# snc

lvr: 31
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k104a_1:" All the spoil of which was to be burned. Cf. Deut. XIII, 13ff."
,k104a_2:" As a part of his shroud."
,k104a_3:" Not being used for walking it cannot be regarded as a shoe."
,k104a_4:" The approved sandal kept by a <i>Beth din</i> for the special purpose of <i>halizah</i> ceremonials."
,k104a_5:" Presumably not. Hence it may well be regarded as a shoe made for the purpose of walking."
,k104a_6:" The first Tanna and R. Eleazar in our Mishnah."
,k104a_7:" The first Tanna."
,k104a_8:" Both having been mentioned in the same Scriptural verse (Deut. XXI, 5). As plagues may be examined by the priest in the daytime only (based on Lev. XIII, 24: 'On the day when raw flesh is seen in him') so may lawsuits also be dealt with by the court in the daytime only. <i>Halizah</i> involving as it does the question of the widow's <i>kethubah</i> is regarded as coming under the category of lawsuits."
,k104a_9:" R. Eleazar."
,k104a_10:" Cf. Sanh. 34b, Nid. 500"
,k104a_11:" But, as a matter of fact, this was explicitly allowed. Cf. Sanh. 32a."
,k104a_12:" The first Tanna and R. Eleazar in our Mishnah."
,k104a_13:" Which must take place in the daytime only. Cf. Sanh. 34b."
,k104a_14:" The first Tanna."
,k104a_15:" Which is allowed even in the night-time. Cf. p. 715, n. 8."
,k104a_16:" Others, 'Raba'. Cf. Alfasi and [H]."
,k104a_17:" On the eastern bank of the Tigris in the south of Assyria."
,k104a_18:" Ironical exclamation."
,k104a_19:" The ruling of the majority being against this opinion."
,k104a_20:" Against Rabbah's action."
,k104a_21:" Lit., 'it was taught'."
,k104a_22:" <i>Supra</i> 102b. And the <i>halachah</i>, as a rule, is in agreement with the anonymous ruling."
,k104a_23:" Cf. Rashi, s.v. [H] a.l. Cur. edd., it was taught'."
,k104a_24:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 9."
,k104a_25:" Lit., 'taught it'."
,k104a_26:" Thus it is proved that it is an individual opinion, that of R. Akiba, that permits <i>halizah</i> in the absence of witnesses."
,k104a_27:" Cf. BaH. Cur. edd. insert: 'And R. Joseph b. Manyumi stated in the name of R. Nahman that the <i>halachah</i> is not in agreement with that pair.' This occurs <i>infra</i> 105b, but is irrelevant here."
,k104a_28:" Lit., 'taught them'."
,k104a_29:" Deut. XXV, 9, dealing with <i>halizah</i>."
,k104a_30:" Lev. XIV, 14."
,k104a_31:" In the case of the leper."
,k104a_32:" Since the text explicitly mentions it."
,k104a_33:" In <i>halizah</i>."
,k104a_34:" Lev. XIV, 14."
,k104a_35:" Who refuses to go out free. V. Ex. XXI, 5f."
,k104a_36:" V. previous note."
,k104a_37:" With the leper. Lev. XIV, 14."
,k104a_38:" Since the text explicitly mentions it."
,k104a_39:" Kid. 15a, which shews that R. Eleazar does make deduction from the terms used in the context of the leper."
,k104a_40:" In our Mishnah. It is R. Eleazar, and not the first Tanna, who ruled that <i>halizah</i> with the left shoe is invalid."
,k104a_41:" As to why R. Eleazar draws an analogy between the terms of ear and not between those of foot."
,k104a_42:" Lit., 'ear, ear'."
,k104a_43:" Both in the case of leper (Lev. XIV, 14 and 17) and in that of the slave (Ex. XXI, 6 and Deut. XV, 17) one of the terms is superfluous and, therefore, free for the deduction that the boring must be performed on the right ear."
,k104a_44:" Lit., 'foot, foot'."
,k104a_45:" Though in the context of the leper the term foot occurs twice (Lev. XIV. 14 and 17), in that of <i>halizah</i> it appears only once (Deut. XXV, 9). As in the latter text it is required for the context itself no deduction can be made from such an analogy unless it is one that is free from all possible objection."
,k104a_46:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 14 final clause. Since no refutation can be advanced, the deduction, though based on texts of which one only is free for the purpose, should hold!"
,k104a_47:" From that of <i>halizah</i>."
,k104a_48:" On the day of his cleansing. (Cf. Lev. XIV, 4). The laws of the leper, being in this respect more rigid than those of <i>halizah</i>, may also be more rigid in respect of the requirement of the right shoe. Hence R. Eleazar's opinion that no deduction is to be made from the analogous words, and that <i>halizah</i> with the left shoe is, therefore, valid."
,k104a_49:" Cf. Deut. XXV, 9."
,k104a_50:" Prior to the <i>halizah</i> she declares (a) 'My husband's brother refuseth to raise up unto his brother a name in Israel; he will not perform the duty of a husband's brother unto me' (ibid. 7). After the <i>halizah</i> she exclaims, (b) 'So shall it be done unto the man that doth not build up his brother's house' (ibid. 9)."
,k104a_51:" The omission of an act, but not that of a formula, renders a <i>halizah</i> invalid. V. <i>infra</i>."
,k104a_52:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 3."
,k104a_53:" Cf. marg. note. Cur. edd., 'Eleazar'. "
}

txt:
<p>
or [with one] that belonged to a condemned city<a id="k104a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; or [with one] that was made<a id="k104a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; in honour of a [dead] elder,<a id="k104a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; no <i>halizah</i> may be performed; and even a <i>halizah</i> that has been performed with it is invalid.
</p><p>
	Said Rabina to R. Ashi: In what respect is [the sandal] that was made in honour of a [dead] elder different [from an ordinary sandal]? Is it because it was not made for walking? That of the <i>Beth din</i> also<a id="k104a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; was not made for walking! &mdash; The other replied: Should the attendant of the <i>Beth din</i> use it for walking, would the <i>Beth din</i> object!<a id="k104a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>
</p><p>
	MISHNAH. IF [A SISTER-IN-LAW] PERFORMED THE <I>HALIZAH</I> AT NIGHT, HER <I>HALIZAH</I> IS VALID. R. ELEAZAR, HOWEVER, REGARDS IT AS INVALID. [IF SHE PERFORMED IT] WITH [THE LEVIR'S] LEFT SHOE, HER <I>HALIZAH</I> IS INVALID, BUT R. ELEAZAR DECLARES IT TO BE VALID.
</p><p>
	GEMARA. May it be suggested that they<a id="k104a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; differ on the following principle: The one Master<a id="k104a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; holds the opinion that lawsuits are to be compared to plagues,<a id="k104a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; while the other Master<a id="k104a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; holds the opinion that lawsuits cannot be compared to plagues?<a id="k104a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; No; all agree that lawsuits cannot be compared to plagues; for should they be compared, even the close of a legal process could not have been allowed at night.<a id="k104a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; Here, however, they<a id="k104a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; differ on the following principle: Ones Master<a id="k104a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; holds that <i>halizah</i> is like the commencement of legal proceedings<a id="k104a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; and the other Master<a id="k104a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; holds that <i>halizah</i> is like the close of the proceedings.<a id="k104a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Rabbah<a id="k104a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; b. Hiyya of Ktesifon<a id="k104a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; carried out a <i>halizah</i> with a felt sock, with no other men present, at night. Said Samuel: How great is his authority<a id="k104a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; in acting on the view of one individual!<a id="k104a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; What [however, could be his] objection?<a id="k104a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; If [against the use of the] felt sock, an anonymous Baraitha<a id="k104a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; [permits it]!<a id="k104a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; If [against his acting at] night, our anonymous Mishnah<a id="k104a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; [permits this]!<a id="k104a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; His objection, however, is [that Rabbah acted] alone. How [he objected] could he act alone when it was only one individual who expressed approval of such a procedure!<a id="k104a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; For we learned: If [a sister-in-law] performed <i>halizah</i> in the presence of two or three men, and one of them. was discovered to be a relative or in any other way unfit [to act as judge], her <i>halizah</i> is invalid; but R. Simeon and R. Johanan ha-Sandelar declare it valid. Furthermore, it once happened that a man submitted to <i>halizah</i> with none present but himself and herself in a prison, and when the case came before R. Akiba he declared the <i>halizah</i> valid.<a id="k104a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>
</p><p>
	And<a id="k104a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; if you prefer I might say: All these [rulings] also are the views of<a id="k104a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; an individual. For it was taught: R. Ishmael son of R. Jose stated, 'I saw R. Ishmael b. Elisha carry out a <i>halizah</i> with a felt sock, with no other men present, and [this occurred] at night'.
</p><p>
	WITH [THE LEVIR'S] LEFT SHOE HER <I>HALIZAH</I> etc. What is the Rabbis' reason? 'Ulla replied: [The meaning of] 'foot' [here]<a id="k104a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; is deduced from that of foot<a id="k104a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; in the context of the leper. As there<a id="k104a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; it is the right<a id="k104a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; so here<a id="k104a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; also it must be the right. Does not R. Eleazar, then, deduce [the meaning of] foot [here]<a id="k104a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; from that of foot<a id="k104a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; in the context of the leper? Surely, it was taught: R. Eleazar stated, Whence is it deduced that the boring [of the ear of a Hebrew slave]<a id="k104a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; must be performed on his right ear? &mdash; For the term ear was used here<a id="k104a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; and the term 'ear' was also used elsewhere;<a id="k104a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; as there<a id="k104a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; it is the right ear<a id="k104a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; so here also it is the right ear!<a id="k104a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; R. Isaac b. Joseph replied in the name of R. Johanan: The statement is to be reversed.<a id="k104a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Raba said: There is, in fact, no need to reverse [the statement,<a id="k104a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; the reply to the objection<a id="k104a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; being that] the terms 'ear'<a id="k104a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; [are both] free [for the deduction];<a id="k104a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; the terms of 'foot,'<a id="k104a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; however, are not free for deduction.<a id="k104a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; But even if [one of the texts] is not free for deduction, what objection can be raised [against the deduction]?<a id="k104a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; It may be objected: The case of the leper is different,<a id="k104a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; since he is also required [to bring] cedar-wood and hyssop and scarlet.<a id="k104a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>
</p><p>
	MISHNAH. [IF A SISTER-IN-LAW] DREW OFF [THE LEVIR'S SHOE] AND SPAT,<a id="k104a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; BUT DID NOT RECITE [THE FORMULAE],<a id="k104a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; HER <I>HALIZAH</I> IS VALID.<a id="k104a_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; IF SHE RECITED [THE FORMULAE] AND SPAT, BUT DID NOT DRAW OFF THE SHOE, HER <I>HALIZAH</I> IS INVALID.<a id="k104a_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; IF SHE DREW OFF THE SHOE AND RECITED [THE FORMULAE] BUT DID NOT SPIT, HER <I>HALIZAH</I>, R. ELIEZER<a id="k104a_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; STATED, IS INVALID; AND R. AKIBA STATED: HER <I>HALIZAH</I> IS VALID.
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k104b_1:" Deut. XXV, 9, emphasis on done. [H] (rt. [H]). V. <i>infra</i> n. 7."
,k104b_2:" [H] (rt. [H]). Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 6."
,k104b_3:" The omission of any act, therefore, renders the <i>halizah</i> invalid."
,k104b_4:" Lit., 'from there'."
,k104b_5:" Deut. ibid., emphasis on man."
,k104b_6:" As, e.g., drawing off the shoe which is an act on the body of the levir. Spitting, therefore, is excluded."
,k104b_7:" The 'deaf' spoken of in the Talmud literature is always to be understood as a deaf-mute. Cf. Ter. I, 2."
,k104b_8:" I.e., not only in a case where there were at least two judges but even where no one beside the levir and the sister-in-law 'vas present."
,k104b_9:" In the first clause of our Mishnah."
,k104b_10:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 718, n. 2."
,k104b_11:" For the invalidity."
,k104b_12:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 718, n. 12. How then could it be said that recital of the formulae is not an indispensable condition?"
,k104b_13:" The minor because of his immature age, and the deaf and dumb because of his physical defects which adversely affect his mental powers."
,k104b_14:" Why then is their <i>halizah</i> valid?"
,k104b_15:" Lit., 'pains"
,k104b_16:" Cf. Deut. XXV, 8."
,k104b_17:" Cf. ibid. 7 and 9."
,k104b_18:" How then can <i>halizah</i> of a dumb person be regarded as valid!"
,k104b_19:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 718, n. 2."
,k104b_20:" Which stated that if she did not recite the formulae the <i>halizah</i> is valid"
,k104b_21:" Of the flour and the oil of a meal-offering. With one <i>log</i> of oil for sixty 'esronim (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>) of flour, and a maximum of sixty 'esronim in one pan, perfect mingling is possible."
,k104b_22:" Even if no mingling has taken place the meal-offering is acceptable."
,k104b_23:" Where, e.g., the proportions of the mixture were less than a <i>log</i> for sixty 'esronim or where more than sixty 'esronim were placed in one pan."
,k104b_24:" Men. 18b, 103b. With <i>halizah</i> also, though in the case of persons who are able to recite the prescribed formulae, the omission does not invalidate the <i>halizah</i>, in the case of dumb persons for whom it is physically impossible ever to recite the formulae, the omission of it does render the <i>halizah</i> invalid."
,k104b_25:" In the presence of the <i>Beth din</i>."
,k104b_26:" Though her act was not a part of a formal <i>halizah</i> ceremony, she forfeits thereby her right ever to contract levirate marriage with any of the levirs."
,k104b_27:" V. <i>supra</i> n. 7."
,k104b_28:" That an informal act of spitting renders the woman unfit for marriage with the brothers."
,k104b_29:" Lit., 'now'."
,k104b_30:" The act of spitting."
,k104b_31:" Which shews what little significance R. Akiba attaches to this part of the ceremony."
,k104b_32:" If, for instance, they were lost or became unfit for the altar owing to uncleanness. Cf. Pes. 59b."
,k104b_33:" So in the case of <i>halizah</i>, R. Akiba might have been expected to regard the spitting, which is an act that can be performed, as an essential."
,k104b_34:" V. <i>supra</i> note 9."
,k104b_35:" Cur. edd., 'Eleazar' (cf. <i>supra</i> p 718, n. 5); who stated in our Mishnah that the act of spitting was indispensable. "
,k104b_36:" Drawing off the shoe and spitting."
,k104b_37:" Of the sister-in-law to marry a stranger."
,k104b_38:" Cf. Men. 89a."
,k104b_39:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 720, n. 9."
,k104b_40:" V. Num. XXVIII, 26-31."
,k104b_41:" The two loaves that were also brought to the Temple on Pentecost. V. Lev. XXIII, 17."
,k104b_42:" The waving of the loaves and the lambs together, which precedes the slaughter of the latter, does not effect the proper consecration of the bread."
,k104b_43:" Is consecration effected even after slaughtering of the lambs."
,k104b_44:" Lit., 'for their name'."
,k104b_45:" Lit., not for their name'; i.e., if they were intended to be merely sacrifices, not specifically those prescribed for the Pentecost festival."
,k104b_46:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 9."
,k104b_47:" I.e., it is subject to some, but not to all, of the restrictions of properly consecrated bread."
,k104b_48:" Cf. <i>supra</i> note 8. Pes. 13b, Men. 47a. Thus it has been shewn that according to Rabbi, where two acts such as proper slaughtering and proper sprinkling are required, consecration is partially effected even though the former act alone was properly performed. Similarly, in respect of <i>halizah</i>, one of the prescribed acts is sufficient to render the woman unfit for the levirate marriage."
,k104b_49:" For the levirate marriage. "
}

txt:
<p>
SAID R. ELIEZER TO HIM: [SCRIPTURE STATED], SO SHALL BE DONE,<a id="k104b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; ANYTHING WHICH IS A DEED<a id="k104b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; IS A SINE QUA NON.<a id="k104b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; R. AKIBA, HOWEVER, SAID TO HIM, FROM THIS VERY TEXT<a id="k104b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; PROOF [MAY BE ADDUCED FOR MY VIEW]: SO SHALL BE DONE UNTO THE MAN,<a id="k104b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; ONLY THAT WHICH IS TO BE DONE UNTO THE MAN.<a id="k104b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>
</p><p>
	IF A DEAF<a id="k104b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; LEVIR SUBMITTED TO HALIZAH, OR IF A DEAF<a id="k104b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; SISTER-IN-LAW PERFORMED HALIZAH, OR IF A HALIZAH WAS PERFORMED ON A MINOR, THE HALIZAH IS INVALID.
</p><p>
	[A SISTER-IN-LAW] WHO PERFORMED HALIZAH WHILE SHE WAS A MINOR MUST AGAIN PERFORM <I>HALIZAH</I> WHEN SHE BECOMES OF AGE; AND IF SHE DOES NOT AGAIN PERFORM IT, THE <I>HALIZAH</I> IS INVALID.
</p><p>
	IF [A SISTER-IN-LAW] PERFORMED HALIZAH IN THE PRESENCE OF TWO OR THREE MEN AND ONE OF THEM WAS DISCOVERED TO BE A RELATIVE OR ONE IN ANY OTHER WAY UNFIT [TO ACT AS JUDGE], HER HALIZAH IS INVALID; BUT R. SIMEON AND R. JOHANAN HA-SANDELAR DECLARE IT VALID. FURTHERMORE,<a id="k104b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; IT ONCE HAPPENED THAT A MAN SUBMITTED TO HALIZAH PRIVATELY BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HERSELF IN A PRISON, AND WHEN THE CASE CAME BEFORE R. AKIBA HE DECLARED THE HALIZAH VALID.
</p><p>
	GEMARA. Raba said: Now that you have stated<a id="k104b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; that the recital [of the formulae]<a id="k104b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; is not a sine qua non, the <i>halizah</i> of a dumb man and a dumb woman is valid.
</p><p>
	We learned: IF A DEAF LEVIR SUBMITTED TO HALIZAH, OR IF A DEAF SISTER-IN-LAW PERFORMED HALIZAH, OR IF A HALIZAH WAS PERFORMED ON A MINOR, THE HALIZAH IS INVALID. Now, what is the reason?<a id="k104b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; is it not because these are unable to recite [the formulae]!<a id="k104b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; No; because they are not in complete possession of their mental faculties.<a id="k104b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; If so, [the same applies] also to a dumb man and to a dumb woman!<a id="k104b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Raba replied: A dumb man and a dumb woman are in full possession of their mental faculties, and it is only their mouth that troubles<a id="k104b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; them. But, surely, at the school of R. Jannai it was explained [that the reason why a deaf-mute is unfit for <i>halizah</i> is] because [the Scriptural instruction], He shall say<a id="k104b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; or She shall say<a id="k104b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; is inapplicable to such a case!<a id="k104b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; [Say] rather, if Raba's statement was ever made it was made in connection with the final clause: IF A DEAF LEVIR SUBMITTED TO HALIZAH, OR IF A DEAF SISTER-IN-LAW PERFORMED HALIZAH, OR IF A HALIZAH WAS PERFORMED ON A MINOR, THE HALIZAH IS INVALID. [It is in connection with this that] Raba said: Now that you have stated that the recital of [the formulae]<a id="k104b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; is a sine qua non, the <i>halizah</i> of a dumb man or a dumb woman is invalid. And our Mishnah<a id="k104b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; [is based on the same principle] as [that propounded by] R. Zera; for R. Zera stated: Wherever proper mingling<a id="k104b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; is possible actual mingling is not essential,<a id="k104b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; but where proper mingling is not possible<a id="k104b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; the actual mingling is a sine qua non.<a id="k104b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>
</p><p>
	[The following ruling] was sent to Samuel's father: A sister-inlaw who spat<a id="k104b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; must perform the <i>halizah</i>.<a id="k104b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; This implies that she is rendered unfit for the brothers;<a id="k104b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; but whose view is this?<a id="k104b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; If it be suggested [that it is that of] R. Akiba, it may be objected:<a id="k104b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; If R. Akiba said that it<a id="k104b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; was not indispensable<a id="k104b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; even where the actual commandment [of <i>halizah</i> is being performed, in which case] it could be argued that it could be given the same force as [the burning] of the altar portions of the sacrifices, which is not an essential [rite] when [the portions] are not available,<a id="k104b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; and yet is a <i>sine qua non</i> when they are available,<a id="k104b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; [would he regard it<a id="k104b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; as a reason for the woman] to become thereby unfit for the brothers! [Should it be suggested], however, [that the view<a id="k104b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; is that] of R. Eliezer,<a id="k104b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; surely [it may be retorted] are two acts<a id="k104b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; which jointly effect permissibility,<a id="k104b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; and any two acts that jointly effect permissibility are ineffective one without the other!<a id="k104b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Rather, the view<a id="k104b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; is in agreement with that of Rabbi. For it was taught: The Pentecostal lambs<a id="k104b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; cause the consecration of the bread<a id="k104b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; only by their slaughter.<a id="k104b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; In what manner?<a id="k104b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; If they were slaughtered for the purpose of the festival sacrifices<a id="k104b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; and their blood also was sprinkled with such intention,<a id="k104b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; the bread becomes consecrated. If they were not slaughtered for the purpose of the festival sacrifices,<a id="k104b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; though their blood was sprinkled for the proper purpose,<a id="k104b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; the bread does not become consecrated. If they were slaughtered for the purpose of the festival sacrifices<a id="k104b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; and their blood was sprinkled for another purpose,<a id="k104b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; [the bread] is partly consecrated and partly unconsecrated;<a id="k104b_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; so Rabbi. R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon, however, stated: [The bread] is never consecrated unless the slaughtering [of the lambs] and the sprinkling of their blood were both intended for the proper purpose of the festival.<a id="k104b_48"><sup>48</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Did R. Akiba, however, hold that the act of spitting does not render the woman unfit?<a id="k104b_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; Surely it was taught: If she drew off [the levir's shoe] but did not
</P>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k105a_1:" The prescribed formulae. V. <i>supra</i> p. 718. n. 2."
,k105a_2:" V. p. 721, n. 14."
,k105a_3:" But the woman is rendered unfit for the levirate marriage. V. <i>infra</i>."
,k105a_4:" I.e., even levirate marriage is permitted."
,k105a_5:" The expression vjuxp, here rendered 'invalid', bears in the original a double meaning: (a) the <i>halizah</i> itself is invalid and (b) the woman becomes invalid, i.e., unfit to contract a marriage. V. <i>infra</i> note 8."
,k105a_6:" Lit., 'to the world', i.e., as the <i>halizah</i> is invalid the woman still remains forbidden to all men except the levirs."
,k105a_7:" Obviously not. Mere spitting could not possibly be regarded as a proper <i>halizah</i>."
,k105a_8:" Lit., 'but not'."
,k105a_9:" The second meaning of vkuxp (v. <i>supra</i> note 4. (b) being that the woman is forbidden to contract the levirate marriage with any of the brothers. Cf. Git. 24b."
,k105a_10:" Since both acts are not indispensable, why does the former act according to R. Akiba cause the sister-in-law to be forbidden to the brothers (as has just been proved), while the latter does not (R. Akiba having stated <i>supra</i> that there was 'no reason whatsoever for apprehension')?"
,k105a_11:" Of the prescribed formulae."
,k105a_12:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 718, n. 2 (a)."
,k105a_13:" V. <i>loc. cit</i>. n. 2 (b)."
,k105a_14:" For a proper <i>halizah</i>. Where the sister-in-law is allowed to marry a levir it is obvious to all who know of the recital that it was only the first formula that was recited and that no <i>halizah</i> had followed it."
,k105a_15:" Anyone witnessing the spitting would form the opinion that the other parts of the <i>halizah</i> ceremonial had preceded it."
,k105a_16:" Were she subsequently permitted to marry a levir."
,k105a_17:" Hence R. Akiba's prohibition. Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 722. n. 9."
,k105a_18:" To Samuel's father. Cf. <i>supra</i> 104b."
,k105a_19:" Before <i>Beth din</i>, though her act did not form a part of the formal <i>halizah</i> ceremony."
,k105a_20:" At the proper time when the formal ceremony is carried out."
,k105a_21:" Cf. BaH. a.l. wanting in cur. edd."
,k105a_22:" R. Abba."
,k105a_23:" I.e., there is no need for her to spit again."
,k105a_24:" And the woman would consequently be allowed to marry a levir even after she had spat:"
,k105a_25:" By allowing her to contract levirate marriage."
,k105a_26:" Cf. <i>supra</i> note 1."
,k105a_27:" R. Ammi."
,k105a_28:" Cf. <i>infra</i> 106b, Sanh. 49b."
,k105a_29:" In the course of a lecture tour. According to the Palestinian Talmud and the Midrash Rabbah, Levi was sent by R. Judah the Prince to take up an appointment as teacher and judge in a provincial town. In his excitement and pride he grew so bewildered that he was unable to answer the following three questions."
,k105a_30:" With her teeth."
,k105a_31:" Dan. X, 21, taken to refer to divine dispensation."
,k105a_32:" The adjectival phrase 'of truth'."
,k105a_33:" Lit., 'it was not in his hand'."
,k105a_34:" Certainly not."
,k105a_35:" 'Writing of truth', i.e., 'permanent', 'unalterable'."
,k105a_36:" The 'writing that is not of truth', i.e., which may be altered or recalled."
,k105a_37:" Lit., 'torn up'."
,k105a_38:" I Sam. III, 14, emphasis on 'sworn' and 'for ever'."
,k105a_39:" I Sam. II, 33."
,k105a_40:" Jer. II, 22, emphasis on 'marked' 'sealed'. The Hebrew equivalent of the former is [H] which is similar in sound to that of the letters [H]."
,k105a_41:" Deut. IV, 7."
,k105a_42:" Isa. LV, 6, emphasis on while he may be found, implying that there are times when he may not be found!"
,k105a_43:" Cf. BaH."
,k105a_44:" Lit., 'these are'."
,k105a_45:" Known as the 'ten days of penitence', [H]."
,k105a_46:" As in the case of ordinary spitting. she may not subsequently contract levirate marriage."
,k105a_47:" A man who hath an issue, cf. Lev. XV, 2."
,k105a_48:" As his spittle or issue respectively is unclean."
,k105a_49:" Ibid., emphasis on issue."
,k105a_50:" Nid. 56a. Apparently because the blood contains no particle of spittle (cf. <i>supra</i> n. 10), which is contradictory to the previous statement that all blood contains some particles of spittle."
,k105a_51:" The ruling sent to Samuel's father."
,k105a_52:" Lit., 'here'."
,k105a_53:" When it is inevitable that some spittle should be mingled with the blood."
,k105a_54:" Lit., 'here'. "
}

