JUDGES ARE NEEDED?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If she did Chalitzah in front of two ...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Nachman):</font></b> The Halachah does not follow this pair (of 
          Tana'im, i.e. R. Shimon and R. Yochanan ha'Sandlar).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Rav Nachman already taught this!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Nachman):</font></b> Chalitzah requires three judges.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Had Rav Nachman said only that three are 
          required, we might have thought that this is 
          l'Chatchilah, but b'Di'eved, two suffice. Therefore, he 
          needed to rule unlike the pair;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Had Rav Nachman said only that the Halachah does not 
               follow law the pair, rather, the first Tana Mishnah 
               (that three are enough), one might have thought that 
               this is b'Di'eved, but l'Chatchilah, five are 
               needed. Therefore, he needed to say that three are 
               required.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> A case occurred (and a Yavam and Yevamah did 
          Chalitzah by themselves in jail...)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> How do we know they really did Chalitzah?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> Witnesses saw them from the 
          outside.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Did they do Chalitzah outside the jail and ask 
          R. Akiva in jail, or was the Chalitzah in jail?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> The Chalitzah was in jail and they 
          asked R. Akiva in jail.
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>A DECEIVED 'CHALITZAH'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> A deceived Chalitzah is valid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is a deceived Chalitzah?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Reish Lakish):</font></b> They tell him that Chalitzah 
          will permit him to do Yibum.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (R. Yochanan - Mishnah):</font></b> Whether he intended 
          but not her, or she intended but not him, the Chalitzah 
          is invalid unless both have intention.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (R. Yochanan):</font></b> They tell him that if he does 
          Chalitzah he will receive 200 Zuz (and he does not get 
          it).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (Beraisa):</font></b> A deceived Chalitzah is valid.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This is when they tell him that if he does Chalitzah 
               he will receive 200 Zuz.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> A case occurred in which a woman fell to an unworthy 
               Yavam. They told him that if he does Chalitzah he 
               will receive 200 Zuz. R. Chiya ruled that the 
               Chalitzah is valid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  A Yavam and Yevamah came in front of R. Chiya bar Aba.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #1:</font></b> R. Chiya told her to do Yibum. Her mother 
          said that it is better that she not do Yibum.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Chiya bar Aba:</font></b> Do you know the nature of the 
               Yavam?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Her mother:</font></b> Yes. He saw that she has money, and he 
               wants to consume it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #2:</font></b> R. Chiya told the Yevamah to stand. Her 
          mother said she cannot (she is an amputee, or sick).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Chiya bar Aba:</font></b> Does the Yavam know this?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Her mother:</font></b> Yes. He wants to do Yibum anyway because 
               he saw that she has money, and he wants to consume 
               it. (end of Version #2)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Chiya bar Aba (to the Yevamah):</font></b> Do you want him?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> The Yevamah:</font></b> No.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Chiya bar Aba (to the Yavam):</font></b> Do Chalitzah, and 
               then you may do Yibum.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b></b> After he did Chalitzah, R. Chiya bar Aba told him 
               that she cannot do Yibum, and he should now do a 
               proper Chalitzah that will permit her to marry a 
               stranger.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b></b>  The daughter of Rav Papa's mother-in-law fell to an 
          unworthy Yavam.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Abaye:</font></b> Do Chalitzah, and this will permit you to do 
               Yibum.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Papa:</font></b> Don't you hold like R. Yochanan, who says 
               that this is invalid?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Abaye:</font></b> What should I tell him?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Papa:</font></b> Say that he will receive 200 Zuz for doing 
               Chalitzah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b></b> After he did Chalitzah, Abaye told her to pay the 
               money. (In any case the Chalitzah was valid, but she 
               must fulfill her contract.)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Papa:</font></b> She was just fooling him;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> A man was fleeing jail, and the 
                    ferry was in front of him. He offered the 
                    ferryman a Dinar (a large amount) to take him 
                    across. He owes only the usual fare.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> This is because he can say that he was just 
                    joking (when he offered a Dinar).
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b></b>Also here, she can say that she was just 
                    joking!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Abaye:</font></b> Where are your parents (who support you, 
               enabling you to become so sharp)?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Papa:</font></b> They are in the city.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  Because of Abaye's envy (he was orphaned from 
                    birth), Rav Papa's parents died.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>COERCION</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> If one was tricked into doing Chalitzah, the 
          Chalitzah is valid. If one was tricked into giving a Get, 
          the Get is invalid;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If one was forced to do Chalitzah, the Chalitzah is 
          invalid. If one was forced to give a Get, the Get is 
          valid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is the case (of being forced)?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> If he said 'I want (to do it)', a forced 
               Chalitzah should also be valid!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> If he did not say 'I want', a forced Get 
               should also be invalid!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The Beraisa means: if one was tricked into doing 
          Chalitzah, the Chalitzah is always valid. If one was 
          tricked into giving a Get, the Get is always invalid;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If one was forced to do Chalitzah or give a Get, 
               sometimes it is valid, sometimes not;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> It is valid only if he said 'I want'.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> 'He will offer (the Korban)' teaches that 
               we force him.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps we force him against his will!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> 'According to his will' - we force him 
               until he says that he wants.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b></b> The same applies to Gitin. We force him until he 
               says that he consents.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava citing Rav Safra):</font></b> We oversee Chalitzah, even if we 
          do not know that they are the Yavam and Yevamah. We 
          oversee Mi'un, even if we do not recognize her.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Therefore, witnesses (who saw Chalitzah or Mi'un) 
               may not write a document of Chalitzah or Mi'un 
               unless they recognize the people. We are concerned 
               lest a Beis Din err. (Another Beis Din will see 
               names in a document and assume that the supervising 
               Beis Din verified that those people performed the 
               Chalitzah or Mi'un.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava himself):</font></b> We oversee Chalitzah only if we recognize 
          the Yavam and Yevamah. We oversee Mi'un only if we 
          recognize her.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Therefore, witnesses may write a document of 
               Chalitzah or Mi'un even if they do not recognize 
               them. We are not concerned lest (the supervising) 
               Beis Din err (and not check the names).
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) ABAYE'S 'AYIN HA'RA' AND THE DEATH OF RAV PAPA'S PARENTS</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara relates that Rav Papa and Abaye were involved in a Halachic dispute. Rav Papa cited proof for his logic from a Beraisa, and Abaye consented. Abaye praised Rav Papa's acumen and declared that his parents must be alive and providing him with support, such that he is able to dedicate all of his time to learning Torah. The Gemara relates that 'Abaye placed his eyes on them, and they died.'
</p><p>
This incident is very difficult to understand.
</p><p>
1. What right did Abaye have to cause the parents of Rav Papa to suffer such a cruel fate, with no apparent guilt on their part?
</p><p>
2. How was Abaye able to 'place his eyes' on Rav Papa's parents when they were not present? An 'Ayin ha'Ra' is effective only when the person actually sees the subject it affects (see Berachos 20a).
</p><p>
3. Why was Abaye's 'placing of the eyes' have such an effect, when neither Rav Papa nor his parents had done anything wrong and did not deserve to die?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER:</b> This incident may be understood in the following way. Every 'placing of the eyes,' or 'Ayin ha'Ra,' mentioned in the Gemara involves a feeling of jealousy (Kin'ah) of a Chacham (or layperson) towards the deeds of his colleague, even if that feeling is very slight. Although he certainly has no conscious intention to harm his colleague (as <b>RAV YAKOV EMDEN</b> here writes at length), nevertheless the distress which the Chacham experienced as a result of his colleague's deeds effects a process of retribution towards the one who pained him. This is the mechanism of every 'Ayin ha'Ra' mentioned in the Gemara. When it involves a Chacham, even the most minute degree of distress can cause the other person to be punished. (See Avos 2:10, 'Hevei Zahir b'Gachaltan...' and the commentaries there.)
</p><p>
In the case of the Gemara here, Abaye's 'Ayin ha'Ra' was not placed upon the parents of Rav Papa, but rather upon Rav Papa himself, who had achieved great success in his Torah learning due to the efforts of his parents in providing him and his family with material support (as Rashi explains). Now that his parents had died, it would be very difficult for him to continue learning with the same exclusive focus with which he had learned until now, since he would now be responsible for the burden of supporting his family himself.
</p><p>
When the Gemara says that Abaye 'placed his eyes <i>on them</i>,' it does not mean literally that he looked upon Rav Papa's parents. Rather, it means that by placing his eyes on Rav Papa, his parents died. (Alternatively, the text of the Gemara should read instead that 'he placed his eyes on <i>him</i>,' as indeed is the Girsa in the Munich manuscript of the Gemara.)
</p><p>
The parents of Rav Papa certainly did no wrong to Abaye. Apparently, their destined time to depart from this world had arrived already and passed, and the only reason they were given extra time in this world was in the merit of their support of their son, Rav Papa. Now, however, for some reason Rav Papa became no longer deserving of their support, and thus his merit was removed from them and they died.
</p><p>
What misdeed did Rav Papa commit that caused him to be unworthy of the continued support of his parents? The fact that he corrected an error in a Halachic ruling of his Rebbi, Abaye, should not have been cause for retribution. On the contrary, one is obligated to point out to his Rebbi an error in a Halachic ruling.
</p><p>
It must be that a person on the level of righteousness of Rav Papa was expected to correct his Rebbi's error in a more respectful manner. Although the manner in which he spoke to Abaye ('But does the master not maintain that...') would have been considered sufficiently respectful had another student spoken, Rav Papa should have spoken with even more reverence and said, 'Is it not written in the Torah that...,' or, 'Did we not learn that...' (as recorded in the Shulchan Aruch YD 240, based on the Gemara in Kidushin 32a). Perhaps Rav Papa was held accountable for not saying <i>both</i> parts of the ruling immediately ('on condition that he give 200 Zuz,' and 'Meshateh Ani Bach'). Instead, he waited until Abaye made a mistake in the second Halachah and then he corrected him, and that was certainly inappropriate (as the Gemara teaches in Shavuos 31a).
</p><p>
Ha'Rav Moshe Shapiro shlit'a explained that Rav Papa did not sin at all. Rather, the death of his parents was for his benefit, so that he would be able to learn Torah through hardship and thereby acquire an eternal share in Torah. (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
<b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE 'CHALITZAH' RITUAL</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> The Mitzvah of Chalitzah is as follows. The 
          Yavam and Yevamah come to Beis Din. They give him a 
          proper counsel - 'The elders will speak to him'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  She says 'My Yevamah refuses to stand up seed for his 
          brother in Yisrael; he does not want to do Yibum with 
          me'. He says 'I do not want to take her' - these are said 
          in Hebrew.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  The Yevamah draws close to the Yavam, in view of the 
          judges, and removes his shoe. She spits in front of him. 
          The judges must see the spit. She says 'So will be done 
          to the man who will not build his brother's house.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  They used to read this much. R. Hurkenus would complete 
          the passage, and this became the custom.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  'He will be called in Yisrael the house of the removed 
          shoe' - the Mitzvah is for the judges to say this, not 
          the Talmidim;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  R. Yehudah says, it is a Mitzvah on all present to say 
          'The one whose shoe was removed'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara - Rav Yehudah):</font></b> The Mitzvah of Chalitzah is as 
          follows. She reads; he reads; she removes his shoe; she 
          spits; she reads.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What does he teach? The Mishnah says this!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> He teaches that this is only a Mitzvah 
          l'Chatchilah. If the order was reversed, it is not a 
          problem.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (Beraisa):</font></b> Whether she removed the shoe before 
          spitting, or spat before removing, what she did, she did 
          (it is valid).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Abaye):</font></b> If the Yavam and Yevamah do not know the verses, 
          one who recites the verses (for them to repeat) should 
          not prompt her to say 'Lo' by itself and 'Avah Yabme' by 
          itself. This connotes 'No, he wants to do Yibum!'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Rather, they should be said together - 'He does not 
               want to do Yibum with me'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b></b>  He should not prompt the Yavam to say 'Lo' by itself, and 
          'Chofatzti' by itself. This connotes 'No, I want to take 
          her!'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Rather, he should say at once 'I do not want to take 
               her'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava):</font></b> This is a mere pause. We are not concerned for 
          this.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b></b>  Rav Kahana was struggling to help a Yevamah to say ' Lo 
          Avah Yabme' without pausing.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Ashi:</font></b> Don't you hold like Rava, that there is no 
               problem if they pause in the middle?!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Kahana:</font></b> Rava admits that 'Lo Avah Yabme' must be 
               said without pause. (He argues only about 'Lo 
               ChofatztI'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Abaye):</font></b> One who writes a Chalitzah document must write 
          'We told her to say from 'My Yavam refuses' until 'He 
          does not want to do Yibum with me'. We told him to say 
          from 'I do not' until 'To take her'. We told her to read 
          from 'so' until 'the one whose shoe was removed'.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b></b>  Mar Zutra scratched a line (to help him write straightly) 
          and wrote the entire passage.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Mar bar Rav Ashi):</font></b> One may not write passages 
          of the Torah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b></b>  The Halachah follows Mar Zutra.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE SPIT</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Abaye):</font></b> If she spat and the wind carried the spit (away 
          from the Yavam), it is as if she did not spit.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  This is because we require 'She will spit in front of 
          him'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  If he is tall and she is short, even if the wind carries 
          the spit, it was in front of him. If she is tall and he 
          is short, we require that the spit should pass in front 
          of his face before the wind takes it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava):</font></b> If she ate garlic or earth and spat, it is as if 
          she did not spit.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> We require that she should spit by herself (not that 
               a food caused the saliva).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava):</font></b> The judges must see the spit when it leaves her 
          mouth - 'She will spit, in the view of the judges.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> 'His name will be called in Yisrael, the house 
          whose shoe was removed' - the Mitzvah is for the judges 
          to say this, not the Talmidim.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa - R. Yehudah):</font></b> A Yevamah did Chalitzah before R. 
          Tarfon - he told us all to say, 'The one whose shoe was 
          removed' three times.
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) ADVISING THE YAVAM NOT TO DO YIBUM</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Mishnah expounds the verses in the Parshah of Chalitzah. The Mishnah explains that the words, 'v'Kar'u Lo... v'Dibru Elav' -- 'They will call to him... and they will speak to him' (Devarim 25:8), teach that the Beis Din must advise the Yavam about the proper course of action he should take. <b>RASHI</b> explains, based on the Gemara earlier (101b), that this means that the Beis Din assesses the situation and, depending on the circumstances (such as if the Yavam is young and the Yevamah is old, or if the Yavam is old and the Yevamah is young) advises the Yavam not to marry the Yevamah but to do Chalitzah instead, and to find another woman who is more fitting for him to marry. 
</p><p>
However, the Mishnah's explanation of those words is entirely inconsistent with the context of the verse. The previous verse (Devarim 25:7) states that 'if the man does not want to take his Yevamah... she should go up to the gate to the elders and say, 'My brother-in-law refuses [to do Yibum].'' The verse then states that the elders call in the Yavam ('v'Kar'u Lo') and speak to him ('v'Dibru Elav'), and then 'the Yavam shall stand and say, 'I do not want to marry her.''
</p><p>
The verse clearly instructs the Beis Din to call the Yavam after he has <i>refused</i> to do Yibum. Why does the Gemara say that these words mean that the Beis Din <i>advises</i> him not to do Yibum?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>ARUCH LA'NER</b> points out that the <b>RAMBAM's</b> explanation of the verse differs slightly from the Gemara's explanation. The Rambam (in Perush ha'Mishnayos and in Hilchos Yibum 4:1) explains that the elders call to the Yavam and instruct him to do Yibum if the Yevamah is appropriate for him, and they advise him to do Chalitzah if she is not appropriate for him.
</p><p>
The Rambam understands the Gemara's elucidation of the verse in a way which is consistent with the context of the verse. When the Beraisa states that Beis Din instructs the Yavam to do Chalitzah when the Yevamah is inappropriate for him, the Beraisa is emphasizing an additional point which is not expressed by the simple meaning of the verse but which apparently is derived from the repetition of 'v'Kar'u Lo... v'Dibru Elav.' If the elders 'call to him,' obviously they must also 'speak to him'! It must be that 'v'Kar'u Lo' -- 'they call to him,' implies that they 'call to him <i>to come in</i>' because they need to see him in order to assess the situation and advise him appropriately. (The Gemara's Derashah of 'v'Lo Shelucham' (Yevamos 101b) may be derived from the word 'Lo' alone and not the word 'v'Kar'u,' leaving that word available for the Gemara's present Derashah.)
</p><p>
(b) Other Rishonim understand that the Beis Din does not advise the Yavam to marry, as the Rambam writes. Rather, the advice of Beis Din is intended merely to prevent the Yavam from doing Yibum where it is inappropriate. Accordingly, the letter 'Vav' of 'v'Kar'u Lo' does not mean 'and,' but rather 'or.' The verse is saying that either the woman tells Beis Din that her Yavam refuses to do Yibum with her, <i>or</i> the Beis Din calls him in and tells him that he should not do Yibum because of their assessment of the situation.
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHEN MAY 'MI'UN' BE DONE?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - Beis Shamai):</font></b> A girl (an orphaned minor 
          married mid'Rabanan) can do Mi'un (retroactively undo the 
          marriage) only during Eirusin;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  Beis Hillel say, she can do so even after Nisu'in.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  Beis Shamai say, Mi'un can be done to the husband, not 
          (after she fell) to a Yavam;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  Beis Hillel say, she can do Mi'un even to a Yavam;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  Beis Shamai say, Mi'un can be done only in front of the 
          husband;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  Beis Hillel say, it need not be in front of him.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  Beis Shamai say, Mi'un can be done only in Beis Din;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b></b>  Beis Hillel say, it need not be in Beis Din.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Beis Hillel:</font></b> A girl may do Mi'un four or five times.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Beis Shamai:</font></b> Benos Yisrael are not Hefker! Rather, she 
          does Mi'un, waits until she grows up, does Mi'un, and 
          gets married.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>'MI'UN' FROM 'NISU'IN'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara) Question:</font></b> Why do Beis Shamai forbid Mi'un from 
          Nisu'in?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> Nisu'in cannot be on condition. 
          If girls do Mi'un from Nisu'in, people will come to say 
          that Nisu'in can be conditional.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, why don't they allow Mi'un after Chupah 
          without Bi'ah?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Chupah cannot be on condition.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, why don't they allow Mi'un after her 
          father handed her over to the husband's messengers?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Chachamim did not distinguish (between types of 
          Nisu'in).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Beis Hillel allow Mi'un from Nisu'in, for people 
               know that Nisu'in of an orphaned minor is only 
               mid'Rabanan.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (to Question (a) - Rabah and Rav Yosef):</font></b> Beis 
          Shamai forbid Mi'un from Nisu'in because a person does 
          not want to have Bi'as Zenus. (Men will not marry orphans 
          if they may do Mi'un and retroactively convert the Bi'os 
          to Bi'as Zenus.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, why don't they allow Mi'un after Chupah 
          without Bi'ah?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> A man does not want that his Chupah was forbidden 
          (retroactively).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, why don't they allow Mi'un after her 
          father handed her over to the husband's messengers?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Chachamim did not distinguish (between types of 
          Nisu'in).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Beis Hillel say, since there is Kidushin and a 
               Kesuvah, people will not consider it to be Bi'as 
               Zenus.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #3 (Rav Papa):</font></b> Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel are 
          both concerned for Peiros (yield of her property);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Beis Shamai hold, if she could do Mi'un, he would 
               hastily eat the Peiros, since he expects her to 
               leave and take back her property;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Beis Hillel say, the option to do Mi'un <i>encourages</i> 
               him to improve the property, lest her relatives 
               counsel her to do Mi'un!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #4 (Rava):</font></b> Beis Shamai hold that a person does not 
          want to make a (wedding) party and lose it (if she does 
          Mi'un);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Beis Hillel hold that they are both happy to acquire 
               the title of being married (even if the marriage 
               will not endure).
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>'MI'UN' TO THE 'YAVAM'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - Beis Shamai):</font></b> She may do Mi'un to her husband 
          (...Beis Hillel permit even to the Yavam).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Oshaya):</font></b> She may do Mi'un to (undo) his Ma'amar (so a 
          Get is not needed), but not to his Zikah (to marry l'Shuk 
          without Chalitzah).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is R. Oshaya's reason?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rav Chisda):</font></b> A Ma'amar requires her consent, 
          therefore she can uproot it. Zikah is against her will, 
          so she cannot uproot it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> Yibum is against her will, yet she can uproot 
          it!
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE KIDUSHIN D'RABANAN OF A 'YESOMAH B'CHAYEI HA'AV'</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara discusses the case of a Ketanah whose father died. The Rabanan instituted that her mother or brother may marry her off with Kidushin d'Rabanan, for which she has the option of doing Mi'un. According to Beis Shamai, from the moment she enters the Chupah (Nisu'in), and even from the moment 'that her father passes her over to the husband's entourage,' she may no longer do Mi'un.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> (DH Masar ha'Av) explains that when the Gemara mentions 'that her father passes her over to the husband's entourage,' it cannot refer literally to the father, because a Ketanah whose father is alive may not do Mi'un. When her father marries her off, the Kidushin is mid'Oraisa, for which Mi'un may not be done. Kidushin d'Rabanan exists only when she has no father and her mother or brother marries her off.
</p><p>
Why does Rashi insist that the Gemara does not refer to the father himself, and that in order for the Kidushin to be mid'Rabanan the father must not be alive? There exists a situation in which the father is alive and yet the Kidushin nevertheless is mid'Rabanan and the Ketanah may do Yibum: the situation of 'Yesomah b'Chayei ha'Av' -- 'an orphan during the life of her father.' If the father married her off, and then she was divorced, the father may not marry her off again to a second husband even though she is still a Ketanah; she has the status of a 'Yesomah b'Chayei ha'Av.' If she then marries someone else while she is a Ketanah, the Kidushin is mid'Rabanan and she has the option to do Mi'un. (Rashi himself discusses this situation on 109a, DH Ketanah, and earlier on 2b and 12a.) Hence, 'the father passes her over' indeed can refer literally to the father. Why does Rashi insist that the Gemara does not refer to the father? (<b>RAV YAKOV EMDEN</b>, <b>ARUCH LA'NER</b>; see also Insights to Yevamos 89:1.)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER:</b> The <b>RITVA</b> addresses this question. He infers from Rashi's words that when the Ketanah is a 'Yesomah b'Chayei ha'Av,' her father no longer has control over whom she marries <i>at all</i>, and he may not marry her off even with Kidushin d'Rabanan. The Rabanan empowered only his wife and sons with the right to marry off the Ketanah in the event that her father is no longer living; they did not give that right to her father after she was married and divorced from her first husband. The Ritva cites Rashi later (109a, DH v'Hechzirah) as additional proof that this is Rashi's opinion.
</p><p>
The Rishonim discuss what type of Kidushin constitutes the Kidushin d'Rabanan of a 'Yesomah b'Chayei ha'Av.'
</p><p>
(a) According to the simple reading of the Ritva, he maintains that according to Rashi a 'Yesomah b'Chayei ha'Av' cannot become married even with Kidushin d'Rabanan. Since her father is alive, she does not have control over her Kidushin. On the other hand, since she was married once and divorced, her father also has no control over her Kidushin. She thus must remain unmarried until she reaches adulthood.
</p><p>
However, this inference from the words of the Ritva is incorrect. The Gemara in numerous places states that she <i>may</i> remarry while she is a Ketanah. The Gemara earlier (12a) discusses a case of one's <i>daughter</i> who falls to her father for Yibum and does Mi'un to her deceased husband. The marriage in that case clearly was a Kidushin d'Rabanan (for otherwise Mi'un may not be done), and yet the father is still alive. Similarly, the Mishnah later (109a) states that a 'Yesomah b'Chayei ha'Av' may get married but not with a 'Kidushin Gemurin,' implying that she Kidushin d'Rabanan <i>does</i> take effect. Rashi himself, in many places, makes this point explicitly (see Rashi to 2b and 12a). (<b>YASHRESH YAKOV</b> and other Acharonim; see footnote #43 of Rav Aharon Yaffen to the Ritva.)
</p><p>
Apparently, Rashi means that the father cannot marry off his daughter when she is a 'Yesomah b'Chayei ha'Av,' but <i>she</i> may accept Kidushin herself, in which case the Kidushin is mid'Rabanan. (The Gemara on 108a refers to a Mema'enes who accepts her own Kidushin.) Just as her father does not have the power to marry her off, he also cannot 'pass her over for Chupah.' This explains why Rashi writes that the Gemara does not mean that the father himself passed her over to the husband. Rashi maintains that the father does not have that authority to do so when she is a 'Yesomah b'Chayei ha'Av.' The <b>TZAFNAS PANE'ACH</b> (Hilchos Ishus 4:7) reaches the same conclusion, and he points out that Rashi himself writes this explicitly in Gitin (65a, DH u'Chenegdan) and in Kidushin (44b, DH Ma'aseh Yesomah).
</p><p>
Accordingly, it seems clear that when the father cannot marry her off, certainly the other relatives also cannot marry her off. The Rabanan did not empower the relatives with the authority to marry her off in the case of a 'Yesomah b'Chayei ha'Av,' because in such a case they were not concerned for her well-being (lest she take to the streets), for she has a father who will take care of her.
</p><p>
(The Aruch la'Ner assumes that according to the Ritva's understanding of Rashi, it is only the <i>father</i> who cannot accept Kidushin for the Ketanah, but her mother and brothers <i>may</i> accept Kidushin for her. This assertion, however, is difficult to justify logically.)
</p><p>
(b) The Ritva quotes others ('Yesh Mefarshim') who explain that the Rabanan <i>did</i> institute that the father may marry off the daughter with Kidushin d'Rabanan (and she has the option for Mi'un) even when she is a 'Yesomah b'Chayei ha'Av.'
</p><p>
The Ritva does not mention whether or not the other relatives may marry her off according to this opinion. It is possible that when the father is alive and can marry her off (mid'Rabanan), the other relatives cannot marry her off.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>BEIS SHMUEL</b> (EH 155:1) writes that not only can the father marry her off, but even the mother and brother can marry off the 'Yesomah b'Chayei ha'Av' with Kidushin d'Rabanan, just as they may marry off an ordinary Yesomah.
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> Rather, the Yavam does Ma'amar and Yibum, so 
          she can uproot them. Shamayim put Zikah on her, so she 
          cannot uproot it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Ula):</font></b> She can do Mi'un even to his Zikah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This is because she uproots the first marriage.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rava - Mishnah):</font></b> If any Ervah (to the Yavam) 
          could have done Mi'un but did not, the Tzarah does 
          Chalitzah, not Yibum.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If Mi'un can uproot Zikah, she should do Mi'un now 
               and the Tzarah can do Yibum!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Tzaras Ervah is different for the following 
          reason:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rami bar Yechezkel):</font></b> If a girl did Mi'un to her 
               husband, she may marry his father. If she did Mi'un 
               to the Yavam, she is forbidden to his father.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> This is because when she fell to Yibum, she looked 
               like his daughter-in-law.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Also in the Mishnah, when she fell to Yibum, the 
               Tzarah looked like Tzaras Ervah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav):</font></b> If she did Mi'un to one brother she is forbidden 
          to all brothers, just like Ba'alas ha'Get (a Yevamah who 
          received a Get);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Since Ba'alas ha'Get is forbidden to the one who 
               gave the Get, she is forbidden to all the brothers. 