txt:
<p>
spit nor recite,<a id="k105a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; her <i>halizah</i> is valid. If she spat but did not draw off the shoe nor recite,<a id="k105a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; her <i>halizah</i> is invalid<a id="k105a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; if she recited<a id="k105a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; but did not spit nor draw off the shoe, there is here no reason whatsoever for apprehension.<a id="k105a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; Now, whose [view is here represented]? If it be suggested [it is that of] R. Eliezer, [how could it be stated that] 'if she drew off [the levir's shoe] but did not spit nor recite, her <i>halizah</i> is valid' when, surely, R. Eliezer said: SO SHALL BE DONE, ANYTHING WHICH IS A DEED IS A SINE QUA NON? It is consequently obvious [that it is the view of] R. Akiba; and yet it was stated that 'if she spat but did not draw off the shoe nor recite, her <i>halizah</i> is invalid'. To whom, [however, does the invalidity cause her to be forbidden]?<a id="k105a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; If it be suggested, 'To strangers';<a id="k105a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; is not this [it may be retorted] self-evident? Is it a <i>halizah</i> [like this that would enable the sister-inlaw] to become free to marry a stranger!<a id="k105a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; It must therefore, be admitted<a id="k105a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; [that the validity refers to her state of prohibition] to the brothers.<a id="k105a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; Thus you have our contention proved.
</p><p>
	According to R. Akiba, wherein lies the legal difference between the act of spitting and that of reciting?<a id="k105a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Recital<a id="k105a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; that must take place both at the commencement<a id="k105a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; [of the <i>halizah</i> ceremony] and at its conclusion<a id="k105a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; cannot be mistaken;<a id="k105a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; spitting, however, which does not take place at the beginning but only at the end, might be mistaken [for a proper <i>halizah</i>],<a id="k105a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; and thus<a id="k105a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; a proper <i>halizah</i> also would be permitted to marry the brothers.<a id="k105a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Others say that the following ruling was sent to him:<a id="k105a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; A sister-in-law who spat<a id="k105a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; may afterwards perform <i>halizah</i> and need not spit a second time.<a id="k105a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; So, in fact, it once happened that a sister-in-law<a id="k105a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; who came before R. Ammi, while R. Abba b. Memel was sitting in his presence, spat prior to her drawing off the shoe. 'Arrange the <i>halizah</i> for her', said R. Ammi to him,<a id="k105a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; 'and dismiss her case'.<a id="k105a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; 'But surely'. said R. Abba to him, 'spitting is a requirement!' &mdash; 'She has spat indeed!' 'But let her spit [again]; what could be the objection?' &mdash; 'The issue might [morally and religiously] be disastrous; for should you rule that she is to spit again, people might assume that her first spitting was ineffective<a id="k105a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; and thus<a id="k105a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; a proper <i>haluzah</i> also would be permitted to marry the brothers!'<a id="k105a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; 'But is it not necessary. [that the various parts of the <i>halizah</i>] should follow in the prescribed order?' &mdash; 'The order of the performances is not essential'. He<a id="k105a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; thought [at the time] that the other<a id="k105a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; was merely shaking him off. When, however, he went out he carefully considered the point and discovered that it was taught: Whether drawing off the shoe preceded the spitting or whether spitting preceded the drawing off, the action performed is valid.<a id="k105a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Levi once went out [to visit] the country towns,<a id="k105a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; when he was asked: 'May a woman whose hand was amputated perform <i>halizah</i>?<a id="k105a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; What is the legal position where a sister-in-law spat blood? [It is stated in Scripture]: Howbeit I will declare unto thee that which is inscribed in the Writing of Truth;<a id="k105a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; does this<a id="k105a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; then imply that there exists a [divine] Writing that is not of truth?' He was unable to answer.<a id="k105a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; When he came and asked these questions at the academy. they answered him: Is it written, 'And she shall draw off with her hand'?<a id="k105a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; Is it written, 'And spit spittle'?<a id="k105a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; [As to the question] 'Howbeit I will declare unto thee that which is inscribed in the Writing of Truth,<a id="k105a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; does this then imply that there exists a [divine] Writing that is not of truth'? There is really no difficulty. For the former<a id="k105a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; refers to a [divine] decree that was accompanied by an oath while the latter<a id="k105a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; refers to one that was not accompanied by an oath. [This is] in accordance with a statement of R. Samuel b. Ammi. For R. Samuel b. Ammi stated in the name of R. Jonathan: Whence is it deduced that a decree which is accompanied by an oath is never annulled?<a id="k105a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; From the Scriptural text, Therefore I have sworn unto the House of Eli, that the iniquity of Eli's house shall not be expiated with sacrifice nor offering for ever.<a id="k105a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; Rabbah said: It will not be expiated 'with sacrifice nor offering', but it will be expiated with the words of the Torah.
</p><p>
	Abaye said: It will not be expiated 'with sacrifice nor offering' but it will be expiated with the practice of lovingkindness.
</p><p>
	Rabbah and Abaye were both descendants of the house of Eli. Rabbah who engaged in the study of the Torah lived forty years. Abaye, however, who engaged in the study of the Torah and the practice of lovingkindness, lived sixty years.
</p><p>
	Our Rabbis taught: There was a certain family in Jerusalem whose members used to die when they were about the age of eighteen. When they came and acquainted R. Johanan b. Zakkai [with the fact,] he said to them: 'perchance you are descendants of the family of Eli concerning whom it is written in Scripture. And all the increase of thy house shall die young men;<a id="k105a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; go and engage in the study of the Torah, and you will live'. They went and engaged in the study of the Torah and lived [longer lives]. They were consequently called 'The family of Johanan', after him.
</p><p>
	R. Samuel b. Unia stated in the name of Rab: Whence is it deduced that a [divine] dispensation against a congregation is not sealed? &mdash; [You say] 'Is not sealed'! Surely it is written, For though thou wash thee with nitre, and take thee much soap, yet thine iniquity is marked before Me!<a id="k105a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; But [this is the question]: Whence is it deduced that even if it has been sealed it is torn up? &mdash; From the Scriptural text, What&nbsp;&hellip; as the Lord our God is whensoever we call upon him.<a id="k105a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; But, surely, it is written, Seek ye the Lord while He may be found!<a id="k105a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; This is no contradiction. The latter applies to an individual, the former to a congregation. And<a id="k105a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; when may an individual [find him]? R. Nahman replied in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha: In<a id="k105a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; the ten days between the New Year and the Day of Atonement.<a id="k105a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>
</p><p>
	[The following ruling] was sent to Samuel's father: A sister-inlaw who spat blood shall perform <i>halizah</i>,<a id="k105a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; because it is impossible that blood should not contain some diluted particles of spittle.
</p><p>
	An objection was raised: It might have been assumed that blood that issues from his<a id="k105a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; mouth or membrum virile is unclean,<a id="k105a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; hence it was explicitly stated, His issue is unclean,<a id="k105a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; but the blood which issues from his mouth or from his membrum virile is not unclean, but clean!<a id="k105a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; This is no contradiction: The former<a id="k105a_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; is a case<a id="k105a_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; where she sucks in;<a id="k105a_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; the latter,<a id="k105a_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; where [the blood] flows gently.
</p><p>
	IF A DEAF LEVIR SUBMITTED TO <I>HALIZAH</I> etc.
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k105b_1:" Others, 'Samuel'. Cf. Tosaf. <i>supra</i> 96a, s.v. [H]."
,k105b_2:" That the <i>halizah</i> of a minor is invalid and that it consequently prohibits the woman from contracting levirate marriage with any of the older brothers."
,k105b_3:" Who stated (<i>supra</i> 96a) that the <i>halizah</i> of a minor has the same force as that of a divorce by a levir who is of age."
,k105b_4:" His act is legally null and void. She is not thereby forbidden even to himself."
,k105b_5:" That a sister-in-law who was a minor may not perform <i>halizah</i>."
,k105b_6:" V. Deut. XXV, 7."
,k105b_7:" Which excludes the male minor."
,k105b_8:" Since both man and sister-in-law (woman) were mentioned in the same verse (ibid.). As the male minor is excluded so is the female minor excluded."
,k105b_9:" Lit., 'and said'."
,k105b_10:" In Jerusalem. Cf. Ber. 28b, 30a."
,k105b_11:" I.e., on this earth, opp. to 'heaven' above."
,k105b_12:" I Kings IX, 3. Hence it must always form the centre of attraction for all engaged in prayer."
,k105b_13:" Cf. BaH. Wanting in cur. edd."
,k105b_14:" Lam. III, 41, emphasis on lift up."
,k105b_15:" When everyone present was expected to take his usual seat."
,k105b_16:" Cf. B.M. 84a."
,k105b_17:" One of Rabbi's disciples. 'Abdan' is a contraction of 'Abba Judan' by which name he is known in the Palestinian Talmud. (Cf. Tosaf. s.v. [H], a.l.)."
,k105b_18:" During the discourses of the Master the disciples were seated on the ground in Eastern fashion; and R. Ishmael, in making his way towards his seat in the front rows, was compelled to stride over the heads of the assembly."
,k105b_19:" Lit., 'my master', a designation applied to R. Judah the prince who was in his time the Master par excellence."
,k105b_20:" R. Ishmael."
,k105b_21:" Abdan."
,k105b_22:" A slight upon Rabbi's recognized high position but one he well deserved for allowing Abdan publicly to annoy R. Ishmael."
,k105b_23:" Desiring him to arrange for her a <i>halizah</i> ceremony."
,k105b_24:" To ascertain whether she has developed the marks of puberty and is consequently eligible to perform <i>halizah</i>."
,k105b_25:" Rabbi."
,k105b_26:" Which excludes the male minor."
,k105b_27:" Deut. XXV, 7."
,k105b_28:" R. Jose. Thus it is proved that it is R. Jose's view that was presented <i>supra</i> as that of 'the Sages'."
,k105b_29:" Cf. <i>supra</i> note 4."
,k105b_30:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a> s.v. <i>Mi'un</i>. The Talmudic text may imply that the two daughters-in-law, as minors, refused to contract levirate marriage with the brothers of their dead husband, so that the names of the deceased were 'blotted out of Israel' (cf. Golds.). Accordingly the rendering of the text should be 'two (of) his (several) sons were drowned'. The text, however, might also be rendered: 'His two sons were drowned (after) his two daughters-in-law had made declarations of refusal (against them)'."
,k105b_31:" As an atonement for his ill-treatment of R. Ishmael; thus enabling him to enter the hereafter free from all sin."
,k105b_32:" R. Jose [H] = [H] lit., 'of the school of my master', or 'of Rabbi', was a title of scholastic distinction given to many eminent scholars who were Rabbi's disciples or contemporaries, and similarly also to predecessors as well as to immediate successors among the early Amoraim. V. <i>Nazir</i>, Sonc., ed., p. 64, n. 1."
,k105b_33:" [H] (cf. [H], 'to babble') 'talkers', children of six or seven years of age, who may legally purchase or sell movable property. A child at this age, being regarded as sufficiently developed to understand certain commercial transactions, is also regarded as sufficiently developed to perform a <i>halizah</i>."
,k105b_34:" One year prior to puberty, or the age of eleven years and one day, when her vows and consecrations are valid if on examination she is found to understand their significance and purpose. (Cf. Nid. 45b)."
,k105b_35:" R. Simeon and R. Johanan ha-Sandelar, the <i>halachah</i> being in agreement with the first Tanna who maintains that three judges are required for a <i>halizah</i>."
,k105b_36:" V. BaH. Cur. edd. omit."
,k105b_37:" Cf. <i>supra</i> 101b."
,k105b_38:" Even ex post facto, which is the case spoken of in our Mishnah, <i>halizah</i> is invalid if no three eligible judges were present."
,k105b_39:" Of which our Mishnah speaks (cf. <i>supra</i> n. 3)."
,k105b_40:" In agreement with R. Judah (cf. <i>supra</i> 101a)."
,k105b_41:" To indicate that even in the dispute between the first Tanna and R. Judah the <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with the former."
,k105b_42:" Cf. our Mishnah. Cur. edd. read here 'they performed halizah'."
,k105b_43:" The ambiguity in our Mishnah is due to a reading which omits the <i>Waw</i> in [H] so that it is possible to join 'in prison' either to the previous, or to the following clause (cf. Tosaf. s.v. [H])."
,k105b_44:" During the revolt of Bar Kokeba (132-135 C.E.) R. Akiba was for a time held by the Romans as a prisoner and was subsequently martyred."
,k105b_45:" [Tosaf.: Rab Judah had it on tradition that it was so, even as it is related in T.J.: R. Johanan ha-Sandelar passed outside the prison wherein R. Akiba was incarcerated, calling out, 'Who requires needles?', 'Who requires forks?'&nbsp;&hellip; 'How is it where the <i>halizah</i> was performed between himself and herself?' R. Akiba thereupon looked out through the window and replied: 'Hast thou of needles (kushin)? Hast thou kasher?', thus intimating that it is legal. V. Tosef. quoted in [H], for a slightly different version]. "
}

txt:
<p>
Rab Judah stated in the name of Rab:<a id="k105b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; This<a id="k105b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; is the view of R. Meir;<a id="k105b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; but the Sages maintain that the <i>halizah</i> of a minor has no effect at all.<a id="k105b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>
</p><p>
	[A SISTER-IN-LAW] WHO PERFORMED <I>HALIZAH</I> WHILE SHE WAS A MINOR etc. Rab Judah stated in the name of Rab: This<a id="k105b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; is the view of R. Meir who stated, 'In the Pentateuchal section [of <i>halizah</i>] the expression man<a id="k105b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; is used,<a id="k105b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; and the woman is to be compared to the man'.<a id="k105b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; The Sages, however, maintain that in the Pentateuchal section 'man' was written;<a id="k105b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; [and as to] a woman, whether she is of age or a minor [her <i>halizah</i> is valid].
</p><p>
	Who [is the Tanna here described as the] Sages? &mdash; It is R. Jose. For R. Hiyya and R. Simeon b. Rabbi once sat together, when one of them began as follows:<a id="k105b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; A man who offers up his prayers must direct his eyes towards [the Temple]<a id="k105b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; below,<a id="k105b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; for it is said, And Mine eyes and Mine heart shall be there perpetually.<a id="k105b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; And the other said: The eyes of him who offers up prayers shall be directed<a id="k105b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; towards [the heavens] above, for it is said Let us lift up our heart with our hand.<a id="k105b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; In the meanwhile they were joined by R. Ishmael son of R. Jose. 'On what subject are you engaged?' he asked them. 'On the subject of prayer', they replied. 'My father', he said to them, 'ruled thus: A man who offers up his prayers must direct his eyes to the [Sanctuary] below and his heart towards [the heavens] above so that these two Scriptural texts may be complied with.' While this was going on, Rabbi entered the academy.<a id="k105b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; They, being nimble, got into their places quickly. R. Ishmael son of R. Jose, however, owing to his corpulence<a id="k105b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; could only move to his place with slow steps. 'Who is this man, cried Abdan<a id="k105b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; out to him, 'who strides over the heads<a id="k105b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; of the holy people!' The other replied. 'I am Ishmael son of R. Jose who have come to learn Torah from Rabbi'.<a id="k105b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Are you, forsooth, fit', the first said to him, 'to learn Torah from Rabbi?' &mdash; 'Was Moses fit', the other retorted, 'to learn Torah from the lips of the Omnipotent!' 'Are you Moses indeed!' the first exclaimed. &mdash; 'Is then your Master a god!' the other retorted. R. Jose remarked: Rabbi got what he merited when the one<a id="k105b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; said to the other<a id="k105b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Your Master' and not 'my Master'.<a id="k105b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; While this was proceeding a sister-in-law came before Rabbi.<a id="k105b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Go out', said Rabbi to Abdan, 'and have her examined'.<a id="k105b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; After the latter went out, R. Ishmael said to him:<a id="k105b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; Thus said my father, 'In the Pentateuchal section man<a id="k105b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; is written;<a id="k105b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; [but as to] a woman, whether she is of age or a minor [her <i>halizah</i> is valid]'. 'Come back', he<a id="k105b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; cried after him,<a id="k105b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; 'you need not [arrange for any examination]; the grand old man<a id="k105b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; has already given his decision [on the subject]'.
</p><p>
	Abdan now came back picking his steps,<a id="k105b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; when R. Ishmael son of R. Jose exclaimed, 'He of whom the holy people is in need may well stride over the heads of the holy people; but how dare he of whom the holy people has no need stride over the heads of the holy people!' 'Remain in your place', said Rabbi to Abdan.
</p><p>
	It was taught: At that instant Abdan became leprous, his two sons were drowned and his two daughters-in-law made declarations of refusal.<a id="k105b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Blessed be the All Merciful', said R. Nahman b. Isaac, 'who has put Abdan to shame in this world'.<a id="k105b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>
</p><p>
	'We may learn from the words of this eminent scholar',<a id="k105b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; said R. Ammi, 'that [a sister-in-law who is] a minor may perform <i>halizah</i> while she is still in her childhood'.<a id="k105b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; Raba said: [She must wait with <i>halizah</i>] until she has reached the age of [valid] vows.<a id="k105b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; The law however, is [that she must not perform <i>halizah</i>] until she has produced two [pubic] hairs.
</p><p>
	IF [A SISTER-IN-LAW] PERFORMED <I>HALIZAH</I> IN THE PRESENCE OF TWO etc. R. Joseph b. Manyumi stated in the name of R. Nahman: The <i>halachah</i> is not in agreement with this pair.<a id="k105b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; But, surely. R. Nahman had once stated this; for R. Joseph b. Manyumi stated in the name of R. Nahman: The <i>halachah</i> is that<a id="k105b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; <i>halizah</i> [must be performed] in the presence of three [judges]!<a id="k105b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; [Both are] required: For if the first only had been stated, it might have been assumed [that three judges are required] ab initio only. but that ex post facto even two [judges are enough] hence we were taught that 'the <i>halachah</i> is not in agreement with this pair'.<a id="k105b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; And if we had been taught that 'the <i>halachah</i> is not in agreement with this pair' but in accordance with the ruling of the first Tanna, it might have been assumed [that this applies only] ex post facto,<a id="k105b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; but that ab initio five [judges] are required,<a id="k105b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; [hence the former statement was also] required.<a id="k105b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>
</p><p>
	IT ONCE HAPPENED THAT A MAN SUBMITTED TO <I>HALIZAH</I><a id="k105b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; etc. PRIVATELY BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HERSELF! How, then, can we know it? &mdash; Rab Judah replied in the name of Samuel: When witnesses observed it from without.
</p><p>
	The question was raised:<a id="k105b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; Did it happen that the <I>HALIZAH</I> was performed privately BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HERSELF outside, AND THE CASE WAS BROUGHT BEFORE R. AKIBA IN PRISON,<a id="k105b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; or perhaps it happened that the <I>HALIZAH</I> was performed BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HERSELF in prison? &mdash; Rab Judah replied in the name of Rab: The incident occurred in prison and the case also came up for decision in prison.<a id="k105b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>
</P>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k106a_1:" [H] (rt. [H] <i>Hof</i>.) lit., 'misled'."
,k106a_2:" Tosef. Yeb. XII, Keth. 74a."
,k106a_3:" Resh Lakish."
,k106a_4:" The levir."
,k106a_5:" When he submitted to <i>halizah</i>."
,k106a_6:" Lit., 'until'."
,k106a_7:" Tosef. Yeb. XII, <i>supra</i> 102b."
,k106a_8:" Even when the levir was misled into thinking that he was performing an act of marriage!"
,k106a_9:" Of 'halizah under a false assumption'."
,k106a_10:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a> Even if the promised sum was not forthcoming, the <i>halizah</i> is valid. Any condition in connection with an act which, like <i>halizah</i>. cannot be performed through an agent is illegal and void. Cf. Keth. 74a."
,k106a_11:" A sister-in-law who fell to the lot of an undesirable levir. (V. <i>infra</i>)."
,k106a_12:" To meet the levir."
,k106a_13:" I.e., to contract the levirate marriage."
,k106a_14:" She was lame or suffered from some other chronic disease which disabled her from standing up. Another interpretation: Her 'sitting', i.e., her abstention from the marriage is her 'standing', i.e., salvation."
,k106a_15:" Cf. BaH."
,k106a_16:" I.e., did she know why he insisted on marrying a disabled woman? According to the second interpretation the question was whether she knew anything against his character."
,k106a_17:" After which he would get rid of her. Lit., 'and he desires to eat it from her'."
,k106a_18:" The sister-in-law."
,k106a_19:" But who insisted on contracting with her the levirate marriage."
,k106a_20:" Requiring both the man and the woman to be of the unanimous intention, during the ceremony, of fulfilling the commandment of <i>halizah</i>. V. <i>supra</i>."
,k106a_21:" Though the <i>halizah</i> was in any case valid, Abaye held that the condition must be complied with."
,k106a_22:" Lit., '(the trick of) \"I fooled with you\", she did to him'. Since the <i>halizah</i> is valid, and since it is the levir's duty to perform it, no legal obligation is incurred by promising him an excessive sum for doing that which it was his duty to do."
,k106a_23:" An excessive fee for crossing a river."
,k106a_24:" B.K. 116a."
,k106a_25:" In the case of <i>halizah</i> under discussion."
,k106a_26:" Abaye's query implied that R. Papa seemed to have all his needs provided for by his parents and that this left him leisure enough to indulge in fine dialectics."
,k106a_27:" Others read, 'Raba said' (She'iltoth section Ki Theze)."
,k106a_28:" If the condition on which it was given was not fulfilled. A condition in the case of divorce has legal validity, since a divorce may be effected through the agency of witnesses. V. Keth. 74a and cf. <i>supra</i> p. 730, n. 10, final clause."
,k106a_29:" The second ruling relating to coercion."
,k106a_30:" After <i>Beth din</i> had brought pressure to bear upon him."
,k106a_31:" Lev. I, 3."
,k106a_32:" To carry out his vow if he undertook to bring an offering."
,k106a_33:" [H] ibid., E.V., 'that he may be accepted'."
,k106a_34:" Who refuses to give a divorce."
,k106a_35:" Cf. Kid. 50a, B.B. 48a, Ar. 21a."
,k106a_36:" The levir and his sister-in-law who apply for a <i>halizah</i> to be arranged for them."
,k106a_37:" To the <i>Beth din</i>."
,k106a_38:" <i>Mi'un</i>. V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k106a_39:" The husband and the minor."
,k106a_40:" Since <i>halizah</i> or <i>mi'un</i> may he arranged even for unknown persons whose declarations might be false."
,k106a_41:" For a woman who applied for such a certificate to enable her to marry again. even if the usual declaration, that the parties were known to the writers, is omitted. V. <i>infra</i> n. 4."
,k106a_42:" To the writers who witnessed the ceremony."
,k106a_43:" <i>Mi'un</i>. V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k106a_44:" I.e., a second <i>Beth din</i> who might be called upon to deal with the question of the remarriage of the parties and who might be unaware of the law that <i>halizah</i> and <i>mi'un</i> may be arranged even for unknown persons, and who, in their reliance on the written certificate, might permit the woman to marry again; overlooking the fact that the usual declaration that the parties were known to the writers (cf. <i>supra</i> note 1) was wanting from the certificate."
,k106a_45:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 732, n. 10."
,k106a_46:" To the <i>Beth din</i>."
,k106a_47:" The husband and the minor."
,k106a_48:" Since no <i>Beth din</i> would allow <i>halizah</i> and <i>mi'un</i> unless the parties are known to them."
,k106a_49:" For witnesses who were present during one or other, as the case may be, of such ceremonies."
,k106a_50:" To enable the woman to marry again."
,k106a_51:" To the writers who witnessed the ceremony."
,k106a_52:" Cf. <i>supra</i> notes 3 and 10."
,k106a_53:" Cf. <i>supra</i> note 4 mutatis mutandis. Since the first <i>Beth din</i> must know the parties the question of mistaken identity does not arise. "
}