               The same applies when she does Mi'un to a Yavam!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Shmuel):</font></b> If she did Mi'un to one brother, she is 
          permitted to the others. She is unlike Ba'alas ha'Get;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The Yavam did an action to Ba'alas ha'Get. Here, she 
               acts on him and says that she does not want him;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> She does not want him, but she desires his brother!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Asi):</font></b> If she did Mi'un to a brother, she is 
          permitted even to him!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Suggestion:</font></b> Rav Asi holds like R. Oshaya, who says that 
          she cannot do Mi'un to uproot his Zikah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> No. When there is only one Yavam, she can 
          uproot the Zikah. The case is, there are two Yevamim. 
          Mi'un does not work on half the Zikah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Ravin):</font></b> If she did Mi'un to one brother, she is 
          permitted to the other brothers. They did not agree to 
          this.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Who didn't agree to this?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Abaye):</font></b> Rav did not agree.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #1 - Answer #2 (Rava):</font></b> R. Oshaya did not agree.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(s)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #2 - Answer #2 (Rava):</font></b> Rav Asi did not agree.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>'MI'UN' IN FRONT OF THE HUSBAND OR 'BEIS' 'DIN'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - Beis Shamai):</font></b> Mi'un must be in front of the 
          husband ...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa - Beis Hillel):</font></b> The wife of Pishon the 
          camel-driver did Mi'un in his absence!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Beis Shamai:</font></b> Since he acted unfairly (he squandered 
               her Melug property), Chachamim were unfair to him 
               (and let her do Mi'un in his absence)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Since he ate Peiros of her property, she must 
          have done Nisu'in. Beis Shamai do not allow Mi'un from 
          Nisu'in!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Chachamim were unfair to him in two respects.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - Beis Shamai):</font></b> Mi'un must be in front of Beis 
          Din ...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> Chalitzah and Mi'un must be in front of three.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Who taught that Mishnah?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rabah):</font></b> It is Beis Shamai.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Abaye):</font></b> It can even be as Beis Hillel. Beis 
          Hillel do not require a Beis Din of expert judges, but 
          they require three!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - Beis Shamai):</font></b> Mi'un must be in front of 
               Beis Din;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Beis Hillel say, it need not be in front of Beis 
               Din.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Both agree that three are needed;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> R. Yosi bar Yehudah and R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon say 
               that with two, it is valid.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Yosef bar Minyomi):</font></b> The Halachah follows the 
               first Tana.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - Beis Shamai):</font></b> She does Mi'un ... (grows up, 
          does Mi'un and gets married).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why is a second Mi'un needed?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Shmuel):</font></b> When she grows up, she must say that 
          she affirms her first Mi'un.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Ula):</font></b> Beis Shamai teach two options (that 
          prevent her from doing Mi'un again):
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> She may do Mi'un, grow up and become Mekudeshes;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> She may do Mi'un and immediately have Nisu'in.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> According to Ula, we understand why it says 
          'until she grows up, <i>does Mi'un</i>, and gets married';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> But according to Shmuel, it should say, 'until she 
               grows up, <i>says</i>...'!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b></b>  This is left difficult.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>5) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHICH GIRLS MUST DO 'MI'UN'?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> Any girl married by her mother and brothers 
          with her consent must do Mi'un. If she was married 
          against her will, she need not do Mi'un;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  R. Chanina ben Antigonus says, any girl too immature to 
          guard her Kidushin money need not do Mi'un;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  R. Eliezer says, the actions of a minor have no effect. 
          She is like one who was enticed (to have Bi'ah);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If she is a Bas Yisrael married to a Kohen, she does 
               not eat Terumah. If she is a Bas Kohen married to a 
               Yisrael, she may eat Terumah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  R. Eliezer ben Yakov says, if the husband is the 
          hindrance (this will be explained), it is as if she is 
          his wife. If he is not the hindrance, it is as if she is 
          not his wife.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara - Rav Yehudah):</font></b> At first, the text of a document 
          of Mi'un used to say 'I do not want him, I do not desire 
          him, and I do not want to be married to him';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Chachamim saw that the text was too long and people 
               might confuse it with a Get. They enacted to write 
               'On day Ploni, Plonis did Mi'un in front of us.'
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) HALACHAH: HOW MANY WITNESSES ARE NEEDED FOR MI'UN</b></font><b>
<br>OPINIONS:</b> The Gemara records an argument with regard to how many witnesses must be present when a Ketanah performs Mi'un. The Beraisa first says that according to Beis Hillel, three witnesses must be present. The Beraisa concludes that other Tana'im maintain that two witnesses suffice and that the Halachah follows that view. The Rishonim disagree about what the Beraisa means.
</p><p>
(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Machshirin) writes that Mi'un may be done even in front of one witness. The reason the Gemara says that it must be done in front of two is that without two witnesses there is no way to prove that she did Mi'un. The Mi'un itself, however, is valid even when two witnesses are not present and there is no way to prove in Beis Din that it was done. Accordingly, if Mi'un is performed in front of a single person and there are two witnesses hiding nearby who witness the Mi'un, the Mi'un is valid and can be proven in Beis Din. This also seems to be the view of <b>RASHI</b> (108a, DH Chenvani) and the <b>RASHBA</b>.
</p><p>
The <b>RITVA</b> adds that even when two witnesses do not watch the Mi'un from a nearby hiding place, the girl is believed when she admits that she performed Mi'un in front of one witness. However, she is believed only from now on (and not retroactively from the time at which she says she did Mi'un), because it is in her hands to do Mi'un now if she chooses to do so.
</p><p>
The <b><b><b>OR</b></b> ZARU'A</b> (1:673) cites <b>RABEINU SIMCHAH</b> who mentions another case of Mi'un performed in front of one witness, for which proof will not be necessary. Mi'un performed only in front of the husband is valid, and when both she and her former husband later admit in court that she did Mi'un, no further proof for the Mi'un is necessary.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAMBAM</b> rules (Perush ha'Mishnayos Yevamos 13:2, Hilchos Gerushin 11:8, and Hilchos Ishus 4:9) that Mi'un must be done in front of two witnesses. This is also the view of <b>RABEINU CHANANEL</b> (cited by Tosfos DH Halachah), the Rashba, and other Rishonim. 
</p><p>
Rabeinu Chananel adds that l'Chatchilah, Mi'un must be done in front of three witnesses; two witnesses are sufficient only b'Di'eved.
</p><p>
According to the Rambam, two witnesses are required not merely to prove that the Mi'un occurred, but actually to effect the Mi'un. If two witnesses are not present at the Mi'un, the Mi'un is not valid (in contrast to the view of Tosfos). Apparently, the Rambam maintains that Mi'un has the status of a 'Davar sheb'Ervah,' like Kidushin and Gerushin, and therefore it must be done in front of two witnesses in order that it take effect, and without two witnesses it does not take effect at all. (The witnesses are not 'Edei Ra'ayah,' witnesses who serve to prove that the event occurred, but they are 'Edei Kiyum,' witnesses who play an integral role in causing the act to take effect. See Kidushin 65b.)
</p><p>
The <b>CHAZON ISH</b> (111:8) adds that according to the Rambam, even when two witnesses are present when Mi'un is done but they are hidden from view, the Mi'un is <i>not</i> valid. Witnesses who are in hiding at the time they see the act are not valid for Kidushin, or for any other act that requires 'Edei Kiyum.'
</p><p>

<b>HALACHAH:</b> The <b>SHULCHAN ARUCH</b> (EH 155:4) cites both opinions.
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>'MACHAZIR' 'GERUSHASO'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If one divorced his wife and remarried her, 
          she may do Yibum when he dies;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  R. Elazar forbids.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  Similarly, if one divorced an orphaned minor and 
          remarried her, she may do Yibum;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  R. Elazar forbids.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  If a father married off his minor daughter and she was 
          divorced, she is like an orphan in the life of her 
          father. If her ex-husband remarries her, all agree that 
          she may not do Yibum.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara) Question:</font></b> What is R. Elazar's reason?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Eifa):</font></b> Because she was once forbidden to the 
          Yavam (when she was divorced, she is always forbidden).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Rabanan):</font></b> If so, Chalitzah should not be 
          required!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps this is true!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection (Beraisa - R. Elazar):</font></b> She does Chalitzah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Retraction (Eifa):</font></b> I was wrong. I do not know his reason.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Abaye):</font></b> R. Elazar is unsure whether death is 
          Mapil (makes her fall to Yibum), or the beginning of the 
          marriage is Mapil;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If death is Mapil, she may do Yibum (at the time 
               there is no Isur);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If the beginning of the marriage is Mapil, Yibum is 
               forbidden (for she was forbidden beforehand).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #3 (Rava):</font></b> Really, R. Elazar is sure that death is 
          Mapil. Rather, everyone knows about the divorce, but not 
          everyone knows that he remarried her. (If she did Yibum, 
          people would think that she merely marries the brother of 
          her ex-husband, which is forbidden.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> To the contrary! When he remarries her, there 
          is publicity!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Perhaps he will remarry her at night and die the 
          next morning.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #4 (Rav Ashi):</font></b> R. Elazar decrees in the first two 
          cases of the Mishnah lest she be confused with an 'orphan 
          in the life of her father'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (Seifa):</font></b> If a father married off his daughter as 
          a minor, and she was divorced, she is like an orphan in 
          the life of her father. If he remarries her, all agree 
          that she may not do Yibum.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> This is obvious! (Mid'Oraisa she was 
               divorced and did not remarry him!)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Rather, the Seifa was taught solely to teach 
               that this is why R. Elazar forbids in the Reisha.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (Beraisa):</font></b> Chachamim admit to R. Elazar about a 
          minor who was married off by her father and divorced. She 
          is like an orphan in the life of her father. If he 
          remarries her she cannot do Yibum, because her divorce is 
          a full divorce, but her remarriage is not full marriage;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This is when he divorced and remarried her when she 
               was a minor. If he divorced her when she was a minor 
               and remarried her when she was an adult, or 
               remarried her when she was a minor and she matured 
               before he died, she does Yibum or Chalitzah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Elazar says, she must do Chalitzah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rava):</font></b> What is the law of her Tzarah?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Nachman):</font></b> She is forbidden to do Yibum only 
          due to a decree. Will we decree to forbid the Tzarah lest 
          one transgress a decree?!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(s)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Beraisa - R. Elazar):</font></b> She and her Tzarah do 
          Chalitzah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Objection:</font></b> Surely, we do not require that both do 
               Chalitzah!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Correction:</font></b> Rather, she or her Tzarah does 
               Chalitzah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(t)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Since the Beraisa must be amended, we can amend 
          it thusly: she may do only Chalitzah; her Tzarah may do 
          Chalitzah or Yibum.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>'ZIKAH' OF A GIRL MARRIED 'MID'RABANAN'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> Two brothers were married to two sisters who 
          are (orphaned) minors; one brother died. His wife is 
          exempt from Yibum and Chalitzah due to her sister. (The 
          same applies if the sisters are deaf - the Gra deletes 
          this from the text.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If one sister is an adult and the other a minor:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the minor's husband died, she is exempt from 
               Yibum and Chalitzah because she is Achos Ishto to 
               the Yavam;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  If the adult's husband died:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Eliezer says, we counsel the minor to do Mi'un 
               (and her sister does Yibum);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Gamliel says, if she does Mi'un on her own, fine. 
               If not, she waits (to have Bi'ah) until she grows 
               up, and then her older sister is exempt from Yibum 
               and Chalitzah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> R. Yehoshua says, woe to him for his wife, woe to 
               him for his brother's wife! He divorces his wife, 
               and does Chalitzah to his Yevamah.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>THINGS TO EMBRACE AND AVOID</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara) Question:</font></b> We do not encourage Mi'un!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Bar Kapara):</font></b> A person should always cling to three 
               things - Chalitzah, bringing Shalom, and permitting 
               vows;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> One should distance himself from three things - 
               Mi'un, deposits, and being a guarantor.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> For a Mitzvah, one may encourage Mi'un.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  Bar Kapara taught that a person should always cling to 
          Chalitzah. This is like Aba Sha'ul:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - Aba Sha'ul):</font></b> If one does Yibum because 
               the Yevamah is attractive, or to be married, or for 
               another reason, it is as if he has Bi'ah with Ervah. 
               I consider the child to be almost a Mamzer.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  One should cling to bringing Shalom - 'Seek Shalom and 
          pursue it';
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) A FATHER'S ACCEPTANCE OF A 'GET' ON BEHALF OF HIS KETANAH DAUGHTER</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Mishnah discusses a Ketanah who was married off by her father and then received a Get while she was still a Ketanah. <b>RASHI</b> (DH Ketanah and DH ba'Meh Devarim Amurim, and in Sanhedrin 69b) writes that her <i>father</i> received the Get on her behalf. Although a man's daughter is no longer in his domain after her Nisu'in, she remains in his domain with regard to his right to receive a Get on her behalf. 
</p><p>
However, Rashi in Kesuvos (46b, DH u'Mekabel) and in Kidushin (43b, DH Hi v'Aviha) writes that the father may <i>not</i> receive a Get for his daughter after Nisu'in. He may receive a Get for her only after Erusin, before Nisu'in, because she leaves the domain of her father at the time of her Nisu'in. 
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> in Kidushin (10a, DH u'Mekabel) discusses the issue of whether the father may receive a Get on behalf of his daughter after Nisu'in. He remains in doubt about the actual Halachah in practice. Rashi, however, seems to take both sides. In some places, he writes that the father may receive the Get for his daughter after Nisu'in, but in other places he writes that the father may not receive the Get for her after Nisu'in. How are the apparently contradictory views of Rashi to be reconciled?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER: REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b> (Teshuvos 2:100) suggests that Rashi's words may be reconciled as follows. When Rashi here and in Sanhedrin writes that the father may receive the Get on behalf of his daughter, he refers to an actual Ketanah. In contrast, when Rashi in Kesuvos and Kidushin writes that the father may not receive the Get on behalf of his daughter, he refers to a Na'arah (see Rashi there). A Na'arah is able to receive her own Get, and thus her father may not receive it for her after Nisu'in. (Tosfos in Kidushin 10a hints to the possibility of such a distinction.)
</p><p>
The reasoning behind this distinction may be as follows. In order to enable a Ketanah to become divorced, the Torah gives the father the authority to accept a Get on his daughter's behalf, because a Ketanah cannot make a Kinyan herself. A Na'arah, however, must accept her own Get, because she is able to make a Kinyan and become divorced on her own. (See, however, Rashi to 113a, DH Al ha'Chareshes, who writes that a Chareshes, who -- like a Ketanah -- lacks Da'as and cannot make a Kinyan, <i>may</i> receive her own Get (when she is an adult), even if her father married her while she was a Ketanah and her Kidushin therefore took effect mid'Oraisa.)
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Avahu):</font></b> We learn a Gezeirah Shavah 
               'Rodef-Rodef'. It says here 'Bakesh Shalom 
               v'Rodfehu', and it says 'Rodef Tzedakah v'Chesed 
               Yimtza Chayim Tzedakah v'Chavod.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  One should cling to permitting vows, like R. Noson 
          taught:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Noson):</font></b> One who vows is like one who builds a 
               private Mizbe'ach (when this is forbidden). If he 
               fulfills his vow, it is as if he offered a Korban on 
               his private Mizbe'ach,
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  One should avoid Mi'un, lest she regret it when she grows 
          up;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  One should avoid deposits from one who lives in the same 
          city, for the depositor is often in the Shomer's house 
          (perhaps he will take back his deposit, and later claim 
          it from him).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b></b>  One should avoid being a guarantor, like guarantors of 
          Shaltziyon:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Yitzchak):</font></b> 'Ra Yero'a Ki Arev Zar' - evil after 
               evil will come upon those that accept converts, 
               guarantors of Shaltziyon, and Toke'a Atzmo 
               li'Dvar`Halachah (this will be explained).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> One who accepts converts is liable, like R. Chelbo 
               taught;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Chelbo):</font></b> Converts are like problematic for 
                    Yisrael like Tzara'as in the skin.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Guarantors of Shaltziyon suffer, for the lender 
               bypasses the borrower and claims immediately from 
               the guarantor.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b></b>  The following teaches about Toke'a Atzmo li'Dvar 
          Halachah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Explanation #1 (Beraisa - R. Yosi):</font></b> If one says that he 
          does not have Torah, he does not have Torah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> This is obvious!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Correction:</font></b> Rather, anyone who says that he has only 
          Torah, has only Torah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> Also this is obvious!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> Rather, he does not have even Torah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Papa):</font></b> 'You will learn and you will do' - only 
               one who fulfills Torah can learn it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> Really, he has only Torah. R. Yosi teaches 
          about one who teaches others, and they fulfill what they 
          learn from him;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> One might have thought that he gets reward for this. 
               R. Yosi teaches that he does not.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Explanation #2:</font></b> Toke'a Atzmo li'Dvar Halachah refers to a 
          judge presiding over a case that slightly resembles a 
          Halachah he has learned (and he applies the law here). 
          Even though he has a Rebbi, he does not ask him;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Shmuel bar Nachmani):</font></b> A judge should view 
               himself as if a sword is between his thighs, and 
               Gehenom is open beneath him. 'Shishim Giborim ... 
               mi'Pachad ba'Lailos' - the judges fear Gehenom, 
               which is like night.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO WAS MARRIED 'MID'RABANAN' TO HIS 'YEVAMAH'S' SISTER</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - R. Gamliel):</font></b> If she does Mi'un (if not, she 
          waits until she grows up, and then her older sister is 
          exempt).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (R. Elazar):</font></b> What is R. Gamliel's reason?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Does he hold that Kidushin of a minor is tentative, 
               and when she matures, her Kidushin matures 
               (retroactively becomes mid'Oraisa) with her, even 
               without Bi'ah (so her sister never fell to Yibum)?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Or, does he hold that (now,a new act of) Kidushin of 
               his Yevamah's sister exempts his Yevamah from Yibum 
               and Chalitzah?
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  This happens only through Bi'ah with his wife 
                    when she is an adult.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav):</font></b> He holds that Kidushin of Achos Yevimto 
          Yevamah exempts his Yevamah. This is only through Bi'ah 
          after she matures.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Rav Sheshes):</font></b> Rav must have been dozing when 
          he said that!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> If one is Mekadesh a minor, the Kidushin 
               is tentative.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> This means that when she grows up, it 
               becomes mid'Oraisa even without Bi'ah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Ravin brei d'Rav Nachman):</font></b> No, the Kidushin is 
          tentative: it becomes mid'Oraisa only if they have Bi'ah 
          after she matures;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> She says, he has power over me (he can divorce me 
               against my will), and I have power over him (I can 
               do Mi'un against his will. Therefore, it is 
               considered Safek Kidushin - Rashi. Ra'avad (brought 
               in Sefer ha'Zechus) - Rav Sheshes accepted the 
               answer, and said 'I used to think that I am better 
               (wiser) than he (Ravin), but I see that he is (able 
               to explain the Beraisa) better than I'.)
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) AGADAH: THE SIXTY 'GIBORIM' SURROUNDING SHLOMO'S BED</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara cites the verse in Shir ha'Shirim (3:7-8) which states, 'Behold, it is the bed of Shlomo surrounded by sixty Giborim (mighty men) of the mighty men of Yisrael. They all clutch the sword and are trained in warfare; each man with his sword upon his thigh, [defending] against the dread of the nights.' The Gemara derives from this verse that when a Dayan issues a ruling, he should be as fearful as though a sword is placed between his legs and Gehinom is open below him.
</p><p>
According to the Gemara's Derashah, who are the 'sixty mighty men' mentioned in the verse?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>RASHI</b> explains that the mighty men are the Talmidei Chachamim who comprise the Sanhedrin, who are fearful in judgment as though a sword is placed beneath them. However, the Sanhedrin was comprised of <i>seventy</i> Dayanim, and not sixty. If the verse refers to the members of the Sanhedrin, why does it mention sixty mighty men and not seventy? Rashi in Sanhedrin (7b) answers that according to the Derashah, the number sixty in the verse is not an exact figure. The point of the verse is to emphasize that Talmidei Chachamim should be adequately prepared when they issue rulings.
</p><p>
The <b>MAHARSHA</b> (in Sanhedrin) cites support for Rashi's interpretation of 'sixty mighty men' from the Midrash (Bamidbar Rabah 11:7) which also explains that the sixty men are Dayanim.
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> disagrees with Rashi and explains that the word 'Giborim' refers to the sixty myriads (600,000) of the Jewish people. (This explanation is also mentioned by the Midrash (loc. cit.) and the Yalkut Shimoni 2:986.) Apparently, according to Tosfos, the verse means that when Shlomo ha'Melech, the Dayan, is surrounded by the Jewish people who come to him to judge their cases, he and his associates must be fearful of Gehinom.
</p><p>
The <b>ROKE'ACH</b> (on Shir ha'Shirim) cites further support for this explanation from a Gematriya: the Gematriya of 'Shishim Giborim' equals the Gematriya of 'Eleh Shishim Rivo' ('these are sixty myriads').
</p><p>
(c) The <b>VILNA GA'ON</b> supports Rashi's interpretation. He explains that when the Sanhedrin convenes, ten of its most prestigious members sit in the middle of the group, surrounded by the other sixty. Those are the 'sixty mighty men' who surround 'the bed of Shlomo.' (The ten in the middle correspond to the seven 'Ro'ei Pnei ha'Melech' and the three 'Shomrei ha'Saf' in the court of a mortal king who are closest to the king, who correspond to the ten in the court of the King of king's; see Megilah 23a. The verse in Melachim II (25:19), which associates these authoritative members of the king's court with sixty other men, appears in the context of a discussion of the members of the Sanhedrin.)
</p><p>
The source for the Vilna Ga'on's explanation is the Midrash (Shir ha'Shirim Rabah 3:13) and Yerushalmi (Sanhedrin 1:2) which associate the verse of Shlomo's bed with the verses that describe the 'Ro'ei Pnei ha'Melech' and the sixty others.
</p><p>
(d) The <b>ARUCH LA'NER</b> cites the Yalkut Shimoni (2:986) which explains that the number sixty refers to the nation of Yisrael, which is comprised of 24 Mishmaros of Kohanim, 24 Mishmaros of Leviyim, and 12 Shevatim which frequented the Beis ha'Mikdash, for a total of sixty groups. (The Aruch la'Ner suggests that these groups comprised the Sanhedrin in the Lishkas ha'Gazis.) (See also Insights to Sanhedrin 7:3)
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHEN DOES A MARRIAGE 'MID'RABANAN 'BECOME 'MID'ORAISA'?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Rav does not hold that it becomes mid'Oraisa 
          only if they have Bi'ah!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav):</font></b> If a minor did not do Mi'un, and she married 
               another man after she matured, she does not need a 
               Get from the second man;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Shmuel):</font></b> She needs a Get from the second man.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> They argue about when she did not have 
               Bi'ah with her first husband after maturing.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> No, the case is, they had Bi'ah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, why doesn't Shmuel require a Get?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> He holds that when the husband has Bi'ah, he 
          relies on the initial Kidushin (and does not intend to 
          Mekadesh through Bi'ah).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> Rav and Shmuel already argued about this!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav):</font></b> If a man was Mekadesh a woman on condition, 
               and did Nisu'in without mentioning the condition 
               (and the condition was not fulfilled), she needs a 
               Get.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Shmuel):</font></b> She does not need a Get.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Rav requires a Get. Since he did Nisu'in, he 
               pardoned his condition;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> Shmuel does not require a Get. When he has Bi'ah, he 
               relies on the initial Kidushin.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> It was necessary for them to argue in both cases.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Had they argued only about the condition, one might 
               have thought that only there Rav holds that she is 
               married, since he pardoned the condition, but 
               regarding a minor who matured, he would agree with 
               Shmuel;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Had they argued only about a minor who matured, one 
               might have thought that only there Shmuel holds that 
               she is not married to the first husband, but 
               regarding a condition, he would agree with Rav!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Did Rav really say that she is married only if 
          they had Bi'ah?!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> A case occurred in which David was Mekadesh Leah 
               (mid'Rabanan), she matured, and she was sitting by 
               the Chupah. Levi grabbed her (and was Mekadesh her). 
               Rav Beruna and Rav Chananel, Talmidim of Rav, were 
               there, and they did not require her to get a Get 
               from Levi.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Ashi):</font></b> Since Levi acted improperly, Chachamim 
          acted improperly to him (and uprooted his Kidushin).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Ravina):</font></b> We understand this if he was Mekadesh 
          her with money (Chachamim can transform the money to be a 
          gift);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If he was Mekadesh her through Bi'ah, how can 
               Chachamim uproot his Kidushin?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Ashi):</font></b> They make his Bi'ah an act of Bi'as 
          Zenus.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yehudah and R. Elazar):</font></b> The Halachah follows R. 
          Eliezer.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>'TZAROS' WHO ARE MARRIED 'MID'RABANAN'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If a man was married to two orphaned minors 
          and he died, Yibum or Chalitzah of one of them exempts 
          the other. The same applies if he was married to two 
          Chershos (deaf-mute women).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If he was married to an orphaned minor and a Chereshes, 
          Yibum or Chalitzah of either does not exempt the other.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  If he was married to a Pikachas (healthy woman) and a 
          Chereshes, Yibum of the Pikachas exempts the Chereshes, 
          but Yibum of the Chereshes does not exempt the Pikachas.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  If he was married to an adult and an orphaned minor, 
          Yibum of the adult exempts the minor, but Yibum of the 
          minor does not exempt the adult.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara) Question:</font></b> A Chereshes cannot do Chalitzah!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> If the Yavam was deaf, or the Yevamah was 
               deaf or a minor and they did Chalitzah, it is 
               invalid.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rav Gidal):</font></b> The Mishnah says 'and similarly' 
          (regarding two Chershos) only regarding Yibum (Yibum of 
          one exempts the other).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rabah):</font></b> It refers even to Chalitzah. We 
          distinguish between a Chereshes from the start of 
          marriage and a Pikachas who later became deaf.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If she was deaf from the start of marriage, just 
               like she married (mid'Rabanan) by gesturing, she 
               leaves (Zikah through Chalitzah) by gesturing.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If she was a Pikachas and later became Chereshes, 
               she is married mid'Oraisa. She cannot do Chalitzah 
               mid'Oraisa, because she cannot recite the verses.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Abaye):</font></b> Also a Chereshes from the start of 
          marriage cannot do Chalitzah!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> If a Cheresh was married to a Chereshes, 
               and his Pike'ach brother was married to a Pikachas 
               not related to the Chereshes, and the Cheresh died, 
               his wife does Yibum. The Yavam may divorce her if he 
               wants;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If the Pike'ach died, the Yavam does Yibum, and he 
               can never divorce her.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Suggestion:</font></b> She was deaf from the start, and 
                    the Mishnah says that she can do only Yibum, 
                    but not Chalitzah!