txt:
<p>
Our Rabbis taught: A <i>halizah</i> under a false assumption<a id="k106a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; is valid.<a id="k106a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; What is meant by 'a <i>halizah</i> under a false assumption'? Resh Lakish explained: Where a levir is told, 'Submit to <i>halizah</i> and you will thereby wed her'. Said R. Johanan to him:<a id="k106a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; I am in the habit of repeating a Baraitha, 'Whether he<a id="k106a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; had the intention<a id="k106a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; [of performing the commandment of <i>halizah</i>] and she had no such intention, or whether she had such intention and he had not, her <i>halizah</i> is invalid, it being necessary<a id="k106a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; that both shall at the same time have such intention',<a id="k106a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; and you say that her <i>halizah</i> is valid!<a id="k106a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; But [in fact this is the meaning]:<a id="k106a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; When a levir is told, 'Submit to her <i>halizah</i> on the condition that she gives you two hundred zuz'.<a id="k106a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>
</p><p>
	So it was also taught [elsewhere]: A <i>halizah</i> under a false assumption is valid; and what is meant by a <i>halizah</i> under a false assumption? One in which the levir is told 'Submit to her <i>halizah</i> on condition that she gives you two hundred zuz'. Such an incident, in fact, occurred with a woman who fell to the lot of an unworthy levir who was told, 'Submit to her <i>halizah</i> on condition that she gives you two hundred zuz'. When this case came before R. Hiyya he ruled that the <i>halizah</i> was valid.
</p><p>
	A woman<a id="k106a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; once came before R. Hiyya b. Abba.<a id="k106a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Stand up,<a id="k106a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; my daughter', the Rabbi said to her. 'Her sitting is her standing',<a id="k106a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; replied her mother.<a id="k106a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Do you know this man?'<a id="k106a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; the Rabbi asked. 'Yes', she answered him, 'it is her money that he saw and he would like to it'.<a id="k106a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Do you not like him then?' he asked the woman.<a id="k106a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; 'No', she replied. 'Submit to her halizah', [the Rabbi] said to [the levir], 'and you will thereby wed her'. After the latter had submitted to <i>halizah</i> at her hands he said to him, 'Now she is ineligible to marry you; submit again to a proper <i>halizah</i> that she may be permitted to marry a stranger'.
</p><p>
	A daughter of R. Papa's father-in-law fell to the lot of a levir who was unworthy of her.<a id="k106a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; When [the levir] came before Abaye the latter said to him, 'Submit to her <i>halizah</i> and you will thereby wed her'. Said R. Papa to him, 'Does not the Master accept the [relevant] ruling of R. Johanan?'<a id="k106a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; 'What then could I tell him?' [the other asked]. 'Tell him', the first replied, '"submit to her <i>halizah</i> on condition that she gives you two hundred <i>zuz</i>."' After [the levir] had submitted to <i>halizah</i> at her hand [Abaye] said to her,<a id="k106a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Go and give him [the stipulated sum]'.<a id="k106a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; 'She', R. Papa replied, 'was merely fooling him';<a id="k106a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; was it not, in fact taught: If a man escaping from prison beheld a ferry boat and said [to the ferryman], 'Take a <i>denar</i> and lead me across',<a id="k106a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; [the latter] can only claim his ordinary fare.<a id="k106a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; From this then it is evident that the one can say to the other, 'I was merely fooling you'; so here also<a id="k106a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; [the woman may say], 'I was merely fooling you'. 'Where is your father?'<a id="k106a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; [Abaye] asked him. &mdash; 'In town', the other replied. 'Where is your mother?'<a id="k106a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; 'In town', the other again replied. He set his eyes upon them and they died.
</p><p>
	Our Rabbis taught:<a id="k106a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; A <i>halizah</i> under a false assumption is valid; a letter of divorce [given] under a false assumption is invalid.<a id="k106a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; A <i>halizah</i> under coercion is invalid; a letter of divorce [given] under compulsion is valid. How is this<a id="k106a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; to be understood? If it is a case where the man [ultimately]<a id="k106a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; says, 'I am willing', the <i>halizah</i> also [should be valid]; and if he does not say, 'I am willing', a letter of divorce also should not [be valid]! &mdash; It is this that was meant: A <i>halizah</i> under a false assumption is always valid, and a letter of divorce [given] on a false assumption is always invalid; but a <i>halizah</i> under coercion and a letter of divorce [given] under coercion are sometimes valid and sometimes invalid, the former when the man [ultimately]<a id="k106a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; declared, 'I am willing', and the latter, when he did not declare, 'I am willing'. For it was taught: He shall offer it<a id="k106a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; teaches that the man is coerced.<a id="k106a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; It might [be assumed that the sacrifice may be offered up] against his will, it was, therefore, expressly stated, In accordance with his will.<a id="k106a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; How then [are the two texts to be reconciled]? He is subjected to pressure until he says, 'I am willing'. And so you find in the case of letters of divorce for women: The man<a id="k106a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; is subjected to pressure until he says, 'I am willing'.<a id="k106a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Raba reported in the name of R. Sehora in the name of R. Huna: <i>Halizah</i> may be arranged even though [the parties]<a id="k106a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; are unknown<a id="k106a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; A declaration of refusal<a id="k106a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; may be arranged even though the parties<a id="k106a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; are unknown.<a id="k106a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; For this reason<a id="k106a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; no certificate of <i>halizah</i> may be written<a id="k106a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; unless the parties are known,<a id="k106a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; and no certificate of <i>mi'un</i><a id="k106a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; may be written<a id="k106a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; unless the parties are known,<a id="k106a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; for fear of an erring <i>Beth din</i>.<a id="k106a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Raba in his own name, however, stated: <i>halizah</i> must not be arranged unless the parties<a id="k106a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; are known,<a id="k106a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; nor may a declaration of refusal<a id="k106a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; be heard unless the parties<a id="k106a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; are known.<a id="k106a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; For this reason<a id="k106a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; it is permissible<a id="k106a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; to write a certificate of <i>halizah</i><a id="k106a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; even though the parties are not known,<a id="k106a_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; and it is also permissible<a id="k106a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; to write a certificate of <i>mi'un</i><a id="k106a_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; even though the parties are not known,<a id="k106a_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; and we are not afraid of an erring <i>Beth din</i>.<a id="k106a_53"><sup>53</sup></a>
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k106b_1:" The levir."
,k106b_2:" As, for instance, whether the respective ages or characters of the parties are likely to be conducive to a happy union. Cf. <i>supra</i> 44a, 101b."
,k106b_3:" Deut. XXV, 8."
,k106b_4:" Deut. XXV, 7."
,k106b_5:" Ibid. 8."
,k106b_6:" The classical Hebrew in which the formulae appear in the Scripture. Cf. Sot. 32a."
,k106b_7:" E.V., loose."
,k106b_8:" E.V., in."
,k106b_9:" Deut. XXV, 9."
,k106b_10:" E.V. 'And she shall answer and say'."
,k106b_11:" Ibid."
,k106b_12:" I.e., to the end of v. 9."
,k106b_13:" Or 'dictate'. The judges dictated and the parties recited."
,k106b_14:" [<i>Var. lec.</i>. [H], Cambridge Mishnah M.S. [H]. Krauss MGWF 1907, p. 332 reads [H], Capphare Accho in lower Galilee. Etam is mentioned in Judges XV, 8 and 11, I Chron. IV, 32 and II Chron. XI, 6]."
,k106b_15:" To the end of v. 10."
,k106b_16:" E.V., loosed."
,k106b_17:" Deut. XXV, 10."
,k106b_18:" Who happen to be present when the <i>halizah</i> ceremony is being performed."
,k106b_19:" E.V., him."
,k106b_20:" The formula prescribed in Deut. XXV, 7."
,k106b_21:" The formula, ibid. 8."
,k106b_22:" Ibid. 9. Cf. Sanh. 49b."
,k106b_23:" Lit., 'what he did is done'. Sanh. 49b, <i>supra</i> 105a."
,k106b_24:" Lit., 'document', 'deed'."
,k106b_25:" [H]. (Deut. XXV, 7) which is the first word of the formula."
,k106b_26:" [H] ibid."
,k106b_27:" The severance of the latter clause from the negative particle."
,k106b_28:" Deut. XXV, 8, cf. <i>supra</i> n. 3."
,k106b_29:" Ibid."
,k106b_30:" Each of the clauses mentioned by Abaye."
,k106b_31:" [H]. This is the reading of Alfasi, Asheri and BaH. Cur. edd., [H] 'breaking', 'pausing'."
,k106b_32:" Hence it is permitted to make a break between 'not' and the rest of the formula."
,k106b_33:" A sister-in-law for whom he was arranging a <i>halizah</i>."
,k106b_34:" The prescribed formula in Deut. XXV, 7."
,k106b_35:" <i>Supra</i>, that a pause after 'not' is immaterial."
,k106b_36:" It is only in the formula of the levir, in which the negative particle, 'not', forms the first word and cannot consequently be misunderstood as being connected with any previous word, that a pause does not matter. In the woman's formula, however, where the negative particle occurs in the middle of a clause, a pause after it might imply the connection of the negative with the preceding words, so that the clause following it would assume the meaning of an affirmative statement."
,k106b_37:" The sister-in-law."
,k106b_38:" The prescribed formula in Deut. XXV, 7."
,k106b_39:" The middle portion of the formula is omitted, since it is forbidden to write down more than three consecutive words of the Pentateuch on unruled paper (cf. Git. 6b). The words permitted to be written according to Abaye represent in the Hebrew no more than two consecutive words."
,k106b_40:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 735, n. 4."
,k106b_41:" The levir."
,k106b_42:" [H], the beginning of the levir's first formula."
,k106b_43:" Ibid."
,k106b_44:" Deut. XXV, 9."
,k106b_45:" V. <i>supra</i> note 3."
,k106b_46:" Ibid. 10, E.V., loosed."
,k106b_47:" For the <i>halizah</i> certificate, cf. Git. 6b."
,k106b_48:" Of each formula, not merely, as Abaye taught, its first and last words."
,k106b_49:" Others, 'Mar b. R. Ashi'. V. Alfasi and Asheri."
,k106b_50:" The Pentateuch in its entirety only may be copied. Cf. Git. 60a."
,k106b_51:" The prohibition against copying a section of the Pentateuch being limited to one that is to be used for teaching purposes. One, however, that is to be used as a mere record, as in the case of the <i>Halizah</i> certificate, does not come under the prohibition."
,k106b_52:" Lit., 'received', 'clutched', 'absorbed'."
,k106b_53:" Lit., 'she did not do anything'."
,k106b_54:" E.V., in."
,k106b_55:" V. <i>supra</i> note 16."
,k106b_56:" Lit., 'there is'."
,k106b_57:" lbid., since at the moment the spittle left her mouth it was before the levir's face."
,k106b_58:" Lit., 'and then'."
,k106b_59:" Impulsively owing to the unpleasant taste in her mouth."
,k106b_60:" The garlic or the clod of earth having been the cause of her involuntary or instinctive action."
,k106b_61:" Deut. XXV, 9."
,k106b_62:" '(The man) that had his shoe drawn off'. V. Deut. XXV, 10. "
}

txt:
<p>
MISHNAH. [THIS IS THE PROCEDURE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF] THE COMMANDMENT OF <I>HALIZAH</I>: HE<a id="k106b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; AND HIS DECEASED BROTHER'S WIFE COME UNTO THE <I>BETH DIN</I>, AND [THE LATTER] OFFER HIM SUCH ADVICE AS IS SUITABLE TO HIS CONDITION,<a id="k106b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; FOR IT IS SAID IN THE SCRIPTURES, THEN THE ELDERS OF HIS CITY SHALL CALL HIM AND SPEAK UNTO HIM.<a id="k106b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; SHE THEN ANNOUNCES: MY HUSBAND'S BROTHER REFUSETH TO RAISE UP UNTO HIS BROTHER A NAME IN ISRAEL; HE WILL NOT PERFORM THE DUTY OF A HUSBAND'S BROTHER UNTO ME.<a id="k106b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; THEN HE MAKES THE DECLARATION: I LIKE NOT TO TAKE HER.<a id="k106b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; [THESE FORMULAE] WERE ALWAYS SPOKEN IN THE HOLY TONGUE.<a id="k106b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; THEN SHALL HIS BROTHER'S WIFE DRAW NIGH UNTO HIM IN THE PRESENCE OF THE THE ELDERS AND DRAW<a id="k106b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; HIS SHOE FROM OFF HIS FOOT, AND SPIT BEFORE<a id="k106b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; HIS FACE,<a id="k106b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; SUCH SPITTLE AS THE JUDGES CAN SEE, AND SHE RAISES HER VOICE AND SAYS:<a id="k106b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; SO SHALL IT BE DONE UNTO THE MAN THAT DOTH NOT BUILD UP HIS BROTHER'S HOUSE,<a id="k106b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; THUS FAR<a id="k106b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; USED THEY TO RECITE.<a id="k106b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; WHEN, HOWEVER, R. HYRKANUS, UNDER THE TEREBINTH AT KEFAR ETAM,<a id="k106b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; ONCE DICTATED THE READING AND COMPLETED THE ENTIRE SECTION,<a id="k106b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; THE PRACTICE WAS ESTABLISHED TO COMPLETE THE ENTIRE SECTION.
</p><p>
	[THAT] HIS NAME SHALL BE CALLED IN ISRAEL, 'THE HOUSE OF HIM THAT HAD HIS SHOE DRAWN<a id="k106b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; OFF',<a id="k106b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; IS A COMMANDMENT [TO BE PERFORMED] BY THE JUDGES AND NOT BY THE DISCIPLES.<a id="k106b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; R. JUDAH, HOWEVER, RULED: IT IS A DUTY INCUMBENT UPON ALL PRESENT TO CRY '[THE MAN]<a id="k106b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; THAT HAD HIS SHOE DRAWN<a id="k106b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; OFF'.<a id="k106b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>
</p><p>
	GEMARA. Rab Judah stated: [This is the procedure in the performance of] the commandment of <i>halizah</i>: She recites;<a id="k106b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; he recites;<a id="k106b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; she draws off his shoe, spits and recites.<a id="k106b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; What does he teach us [by this statement]? This is our very Mishnah! &mdash; It is this that he teaches us: The prescribed procedure is such, but if the order was reversed, it does not matter. So it was also taught: Whether the drawing off of the shoe preceded the spitting or whether the spitting preceded the drawing off, the act is valid.<a id="k106b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Abaye ruled: The man who dictates the <i>halizah</i> formulae<a id="k106b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; shall not read for the woman [the word] not<a id="k106b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; separately and [the clause] he will perform the duty of a husband's brother unto me<a id="k106b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; separately, since this<a id="k106b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; would convey the meaning, 'He desires to perform the duty of a husband's brother to me'; but [should read without a pause]. He will not perform the duty of a husband's brother unto me. Nor shall he read for the levir [the word] not<a id="k106b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; separately and [the clause] I like<a id="k106b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; separately; for this<a id="k106b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; would convey the meaning. 'I like to take her'; but [he should read without a pause], I like not to take her.<a id="k106b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; Raba, however, stated: This<a id="k106b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; is only the conclusion<a id="k106b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; of a sentence, and in a concluding clause [a pause] is of no consequence.<a id="k106b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Ashi found R. Kahana making a painful effort to read out for a woman,<a id="k106b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; He will not perform the duty of a husband's brother unto me,<a id="k106b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; [without a pause]. 'Does not the Master,' he asked him, 'accept the ruling of Raba?'<a id="k106b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; 'Raba', the other replied, 'admits in [the case of the formula] He will not perform the duty of a husband's brother unto me<a id="k106b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; [that no pause is permitted].<a id="k106b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Abaye stated: The person who writes a certificate of <i>halizah</i> shall word it as follows: 'We read out for her<a id="k106b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; from My husband's brother refuseth<a id="k106b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; to<a id="k106b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; will perform the duty of a husband's brother unto me;<a id="k106b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; and we read out for him<a id="k106b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; from not<a id="k106b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; to<a id="k106b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; to take her;<a id="k106b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; and we read out for her from So<a id="k106b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; to<a id="k106b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; him that had his shoe drawn off.<a id="k106b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Mar Zutra ruled [the paper]<a id="k106b_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; and copied the full text.<a id="k106b_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; Mar b. Idi<a id="k106b_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; demurred: But, surely, [a section only of the Pentateuch] is not permitted to be written!<a id="k106b_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; The law, however, is in agreement with the ruling of Mar Zutra.<a id="k106b_51"><sup>51</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Abaye stated: If, when she spat. the wind carried the spittle away,<a id="k106b_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; her act is invalid.<a id="k106b_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; What is the reason? &mdash; It is necessary that she shall spit before<a id="k106b_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; his face.<a id="k106b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; If, therefore, he was tall and she was short, and the wind carried the spittle away,<a id="k106b_55"><sup>55</sup></a>&nbsp; her act is deemed to have been<a id="k106b_56"><sup>56</sup></a>&nbsp; before his face.<a id="k106b_57"><sup>57</sup></a>&nbsp; If, however, she was tall and he was short, it is necessary that [the spittle] shall drop to the level of his face before<a id="k106b_58"><sup>58</sup></a>&nbsp; it disappears.
</p><p>
	Raba stated: If she ate garlic and then spat<a id="k106b_59"><sup>59</sup></a>&nbsp; or if she ate a clod of earth and then spat,<a id="k106b_59"><sup>59</sup></a>&nbsp; her act is invalid.<a id="k106b_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; What is the reason? &mdash; Because it is necessary that she shall spit<a id="k106b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; of her own free will, which is not the case here.<a id="k106b_60"><sup>60</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Raba further stated: The judges must see the spittle issuing from the mouth of the sister-in-law, because it is written in Scripture Before the eyes of the elders&nbsp;&hellip; and spit.<a id="k106b_61"><sup>61</sup></a>
</p><p>
	[THAT] HIS NAME SHALL BE CALLED IN ISRAEL, 'THE HOUSE OF HIM THAT HAD HIS SHOE DRAWN OFF' IS A COMMANDMENT [TO BE PERFORMED] BY THE JUDGES AND NOT BY THE DISCIPLES. It was taught: R. Judah stated: We were once sitting before R. Tarfon when a sister-in-law came to perform <i>halizah</i>, and he said to us, 'Exclaim all of you: <i>Haluz ha-na'al,<a id="k106b_62"><sup>62</sup></a>&nbsp; haluz ha-na'al, haluz ha-na'al</i>!'
</P>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k108a_1:" And might consequently include the formula in letters of divorce also."
,k108a_2:" The minor."
,k108a_3:" Lit., 'with which they have consecrated me'."
,k108a_4:" I.e., extended the scope of <i>mi'un</i> still further."
,k108a_5:" [H], [G]."
,k108a_6:" Lit., 'and goes"
,k108a_7:" Though it might be objected that, had she really meant what she said, she would have refused to be carried to her husband."
,k108a_8:" Lit., 'it is'."
,k108a_9:" V. <i>supra</i> note 3."
,k108a_10:" Lit., 'and giving drink'."
,k108a_11:" Though her waiting upon the guests might seem to contradict her declaration, and though no proper <i>Beth din</i> is present."
,k108a_12:" Lit., 'behold it'."
,k108a_13:" Lit., 'an object of his'."
,k108a_14:" Tosef. Yeb. XIII. Though her statement might possibly be the result of a mere outburst against her husband for troubling her with his errand, and though no one but the shopkeeper was present when she made the statement."
,k108a_15:" A minor who did not make her declaration of refusal."
,k108a_16:" Not married. Has betrothal the same validity as marriage?"
,k108a_17:" Do they require separate <i>mi'un</i>, but not in the case of marriage, where they agree with R. Judah."
,k108a_18:" R. Judah; though he is in the minority."
,k108a_19:" In respect of marriage as well as in that of betrothal."
,k108a_20:" Had they all been of the same opinion there would have been no need to make the statement that the <i>halachah</i> agrees with him."
,k108a_21:" Concerning whom it was ruled that no <i>mi'un</i> is required."
,k108a_22:" l.e., to her first husband."
,k108a_23:" But if married, specific <i>mi'un</i> is required."
,k108a_24:" Abdan was one of Rabbi's disciples, who, after an incident with R. Ishmael, lost his two sons the husbands of the young women here mentioned. Cf. <i>supra</i> 105b."
,k108a_25:" Who were minors."
,k108a_26:" Refusing to perform their marital obligations."
,k108a_27:" To ascertain whether their refusal was in earnest."
,k108a_28:" I.e., you are welcome to them."
,k108a_29:" Lit., 'what not (but) that she was married', i.e., each of them was married to her husband, and, since a mere casual remark was nevertheless accepted by Rabbi as <i>mi'un</i>, it may be inferred that an actual marriage with, or a betrothal to another man may even more so be regarded as <i>mi'un</i>."
,k108a_30:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 746, n. 4."
,k108a_31:" Necessitated by their connubial intercourse."
,k108a_32:" If her father is a priest, though her husband is an Israelite. R. Eliezer does not regard the minor as a wife either in respect of the requirement of <i>mi'un</i> or in respect of any other restrictions or privileges such as those relating to <i>terumah</i>."
,k108a_33:" To which a lawful husband is entitled."
,k108a_34:" Which is the privilege of a husband. Cf. Num. XXX. 71f."
,k108a_35:" If he is a priest. Only a lawful husband may. Cf. Lev. XXI, 2."
,k108a_36:" If she wishes to marry another man."
,k108a_37:" Rabbinic law has conferred upon him the same rights as those of a lawful husband. Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 4."
,k108a_38:" Even if he is a priest (cf. <i>supra</i> n. 6). She is regarded as a <i>meth mizwah</i> (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>), hence he may defile himself for her though Pentateuchally she is not his proper wife."
,k108a_39:" And no letter of divorce is required."
,k108a_40:" <i>Mi'un</i> should not have been allowed."
,k108a_41:" Certainly not. Hence the requirement of <i>mi'un</i>."
,k108a_42:" While she was still living with her first husband."
,k108a_43:" Since the minor has shewn by her declaration that it was her desire to continue to live with him."
,k108a_44:" Since she did not exercise her right of refusal it is obvious that as far as she was concerned the union would never have been broken."
,k108a_45:" Like any other divorced woman."
,k108a_46:" Since she is not regarded as his wife."
,k108a_47:" Our Mishnah according to the explanation of Abaye and R. Hanina."
,k108a_48:" V. Mishnah intro. Why then should the same ruling be recorded twice?"
,k108a_49:" The Mishnah cited."
,k108a_50:" R. Eliezer b. Jacob's ruling in our Mishnah."
,k108a_51:" Since she is not regarded as his wife."
,k108a_52:" Like any other divorced woman."
,k108a_53:" It is only a divorced woman that must not be remarried by her first husband after she had been married to another (v. Deut. XXIV, 2-4) but not a minor who left her husband by <i>mi'un</i> which even cancels her status of divorcee in which she may find herself after a previous separation from her husband."
,k108a_54:" Her first husband."
,k108a_55:" Since her second separation from her first husband was by means of a letter of divorce, she retains the status of a divorcee. Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 6. "
}