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE YIBUM OF A 'CHERESH'</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara quotes the Mishnah earlier (104b) which states that a Cheresh and Chareshes cannot perform Chalitzah. The Gemara (here and on 104b) explains that since Chalitzah requires that one say the words in the Parshah of Chalitzah (Devarim 25:7-8), one who is unable to speak cannot perform Chalitzah. However, a Cheresh and Chareshes may perform <i>Yibum</i>, as the Mishnah here states.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (44a, DH Kol she'Eino) asks a basic question on the Gemara. If a Cheresh and Chareshes cannot do Chalitzah, they should also not be able to do Yibum. Just as Chalitzah may not be done in a situation in which Yibum cannot be done (44a), Yibum may not be done in a situation in which Chalitzah cannot be done (see <b>TOSFOS</b> to 44a, DH u'Neyabem). Why may a Cheresh do Yibum if he is unable to do Chalitzah?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER: TOSFOS</b> answers that the only reason why a Cheresh cannot do Chalitzah is that he cannot recite the words that are part of the Chalitzah procedure. It is not because a Cheresh is inherently unfit to do Chalitzah; rather, he is fit to do Chalitzah but something impedes his performance of the procedure. He is like a person who cannot talk because his mouth is in pain (as the Gemara mentions on 104b). Therefore, a Cheresh is considered <i>fit</i> for Chalitzah, and thus he may do Yibum.
</p><p>
Tosfos apparently follows his reasoning as expressed elsewhere. Tosfos (104b, DH v'Ha Amri) writes that even a person who has no Da'as is able to do Chalitzah, as the Gemara (105b) teaches that a Ketanah may do Chalitzah even though she has no Da'as.
</p><p>
This assertion itself, however, is difficult to understand. Why may a Ketanah and a Chareshes -- who have no Da'as -- perform Chalitzah? Chalitzah requires proper mental intent (106a), and Ketanah and Cheresh are incapable of having proper mental intent.
</p><p>
Tosfos answers that since Chalitzah is done in the presence of the elders of Beis Din who instruct the Ketanah or Chareshes to have the appropriate intent, her intent is considered sufficient enough for the Chalitzah to take effect (as the Gemara describes in Gitin 22b with regard to a Katan who writes a Get Lishmah). (Although the Tosefta (11) states that a woman who is a Shotah cannot perform Chalitzah because she lacks Da'as, a Shotah is different from a Ketanah and Chareshes in that she has so little Da'as that even when the Beis Din tells her exactly what intent to have in mind, she is unable to do the act with the intent that it is for the sake of Chalitzah.)
</p><p>
Other Rishonim disagree with Tosfos and give other reasons for why the Chalitzah of a Cheresh is invalid. The <b>RAMBAN</b>, <b>RASHBA</b>, and <b>RITVA</b> (104b) explain that a Cheresh indeed lacks Da'as, and for that reason he cannot perform Chalitzah, and not simply because he cannot articulate the words. (A Ketanah, however, is able to do Chalitzah because she is able to articulate the words and she has enough Da'as to have proper intent for Chalitzah; see <b>RASHBA</b> to Chulin 12b.) According to these Rishonim, why does the Gemara say that a Cheresh cannot perform Chalitzah because 'he cannot speak'? 
</p><p>
The Ramban and Ritva answer that the Gemara refers to a Cheresh who is able to speak but cannot hear. When the Gemara says that he cannot do Chalitzah because he cannot speak, it means that he is unable to <i>hear</i> what the <i>other party</i> says. The Rashba (104b) writes that although a Cheresh is actually unfit for Chalitzah because he has no Da'as, the Gemara gives the reason that he is unable to speak in order to teach that even an <i>Ilem</i>, one who can hear but cannot speak, may not do Chalitzah.
</p><p>
According to these Rishonim, what is the Halachah in the case of a Cheresh who can neither speak nor hear? May he do Yibum? If such a Cheresh is considered to have no Da'as, he is completely unfit for Chalitzah and thus he should not be able to do Yibum. 
</p><p>
These Rishonim make no mention of the logic of Tosfos. They apparently disagree with Tosfos (44a) and maintain that the rule that Yibum depends on Chalitzah is not reciprocative: one who is unfit to do Yibum may not do Chalitzah, but one who is unfit to do Chalitzah <i>may</i> do Yibum. 
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> No. She was Pikachas and went deaf.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Mishnah):</font></b> If two brothers Pikchim were married 
          to two unrelated women, one Pikachas and one Chereshes, 
          and the husband of the Chereshes died, the Yavam does 
          Yibum. Later, he may divorce her if he wants.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the husband of the Pikachas died, the Yavam may 
               do Chalitzah or Yibum.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> Just like the Yavam was Pike'ach from 
               the start, also the Yevamah was deaf from the start, 
               and it says that she may do only Yibum, but not 
               Chalitzah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> No, each case is different. He was Pike'ach from 
          the start, but she was Pikachas and went deaf.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Mishnah):</font></b> If a Cheresh was married to a 
          Chereshes, and his Pike'ach brother was married to her 
          Pikachas sister, and the Cheresh died, his wife is exempt 
          from Chalitzah and Yibum, due to Achos Ishto;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the Pike'ach died, the Cheresh must divorce his 
               wife, and the Yevamah is forbidden forever (until 
               the Yavam dies).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> Here also the Yavam was Pike'ach and 
               went deaf!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> If so, he could not divorce her!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If she went deaf he may divorce her, 
                    but not if she went insane. If he went deaf or 
                    insane, he can never divorce her.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> Rather, he was deaf from the start.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> Just like he was deaf from the start, so 
               was the Yevamah. Since in the case of sisters they 
               were deaf from the start, also in the case of the 
               unrelated women;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  Regarding unrelated women, it says that she may 
                    do only Yibum, but not Chalitzah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b></b>  Rabah had no answer.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rav Yosef (to Abaye):</font></b> Why did you ask from that case? 
          Rabah could answer that the sisters were deaf from the 
          start, but the unrelated women were Pikchos and went 
          deaf! You should have asked from the following case!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> If two brothers were married to two 
               sisters, and both men or both women (including when 
               three or all four of them) were deaf, and one man 
               died, his wife is exempt from Chalitzah and Yibum;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If the wives were unrelated, the Yavam may do Yibum. 
               Afterwards, if he wants he may divorce her.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> What is the case?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> The men were Pikchim and later went 
               deaf.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> If so, they could not divorce!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If she went insane, he may not 
                    divorce her. If he went deaf or insane, he can 
                    never divorce her.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Rather, the men were deaf from the start. 
               Since they were deaf from the start, so were the 
               women, and it says that the Yavam may do Yibum but 
               not Chalitzah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b></b>  Rabah is refuted.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO IS MARRIED TO A 'CHERESHES' AND A MINOR</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If an (orphaned) minor and a Chereshes (were 
          Tzaros, Yibum or Chalitzah of either does not exempt the 
          other).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Ada bar Ahavah and Rav Chana):</font></b> This is only if their 
          husband was Pike'ach, and we do not know which wife he 
          preferred.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Perhaps he preferred the minor, because she will 
               (mature and) have understanding;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Perhaps he preferred the Chereshes, because she is 
               an adult and is (more) fit for Bi'ah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> But if he was deaf, surely he preferred the 
               Chereshes, because she was fit for Bi'ah and was 
               like him!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Nachman):</font></b> Even if their husband was deaf, the Tana 
          is unsure.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is the solution? (A Chereshes cannot do 
          Chalitzah. Chalitzah with the minor (after she matures) 
          would forbid the Chereshes to him.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Chisda citing Rav):</font></b> He does Yibum with the 
          Chereshes, then divorces her. The minor does Chalitzah 
          when she grows up.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Chisda):</font></b> Rav holds that a Chereshes is partially 
          married, and a minor is married and not married (i.e. 
          Safek married).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Perhaps a minor is partially married, and a 
          Chereshes is Safek!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> If so, he would not need to divorce the Chereshes 
          after Yibum. In any case, he could remain married to her!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If a Chereshes is married, the Yibum is valid, so he 
               may keep her;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If a Chereshes is not married, she is like a 
               stranger (i.e. not a Yevamah) who married the Yavam, 
               so she may remain with him!
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) THE REASON WHY A KETANAH AND A CHARESHES DO NOT EXEMPT EACH OTHER FROM YIBUM</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Mishnah (110a) states that when two Tzaros, a Ketanah and a Chareshes, fall to Yibum together, the Yibum or Chalitzah of one does not exempt the other. The Gemara explains that it is assumed that the deceased brother preferred either the Ketanah or the Chareshes, and whichever woman he preferred as his wife is considered his main wife whose Yibum or Chalitzah exempts the other. Since there is a doubt about which wife the brother preferred, neither one exempts the other. Rashi quotes this reason in the Mishnah.
</p><p>
However, the Gemara soon afterwards gives a completely different reason for why the Yibum or Chalitzah of a Chareshes or Ketanah does not exempt the other. The Gemara says that the Kinyan of a Chareshes is a 'half-Kinyan,' while the Kinyan of a Ketanah is a 'Safek Kinyan' -- it might be a fully valid Kinyan, but it also might not be a Kinyan at all. It is because of <i>that</i> doubt that neither woman exempts the other. This reason seems to be entirely different from the reason the Gemara gives earlier. How are the two Sugyos to be reconciled?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) When the Gemara says that there is a doubt which wife the deceased brother preferred, the Chareshes or the Ketanah, Rav Ada bar Ahavah suggests that if the dead brother himself was a Cheresh, obviously he must have preferred the Chareshes over the Ketanah. Rav Nachman rejects this suggestion and states that even if the brother was a Cheresh, a doubt still remains about which wife he preferred, the Chareshes or the Ketanah.
</p><p>
It is possible that Rav Nachman argues with Rav Ada bar Ahavah because he understands the doubt in an entirely different way. Rav Nachman maintains that which wife exempts the other from Yibum does not depend on whether the deceased husband was more fond of one than the other. Rather, he maintains that it depends on whether the Kinyan of a Ketanah is stronger or weaker than the Kinyan of a Chareshes. The Gemara which follows is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Nachman and discusses only the question of the strength of the Kinyan of the Ketanah relative to the Kinyan of the Chareshes.
</p><p>
(b) However, the <b>RASHBA</b> (Teshuvos 1:1196) has a slightly different Girsa in the Gemara. According to his Girsa, it is clear that even Rav Nachman maintains that the doubt is which wife did the Cheresh prefer. Rav Nachman maintains that although the brother was a Cheresh, he might have preferred the Ketanah over the Chareshes. 
</p><p>
The Rashba explains that the Sugyos actually argue with each other, and the Gemara indeed alters its explanation of the Mishnah at this stage.
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO IS MARRIED TO A 'CHERESHES' AND A MINOR (cont.)</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If Rav holds that a minor is Safek married, why 
          must she wait until she grows up and do Chalitzah? She 
          should be allowed to do Yibum in any case!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If a minor is married, the Yibum is valid, so she 
               may remain with him;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If a minor is not married, she is like a stranger 
               who married the Yavam, so she may remain with him!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> If she would do Yibum, there would be no way to 
          permit the Chereshes to marry someone else.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (for Rav Chisda - Rav Sheshes - Beraisa):</font></b> If two 
          brothers are married to two orphaned sisters, a minor and 
          a Chereshes, and the minor's husband died, the Yavam must 
          divorce his wife. The Yevamah waits until she grows up, 
          and does Chalitzah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the Chereshes' husband died, the Yavam must 
               divorce his wife, and the Yevamah is forbidden 
               forever (until the Yavam dies).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If he did Yibum, he divorces her and she may marry a 
               stranger.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> We understand this if a Chereshes is partially 
               married and a minor is Safek. If the Chereshes did 
               Yibum, he divorces her and she may marry a stranger 
               in any case!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  If a minor is married, the Chereshes is the 
                    Yavam's Achos Ishto (his sister' wife)!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> If a minor is not married, the Yibum was a real 
                    Yibum!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> But if a Chereshes is Safek and a minor is 
               partially married, if the Chereshes did Yibum and 
               was divorced, why may she marry a stranger?
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  The Yibum was Pasul (forbidden), and this does 
                    not exempt her from Zikah (even after she is 
                    divorced)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> The Beraisa is like R. Nechemyah, who says 
          that a Pasul Yibum exempts from Chalitzah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Seifa):</font></b> A man was married to two orphaned 
          sisters, a minor and a Chereshes, and he died. The Yavam 
          had Bi'ah with the minor, and then he or another brother 
          had Bi'ah with the Chereshes. Both are forbidden to the 
          Yavam;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> To permit them to marry strangers, he divorces the 
               Chereshes, and the minor does Chalitzah when she 
               grows up.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> We understand this if a Chereshes is partially 
               married, and a minor is Safek; the Beraisa is like 
               Chachamim;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  We decree that the minor needs Chalitzah, lest 
                    people apply the same law when the Yavam had 
                    Bi'ah with the Chereshes first, and then Yibum 
                    of the minor is invalid.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> But R. Nechemyah would not require Chalitzah. He 
               says that a Pasul Yibum exempts!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Conclusion:</font></b> The Beraisa must be like Chachamim.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (Rav Ashi):</font></b> We can also prove this from the 
          Reisha.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> It teaches that if he had Bi'ah with the Chereshes, 
               he divorces her and she is permitted. It does not 
               teach that if he had Bi'ah with the minor, he 
               divorces her and she is permitted!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> This is no proof. There is no permitted way to 
          permit her to marry a stranger, so the Tana taught how 
          she becomes permitted through an Isur (it was forbidden 
          to have Bi'ah with her, due to the Zikah of her sister).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The minor can become permitted to marry a stranger 
               in a permitted way (Chalitzah, after she matures), 
               so the Tana does not teach how she becomes permitted 
               through an Isur.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>RABBINICALLY MARRIED 'TZAROS'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> A man was married to two orphaned minors, and 
          died. If the Yavam had Bi'ah with one, and then he or his 
          brother had Bi'ah with the other, the first Yevamah 
          remains permitted.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) WHEN DOES BEIS DIN INSTRUCT A 'KETANAH' TO DO 'MI'UN'</b></font><b>
<br>OPINIONS:</b> The Mishnah discusses several cases in which a Ketanah and her Tzarah fall together to Yibum, and the Yavam lives with both of them (or he and his brother each take one of them). The Mishnah concludes with the view of Rebbi Elazar who states that Beis Din instructs the Ketanah to do Mi'un, because by doing Mi'un she prevents her Tzarah from becoming forbidden to the Yavam.
</p><p>
According to the Girsa of the Rif and other Rishonim, Rebbi Elazar says that '<i>in all of the cases</i> (b'Chulan) Beis Din instructs the Ketanah to do Mi'un.' Does Rebbi Elazar actually argue that in <i>all</i> of the cases of the Mishnah the Ketanah should do Mi'un? The Mishnah discusses not only cases of a Ketanah and a Gedolah who are Tzaros, but also cases of a Ketanah and a Chareshes who are Tzaros. In the case of a Yavam who lived with both the Ketanah and the Chareshes, does Rebbi Elazar also maintain that Beis Din instructs the Ketanah to do Mi'un so that the Chareshes will not be forbidden to the Yavam?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>RA'AVAD</b> on the Rif and on the Rambam (Hilchos Yibum 5:24) writes that Beis Din does not instruct a Ketanah to do Mi'un when her Tzarah is a Chareshes. He explains that the reason why Beis Din would instruct a Ketanah to do Mi'un is 'Gedolah Ramya Kamei' -- by doing Mi'un, the Ketanah enables the Gedolah to fulfill her Chiyuv d'Oraisa of Yibum. In contrast, a Chareshes has no Chiyuv d'Oraisa to do Yibum, and therefore there is no reason to instruct the Ketanah to do Mi'un.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAMBAN</b> and other Rishonim disagree with the Ra'avad. The Ramban writes that the only reason the Gemara (109b) gives for why a Ketanah should 'distance herself from Mi'un' is that after the Ketanah reaches adulthood she may regret having done Mi'un and she will be left without a husband. In the case of the Mishnah, however, the Yavam lived with the Chareshes after he lived with the Ketanah, and thus the Ketanah becomes forbidden to the Yavam in any case (and she must do Chalitzah and receive a Get if she does not do Mi'un). Therefore, there is no point in discouraging her from Mi'un.
</p><p>
Why, then, does the Gemara state that one would have thought that Rebbi Elazar's ruling applies only in the cases of the earlier Mishnah (109a) and not the Mishnah here, or that his it applies only in the cases of the Mishnah here but not in the cases of the earlier Mishnah? It is unreasonable to suggest that his ruling applies only in the case of the Mishnah here and not in the previous Mishnah, in which the sister of the Ketanah who does Mi'un falls to Yibum to the Ketanah's husband. In all of the cases, if the Ketanah does not do Mi'un she will be sent away with a Get, and thus Beis Din certainly should instruct her to do Mi'un. Moreover, why does the Tana Kama argue with Rebbi Elazar in these cases?
</p><p>
The <b>RAMBAN</b> explains that in the case of the Mishnah here, perhaps the Yavam should be penalized for living with the Chareshes (when he was prohibited to do so) after he lived with the Ketanah, and that is why the Ketanah should not be allowed to do Mi'un. In the case of the earlier Mishnah, it may be preferable <i>not</i> to instruct the Ketanah to do Mi'un so that her sister will not fall to Yibum after her Mi'un. If her sister falls to Yibum after her Mi'un, it will appear as though the Yavam is marrying 'Achos Ishto,' the sister of his wife (since not everyone will realize that the Ketanah did Mi'un).
</p><p>
Therefore, when a Ketanah and Chareshes fall together to Yibum, and the Yavam does Yibum with the Ketanah and afterwards he lives with the Chareshes, the Ketanah should do Mi'un to retroactively remove her Zikah to Yibum, and subsequently the Chareshes will be permitted to the Yavam.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Yibum v'Chalitzah 5:28) rules that if the Yavam lived with the Chareshes and then with the Ketanah, Beis Din does not instruct the Ketanah to do Mi'un and to uproot the Zikah of Yibum from herself, thus leaving the Chareshes as the only Yevamah, as the Ramban writes. However, the Rambam adds that even after the Ketanah does Mi'un, the Yavam should divorce the Chareshes with a Get.
</p><p>
The <b>RAMBAN</b>, <b>RASHBA</b>, and other Rishonim are perplexed with this ruling. If the Ketanah retroactively is not a Tzarah of the Chareshes (because of her Mi'un), why does the Yavam need to divorce the Chareshes with a Get?
</p><p>
One might answer that the Mi'un of the Ketanah does not help to permit the Chareshes to the Yavam because at the time she fell to Yibum it certainly <i>looked</i> like the Ketanah was also a Yevamah. Therefore, the Rabanan enacted that the Yavam's Bi'ah with the Ketanah renders the Chareshes Pesulah even after the Ketanah's Mi'un. This answer is untenable, however, because the Rambam himself (ibid. 5:30) writes that in a case in which the Yavam lived with a Ketanah and then with a Gedolah, the Ketanah should do Mi'un so that the Gedolah retroactively becomes the only Yevamah and becomes <i>permitted</i> to the Yavam! If Mi'un does not completely permit the other Yevamah (as in the case of the Chareshes), the Rambam should say that the Gedolah is <i>not</i> permitted, because she became Pesulah through the Yavam's Bi'ah with the Ketanah that preceded his Bi'ah with her.
</p><p>
The Rishonim reject the ruling of the Rambam because of this problem.
</p><p>
The <b>VILNA GA'ON</b> (EH 171:13) points out that the Rambam himself answers this question. The Rabanan indeed enacted that Bi'ah with the Ketanah before Mi'un renders the Chareshes Pesulah, as mentioned above. However, in the case of the Gedolah and Ketanah, where the Yavam lived with the Ketanah and then with the Gedolah, the Yavam may remain with the Gedolah because, as the Rambam writes, the Kinyan of the Gedolah is a 'Kinyan Gamur' (a Kinyan d'Oraisa). The Rabanan did not enact that Bi'ah before Mi'un disqualifies a 'Kinyan Gamur.' It can disqualify only a Kinyan which is not complete (a Kinyan d'Rabanan), such as the Kinyan of a Chareshes.
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  The same applies if the deceased was married to two 
          Chershos.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  A man was married to a minor and a Chereshes, and he 
          died. If the Yavam had Bi'ah with the minor, and then he 
          or his brother had Bi'ah with the Chereshes, the minor is 
          forbidden to the Yavam;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the Yavam had Bi'ah with the Chereshes, and then 
               he or his brother had Bi'ah with the minor, the 
               Chereshes is forbidden to the Yavam.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  A man was married to a Pikachas and a Chereshes, and he 
          died. If the Yavam had Bi'ah with the Pikachas, and he or 
          his brother later had Bi'ah with the Chereshes, the 
          Pikachas is permitted to the Yavam;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the Yavam had Bi'ah with the Chereshes, and then 
               he or his brother had Bi'ah with the Pikachas, the 
               Chereshes is forbidden to the Yavam.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  A man was married to an adult and a minor, and he died. 
          If the Yavam had Bi'ah with the adult, and he or his 
          brother later had Bi'ah with the minor, the adult is 
          permitted to the Yavam;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the Yavam had Bi'ah with the minor, and then he 
               or his brother had Bi'ah with the adult, the minor 
               is forbidden to the Yavam;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Elazar says, we counsel the minor to do Mi'un.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara - Shmuel):</font></b> The Halachah follows R. Elazar.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  Shmuel needed to rule like R. Elazar both here and above 
          (109a).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Had he ruled only in that Mishnah, one might have 
               thought that this is because Yibum can be done only 
               through Mi'un, but here, since Yibum was already 
               done, the Yavam would divorce both women!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Had he ruled only in our Mishnah, one might have 
               thought that this is because the adult fell to Yibum 
               to the Yavam, but there, the adult did not fall to 
               him (she was Achos Ishto), so we do not encourage 
               Mi'un!
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHEN THE 'YAVAM' AND 'YEVAMAH' ARE MINORS</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If a Yavam and Yevamah are both minors, and 
          they had Bi'ah, they may stay together while growing up;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If he is a minor and she is an adult, and they had Bi'ah, 
          she stays with him while he grows up;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  If within 30 days (of entering the Yavam's house) a 
          Yevamah says that the Yavam has not had Bi'ah with her, 
          we force him to do Chalitzah. If she says this after 30 
          days, we request that he do Chalitzah. If he agrees that 
          he has not had Bi'ah we force him to do Chalitzah, even 
          after 12 months.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  If a woman vowed in the life of her husband not to 
          benefit from her Yavam, we force the Yavam to do 
          Chalitzah. If she vowed after falling to Yibum, we 
          request of him to do Chalitzah;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  If she intended to prevent Yibum, even if she vowed in 
          her husband's lifetime we request of the Yavam to do 
          Chalitzah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara) Suggestion:</font></b> Our Mishnah is unlike R. Meir:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Meir):</font></b> A Yavam or Yevamah who is a 
               minor does not do Yibum or Chalitzah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> The Mishnah can be like R. Meir. R. Meir 
          forbids a minor to do Yibum with an adult, lest the adult 
          transgress (if the minor is a Seris or Ailonis);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> When both are minors, R. Meir permits.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Seifa):</font></b> If the Yavam (a minor) did Yibum, they 
          remain together while he grows up!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (R. Chanina Chuza'ah):</font></b> The case when he already 
          had Bi'ah is different.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> The Mishnah permits them to remain together 
          while he grows up. Each Bi'ah is a (Safek) Isur!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Conclusion:</font></b> Indeed, the Mishnah is unlike R. Meir.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> A minor cannot fulfill 'to establish a name for 
          his brother'!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Abaye):</font></b> 'Her Yavam will have Bi'ah with her' - 
          any Yavam (even a minor).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rava):</font></b> Even without that verse, it cannot be 
          that the Yevamah is forbidden now and will become 
          permitted later (when he matures)!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> Any Yevamah who may not do Yibum when 
               she falls to Yibum is like the widow of a brother 
               who had children, and is (permanently) forbidden to 
               do Yibum.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps the Halachah is, if she falls to 
               Yibum to a minor, he can never do Yibum!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> Yibum applies 'when brothers will dwell 
               together', even if they dwelled together only one 
               day (the Yavam is a baby).
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>A 'YEVAMAH' WHO SAYS THAT THE 'YAVAM' DID NOT DO 'BI'AH'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> Within 30 days (if she says that he did not do 
          Bi'ah, we force him to do Chalitzah).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Who is our Tana, who says that a man can 
          restrain himself (up to) 30 days?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (R. Yochanan):</font></b> It is R. Meir:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Meir):</font></b> A Chasan has 30 days to claim 
               that he found that his wife is not a virgin;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Yosi says, if they were secluded, he must make 
               his claim immediately. If they were not secluded, he 
               may make his claim even after several years.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rabah):</font></b> The Mishnah is even like R. Yosi;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Yosi said only that a man does not withhold 
               himself (when secluded) with his Arusah, since he is 
               familiar with her. A Yavam is shy (to have Bi'ah) 
               with his Yevamah,
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>A 'YEVAMAH' WHO SAYS THAT THE 'YAVAM' DID NOT DO 'BI'AH' (cont.)</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Rather than force him to do Chalitzah, we 
          should force him to do Yibum!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav):</font></b> The case is, she has a Get from him.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Beraisa):</font></b> If within 30 days a Yevamah says that 
          the Yavam has not had Bi'ah with her, whether or not he 
          says that he did Bi'ah, we force him to do Chalitzah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If she says this after 30 days, we request that he 
               do Chalitzah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If she says that he did Yibum and he denies this, he 
               gives her a Get;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> If he says that he did Yibum and she denies this, 
               she needs a Get and Chalitzah, even if he later 
               denies that he did Bi'ah. (Even though she has no 
               Get, in the Reisha within 30 days we force him to do 
               Chalitzah!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (R. Ami):</font></b> Really, she already has a Get. The 
          Seifa teaches that she needs Chalitzah in addition to her 
          Get. (Even if he retracted, she <i>needs</i> Chalitzah, but we 
          do not force him.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rav Ashi):</font></b> She already received a Get from 
          Zikah (forbidding Yibum). She needs Chalitzah and another 
          Get (because he said that he did Bi'ah, even though he 
          later retracted).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  A Yavam and Yevamah came before Rava. Both said that they 
          had not done Yibum (after he initially claimed that they 
          did).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rava:</font></b> Do Chalitzah, and she is permitted.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question (Rav Sharbiya - Beraisa):</font></b> She needs a Get 
               and Chalitzah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rava:</font></b> If the Beraisa says so, that is the law.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Hon):</font></b> What is the law of the Tzarah (of a 
          Yevamah who has been living with the Yavam and claims 
          that she has not had Bi'ah)?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Nachman):</font></b> We will not forbid the Tzarah just 
          because we force or request the Yavam to do Chalitzah!
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO FORBADE HERSELF TO HER 'YAVAM'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If a woman vowed (in the life of her husband 
          not to benefit from her Yavam, we force the Yavam to do 
          Chalitzah).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> At first, they used to say that three in three 
          cases we force a man to divorce his wife and pay a 
          Kesuvah:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> A Kohen's wife said that she was defiled;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> She said 'Shamayim is between us (my husband cannot 
               have normal Bi'ah)';
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> She vowed not to have Bi'ah with any Yisrael.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  Later, Chachamim changed the law, lest a woman desire to 
          marry someone else and use one of these reasons to get 
          divorced.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If a Kohen's wife says that she was defiled, she 
               must prove this;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If she says 'Shamayim is between us', he should seek 
               to appease her;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> If she vows not to have Bi'ah with any Yisrael, her 
               husband annuls the part of the vow that forbids him. 
               She is permitted to him and permanently forbidden to 
               other men.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If she vowed not to have Bi'ah with any Yisrael 
          (and fell to Yibum), what is the law?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Did it cross her mind that she might fall to Yibum 
               (and she intended to forbid Yibum), or not? (Rashi - 
               if not, she is permitted to the Yavam. Tosfos - 
               surely she is forbidden to the Yavam. We ask whether 
               or not we force him to do Chalitzah.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rav):</font></b> The Yavam is not like the husband (it 
          did not cross her mind).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Shmuel):</font></b> He is like the husband.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (for Rav - Abaye - Mishnah):</font></b> If a woman vowed in 
          her husband's lifetime not to benefit from her Yavam, we 
          force him to do Chalitzah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If it crossed her mind, we should only <i>request</i> 
               that he do Chalitzah!
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) A WOMAN WHO MAKES A 'NEDER' AND PROHIBITS HERSELF TO ALL MEN</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTIONS:</b> The Gemara discusses the Halachah of a married woman who made an oath to prohibit herself (b'Tashmish) to all men. The Gemara inquires about her status with regard to her husband's brother after her husband dies. At the time she made her Neder, did she anticipate falling to Yibum, in which case she had her Yavam in mind when she made her Neder, or did she not anticipate falling to Yibum and did not have him in mind, and he is not included in her Neder?
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> explains that the Gemara's question is as follows. When a woman makes a Neder to prohibit herself to someone, she obviously intends to prohibit herself only to someone to whom she otherwise would be permitted. Does she consider the possibility that she will fall to Yibum and become permitted to the Yavam and thus she has intention to prohibit herself to him as well? Perhaps she does not consider the possibility that she will become permitted to the Yavam and thus she does not have in mind to prohibit herself to him.
</p><p>
The Gemara says that according to Rav, 'the Yavam is not like the husband.' According to Shmuel, 'the Yavam is like the husband.' Rashi explains that the woman obviously has in mind to prohibit herself to her husband, as is clear from the fact that the husband must annul her Neder in order to be permitted to her (as mentioned in the Mishnah quoted by the Gemara earlier). Rav maintains that the Yavam is not like the husband and her Neder does not prohibit her to him. Shmuel argues and says that her Neder does prohibit her to the Yavam.
</p><p>
The Gemara attempts to prove Rav's view from the Mishnah (111b). The Mishnah states that when a woman makes a Neder while her husband is alive to prohibit her husband's brother from deriving pleasure from her, Beis Din forces him to do Chalitzah with her when her husband dies. It is assumed that she did not consider the possibility that she would fall to him for Yibum, and thus she did not have in mind to prohibit herself to him under such circumstances. Since she did not intentionally prohibit herself from performing Yibum with the Yavam, Beis Din forces the Yavam to do Chalitzah with her.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> and other Rishonim ask a number of questions on Rashi's explanation.
</p><p>
1. If it is true that when the woman makes her Neder she does not have in mind that her Neder should apply to a man to whom she is prohibited already, why does the Gemara ask its question only about the Yavam? The Gemara's question applies to every other man in the world to whom she is not married. At the moment she makes her Neder, she is prohibited to all other men because of the Isur of 'Eshes Ish'! Similarly, why does the Gemara not ask whether her Neder prohibits her to the husband of her sister after her sister dies? Why does the Gemara ask specifically about the Yavam, when its question is not a question specific to the Yavam?
</p><p>
2. Why does Rav and Shmuel compare the Yavam to 'the husband'? The woman's Neder includes <i>all Jews</i> and not just the husband, and thus Rav should say that the Yavam is 'not like all other Jews,' and Shmuel should say that the Yavam 'is like all other Jews.'
</p><p>
3. It is clear from the Gemara that when a woman makes a Neder while her husband is alive to prohibit her husband's brother from deriving pleasure from her (the case of the Mishnah), she is prohibited to him when she falls to Yibum even though she did not consider the possibility that she might fall to Yibum. It is clear that even though she does not consider the possibility that she might fall to Yibum, she <i>does</i> have in mind to prohibit herself to him (b'Tashmish) when she makes a Neder to prohibit him from deriving pleasure from her.
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The Rishonim propose various answers for these questions:
</p><p>
1. The <b>RASHBA</b> addresses the first question, why the Gemara asks only whether she has the Yavam in mind and does not ask whether she has all other prohibited men in mind. He explains that she certainly has in mind other men who are prohibited to her already because of the Isur of 'Eshes Ish,' because she knows that she can become permitted to them through Gerushin, divorce. Hence, the Gemara does not ask whether or not she includes them in her Neder. As for why the Gemara does not ask whether she has in mind her sister's husband after the death of her sister, the Rashba suggests that perhaps the Gemara's question also applies to that case but it chose to ask its question with regard to just one of the two cases (that of Yavam).
</p><p>
The <b>RITVA</b> adds that the Gemara's question indeed may be specific to the Yavam. In the case of her sister's husband, she certainly considers the possibility that her sister will die and she will become permitted to her sister's husband (because she will become permitted to him when her sister dies regardless of whether her sister has children). In contrast, she might <i>not</i> consider the possibility that her husband will die <i>without children</i> and she will become a Yevamah. Therefore, the Gemara asks only whether she is permitted to the Yavam and not whether she is permitted to her sister's husband.
</p><p>
2. The first question itself may provide the answer to the second question, why Rav and Shmuel say that the 'Yavam is (or is not) like the <i>husband</i>.' The person most obviously included in her Neder is her husband, since he is the only one who is presently permitted to her (without the Neder). It is not so obvious that she includes other men in her Neder, since she is already prohibited to them even without the Neder. Rav and Shmuel compare (or contrast) the Yavam specifically to the <i>husband</i> because it is clear that her Neder refers to him. 
</p><p>
A closer analysis of the words of Rashi (DH Eino k'Ba'al) reveals that Rashi may have another answer to this question. The reason why Rav and Shmuel compare the Yavam to the husband is as follows. If the woman's Neder <i>does</i> prohibit her to the Yavam, the Neder will cause the husband will suffer -- there will be no one to carry on his name if he dies without children. Consequently, her Neder might qualify as 'Devarim she'Beino l'Veinah,' a Neder which affects the relationship between the husband and wife, a type of Neder which the husband is entitled to annul. Thus, the question of the Gemara is not merely whether or not she is prohibited to the Yavam, but whether or not the husband needs to annul the Neder (which prohibits her to the Yavam) or she is permitted to the Yavam without the annulment of the Neder.
</p><p>
This explains why Rav and Shmuel compare the Yavam to the husband. According to Shmuel, the woman's Neder which prohibits her to the Yavam is considered a Neder <i>against the husband</i> which he is entitled to annul. According to Rav, her Neder does <i>not</i> prohibit her to the Yavam and thus the husband has no need to annul it. The husband, however, certainly is not permitted to annul the part of the Neder which affects all other men in the world, because that part of the Neder does not constitute 'Devarim she'Beino l'Veinah.'
</p><p>
This approach answers a different question which the Rishonim ask on the explanation of Rashi. Why does the Gemara find it necessary to quote the Mishnah in Nedarim (which discusses the enactment of the Rabanan which authorizes the husband to annul his wife's Neder that prohibits herself to all Jews) as a preface to the question of whether or not the woman's Neder includes the Yavam? That Mishnah seems unrelated to the question of the Gemara. The Mishnah there says merely that since there is a concern that she is trying to rid herself of her husband, the Rabanan enacted that he may annul her Neder.
</p><p>
According to the explanation implied by Rashi, the reason for why the Gemara cites that Mishnah is clear. The Gemara cites that Mishnah to show that the Rabanan allow the husband to remain married and to annul the part of his wife's Neder that affects him, when she prohibits herself to all Jews. The Gemara questions whether he needs to annul the part of her Neder which prohibits her to the Yavam as well in the event that she falls to Yibum afterwards. (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>
3. The <b>RA'AVAD</b> (cited by the Rashba) answers the third question. He explains that in the case of the Mishnah (111b), the woman does not prohibit herself specifically from Bi'ah, but she prohibits herself from <i>all</i> pleasures from her Yavam, as the Mishnah says, 'ha'Noderes <i>Hana'ah</i>....' Even if she does not intend to prohibit Bi'ah with the Yavam (since she does not anticipate that her husband will die childless), she certainly <i>does</i> prohibit herself from receiving any other form of benefit from him. Beis Din forces him to do Chalitzah, because if he does Yibum with her she will not be able to live with him -- one cannot live with a spouse from whom one is prohibited from deriving any pleasure.
</p><p>
The <b>RITVA</b> offers a different answer. The Ritva explains that in the case of the Mishnah, since the woman singled out the Yavam by mentioning him specifically when she prohibited all Hana'ah from him, although she does not anticipate falling to him for Yibum, she intends for the Neder to prohibit Bi'ah just as it prohibits all of the other forms of Hana'ah from him.
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> and other Rishonim explain the Sugya differently. They explain that the Gemara's question of whether her Neder includes the Yavam refers to the ruling of the Mishnah.
</p><p>
1. The Mishnah states that if the woman considered the possibility that she might fall to Yibum when she prohibited herself to her husband's brother (and she intended to avoid Yibum), Beis Din does not force the Yavam to do Chalitzah. If, on the other hand, she did not consider the possibility that she might fall to Yibum (and she did not intend to avoid Yibum), Beis Din forces the Yavam to do Chalitzah. The Gemara asks what her intention is when she prohibits herself to the Yavam during her husband's lifetime.
</p><p>
This approach provides a clear answer to the first question. The Gemara's question is unrelated to the assumption that a woman does not intend to prohibit herself to a man who is already prohibited to her. In fact, that assumption is incorrect -- <i>all men</i> become prohibited to her as a result of her Neder, whether or not they are presently permitted to her. The Yavam is included in the Neder as well, and thus the Mishnah rules that he must perform Chalitzah and not Yibum (this answers the third question). The Gemara is in doubt only whether or not she <i>intended</i> to avoid a situation of Yibum with her Neder.
</p><p>
2. Rav says that 'the Yavam is not like the husband.' He means that when the woman declares that she is prohibited from all Jews, it is assumed that she is attempting to get away from her husband (as the Mishnah in Nedarim teaches), but she is <i>not</i> attempting to get away from the Yavam because she does not consider the possibility of falling to Yibum. In that sense, 'the Yavam is not like the husband.' Shmuel says that she <i>does</i> consider the possibility of falling to Yibum and thus she <i>does</i> intend to get away from him through her Neder, just as she intends to get away from her husband through her Neder.
</p><p>
3. There is no question that the Neder <i>does</i> take effect with regard to the Yavam even though he is presently prohibited to her (as mentioned above in the answer to the first question). The question of the Gemara is only whether she <i>intended</i> to avoid a situation of Yibum.
</p><p>
Why does Rashi not explain the Gemara in this straightforward fashion? Rashi apparently is bothered by the wording of the Gemara's question. If the Gemara's question has no practical applications other than the Halachah of the Mishnah, the Gemara should not ask about a woman who made a Neder with the words, 'I am hereby prohibited to <i>all Jews</i>.' The Gemara should ask instead what the Halachah is in a simple case in which a woman makes a Neder, during her husband's, which prohibits herself specifically to her <i>husband's brother</i>. (Although the Mishnah says that it is assumed that she does <i>not</i> intend to avoid a situation of Yibum with the Neder she makes while her husband is alive, perhaps that reasoning applies only when her husband has children who die later (after she makes her Neder), and whose death necessitates that she fall to Yibum when her husband dies. (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> The case is, she had children. She did not 
          expect that her children will die and then her husband.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Inference:</font></b> If she had no children, we only request that 
          he do Chalitzah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Seifa):</font></b> If she intended to prevent Yibum, we 
          request that he do Chalitzah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The Seifa should distinguish without changing her 
               intent, i.e. we force him to do Chalitzah only if 
               she had children. If not, we only request!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Conclusion:</font></b> Rather, whether or not she had children, we 
          force him to do Chalitzah, like Rav.
<br>
<br><center><font color='ff0000' size='+1'><b>***<b>PEREK CHERESH</b>***
</b></font></center><p><b>
<br><b></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>MARRIAGE OF DEAF PEOPLE</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If a Cheresh (deaf man) married a Pikachas, or 
          he was a Pike'ach and she was a Chereshes, he may choose 
          to divorce her or stay married;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Just like he married through gesturing, he may 
               (authorize a Get and) divorce by gesturing.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If a Pike'ach married a Pikachas and she went deaf, he 
          may choose to divorce her or stay married. If she went 
          insane, he may not divorce her;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If he went deaf or insane, he can never divorce her.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (R. Yochanan ben Nuri):</font></b> Why do we say that if 
          she goes deaf he may divorce her, but if he goes deaf he 
          cannot?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Chachamim):</font></b> A woman is divorced whether or not 
          she wants. A man divorces only if he wants to;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Yochanan ben Gudgada testified that if a man 
               married off his Chereshes daughter (before she was a 
               Bogeres), she may be divorced.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Chachamim:</font></b> Also she (a Pikachas that went deaf) has 
               the same law.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  If two brothers were married to two sisters, and both 
          members of one or both pairs of siblings were deaf, and 
          one man died, his wife is exempt from Chalitzah and 
          Yibum;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the wives were unrelated, the Yavam may do Yibum. 
               Afterwards, if he wants he may divorce her.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  If two brothers, one deaf and one Pike'ach, were married 
          to two sisters Pikchos, and the deaf brother died, his 
          wife is exempt from Chalitzah and Yibum, for she is 
          (mid'Oraisa the Yavam's) Achos Ishto;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the Pike'ach died, the Cheresh must divorce his 
               wife, and the Yevamah is forbidden forever (until 
               the Yavam dies).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  If two brothers Pikchim were married to two sisters, one 
          deaf and one Pikachas, and the husband of the Chereshes 
          died, she is exempt from Chalitzah and Yibum, due to 
          Achos Ishto;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the husband of the Pikachas died, the Yavam must 
               divorce his wife, and the Yevamah does Chalitzah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b></b>  If a Cheresh was married to a Chereshes, and his Pike'ach 
          brother was married to her Pikachas sister, and the 
          Cheresh died, his wife is exempt from Chalitzah and 
          Yibum, due to Achos Ishto;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the Pike'ach died, the Cheresh must divorce his 
               wife, and the Yevamah is forbidden forever (until 
               the Yavam dies).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b></b>  If two brothers, one deaf and one Pike'ach, were married 
          to two unrelated Pikchos, and the Cheresh died, the Yavam 
          may do Chalitzah or Yibum.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the Pike'ach died, the Yavam does Yibum and can 
               never divorce her.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b></b>  If two brothers Pikchim were married to two unrelated 
          women, one Pikachas and one Chereshes, and the husband of 
          the Chereshes died, the Yavam does Yibum. Later, he may 
          divorce her if he wants.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the husband of the Pikachas died, the Yavam may 
               do Chalitzah or Yibum.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b></b>  If a Cheresh was married to a Chereshes, and his Pike'ach 
          brother was married to a Pikachas not related to the 
          Chereshes, and the Cheresh died, his wife does Yibum. The 
          Yavam may divorce her if he wants;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the Pike'ach died, the Yavam does Yibum, and he 
               can never divorce her.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>RABBINIC MARRIAGES</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara - Rami bar Chama) Question:</font></b> Why did Chachamim 
          enact marriage for Chershim, but not for lunatics?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> If a lunatic or a minor married a woman, 
               and he died, she is exempt from Chalitzah and Yibum.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Marriage with a Cheresh will last, so Chachamim 
          enacted it. Marriage with a lunatic will not last, for a 
          person cannot live in a basket with a snake (i.e. very 
          close to a source of constant anxiety), so Chachamim did 
          not enact it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why Chachamim enact marriage for Chershim, but 
          not for a (male) minor?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Chershim will never be able to marry mid'Oraisa, 
          so Chachamim enacted marriage mid'Rabanan for them. A 
          minor will be able to get married mid'Oraisa, so no 
          enactment was made for him.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> A female (orphaned) minor will be able to be 
          marry mid'Oraisa, and marriage was enacted for her!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> This was so men will not treat (have Bi'ah with) 
          her like Hefker.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why may a girl do Mi'un, but a Chereshes may 
          not?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> If Chershos could do Mi'un, men would not marry 
          them.
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) THE KIDUSHIN OF A KETANAH</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara discusses whether the Rabanan instituted Nisu'in for a Cheresh, Shoteh, Katan, and Ketanah. The Gemara says that for a Shoteh (and Shotah) and a Katan the Rabanan did <i>not</i> institute Nisu'in, but for a Cheresh (and Chareshes) and Ketanah they <i>did</i> institute Nisu'in.
</p><p>
Why does the Gemara discuss only Nisu'in? Why does it not ask whether the Rabanan instituted <i>Kidushin</i> for a Cheresh, Shoteh, Katan, and Ketanah? Similarly, the Mishnah discusses only the Nisu'in of a Cheresh. Why does it not also discuss his Kidushin?
</p><p>
Moreover, the Mishnah earlier (107b) states that the Ketanah who may do Mi'un is one whose mother and brother effected her 'Nisu'in.' Why does it not mention the Ketanah's <i>Kidushin</i> at all?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>TESHUVOS HA'RIF</b> (1:267-268), in a Teshuvah attributed to <b>RABEINU YEHUDAH ALBARGELONI</b> (author of Sefer ha'Itim), writes that a Ketanah cannot have Kidushin (since she cannot effect a Kinyan) but only Nisu'in. For this reason the Mishnah mentions only the 'Nisu'in' of a Ketanah. The same reasoning presumably applies to a Cheresh and Chareshes.
</p><p>
(b) The Ramban (107a) and other Rishonim cite the <b>RIF</b> who rejects this suggestion because it is clear from many places in the Mishnah and Gemara that a Ketanah <i>does</i> have Kidushin. For example, the Mishnah (107a) states that according to Beis Hillel, a Ketanah who is an <i>Arusah</i> (with only Kidushin) may do Mi'un, while according to Beis Shamai <i>only</i> an Arusah may do Mi'un. Similarly, the Beraisa (108a) gives an example of Mi'un wherein a girl says, 'I do not want the <i>Kidushin</i> with which my mother was Mekadesh me,' and the Gemara (ibid.) discusses whether it is considered Mi'un when an <i>Arusah</i> accepts Kidushin from another person. (See also 109b, where the Gemara discusses the Kidushin of one who was Mekadesh a Ketanah.) In Gitin (65a), the Gemara says that a girl who is old enough to take care of an object she receives is old to become 'Miskadeshes' with Kidushin d'Rabanan. Similarly, Rashi here (DH d'Takinu) writes that the Rabanan instituted Nisu'in 'and Kidushin' for a Cheresh.
</p><p>
Accordingly, it seems that whenever the Mishnah or Gemara mentions Nisu'in with regard to a Ketanah, it is not used in the specific sense, but rather as a general term which includes Kidushin as well.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>RAMBAN</b> (107a, and cited by the Rashba and Ritva) accepts the reasoning of Rabeinu Yehudah Albargeloni and suggests a compromise between the above-mentioned opinions in order to explain why the Mishnah uses the term 'Nisu'in' when it discusses the betrothal (Kidushin) and marriage (Nisu'in) of a Ketanah.
</p><p>
The Ramban suggests that a Ketanah does have Kidushin, but only when the Ketanah herself personally accepts the Kesef or Shtar of Kidushin. If her mother or brother accepts the Kesef or Shtar on her behalf, the Kidushin does not take effect. This is because the Rabanan did not institute Shelichus for a Ketanah, and thus Kidushin does not take effect for her when someone else accepts the Kidushin on her behalf. Furthermore, when someone else accepts the Kidushin for the Ketanah, the Ketanah does not relate to that action as one which affects her personally, and thus she does not consent to the Kidushin. (The Kidushin of a Ketanah takes effect only with her full consent, 107b.) Nisu'in, in contrast, involves physically bringing the Ketanah into the home of the husband, and thus the Nisu'in is valid even when it is her mother or brother who gives her over to the husband for Nisu'in. Since the Ketanah is involved in the act of Nisu'in, she presumably consents to it. The Mishnayos which mention the Nisu'in of a Ketanah done through her mother or brother specifically mention Nisu'in because the mother and brother are not involved in her Kidushin but only in marrying her off with Nisu'in. The Mishnayos that mention Kidushei Ketanah refer to cases in which she accepted the Kidushin herself.
</p><p>
In the case of the Gemara here, perhaps the Ramban maintains that the Rabanan did not institute Kidushin for a Chareshes at all (even when she accepts the Kesef or Shtar herself), and thus the Gemara discusses only whether the Rabanan instituted <i>Nisu'in</i> for a Chareshes. A Chareshes is considered to have less Da'as than a Ketanah since she will <i>never</i> have Da'as, unlike a Ketanah who eventually will have Da'as. The Rabanan required that Kidushin be done with her only so that it be followed by Nisu'in. The Kidushin itself is ineffective until the Nisu'in is done. Therefore, it is logical to suggest that a Chareshes has <i>only</i> Nisu'in, in contrast to a Ketanah who has Kidushin as well.
</p><p>
According to this approach, what does the Beraisa (108a) mean when it says that Mi'un occurs when the Ketanah says, 'I do not want the Kidushin with which my mother was Mekadesh me'? If the Ketanah's mother accepted Kidushin for her, the Kidushin should not take effect and there should be no need for Mi'un! The Ramban explains that the Beraisa means that the Ketanah says, 'I do not want the Kidushin that they (my mother or brother) <i>persuaded me</i> to accept for myself.'
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MARRIAGE OF DEAF PEOPLE AND A MINOR</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why may a girl married mid'Rabanan to a Kohen 
          eat Terumah, but a Chereshes may not?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> R. Yochanan ben Gudgada testified that if 
               a man married off his Chereshes daughter she may be 
               divorced, and that a minor married (mid'Rabanan) to 
               a Kohen eats Terumah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> A Chereshes does not eat Terumah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> We decree to forbid, lest a Chereshes married to 
          a Cheresh (Kohen) eat.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why shouldn't she eat? We need not stop a minor 
          (or a Chereshes, who is also exempt from Mitzvos) from 
          eating forbidden food!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> We forbid a Chereshes married to a Cheresh lest a 
          Pikachas married to a Cheresh eat.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Since she is married mid'Rabanan, she should be 
          permitted to eat Terumah mid'Rabanan!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> We decree lest she eat Terumah mid'Oraisa.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why does a minor have a Kesuvah, but a 
          Chereshes does not?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> If a Chereshes had a Kesuvah, no man would marry 
          her;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is the source that a minor has a Kesuvah?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Mishnah):</font></b> The following have no Kesuvah: one who 
          did Mi'un, a Sheniyah, and an Ailonis.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> If a minor was divorced, she would have a 
               Kesuvah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is the source that a Chereshes has no 
          Kesuvah?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Beraisa):</font></b> If a Cheresh or lunatic married a 
          Pikachas, even if he became healthy, she has no claim 
          against him. If he wants to remain with her, she has a 
          Kesuvah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If a Pike'ach married a Chereshes or lunatic, even 
               if he wrote her a Kesuvah of 10000 Zuz it is valid, 
               because he chose to give away his property.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> This is only because he chose to give. If 
               not, she has no Kesuvah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> This is because if she had a Kesuvah, no man would 
               marry her.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, we should enact a Kesuvah for a Pikachas 
          who marries a Cheresh. If not, women will not marry deaf 
          men!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Women (will marry in any case, for they) are more 
          eager to marry than men are.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b></b>  Rav Malkiyo married off a Cheresh to a woman; he wrote 
          her a Kesuvah of 400 Zuz from the man's property.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rava:</font></b> This was very smart! If the man wanted a slave to 
          serve him, we would buy one for him. Now, he also gets a 
          wife!
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>A DEAF PERSON'S OBLIGATION IN 'MITZVOS'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #1 (Shmuel):</font></b> If another man had Bi'ah with a 
          Cheresh's wife, (we do not consider her a Safek Eshes 
          Ish, so) he does not bring an Asham Taluy.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support	(Mishnah):</font></b> There are five types of people cannot 
          separate Terumah, even b'Di'eved: a Cheresh, a lunatic, a 
          minor, one who does not own the produce, and a Nochri who 
          separated a Yisrael's produce, even with permission.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> Shmuel holds like R. Elazar (who considers a 
          Cheresh to be a Safek Pike'ach);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Elazar):</font></b> One may not treat Terumah 
               separated by a Cheresh like Chulin, because he is a 
               Safek (Pike'ach).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If Shmuel holds like R. Elazar, he should 
          obligate an Asham Taluy!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> (He holds that) one brings an Asham Taluy only 
          for a Safek based on two objects (one of which was Vadai 
          forbidden).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> R. Elazar does not require that there were two 
          objects!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Elazar):</font></b> One must bring an Asham Taluy 
               for eating Chelev of a Koy (a Safek Beheimah, Safek 
               Chayah).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Shmuel holds like R. Elazar regarding a Cheresh, 
          but not regarding Asham Taluy.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #2 (Shmuel):</font></b> One brings an Asham Taluy for Bi'ah 
          with a Cheresh's wife.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Mishnah):</font></b> Five types of people cannot separate 
          Terumah...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Shmuel holds like R. Elazar.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rav Ashi):</font></b> What is R. Elazar's reason?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Does he hold that a Cheresh always has the same weak 
               Da'as (understanding), and he is unsure whether or 
               not his Da'as is clear?
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE KIDUSHIN OF A KATAN</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara rules that a Ketanah married to a Kohen may eat Terumah, but a Chareshes married to a Kohen may not eat Terumah. (According to some Rishonim, the Gemara refers to Terumah d'Rabanan; see Tosfos to Yevamos 90a, DH v'Ocheles, and Gitin 55a, DH v'Al Ketanah.) The Gemara explains that in the case of a Chareshes, although the Chareshes does nothing wrong when she eats Terumah (since she is not obligated to observe the Mitzvos), the Rabanan prohibited her from eating Terumah, lest people see her eat Terumah and mistakenly assuming that in the converse situation, where an ordinary woman is married to a Cheresh Kohen, the woman may eat Terumah (which is prohibited mid'Oraisa, since the Kidushin is not valid mid'Oraisa).