txt:
<p>
people might mistake it for a letter of divorce,<a id="k108a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; the following formula was instituted: 'On the Nth day, So-and-so the daughter of So-and-so made a declaration of refusal in our presence'.
</p><p>
	Our Rabbis taught: What is regarded as <i>mi'un</i>? &mdash; If she<a id="k108a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; said, 'I do not want So-and-so my husband', or 'I do not want the betrothal which my mother or my brothers have arranged for me'.<a id="k108a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Judah said even more than this:<a id="k108a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; Even if while sitting in the bridal litter,<a id="k108a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; and being carried<a id="k108a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; from her father's house to the home of her husband, she said, 'I do not want So-and-so my husband', her statement<a id="k108a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; is regarded as<a id="k108a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; a declaration of refusal. R. Judah said more than this:<a id="k108a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; Even if, while the wedding guests were reclining [on their dining couches] in her husband's house and she was standing and waiting<a id="k108a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; upon them, she said to them, 'I do not want my husband So-and-so', her statement<a id="k108a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; is regarded as<a id="k108a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; a declaration of refusal. R. Jose b. Judah said more than this: Even if, while her husband sent her to a shopkeeper to bring him something for himself,<a id="k108a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; she said, 'I do not want So-and-so my husband', you can have no <i>mi'un</i> more valid than this one.<a id="k108a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. HANINA B. ANTIGONUS RULED: ANY CHILD etc. Rab Judah reported in the name of Samuel: The <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with R. Hanina b. Antigonus.
</p><p>
	A Tanna taught: If a minor who did not make a declaration of refusal married herself again, her marriage, it was stated in the name of R. Judah b. Bathyra, is to be regarded as her declaration of refusal.
</p><p>
	It was asked: What is the law where she<a id="k108a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; was only betrothed?<a id="k108a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Come and hear: If a minor who did not make a declaration of refusal betrothed herself [to another man], her betrothal, it was stated in the name of R. Judah b. Bathyra, is regarded as her declaration of refusal.
</p><p>
	The question was raised: Do the Rabbis differ from R. Judah b. Bathyra or not? If you can find some ground for holding that they  differ, [it may be asked whether only] in respect of betrothal,<a id="k108a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; or even in respect of marriage? And should you find some reason for holding that they differ even in respect of marriage [the question arises whether] the <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with him<a id="k108a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; or not? And if you can find some ground for holding that the <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with him [it may be asked whether only] in respect of marriage or also in respect of betrothal? &mdash; Come and hear: Rab Judah stated in the name of Samuel that the <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with R. Judah b. Bathyra;<a id="k108a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; [since it had to be stated that] the <i>halachah</i> [is so] it may be inferred that they differ.<a id="k108a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>
</p><p>
	The question, however, still remains [whether the minor spoken of]<a id="k108a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; is one who was married in the first instance<a id="k108a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; or perhaps she is one who was only betrothed?<a id="k108a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Come and hear: Abdan's<a id="k108a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; daughters-in-law<a id="k108a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; rebelled [against their husbands].<a id="k108a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; When Rabbi sent a pair of Rabbis to interrogate then,<a id="k108a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; some women said to them, 'See your husbands are coming'. 'May they', they replied, 'be your husbands!'<a id="k108a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; and 'Rabbi decided: 'No more significant <i>mi'un</i> than this is required'. Was not this a case of marriage?<a id="k108a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; No, one of betrothal only. The <i>halachah</i>, however, is in agreement with R. Judah b. Bathyra, even where marriage with the first husband has taken place.
</p><p>
	R. ELIEZER<a id="k108a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; RULED etc. Rab Judah stated in the name of Samuel: I have surveyed [the rulings] of the Sages from all aspects and found no man who was so consistent in his treatment of the minor as R. Eliezer.<a id="k108a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; For R. Eliezer<a id="k108a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; regarded her as one taking a walk with [her husband] in his courtyard who, when she rises from his bosom, performs her ritual immersion<a id="k108a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; and is permitted to eat <i>terumah</i> in the evening.<a id="k108a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>
</p><p>
	It was taught: R. Eliezer stated: There is no validity whatsoever in the act of a minor, and her husband is entitled neither to anything she may find,<a id="k108a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; nor to the work of her hands,<a id="k108a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; nor may he annul her vows;<a id="k108a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; he is not her heir<a id="k108a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; and he may not defile himself for her.<a id="k108a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; This is the general rule: She is in no respect regarded as his wife, except that it is necessary for her to make a declaration of refusal.<a id="k108a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Joshua stated: Her husband has the right to anything she finds<a id="k108a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; and to the work of her hands,<a id="k108a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; to annul her vows,<a id="k108a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; to be her heir,<a id="k108a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; and to defile himself for her;<a id="k108a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; the general principle being that she is regarded as his wife in every respect, except that she may leave him<a id="k108a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; by a declaration of refusal.<a id="k108a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; Said Rabbi: The views of R. Eliezer are more acceptable than those of R. Joshua; for R. Eliezer is consistent throughout in his treatment of the minor while R. Joshua makes distinctions. What [unreasonable] distinctions does he make? &mdash; If she is regarded as his wife, she should also require a letter of divorce.<a id="k108a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; But according to R. Eliezer also [it may be argued] if she is not regarded as his wife, she should require no <i>mi'un</i> either! &mdash; Should she then depart without any formality whatever?<a id="k108a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. ELIEZER B. JACOB RULED: etc. What is to be understood by a HINDRANCE THAT WAS DUE TO THE HUSBAND and a HINDRANCE THAT WAS NOT DUE TO THE HUSBAND? &mdash; Rab Judah replied in the name of Samuel: If when she was asked to marry<a id="k108a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; she replied, '[I must refuse the offer] owing to So-and-so my husband'; such a HINDRANCE is one THAT WAS DUE TO THE HUSBAND.<a id="k108a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; [If, however, she refused the offer] 'because', [she said] 'the men [who proposed] are not suitable for me'; such a HINDRANCE is one THAT WAS NOT DUE TO THE HUSBAND.
</p><p>
	Both Abaye b. Abin and R. Hanina b. Abin gave the following explanation: If he gave her a letter of divorce, the HINDRANCE IS one THAT WAS DUE TO THE HUSBAND<a id="k108a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; and, therefore, he is forbidden to marry her relatives and she is forbidden to marry his relatives, and he also disqualifies her from marrying a priest.<a id="k108a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; If, however, she exercised her right of refusal against him, the HINDRANCE is one THAT WAS NOT DUE TO THE HUSBAND and, therefore, he is permitted to marry her relatives and she is permitted to marry his relatives, and he does not disqualify her from marrying a priest.<a id="k108a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>
</p><p>
	But surely, this<a id="k108a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; was specifically stated below: If a minor made a declaration of refusal against a man, he is permitted to marry her relatives and she is permitted to marry his relatives, and he does not disqualify her from marrying a priest; but if he gave her a letter of divorce he is forbidden to marry her relatives and she is forbidden to marry his relatives, and he also disqualifies her from marrying a priest!<a id="k108a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; The latter<a id="k108a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; is merely an explanation [of the former].<a id="k108a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. IF A MINOR MADE A DECLARATION OF REFUSAL AGAINST A MAN, HE IS PERMITTED [TO MARRY] HER RELATIVES AND SHE IS PERMITTED TO [MARRY] HIS RELATIVES, AND HE DOES NOT DISQUALIFY HER FROM [MARRYING] A PRIEST;<a id="k108a_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; BUT IF HE GAVE HER A LETTER OF DIVORCE, HE IS FORBIDDEN TO [MARRY] HER RELATIVES AND SHE IS FORBIDDEN TO [MARRY] HIS RELATIVES, AND HE ALSO DISQUALIFIES HER FROM [MARRYING] A PRIEST.<a id="k108a_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; IF HE GAVE HER A LETTER OF DIVORCE AND REMARRIED HER AND, AFTER SHE HAD EXERCISED HER RIGHT OF REFUSAL AGAINST HIM, SHE WAS MARRIED TO ANOTHER MAN AND BECAME A WIDOW OR WAS DIVORCED, SHE IS PERMITTED TO RETURN TO HIM.<a id="k108a_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; IF, HOWEVER, SHE EXERCISED HER RIGHT OF REFUSAL AGAINST HIM<a id="k108a_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; AND HE REMARRIED HER, AND SUBSEQUENTLY GAVE HER A LETTER OF DIVORCE AND THEN SHE WAS MARRIED TO ANOTHER MAN AND BECAME A WIDOW OR WAS DIVORCED, SHE IS FORBIDDEN TO RETURN TO HIM.<a id="k108a_55"><sup>55</sup></a>
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k108b_1:" Irrespective of the number of times the man married and divorced her and the number of times she exercised the right of <i>mi'un</i>."
,k108b_2:" Because her last separation was by means of a letter of divorce. Cf. <i>supra</i>. n. 8."
,k108b_3:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 6."
,k108b_4:" Others insert here, 'to another against whom she exercised her right of refusal' (cf. separate edd. of the Mishnah, Alfasi and BaH)."
,k108b_5:" Cur. edd., 'this is the general rule' is here omitted in accordance with the reading of the separate edd. of the Mishnah and Alfasi."
,k108b_6:" Since it was ruled that IF <I>MI'UN</I> FOLLOWED DIVORCE SHE IS PERMITTED TO RETURN to her husband, despite the divorce that preceded it. Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 751, 15, 6."
,k108b_7:" Lit., 'comes&nbsp;&hellip; and cancels'."
,k108b_8:" V. <i>supra</i> note 1."
,k108b_9:" That preceded the <i>mi'un</i>."
,k108b_10:" [H] (rt. [H], 'to break'). Others 'contradiction' (cf. Rashi, Levy and Jast )."
,k108b_11:" Lit., 'this'."
,k108b_12:" Others, 'Rabbah'. Cf. BaH."
,k108b_13:" The case spoken of in the first statement of our Mishnah."
,k108b_14:" Spoken of in the second statement."
,k108b_15:" The first husband."
,k108b_16:" Lit., 'entangle and bring her', i.e., he might take advantage of their earlier familiarity and insidiously ingratiate himself with her, creating dislike between her and her second husband so that she might be led to exercise her right of <i>mi'un</i> against the latter and return to him."
,k108b_17:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 3."
,k108b_18:" Lit., 'she was not entangled', 'confused'. The fact that she exercised the right of refusal against him after he had married her a second time and presumably made every effort to retain her, may be regarded as proof that she would not be induced to marry him a third time. When the <i>mi'un</i>, however, concerns a second husband. It is quite likely that, as her separation from her first husband was not due to her <i>mi'un</i> but to his divorcing her, she might readily consent to return to him and thus allow him to induce her to exercise her right of <i>mi'un</i> against her second husband."
,k108b_19:" Against her second husband."
,k108b_20:" Her first husband."
,k108b_21:" Lit., 'comes&nbsp;&hellip; and cancels'."
,k108b_22:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 752, n. 2."
,k108b_23:" Lit., 'comes and cancels'."
,k108b_24:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 752, n. 7."
,k108b_25:" Lit., 'this'."
,k108b_26:" It is in such a case only that she may not he remarried to any of the men, even though her separation from her last husband was by <i>mi'un</i>. If, however, she was divorced once or twice only, the <i>mi'un</i> against her last husband confirms her in the state of her minority, and she may be married again by either of the men who had previously divorced her."
,k108b_27:" Concerning which it was said <i>supra</i> that they represent the views of different authors."
,k108b_28:" Lit., 'what (is the meaning) of that which was written'."
,k108b_29:" Lam. v, 4."
,k108b_30:" Lit., 'danger': the times of the suppression of the Bar Kokeba revolt in 135 C.E. when the study of the Torah and Rabbinic or oral law was forbidden by the Roman authorities under pain of death,"
,k108b_31:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k108b_32:" The payment of the exorbitant sum of four hundred <i>zuz</i> for obtaining the required ruling recalled to Rab's mind the text of Lamentations quoted."
,k108b_33:" To return to her first husband."
,k108b_34:" Since, as is shewn presently, it is obvious that the minor is permitted to marry her first husband again after she has been separated from her second husband by <i>mi'un</i>."
,k108b_35:" Marriage with a married woman."
,k108b_36:" In the case of a minor who has exercised the right of <i>mi'un</i>."
,k108b_37:" Should one be permitted to marry her."
,k108b_38:" That of again marrying one's divorced wife. Thus it has been shewn that the author of the first statement in our Mishnah was Rab and that the author of the second statement was R. Ishmael son of R. Jose. Rab, though he belonged to the first generation of Amoraim, was also among the last of the Tannaim. Hence he was sometimes described as Tanna."
,k108b_39:" Forbidden by Rabbinic law. Cf. <i>supra</i> 21a."
,k108b_40:" After the death of her first husband."
,k108b_41:" Without issue, so that she became subject to levirate marriage with his paternal brother."
,k108b_42:" Against her first husband, through marriage with whom she became forbidden to the levir, the man in question."
,k108b_43:" And remove thereby her forbidden relationship with the levir."
,k108b_44:" With the levir between whom and herself no forbidden relationship any longer exists owing to her <i>mi'un</i>. Cf. <i>supra</i> notes 7 and 8."
,k108b_45:" Cur. edd. insert in parenthesis 'her rival'."
,k108b_46:" That of the levirate marriage (Deut. XXV, 5)."
,k108b_47:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k108b_48:" A divorced minor who may not be married again by the husband who divorced her though she was separated from her second husband by <i>mi'un</i>."
,k108b_49:" She is not regarded as his brother's divorcee."
,k108b_50:" Though her <i>mi'un</i> does not alter her status of divorcee in respect of her former husband himself (for the reason stated <i>supra</i>) it does remove it as far as marriage with his brother is concerned. She is, as a result of her <i>mi'un</i>, no longer regarded as his brother's divorcee."
,k108b_51:" And since it is only this familiarity that is the cause of the prohibition, it is obvious that where it does not apply there should be no prohibition."
,k108b_52:" Lit., 'this'."
,k108b_53:" V. p. 755, n. 13."
,k108b_54:" The husband who divorced her."
,k108b_55:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 755, n. 16. Why then should she be forbidden to marry them? "
}

txt:
<p>
THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE: IF DIVORCE FOLLOWED <I>MI'UN</I><a id="k108b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; SHE IS FORBIDDEN TO RETURN TO HIM,<a id="k108b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; AND IF <I>MI'UN</I> FOLLOWED DIVORCE<a id="k108b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; SHE IS PERMITTED TO RETURN TO HIM.<a id="k108b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>
</p><p>
	IF A MINOR EXERCISED HER RIGHT OF REFUSAL AGAINST A MAN, AND THEN SHE WAS MARRIED TO ANOTHER MAN WHO DIVORCED HER, AND AFTERWARDS TO ANOTHER MAN AGAINST WHOM SHE MADE A DECLARATION OF REFUSAL, AND THEN TO ANOTHER MAN WHO DIVORCED HER,<a id="k108b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; SHE<a id="k108b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; IS FORBIDDEN TO RETURN TO THE MAN FROM WHOM SHE WAS SEPARATED BY A LETTER OF DIVORCE, BUT IS PERMITTED TO RETURN TO HIM FROM WHOM SHE WAS SEPARATED BY HER EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF <I>MI'UN</I>.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. It is thus<a id="k108b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; evident that <i>mi'un</i> has the power to cancel<a id="k108b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; divorce; but this, surely, is contradicted by the following: IF A MINOR EXERCISED THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL AGAINST A MAN AND THEN WAS MARRIED TO ANOTHER MAN WHO DIVORCED HER, AND AFTERWARDS TO ANOTHER MAN AGAINST WHOM SHE MADE A DECLARATION OF REFUSAL, AND THEN TO ANOTHER MAN WHO DIVORCED HER,<a id="k108b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; SHE<a id="k108b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; IS FORBIDDEN TO RETURN TO THE MAN FROM WHOM SHE WAS SEPARATED BY A LETTER OF DIVORCE, BUT IS PERMITTED TO RETURN TO HIM FROM WHOM SHE WAS SEPARATED BY HER EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF <I>MI'UN</I>, from which it is evident that <i>mi'un</i> against his fellow has no power to cancel<a id="k108b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; his own divorce!<a id="k108b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Rab Judah replied in the name of Samuel: There is a break<a id="k108b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; [in our Mishnah], the one who taught the former<a id="k108b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; did not teach the latter.<a id="k108b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; Raba<a id="k108b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; said: But what contradiction is this? It is possible that <i>mi'un</i><a id="k108b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; cancels his own divorce, but that the <i>mi'un</i> against his fellow<a id="k108b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; does not cancel his own letter of divorce! But in what way is the <i>mi'un</i> against his fellow different from one against himself] that it should not cancel his own<a id="k108b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; divorce? [Obviously for the reason that] as she is familiar with his<a id="k108b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; hints and gesticulations he<a id="k108b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; might allure her and marry her again.<a id="k108b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; [But if this is the case] <i>mi'un</i> against himself also should not cancel his divorce, [for the same reason] that as she is familiar with his hints and gesticulations he might allure her and marry her again! Surely, he<a id="k108b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; had already tried to allure<a id="k108b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; her but she did not succumb.<a id="k108b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>
</p><p>
	If a contradiction, however, [exists it is that between one ruling] concerning his fellow against [another ruling] concerning his fellow: IF, HOWEVER, SHE EXERCISED HER RIGHT OF REFUSAL AGAINST HIM AND HE REMARRIED HER, AND HAVING SUBSEQUENTLY GIVEN HER A LETTER OF DIVORCE SHE MARRIED ANOTHER MAN AND BECAME A WIDOW OR WAS DIVORCED, SHE IS FORBIDDEN TO RETURN TO HIM. The reason [then why she is forbidden to return to him is] because she BECAME A WIDOW OR WAS DIVORCED, but had she exercised her right of refusal<a id="k108b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; she would have been permitted to return to him,<a id="k108b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; from which it is evident that the <i>mi'un</i> against his fellow has the power to cancel<a id="k108b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; his own divorce; but this view is contradictory to the following: IF A MINOR EXERCISED THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL AGAINST HER HUSBAND AND THEN WAS MARRIED TO ANOTHER MAN WHO DIVORCED HER, AND AFTERWARDS TO AN OTHER MAN AGAINST WHOM SHE MADE A DECLARATION OF REFUSAL, SHE<a id="k108b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; IS FORBIDDEN TO RETURN TO THE MAN FROM WHOM SHE WAS SEPARATED BY A LETTER OF DIVORCE, BUT IS PERMITTED TO RETURN TO HIM FROM WHOM SHE WAS SEPARATED BY HER EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF <I>MI'UN</I>. From this, then, it is evident that the <i>mi'un</i> against his fellow has no power to cancel<a id="k108b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; his own divorce! R. Eleazar replied: There is a break<a id="k108b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; [in our Mishnah]; the one who taught the former<a id="k108b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; did not teach the latter.<a id="k108b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Ulla replied: [The latter statement refers to a case where], for instance, she was thrice divorced, so that she appears like a grown up.<a id="k108b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Who taught [the two respective statements of our Mishnah]?<a id="k108b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; Rab Judah replied in the name of Rab: To this may be applied the Scriptural text,<a id="k108b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; We have drunk our water for money; our wood cometh to us for price.<a id="k108b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; In the time of proscription<a id="k108b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; the following <i>halachah</i> was inquired for: If a minor left her first husband with a letter of divorce and her second husband through <i>mi'un</i>, may she return to her first husband? They hired a man for four hundred <i>zuz</i>,<a id="k108b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; and [through him] they addressed the enquiry to R. Akiba in prison,<a id="k108b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; and he stated that she was forbidden.<a id="k108b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Judah b. Bathyra [also was asked] at Nesibis and he too forbade her.<a id="k108b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; Said R. Ishmael son of R. Jose: There was no need for us to [ascertain] such [an <i>halachah</i>],<a id="k108b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; For if in a prohibition involving the penalty of <i>kareth</i><a id="k108b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; he has been permitted<a id="k108b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; how much more so<a id="k108b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; in one [involving only the penalty of] a negative commandment.<a id="k108b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; But the enquiry was in this manner: If [a minor] was the wife of his mother's brother, and consequently forbidden to him as a relative of the second degree,<a id="k108b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; and his paternal brother [subsequently] married her<a id="k108b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; and died,<a id="k108b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; may she now exercise her right of <i>mi'un</i>,<a id="k108b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; and thus annul her first marriage<a id="k108b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; and so be permitted to contract the levirate marriage?<a id="k108b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; Is<a id="k108b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; <i>mi'un</i> valid after [a husband's] death where a religious performance<a id="k108b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; is involved, or not? Two men were hired for four hundred <i>zuz</i><a id="k108b_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; and when they came and asked R. Akiba in prison he ruled [that such levirate marriage was] forbidden; and when R. Judah b. Bathyra [was asked] at Nesibis he also decided that it was forbidden.
</p><p>
	R. Isaac b. Ashian stated: Rab, however, admits that she<a id="k108b_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; is permitted to marry the brother<a id="k108b_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; of the man whom she is forbidden [to remarry].<a id="k108b_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; Is not this obvious? For it is only he with whose hints and gesticulations she is familiar but not his brother!<a id="k108b_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; It might have been assumed that [marriage with] the one<a id="k108b_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; should be forbidden as a preventive measure against the other<a id="k108b_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; hence we were taught [that his brother may marry her]. Another reading: R. Isaac b. Ashian stated: As she<a id="k108b_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; is forbidden to him<a id="k108b_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; so is she forbidden to his brothers. But, surely, she is not familiar with their hints and gesticulations!<a id="k108b_55"><sup>55</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; His brothers were forbidden [marriage with her] as a preventive measure against [marriage] with him.
</P>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k109a_1:" Though at the time his brother had divorced her she was forbidden to him as 'his brother's divorcee'."
,k109a_2:" Mishnah edd.: R. Eliezer."
,k109a_3:" The reason is given <i>infra</i>."
,k109a_4:" A minor who was given to him in marriage by her mother or brothers, and who is entitled, therefore, to exercise <i>mi'un</i>."
,k109a_5:" Whether during her minority or after she had attained her majority."
,k109a_6:" It is the death of her husband, not his marriage with her, that subjects her to the levir; and at the hour of his death she was no longer his divorcee but his wife."
,k109a_7:" While she was still in her minority, the letter of divorce having been accepted on her behalf by her father (Rashi). (Cf. Keth. 46b) Rashi s.v. [H] and Sonc. ed. p. 266, n. 6."
,k109a_8:" A father, in accordance with Pentateuchal law, is entitled to give his minor daughter in marriage only once. After she has been divorced, therefore, a father has no more right to give her away in marriage than her mother or brothers in the case where the father is dead. As in the latter case <i>mi'un</i> cancels marriage so it does in the former. The minor thus assumes the status of 'orphan' while her father is still alive."
,k109a_9:" During her minority."
,k109a_10:" If her husband died during her minority. She has the status of a divorcee because her letter of divorce, having been accepted by her father, is valid, Her subsequent marriage has no validity since her father can no longer act for her (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 756, n. 12) and her own act has no legal force."
,k109a_11:" For forbidding to the levir his brother's divorced wife despite the fact that at the time of his brother's death she was married to him again."
,k109a_12:" Lit., 'she stood for him one hour in prohibition'; i.e., at the time she was divorced she was forbidden to him under the penalty of <i>kareth</i> as his 'brother's divorcee'. Her subsequent remarriage does not alter her status."
,k109a_13:" As any other 'brother's divorcee'."
,k109a_14:" Of the childless husband,"
,k109a_15:" Lit.,'the first'."
,k109a_16:" Lit., 'behold she is thrust before him'."
,k109a_17:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 4. Hence levirate marriage is forbidden (owing to the second possibility), and <i>halizah</i> is necessary (owing to the first)."
,k109a_18:" Should the levir, therefore, be permitted to contract with her the levirate marriage, it might be assumed by those who knew of the divorce and not of the remarriage that he married his brother's divorcee. Hence R. Eleazar's prohibition."
,k109a_19:" Certainly we do, since the Mishnah applies to all possible cases. In such a case as the one mentioned the remarriage remains unknown."
,k109a_20:" v. <i>supra</i> p. 757, n. 3."
,k109a_21:" The remarried women spoken of in our Mishnah."
,k109a_22:" Who, as stated in our Mishnah, may not be married by the levir because she retains the status of a divorcee."
,k109a_23:" R. Ashi's explanation."
,k109a_24:" As her father has no legal authority to give her in marriage, and as the remarriage that has been contracted by herself (a minor) has no validity, it is obvious that her previous legal status of divorcee remains in force and that she is, therefore, forbidden to the levir as 'his brother's divorcee'."
,k109a_25:" Lit. 'but not'?"
,k109a_26:" That the Sages admit that the minor may not contract the levirate marriage."
,k109a_27:" Her first husband."
,k109a_28:" Her father having accepted on her behalf the letter of divorce which is thus valid."
,k109a_29:" When neither she nor her father had the right to contract the marriage (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 756, n. 12); and where the death of the husband occurred while she was still in her minority, so that there was no cohabitation at all when she was of age."
,k109a_30:" So that cohabitation between them could take place while she was of age."
,k109a_31:" Since the final act of cohabitation after she becomes of age constitutes a legal <i>kinyan</i> of marriage."
,k109a_32:" Keth. 73bf. Since it was stated that 'the Sages agree with R. Eleazar in respect of a minor&nbsp;&hellip; in her father's lifetime', it is obvious that R. Eleazar himself spoke of this case and presumably made it the cause of the prohibition of the levirate marriages with the others mentioned."
,k109a_33:" According to R. Eleazar."
,k109a_34:" A divorced minor whom the husband remarried when she was of age."
,k109a_35:" Is her rival permitted levirate marriage?"
,k109a_36:" Against the possibility of contracting levirate marriage with an 'orphan' in her father's lifetime."
,k109a_37:" Lit., 'rise'."
,k109a_38:" Prohibition of the levirate marriage of the rival."
,k109a_39:" Cf. <i>supra</i> note 5. Obviously not."
,k109a_40:" Lit., 'but no?'"
,k109a_41:" How then could it be said <i>supra</i> that, according to R. Eleazar, the rival may contract the levirate marriage?"
,k109a_42:" The statement being obscure, and an explanation being required in any case."
,k109a_43:" And given in marriage by their mother or brothers."
,k109a_44:" So in accordance with the separate edd. of the Mishnah. The last two words are wanting in cur. edd."
,k109a_45:" Without issue."
,k109a_46:" Cur. edd., [H] 'that', is here omitted, in accordance with the reading of the separate edd. of the Mishnah, and the Palestinian Talmud, Cf. Wilna Gaon."
,k109a_47:" From levirate marriage and <i>halizah</i>."
,k109a_48:" Deaf and dumb, whose marriage is valid according to Rabbinic law only."
,k109a_49:" Others, 'Eleazar'."
,k109a_50:" Her husband. His marriage with her (a minor) being only Rabbinically valid, his levirate bond with the elder sister renders her forbidden to him. By the <i>mi'un</i> of the minor the levir is able to perform the Pentateuchal law."
,k109a_51:" The minor."
,k109a_52:" Lit., 'she refused' and the elder sister is then enabled to contract the levirate marriage."
,k109a_53:" I.e., she is not forbidden to her husband, despite his levirate bond with her elder sister which his brother's death had created, (Cf. <i>supra</i> 51a)."
,k109a_54:" And her marriage with her husband becomes Pentateuchally binding."
,k109a_55:" The surviving brother,"
,k109a_56:" He may not retain her owing to the levirate bond (cf. <i>supra</i> note ); R. Joshua, contrary to the opinion of R. Gamaliel, holding the view that a levirate bond does cause the prohibition of the widow's minor sister; and since the levirate bond is the result of a Pentateuchally binding marriage, the marriage with the minor, which is only Rabbinically valid, must be dissolved,"
,k109a_57:" Not by <i>mi'un</i> for the reason given in the Gemara <i>infra</i>."
,k109a_58:" Who is forbidden as the sister of his divorcee. "
,k109a_59:" To instruct a minor to exercise her right of refusal."
,k109a_60:" The reasons are given <i>infra</i>. From this then it is obvious that <i>mi'un</i> is not to be encouraged. Why then is THE MINOR TO BE INSTRUCTED TO EXERCISE HER RIGHT OF <I>MI'UN</I>?"
,k109a_61:" As is the case in our Mishnah, where the exercise of <i>mi'un</i> enables the levir to observe the Pentateuchal commandment of the levirate marriage."
,k109a_62:" From ordinary <i>mi'un</i>; while the latter is to be avoided the former is to be encouraged."
,k109a_63:" <i>Supra</i> 39b."
,k109a_64:" Ps. XXXIV, 15. Pursue it [H] (rt. [H]). "
}

txt:
<p>
MISHNAH. IF A MAN DIVORCED HIS WIFE AND REMARRIED HER, SHE IS PERMITTED TO MARRY THE LEVIR;<a id="k109a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; R. ELEAZAR<a id="k109a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; HOWEVER, FORBIDS.<a id="k109a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; SIMILARLY, IF A MAN DIVORCED AN ORPHAN<a id="k109a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; AND REMARRIED HER,<a id="k109a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; SHE IS PERMITTED TO MARRY THE LEVIR;<a id="k109a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; R. ELEAZAR, HOWEVER, FORBIDS.
</p><p>
	IF A MINOR WAS GIVEN IN MARRIAGE BY HER FATHER AND WAS DIVORCED,<a id="k109a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; [SO THAT SHE IS REGARDED] AS AN 'ORPHAN' IN HER FATHER'S LIFETIME,<a id="k109a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; AND THEN HER HUSBAND REMARRIED HER,<a id="k109a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; ALL AGREE THAT SHE IS FORBIDDEN TO MARRY THE LEVIR.<a id="k109a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. 'Efa stated: What is R. Eleazar's reason?<a id="k109a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; Because there was a period when she was forbidden to him.<a id="k109a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; Said the Rabbis to 'Efa: If so, <i>halizah</i> also should not be required!<a id="k109a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; And should you reply that the law is so indeed; surely [it may be pointed out] it was taught: In the name of R. Eleazar it was stated that she does perform <i>halizah</i>! &mdash; In truth, said 'Efa, the reason of R. Eleazar is unknown to me.
</p><p>
	Abaye said, This is the reason of R. Eleazar:<a id="k109a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; He was in doubt whether it was death<a id="k109a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; that subjects [the widow to the levirate marriage] or whether it was the marriage that preceded it<a id="k109a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; that subjects her to it. If it is death that subjects her to it, she should be subject to the<a id="k109a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; levirate marriage; and if it is the marriage preceding it<a id="k109a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; that subjects her to it, then there was a period when she was forbidden to him.<a id="k109a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Raba said: It was in fact obvious to R. Eleazar that it is death<a id="k109a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; that subjects [the widow to the levirate marriage], but while all well know of the divorce, not all are aware of the remarriage.<a id="k109a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; On the contrary! Remarriage gets noised abroad since the woman dwells with him! &mdash; Do we not, however, deal here [even with such a case as] where he remarried her in the evening and died in the morning?<a id="k109a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Ashi said, This is the reason of R. Eleazar:<a id="k109a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; He forbade [the levirate marriage of] these<a id="k109a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; as a preventive measure against the remarriage of an 'orphan' [minor] in her father's lifetime.<a id="k109a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; This<a id="k109a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; may also be logically supported; for in the final clause it was stated, IF A MINOR WAS GIVEN IN MARRIAGE BY HER FATHER AND SHE WAS DIVORCED [SO THAT SHE IS REGARDED] AS AN 'ORPHAN' IN HER FATHER'S LIFETIME, AND THEN REMARRIED HER HUSBAND, ALL AGREE THAT SHE IS FORBIDDEN TO MARRY THE LEVIR. Now what [need was there] to state [this when it is so] obvious!<a id="k109a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; Consequently it must be<a id="k109a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; this that was taught: R. Eleazar's reason<a id="k109a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; is because he forbade [the levirate marriages of] those as a preventive measure against [the levirate marriage of] this one. Thus our case has been proved.
</p><p>
	It was taught in agreement with R. Ashi: The Sages agree with R. Eleazar in respect of a minor whom her father had given in marriage and who was divorced [so that she is regarded] as an 'orphan' in her father's lifetime, and who then remarried [her husband], that she is forbidden to [contract the levirate marriage with] the levir, because her divorce was a perfectly legal divorce, whereas her remarriage was not a perfectly legal remarriage. This,<a id="k109a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; however, applies only where he<a id="k109a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; divorced her while she was a minor<a id="k109a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; and remarried her while she was still a minor;<a id="k109a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; but if he<a id="k109a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; divorced her while she was a minor and remarried her when she was of age, and also if he remarried her while she was still a minor and she became of age while she was with him, and then he died,<a id="k109a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; she may either perform <i>halizah</i> or contract the levirate marriage.<a id="k109a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; In the name of R. Eleazar, however, it was stated: She must perform <i>halizah</i> but may not contract the levirate marriage.<a id="k109a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Raba enquired of R. Nahman: What is [the law<a id="k109a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; in respect of] her<a id="k109a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; rival?<a id="k109a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; The other replied: [The prohibition against] herself is a preventive measure;<a id="k109a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; shall we then go so far<a id="k109a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; as to enact a preventive measure<a id="k109a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; against a preventive measure?<a id="k109a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; But, surely, it was taught: It was stated in the name of R. Eleazar, 'She and her rival perform halizah'; Now can it possibly be imagined that she and her rival [are to perform <i>halizah</i>]? Consequently it must mean,<a id="k109a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; 'either she or her rival performs halizah'!<a id="k109a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Are you not [in any case obliged to] offer an explanation?<a id="k109a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; Explain, then,<a id="k109a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; as follows: She performs <i>halizah</i> while her rival may either perform <i>halizah</i> or contract the levirate marriage.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. WHERE TWO BROTHERS WERE MARRIED TO TWO SISTERS WHO WERE MINORS<a id="k109a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; AND ORPHANS,<a id="k109a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; AND THE HUSBAND OF ONE OF THEM DIED,<a id="k109a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; [THE WIDOW]<a id="k109a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; IS FREE<a id="k109a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; AS BEING [THE LEVIR'S] WIFE'S SISTER. SIMILARLY IN THE CASE OF TWO DEAF<a id="k109a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; [SISTERS ONE OF WHOM WAS] OF AGE AND [THE OTHER] A MINOR, IF THE HUSBAND OF THE MINOR DIED, THE MINOR IS FREE<a id="k109a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; AS BEING [THE LEVIR'S] WIFE'S SISTER. IF THE HUSBAND OF THE ELDER SISTER DIED, THE MINOR IS TO BE INSTRUCTED, R. ELIEZER<a id="k109a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; STATED, TO EXERCISE HER RIGHT OF <I>MI'UN</I> AGAINST HIM.<a id="k109a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; R. GAMALIEL SAID: IF SHE<a id="k109a_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; EXERCISED HER RIGHT OF <I>MI'UN</I> WELL AND GOOD;<a id="k109a_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; BUT IF [SHE DID] NOT, LET HER WAIT<a id="k109a_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; UNTIL SHE IS OF AGE<a id="k109a_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; WHEN THE OTHER BECOMES FREE<a id="k109a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; AS BEING [THE LEVIR'S] WIFE'S SISTER. R. JOSHUA SAID: WOE TO HIM<a id="k109a_55"><sup>55</sup></a>&nbsp; BECAUSE OF HIS WIFE AND WOE TO HIM BECAUSE OF HIS BROTHER'S WIFE! HE MUST ALLOW HIS WIFE TO GO<a id="k109a_56"><sup>56</sup></a>&nbsp; BY [GIVING HER] A LETTER OF DIVORCE,<a id="k109a_57"><sup>57</sup></a>&nbsp; AND HIS BROTHER'S WIFE<a id="k109a_58"><sup>58</sup></a>&nbsp; BY [SUBMITTING TO HER] <I>HALIZAH</I>.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. But is this is permitted?<a id="k109a_59"><sup>59</sup></a>&nbsp; Surely. Bar Kappara taught: A man should always cling to three things and keep away from three things. 'A man should cling to the following three things': <i>Halizah</i>, the making of peace and the annulment of vows; 'and keep away from three things': &mdash; From <i>mi'un</i>, from [receiving] deposits and from acting as surety!<a id="k109a_60"><sup>60</sup></a>&nbsp; <i>Mi'un</i> [involving the fulfilment] of a commandment<a id="k109a_61"><sup>61</sup></a>&nbsp; is different.<a id="k109a_62"><sup>62</sup></a>
</p><p>
	[Reverting to our] previous text, 'Bar Kappara taught: A man should always cling to three things&nbsp;&hellip; Halizah', in accordance with [a statement of] Abba Saul. For it was taught: Abba Saul said, 'If [a levir] married his sister-in-law on account of her beauty, or in order to gratify his sexual desires 'or with any other ulterior motive, it is as if he has infringed [the law of] incest; and I am even inclined to think that the child [from such a union] is a bastard'.<a id="k109a_63"><sup>63</sup></a>
</p><p>
	'The making of peace', for it is written, Seek peace and pursue it<a id="k109a_64"><sup>64</sup></a>
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k109b_1:" As to the greatness of the reward for the propagation of peace. Lit., 'comes'."
,k109b_2:" Lit., 'pursuing' (bis) rt. [H]."
,k109b_3:" [H] (rt. [H]), E.V., 'followeth'."
,k109b_4:" Prov. XXI, 21; the reward for the pursuit of the latter will also be enjoyed by him who pursues the former. Cf. Kid. 40a."
,k109b_5:" At the time when the erection of such was forbidden; i.e., after the setting up of the Central Sanctuary in Palestine."
,k109b_6:" I.e., he does not go to the expert Sage to have it annulled."
,k109b_7:" Git. 46b, Ned. 22a."
,k109b_8:" Being a constant visitor at his house he may sometimes help himself to the deposited object and, losing or forgetting about it, would claim it again."
,k109b_9:" Where debts were collected from the guarantors and not from the creditors. [H] is a place name (Rashi); perhaps Seleucia, or an abbreviation of [H], v. note 10."
,k109b_10:" Prov. XI, 15."
,k109b_11:" The inference is based on the expression [H] (in which the rt. [H] which is also that of [H] 'evil' is repeated)."
,k109b_12:" The original for <i>He that&nbsp;&hellip; stranger</i> (ibid.) is [H] which is interpreted as the mixing of proselytes with Israel. The rt. [H] may bear both meanings."
,k109b_13:" The E V. reading of the text."
,k109b_14:" I.e., to the <i>word</i> but not to its <i>practice</i>."
,k109b_15:" This is deduced from [H] (E.V., <i>that strike hands</i>) in the concluding clause of the verse cited. [H] may also bear the meaning of 'stick to', 'nail oneself to'. This will be further explained anon."
,k109b_16:" In speaking of proselytes (Isa. XIV, 1) the word used is that of [H] (E.V., <i>shall join</i>) which is of the same rt. as [H] (a sore). V. <i>supra</i> 47b."
,k109b_17:" They 'pull out' the debtor from his obligation and 'thrust in' the creditor."
,k109b_18:" Not in its observance."
,k109b_19:" Deut. V, 1."
,k109b_20:" Of the laws of the Torah."
,k109b_21:" As if he had himself observed the laws of the Torah."
,k109b_22:" Following his own conclusions."
,k109b_23:" In order to obtain definite guidance on the case under consideration. It is a judge of such a character who is described as one 'who rivets himself to the word of the halachah'."
,k109b_24:" E.V., litter, the seat from which he dispensed justice."
,k109b_25:" Judges."
,k109b_26:" Cant. III, 7f."
,k109b_27:" Should justice be perverted."
,k109b_28:" For allowing the exemption of the elder when the minor becomes of age."
,k109b_29:" During her minority."
,k109b_30:" I.e., becomes retrospectively effective as soon as she attains her majority."
,k109b_31:" After her majority. As the validity of the original betrothal is thus made retrospective, the provisional levirate bond between the levir and the elder sister may be regarded as never having existed."
,k109b_32:" Lit.,'and she goes for herself'. Only by the 'betrothal' (i.e., the cohabitation) that took place when the minor bad attained her majority does the elder procure her exemptions not by the original betrothal of the minor which is ineffective."
,k109b_33:" Lit., 'yes'. Because it is the 'betrothal' that severs the levirate bond which existed between the levir and the elder sister from the moment his brother died."
,k109b_34:" Lit., 'I would say'."
,k109b_35:" Lit., 'while dozing and lying'."
,k109b_36:" Lit., 'not?'"
,k109b_37:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 763 n, 12."
,k109b_38:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 63, n. 13."
,k109b_39:" Lit., 'this matter of a minor'."
,k109b_40:" After her majority was attained."
,k109b_41:" He can divorce her at any time against her will."
,k109b_42:" She may, according to Pentateuchal law, exercise against him her right of <i>mi'un</i> at any moment. Though she cannot do so according to-Rabbinic law after she produces two pubic hairs, (cf. Mid. 52a and Tosaf. s.v. [H] a.l.), the uncertainty in her mind as to the durability of the union causes it to remain in a suspended condition until <i>kinyan</i> by cohabitation, after she becomes of age, has been effected."
,k109b_43:" Lit., 'yes'."
,k109b_44:" Lit., 'and stood up'."
,k109b_45:" Keth. 73a. "
}

txt:
<p>
and [in connection with this] R. Abbahu stated that deduction is made<a id="k109b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; by a comparison between the two expressions of 'pursuit':<a id="k109b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; Here it is written, Seek peace and pursue it and elsewhere it is written, He that pursueth<a id="k109b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; after righteousness and mercy findeth life, prosperity and honour.<a id="k109b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>
</p><p>
	'The annulment of vows', in accordance with [a statement of] R. Nathan. For it was taught: R. Nathan said, 'If a man makes a vow it is as if he has built a high place<a id="k109b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; and if he fulfils it,<a id="k109b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; it is as if he has offered up a sacrifice upon it'.<a id="k109b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>
</p><p>
	'And keep away from three things: From mi'un', since it is possible that when she becomes of age she will change her mind.
</p><p>
	'From [receiving] deposits' [applies to deposits made by] his fellow townsman who [regards] his house as his own house.<a id="k109b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>
</p><p>
	'From acting as surety [refers to would-be] sureties in Shalzion.<a id="k109b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; For R. Isaac said, 'What was meant by the Scriptural text, He that is surety for a stranger shall smart for it?<a id="k109b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; Evil after evil<a id="k109b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; comes upon those who receive proselytes,<a id="k109b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; and upon the sureties<a id="k109b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; of Shalzion and upon him who rivets<a id="k109b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; himself to the word of the <i>halachah</i>.<a id="k109b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>
</p><p>
	That 'those who receive proselytes', [bring evil upon themselves, is deduced] in accordance with [a statement of] R. Helbo. For R. Helbo stated: Proselytes are hurtful to Israel as a sore on the skin.<a id="k109b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>
</p><p>
	'The sureties of Shalzion [bring evil upon themselves]' because [in that place] they practice 'pull out and thrust in'.<a id="k109b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>
</p><p>
	'Who rivets himself to the word of the halachah', [brings evil upon himself], for it was taught: R. Jose said, 'Whosoever says that he has no [desire to study the] Torah, has no [reward for the study of the] Torah'. Is not this obvious? &mdash; But [this must be the meaning]: 'Whosoever says that he has only [an interest in the study of the] Torah<a id="k109b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; has only [reward for the study of the] Torah'. This, however, is also obvious! &mdash; But [the meaning really is] that he has no [reward] even [for the study of the] Torah. What is the reason? &mdash; R. Papa replied: Scripture said, That ye may learn them and observe to do them,<a id="k109b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; whosoever is [engaged] in observance<a id="k109b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; is [also regarded as engaged] in study, but whosoever is not [engaged] in observance is not [regarded as engaged] in study. And if you wish I may say: [The reading is] in fact, as was said before: 'Whosoever says that he has only [an interest in the study of the] Torah has only [reward for the study of the] Torah', yet [the statement] was necessary [in the case] where he teaches others and these go and do observe [the laws of the Torah]. Since it might have been assumed that he also receives reward,<a id="k109b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; hence we were taught [that he does not]. And if you wish I may say [that the statement] 'who rivets himself to the word of the halachah' [applies] to a judge who, when a lawsuit is brought before him, and he knows of an <i>halachah</i> [relating to a similar case], compares one case with the other<a id="k109b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; and, though he has a teacher, he does not go to him to inquire.<a id="k109b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; [Such a judge brings evil upon himself] for R. Samuel b. Nahmani stated in the name of R. Jonathan: A judge should always imagine himself as if [he had] a sword lying between his thighs, and Gehenna was open beneath him; as it is said in Scripture, Behold, it is the couch<a id="k109b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; of Solomon; threescore mighty men<a id="k109b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; are about it, of the mighty men of Israel etc. because of the dread in the night:<a id="k109b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; 'because of the dread of' Gehenna<a id="k109b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; which is like 'the night'.
</p><p>
	R. GAMALIEL SAID: IF SHE EXERCISED HER RIGHT OF <I>MI'UN</I> etc. R. Eleazar inquired of Rab: What is R. Gamaliel's reason?<a id="k109b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; Is it because he holds the opinion that the betrothal of a minor remains in a suspended condition<a id="k109b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; and as she grows up it grows with her<a id="k109b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; even though no cohabitation has taken place;<a id="k109b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; or is the reason because he is of the opinion that when a man betroths the sister of his sister-in-law the latter procures her exemption thereby, but thereby only,<a id="k109b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; [and consequently] only if cohabitation has taken place is the elder sister exempt,<a id="k109b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; but if no cohabitation has taken place she is not? &mdash; The other replied, This is R. Gamaliel's reason: Because he is of the opinion that when a man betroths the sister of his sister-in-law the latter procures her exemption thereby but thereby only<a id="k109b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; [and consequently] only if cohabitation has taken place is the elder sister exempt,<a id="k109b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; but if no cohabitation has taken place she is not.
</p><p>
	Said R. Shesheth: It seems<a id="k109b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; that Rab made this statement while he was sleepy and about to doze off;<a id="k109b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; for it was taught: If a man betrothed a minor, her betrothal remains in a suspended condition. Now, what [is meant by] 'a suspended condition'? Obviously<a id="k109b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; that as she grows up it grows up with her<a id="k109b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; even though there was no cohabitation.<a id="k109b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; Said Rabin the son of R. Nahman to him: The matter of the betrothal of a minor<a id="k109b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; remains in a suspended condition. If cohabitation had taken place<a id="k109b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; it is valid, but if no cohabitation had taken place<a id="k109b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; it is not; for [in the absence of such cohabitation] she thinks 'He has an advantage over me<a id="k109b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; and I have an advantage over him'.<a id="k109b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Is Rab, however, of the opinion that only if cohabitation had taken place is the betrothal valid,<a id="k109b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; but if there was no cohabitation it is not? Surely it was stated: Where a minor did not exercise her right of <i>mi'un</i> and, when she became of age, actually<a id="k109b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; married [another man], Rab ruled: She requires no letter of divorce from her second husband, and Samuel ruled: She requires a letter of divorce from her second husband.<a id="k109b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>
</P>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k110a_1:" Her first husband."
,k110a_2:" After she had attained her majority. And since Rab nevertheless rules that no divorce from the second husband is required it is obvious that he regards her first marriage as valid!"
,k110a_3:" And it is this cohabitation, not their first betrothal, that constitutes the <i>kinyan</i> of the first marriage."
,k110a_4:" Since cohabitation renders the betrothal of the first husband valid, that of the second must be invalid; why then did Samuel require the woman to be divorced from her second husband!"
,k110a_5:" Which was invalid. The marriage with the second husband is therefore valid and can be annulled by divorce only."
,k110a_6:" Rab and Samuel."
,k110a_7:" Stipulating, for instance, that she must have no bodily defect or that she must not be subject to any restrictions due to a vow she may have made."
,k110a_8:" If it was discovered that she had a defect or that she was subject to the restrictions due to a vow."
,k110a_9:" And valid <i>kinyan</i> is effected by their first cohabitation."
,k110a_10:" Which was invalid; v, Keth. 72b. Why then should they dispute the same point again?"
,k110a_11:" Lit., 'that'; the dispute concerning a minor who did not exercise her right of <i>mi'un</i>, cited from Keth. 73a."
,k110a_12:" This is the reading of Rashi, following the version in Keth. 73a. The reading of cur. edd. is given <i>infra</i> p. 766, n. 6."
,k110a_13:" And the husband was obviously anxious to give the union all the necessary validity. Being well aware that the betrothal of a minor is Pentateuchally invalid he naturally 'betroths' her again by cohabitation as soon as she becomes of age."
,k110a_14:" Lit., 'that'; cited from Keth. 72b."
,k110a_15:" That the original condition remains in force even after consummation of the marriage."
,k110a_16:" Since the condition was attached to the original betrothal,"
,k110a_17:" That the marriage remains dependent on the original condition and is, therefore, invalid."
,k110a_18:" v. <i>supra</i> p. 765, n. 13."
,k110a_19:" Cur. edd. read, 'For if that had been stated, (it might have been assumed that) in that case only did Rab maintain his view, because there existed a condition and as soon as (the man) cohabited with her he dispensed with his condition; but in this case it might have been assumed that he agrees with Samuel; and if this had been stated (it might have been assumed that) in this case only did Samuel maintain his view; but in that, it might have been said, he agrees with Rab'. [Rashi rejects this reading in view of the passage in Keth. 72a which states distinctly that Rab's ruling was not because he held that the man dispenses with the condition on intercourse, but because he renews betrothal at the time to avoid intercourse degenerating into mere fornication. Tosaf. s.v. [H] retains the reading of cur. edd., and explains that it is because no man would render his intercourse mere fornication that we assume that he dispensed with the condition, since he made no mention of the condition at the time. Had he, however, repeated the condition at intercourse, the condition would stand]."
,k110a_20:" The minor who has attained majority."
,k110a_21:" Lit., 'yes'."
,k110a_22:" Lit., 'not'."
,k110a_23:" It is assumed that this was a ceremony similar to ordinary huppah (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>)."
,k110a_24:" Obviously because they regarded the first marriage. though no cohabitation had taken place (v. <i>supra</i> n. 10), as valid, As the disciples presumably acted in accordance with the ruling of their Master, Rab, how could it be said that Rab requires a divorce only where cohabitation had taken place?"
,k110a_25:" Cohabitation."
,k110a_26:" And this is the reason why Rab's disciples regarded the marriage with the first husband as valid and, therefore, required no divorce from the second man."
,k110a_27:" The second man."
,k110a_28:" In snatching away another man's wife."
,k110a_29:" All betrothals are made 'in accordance with the law of Moses and Israel' (cf. P.B. p. 298) i.e.. the Pentateuchal, as well as Rabbinic law; hence it is within the power of the Rabbinical authorities to declare certain betrothals, such, for instance, as the present one where the girl was improperly snatched away, to be invalid."
,k110a_30:" One of the forms of <i>kinyan</i> in marriage (cf. Kid. 2a). Since the Rabbis are empowered to confiscate a man's property they might well dispose of the money of the betrothal by treating it as a mere gift to the girl."
,k110a_31:" Which has no legal validity to effect a <i>kinyan</i>."
,k110a_32:" That THE MINOR IS TO BE INSTRUCTED TO EXERCISE HER RIGHT OF <I>MI'UN</I>."
,k110a_33:" Marriage with whom is only Rabbinically valid."
,k110a_34:" By the levir, even during her minority, for the purpose of the levirate marriage."
,k110a_35:" After she has attained her majority."
,k110a_36:" From levirate marriage and <i>halizah</i>."
,k110a_37:" Lit., 'and so'."
,k110a_38:" I.e., deaf.mute."
,k110a_39:" Marriage with whom, like marriage with a minor, is only Rabbinically valid."
,k110a_40:" Though the marriage with either, according to Rabbinic law, is of equal validity."
,k110a_41:" Since it is uncertain, owing to the difference in their physical condition and age, which of them he preferred and which of them has consequently the greater claim to be regarded as his wife."
,k110a_42:" I.e., deaf-mute."
,k110a_43:" <i>Supra</i> 104b. How then could it be said in our Mishnah. AND THE SAME LAW IS APPLICABLE TO TWO DEAF WOMEN?"
,k110a_44:" The law in our Mishnah concerning two deaf women. V. <i>supra</i> n. 3."
,k110a_45:" Not to <i>halizah</i>."
,k110a_46:" Others, 'Rabbah'. Cf. <i>infra</i> p. 772, n. 8."
,k110a_47:" V. <i>supra</i> note 4."
,k110a_48:" Lit., 'here'; our Mishnah which allows <i>halizah</i> in respect of a deaf woman."
,k110a_49:" Even before her marriage."
,k110a_50:" The Mishnah <i>supra</i> 104b which rules the <i>halizah</i> of a deaf woman to be invalid."
,k110a_51:" At the time she married."
,k110a_52:" The levir by means of <i>halizah</i>."
,k110a_53:" The marriage with her husband. As the marriage was performed by means of signs and gestures so also is the <i>halizah</i>."
,k110a_54:" Cf. <i>supra</i> 106b."
,k110a_55:" As a deaf-mute she is unable to recite them and is consequently precluded from the performance of <i>halizah</i>."
,k110a_56:" I.e., women who were not related to one another."
,k110a_57:" I.e., deaf-mute."
,k110a_58:" I.e., contracts the levirate marriage by means of signs and gestures. No <i>halizah</i> is permitted since the woman is incapable of reciting the prescribed formulae."
,k110a_59:" After he has married her."
,k110a_60:" Divorcing her, as he married her, by the use of signs and gestures."
,k110a_61:" <i>Infra</i> 112b. The divorce of a man who is not in the possession of all his faculties cannot annul the marriage of his brother who was in the possession of all his faculties and whose marriage, therefore, subjects him to a levirate marriage that can never be annulled."
,k110a_62:" Probably it does. "
}