</p><p>
Why did the Rabanan not enact the same prohibition in the case of a Ketanah married to a Kohen? In that case, too, there is a concern that people will see the Ketanah eat Terumah and mistakenly assume that when a Katan who is a Kohen marries an adult woman, the woman may eat Terumah, when in truth the Kidushin is not valid mid'Oraisa and the woman certainly is prohibited from eating Terumah.
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>RASHI</b> (DH Gezeirah) answers that there can be no such case in which a Kohen Katan is married to an adult woman. The Rabanan did not institute Kidushin at all for a Katan, as the Gemara says earlier (112b).
</p><p>
Rashi's opinion is not accepted by all Rishonim. Others maintain that the Rabanan did institute Kidushin d'Rabanan for a Katan who marries a Gedolah. (Their opinion will be explained below.)
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Shema Ya'achil) disagrees with Rashi's answer. Tosfos earlier (62b, DH Samuch) points out that the Gemara praises a person who marries off his <i>children</i> (i.e. daughters <i>and sons</i>) immediately before they reach adulthood. The Gemara there implies that the Rabanan <i>did</i> institute Kidushin for a Katan (see also Tosfos 96b, DH Nasa). When the Gemara (112b) says that the Rabanan did not institute marriage for a Katan, it means that they did not institute a state of Nisu'in which has the full status of marriage for all of the Halachos of marriage (such as the right of the husband to keep the income of the wife). However, they did institute that a Katan is permitted to marry and is not considered to be living with an unmarried woman immorally.
</p><p>
Why, according to Tosfos, did the Rabanan not prohibit a Ketanah married to a Kohen from eating Terumah lest people assume that a Gedolah (an adult woman) married to a Kohen Katan may also eat Terumah?
</p><p>
Tosfos explains that a Katan usually is married off only close to adulthood. Since not much time remains until he reaches adulthood -- at which moment his Kidushin becomes a Kidushin d'Oraisa -- the Rabanan did not deem it necessary to prohibit the Ketanah-wife of a Kohen from eating Terumah lest people think that the Gedolah-wife of a Kohen Katan may eat Terumah in the short amount of time before he reaches adulthood.
</p><p>
(The <b>TESHUVOS HA'RASHBA</b> 4:207 disagrees with Tosfos and sides with Rashi, who maintains that the Rabanan did not mean that a father should marry off his sons <i>before</i> they reach the age of adulthood, but rather immediately <i>after</i> they reach that age. Any relationship they have before they reach adulthood is considered Bi'as Z'nus.)
</p><p>
(c) <b>RABEINU YITZCHAK B'REBBI YEHUDAH</b>, cited by the <b>MAHARIK</b> (Shoresh #32), writes that the father of a Katan may accept Kidushin for his minor son and the Kidushin takes effect mid'Oraisa, because of the principle of 'Zachin l'Adam she'Lo b'Fanav' -- a person may acquire a benefit on behalf of somebody else while not in his presence. If the Kidushin of the Katan takes effect mid'Oraisa, perhaps there was no need for the Rabanan to prohibit the Ketanah from eating Terumah, because when a Katan is married to a Gedolah she may eat Terumah because the Kidushin is d'Oraisa!
</p><p>
The Acharonim discuss the opinion of Rabeinu Yitzchak at length. Although an acquisition of <i>property</i> may be transacted on behalf of a Katan through the principle of 'Zechiyah' (Bava Metzia 72a, Kidushin 42a), and according to some Rishonim (<b>RAN</b> to Kidushin 42a, <b>TOSFOS</b> to Sanhedrin 68b) the Kinyan takes effect mid'Oraisa, the same does not apply to Kidushin. One cannot transact a Kinyan of a <i>wife</i> for a Katan through 'Zechiyah' (or even for a Gadol for that matter; see Kidushin 45a and Rashi there).
</p><p>
The <b>MAHARIT</b> (Teshuvos, EH 2:41) cites many proofs against the opinion of Rabeinu Yitzchak, including the Gemara here (112b) which states that the Rabanan did not institute Nisu'in for a Katan because there certainly exists no Kidushin d'Oraisa for a Katan. (See also <b>AVNEI MILUIM</b> 1:1 who addresses some of the Maharit's questions.)
</p><p>
The Maharit concludes that even Rabeinu Yitzchak himself does not mean that a Katan can become married as a minor with Kidushin d'Oraisa through the father's ability of 'Zocheh she'Lo b'Fanav.' Rather, he means that the father may accept the money for the Kidushin while his son is a Katan in order for the Kidushin to take effect mid'Oraisa <i>when his son reaches adulthood</i> -- if his son expresses interest in the Kidushin at that point. (He compares this opinion to the Gemara in Kesuvos (11a) which allows Beis Din to perform conversion for a Katan. The conversion takes effect at the time the convert reaches adulthood and consents to the conversion.) Accordingly, even Rabeinu Yitzchak agrees that there is no Kidushin d'Oraisa for a Katan.
</p><p>
The <b>RASHBA</b> (109b) proposes a similar logic with regard to a Ketanah. He writes that when a father accepts Kidushin for his Ketanah daughter, as soon as she reaches adulthood the Kidushin becomes d'Oraisa. The money that the father accepted when she was a Ketanah was intended for the purpose of making Kidushin take effect with the daughter from the moment she becomes a Gedolah, if she consents to the Kidushin at that point.
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Or, is he sure that his Da'as is weak and (normally) 
               unclear, but at times it is clear?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> What difference does it make what his 
               reason is?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> It determines whether or not he may divorce 
               his wife;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  If he is always the same, his Get is as valid 
                    as his Kidushin!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> If he alternatives, he can Mekadesh but cannot 
                    divorce (we must be concerned lest his Da'as 
                    was clear at the time of Kidushin, but unclear 
                    when he divorced)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b></b>  This question is not resolved.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>AN INSANE WOMAN</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If she went insane...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Yitzchak):</font></b> Mid'Oraisa, a man can divorce a lunatic; 
          just like a Pikachas is divorced against her will.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Chachamim said that she may not be divorced, lest 
               she be treated like Hefker.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is the case?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If she can guard her Get and herself, she will not 
               be like Hefker!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If she cannot guard her Get nor herself, she cannot 
               be divorced mid'Oraisa!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (D'Vei R. Yanai):</font></b> 'V'Nasan b'Yadah (he will put 
                    a Get in her hand)' discusses a woman who has a 
                    Yad (power of acquisition) to accept divorce 
                    herself (as opposed to through her father);
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> A lunatic has no such Yad!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>(Tana d'Vei R. Yishmael):</font></b> 'He will send her 
                    from his house' discusses a wife who is 
                    expelled and does not return.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iv. </font></b></b> A lunatic will return to him!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The case is, she can guard her Get but not 
          herself.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Mid'Oraisa, she can be divorced, since she can guard 
               her Get;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Mid'Rabanan she may not be divorced, lest she be 
               like Hefker.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (Abaye - Mishnah):</font></b> If she went insane, he may not 
          divorce her. If he went insane, he may <i>never</i> divorce 
          her.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> 'Never' connotes that this is mid'Oraisa. When she 
               went insane, it is only mid'Rabanan (that he cannot 
               divorce her).
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>DIVORCE OF DEAF PEOPLE</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - R. Yochanan ben Nuri) Question:</font></b> (Why do we say 
          that if she goes deaf he may divorce her, but if he goes 
          deaf he cannot?)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Is the case of a man (who went deaf) clear to 
          R. Yochanan ben Nuri, and he is unsure about a woman (who 
          went deaf)?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Or, is the case of a woman clear, and he is unsure 
               about a man?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Mishnah - Chachamim):</font></b> A man that divorces is 
          unlike a woman that is divorced. A woman is divorced 
          willingly or unwillingly, and a man divorces only 
          willingly.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This shows that R. Yochanan ben Nuri was unsure 
               about a man.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> To the contrary! Since they (brought R. 
          Yochanan ben Gudgada's testimony, and) said 'Also she has 
          the same law', this shows that R. Yochanan ben Nuri was 
          unsure about a woman!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> R. Yochanan ben Nuri (had no doubt. He) 
          addressed Chachamim according to their reasoning;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> I hold that just like a deaf man cannot divorce, a 
               Chereshes cannot be divorced. Why do you 
               distinguish?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> They answered that a man who divorces is unlike a 
               woman who is divorced...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> R. Yochanan ben Gudgada testified (that a 
          Chereshes married mid'Oraisa may be divorced).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava):</font></b> This teaches that if a man tells witnesses 'watch 
          me give this Get', and tells his wife (before giving it) 
          'take this loan document', she is divorced.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Yochanan ben Gudgada taught that divorce works 
               even if she has no understanding. The same applies 
               here!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> This is obvious!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> One might have thought that since he said 'take 
          this loan document', he invalidated the Get. R. Yochanan 
          teaches that this is not so;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Had he invalidated it, he would have told the 
               witnesses. Since he did not tell them, it is still 
               valid;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> He deceived his wife to spare himself shame.
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>MUST ONE STOP A MINOR OR DEAF PERSON FROM SINNING?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b></b>  R. Yitzchak bar Bisna lost the keys to the Beis Medrash 
          in a Reshus ha'Rabim on Shabbos.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Pedas:</font></b> Get children to play there. If they find 
               the keys, they will bring them.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> He holds that if a child is eating forbidden food 
               (or doing any other Isur), Beis Din need not stop 
               him.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (Beraisa):</font></b> A man should not tell a child 'bring 
          to me a key' or 'bring to me a stamp' but he may allow 
          the child to uproot or throw things.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection (Abaye):</font></b> The case is, he uproots from a 
          flowerpot without holes (what grows inside is not 
          considered attached to the ground) or throws in a 
          Karmelis (these are forbidden only mid'Rabanan).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Mishnah):</font></b> If a Nochri comes to extinguish a 
          fire, we do not tell him 'extinguish' or 'don't 
          extinguish', since we are not commanded that he rest;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If a child comes to extinguish, we tell him 'don't 
               extinguish', since we are commanded that he rest on 
               Shabbos.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (R. Yochanan):</font></b> It is forbidden when the child does 
          so to please his father.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, similarly the Nochri does so to please 
          the Yisrael. This is forbidden!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> A Nochri acts in his own interest.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (Beraisa):</font></b> If the son of a Chaver (one 
          trustworthy about Ma'aser) often goes to his mother's 
          father's house, we are not concerned lest they feed him 
          Tevel. If the father finds food in his son's hand, he is 
          not responsible.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection (R. Yochanan):</font></b> This is no support. We are more 
          lenient about Demai (doubtfully tithed produce).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Inference:</font></b> If it was definitely Tevel, he would need to 
          Ma'aser it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Contradiction:</font></b> Above, R. Yochanan answered 'he acts on 
          his father's volition' (but we need not stop minors who 
          transgress for their own benefit)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> R. Yochanan is in doubt what is the Halachah. He 
          rejects the proofs for both opinions.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (Beraisa):</font></b> If the son of a Kohen Chaver (who is 
          reliable regarding Taharah) often goes to the house of 
          his mother's father, an ignoramus Kohen, we are not 
          concerned lest they feed him Tamei Terumah. If the father 
          finds food in his hand, he is not responsible.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> This is no support. The Beraisa discusses 
          Terumah mid'Rabanan.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (Beraisa):</font></b> A child may nurse from a Nochris or a 
          Tamei animal. We are not concerned that he suckles 
          something detestable and forbidden;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> One may not <i>feed</i> to a child Neveilah, Treifah, 
               Tamei rodents or vermin;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> The child may nurse from them even on Shabbos. An 
               adult may not;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Aba Sha'ul says, we used to nurse from Tahor animals 
               on Yom Tov.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Conclusion:</font></b> The Beraisa says that we are not 
               concerned that he suckles Isur!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> It is permitted because the child is in danger 
          if he does not nurse.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, it should be permitted even for an 
          adult!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> An adult is forbidden until we assess that he is 
          in danger.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(s)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> A child should also need an assessment!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(t)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Huna brei d'Rav Yehoshua):</font></b> We assume that a 
          child is in danger if he lacks milk.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>DIRECTLY GIVING 'ISUR' TO A CHILD</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa - Aba Sha'ul):</font></b> We used to nurse from Tahor 
          animals on Yom Tov.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is the case?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If there is a danger, it should be permitted even on 
               Shabbos!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If there is no danger, it should be forbidden even 
               on Yom Tov!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The case is, they were in pain. He holds that 
          nursing is Mefarek (extracting) in an unskillful manner, 
          which is forbidden only mid'Rabanan.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> On Shabbos one (who is Mefarek normally) is liable 
               to stoning, therefore Chachamim decreed (against 
               unskillful Mefarek, e.g. nursing, even though he is 
               in pain);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Skilled Melachah on Yom Tov is only a Lav, so they 
               did not decree to forbid one in pain.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Beraisa):</font></b> 'Lo Tochlum (do not eat Sheratzim)' - 
          we read this 'Lo Ta'achilum (do not feed them)', to warn 
          adults about minors.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> One must tell minors not to eat them!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> No, this forbids giving them to minors to eat.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Beraisa):</font></b> 'Every soul among you will not eat 
          blood' warns adults about minors.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> One must tell minors not to eat it!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> No, this forbids giving it to minors to eat.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Beraisa):</font></b> It says 'Emor' and 'v'Omarta' (before 
          the Lav for Kohanim to become Tamei), to warn adults 
          about minors.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> One must tell minors not to become 
               Tamei!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> No, this forbids making them Tamei.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b></b>  All three verses are needed;
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE MITZVAH OF 'CHINUCH'</b></font><b>
<br>OPINIONS:</b> The Gemara discusses whether or not Beis Din is required to stop a Katan from committing a transgression.
</p><p>
What is the Gemara's question? The general obligation of Chinuch requires that every Jewish child be taught to fulfill the Mitzvos and refrain from Aveiros. Why should the obligation of Chinuch not obligate Beis Din to stop a Katan from committing a transgression?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros 17:28, and Hilchos Avel 3:12) explains that the Gemara is discussing the specific obligation of <i>Beis Din</i>. Beis Din has no obligation of Chinuch for a child. The obligation of Chinuch is the exclusive responsibility of the child's father (or parents; see Insights to Chagigah 6:1). When the father is present he certainly is obligated to stop the child from committing the Aveirah. The Gemara's question is whether Beis Din must stop the child when the father is not present (or when he is present but does not stop the child himself). This approach is cited by <b>TOSFOS</b> and the <b>TOSFOS YESHANIM</b> in Yoma (82a) in the name of the <b><b><b>RI</b></b></b>.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RASHBA</b> and <b>RITVA</b> here, and <b>TOSFOS</b> in Shabbos (121a, DH Shema Mina), suggest that the Gemara is discussing a Katan who has not yet reached the age of Chinuch ('Katan she'Lo Higi'a l'Chinuch'). No obligation of Chinuch applies for such a Katan. Nevertheless, perhaps Beis Din is obligated to stop him from doing a forbidden act. The point of the Gemara's question is whether an Isur is more severe than a positive Mitzvah, such that Beis Din must prevent a child from committing an Isur even before he reaches the age at which his parents are required to instruct him to fulfill positive Mitzvos.
</p><p>
Although the Ritva accepts this ruling in practice, the Rashba rejects it. The Rashba cites the Gemara earlier (113a) which asks that a Chareshes married to a Kohen should be allowed to eat Terumah because she is like a Katan who is not obligated to observe the Mitzvos, and Beis Din is not required to stop such a person from committing an Aveirah. The Gemara implies that there is no difference between a Ketanah who has reached the age of Chinuch and a Ketanah who has not reached the age of Chinuch -- in both cases, Beis Din is <i>not</i> required to stop the Ketanah from committing an Aveirah.
</p><p>
(Perhaps the Ritva does not accept this proof because he differentiates between a Chareshes and a Ketanah who has reached the age of Chinuch: unlike a Ketanah, a Chareshes will <i>never</i> be obligated to do Mitzvos. See end of Insights to Yevamos 112:2.)
</p><p>
(c) The <b>RASHBA</b> concludes that the Gemara here refers to a child who has reached the age of Chinuch. The reason why the Mitzvah of Chinuch does not obligate Beis Din to prevent the child from committing an Aveirah is that the Mitzvah of Chinuch applies only to Mitzvos Aseh. The Gemara's question is whether there is a requirement of Chinuch for Mitzvos Lo Ta'aseh as well. This is also the view of <b>TOSFOS</b> in Nazir (28b), and of <b>TOSFOS YESHANIM</b> in Yoma (82a) in the name of <b>RABEINU ELIEZER</b>.
</p><p>
The reason why Chinuch should apply specifically to Mitzvos Aseh and not to Mitzvos Lo Ta'aseh is that more effort is required to teach a child to actively perform an action than to teach him to passively refrain from doing an action (see <b>TERUMAS HA'DESHEN</b> #94). (See also Insights to Shabbos 121:1.)
</p><p>

<b>HALACHAH:</b> The <b>SHULCHAN ARUCH</b> (OC 343) cites the Rambam's opinion (a) that only the father, and not Beis Din, is commanded to stop the child from sinning. The <b>REMA</b> cites the opinion of the Rambam (a) and the opinion of the Ritva and Tosfos (b). He refers to the Rambam's opinion as 'Yesh Omrim.' The Terumas ha'Deshen favors the opinion of the Rashba and Tosfos Yeshanim (c) who differentiate between a Mitzvas Aseh and a Lo Ta'aseh. (See also Insights to Nazir 29:1.)
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Had the Torah taught only about Sheratzim, one might 
               have thought that this is because the Isur applies 
               to any amount (if it is a full creature - Tosfos), 
               but adults may feed blood to minors, for the Shi'ur 
               (to be liable) for blood is a Revi'is;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Had the Torah taught only regarding blood, one might 
               have thought that this is because there is Kares for 
               eating blood; but adults may feed Sheratzim to 
               minors.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Had the Torah taught only these two, one might have 
               thought that this is because the Isur applies to 
               everyone; but since Tum'ah applies only to Kohanim, 
               adults may make minors Tamei.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> Had the Torah taught only regarding Tum'ah, one 
               might have thought this applies only there, since 
               the Torah gave extra laws to Kohanim; but adults may 
               give to minors Isurim that apply to everyone.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Mishnah):</font></b> If two brothers, one deaf and one 
          Pike'ach, were married to two sisters Pikchos, and the 
          Cheresh died, his wife is exempt from Chalitzah and 
          Yibum, due to Achos Ishto;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the Pike'ach died, the Cheresh must divorce his 
               wife, and the Yevamah is forbidden forever.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Why must he divorce her? If we need not stop a minor 
               from eating forbidden food, we need not stop a 
               Cheresh from having forbidden Bi'ah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> He must divorce her because she is forbidden to 
          him, and she is a Pikachas.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Mishnah):</font></b> If two brothers Pikchim were married 
          to two sisters, a Chereshes and a Pikachas, and the 
          Chereshes' husband died, she is exempt from Chalitzah and 
          Yibum, due to Achos Ishto;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the Pikachas' husband died, the Yavam must 
               divorce his wife, and the Yevamah does Chalitzah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Why must he divorce her? If we need not stop a minor 
               from eating forbidden food, we need not stop a 
               Chereshes from having forbidden Bi'ah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> He must divorce her, because he is forbidden to 
          her, and he is a Pike'ach.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Mishnah):</font></b> If a Cheresh was married to a 
          Chereshes, and his Pike'ach brother was married to her 
          Pikachas sister, and the Cheresh died, his wife is exempt 
          from Chalitzah and Yibum, due to Achos Ishto;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the Pike'ach died, the Cheresh must divorce his 
               wife, and the Yevamah is forbidden forever
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Here, why must he divorce her? They are both 
               Chershim!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Shemayah):</font></b> This is a decree lest people (who 
          do not realize that they may stay married because they 
          are exempt from Mitzvos) will think that their Yibum 
          dispels Zikah, and permit the Tzarah to marry a stranger.
<br>
<br><center><font color='ff0000' size='+1'><b>***<b>PEREK HA'ISHAH SHALOM</b>***
</b></font></center><p><b>
<br><b></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHEN ONE WITNESS IS NOT BELIEVED TO SAY THAT A MAN DIED</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> A woman went with her husband overseas. They 
          were at peace, and there was peace in the world. If she 
          returned and said that her husband died, she may remarry, 
          or do Yibum if he had no children;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If she was at peace with her husband, but there was war 
          in the world, or she was quarreling with her husband and 
          there was peace in the world, she is not believed to say 
          that he died;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  R. Yehudah says, she is believed only if she returns 
          crying and her clothes are torn;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Chachamim:</font></b> Whether or not she is crying and has torn 
               clothes, she is believed.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara):</font></b> It says 'they were at peace' to exclude when 
          they were quarreling. It says 'there was peace in the 
          world' to exclude when there was war.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rava):</font></b> Why is she not believed when there is 
          war in the world?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rava):</font></b> She will testify based on estimation;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> She thinks that everyone is getting killed. Will he 
               really be saved?!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> Since she is at peace with him, she will 
               wait until she sees that he died!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Sometimes he is hit with an arrow or spear, 
               and she is sure that he will die;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  She doesn't know that such wounds can be 
                    bandaged, and he can live.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava):</font></b> Famine is not like war. She would not testify 
          from estimation.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Retraction (Rava):</font></b> Famine is like war.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> A woman came before Rava; she said that her husband 
               died from hunger.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rava:</font></b> You were wise to leave in time to save 
               yourself! Of course, he couldn't survive on the drop 
               of flour remaining.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> The woman:</font></b> I see, you also know that people cannot 
               survive in such circumstances!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Retraction (Rava):</font></b> Famine is worse than war!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> In wartime, if she says that he died in war, she is 
               not believed, but if she says that he died on his 
               bed, she is believed;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> In famine, she is not believed unless she says that 
               she buried him.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b></b>  A house that collapsed is like wartime; she testifies by 
          estimation.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b></b>  When snakes and scorpions are rampant this is like 
          wartime; she testifies by estimation.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #1:</font></b> Pestilence is like wartime; she testifies by 
          estimation;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #2:</font></b> It is not like wartime. She relies on what 
          people say, 'There can be seven years of pestilence, and 
          a man does not die before his time.'
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WAR AND FAMINE</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Mishnah states that a woman who claims that her husband died during a time of war is not believed. The Gemara says that the same applies during a time of famine, with one difference: In a time of war, a woman <i>is</i> believed to say that her husband died upon his bed. In a time of famine, a woman is <i>not</i> believed to say that her husband died upon his bed, unless she also says that she buried him.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> (DH Meis u'Kevartiv) explains the reason for this difference. 'In a time of war, she assumes that he might have run away and was saved (if she did not actually see him die, and thus she will not mistakenly assume that he died on his bed), but in a time of famine, she assumes that there is no way he could live (and thus she might mistakenly assume that he is dead).'
</p><p>
Rashi assumes that there is less of a chance that a person will survive in a famine than in a war, because, as he explains, one stands a chance to escape from the dangers of war more easily than from the dangers of famine. What is the basis for such a difference? Why is it easier for one to run away from war than from famine? One who is sick and bedridden cannot run away from war any easier than he can run away from famine. Moreover, why will his wife assume, if he recovered from his sickness, that he died from the famine? The Gemara implies that the only concern is that the wife will testify to the husband's death 'bid'Dami,' based on conjecture, because she thinks that since he is almost dead already he will certainly die soon (as in the incident with Rava and the 'Nafefisa'). Why, then, would she testify that a hitherto <i>healthy</i> husband is dead just because there is a famine?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>MAHARSHAL</b> explains the words of Rashi as follows. When a woman says that her husband died a natural death on his bed, there indeed is no reason to suspect that she is testifying 'bid'Dami.' In times of famine, however, a woman is so certain that her husband cannot survive the famine that she is prepared to lie and say that she saw him die. Since she is so certain that her husband will die from the famine, Beis Din must suspect that she is <i>lying</i> when she claims that her husband died a natural death. 
</p><p>
In times of war, she assumes that her husband is able to run away and escape death. Therefore, she will not say that he died unless she personally witnesses his death. In times of famine, when she thinks that it is impossible to escape death, she will lie and say that she saw him dead because she assumes that he will die soon in any case. However, she will not lie and say that she also buried him, because she has no reason to assume that he was buried if she in fact did not bury him.
</p><p>
<b>RAV YAKOV EMDEN</b> points out that this does not appear to be the Gemara's intention. The Gemara does not indicate that the wife is suspected of lying outright.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>ME'IRI</b> gives a simple difference between hunger and war. Hunger affects a person regardless of where he is or what he is doing. Even if he dies on his bed of other causes, his hunger hastens his death by compounding the effects of his illness. Therefore, in a famine his wife assumes that he died (and she testifies 'bid'Dami') even if he was in bed due to illness or other ailments unrelated to hunger. In contrast, a war does not affect a person dying of natural causes, and thus his wife does not assume that he will die faster from natural causes during a time of war than at any other time.
</p><p>
Perhaps this is also the intent of Rashi (and not as the Maharshal explains his intent). When Rashi says that the woman assumes that her husband can run away from war, it means that she knows that he might <i>recover from his illness</i> in a time of war because the war itself does not affect a person dying from other causes. In a time of famine, hunger exacerbates disease, and therefore she assumes that her husband will not recover and will die from his illness. (Perhaps the word 'Barach' (flee) in Rashi should be 'Barya' (he became healthy), with an 'Alef' instead of a 'Ches.' In a time of war, a woman assumes that her husband <i>will recover</i>, and that is why she does not attest that he died unless she knows for certain that he died.)
</p><p>
(c) The <b>RITVA</b> and other Rishonim disagree with Rashi and explain that the difference between the trustworthiness of the wife during war and her trustworthiness during famine is unrelated to the likelihood of her husband recovering from illness. The chances for recovery are equal in both situations. When the Gemara says that he is dying in bed, it does not mean that he is dying from natural causes, but rather that he is dying at home from battle-wounds.
</p><p>
If the chances of his death are equal in both cases, why is his wife believed during a time of war and not during a time of famine?
</p><p>
The answer is that the reason why a woman is not believed is that she testifies 'bid'Dami' -- she <i>assumes</i> that her husband died without definite knowledge to that effect. Why does she not wait at her husband's side to see if he indeed dies? She does not wait because she fears for <i>her own</i> life, and therefore she flees! (This reasoning may be inferred from the Gemara's words with regard to armed robbers; see 115a and Rashi, DH Hasam.) Accordingly, even if her husband was wounded in war, since he is now on his bed and no longer on the battlefield the war no longer poses a danger. Hence, his wife will stay with him and will see whether or not he dies. There is no concern that she will testify 'bid'Dami' in such a case. In contrast, in times of famine the danger posed by the famine affects them even when they are in the safety of their home. Therefore, the wife is still afraid that she will die herself from the famine if she stays there, and she flees before she witnesses her husband's fate.
</p><p>


<font><b>3) A WOMAN'S TESTIMONY ABOUT HER HUSBAND'S BURIAL</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara teaches that although a woman is not believed to say that her husband died during a time of famine (even when she says that he died on his bed of natural causes), she <i>is</i> believed to say, 'He died and <i>I buried him</i>.' She is not believed to testify about his actual death because she is suspected of testifying based on conjecture ('bid'Dami'). In contrast, when she testifies that she buried him her testimony is based on fact and not conjecture.