txt:
<p>
Does not [this refer to a case] where he<a id="k110a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; did not cohabit [with her]?<a id="k110a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; No; where he<a id="k110a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; did cohabit with her.<a id="k110a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; If, however, he<a id="k110a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; cohabited [with her] what is Samuel's reason?<a id="k110a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; He holds the view that one Who performs cohabitation does so in reliance on his first betrothal.<a id="k110a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; But surely they<a id="k110a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; once disputed this point! For it was stated: If a man betrothed a woman conditionally,<a id="k110a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; and unconditionally, Rab ruled: She<a id="k110a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; requires from him a letter of divorce; and Samuel ruled: She requires no letter of divorce from him. 'Rab ruled: She requires from him a letter of divorce', because as soon as he marries her he undoubtedly dispenses with his condition.<a id="k110a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; 'And Samuel ruled: She requires no letter of divorce from him', because one who performs cohabitation does so in reliance on his first betrothal!<a id="k110a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; [Both disputes were] necessary. For if the former<a id="k110a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; only had been stated, it might have been assumed that Rab adheres to his opinion there only because no condition<a id="k110a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; was attached [to the betrothal]<a id="k110a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; but in the latter case,<a id="k110a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; where a condition was attached to it, he agrees with Samuel.<a id="k110a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; And if the latter case<a id="k110a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; only had been stated, it might have been assumed that there only<a id="k110a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; does Samuel maintain his view<a id="k110a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; but in the former<a id="k110a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; he agrees with Rab.<a id="k110a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; [Hence both were] required.
</p><p>
	Did Rab, however, state that only where [the husband] cohabited with her<a id="k110a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; does she require a letter of divorce<a id="k110a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; but that if he did not cohabit with her none is required?<a id="k110a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; Surely it once happened at Naresh that a man betrothed a girl while she was a minor, and, when she attained her majority and he placed her upon the bridal chair,<a id="k110a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; another man came and snatched her away from him; and, though Rab's disciples, R. Beruna and R. Hananel, were present on the occasion, they did not require the girl to obtain a letter of divorce from the second man!<a id="k110a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; R. Papa replied: At Naresh they married<a id="k110a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; first and then placed [the bride] upon the bridal chair.<a id="k110a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Ashi replied: He<a id="k110a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; acted improperly<a id="k110a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; they, therefore, treated him also improperly, and deprived him of the right of valid betrothal.<a id="k110a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; Said Rabina to R. Ashi: [Your explanation is] satisfactory where the man betrothed [her] with money;<a id="k110a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; what [however, can be said where] he betrothed her by cohabitation? &mdash; The Rabbis have declared his cohabitation to be an act of mere fornication.<a id="k110a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Rab Judah stated in the name of Samuel: The <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with R. Eliezer;<a id="k110a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; and so did R. Eleazar state: The <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with R. Eliezer.<a id="k110a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. IF A MAN WAS MARRIED TO TWO ORPHANS WHO WERE MINORS<a id="k110a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; AND DIED, COHABITATION<a id="k110a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; OR <I>HALIZAH</I><a id="k110a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; WITH ONE OF THEM EXEMPTS HER RIVAL.<a id="k110a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; AND THE SAME LAW IS APPLICABLE TO<a id="k110a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; TWO DEAF<a id="k110a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; WOMEN.<a id="k110a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>
</p><p>
	[IF A MAN WAS MARRIED TO] A MINOR AND TO A DEAF<a id="k110a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; WOMAN,<a id="k110a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; COHABITATION WITH ONE OF THEM DOES NOT EXEMPT HER RIVAL.<a id="k110a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; [IF ONE WAS] POSSESSED OF HER FACULTIES AND THE OTHER WAS DEAF,<a id="k110a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; COHABITATION WITH THE FORMER EXEMPTS THE LATTER, BUT COHABITATION WITH THE LATTER DOES NOT EXEMPT THE FORMER. [IF ONE WAS] OF AGE AND THE OTHER A MINOR, COHABITATION WITH THE FORMER EXEMPTS THE LATTER, BUT COHABITATION WITH THE LATTER DOES NOT EXEMPT THE FORMER.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. Is, however, a deaf<a id="k110a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; woman permitted to perform <i>halizah</i>? Surely, we learned: If a deaf levir submitted to <i>halizah</i> or a deaf sister-in-law performed <i>halizah</i>, or if <i>halizah</i> was performed on a minor, the <i>halizah</i> is invalid!<a id="k110a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; R. Giddal replied in the name of Rab: [This<a id="k110a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; applies] to COHABITATION.<a id="k110a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; Raba<a id="k110a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; replied: It<a id="k110a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; may be said to apply even to <i>halizah</i>; one<a id="k110a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; referring to a woman who was originally deaf,<a id="k110a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; and the other<a id="k110a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; referring to a woman who was possessed of hearing<a id="k110a_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; and became deaf afterwards. The 'woman who was originally deaf', leaves<a id="k110a_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; as she entered,<a id="k110a_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; but the 'woman who was possessed of hearing and became deaf afterwards' cannot do so, since her inability to recite [the prescribed formulae]<a id="k110a_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; acts as an obstacle.<a id="k110a_55"><sup>55</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Abaye raised an objection against him: Is, however, one who was originally deaf permitted to perform <i>halizah</i>? Surely, we learned: If two brothers, one of whom was in possession of his faculties and the other deaf,<a id="k110a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; were [respectively] married to two strangers,<a id="k110a_56"><sup>56</sup></a>&nbsp; one of whom was in the possession of her faculties and the other deaf,<a id="k110a_57"><sup>57</sup></a>&nbsp; and the deaf [brother] who was the husband of the deaf woman died, what should [his brother who was] in possession of his faculties, the husband of the woman in possession of her faculties, do? He marries her<a id="k110a_58"><sup>58</sup></a>&nbsp; and if he wishes to send her away,<a id="k110a_59"><sup>59</sup></a>&nbsp; he may do so.<a id="k110a_60"><sup>60</sup></a>&nbsp; If the [brother] who was in possession of his faculties, the husband of the woman who was in possession of her faculties, died, what should the deaf brother, the husband of the deaf woman do? He marries [the widow] and may never divorce her.<a id="k110a_61"><sup>61</sup></a>&nbsp; Does not this apply to a woman who was originally deaf?<a id="k110a_62"><sup>62</sup></a>&nbsp; And yet it was stated that he may only marry
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k110b_1:" Owing to the woman's incapability of reciting the prescribed formulae. How, then, could Raba (or Rabbah) state that in such a case <i>halizah</i> is permissible?"
,k110b_2:" At the time she married."
,k110b_3:" After he has married her."
,k110b_4:" I.e., women who were not related to one another."
,k110b_5:" V. <i>supra</i> n. 5."
,k110b_6:" <i>Infra</i> 112b."
,k110b_7:" Lit., 'what not?'"
,k110b_8:" Even before marriage."
,k110b_9:" Lit., 'yes'."
,k110b_10:" V. p. 769, n. 8."
,k110b_11:" Lit., 'that as it is, and that etc.'"
,k110b_12:" Raba (or Rabbah)."
,k110b_13:" From levirate marriage and <i>halizah</i>."
,k110b_14:" He must not continue to live with her because she is the sister of his zekukah (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>) the levirate bond with whom is, as was her marriage with her husband, Pentateuchally valid, while his own marriage with his deaf wife, though valid in Rabbinic law, is invalid in Pentateuchal law. A Rabbinically valid marriage cannot override a levirate bond which is Pentateuchal."
,k110b_15:" <i>Infra</i> 112b. She is forbidden to her brother-in-law since she is (in Rabbinic law) his wife's (or divorcee's) sister, and she is forbidden to other men since, as a deaf-mute who is unable to recite the prescribed formulae, her brother-in-law is precluded from submitting to <i>halizah</i> from her, and, in consequence, she remains attached to him by the levirate bond. Now, as the levir's deafness is, in this case, an affliction from which he suffered prior to his marriage, the deafness spoken of in the two previously cited cases (since all these appear in the same contexts) must similarly refer to afflictions commenced prior to the marriage. This then presents an objection against Raba (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 769, n. 8)!"
,k110b_16:" One's wife."
,k110b_17:" In accordance with a Rabbinical provision safeguarding the position of the woman who, were she to be divorced and thus remain unprotected by a husband, would be subject, owing to her mental condition, to serious moral and physical danger."
,k110b_18:" <i>Infra</i> 112b; because his marriage which took place when he was in full possession of his senses was Pentateuchally valid, while a divorce given by him while deaf or insane would have no Pentateuchal validity."
,k110b_19:" Lit., 'but not?'"
,k110b_20:" Prior to the marriage."
,k110b_21:" Lit., 'yes'."
,k110b_22:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 769, n. 8."
,k110b_23:" Raba (or Rabbah)."
,k110b_24:" Abaye."
,k110b_25:" If their husbands died without issue."
,k110b_26:" Because all these marriages having been contracted by signs and gestures, are of equal validity. Each widow is, therefore, forbidden to the respective levir as his wife's sister."
,k110b_27:" To one another."
,k110b_28:" <i>Halizah</i> is forbidden, since either the levir or the sister-in-law (or both), as the case may be, is unable to recite the prescribed formulae."
,k110b_29:" Cit. 71b, <i>infra</i> 112b."
,k110b_30:" Concerning the deaf people spoken of in this context."
,k110b_31:" Prior to the marriage."
,k110b_32:" After the marriage."
,k110b_33:" Cf. BaH. Cur. edd. insert: 'If she became insane he may not divorce'."
,k110b_34:" Git. 71 b. <i>infra</i> 112b. Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 771, n. 1. How, then, could it be said to be a case of deafness acquired after marriage!"
,k110b_35:" Lit., 'but not?'"
,k110b_36:" Git. 71 b, <i>infra</i> 112b."
,k110b_37:" Lit., 'yes'."
,k110b_38:" Or 'Raba'. Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 768, n. 6 and <i>supra</i> p. 769, n. 8."
,k110b_39:" So Tosaf. and one of Rashi's explanations. [H] (vb. [H] 'to blunt' and noun [H] or [H] 'refutation'). Jastrow renders, 'They were sitting and raising arguments. Another interpretation of Rashi derives the expression from the [H] 'to gather'; 'they were gathering round them an assembly of students'."
,k110b_40:" Lit., 'that which we learned'."
,k110b_41:" Lit., 'these words'."
,k110b_42:" Lit., 'she fell'."
,k110b_43:" The deceased brother."
,k110b_44:" The deceased brother."
,k110b_45:" Lit., 'she fell'."
,k110b_46:" The minor and the deaf wife whose husband died childless and who became subject to a levir."
,k110b_47:" Since one does not exempt the other (v. our Mishnah) and the deaf woman is incapable of performing <i>halizah</i>. Were the levir to marry the deaf widow and submit to <i>halizah</i> from the minor after she had attained her majority, the former would become forbidden to him by the <i>halizah</i> of her rival ('If a man did not build he must never build', <i>supra</i>), the marriage of the deaf not being Pentateuchally valid to sever the levirate bond with the minor."
,k110b_48:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 4."
,k110b_49:" Both widows are thus released from the levir."
,k110b_50:" By her husband. Lit., 'acquired and left over'; only in a part of her person is she legally regarded as wife, Cf. <i>infra</i> n. 9."
,k110b_51:" Completely; and she is consequently regarded as the deceased brother's proper wife."
,k110b_52:" And consequently she is legally no more than a stranger. That the legal condition of relationship between the minor and her husband is different from that between the deaf wife and her husband is fairly obvious. For if they were both regarded as partially acquired, or if the acquisition of either was regarded as doubtful, their legal position would in no way differ from that of two minors or two deaf women, while, in fact, it does. (Cf. our Mishnah and the following one). From Rab's ruling, however, it is inferred that it is the deaf wife who is partially acquired and that it is the minor concerning whom it is uncertain whether she is wholly acquired or not acquired at all. "
}

txt:
<p>
but not submit to <i>halizah</i>!<a id="k110b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; No, this refers to a woman who was capable of hearing<a id="k110b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; and became deaf afterwards.<a id="k110b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Come and hear: If two brothers of sound senses were married to two strangers<a id="k110b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; one of whom was of sound senses and the other deaf, and [the brother who was] of sound senses, the husband of the deaf woman, died, what should the [brother who was] of sound senses, the husband of the woman who was of sound senses, do? He marries [the deaf widow], and if he wishes to divorce her he may do so.<a id="k110b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; If [the brother who was] of sound senses, the husband of the woman who was of sound senses, died, what should the [brother who was] of sound senses, the husband of the woman who was deaf, do? He may either submit to <i>halizah</i> or contract levirate marriage.<a id="k110b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; Are we not to assume that<a id="k110b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; as the man was originally<a id="k110b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; of sound senses so was she originally<a id="k110b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; deaf, and nevertheless it was stated that he may only<a id="k110b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; marry her but may not submit to her <i>halizah</i>!<a id="k110b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Is this an argument? Each one may bear its own meaning.<a id="k110b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>
</p><p>
	An objection was raised against him:<a id="k110b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; If two brothers, one of whom was of sound senses and the other deaf, were married to two sisters, one of whom was of sound senses and the other deaf, and the deaf brother, the husband of the deaf sister, died, what should [the brother who was] of sound senses, the husband of [the sister who was] of sound senses, do? &mdash; [Nothing, since] the widow is released<a id="k110b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; by virtue of her being [the levir's] wife's sister. If [the brother who was] of sound senses, the husband of [the sister who was] of sound senses, died, what should the deaf brother, the husband of the deaf sister, do? He releases his wife by means of a letter of divorce,<a id="k110b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; while his brother's wife is for ever forbidden [to marry again]!<a id="k110b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; And should you reply that here also [it is a case of a man] who was of sound senses and who became afterwards deaf, is [such a man, it may be retorted], in a position to divorce [his wife]? Surely, we learned: If she<a id="k110b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; became deaf, he may divorce her; if she became insane, he may not divorce her.<a id="k110b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; If he became deaf or insane he may never divorce her.<a id="k110b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; Consequently it must be a case of a man<a id="k110b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; who was originally<a id="k110b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; deaf. And since [the man spoken of] is one who was originally deaf, the woman [spoken of in the same context must] also be one who was originally deaf; and, as the sisters were such as were originally deaf, the strangers also [must be such as were] originally deaf; but in the case of the strangers we learned that [the levir] may only marry<a id="k110b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; but may not submit to <i>halizah</i>!<a id="k110b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; The other<a id="k110b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; remained silent.
</p><p>
	When he<a id="k110b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; visited R. Joseph, the latter said to him: Why did you raise your objections against him<a id="k110b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; from [teachings] which he could parry by replying that the sisters [spoken of are such as were] originally deaf, and that the strangers [are such as were originally] of sound senses who became deaf afterwards? You should rather have raised your objection against him from the following: If two deaf brothers were married to two sisters who were of sound senses, or to two deaf sisters or to two sisters one of whom was of sound senses and the other deaf; and so also if two deaf sisters were married to two brothers who were of sound senses, or to two deaf brothers, or to two brothers one of whom was of sound senses and the other deaf, behold these women<a id="k110b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; are exempt from levirate marriage and from <i>halizah</i>.<a id="k110b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; If [however the women] were strangers<a id="k110b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; [the respective levirs] must marry them,<a id="k110b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; and if they wish to divorce them, they may do so.<a id="k110b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; Now, how [is this ruling]<a id="k110b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; to be understood? If it be suggested [that it refers to brothers who were first]<a id="k110b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; of sound senses and who became deaf afterwards,<a id="k110b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; could they [it may be asked] divorce [their wives]? Surely, we learned: If he<a id="k110b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; became deaf or insane he may never divorce her!<a id="k110b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; This ruling must consequently refer<a id="k110b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; to [brothers who were] originally<a id="k110b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; deaf; and since they [are such as were] originally deaf, the women [referred to must] also be [such as were] originally<a id="k110b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; deaf; and it was nevertheless taught: 'If [the women, however], Were strangers [the respective levirs] must marry them',<a id="k110b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; they may thus only<a id="k110b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; marry them but may not submit to their <i>halizah</i>. This, then, presents a refutation of Rabbah!<a id="k110b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; This is indeed a refutation.
</p><p>
	A MINOR AND A DEAF WOMAN etc. R. Nahman related: I once found R. Adda b. Ahabah and his son-in-law R. Hana sitting in the market place of Pumbeditha and bandying arguments<a id="k110b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; and [in the course of these they] stated: The ruling,<a id="k110b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; [IF A MAN WAS MARRIED TO] A MINOR AND TO A DEAF WOMAN, COHABITATION WITH ONE OF THEM DOES NOT EXEMPT HER RIVAL applies only to a case<a id="k110b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; where [the widows] became subject to him<a id="k110b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; through a brother of his who was of sound senses, since it is not known to us whether he<a id="k110b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; was more pleased with the minor or whether he was more pleased with the deaf woman; 'whether he was more pleased with the minor' because she would [in due course] reach the age of intelligence or 'whether he was more pleased with the deaf woman' because she was fully grown and in a marriageable condition; if [the widows], however, became subject to him<a id="k110b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; through a deaf brother of his, there is no doubt that he<a id="k110b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; was more pleased with the deaf woman, because she was of matrimonial age and of his kind. But I told them: Even if [the widows] became subject to him<a id="k110b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; through a deaf brother of his [the question of his preference still remains] a matter of doubt.
</p><p>
	How do they<a id="k110b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; obtain redress?<a id="k110b_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; R. Hisda replied in the name of Rab: [The levir] marries the deaf widow and then releases her by a letter of divorce,<a id="k110b_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; while the minor waits until she is of age, when she performs <i>halizah</i>.<a id="k110b_49"><sup>49</sup></a>
</p><p>
	From this, said R. Hisda, it may be inferred that Rab is of the opinion that a deaf wife is partially acquired,<a id="k110b_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; [while concerning] a minor [it is a matter of doubt whether] she is [properly] acquired,<a id="k110b_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; or not acquired [at all];<a id="k110b_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; for were it to be suggested that concerning a deaf wife [it is uncertain whether] she is acquired<a id="k110b_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; or not acquired [at all and that] a minor is partially acquired,<a id="k110b_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; [the question would arise] why [should the levir] marry [the deaf widow] and release her by a letter of divorce?
</P>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k111a_1:" Once the levir married her."
,k111a_2:" As the legal wife of her husband."
,k111a_3:" And having been the proper wife of the deceased, her marriage with the levir severs the levirate bond with the minor, the subsequent <i>halizah</i> with whom is null and void and in no way affects the validity of her marriage."
,k111a_4:" As the legal wife of her husband."
,k111a_5:" To the minor, <i>halizah</i> with whom does not concern her at all. Consequently it must be inferred that it is the deaf wife who is partially acquired, and that the doubt as to complete acquisition or none exists in the case of the minor."
,k111a_6:" Once the levir married her."
,k111a_7:" Given in the case of the deaf woman."
,k111a_8:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 1 mutatis mutandis."
,k111a_9:" To the deaf woman, marriage with whom does not consequently affect the validity of her marriage."
,k111a_10:" Of <i>halizah</i> she is incapable, owing to her inability to recite the prescribed formulae; and marriage with her after a marriage had been contracted with the minor is forbidden. Hence the necessity for Rab's ruling which provides redress for the minor as well as the deaf widow."
,k111a_11:" That a deaf wife is partially acquired and the legality of the acquisition of a minor is altogether doubtful."
,k111a_12:" Orphan is mentioned on account of the minor."
,k111a_13:" She is forbidden to live with her husband as the sister of the minor who is now his zekukah (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>), since she, as a deaf woman, is only partially acquired as wife, while the minor's acquisition by her husband (and consequently her levirate bond with the levir) might possibly have been completely valid."
,k111a_14:" And is then free to marry any other man."
,k111a_15:" As it is possible that the minor is not acquired at all as a wife, while the levirate bond with the deaf widow is at all events partially valid, the former is forbidden to her husband as the sister of his zekukah. (V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a> and cf. <i>supra</i> n. 11)."
,k111a_16:" She is forbidden to the levir as the sister of his divorcee (it being possible that the minor was completely acquired as his wife), and she is forbidden to any other man since, owing to her inability to recite the required formulae, the levir cannot release her by <i>halizah</i>. Even when the minor dies, and the prohibition of 'divorcee's sister' is lifted, she remains forbidden to the levir as 'brother's wife'. Since at the time she became subject to the levir as his deceased brother's wife she was for some reason unfit to contract the levirate marriage, the prohibition of 'brother's wife' comes again into force."
,k111a_17:" After he had divorced the minor."
,k111a_18:" Though the cohabitation was forbidden."
,k111a_19:" Because (a) if the minor was to be regarded as his legal wife, the deaf woman was all the time permitted to marry a stranger since, as his wife's sister, she was never subject to the levirate obligations; and if (b) the minor was not to be regarded as his legal wife, his marriage with the deaf widow, who accordingly was not his wife's sister, was a valid levirate marriage which was duly and lawfully annulled by the letter of divorce which set her free."
,k111a_20:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 773, n. 7."
,k111a_21:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 773, n. 8."
,k111a_22:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 3 (a)."
,k111a_23:" The deaf widow."
,k111a_24:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 3 (b)."
,k111a_25:" Since the minor is at least partially his wife and the deaf widow is forbidden to him as his wife's sister."
,k111a_26:" From the levirate obligations. Since it is possible that the deaf woman was completely acquired as wife by the deceased brother, the levirate bond between her and the levir is also fully valid, and as the partial acquisition of the minor by her husband (the levir) cannot annul such a possibly fully valid bond, the deaf widow is precluded from marrying either the levir whose partial wife's sister she is (cf. <i>supra</i> n. 9) or from marrying any other man to whom she can be permitted only through <i>halizah</i> with the levir, which she, as a deaf person, is incapable of performing. Had she been permitted to marry the levir, his cohabitation with her would have released her from any further levirate obligation, while his divorce would have set her free to marry any other man. Since, however, cohabitation with the levir is unlawful, she cannot thereby be released from her levirate obligation and should consequently remain forbidden to all men forever!"
,k111a_27:" Lit., 'this, who?'"
,k111a_28:" V. <i>supra</i> 50b. Hence the permissibility for the deaf widow to marry again after she had been divorced."
,k111a_29:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 774 n. 10."
,k111a_30:" After the former had cohabited with the minor."
,k111a_31:" The reason is given <i>infra</i>."
,k111a_32:" And she is free at all events: If the minor was a lawfully acquired wife the deaf widow is exempt from the levirate marriage by the former's levirate marriage; and if the minor was not a lawfully acquired wife, the deaf widow had performed the levirate obligation by her own cohabitation with the levir through whose divorce she is now free to marry again."
,k111a_33:" In respect of the two sisters spoken of in the first clause cited."
,k111a_34:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 775, n. 3."
,k111a_35:" Who maintain that an unlawful cohabitation does not exempt a deceased brother's widow from the levirate marriage and <i>halizah</i>."
,k111a_36:" In the final clause, relating to a marriage with orphans who were strangers to each other."
,k111a_37:" Though marriage with her by the levir should in any case be permitted. For if she was fully acquired by her husband the subsequent cohabitation by the levir with the deaf widow who was only partially acquired can have no validity to cause the minor's prohibition to him; and if she was not acquired at all she, as a stranger, should also be permitted to the levir; and in either case her divorce should set her free without the performance of <i>halizah</i>."
,k111a_38:" If <i>halizah</i> were not imposed upon the minor when she attains her majority."
,k111a_39:" And the minor, since it is possible that she was fully acquired, would not be exempt by the levir's cohabitation with the deaf widow who was only partially acquired."
,k111a_40:" Since it followed that of the deaf widow who, having been at least partially acquired, is the minor's rival, and two rivals may not be married. As in such a case the minor could not be free before she became of age and performed <i>halizah</i>, a similar restriction has been imposed in the former case also."
,k111a_41:" That the minor is partially acquired and that concerning the deaf woman the validity of her acquisition as a wife is in doubt."
,k111a_42:" Why then should the minor have to wait until she is of age? If the deaf woman is not acquired at all the minor's cohabitation with the levir is, surely, permitted. But even if the deaf woman is acquired, and her levirate bond causes the minor to be forbidden to the levir, there should be no need for the minor to wait until she is of age and able to perform the <i>halizah</i>, while according to R. Nehemiah, an unlawful cohabitation also exempts a woman from the levirate marriage and <i>halizah</i>!"
,k111a_43:" Which deals with the marriage of two sisters."
,k111a_44:" When the husband of the deaf sister died."
,k111a_45:" In the case where the husband of the minor died."
,k111a_46:" Which would be the law according to R. Nehemiah, who ruled that an unlawful cohabitation exempts the woman from the levirate obligations. The statement, consequently, must represent the view of the Rabbis, and the reason why the minor cannot be released by a letter of divorce is because cohabitation with her is unlawful since she is the sister of the levir's partially acquired wife; while she herself, in case she was fully acquired, is subject to the levirate bond, from which the marriage with her deaf sister, whose <i>kinyan</i> was only partial, cannot exempt her."
,k111a_47:" As she is forbidden to all men including the levir, as shewn <i>supra</i>."
,k111a_48:" It being the only possible means whereby she could marry again."
,k111a_49:" She has only to wait until she is of age, when she can lawfully perform <i>halizah</i> and thereby obtain her freedom."
,k111a_50:" Lit., 'the first'."
,k111a_51:" Lit., 'the second'. >"
}

txt:
<p>
Let her<a id="k111a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; continue to live with him in any case. For if [a deaf woman] is acquired<a id="k111a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; then she is of course acquired,<a id="k111a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; and if she is not acquired,<a id="k111a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; then she is a mere stranger.<a id="k111a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; And should you argue, 'why should the minor wait until she grows up and then performs <i>halizah</i>? Let her<a id="k111a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; continue to live with him [for the same reason<a id="k111a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; that] if she is [properly] acquired<a id="k111a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; then she is of course acquired,<a id="k111a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; and if she is not acquired,<a id="k111a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; then she is a mere stranger';<a id="k111a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; if so [it could be retorted] whereby should the deaf [widow] be released!<a id="k111a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Shesheth said: Logical deduction leads also to the interpretation R. Hisda imparted to Rab's ruling.<a id="k111a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; For it was taught: If two brothers were married to two orphan sisters,<a id="k111a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; a minor and a deaf woman, and the husband of the minor died, the deaf widow is released by means of a letter of divorce<a id="k111a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; while the minor waits until she is of age, when she performs <i>halizah</i>.<a id="k111a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; If the husband of the deaf woman dies, the minor is released by a letter of divorce<a id="k111a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; while the deaf widow is forever forbidden [to marry again].<a id="k111a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; If, however, he cohabited with the deaf widow<a id="k111a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; he must give her a letter of divorce and she<a id="k111a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; becomes permitted [to marry any other man].<a id="k111a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; Now, if you grant that a deaf wife is partially acquired<a id="k111a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; [and that concerning] a minor [it is doubtful whether] she is [fully] acquired<a id="k111a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; or not acquired [at all], one can well see the reason why when he cohabited with the deaf widow he gives her a letter of divorce and she becomes permitted [to marry any other man]. For you may rightly claim that in any case [she becomes permitted]. If the minor is acquired,<a id="k111a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; [the deaf widow] is rightly released as his wife's sister;<a id="k111a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; and if she is not acquired [at all] he has quite lawfully contracted with her<a id="k111a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; the levirate marriage.<a id="k111a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; If you contend, however, [that concerning] a deaf woman [it is doubtful whether] she is acquired<a id="k111a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; or not acquired [at all], and that a minor is partially acquired,<a id="k111a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; [the difficulty arises] why should the deaf widow, if he cohabited with her and gave her a letter of divorce, be permitted [to marry again] when the cohabitation with her was unlawful,<a id="k111a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; and an unlawful cohabitation does not release a woman?<a id="k111a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; It is possible that this statement represents the view of<a id="k111a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Nehemiah who ruled that an unlawful cohabitation exempts [a widow] from <i>halizah</i>.<a id="k111a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>
</p><p>
	If [this statement represents the view of] R. Nehemiah read the final clause: 'If a man was married to two orphans,<a id="k111a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; one of whom was a minor and the other deaf, and died 'and the levir cohabited with the minor and then cohabited with the deaf widow, or a brother of his cohabited with the deaf widow,<a id="k111a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; both are forbidden to him.<a id="k111a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; How do they obtain redress? The deaf woman is released by a letter of divorce<a id="k111a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; while the minor waits until she is of age 'when she performs halizah'.<a id="k111a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; Now, if you grant<a id="k111a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; that a deaf wife is partially acquired [and that concerning] a minor [it is doubtful whether she is fully] acquired or not acquired [at all],<a id="k111a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; and [that the opinion in this statement] is that of the Rabbis,<a id="k111a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; one can well understand the reason why<a id="k111a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; 'the minor<a id="k111a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; waits until she is of age, when she performs halizah', since [otherwise]<a id="k111a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; he might cohabit with the deaf widow first,<a id="k111a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; and the [subsequent] cohabitation with the minor would [thereby] be rendered an unlawful cohabitation.<a id="k111a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; If you contend, however, [that the opinion in the statement is that of] R. Nehemiah,<a id="k111a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; surely he [it may be objected] ruled that an unlawful cohabitation does exempt!<a id="k111a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; Consequently it must be concluded [that the opinion in the statement is that of] the Rabbis. Our point is thus proved.
</p><p>
	R. Ashi said: From the first clause<a id="k111a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; also it may be inferred that [the opinion expressed] is that of the Rabbis. For it was stated, 'If,<a id="k111a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; however, he cohabited with the deaf widow he must give her a letter of divorce and she becomes permitted [to marry any other man]', but it was not stated,<a id="k111a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; 'If he cohabited with the minor, he must give her a letter of divorce and she becomes permitted'!<a id="k111a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; If this is all, there is not much force in the argument; since in respect of the deaf widow for whom no lawful redress is possible<a id="k111a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; mention had to be made of redress obtained through a forbidden act,<a id="k111a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; but concerning a minor, for whom lawful redress is possible,<a id="k111a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; no redress obtainable through a forbidden act was mentioned.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. IF A MAN WHO WAS MARRIED TO TWO ORPHANS WHO WERE MINORS DIED, AND THE LEVIR COHABITED WITH ONE,<a id="k111a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; AND THEN HE ALSO COHABITED WITH THE OTHER,<a id="k111a_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; OR A BROTHER OF HIS COHABITED WITH THE OTHER,<a id="k111a_51"><sup>51</sup></a>
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k111b_1:" As the <i>kinyan</i> of both is of equal validity or invalidity, if the levir's <i>kinyan</i> of the first was valid, that of the other, coming as it does after it, is ineffective, while if his <i>kinyan</i> of the first was invalid, that of the other was equally invalid and both have the same status as strangers whom he never married. He may, therefore, retain the first who is in any case permitted to him, while the second must be released, since it is possible that the <i>kinyan</i> of a minor is valid and both were, therefore, the lawful wives of the deceased brother, who, as rivals, cannot both be married by the levir."
,k111b_2:" This is a preventive measure against the possibility of marrying the deaf woman first. Cf. Gemara <i>supra</i> 111a &mdash; Rashi. Cf. <i>infra</i> p. 779, n. 1. [Mishnayoth edd.: 'he does not render the minor ineligible', the reason being if the minor is fully acquired, the act of cohabitation with the deaf-mute that followed has no validity. Should, on the other hand, the <i>kinyan</i> in regard to a minor be of no effect whatsoever, then she could not be considered the wife of the deceased brother, v. Bertinoro a.l.]."
,k111b_3:" Since it is possible that the minor is fully acquired, while in the case of the other it is certain that, as a deaf person, she is only partially acquired."
,k111b_4:" Thus annulling her marriage and enabling the levir to retain the elder woman."
,k111b_5:" With reference to Mishnah 109a which deals with the levirate marriage of two sisters, cf. however <i>supra</i> p. 760, n. 5."
,k111b_6:" R. Eleazar b. Pedath, one of the Amoraim."
,k111b_7:" R. Eleazar b. Shammua', the Tanna in our Mishnah."
,k111b_8:" That (a) the <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with R. Eleazar in our Mishnah and that (b) it is also in agreement with R. Eliezer's view in the Mishnah <i>supra</i> 109a, as stated in the Gemara <i>supra</i> 110a."
,k111b_9:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 779, n. 3."
,k111b_10:" There only it is permissible to teach the minor to exercise her right of <i>mi'un</i>, in order that the levir may be enabled to perform the commandment with the elder."
,k111b_11:" Our Mishnah."
,k111b_12:" The levir having cohabited with both widows."
,k111b_13:" And that the minor is not to be taught to exercise her right of <i>mi'un</i>."
,k111b_14:" That the <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with R. Eleazar."
,k111b_15:" V. <i>supra</i> note 2."
,k111b_16:" Cf. <i>supra</i> note 5."
,k111b_17:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 779, n. 3, where, should the minor fail to exercise her right of <i>mi'un</i>, the elder widow would, as his wife's sister, be altogether exempt from the levirate marriage."
,k111b_18:" Lit., 'this with this'. As the divorce of a minor is invalid, they cannot be separated by a letter of divorce, should they desire to do so, before both have attained their majority."
,k111b_19:" During his minority he cannot divorce her (cf. <i>supra</i> note 10)."
,k111b_20:" And he denies her statement."
,k111b_21:" It being assumed that a period of thirty days sometimes elapses before a marriage is consummated, her word is accepted; v. Gemara."
,k111b_22:" He cannot be compelled, because it is assumed that no one postpones consummation of marriage for a longer period than thirty days. His word is, therefore, accepted. As the woman, however, by her statement, declared herself to be still bound to him by the levirate bond it is necessary that she should perform <i>halizah</i>, to submit to which, however, the levir can only be asked, not compelled."
,k111b_23:" When she is not likely to have had in her mind the possibility of ever marrying the levir. The vow is, therefore, presumed to have been due to some quarrel or misunderstanding between her and the levir and to be in no way due to a desire on her part to evade the precept of the levirate marriage."
,k111b_24:" When her intention may have been to avoid marrying the levir."
,k111b_25:" But may not be compelled."
,k111b_26:" Avoidance of the levirate marriage."
,k111b_27:" And if he refuses, the widow, who is alone to blame for the fact that the levirate marriage cannot be contracted with her, is forbidden to marry again; nor is she entitled to her <i>kethubah</i>."
,k111b_28:" Which allows levirate marriage to a minor."
,k111b_29:" Since it is possible that on attaining majority they may be found wanting in procreative powers, in consequence of which they will be unfit for the performance of the levirate obligations. As the Pentateuchal law is thus incapable of fulfilment, the sister-in-law remains forbidden to the levir as his brother's wife'."
,k111b_30:" <i>Supra</i> 61b. (Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 6)."
,k111b_31:" I.e., the party that is of age."
,k111b_32:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 781, n. 7."
,k111b_33:" Both are not subject to punishment, even if their cohabitation is found to be a forbidden act and consequently may be allowed in a doubtful case such as this; cf. <i>infra</i> 114a."
,k111b_34:" Which is not a case concerning two minors."
,k111b_35:" Though the levirate marriage of a minor with one who is of age is forbidden, it is nevertheless valid ex post facto."
,k111b_36:" Implying permissibility to continue to live with him."
,k111b_37:" Which proves that our Mishnah permits directly, not only ex post facto, the levirate marriage of a minor."
,k111b_38:" Deut. XXV, 7."
,k111b_39:" As he is incapable of procreation."
,k111b_40:" To raise up unto his brother a name. Why then is he allowed, the levirate marriage?"
,k111b_41:" Deut. XXV. 5."
,k111b_42:" Even one who is incapable of fulfilling the commandment in its entirety."
,k111b_43:" Others, 'Rabbah' (cf. Tosaf. <i>supra</i> 2a s.v. [H])."
,k111b_44:" Lit., 'now', while one of the parties is a minor."
,k111b_45:" When majority is attained."
,k111b_46:" <i>Supra</i> 30a; for all time, even when the cause of her prohibition had ceased to exist. Were not the minor then permitted the levirate marriage, this prohibition would not have been removed even after he had attained majority."
,k111b_47:" I.e., that a levir who was a minor at the time his brother died may never contract levirate marriage."
,k111b_48:" Deut. XXV, 5."
,k111b_49:" Must the levirate marriage he contracted, cf. ibid."
,k111b_50:" After his marriage."
,k111b_51:" From cohabitation. This being evidently the reason why in our Mishnah the woman's statement is accepted as true."
,k111b_52:" A husband's assertion that he found no tokens of virginity (cf. Deut. XXII, 13ff), and that, consequently, his wife is not entitled to her <i>kethubah</i>."
,k111b_53:" Lit., 'all'."
,k111b_54:" After marriage; and the husband is believed when he states that he had only just then discovered her defect. If his complaint is made after thirty days, he cannot deprive his wife of her <i>kethubah</i>, it being assumed that her defect, if any, had been discovered by him long ago and that he had acquiesced. His present complaint is regarded as a mere pretext to penalize the woman because of some new quarrel that may have arisen between them."
,k111b_55:" V. Tosef. Keth. I."
,k111b_56:" The statement in our Mishnah, which implies that for thirty days after marriage a man may restrain himself. (Cf. <i>supra</i> note 5)."
,k111b_57:" Not only that of R. Meir."
,k111b_58:" And since he met her in privacy consummation of marriage might well be assumed. "
}

txt:
<p>
HE HAS NOT THEREBY RENDERED THE FIRST INELIGIBLE [FOR HIM];<a id="k111b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; AND THE SAME LAW IS APPLICABLE TO TWO DEAF WOMEN.
</p><p>
	[IF ONE WAS] A MINOR AND THE OTHER DEAF, AND THE LEVIR COHABITED WITH THE MINOR AND THEN HE ALSO COHABITED WITH THE DEAF WIDOW, OR A BROTHER OF HIS COHABITED WITH THE DEAF WIDOW, HE HAS RENDERED THE MINOR INELIGIBLE [FOR HIM].<a id="k111b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; IF THE LEVIR COHABITED WITH THE DEAF WIDOW AND THEN HE ALSO COHABITED WITH THE MINOR, OR A BROTHER OF HIS COHABITED WITH THE MINOR, HE HAS RENDERED THE DEAF WIDOW INELIGIBLE [FOR HIM].<a id="k111b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>
</p><p>
	[IF ONE WAS] OF SOUND SENSES AND THE OTHER DEAF, AND THE LEVIR COHABITED WITH THE FORMER AND THEN HE ALSO COHABITED WITH THE LATTER, OR A BROTHER OF HIS COHABITED WITH THE LATTER, HE DOES NOT RENDER THE FORMER INELIGIBLE [FOR HIM]. IF THE LEVIR COHABITED WITH THE LATTER, AND THEN HE ALSO COHABITED WITH THE FORMER, OR A BROTHER OF HIS COHABITED WITH THE FORMER, HE RENDERS THE LATTER INELIGIBLE [FOR HIM].
</p><p>
	[IF ONE WAS] OF AGE AND THE OTHER A MINOR, AND THE LEVIR COHABITED WITH [THE WIDOW] WHO WAS OF AGE, AND THEN HE ALSO COHABITED WITH THE MINOR, OR A BROTHER OF HIS COHABITED WITH THE MINOR, HE DOES NOT RENDER THE ELDER INELIGIBLE FOR HIM. IF THE LEVIR COHABITED WITH THE MINOR, AND THEN HE ALSO COHABITED WITH [THE WIDOW WHO WAS] OF AGE, OR A BROTHER OF HIS COHABITED WITH [THE WIDOW WHO WAS] OF AGE, HE RENDERS THE MINOR INELIGIBLE [FOR HIM].
</p><p>
	R. ELEAZAR RULED: THE MINOR IS TO BE INSTRUCTED TO EXERCISE HER RIGHT OF <I>MI'UN</I> AGAINST HIM.<a id="k111b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. Rab Judah stated in the name of Samuel: The <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with R. Eliezer.<a id="k111b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; So also did R. Eleazar<a id="k111b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; state: The <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with R. Eleazar.<a id="k111b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; And [both statements<a id="k111b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; were] required. For if the statement had been made on the first [Mishnah] only<a id="k111b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; [it might have been assumed that] in that case alone did Samuel hold that the <i>halachah</i> is in agreement With R. Eliezer,<a id="k111b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; since [the levir there] had not fulfilled the commandment of the levirate marriage,<a id="k111b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; but in this case<a id="k111b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; where<a id="k111b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; the commandment of the levirate marriage has been fulfilled, it might have been assumed that both must be released by a letter of divorce.<a id="k111b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; And if the information<a id="k111b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; had been given on the latter<a id="k111b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; only, [it might have been suggested that] only in this case [is the <i>halachah</i> in agreement with him], because the elder is subject to levirate marriage<a id="k111b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; with him, but not<a id="k111b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; in the other case.<a id="k111b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; [Hence both statements were] required.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. IF A LEVIR WHO WAS A MINOR COHABITED WITH A SISTER-IN-LAW WHO WAS A MINOR, THEY SHOULD BE BROUGHT UP TOGETHER.<a id="k111b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; IF HE COHABITED WITH A SISTER-IN-LAW WHO WAS OF AGE, SHE SHOULD BRING HIM UP UNTIL HE IS OF AGE.<a id="k111b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>
</p><p>
	IF A SISTER-IN-LAW DECLARED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS [AFTER HER LEVIRATE MARRIAGE], 'HE HAS NOT COHABITED WITH ME',<a id="k111b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; [THE LEVIR] IS COMPELLED TO SUBMIT TO HER HALIZAH,<a id="k111b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; BUT [IF HER DECLARATION WAS MADE] AFTER THIRTY DAYS, HE IS ONLY REQUESTED TO SUBMIT TO HER HALIZAH.<a id="k111b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; WHEN, HOWEVER, HE ADMITS [HER ASSERTION], HE IS COMPELLED, EVEN AFTER TWELVE MONTHS, TO SUBMIT TO HER HALIZAH.
</p><p>
	IF A WOMAN VOWED TO HAVE NO BENEFIT FROM HER BROTHER-IN-LAW, THE LATTER IS COMPELLED TO SUBMIT TO HER HALIZAH, [IF HER VOW WAS MADE] DURING THE LIFETIME OF HER HUSBAND,<a id="k111b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; BUT IF AFTER THE DEATH OF HER HUSBAND,<a id="k111b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; THE LEVIR MAY ONLY BE REQUESTED<a id="k111b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; TO SUBMIT TO HER HALIZAH. IF THIS,<a id="k111b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; HOWEVER, WAS IN HER MIND [EVEN IF HER VOW WAS MADE] DURING THE LIFETIME OF HER HUSBAND, THE LEVIR MAY ONLY BE REQUESTED TO SUBMIT TO HER HALIZAH.<a id="k111b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. Must it be assumed that our Mishnah<a id="k111b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; is not in agreement with R. Meir? For it was taught: A boy minor and a girl minor may neither perform <i>halizah</i> nor contract levirate marriage;<a id="k111b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; so R. Meir!<a id="k111b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; It may even be said to agree with R. Meir, for R. Meir spoke only [of the levirate marriage of a sister-in-law] who was of age to a minor, and [of one who was] a minor to [a levir that was] of age, since one of these<a id="k111b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; [may possibly be performing] forbidden cohabitation.<a id="k111b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; He did not speak, however, of a boy minor who cohabited with a girl minor, in which case both are in the same position.<a id="k111b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; But, surely, it was stated, IF HE COHABITED WITH A SISTER-IN-LAW WHO WAS OF AGE SHE SHOULD BRING HIM UP UNTIL HE IS OF AGE!<a id="k111b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; R. Hanina of Hozaah replied: If he had already cohabited [the law] is different.<a id="k111b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; But was it not stated: SHE SHOULD BRING HIM UP UNTIL HE IS OF AGE,<a id="k111b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; though each act of cohabitation is a forbidden one!<a id="k111b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; The truth is clearly that our Mishnah cannot be in agreement with R. Meir.
</p><p>
	Should not the text, To raise up unto his brother a name,<a id="k111b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; be applied here? And this minor,<a id="k111b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; Surely, is not capable of it!<a id="k111b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Abaye replied: Scripture said, Her husband's brother shall go in unto her,<a id="k111b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; whoever he may be.<a id="k111b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; Raba<a id="k111b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; replied: Without this [text] also you could not say [that a minor may not contract levirate marriage]. For is there any act [in connection with the levirate marriage] which is at one time<a id="k111b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; forbidden and after a time<a id="k111b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; permitted? Surely, Rab Judah stated in the name of Rab: Any sister-in-law to whom the instruction, Her husband's brother shall go in unto her,<a id="k111b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; cannot be applied at the time when she becomes subject to the levirate marriage, is indeed like the wife of a brother who has children, and is consequently forbidden!<a id="k111b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; But then might it not be suggested that this same [principle is applicable here] also?<a id="k111b_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Scripture said, If brethren dwell together,<a id="k111b_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; even if [one brother is only] one day old.<a id="k111b_49"><sup>49</sup></a>
</p><p>
	IF A SISTER-IN-LAW DECLARED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS etc. Who is it that taught that up to thirty days<a id="k111b_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; a man may restrain himself?<a id="k111b_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp;&mdash; R. Johanan replied: It is R. Meir; for it was taught: A complaint in respect of virginity<a id="k111b_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; [may be brought] during the first<a id="k111b_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; thirty days;<a id="k111b_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; so R. Meir. R. Jose said: If [the woman] was shut up [with him, the complaint must be made] forthwith; if she was not shut up [with him], it may be made even after many years.<a id="k111b_55"><sup>55</sup></a>&nbsp; Rabbah stated: It<a id="k111b_56"><sup>56</sup></a>&nbsp; may even be said [to represent the opinion of] R. Jose,<a id="k111b_57"><sup>57</sup></a>&nbsp; for R. Jose spoke there<a id="k111b_55"><sup>55</sup></a>&nbsp; only of one's betrothed with whom one is familiar,<a id="k111b_58"><sup>58</sup></a>&nbsp; but [not of] the wife of one's brother
</P>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k119a_1:" Since her husband, when he departed, was known to have had no issue."
,k119a_2:" It being possible that her rival had a child from their husband."
,k119a_3:" If the rival is found to be pregnant the woman is free to marry again; and if she is not pregnant, levirate marriage or <i>halizah</i> must be performed."
,k119a_4:" Overseas."
,k119a_5:" Who, at the time of her departure, had no other son but the one who is now dead."
,k119a_6:" To her mother-in-law. It is only in respect of a rival that the possibility of a birth must be taken notice of, since a child, whatever its sex, exempts the woman from the levirate obligations. In the case of a mother-in-law, however, the birth of a female would not affect the woman's freedom to marry again, since it is only a male that subjects her to the levirate obligations. There is no need to apprehend that the mother-in-law had not only (a) given birth to a child but also (b) that that child was not a female but a male."
,k119a_7:" Since the only doubt is whether the child was a male. Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 6."
,k119a_8:" Because here also two possibilities must be postulated: (a) that the mother-in-law did not miscarry and (b) that the child born was not a female but a male."
,k119a_9:" Lit., 'she' or 'it'."
,k119a_10:" Emphasis on HER."
,k119a_11:" Who went with her husband to a country beyond the sea."
,k119a_12:" If witnesses testified that the known rival (v. <i>supra</i> n. 11) was not pregnant there is no need to apprehend the possibility of a marriage with another wife who may have given birth to a child."
,k119a_13:" Lit., 'meet'."
,k119a_14:" Lit., 'go'."
,k119a_15:" Since the majority principle is not followed."
,k119a_16:" Hul. 6a; and since some women do not conceive and bear, the possibility that the rival belonged to this minority must be provided against by forbidding levirate marriage. Would then our anonymous Mishnah represent the view of an individual!"
,k119a_17:" Lit., 'when do they go'."
,k119a_18:" Lit., 'which is before us'."
,k119a_19:" Which were selling permitted meat, while one shop in their vicinity was selling forbidden meat. If between these shops a piece of meat was found and it is not known from which shop it came, it is assumed to be permitted meat, since the majority of the shops were selling meat of such a character. V. Hul. 95a."
,k119a_20:" A majority of whom (twelve against eleven) are in favour of a certain decision. V. Sanh. 40a."
,k119a_21:" The majority of women in general who are assumed to conceive and bear."
,k119a_22:" Dealing with <i>halizah</i>."
,k119a_23:" V. Deut. XXV, 7."
,k119a_24:" As the male must be of mature age and not a minor, so must also be the female."
,k119a_25:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k119a_26:" Pl. of saris, v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k119a_27:" Bek. 19b. Cf. <i>supra</i> 61b, 105b. The majority spoken of here is, surely, one which is not actually present, and the Rabbis are nevertheless guided by it!"
,k119a_28:" Lit., 'in what did you place it', sc. the first clause of our Mishnah."
,k119a_29:" Lit., 'like'."
,k119a_30:" According to R. Meir."
,k119a_31:" And, contrary to the ruling in our Mishnah, the woman should, as in the first clause, be forbidden marriage."
,k119a_32:" When her mother-in-law departed."
,k119a_33:" Lit., 'to the market'; because there was no known levir."
,k119a_34:" R. Meir."
,k119a_35:" If a woman's confirmed status at a certain period is a determining factor."
,k119a_36:" Since her husband when he departed, had no issue."
,k119a_37:" By the rival."
,k119a_38:" The marriage of a yebamah to a stranger."
,k119a_39:" That a son was born by the mother-in-law."
,k119a_40:" Neither is a mere Rabbinically preventive measure. "
}

txt:
<p>
      <H2 ALIGN="Center">
	<A NAME="chapter_xvi">CHAPTER XVI</A>
      </H2>