</p><p>
It stands to reason that during a time of <i>war</i>, when the woman is believed to say that her husband died on his bed of natural causes, she certainly is believed to say, 'He died [in the war] and I buried him.' Indeed, this is the ruling of most Rishonim. The <b>RAMBAM</b>, however, rules differently. The Rambam rules that she is <i>not</i> believed to say that he died and she buried him (Hilchos Gerushin 13:2; see <b>HAGAHOS HA'GRA</b> here).
</p><p>
The Rishonim ask that the Rambam's ruling seems illogical. If a woman is believed when she says that she buried her husband in a time of famine because she does not testify based on conjecture ('bid'Dami'), she certainly should be believed in a time of war when there is no grounds to suspect her of conjecture.
</p><p>
The Acharonim suggest a number of approaches to understanding the Rambam.
</p><p>
(a) The <b>KESEF MISHNEH</b> (Hilchos Gerushin 13:1) cites a lengthy Teshuvah of <b>RABEINU ELIYAHU MIZRACHI</b> (#20) who discusses many aspects of the Rambam's rulings with regard to Beis Din's acceptance of the testimony of a woman who says that her husband died.
</p><p>
The Mizrachi (towards the end of his Teshuvah) suggests that in a time of war, it is unusual to have time to bury the dead. It is even more unusual for a woman to bury her dead husband. Every person is concerned with trying to save his own life, and he flees from the battlefield and does not linger there to seek out and bury the dead. Consequently, there is strong reason to assume that the woman is lying when she says that she buried her husband who was killed in battle.
</p><p>
(According to this explanation, if she says that she buried him after the battle was over, she should be believed.)
</p><p>
(b) The Kesef Mishneh cites the <b>MAHARI BEN LEV</b> (2:16) who discusses many of the points raised by the Mizrachi and offers another explanation for the Rambam's ruling. He explains that although a woman is not suspected of lying outright, she is suspected of speculating ('bid'Dami') that her husband is dead and then <i>supporting</i> her conjecture with a lie.
</p><p>
This logic is sound (and is similar to what the Maharshal writes, as cited in the previous Insight). However, why does the same logic not apply in a time of famine, when she <i>is</i> believed to say that her husband died and she buried him? According to this logic, she should <i>not</i> be believed just as she is not believed in a time of war.
</p><p>
Perhaps the difference between famine and war can be understood based on the words of the <b>LECHEM MISHNEH</b>. The Lechem Mishneh writes that according to the Rambam, the woman is <i>not</i> believed when she says that her husband died and she buried him in a time of war or famine <i>only</i> when she says that he died <i>as a result</i> of the war or the famine. When she claims that her husband died on his bed, she is believed to say that she buried him, both in wartime and in famine.
</p><p>
Accordingly, she is suspected of lying to strengthen her claim only when she testifies about a death due to war or famine, in which case she is more certain that her husband died and is not afraid to lie and say that she buried him. When her husband did not die as a result of war or famine, she is not so certain that he died and thus she will not exaggerate and say that she buried him; rather, she will say the facts as they are.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>LEVUSH</b> writes that even when she says, 'He died and I buried him,' there is a concern that she only <i>assumes</i> that he was buried when she saw a body being buried, when in fact it was the body of someone else and not the body of her husband. She says that she buried him ('bid'Dami') because she does not verify the facts. In a time of famine there is no concern that she will make such a mistake about the burial, because she is less panic-stricken than during a time of war. In a famine, she might mistakenly assume that her husband died, but she will not mistakenly assume that she saw him being buried when it was someone else she saw being buried. (See also Insights to Yevamos 116:1:c, and footnotes of Rav Aharon Yaffen to the Ritva, 14:3.)
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>IS A WOMAN BELIEVED IN WARTIME?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If she informed us that there is war in the 
          world, what is the law?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Is she believed due to a Migo? I.e. it is 
               unreasonable that she would say such a lie. (If she 
               wanted to lie,) she could have said that there is 
               peace in the world (and surely she would be 
               believed)!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Or, since it is now established that it is wartime, 
               are we concerned that she testifies by estimation, 
               and the Migo does not override this?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Beraisa):</font></b> If a woman says 'the house burned and 
          was full of smoke. I survived, and he died', she is not 
          believed.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> There is different. She reasons that a miracle 
          was done for her, but not for him!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Beraisa):</font></b> If a woman says 'Nochrim or robbers 
          came upon us. He was killed, and I survived', she is 
          believed.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> That case is different, like Rav Idi taught.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Idi):</font></b> A woman's weapons are with her (she does 
               not fear robbers, for they would rather have 
               relations with her than kill her. Therefore, she 
               waits to see if her husband really died.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  At the end of a Chupah, a fire broke out. The Kalah cried 
          'See, it is my husband!' They found a burned man and a 
          hand.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Chiya bar Avin:</font></b> This is like the case of the 
               house that burned (she is not believed).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rava:</font></b> Here is different! She cried, 'See, it is my 
               husband'! And here, a burned man and a hand were 
               found!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> R. Chiya bar Avin is concerned lest the burned man 
               tried to save her husband, and the hand is her 
               husband's. He became blemished, and fled due to 
               shame.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WITNESS IN WAR</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Is one witness believed in wartime?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If one witness is believed because people do not lie 
               about matters that are Avid l'Igluyei (prone to 
               become known, e.g. if the husband is alive), here 
               also, he will not lie!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If one witness is believed because she will 
               investigate before marrying, here, perhaps she hates 
               him (Maharshal's text - she will rely on estimation) 
               and will not investigate!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rami bar Chama - Mishnah - R. Akiva):</font></b> In Eretz 
          Yisrael, only R. Yehudah ben Bava permitted a woman to 
          remarry based on one witness. Nechemyah of Beis Deli 
          said, 'You know, the land is perilous because of troops. 
          I received from R. Gamliel that we may marry a woman 
          based on one witness.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> Why did he say, the land is perilous 
               because of troops?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #1:</font></b> Even though soldiers are rampant, we may 
               marry a woman based on one witness.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection (Rava):</font></b> If so, what is special about this 
               land? He should have said 'Any place where soldiers 
               are rampant'!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection (and Answer #2 to Question (1) - Rava):</font></b> Rather, 
          this land is perilous because of the troops, and I cannot 
          leave my household to testify before Chachamim. I 
          received from R. Gamliel that a woman may marry based on 
          one witness.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> A case occurred in which two Chachamim were 
          coming in a ship with R. Yosi ben Simai. The ship sank; 
          Rebbi allowed their widows to remarry based on the 
          testimony of women.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> Drowning is like war; and even 100 women 
               are like one witness, and Rebbi allowed the widows 
               to remarry!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> This cannot be! Whenever one cannot see 
               the end of the water, she is forbidden!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> Rather, women saw the bodies immediately 
          (after they were taken from the water), and they gave 
          identifying signs;
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) BELIEVING A WOMAN WITH A 'MIGU'</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara discusses a case in which a woman testifies that there was a war in a certain place and her husband died there. Beis Din knows of the war only because of her testimony. The Gemara asks if she is believed or not. On one hand, she has a 'Migu' that if she wanted to lie, she would have said that there was peace in that place, and then she certainly would have been believed to say that her husband died there. On the other hand, perhaps a 'Migu' is not effective in this case, because the concern is not that she is lying, but that she assumes that her husband died without definite knowledge ('bid'Dami'). Since she <i>thinks</i> she is telling the truth and she is not attempting to lie, the logic of a 'Migu' does not support her claim.
</p><p>
Why does the Gemara ask in the first place that she should be believed because of the 'Migu'? There clearly is no concern that she is lying.
</p><p>
Moreover, if the logic of 'Migu' applies when she testifies that her husband is dead, why is she not believed during a time of war or famine? During those times she also should be believed because of a 'Migu' -- if she wanted to lie, she would have made a more effective claim: in a time of war she would have claimed that her husband died upon his bed, and in a time of famine she would have claimed that her husband died and she buried him.
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (114b, DH Mi) writes that the Gemara does not actually mean that she should be believed because of a 'Migu.' Indeed, she is not suspected of lying, and thus a normal 'Migu' cannot raise her level of trustworthiness. Rather, the Gemara means that the 'Migu' proves that the woman was careful to <i>verify the facts</i> of her testimony even though it was a time of war.
</p><p>
How exactly does the 'Migu' prove that she was careful to verify the facts?
</p><p>
The woman could have come to Beis Din and said merely that her husband died, without adding any details. However, she added pertinent details to her testimony which Beis Din did not ask her to report (i.e. that there was a war, and that her husband died from the war). Beis Din would not have known these details without her testimony. Since she was so careful to point out the details because of her concern that they were necessary for the outcome of her testimony, Beis Din may assume that she was careful about her testimony and did not add anything based on conjecture.
</p><p>
This is the question of the Gemara here: Does her addition of facts in her testimony prove that she is telling the truth (like a 'Migu') or not?
</p><p>
In contrast, when it is already known that there is a war or famine and the woman says merely that her husband died, she has no 'Migu' that she could have said that he died upon his bed, or that he died and she buried him. In such a case, Beis Din knows that she is not trying to lie, and a 'Migu' helps only a person who has reason to lie. Similarly, Beis Din has no proof that she verified the details of her testimony because she adds no pertinent details. Therefore, Beis Din suspects that she is testifying based on conjecture ('bid'Dami').
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RASHBA</b>, <b>RITVA</b>, and <b>TOSFOS CHAD MI'KAMAI</b> explain the 'Migu' of the Gemara in a slightly different manner than Tosfos. They do not consider the fact that she informed Beis Din that there was a war as a 'Migu' which proves that she verified the details of her testimony. Rather, she is believed for a different reason. 
</p><p>
The 'Migu' here does not state that if she is lying, she would have said a better lie. Rather, the 'Migu' is that she did not have to say a lie at all; she could have said <i>nothing</i> about the war. Her omission of the fact that there was a war would <i>not</i> have been a lie, and yet it <i>would</i> have enabled Beis Din to believe her testimony that her husband died. Since she could have testified and been believed <i>without</i> lying at all, when she mentions that there was a war -- a fact which is to her detriment because Beis Din assumes that in such situations a woman only speculates about what happened ('bid'Dami') -- she should be believed. She informed Beis Din about the war only because she knows that her testimony is <i>not</i> based on conjecture and that her testimony is the absolute truth.
</p><p>
This explanation also addresses why no 'Migu' applies when a woman says that her husband died due to the war or famine. When she says that her husband died, the 'Migu' -- that she could have said that her husband died on his bed or that he died and she buried him -- does not enable Beis Din to believe her now, because Beis Din knows that the woman does not want to utilize those claims since she has no desire to lie.
</p><p>
(c) <b>TOSFOS CHAD MI'KAMAI</b> cites <b>RABEINU MOSHE BAR YOSEF</b> who says that the woman has no 'Migu' that she could have said that her husband died on his bed during a war, because such testimony -- that he died a natural death during a time of war -- appears very dubious. (Tosfos mentions this logic apparently as a second answer to his question.)
</p><p>
However, Tosfos Chad mi'Kamai (and the <b>HAGAHOS MAYIM CHAYIM</b> on Tosfos) asks that this reason does not explain why she is not believed with a 'Migu' that she could have said, 'He died and I buried him.' In both a case of war and a case of famine she should have a 'Migu' that she could have said that she buried him. Such a 'Migu' should be valid since there is no reason for her to be afraid to make such a statement.
</p><p>
The answer to this question may be as follows. A woman who knows that Beis Din does not accept her testimony about her husband's death during a time of war or famine does not think that they do not believe her because of her tendency to conjecture ('bid'Dami'). Rather, she thinks that Beis Din does not believe her during a time of war because they assume that she is using the war as a pretext to claim that her husband died. She thinks that Beis Din suspects her of lying; she does not realize that they do not accept her testimony only because she says 'bid'Dami.' Accordingly, when she says 'he died and I buried him,' there is no greater reason to believe her than when she says simply that he died; she thinks that what she says makes no difference, and that is why she does not mention that she buried him. (This approach may also explain why Tosfos does not ask the question from the 'Migu' of 'he died and I buried him' but only from the 'Migu' of 'he died on his bed.')
</p><p>
With regard to why the Gemara suggests that she has a 'Migu' in the first place if she is not trying to lie at all, perhaps Rabeinu Moshe bar Yosef understands that even when she testifies 'bid'Dami' and thinks that she is telling the truth, she knows that she is not saying the facts <i>exactly</i> as they are. She is aware that she did not actually witness the death of her husband; she is just so certain that he died that she allows herself to exaggerate so that no one will doubt what she says. She should be believed with a 'Migu' because once she knows that she is altering the facts, she might alter the facts even more so that Beis Din will accept her testimony with no questions.
</p><p>
(According to this explanation, why is she believed to say, 'He died and I buried him'? Once Beis Din suspects her of lying, Beis Din should suspect that she might lie about his burial as well! The answer is that a woman will not lie about what happened after her husband's death (i.e. his burial) in order to strengthen her testimony, because she does not realize that it will affect her testimony.) (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Rebbi relied on the Simanim, not on the women.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  Reuven deposited sesame by Shimon, and later asked for 
          it.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shimon:</font></b> You already took it back!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Reuven:</font></b> The quantity is such and such, and it is in 
               a barrel.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Shimon:</font></b> You took yours. I have other sesame.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Chisda):</font></b> This is like the case of the two Chachamim. 
          We do not say that they went elsewhere, and other men 
          were found. (Also here, we are not concerned lest Reuven 
          took his sesame, and Shimon has different sesame.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava):</font></b> This case is different! There, there were 
          Simanim. Here, there are not!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Even though Reuven gave the correct quantity, 
               perhaps he guessed right!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Mar Kashisha bar Rav Chisda):</font></b> We are not 
          concerned lest something was removed and replaced!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> If the letter Kuf is on a vessel 
               (denoting Korban), we assume that the contents are 
               Hekdesh. If there is a Mem, Dalet, Tes or Tav, the 
               contents are Ma'aser, Dimua (Terumah mixed with 
               Chulin), Tevel (untithed produce) or Terumah, 
               respectively.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> When there were decrees against Mitzvos, people 
               wrote Tav in place of Terumah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Counter-question (Ravina):</font></b> You cannot say that no 
               one is concerned lest something was removed and 
               replaced!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Seifa - R. Yosi):</font></b> Even if Terumah is written 
                    on the barrel, it is Chulin. We assume that the 
                    Terumah inside was removed and replaced by 
                    Chulin (the majority usage).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer to both questions (Ravina):</font></b> Really, both Tana'im 
          are concerned lest the contents were removed and 
          replaced;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The first Tana holds that had he transferred the 
               Terumah, he would have erased the marking on the 
               barrel;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Yosi assumes that he forgot to do so, or he left 
               the Tav to discourage others from taking the 
               contents.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>ARE WE CONCERNED FOR OTHER PEOPLE WITH THE SAME NAME?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b></b>  Yitzchak Reish Galusa, the nephew of Rav Bivi, was going 
          from Korteva to Aspamya; he died. They relayed this 
          information back to Korteva. (Rashba - he was the head of 
          Yisrael in Galus. Tosfos Rid - his name was Yitzchak 
          Reish Galusa.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Are we concerned lest a different man with this 
          name died (and forbid R. Yitzchak's widow to remarry, 
          even though we do not know of another man with this 
          name)?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Abaye):</font></b> We are concerned.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rava):</font></b> We are not concerned.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support  (Abaye, for himself):</font></b> A Get was found in 
          Nehardai. It said 'next to Kalonya (a city), I, 
          Androlinai of Nehardai, divorce my wife.' Shmuel's father 
          sent this question to R. Yehudah Nesi'ah, who answered 
          that all of Nehardai must be checked (for another 
          Androlinai).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection (Rava):</font></b> This is no proof. If we were truly 
          concerned, we would have to check the whole world!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Yehudah Nesi'ah said to check only so that 
               Shmuel's father would not be embarrassed for asking 
               the question.
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>ARE WE CONCERNED FOR OTHER PEOPLE WITH THE SAME NAME? (cont.)</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support  (Rava, for himself):</font></b> There were two documents in 
          Mechuza in which the borrowers were Chavi bar Nanai and 
          Nanai bar Chavi. Rabah bar Avuha authorized collection of 
          both of them. These are common names in Mechuza 
          (nevertheless we are not concerned for others of the same 
          name!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection (Abaye):</font></b> Even if we were concerned that others 
          have the same name, there is no concern (why the bearer 
          should not collect)!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> We are not concerned lest the lender dropped it, for 
               people are careful with documents!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> We are not concerned lest the lender deposited it 
               with the current bearer. Since they have the same 
               name, he would not deposit it by him!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps the lender gave it to the 
               current bearer.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> If so he is entitled to collect, for 
               handing over a document is a proper acquisition!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  A Get was found in Sura. It said 'In Sura, I, Anan bar 
          Chiya of Nehardai, divorce my wife Plonis.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  Chachamim checked from Sura to Nehardai. The only other 
          Anan bar Chiya they found was from Chigra and lived in 
          Neharda'a. Witnesses said that he was in Nehardai the day 
          that the Get was written.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Abaye:</font></b> Even though normally I say that we must be 
          concerned, here there is no concern. Since he was in 
          Nehardai, he could not have written a Get in Sura.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rava:</font></b> Even though normally I say that we are not 
          concerned, here we are concerned. Perhaps he went on a 
          fast camel, or by use of a name of Hash-m, or he had 
          previously authorized the Get to be written.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Safra and Rav Huna (to scribes):</font></b> When you are in 
               Shili, write Shili on the document, even though you 
               were in Hini when asked to write it. When you are in 
               Hini, write Hini, even though you were in Shili when 
               asked to write it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What was the final ruling about the sesame?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rav Yemar):</font></b> We are not concerned.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Ravina):</font></b> We are concerned.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b></b>  The Halachah is, we are concerned.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHEN THEY WERE QUARRELING</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If they were quarreling (she is not believed).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is the case of a quarrel?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> She tells him 'divorce me.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> All women say this when they are angry!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Correction:</font></b> Rather, she says 'you divorced me.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> She should be believed, like Rav Hamnuna 
          taught!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Hamnuna):</font></b> If a woman says to her husband 'you 
               divorced me', she is believed.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> There is a Chazakah that she could not be so 
               impudent to lie to her husband about this.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The case is, she named the witnesses in front of 
          whom she was divorced, and the witnesses deny this.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why isn't a woman believed when they were 
          quarreling?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (R. Chanina):</font></b> We are concerned lest she lie.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rav Simi bar Ashi):</font></b> We are concerned lest she 
          testify from estimation.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) A WOMAN WHO TESTIFIES ABOUT HER HUSBAND'S DEATH AFTER THEY HAD A QUARREL</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Mishnah (114b) states that if a husband and his wife had been quarreling and the woman then testifies that her husband died, she is not believed. The Gemara defines a 'quarrel' as any situation in which the woman exclaims, 'You already divorced me,' when in truth he did not divorce her. Her readiness to make such a false statement in order to get away from her husband indicates that they despise each other. Hence, if she later testifies that her husband died she is not believed.
</p><p>
The Amora'im disagree about why she is not believed. Rav Chanina says that Beis Din suspects that she will lie maliciously and claim that he is dead when he really is alive. Rav Shimi bar Ashi says that she convinces herself that he is dead ('bid'Dami') when he really is alive.
</p><p>
The Gemara explains that the practical difference between the two opinions exists in a case in which the <i>husband</i>, and not the wife, instigated the quarrel between them.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> explains that if she is not believed after a quarrel because she is suspected of lying, as Rav Chanina explains, when the husband instigated the quarrel she <i>is</i> believed because she is not so angry with him. In contrast, according to Rav Shimi she is still suspected of conjecturing, incorrectly, that her husband is dead, and her testimony is not accepted.
</p><p>
Why does the Gemara not give a very simple difference between the two opinions? The Gemara (114b) teaches that a woman does not mistakenly assume ('bid'Dami') that she buried her husband when she did not actually bury him. Therefore, in a time of war, even though she is not believed to say that her husband died because she might testify 'bid'Dami,' she <i>is</i> believed to say that 'he died and I buried him.'
</p><p>
The Gemara should give this simple case, in which she testifies that 'he died and I buried him,' as a practical difference between Rav Chanina and Rav Shimi. According to Rav Chanina who says that she is suspected of lying, she is not believed to say that she buried him. According to Rav Shimi who says that she is suspecting of conjecturing but not outright lying, she is believed to say that she buried him. (<b>TOSFOS HA'ROSH</b>; see also <b>HAGAHOS HA'GRA</b> to 114b.)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b> 
<br>(a) The <b>RITVA</b> writes that the Gemara indeed could have given this case as a difference between Rav Chanina and Rav Shimi, but it chose to mention the other difference instead.
</p><p>
The <b>MAHARI BEN LEV</b> (quoted by the <b>KESEF MISHNEH</b> in Hilchos Gerushin 13:1) adds that the case the Gemara gives as a practical difference between the opinions teaches an additional Chidush. The Gemara teaches that when the husband instigated the quarrel, the woman does not hate him to the extent that she will lie about his death. One might have thought that it does not matter who provoked the quarrel; since she is upset with him (and even proclaimed that he divorced her) she will lie about his death. The Gemara teaches that when he instigates the quarrel, she does not hate him so much and she does not lie about his death.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>ARUCH LA'NER</b> suggests that Rav Shimi, who maintains that she is suspected of testifying 'bid'Dami,' agrees that she is <i>also</i> suspected of lying about her husband's death. Rav Shimi's intention is to add that even in a case in which there is no concern that she will lie, there remains a concern that she will testify 'bid'Dami.'
</p><p>
<b>RABEINU ELIYAHU MIZRACHI</b> (Teshuvos #20, cited by the <b>KESEF MISHNEH</b>, Hilchos Gerushin 13:1) suggests a similar answer and adds that there is a strong logical basis for this explanation of the Gemara. Since the woman who quarreled with her husband has already lied once by saying 'Gerashtani' ('you divorced me'), it is likely that she will lie again. Accordingly, both Amora'im must agree that she is suspected of lying to get rid of her husband. The practical difference between the two Amora'im exists in a case in which Beis Din knows that she will not lie. According to Rav Shimi, there still is a fear that she will testify 'bid'Dami,' while according to Rav Chanina, there is no such concern (see Maharsha). This explains why the Gemara does not give the case of 'he died and I buried him' as a difference between the Amora'im; both agree that she might be lying when she says that she buried him.
</p><p>
(The Mizrachi limits the suspicion that the woman lies to a case of 'bid'Dami.' He explains that Rav Shimi, who says that she is suspected of testifying 'bid'Dami,' maintains that although she normally is not suspected of lying, <i>in a case in which she testifies 'bid'Dami'</i> Beis Din suspects that she will strengthen her claim by lying because she thinks that her husband really died.)
</p><p>
The <b>TOSFOS HA'ROSH</b> also asks why the Gemara does not mention the case of 'I buried him' as a practical difference between Rav Chanina and Rav Shimi. He questions <b>RABEINU CHANANEL</b> who states explicitly that Rav Shimi is <i>not</i> concerned that she will lie, and that the Amora'im indeed argue about a case in which she says, 'He died and I buried him.' Tosfos, however, may disagree with Rabeinu Chananel on this point.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>RAMBAM</b> writes that in a time of war, when the woman says that 'he died and I buried him' she is <i>not</i> believed (contrary to the simple way of understanding the Gemara earlier (114b), which says that even in a time of starvation she is believed to say 'he died and I buried him'; see Insights to Yevamos 114:3.)
</p><p>
The <b>VILNA GA'ON</b> (in Hagahos ha'Gra, Yevamos 114b and Shulchan Aruch EH 17:107) apparently understands that the Rambam rules that even in a case in which she says that 'he died and I buried him,' Beis Din is concerned that she will testify 'bid'Dami.' Only when he died in a famine is there no concern that she will testify 'bid'Dami.' In such a case, she is relatively more relaxed because she faces no imminent danger herself, and thus she will not err so grossly as to say that she buried him when it was someone else who was buried. (See Insights to Yevamos 114:3:c, in the name of the <b>LEVUSH</b>.) In contrast, under other circumstances in which she says that her husband was killed in a sudden, tragic way, she will testify 'bid'Dami' even about his burial, because the suddenness of his death, the chaos, and the danger which she faces herself cause her to become confused and think that is was her husband who was buried.
</p><p>
According to this reasoning, it is clear why a case in which she says 'he died and I buried him' is not a practical difference between Rav Chanina and Rav Shimi. According to both Amora'im, she is not believed in such a situation since she either lies <i>or</i> testifies 'bid'Dami' about the burial of her husband (unless he dies in an anticipated manner, such as in a time of famine).
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> They argue about a case in which he started the 
               quarrel (she would not lie, but she would testify 
               from estimation).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Is one witness believed when they were 
          quarreling?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If one witness is normally believed (to say that a 
               man died) because people do not lie about something 
               Avid l'Igluyei, here also the witness would not lie;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If he is believed because she investigates before 
               remarrying, here she will not check.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> This question is unresolved.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> R. Yehudah says, she is believed (only if she 
          returns crying and her clothes are torn).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa - Chachamim (to R. Yehudah)):</font></b> According to you, 
          a clever woman will be permitted, a simple woman will be 
          forbidden! Rather, whether or not she is crying she is 
          permitted.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b></b>  A woman entered R. Yehudah's Beis Din. They told her to 
          eulogize her husband, tear her garments and undo her 
          hair.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> They teach her to lie!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> They hold like Chachamim. They wanted that R. 
          Yehudah would permit her.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHEN IS SHE BELIEVED?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - Beis Hillel):</font></b> We heard that she is believed 
          only when she comes from the (grain) harvest, in the same 
          province, like the case that occurred.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Beis Shamai:</font></b> It is the same whether she comes from the 
          grain harvest, the olive harvest, or the grape harvest, 
          or from one province to another. Chachamim merely 
          discussed the usual case.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Beis Hillel retracted and agreed to Beis Shamai.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara - Beraisa - Beis Shamai (to Beis Hillel)):</font></b> 
          According to you, we know only that she is believed 
          during the wheat harvest. What is the source that she is 
          believed during the harvest of barley, grapes, olives, 
          dates and figs?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> We must say that the case was during the wheat 
               harvest, but the same applies to all harvests;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Likewise, the case was in the same province, but the 
               same applies to if they were in different provinces!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Beis Hillel:</font></b> Within the same province there is much 
          traffic, so she is afraid to lie (lest witnesses 
          contradict her). From a different province people do not 
          come often, so she is not afraid to lie.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  Beis Shamai say, even from a different province, caravans 
          are common (so she is afraid to lie).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What was the case that occurred?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> In the end of the wheat harvest 10 
          men went to harvest wheat. One was bitten by a snake and 
          died. His wife came and told Beis Din they verified her 
          story;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> They decreed that a woman who says that her husband 
               died may remarry or do Yibum.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Suggestion:</font></b> The following Tana'im argue as Beis Shamai 
          and Beis Hillel do:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> One may not transport Mei Chatas (water 
               sanctified with ashes of Parah Adumah) across the 
               Yarden River, or in a boat. He may not throw it 
               across a river, float it across, send it across on 
               an animal or with a person being carried across, 
               unless the carrier's feet touch the ground. He may 
               take it across a bridge;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> This applies to all rivers.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> R. Chananya ben Akiva says, they forbade only in a 
               boat across the Yarden, like the case that occurred 
               (brought below).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> Chachamim hold like Beis Shamai, and R. 
               Chananya holds like Beis Hillel.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection #1:</font></b> Chachamim can hold even like Beis Hillel;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Beis Hillel require her to be in the same province, 
               for she is not afraid to lie if it is far away. Here 
               there is no reason to distinguish the Yarden from 
               other rivers.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b></b>  Rejection #R. Chananya can hold even like Beis Shamai;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Beis Shamai say that she is believed even from a 
               different province, for she will investigate well 
               whether it is close or far. Here, we decreed only 
               like the case that occurred, in a boat on the 
               Yarden.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What was the case in the boat?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> A man was carrying Mei Chatas and 
          ashes of the Parah Adumah in a boat on the Yarden. Flesh 
          of a corpse was found in the ship's bottom, which made 
          the water and ashes Teme'im;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> They decreed not to transport Mei Chatas or the 
               ashes in a boat on the Yarden.
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>A WOMAN IS NOT BELIEVED REGARDING HER 'TZARAH '(cont.)</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara) Inference:</font></b> Sarah is forbidden because she said 
          that he did not die. Had she kept quiet, she would be 
          permitted!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> A wife is not believed regarding her Tzarah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Affirmation:</font></b> Indeed, the inference is wrong. This clause 
          teaches something else;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> One might have thought that (Sarah knows that) he 
               really died, and she lies to prevent her Tzarah from 
               remarrying. She afflicts herself in order to afflict 
               her Tzarah. The Mishnah teaches that this is not so.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - R. Meir):</font></b> If Leah says that he died (and Sarah 
          says that he was killed, since they contradict each 
          other, they may not remarry).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why doesn't R. Meir argue also in the Reisha? 
          (Also there they contradict each other!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (R. Elazar):</font></b> He does!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (R. Yochanan):</font></b> The Reisha is even like R. Meir. 
          (One witness) saying that a man did not die (after she 
          was permitted) is not considered contradictory testimony 
          regarding Edus Ishah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If one witness says that he died and one says 
          that he did not die, or a woman says that he died and a 
          woman (even a Tzarah) says that he did not die, she may 
          not remarry.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> We understand according to R. Elazar. The Stam 
          Mishnah is as R. Meir;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> But according to R. Yochanan, this is unlike all the 
               Tana'im!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b></b>  This is left difficult.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If Leah went overseas with her husband and 
          returned and said that her husband died, she may remarry, 
          and she receives her Kesuvah. Her Tzarah (Sarah) is 
          forbidden;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b></b>  R. Tarfon says, if Sarah is a Bas Yisrael and her husband 
          was a Kohen, she continues to eat Terumah;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b></b>  R. Akiva says, to avert sin, Sarah may not remarry or eat 
          Terumah;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b></b>  If Leah says 'my husband died, and then my 
          father-in-law', she may remarry and receives her Kesuvah, 
          but her mother-in-law (Miryam) may not remarry;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b></b>  R. Tarfon says, if Miryam is a Bas Yisrael married to a 
          Kohen, she continues to eat Terumah;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b></b>  R. Akiva says, to avert sin, Miryam may not remarry or 
          eat Terumah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara):</font></b> It is necessary to teach both cases:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If we taught only the Reisha, we would think that 
               there R. Tarfon says that Leah's testimony does not 
               even forbid her Tzarah to eat Terumah, because the 
               Tzarah causes her bodily pain (less frequent Bi'ah. 
               It is likely that Leah is lying, so Sarah keeps her 
               Chazakah to eat.) Her mother-in-law causes only 
               verbal pain, so we would forbid the mother-in-law, 
               lest Leah is telling the truth;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If we taught only the Seifa, we would think that 
               there R. Akiva is stringent on the mother-in-law, 
               lest Leah is telling the truth. A Tzarah causes 
               bodily pain, so R. Akiva would agree with R. Tarfon.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> The Halachah follows R. Tarfon.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(s)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (Abaye):</font></b> A Stam Mishnah is like R. Tarfon:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> If Leah says 'I had a son overseas. My 
               son died, and then my husband', she is believed. If 
               she says 'my husband died, and then my son', she is 
               not believed, and we are concerned for her words. 
               She does Chalitzah, not Yibum.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> We are concerned for her words, but not 
               her Tzarah's words.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE PENALTY FOR A MAN WHO MARRIES ONE OF FIVE WOMEN AND DOES NOT KNOW WHICH ONE</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Mishnah records a dispute about the law in the case of a man who betrothed one of five women and does not know which one he was betrothed. According to Rebbi Tarfon, the man must give each woman a Get out of doubt, but he writes only one Kesuvah and he leaves it to the women to decide what to do with it. According to Rebbi Akiva, he must write a Kesuvah for each woman. Rebbi Tarfon and Rebbi Akiva similarly disagree about the law in the case of a person who stole an object from one of five people and does not know from whom he stole.
</p><p>
The Gemara cites a Beraisa in which Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar and the Tana Kama disagree about the exact cases in which Rebbi Tarfon and Rebbi Akiva argue.
</p><p>
According to the Tana Kama, they argue not only about a case in which one stole an object, but even in a case in which one <i>bought</i> (and did not steal) an object from one of five sellers and does not know from whom he bought it. Similarly, according to the Tana Kama, Rebbi Tarfon and Rebbi Akiva argue about a case in which one betrothed one of five women with <i>money</i>, and not just with Bi'ah, and he does not know whom he betrothed.
</p><p>
Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar, on the other hand, maintains that the argument applies only where an Isur was involved, such as when a person <i>stole</i> (an Isur d'Oraisa) from one of five people, or betrothed with <i>Bi'ah</i> (an Isur d'Rabanan) one of five women.
</p><p>
The Gemara explains that the Mishnah follows the view of Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar. When it says that Rebbi Tarfon and Rebbi Akiva argue in a case of 'Kidesh,' it means a case in which a man betrothed with <i>Bi'ah</i> (and not with money). The Gemara adds that the reason the Mishnah records their dispute in both cases (betrothal and theft) is to teach that although one who betroths a woman with Bi'ah transgressed only an Isur d'Rabanan, Rebbi Akiva still penalizes him and requires that he pay the Kesuvah to each woman.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> (DH Kidesh Katani and DH u'Mai Kidesh) explains why, according to Rebbi Akiva, the Rabanan penalize a man who betrothed one of five women with <i>Bi'ah</i> and they do not penalize a man who betrothed one of five women with money. Rashi writes when he betrothed a woman with Bi'ah, 'he did an action and shamed her,' and thus he should be penalized. In contrast, Kidushin performed with money is not shameful and involves no intimate act with the woman.
</p><p>
Why does Rashi give this reason for why Rebbi Akiva maintains that the man must pay the Kesuvah to each woman? The Gemara says that the reason for the penalty is that the man transgressed an Isur d'Rabanan by performing Kidushin with Bi'ah. Had he not committed an Isur, he would not be penalized, even though he shamed her! What is Rashi's source to say that the reason for the penalty in a case of Kidushin with Bi'ah is the shame that he caused her? (<b>MAHARSHA</b>)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER:</b> The <b>ARUCH LA'NER</b> explains that the Isur d'Rabanan alone is not sufficient reason to penalize a man and make him pay five women out of doubt. The Isur d'Rabanan of Kidushin with Bi'ah (a decree instituted to uphold high standards of moral conduct) does not involve a monetary obligation, and thus there is no basis to make him pay more because of an Isur d'Rabanan which is unrelated to payment. It is because of this reasoning that Rashi understands that there is an additional factor involved -- that the Kidushin with Bi'ah was not only an Isur d'Rabanan but was also done without the full consent of the woman (she was persuaded by him because he refused to betroth her with money). In this sense, his act resembles thievery: the difference between one who stole from one of five people ('Gazal') and one who bought an item from one of five people ('Lakach') is that in one case he takes the object without the consent of the owner ('Gazal'), and in the other case he takes the object with the consent of the owner ('Lakach'). Similarly, Kidushin with money is done with the woman's full consent, while Kidushin with Bi'ah is done with reluctance on the part of the woman and without her full consent. For this reason Rebbi Akiva maintains that the man is penalized only when he performs Kidushin with Bi'ah (according to Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar), for his act is similar to theft.
</p><p>
According to this explanation, why does the Gemara itself say that the penalty for Kidushei Bi'ah is due to the fact that the man transgressed an Isur d'Rabanan? Even if there would be no Isur d'Rabanan, he still should be penalized because he shamed her and the Kidushei Bi'ah was not done wit her full consent!
</p><p>
The answer is that, indeed, even without an Isur d'Rabanan there still would be a penalty and the man would have to give a Kesuvah to each of the women. The point of the Gemara is to teach that although one transgresses an Isur d'Oraisa in the case of theft but not in the case of Kidushin with Bi'ah, nevertheless Rebbi Akiva maintains that the man is penalized in the latter case as well. The Gemara mentions that there is an Isur d'Rabanan involved only because that is the truth. That is, when it contrasts Kidushei Bi'ah with Gezel, it cannot say that one is 'permitted' to betroth a woman with Bi'ah, because it certainly is prohibited, mid'Rabanan, due to licentiousness.
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
<b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO IS UNSURE WHOM HE OWES</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - R. Tarfon):</font></b> If a man does not know which one 
          of five women he was Mekadesh, and each says 'You were 
          Mekadesh me', he gives a Get to each one. He hands over 
          money for one Kesuvah, and withdraws;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  R. Akiva says, to clear himself from sin, he must pay a 
          Kesuvah to each one.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  If a man does not know from which one of five people he 
          stole, and each says 'You stole from me', he hands over 
          the amount stolen, and withdraws;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  R. Akiva says, to clear himself from sin, he must pay the 
          amount stolen to each one.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara):</font></b> The Mishnah teaches a case of Kidushin, not 
          Bi'ah; it teaches a case of theft, not buying.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> The Mishnah is not like R. Shimon ben Elazar, 
          nor the Tana he argues with!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Shimon ben Elazar):</font></b> R. Tarfon and R. 
               Akiva agree that if a man was Mekadesh one of five 
               women, he hands over one Kesuvah and withdraws. They 
               argue about when he had Bi'ah with one;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  R. Tarfon says that he pays one Kesuvah. R. 
                    Akiva says that he pays a Kesuvah to each.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> They agree that if he bought from one of five people 
               (and did not pay), he hands over the purchase price 
               and withdraws. They argue about when he stole;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  R. Tarfon says that he pays once. R. Akiva says 
                    that he pays to each.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> R. Shimon ben Elazar says that they do 
               not argue about Kidushin and buying. This implies 
               that there is a Tana earlier in the Beraisa who says 
               that they argue in these cases!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> If our Tana (of our Mishnah) is that Tana, he should 
               teach about Kidushin and buying!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b></b> If our Tana is R. Shimon ben Elazar, he should teach 
               about Bi'ah and stealing!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Our Tana is R. Shimon ben Elazar. The case is, he 
          was Mekadesh one of the women through Bi'ah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> He teaches about Kidushin (through Bi'ah) to show 
               the extremity of R. Akiva's opinion. Even though 
               Kidushei Bi'ah is forbidden only mid'Rabanan, he 
               must pay each woman!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> He teaches about stealing to show the extremity of 
               R. Tarfon's opinion. Even though this is forbidden 
               mid'Oraisa, he pays only once!
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WITNESS ABOUT A 'YEVAMAH'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If a woman went overseas with her husband and 
          son and returns and says 'my husband died, and then my 
          son', she is believed. If she says 'my son died, and then 
          my husband', she is not believed. We are concerned for 
          her words; she does Chalitzah, not Yibum.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  (If she left without children, and returns and says) 'I 
          had a son overseas. My son died, and then my husband', 
          she is believed. If she says 'my husband died, and then 
          my son', she is not believed. We are concerned for her 
          words; she does Chalitzah, not Yibum.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  (If she left without a Yavam, and returns and says) 'a 
          Yavam was born (a brother to my husband). My husband 
          died, and then my Yavam'; or if she says 'my Yavam died, 
          and then my husband', she is believed;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  If she left with her husband and her Yavam, and returns 
          and says 'my husband died, and then my Yavam', or 'my 
          Yavam died, and then my husband', she is not believed;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This is because a woman is not believed to say that 
               her Yavam died to permit herself to marry a 
               stranger; nor to say that her sister died, to marry 
               her sister's husband;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> A man is not believed to say 'my brother died' to do 
               Yibum, nor to say 'my wife died' to marry her 
               sister.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara - Rava) Question:</font></b> If Reuven asks Shimon to 
          receive a Get on behalf of Reuven's wife in a situation 
          where she will fall to Yibum if not for the Get, does 
          this work?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Since (normally) she hates the Yavam, it benefits 
               her to receive the Get, and one can be Zocheh 
               (acquire something beneficial) for a person in his 
               absence;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Or, since sometimes she likes the Yavam, the Get 
               could be detrimental. One cannot be Chav (acquire 
               something detrimental) to a person in his absence;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Nachman - Mishnah):</font></b> We are concerned for her 
          words. She does Chalitzah, not Yibum. (Perhaps she is 
          lying because she wants to do Yibum!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Ravina):</font></b> If Reuven was quarreling with his wife 
          and he asks Shimon to receive a Get on her behalf, does 
          it work?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Since they are quarreling, it is a Zechus for her to 
               receive the Get;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Or, perhaps she prefers being married, in spite of 
               the quarrels!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> She prefers being married;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Reish Lakish:</font></b> A woman says, 'It is better to live as 
               two (i.e. married) than to live as a widow.'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Abaye:</font></b> A woman married to an ant (i.e. even a 
               midget) puts her chair among the important women.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Papa:</font></b> Even if her husband cleans wool (a scorned 
               profession), she goes out on the porch to greet him 
               (she is not ashamed).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Ashi:</font></b> Even if he sells heads of cabbage (Tosfos; 
               Rashi - his lineage is tainted), she will not even 
               request lentils (it suffices to her that she is 
               married).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> All women married to such men have Bi'as Zenus 
          and attribute the child to their husbands.
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>ARE WE CONCERNED LEST CHILDREN WERE BORN?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If a (childless) man went overseas with a wife 
          and left a wife (Leah) home and they told Leah that he 
          died, she may not remarry nor do Yibum until she hears 
          whether or not she, her Tzarah, is pregnant;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If Leah has no Yavam but has a mother-in-law overseas, 
          she need not be concerned lest a Yavam was born;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  If her mother-in-law was pregnant and went overseas, Leah 
          must be concerned lest a Yavam was born (she may not 
          remarry);
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  R. Yehoshua says, she need not be concerned.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara) Question:</font></b> Why does it say '<i>she</i>, her Tzarah'? 
          (This is unnecessary!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> We are concerned only for a Tzarah we know about. 
          We are not concerned lest he married a woman overseas.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> She may not remarry nor do Yibum ...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Granted, she may not do Yibum. If her Tzarah is 
          pregnant, the Yavam is forbidden mid'Oraisa due to Eshes 
          Ach without the Mitzvah of Yibum.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> But why can't she remarry? We should assume that the 
               Tzarah is from the majority of women who get 
               pregnant and have children!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> The Mishnah is R. Meir, who is concerned for 
          the minority.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> The Mishnah can even be as Chachamim;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Chachamim follow a Ruba d'Isa Kaman (a majority in 
               front of us that we can count it), e.g. if there are 
               nine stores (in this city that sell Kosher meat and 
               one sells Tereifah, and meat was found and we do not 
               know from which store it came);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Also regarding Beis Din (we follow the majority of 
               judges);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> We do not find that Chachamim follow a Ruba d'Leisa 
               Kaman (i.e. a statistical majority, e.g. most women 
               get pregnant and have children).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> When a minor falls to Yibum, Chachamim rely on 
          a Ruba d'Leisa Kaman!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Meir):</font></b> A minor Yavam or Yevamah does 
               not do Chalitzah or Yibum;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Chachamim:</font></b> We understand why they cannot do 
               Chalitzah. 'Ish' must be an adult, and we equate the 
               law of the Yevamah to the Yavam;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question (Chachamim):</font></b> Why can't they do Yibum?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer (R. Meir):</font></b> If he is a minor, we are concerned 
               lest he be found to be a Seris. If she is a minor, 
               we are concerned lest she is an Ailonis. In either 
               case (there was no Mitzvah of Yibum, so) they 
               transgressed Ervah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b></b> Chachamim rely on the majority. Most people are 
               normal males and females.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Conclusion:</font></b> We must say that our Mishnah is R. Meir.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Seifa):</font></b> If she has no Yavam but has a 
          mother-in-law overseas, she need not be concerned lest a 
          Yavam was born.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the Mishnah is R. Meir, we should be concerned!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Most women get pregnant and bear children. A 
               minority miscarry. Of those who bear children, half 
               are male;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> The chance that her mother-in-law bore a son is less 
               than half. R. Meir is concerned for a minority!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Since Leah's Chazakah is that she will not fall 
          to Yibum when her husband dies, R. Meir is not concerned 
          for the minority.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> If so, in the Reisha her Chazakah is that she 
          will fall to Yibum. She should do Yibum!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rav Nachman):</font></b> There to do Yibum is Chayavei 
          Kerisos (if indeed he had a son and Yibum does not 
          apply), so we are concerned. Yevamah l'Shuk (if there is 
          a Yavam) is only Chayavei Lavin, so we are not stringent.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection (Rava):</font></b> Both are mid'Oraisa. We should be as 
          stringent about Chayavei Lavin as we are about Chayavei 
          Kerisos!
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) A WOMAN'S TESTIMONY ABOUT HER HUSBAND AND CHILD ABROAD</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> If a woman's husband and her Tzarah travel together abroad and the woman finds out that her husband died, she may not do Yibum even though her husband had no children when he left. She must take into account the possibility that her Tzarah bore children to her husband while abroad. On the other hand, she is not permitted to remarry because perhaps her Tzarah did not bear any children to her husband, in which case she is obligated to do Yibum.
</p><p>
The Gemara asks that she should be permitted to remarry because 'most married women become pregnant and have children.' Beis Din should permit the woman to remarry based on the assumption of the 'Rov' that the Tzarah had a child.
</p><p>
The Gemara answers that the Mishnah follows the opinion of Rebbi Meir who maintains that Beis Din must be stringent and take into account the less likely possibility ('Chosheshim l'Mi'ut'). In this case, Beis Din must be stringent and take into account the possibility that the Tzarah did not have a child. (The Chazakah that she did not have a child until now supports that Mi'ut.)
</p><p>
The Mishnah in the end of the previous chapter (118b) discusses the case of a man (who had no children) and his wife who traveled together abroad. The Mishnah states that if the woman returns and says that she gave birth to a child abroad but the child died before her husband died, she is believed (and must do Yibum) because of the Chazakah that until now she was obligated to do Yibum since she had no children. Although she admits that she gave birth to a child and cannot prove that the child died before her husband died, she is believed to say that the child died before her husband died because of a 'Migu': she could have said nothing about the child, and she would have been obligated to do Yibum because of the Chazakah (<b>RASHI</b> DH Meis Ba'ali, <b>RITVA</b>). If she says that the child died <i>after</i> her husband died (and she should be exempt from Yibum), she is <i>not</i> believed because she contradicts the Chazakah that she is obligated to do Yibum.
</p><p>
Why should the Chazakah that she did not have children before she departed be the decisive factor in proving that she is obligated to do Yibum? The <i>Rov</i> contradicts the Chazakah and states that she probably became pregnant and had a child (and is <i>not</i> obligated to do Yibum).
</p><p>
According to the Rabanan (who do not take into account the Mi'ut), when the woman says nothing about the child she should be allowed to marry anyone (without doing Yibum) because of the Rov. According to Rebbi Meir, she should be required to do Chalitzah and not Yibum ('Choletzes v'Lo Misyabemes'), because Rebbi Meir takes into account the Mi'ut, the lesser possibility that she did not have children. Hence, even if she says that she had a child abroad and the child died before her husband died, the same Halachah should apply because of the 'Migu' -- she should be required to do Chalitzah and not Yibum, 'Choletzes v'Lo Misyabemes.' (<b>TOSFOS REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b>, Yevamos 15:125)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER:</b> The <b>RAMBAN</b> and <b>RASHBA</b> address this question. They explain that in the case of a man and his wife who went abroad without a child and the wife returned without a child, all Tana'im agree that the Rov does not overpower the Chazakah. This is because two factors indicate that she is obligated to do Yibum -- the Chazakah that she had no children before she left, and the fact that she returns without a child (with no evidence that there ever was a child). That is, there are two Chazakos -- one Chazakah that she had no children before she departed, and another Chazakah that she had no children when she returned. These two Chazakos overpower the Rov which says that she gave birth to a child abroad. Accordingly, Beis Din assumes that she does not have a child and requires that she do Yibum or Chalitzah. If she says that she had a child and the child died before her husband died, she is believed with a 'Migu' that she could have said nothing about a child, in which case she would have been obligated to do Yibum.
</p><p>
The Gemara here, however, discusses the case of the woman's <i>Tzarah</i> who went abroad (and not the woman herself). Since she never returned, there obviously is no Chazakah that states that upon her return she had no children. Therefore, the Rov overrides the single remaining Chazakah (that she had no children when she departed) and states that she probably gave birth to a child abroad.
</p><p>
However, the Mishnah earlier (118b) teaches that if the woman who returns from abroad testifies that the child died <i>after</i> her husband died (and she should be exempt from Yibum), she is <i>not</i> believed because she contradicts the Chazakah that until now she had no children. Why, though, is she not believed? She should be believed because of the Rov that says that she probably <i>did</i> have a child while abroad. Although she says that the child died, she has a 'Migu' that she could have said that she had a child and the child is still alive. (She certainly would have been believed had she made such a claim, because her testimony is supported by the Rov.)
</p><p>
The simple answer would be that the Mishnah there follows the opinion of Rebbi Meir (as the Mishnah here does) and maintains that the Rov does not override the Chazakah because of the concern for the Mi'ut. Therefore, the woman must do Chalitzah and not Yibum, 'Choletzes v'Lo Misyabemes.'
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Amai) challenges this answer. If the Mishnah earlier (118b) follows the opinion of Rebbi Meir, why does the Gemara wait until now to prove that the Mishnah follows the opinion of Rebbi Meir? The Gemara should have discussed the matter earlier!
</p><p>
1. <b>TOSFOS</b> answers that the previous Mishnah does <i>not</i> follow the opinion of Rebbi Meir. Rather, it refers to a case in which <i>witnesses</i> testify about the death of the woman's child but do not know whether her child or her husband died first. Their testimony eliminates her 'Migu': Once they testify that she had a child, she no longer is believed to say that the child died after her husband, based on a 'Migu' that she could have said that her child is still alive. She is not permitted to remarry without first doing Yibum, even according to the Rabanan who normally follow a Rov, since she has no 'Migu' to say that the child is still alive.
</p><p>
The <b>MAHARSHA</b> is perplexed by this answer. If the Mishnah there refers to a case in which witnesses testify that she had a child and the child died, she has a Chazakah that she is <i>exempt</i> from Yibum because she had a child! Therefore, if she says that her child died <i>before</i> her husband died, she should not be believed and permitted to do Yibum. On the contrary, there is a Chazakah that she is <i>prohibited</i> to the Yavam. (See <b>ARUCH LA'NER</b>, <b>KARNEI RE'EM</b>.)
</p><p>
The <b>KEREN ORAH</b> answers that Tosfos means to apply the logic of the Ramban and the Rashba even when witnesses come and testify that there was a child but the child died. Since she left without a child, and upon her return the witnesses who testify that she had a child also testify that she no longer has a child, the original Chazakah -- that she is obligated to do Yibum -- is in force. Although there was a point in time at which she had a child (as the witnesses testify), since the birth of that child becomes known only at the same time that the death of the child becomes known, the Chazakah that she had no child and is obligated to do Yibum remains. Just as the existence of the Rov does not preclude the application of the Chazakah, the testimony of the witnesses that she had a child is not reason to reject the Chazakah since she presently has no child. When she says that the child died after her husband died, she is not believed with a 'Migu' that she could have said that the child is still alive, because witnesses testified that the child died.
</p><p>
Why does she not have a 'Migu' that she could have said that she had <i>twins</i> and the second child is still alive? Perhaps she does not have such a 'Migu' because she had no way of knowing that witnesses would testify that her child died, and thus she did not consider making such a claim. Alternatively, a 'Migu' alone is insufficient grounds to counteract the Chazakah that she is obligated to do Yibum. (Only the type of 'Migu' of 'Peh she'Asur Hu ha'Peh she'Hitir,' or a 'Migu d'Iy Ba'i Shasik,' a Migu that she could have said nothing if she indeed is lying, is strong enough to counteract the Chazakah. The logic of the 'Migu' validates her claim only when she could have omitted something from her testimony (and thereby made her testimony <i>more</i> plausible) but she said it anyway. It does not validate her claim when she merely could have said a stronger claim than the one she actually said.)
</p><p>
2. Other Rishonim disagree with the answer of Tosfos. The <b>RAMBAN</b> explains that the woman who went abroad with her husband has a Chazakah that she is obligated to do Yibum not only because she left and returned without children, but also 'because we never heard that she had children.' According to the Ramban, if witnesses testify that she had a child while abroad, even though they also say that the child died the woman no longer has a Chazakah that she is obligated to do Yibum. (It is interesting to note that the Rashba omits these words when he quotes the Ramban here.)
</p><p>
However, if she has no Chazakah that she must do Yibum, the question returns: Why is she not believed when she returns from abroad and testifies, 'I bore a son abroad, and my husband died before my son died'? She should be believed because of a 'Migu' that she could have said that she bore a son and her son is still alive (a claim which would be believed because of the Rov)!
</p><p>
Apparently, the answer is that the Ramban indeed understands that the Mishnah earlier (118b) follows the opinion of Rebbi Meir who says that Beis Din does not rely on the Rov that the woman bore a child abroad. Therefore, even if the woman says that she bore a child abroad, she is <i>not</i> believed because the Rov which supports her claim is unable to counter the Chazakah that she is obligated to do Yibum. 
</p><p>
Why does the Gemara there not mention that the Mishnah there follows the opinion of Rebbi Meir? Perhaps it was obvious that the Mishnah there follows his opinion. In contrast, it is not so obvious that the Mishnah here follows his opinion because, as the Gemara points out, if the Mishnah follows Rebbi Meir, the end of the Mishnah contradicts the beginning of the Mishnah.
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rava):</font></b> In the Reisha, her Chazakah is that she 
          will fall to Yibum, and the majority says that she will 
          not. A Chazakah is not as strong as a majority, so it 
          joins with the minority of women who miscarry, and we are 
          left with an even doubt, so she may not do Yibum or marry 
          l'Shuk;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> In the Seifa, the Chazakah and the majority both say 
               that she will not fall to Yibum. Therefore, the 
               chance that a Yavam was born is considered 
               miniscule, and even R. Meir is not concerned for 
               this.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>MAY SHE DO 'CHALITZAH'?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> Leah may not marry l'Shuk or do Yibum ...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Can she never remarry?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Ze'iri):</font></b> She must wait three months to see if 
          she herself is pregnant. She must wait nine months lest 
          her Tzarah is pregnant. After this Leah does Chalitzah, 
          and she is permitted l'Shuk whether or not her Tzarah 
          bore a child.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (R. Chanina):</font></b> She must wait three months to see 
          if she herself is pregnant. She must wait forever for her 
          Tzarah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why can't Leah do Chalitzah after nine months, 
          whether or not her Tzarah had a child?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Abaye bar Avin and R. Chanina bar Avin):</font></b> This is 
          a decree, lest the Tzarah had a child, and we will have 
          to announce that the Chalitzah was unnecessary and void, 
          so Leah is permitted to a Kohen.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is wrong if we need to announce this?!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Perhaps someone who saw the Chalitzah will not 
          hear the announcement. When he sees her marry a Kohen, he 
          will think that a Chalutzah was permitted to a Kohen.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If a woman says 'I had a son overseas. My son 
          died, and then my husband', she is believed. If she says 
          'My husband died, and then my son', she is not believed, 
          and we are concerned for her words. She does Chalitzah, 
          not Yibum.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> We should be concerned lest witnesses will come 
          and verify her story, and we will have to announce that 
          she is permitted to a Kohen!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rav Papa):</font></b> That Mishnah discusses a divorcee.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (R. Chiya brei d'Rav Huna):</font></b> The case is, she 
          said that she and her husband were alone in a cave. We 
          are not concerned lest witnesses will come.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE TESTIMONY OF 'YEVAMOS'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> Sarah and Leah were married to two brothers. 
          Each said 'My husband died (without children)'. Leah 
          cannot remarry, lest Sarah's husband (her Yavam) is 
          alive. Likewise, Sarah cannot remarry.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If Sarah has witnesses that her husband died, and Leah 
          has no witnesses that her husband died, Sarah may not 
          remarry, but Leah may;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  If one man died with children and the other without 
          children, the widow with children may marry. The other 
          widow may not;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  If Sarah and Leah did Yibum (to other brothers), and the 
          Yevamim died, the women may not remarry;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  R. Elazar says, since they were permitted to the Yevamim, 
          they are permitted to others.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara - Beraisa):</font></b> If Sarah has witnesses and children, 
          and Leah has neither, both may remarry;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  If (neither had witnesses or children and) they did Yibum 
          and the Yevamim died, they are forbidden;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b></b>  R. Elazar says, since they were permitted to the Yevamim, 
          they are permitted to others.
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) LETTING A WOMAN REMARRY BY PROHIBITING HER TO A KOHEN</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara concludes that if a woman's husband and Tzarah traveled abroad and she does not know whether the Tzarah bore a child to her husband before he died, she is prohibited to remarry (without first doing Yibum) until she verifies that the Tzarah had a child. 
</p><p>
The Gemara asks that she should simply be allowed to do Chalitzah and then remarry. Chalitzah will solve her problem regardless of whether or not her Tzarah had a child: If her Tzarah had a child, she does not need Chalitzah (and she commits no wrong by doing Chalitzah when it is not required), and if her Tzarah did not have a child, the Chalitzah permits her to remarry. The Gemara answers that she is not allowed to do Chalitzah because if it is discovered later that the Tzarah did have a child, Beis Din will have to announce that the woman's Chalitzah was not valid (she there was no obligation to do Chalitzah) and she is permitted to marry a Kohen. However, such a public announcement that the Chalitzah was not valid is not an efficient way of spreading the word that she is permitted to marry a Kohen. Someone might not hear the announcement, and when he sees the woman marry a Kohen he will mistakenly assume that a Kohen is allowed to marry a Chalutzah. Therefore, the woman is not permitted to do Chalitzah out of doubt in the first place.
</p><p>
The Gemara's reasoning is difficult to understand. Why do the Rabanan <i>prohibit</i> her from doing Chalitzah now due to the fear that later she might marry a Kohen when it is discovered that her Chalitzah was not necessary (and someone might not know that her Chalitzah was not necessary)? The Rabanan should <i>permit</i> her to do Chalitzah now and <i>prohibit</i> her from marrying a Kohen if later it is discovered that she did not need Chalitzah!
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>PERISHAH</b> (EH 156:29) and the <b>HAGAHOS TOFOS YOM TOV</b> (ibid.) answer that if the Rabanan permit the woman to do Chalitzah and to marry anyone except a Kohen, when the woman later discovers that her Tzarah gave birth and she did not need Chalitzah, she will <i>think</i> that she is permitted to marry a Kohen despite what she was told at the time she did Chalitzah. Although Beis Din tells her that she is prohibited from marrying a Kohen forever once she performs this act of Chalitzah, she will reason that they told her this only because of the possibility that the Chalitzah was valid. She will not understand why she should be prohibited to a Kohen when it becomes known that her Chalitzah was completely unnecessary.
</p><p>
Therefore, the only suitable course of action is to <i>not</i> allow her to do Chalitzah, and to remain unmarried until she finds out whether her Tzarah had a child. Such a ruling will seem logical to her, as it makes sense that she cannot do Chalitzah as long as she does not know whether or not her husband had children. 
</p><p>
(b) The Perishah's explanation may be developed further as follows. If the Rabanan permit her to do Chalitzah and then prohibit her to a Kohen when it becomes known that her Tzarah had a child and the Chalitzah was meaningless, people will wonder why the Chalitzah was valid enough to prohibit her to a Kohen in the first place. They will incorrectly conclude that the Chalitzah must have been done while the Tzarah was pregnant, before the child was born, and that is why it was valid. 
</p><p>
This, in turn, will lead people to conclude that when a man dies with no children but his wife is pregnant, her act of Chalitzah or Yibum sis valid even if the child is born healthy and lives, since he was not born before the death of his father. In truth, however, the Halachah in such a case is that the Chalitzah is not valid, and Yibum is prohibited with an Isur Kares (35b). It was because of this concern that the Chachamim did not permit her to do Chalitzah now and prohibit her to a Kohen when her Tzarah returns with a child. (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE TESTIMONY OF 'YEVAMOS' (cont.)</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rava):</font></b> What is R. Elazar's reason?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Does he hold that Leah's testimony helps for her 
               Tzarah Sarah?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Or, does he hold that Leah would not ruin herself 
               (do Yibum if her husband were alive) to ruin Sarah?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> These answers disagree about whether or not Sarah 
               may remarry before Leah:
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  If Leah's testimony helps for her Sarah, Sarah 
                    may remarry first;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> If Sarah is permitted only because Leah would 
                    not ruin herself, Sarah may not remarry before 
                    Leah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Mishnah - R. Elazar):</font></b> Since they were 
          permitted to the Yevamim, they are permitted to others.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If Sarah is permitted because Leah would not ruin 
               herself, we understand why Sarah is permitted only 
               after Leah remarries;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> But if Leah's testimony helps for Sarah, it should 
               help even if Leah didn't marry!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Conclusion:</font></b> The reason is because Leah would not 
               ruin herself.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> No, perhaps R. Elazar addresses Chachamim 
          according to their opinion;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> I hold that Leah's testimony helps for Sarah, even 
               if Leah didn't remarry.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> You should at least agree that if Leah remarried 
               Sarah may remarry, for Leah would not ruin herself!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Chachamim:</font></b> A woman would ruin herself to ruin her 
               Tzarah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Mishnah):</font></b> If a woman went overseas with her 
          husband and returned and said that he died, she may 
          remarry and she receives her Kesuvah. Her Tzarah is 
          forbidden;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Elazar):</font></b> Since she was permitted, her 
               Tzarah is also permitted.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> Perhaps R. Elazar means that since she was 
          permitted and remarried, her Tzarah is permitted.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> We should be concerned lest she remarried 
          because she was divorced, but her ex-husband is still 
          alive, and she lies to ruin her Tzarah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The Tzarah is permitted only if Leah married a 
          Kohen. She would not do so if she was divorced.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHAT MUST BE SEEN TO TESTIFY THAT A MAN DIED</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> Witnesses can testify only if they saw face, 
          including the nose. This is even if there are Simanim on 
          his body and clothing.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  They can testify only if they saw him die. This is even 
          if they saw him cut up, hanging, and a wild animal eating 
          him.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  They can testify only if they saw the body within three 
          days of death;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  R. Yehudah ben Bava says, it depends on the deceased, the 
          place and the time.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara - Beraisa):</font></b> If they only saw the forehead but not 
          the face, or vice-versa, they cannot testify. They must 
          see both, including the nose.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Abaye):</font></b> We learn from 'Hakaras Peneihem Onsah Bam'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  Aba bar Marsa owed money to the Exilarch's house. He 
          stuck remnants of garments on his forehead, and they did 
          not recognize him.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> Even if there are Simanim ...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Inference:</font></b> This shows that mid'Oraisa we may not rely on 
          Simanim.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Contradiction (Mishnah):</font></b> If (a messenger to give a Get 
          lost the Get, and) it was found tied to his wallet or 
          ring, or if it was found among his clothes, even after a 
          long time, the Get may be used.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Abaye):</font></b> Tana'im argue about whether or not 
          mid'Oraisa we may rely on Simanim:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> We may not identify a dead man based on a 
               wart to permit his wife to remarry;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Eliezer ben Mahavoy permits this.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> Chachamim hold that we may rely on 
               Simanim mid'Oraisa; R. Eliezer says, only 
               mid'Rabanan.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #1 - Rejection (Rava):</font></b> All hold that Simanim are 
          mid'Oraisa;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Version #1a:</font></b> They argue about whether we are 
               concerned lest someone born at the same time with 
               the same Mazel has an identical wart.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Version #1b:</font></b> They argue about whether or not warts 
               are prone to change after death.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #2 - Rejection (Rava):</font></b> All hold that (regular) 
          Simanim are mid'Rabanan. They argue about whether or not 
          a wart is an exceptional Siman (which works mid'Oraisa).
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) HALACHAH: TESTIMONY ABOUT THE IDENTITY OF A CORPSE</b></font><b>
<br>OPINIONS:</b> The Mishnah states that the testimony of a witness about the identity of a corpse is not acceptable unless he recognizes the forehead and nose of the dead person.
</p><p>
<b>RABEINU TAM</b> in <b>SEFER HA'YASHAR</b> (#92, cited by <b>TOSFOS</b> DH Ein and other Rishonim here) asserts that it is not reasonable to suggest that a dead person can be recognized only through his facial features. If the witness is familiar with the dead person's bodily features, he certainly may identify the corpse based on those features. Rabeinu Tam explains that the Mishnah's law refers specifically to a head without a body. A witness who saw the head of a dead person (detached from the body) may identify it only if he recognized the forehead and the nose. If, however, the rest of body was present and the witness recognized its bodily features, his identification of the dead person certainly is acceptable.
</p><p>
The <b>RASHBA</b> and other Rishonim (121a) reject Rabeinu Tam's explanation. They argue that the Mishnah makes no mention of the body, implying that regardless of whether or not the body is present the witness may identify the corpse <i>only</i> based on recognition of the forehead and nose.
</p><p>
The <b>ARUCH LA'NER</b> resolves this and other questions which the Rishonim ask on Rabeinu Tam's explanation. He points out that the Rishonim did not have the original version of Rabeinu Tam's Teshuvah as it appears in the Sefer ha'Yashar; their questions on his explanation is based on the brief excerpt of his words as cited by Tosfos. In the original Teshuvah, Rabeinu Tam clearly explains that the Mishnah discusses one whose testimony is based only on 'Simanim,' specific features, and who does not have 'Tevi'us Ayin,' general recognition, of the corpse. Accordingly, the Mishnah states that one must recognize the forehead and the nose because 'Simanim' are a valid form of identification only when they appear on the head (nose and forehead), whether or not the head is attached to a body. Only when one testifies to the identity of the corpse based on 'Tevi'us Ayin' (general familiarity) may he testify based on recognition of the rest of the body. The Mishnah discusses recognition based on specific signs ('Simanim'), and thus it refers only to testimony about the specific features of the head.
</p><p>

<b>HALACHAH:</b> The <b>SHULCHAN ARUCH</b> (EH 17:25) cites the opinion of Rabeinu Tam and writes that other Rishonim disagree.
</p><p>
However, when one recognizes the body or head through 'Simanim Muvhakim' -- clear signs unique to this person, his testimony is accepted. 'Simanim Muvhakim' are always accepted mid'Oraisa as testimony, regardless of whether one maintains that testimony based on ordinary 'Simanim' is accepted mid'Oraisa or mid'Rabanan.
</p><p>
The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Nachalos 7:3) writes that if a person was killed and witnesses did not recognize the face but testified about 'Simanim Muvhakim' they found on his body, Beis Din may not permit his wife to remarry. The Rambam seems to rule that even 'Simanim Muvhakim' are not accepted as testimony. This also seems to be the ruling of the <b>SEFER HA'ITUR</b> (as cited by the <b>BEIS YOSEF</b>).
</p><p>
The <b>BEIS YOSEF</b> (EH 17:40, and <b>KESEF MISHNEH</b>, Hilchos Gerushin 13:21) ask that the Gemara here contradicts the ruling of the Rambam, because it implies that even if ordinary 'Simanim' are mid'Rabanan, a mole which is a 'Siman Muvhak' certainly is accepted as testimony mid'Oraisa. Moreover, the Rambam himself (Hilchos Gezeilah 13:5) writes that 'Simanim Muvhakim' <i>are</i> accepted for all testimony mid'Oraisa, and, in accordance with this principle, he rules (Hilchos Gerushin 3:11) that one may return a Get based on a 'Siman Muvhak' (such as a hole next to a certain letter). 
</p><p>
The Kesef Mishneh therefore concludes that when the Rambam in Hilchos Nachalos writes that a 'Siman Muvhak' is not accepted, he refers to what the Gemara here calls an ordinary 'Siman' and not an actual 'Siman Muvhak.' A 'Siman Muvhak' which <i>is</i> acceptable, even according to the Rambam, is a 'Siman' which is <i>very</i> unique and singular to this person. Everyone agrees that testimony about such a 'Siman Muvhak' is acceptable. The Kesef Mishneh concludes that this must be the intention of the Sefer ha'Itur as well.
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> In Version #1, Rava says that Simanim are 
          mid'Oraisa. But the Mishnah says (that witnesses can 
          testify only if they saw the face) even if there are 
          Simanim on his body and clothes!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer - part 1:</font></b> The Simanim on his body are (vague and 
          unreliable, e.g.) he is tall or short;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 - part 2 (regarding clothing):</font></b> We cannot rely 
          on Simanim on his clothing, for we are concerned lest 
          someone borrowed his clothing.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> If we are concerned that someone borrowed 
               his clothing, why do we return a donkey based on a 
               sign on the Ukaf (wood placed above the saddle)? We 
               should be concerned lest the Ukaf was borrowed!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> One does not borrow another's Ukaf, lest it 
               wound his donkey.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> If a Get was found tied to a man's wallet 
               or ring, why may it be used? Perhaps it is a 
               different Get of one who borrowed his wallet or 
               ring!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> One does not lend his (signet) ring, lest 
               the borrower forge with it. One does not lend his 
               wallet, lest it harm his Mazel.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 - part 2 (regarding clothing):</font></b> The Simanim on 
          his clothes are (vague and unreliable, e.g.) they are 
          white or black.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO WAS CUT UP</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> Even if they saw that he was cut up ... (they 
          cannot testify).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Inference:</font></b> A cut up person may live.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Contradiction (Mishnah):</font></b> A person is not Tamei until he 
          dies, even if he is cut up, even Goses (about to die).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> He is not dead, but he will not live!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Abaye):</font></b> Tana'im argue about whether he can 
          survive:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> We can testify that a cut up person died, 
               but not one who was hanging;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Shimon ben Elazar says, we cannot testify even 
               about one who was cut up, since he could be 
               cauterized and live.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> The Mishnah cannot be R. Shimon ben Elazar, 
          for the Seifa is unlike him!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> A case occurred in Asya in which a man 
               was lowered into water. When they lifted him, only 
               his leg came up. Chachamim ruled that his wife may 
               remarry only if more than the knee came up.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> There is different, for water aggravates the 
          wound.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Rabah bar bar Chanah saw a man cut up his 
          camel. It died while still neighing!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Abaye):</font></b> That was a weak camel.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rava):</font></b> The Mishnah discusses one cut with a 
          burning-hot knife. All agree that in such a case he can 
          live.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> A wild animal was eating from him...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> This is only if it was eating from a place 
          where a person does not die. If it was eating from a 
          place from where a person dies, we may testify.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> If both Simanim (foodpipe and windpipe) of 
          a man were cut, or the majority of both, and he fled, we 
          may testify that he died.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Rav Yehudah said that if such a man authorized 
          to divorce his wife, we write and give the Get!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> He is living, but he will die.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, one who cut the Simanim of a person 
          b'Shogeg should be exiled, but a Beraisa says that he is 
          not!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (R. Oshaya):</font></b> We are concerned that the wind 
          precipitated his death, or he himself did.
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>'SIMANIM' THAT CHANGE AFTER DEATH</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What difference is there are between the two 
          concerns?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> He was slaughtered in a marble house (there is 
          no wind) and moved before dying.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> He was slaughtered outside, and did not move.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - R. Yehudah ben Bava):</font></b> It depends on the 
          deceased...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Does he allow more time to identify the body, 
          or less?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> A man drowned and his body was recovered after 
          three days. Rav Dimi of Nehardai permitted his wife to 
          remarry. A man drowned in the Diglas River and his body 
          was recovered after five days. Rava permitted his wife to 
          remarry.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Granted, if R. Yehudah allows more time, these 
               Amora'im hold like him. But if R. Yehudah allows 
               less time, like whom did they rule?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> A body in water may be recognized for more 
          time, for water prevents swelling and distortion of the 
          face.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Above we said that water aggravates a wound!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> When there is a wound, it aggravates it. When 
          there is no wound, it preserves the body.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This is only if he was seen right after removal from 
               the water. If there was a delay, he swells up and 
               changes.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO FELL INTO WATER</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If a man fell into water, whether or not it is 
          endless (this will be explained), his wife is forbidden;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  R. Meir:</font></b> A man fell into the great reservoir, and he came 
          out after three days.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  R. Yosi:</font></b> A blind man went to immerse in a cave; the man 
          leading him went after him. People with them waited until 
          they surely drowned, and their wives were permitted to 
          remarry.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  A case occurred in Asya in which a man was lowered into 
          water. When they lifted him, only his leg came up. 
          Chachamim ruled that his wife may remarry only if more 
          than the knee came up.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara - Beraisa - R. Meir):</font></b> If a man fell into water, 
          whether or not it is endless, his wife is forbidden;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  Chachamim say, she is forbidden only if it is endless.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is considered water with an end?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Abaye):</font></b> A person can see the shore in all four 
          directions.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b></b>  A man drowned in the swamp of Samki; Rav Shilo permitted 
          his wife to remarry. Rav wanted to excommunicate him; 
          Shmuel said that they should ask him first.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Rav and Shmuel asked him 'What is the law of endless 
               water?' He answered that the wife is forbidden.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> They asked if the swamp of Samki is considered 
               endless; he said that it is.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav and Shmuel:</font></b> Why did you permit the woman?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Shilo:</font></b> I erred. I thought that since the water 
               does not flow, it is like endless water;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  This is wrong. There are waves, and these could 
                    take him far away (beyond vision of the 
                    witnesses).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Shmuel:</font></b> 'Sin will not occur to a Tzadik' (Hash-m 
          prevented Rav from unjustly excommunicating R. Shilo).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rav:</font></b> 'Salvation comes through much counsel.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa - Rebbi):</font></b> A case occurred in which Reuven and 
          Shimon were setting fish traps in the Yarden. Reuven 
          entered a hole to catch fish. The sun set, and he could 
          not find the opening. Shimon waited until he surely 
          drowned, and informed Reuven's family of his death.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> In the morning, Reuven saw the opening and returned 
               home, where they were eulogizing him.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rebbi:</font></b> How great are the words of Chachamim, who 
               said that if the water has an end his wife is 
               permitted, but if it is endless she is forbidden!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Even if it has an end, we should be concerned 
          for a fishing hole!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Fishing holes are not common in water with an 
          end.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Ashi):</font></b> Chachamim say that if the water is endless, 
          she is forbidden. This refers to a regular person, but if 
          a Chacham died, she is permitted. Had he survived, word 
          would spread.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b></b>  This is wrong. Whether or not he is a Chacham, if he fell 
          in endless water, l'Chatchilah, his wife may not remarry. 
          B'Di'eved, if she remarried, she may stay married.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa - R. Gamliel):</font></b> Once, I was on a boat and I saw a 
          boat sink. I was distressed, for R. Akiva was on the 
          boat. When I got to the dry land, I saw him learning.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Gamliel:</font></b> How did you get to the land?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Akiva:</font></b> I found a board of the boat (and floated 
               on it). Every time a wave came (to submerge it), I 
               nodded my head to the wave (and it went away).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Chachamim learned from here that if Resha'im come to 
               a person, he should nod his head (and not confront 
               them).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  R. Gamliel:</font></b> How great are the words of Chachamim, who 
          said that his wife is permitted only if the water has an 
          end!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(s)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa - R. Akiva):</font></b> Once, I was on a boat, and I saw a 
          boat sink. I was distressed, for R. Meir was on the boat. 
          When I got to the dry land, I saw him learning.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Akiva:</font></b> How did you reach the land?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Meir:</font></b> One wave carried me to the next wave, and 
               the next to the next, until I was deposited on the 
               land.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Akiva:</font></b> How great are the words of Chachamim, who 
               said that his wife is permitted only if the water 
               has an end!
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHEN MAY WE TESTIFY THAT A MAN DIED?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> If a man fell into a den of lions, we may not 
          testify about him (that he died). If he fell into a pit 
          of snakes and scorpions, we may testify;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  R. Yehudah ben Beseirah says, even if he fell into a pit 
          of snakes and scorpions, we may not testify. Perhaps he 
          is a snake charmer!
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) HALACHAH: FORENSIC EVIDENCE AND PASSAGE OF TIME SINCE DEATH</b></font><b>
<br>OPINIONS:</b> The Tana Kama of the Mishnah (120a) maintains that testimony about the identity of a person who has been dead for more than three days is not accepted because physical changes occur in three days which render it impossible to positively identify the body. The Gemara states that if the person drowned, one may testify about his identity even after five days have passed because the water preserves the body.
</p><p>
What is the Halachah in practice with regard to identifying a body after three days have passed, when the body was not in water?
</p><p>
(a) <b>RABEINU TAM</b> in <b>SEFER HA'YASHAR</b> (#92; see previous Insight) writes that if the face is complete and not mutilated, one certainly is able to recognize a person even though he has been dead for more than three days. A deceased person's face does not change after three days, and one certainly may recognize him. The Mishnah discusses a case in which the face was not recognizable and the identification of the corpse was based on marks found on the body.
</p><p>
(b) However, the Rishonim reject Rabeinu Tam's explanation because the Gemara says that when a person drowns, one may identify the body after three days have passed only because the water preserves it -- even if his body is found complete and not wounded. This implies that without the preservative property of water, the body would <i>not</i> be identifiable after three days and one would <i>not</i> be permitted to identify body and permit the wife of the suspected victim to remarry. According to Rabeinu Tam, however, one should be permitted to identify the body based on the face which was found complete.
</p><p>
Rabeinu Tam answers that the Gemara refers a case in which the witnesses did not recognize the body with 'Tevi'us Ayin' (general familiarity) since the body was partially eaten by fish (see previous Insight). They recognized the body only based on 'Simanim' (specific identifying marks) on the face. In such a case, their testimony about his identity is not accepted when they saw the body three days after the death. Had they testified with 'Tevi'us Ayin,' however, they would have been believed even after the passage of many days. Although the Gemara does not mention, in the case of drowning, that the body is not whole, it is clear that this is the condition of the body (since fish often eat from the corpses they find underwater).
</p><p>

<b>HALACHAH:</b> The <b>RAMBAM</b> does not differentiate between whether the face is complete or not. This implies that he, too, disagrees with Rabeinu Tam. The <b>SHULCHAN ARUCH</b> (EH 17:25) cites Rabeinu Tam's opinion and writes that other Rishonim disagree.
</p><p>


<font><b>2) HALACHAH: FORENSIC EVIDENCE AND DOUBTS ABOUT THE TIME OF DEATH</b></font><b>
<br>OPINIONS:</b> The Tana Kama of the Mishnah (120a) maintains that testimony about the identity of a person who has been dead for more than three days is not accepted because physical changes occur in three days which render it impossible to positively identify the body. The Gemara states that if the person drowned, one may testify about his identity even after five days have passed because the water preserves the body.
</p><p>
What is the Halachah in a case in which a body is found and it is not known how many days have passed since the time of death? What form of testimony about the identity of the corpse is acceptable?
</p><p>
(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> writes that testimony about the identity of the corpse is accepted. Out of doubt, we assume that less than three days have passed since the time of death. The justification for such an assumption is, as the <b>RASHBA</b> writes, that the Halachah that testimony is not accepted after three days is only a Chumra mid'Rabanan, a stringency enacted by the Rabanan. Hence, in a case of doubt one may be lenient (particular because, as Rabeinu Tam writes, it <i>is</i> possible to reliably recognize a corpse after three days).
</p><p>
The <b>RITVA</b> rules that the testimony is accepted for a different reason. Since the witnesses claim that they recognize the body, there is strong reason to assume that the death occurred within three days.
</p><p>
(b) Others, however, question the reasoning of Tosfos and rule stringently. The conclusion of the <b>RASHBA</b> here (as cited by the <b>MAGID MISHNEH</b>, Hilchos Gerushin 13:21) and the <b>TESHUVOS HA'RAN</b> (#71) is that testimony about the identity of the corpse is <i>not</i> accepted when there is a doubt about how long ago the person died.
</p><p>
They rule stringently because they maintain that the limit of three days from the time of death for accepting testimony about the body is a Halachah d'Oraisa and not d'Rabanan (<b>RIVASH</b> #379-380). Therefore, the Halachah is stringent in the case of a doubt. Alternatively, they maintain that even if the three-day limit for testimony is only mid'Rabanan, the rule of 'Safek d'Rabanan l'Kula' does not apply because the woman has a Chazakah that she is forbidden as an Eshes Ish (<b>NODA B'YEHUDAH</b> EH 1:29, DH v'Achshav, and <b>SHEV SHEMAITSA</b> 7:21).
</p><p>

<b>HALACHAH:</b> The <b>SHULCHAN ARUCH</b> (EH 17:27) cites both opinions.
</p><p>
<br>