</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. A WOMAN WHOSE HUSBAND AND RIVAL WENT TO A COUNTRY BEYOND THE SEA, AND TO WHOM PEOPLE CAME AND SAID, 'YOUR HUSBAND IS DEAD', MUST NEITHER MARRY AGAIN<a id="k119a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; NOR CONTRACT LEVIRATE MARRIAGE<a id="k119a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; UNTIL SHE HAS ASCERTAINED WHETHER HER RIVAL IS PREGNANT.<a id="k119a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; IF SHE HAD<a id="k119a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; A MOTHER-IN-LAW<a id="k119a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; SHE NEED NOT APPREHEND [THE POSSIBILITY OF THE BIRTH OF ANOTHER SON];<a id="k119a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; BUT IF SHE DEPARTED WHILE PREGNANT [SUCH POSSIBILITY] MUST BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION.<a id="k119a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; R. JOSHUA RULED; SHE NEED NOT APPREHEND [SUCH A POSSIBILITY].<a id="k119a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. What is implied by<a id="k119a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; 'HER RIVAL'?<a id="k119a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; It is this that we are told: {The possibility of a birth in respect] of that rival<a id="k119a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; need be apprehended; in respect of another rival, however, it need not be apprehended.<a id="k119a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>
</p><p>
	MUST NEITHER MARRY AGAIN NOR CONTRACT LEVIRATE MARRIAGE etc. It is quite proper that she shall not contract levirate marriage since it is possible that [her rival] is pregnant and that she would in consequence cause an infringement<a id="k119a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; [of the prohibition against marriage] of a brother's wife, which is Pentateuchal; but why should she not marry [a stranger]? The majority of women should be taken as a criterion<a id="k119a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; and the majority of women conceive and bear children! Must it then<a id="k119a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; be assumed that [the ruling is that of] R. Meir who takes a minority also into consideration?<a id="k119a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; It may even be said [to represent the view of] the Rabbis; for the Rabbis follow<a id="k119a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; the majority principle only where the majority is actually present<a id="k119a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; as, for instance, in the case of 'nine shops'<a id="k119a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; and 'Sanhedrin',<a id="k119a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; but in respect of a majority that is not actually present<a id="k119a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; the Rabbis were not guided by the majority principle.
</p><p>
	Behold the case of a minor boy and a minor girl, where the majority is one that is not actually present and the Rabbis nevertheless follow the majority principle; for it was taught: A minor, whether male or female, may neither perform nor submit to <i>halizah</i>, nor may he contract levirate marriage; so R. Meir. They said to R. Meir: You spoke well [when you ruled] that 'He may neither perform nor submit to halizah', since in the Pentateuchal section<a id="k119a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; man was written,<a id="k119a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; and we draw a comparison between 'woman' and man.<a id="k119a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; What, however, is the reason why he may not contract levirate marriage? He replied: Because a minor male might be found to be a saris;<a id="k119a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; a minor female might be found to be incapable of procreation; and thus the law of incest would be violated. The Rabbis, however, maintain, 'Follow the majority of male minors'; and the majority of male minors are not sarisin;<a id="k119a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Follow the majority of female minors' and the majority of female minors are not incapable of procreation!<a id="k119a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; But, clearly, [it must be admitted], our Mishnah represents the view of R. Meir.
</p><p>
	How have you explained it?<a id="k119a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; That it is in agreement with the view of<a id="k119a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Meir? Read, then, the final clause: IF SHE HAD A MOTHER-IN-LAW SHE NEED NOT APPREHEND [THE POSSIBILITY OF THE BIRTH OF ANOTHER SON]; but why? One should be guided by the majority of women, and the majority of women conceive and bear while a minority miscarry, and, since all those who bear [produce] a half of males and a half of females, the minority of those who miscarry should be added to the half [of those who bear] females, and so the males would constitute a minority which<a id="k119a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; should be taken into consideration!<a id="k119a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; It is possible that since the woman was confirmed<a id="k119a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; in her status of permissibility to strangers<a id="k119a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; [the possibility of the birth of a levir] was not taken by him<a id="k119a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; into consideration. In the first clause, then,<a id="k119a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; where she was confirmed in the status of eligibility for the levirate marriage,<a id="k119a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; let her contract the levirate marriage! &mdash; R. Nahman replied in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha: In the first clause where a prohibition which is subject to the penalty of <i>kareth</i> [is involved, the possibility of the birth of a son]<a id="k119a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; had to be provided against; in the final clause, however, where a prohibitory law [only is involved]<a id="k119a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; no [such possibility]<a id="k119a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; was taken into consideration. Said Raba: Consider: The one [prohibition] is Pentateuchal and the other also is Pentateuchal;<a id="k119a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; what matters it, then, whether the prohibition is one involving <i>kareth</i> or whether it is only a mere prohibitory law? &mdash; Rather, said Raba;
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k119b_1:" It was an established fact that her husband had no issue and that a levir was in existence."
,k119b_2:" Most women bear viable children and her rival's child would exempt her from the levirate obligations."
,k119b_3:" Lit., 'to the market'."
,k119b_4:" Lit., 'and it is a half and a half', 'confirmed status' plus minority pointing to the levirate marriage while the majority principle points to permissibility to marry any stranger."
,k119b_5:" Since neither consideration can be regarded as more weighty than the other."
,k119b_6:" As one who had no brother-in-law."
,k119b_7:" Miscarriages and the births of females constitute a majority against the minority of births of viable males."
,k119b_8:" Only a viable male child exempts a woman from the levirate obligations."
,k119b_9:" I.e., besides the fact that viable males are in a minority (v. <i>supra</i> n. 10) the possibility of the birth of a viable male is still less to be taken note of in view of the confirmed status of the woman (v. <i>supra</i> note 9)."
,k119b_10:" But why! Let her perform <i>halizah</i> and thus at all events procure her freedom. V. <i>infra</i> p. 844, n. 5."
,k119b_11:" As any other woman whose husband died. V. <i>supra</i> 42b."
,k119b_12:" Since should her rival be pregnant, her levirate bond could not be severed by <i>halizah</i> but by the actual birth of a viable child."
,k119b_13:" Whether the rival gave birth to a child or not. V. <i>infra</i> note 5."
,k119b_14:" Her rival who might he pregnant."
,k119b_15:" Until it is definitely ascertained whether her rival had given birth to a viable child."
,k119b_16:" After a period of nine months (v. <i>supra</i> p. 843, n. 15), and so procure her freedom to marry again."
,k119b_17:" Since either she is exempted altogether from the levirate obligations by the birth of her rival's child (if one was horn) or (if no viable child was born) she gains her freedom by the <i>halizah</i>."
,k119b_18:" That no <i>halizah</i> must be performed; v. <i>supra</i> n. 3."
,k119b_19:" Of the rival."
,k119b_20:" In consequence of which the <i>halizah</i> would become null and void as if it had never taken place."
,k119b_21:" Lit., 'it is found'."
,k119b_22:" That the <i>halizah</i> was unnecessary and consequently null and void."
,k119b_23:" I.e., that she is permitted to marry a priest."
,k119b_24:" V. <i>supra</i> note 10."
,k119b_25:" Should she eventually be married to a priest."
,k119b_26:" <i>Supra</i> 118b, q.v. for notes."
,k119b_27:" From a former husband; before she was married to the one now deceased. As a divorcee she remains forbidden to marry a priest even if the <i>halizah</i> is subseqeuntly found to have no validity."
,k119b_28:" She and her husband together with their son."
,k119b_29:" When death occurred. Since no one was present there is no need to provide against the possibility of the appearance of witnesses."
,k119b_30:" The wives of two brothers."
,k119b_31:" Lit., 'this'."
,k119b_32:" To marry a stranger."
,k119b_33:" Who might, in fact, he alive and with whom <i>halizah</i> or levirate marriage must he performed. A woman is eligible to tender evidence on the death of her husband in so far only as to enable herself to marry again. She is ineligible, however, to give evidence enabling her sister-in-law to marry again."
,k119b_34:" To marry again."
,k119b_35:" That her husband was dead."
,k119b_36:" To marry a stranger; since there are no witnesses to testify to the death of the levir. The evidence of his wife alone (cf. <i>supra</i> n. 4) is not sufficient for the purpose."
,k119b_37:" To marry any stranger; since she herself is believed in respect of the death of her husband while in respect of the death of the levir the evidence of the witnesses is available."
,k119b_38:" And neither had witnesses."
,k119b_39:" Who exempt their mother from the levirate bond."
,k119b_40:" And who is consequently subject to the levirate bond of a man whose death is attested only by her sister-in-law whose word cannot he accepted (cf. <i>supra</i> n. 4)."
,k119b_41:" The two sisters-in-law spoken of in the first clause of our Mishnah, neither of whom had children nor was able to produce witnesses to attest her husband's death."
,k119b_42:" With the levirs other than the absent husbands."
,k119b_43:" V. <i>supra</i> note 12."
,k119b_44:" Any stranger. Though the evidence of each woman was valid to enable herself to contract levirate marriage, it is not valid to exempt her sister-in-law- from the levirate bond (cf. <i>supra</i> note 4), and the possibility that their absent levirs (the first husbands) were still alive must he taken into consideration."
,k119b_45:" <i>Var. lec</i>. R Eliezer."
,k119b_46:" On the assumption that their husbands were dead."
,k119b_47:" Of two sisters-inlaw who stated that their husbands were dead."
,k119b_48:" To confirm her statement."
,k119b_49:" The former because of her children who exempt her from the levirate bond; and the latter, because witnesses had testified to the death of her levir while she herself is believed in respect of the death of her husband."
,k119b_50:" Cur. edd. do not indicate by the usual stops that this passage is derived from our Mishnah. Cf. however, Bomb. ed."
,k119b_51:" By a statement whereby she injures her associate."
,k119b_52:" Her evidence here would injure herself as it would her associate. Where, however, her associate alone would be the sufferer a rival's evidence is not accepted. "
}

txt:
<p>
in the first clause the woman's confirmed status<a id="k119b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; [would subject her] to the levirate marriage while the majority principle<a id="k119b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; [would enable her] to marry any stranger;<a id="k119b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; and, though 'confirmed status' is not as important a factor as a majority, the minority of women who miscarry must be added to the 'confirmed status' so that the factors on either side are equally balanced;<a id="k119b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; hence<a id="k119b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; she MUST NEITHER MARRY AGAIN NOR CONTRACT LEVIRATE MARRIAGE. In the final clause, however, the woman's confirmed status<a id="k119b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; as well as the majority principle<a id="k119b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; [points] to [the permissibility of marriage with] any stranger,<a id="k119b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; so that [viable] males<a id="k119b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; constitute a minority of a minority;<a id="k119b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; and a minority of a minority is not taken into consideration even by R. Meir.
</p><p>
	MUST NEITHER MARRY AGAIN NOR CONTRACT LEVIRATE MARRIAGE etc. For ever?<a id="k119b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Ze'iri replied: [She waits] on account of herself three months<a id="k119b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; and on account of her associate nine,<a id="k119b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; and then she may, at all events,<a id="k119b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; perform <i>halizah</i>. R. Hanina said: On account of herself [she must wait] three months, but on account of her associate<a id="k119b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; for ever.<a id="k119b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; But let her perform <i>halizah</i><a id="k119b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; at all events!<a id="k119b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Both Abaye b. Abin and R. Hanina b. Abin replied: This<a id="k119b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; is a preventive measure against the possibility that the child<a id="k119b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; might be viable<a id="k119b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; as a result of which<a id="k119b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; you would have to subject her to the necessity of a public announcement<a id="k119b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; in respect of the priesthood.<a id="k119b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; Well, let her be subjected to the necessity! &mdash; It may happen that someone would be present at the <i>halizah</i> and not at the announcement,<a id="k119b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; and he would form the opinion<a id="k119b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; that a <i>haluzah</i> was permitted to a priest.
</p><p>
	We learned: [If a woman states], 'A son was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea' and she also asserts, 'My son died and afterwards my husband died', she is believed. [If she states, however], 'My husband died and afterwards my son died', she is not believed, but note is taken of her assertion and she must, therefore, perform <i>halizah</i> but may not contract levirate marriage.<a id="k119b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; Let it, however, be apprehended that witnesses might come and confirm her statement and that, as a result, you would subject her to the necessity of an announcement in respect of the priesthood! &mdash; R. Papa replied: [This refers to] a woman divorced.<a id="k119b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Hiyya son of R. Huna replied: [It refers to one] who stated 'I and he<a id="k119b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; were hidden in a cave'.<a id="k119b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. [IN THE CASE OF] TWO SISTERS-IN-LAW<a id="k119b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; ONE OF WHOM<a id="k119b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; STATED, 'MY HUSBAND IS DEAD', AND THE OTHER ALSO STATED, 'MY HUSBAND IS DEAD', THE FORMER<a id="k119b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; IS FORBIDDEN<a id="k119b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; ON ACCOUNT OF THE HUSBAND OF THE LATTER,<a id="k119b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; AND THE LATTER IS FORBIDDEN<a id="k119b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; ON ACCOUNT OF THE HUSBAND OF THE FORMER.<a id="k119b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; IF THE ONE HAD WITNESSES<a id="k119b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; AND THE OTHER HAD NO WITNESSES,<a id="k119b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; SHE WHO HAD THE WITNESSES IS FORBIDDEN,<a id="k119b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; WHILE SHE WHO HAD NO WITNESSES IS PERMITTED.<a id="k119b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; IF THE ONE HAD CHILDREN AND THE OTHER HAD NO CHILDREN,<a id="k119b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; SHE WHO HAD CHILDREN<a id="k119b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; IS PERMITTED<a id="k119b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; AND SHE WHO HAD NO CHILDREN<a id="k119b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; IS FORBIDDEN.<a id="k119b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; IF THEY<a id="k119b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; CONTRACTED LEVIRATE MARRIAGES,<a id="k119b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; AND THE LEVIRS DIED, THEY<a id="k119b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; ARE FORBIDDEN [TO MARRY AGAIN].<a id="k119b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; R. ELEAZAR<a id="k119b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; RULED: SINCE THEY WERE ONCE PERMITTED TO MARRY THE LEVIRS<a id="k119b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; THEY ARE PERMITTED TO MARRY ANY MAN.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. A Tanna taught: If the one<a id="k119b_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; had witnesses<a id="k119b_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; and also children, and the other had neither witnesses nor children, both are permitted [to marry again].<a id="k119b_49"><sup>49</sup></a>
</p><p>
	IF<a id="k119b_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; THEY CONTRACTED LEVIRATE MARRIAGES, AND THE LEVIRS DIED, THEY ARE FORBIDDEN [TO MARRY AGAIN]. R. ELEAZAR RULED: SINCE THEY WERE ONCE PERMITTED TO THE LEVIRS THEY ARE PERMITTED TO MARRY ANY MAN. Raba inquired: What is R. Eleazar's reason? Is it because he is of the opinion that a rival<a id="k119b_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; is eligible to tender evidence in favour of her associate or is it because [he holds that] she would not<a id="k119b_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; cause injury to herself?<a id="k119b_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; What practical difference is there [between the two assumptions]?
</P>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k113a_1:" Because at any time throughout her life she could leave her husband by merely making her declaration of refusal. This does not apply to a minor who loses her right to <i>mi'un</i> as soon as she becomes of age."
,k113a_2:" Even if only her mother or brother gave her in marriage to a priest."
,k113a_3:" Who was not given in marriage by her father. V. <i>infra</i>."
,k113a_4:" While she was in her minority."
,k113a_5:" Even after she became of age, when it is she and not her father that receives it."
,k113a_6:" By her mother or brothers after the death of her father."
,k113a_7:" Cf. <i>supra</i> 902."
,k113a_8:" 'Ed. VII, 9, Git. 53b. Though such marriage is not Pentateuchally valid."
,k113a_9:" Since only the minor, and not the deaf woman of whom the first clause speaks, was mentioned in this, the second clause."
,k113a_10:" The prohibition against the eating of <i>terumah</i> by a deaf woman."
,k113a_11:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a> Neither he nor she is subject to any punishment for the eating of forbidden food, v. <i>infra</i> 114a."
,k113a_12:" The prohibition against the eating of <i>terumah</i> by the deaf woman."
,k113a_13:" Since their marriage is at least Rabbinically valid."
,k113a_14:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 793, n. 5, mutatis mutandis. While deafness, as a rule, is an affliction for life, a minor does not forever remain in her minority."
,k113a_15:" Who is forbidden in Rabbinic, though not in Pentateuchal law. Cf. <i>supra</i> 21a."
,k113a_16:" Keth. 100b, B.M. 67a. The first mentioned, because her separation from her husband is effected even against his will; the second was penalized for contracting an unlawful marriage (cf. <i>supra</i> 85b); while in the case of the last the marriage is regarded as a contract under false pretenses."
,k113a_17:" Since the Mishnah cited speaks only of a minor who has exercised the right of <i>mi'un</i>, and whose separation was, therefore, effected even without the husband's consent."
,k113a_18:" Which is valid only if the husband had consented to the separation."
,k113a_19:" Because, at the time the marriage had been contracted, the men were not in the possession of all their senses or faculties and were, in consequence, incapable of undertaking any monetary obligations."
,k113a_20:" V. BaH. Cur. edd. omit to the end of the clause."
,k113a_21:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a> [Their marriage is deemed to have taken place when the husband recovers his faculties, and at that time they were no longer virgins. Beth Joseph, Eben ha-Ezer LXVII]."
,k113a_22:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k113a_23:" [H], lit., 'to be damaged in his estate'. Bomb. ed. and others (cf. BaH) read [H] 'to be maintained'."
,k113a_24:" Why the deaf woman is entitled to her <i>kethubah</i>."
,k113a_25:" Even according to Rabbinic law."
,k113a_26:" Lit., 'for if so', i.e., if the Rabbis had entitled her to receive a <i>kethubah</i>."
,k113a_27:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 793, n. 5 <i>mutatis mutandis</i>."
,k113a_28:" That eligibility to receive a <i>kethubah</i> is determined by the likelihood of the consent to marry the deaf person."
,k113a_29:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 5, mutatis mutandis."
,k113a_30:" The lack of a <i>kethubah</i> would not prevent a woman from marrying a man even if he was deaf."
,k113a_31:" The deaf man's."
,k113a_32:" R. Malkiu, in allowing the deaf man to accept responsibility for the sum mentioned."
,k113a_33:" The answer is, of course, in the affirmative."
,k113a_34:" Matrimony and service."
,k113a_35:" Though it might be argued that, since the degree of her husband's intelligence or mental capacity cannot be accurately gauged &mdash; the validity of her marriage should be deemed doubtful."
,k113a_36:" Such an offering is due only when the offence is a matter of doubt (cf. <i>infra</i> p. 796. n. 10). In this case, however, as the marriage is valid in Rabbinic law only but remains definitely invalid in Pentateuchal law, no offering could be incurred."
,k113a_37:" Samuel's."
,k113a_38:" Without the authority of its owner."
,k113a_39:" Ter. I, 1 Shab. 153b. From this Mishnah, then, it follows, since the <i>terumah</i> of a deaf man is regarded as definitely invalid, that the incapacity of a deaf man is not a matter of doubt; and this apparently provides support to Samuel's view."
,k113a_40:" Samuel."
,k113a_41:" In regard to <i>terumah</i>."
,k113a_42:" Lit., 'go out'."
,k113a_43:" Shab. 153a. The invalidity of the <i>terumah</i> spoken of in the Mishnah cited may consequently be due to a similar reason. Hence no support for Samuel's view concerning a deaf man's wife may be adduced from it."
,k113a_44:" That the validity of the deaf man's action, and consequently also his capacity, is a matter of doubt."
,k113a_45:" In a case of intercourse with his wife. Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 795, n. 15, mutatis mutandis."
,k113a_46:" If an <i>asham talui</i> is to be incurred."
,k113a_47:" One of which was definitely forbidden and the other definitely permitted, and it is unknown whether a person ate the one or the other. Only in such a case, where the doubt is due to the existence of two objects, is an <i>asham talui</i> incurred. Similarly in the case of intercourse with one of two women, when it is unknown whether the woman affected was his own wife or a forbidden stranger, an <i>asham talui</i> is incurred. If the doubt, however, relates to one object, it being unknown, for instance, whether a piece of fat one has eaten was of the permitted or forbidden kind, no <i>asham talui</i> is involved. Similarly, in the case of the deaf man's marriage, where the doubt relates to one woman, it being uncertain whether she has the status of a married woman or not, no <i>asham talui</i> is incurred."
,k113a_48:" A kind of antelope, [G], concerning which it was unknown whether it belonged to the genus of cattle whose suet is forbidden or to that of the beast of chase whose suet is permitted. Cf. Hul. 80a."
,k113a_49:" Though the doubt relates to one object only."
,k113a_50:" In regard to <i>terumah</i>."
,k113a_51:" In regard to the liability of an <i>asham talui</i>."
,k113a_52:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 795. n. 14 <i>mutatis mutandis</i>."
,k113a_53:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 796. n. 2 <i>mutatis mutandis</i>."
,k113a_54:" Samuel."
,k113a_55:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 796. n. 7 (<i>mutatis mutandis</i>) and text."
,k113a_56:" And whatever little his feebleness enables him to do he can do well at all times. "
}

txt:
<p>
men would abstain from marrying her.<a id="k113a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>
</p><p>
	And why is there a difference between a minor [and a deaf woman] that the former should be permitted to eat <i>terumah</i><a id="k113a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; while a deaf woman<a id="k113a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; may not? For we learned, 'R. Johanan b. Gudgada testified concerning a deaf girl whom her father gave in marriage<a id="k113a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; that she may be dismissed by a letter of divorce,<a id="k113a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; and concerning a minor, the daughter of an Israelite, who was married<a id="k113a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; to a priest, that she may eat [Rabbinical]<a id="k113a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; terumah',<a id="k113a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; while the deaf woman may not eat'!<a id="k113a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; This<a id="k113a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; is a preventive measure against the possibility that a deaf man might feed a deaf woman [with such <i>terumah</i>]. Well, let him feed her, [since she is only in the same position] as a minor who eats <i>nebelah</i>!<a id="k113a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; This<a id="k113a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; is a preventive measure against the possibility that a deaf [husband] might feed a wife of sound senses [with it]. But even a deaf husband might well feed his wife who was of sound senses with Rabbinical <i>terumah</i>!<a id="k113a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; A preventive measure was made against the possibility of his feeding her with Pentateuchal <i>terumah</i>.
</p><p>
	And why is the minor different [from the deaf woman] that the former should be entitled to her <i>kethubah</i> while the deaf woman is not entitled to her <i>kethubah</i>? &mdash; Because if [the latter also were] so [entitled] men would abstain from marrying her.<a id="k113a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Whence, however, is it inferred that a minor is entitled to a <i>kethubah</i>? &mdash; From what we learned: A minor who exercised the right of <i>mi'un</i>, a forbidden relative of the second degree,<a id="k113a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; and a woman who is incapable of procreation, are not entitled to a <i>kethubah</i>;<a id="k113a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; but [it follows<a id="k113a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; that one] released by a letter of divorce,<a id="k113a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; though a minor, is entitled to receive her <i>kethubah</i>.
</p><p>
	And whence is it inferred that a deaf woman is not entitled to her <i>kethubah</i>? &mdash; From what was taught: If a man who was deaf or an imbecile married women of sound senses [the latter], even though the deaf man recovered his faculties or the imbecile regained his intelligence, have no claim whatsoever on [either of] them.<a id="k113a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; But if [the men] wished to retain them [the latter] are entitled to a <i>kethubah</i> of the value of<a id="k113a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; a <i>maneh</i>.<a id="k113a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; If, however, a man of sound senses married a woman who was deaf or an imbecile, her <i>kethubah</i> is valid, even if he undertook in writing to give her a hundred <i>maneh</i>,<a id="k113a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; since he himself had consented to suffer the loss.<a id="k113a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; The reason, then,<a id="k113a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; is because he himself consented; had he not consented, however, she would receive no <i>kethubah</i>,<a id="k113a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; since otherwise<a id="k113a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; men would abstain from marrying her.<a id="k113a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>
</p><p>
	If so,<a id="k113a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; a <i>kethubah</i> should have been provided for a woman of sound senses who married a deaf man, since otherwise<a id="k113a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; [women] would abstain from marrying [deaf men]! &mdash; More than the man desires to marry does the woman desire to be taken in marriage.<a id="k113a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>
</p><p>
	A deaf man once lived in the neighbourhood of R. Malkiu [and the latter] allowed him to take a wife to whom he had assigned in writing a sum of four hundred <i>zuz</i> out of his<a id="k113a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; estate. Raba remarked: Who is so wise as R. Malkiu who is indeed a great man. He<a id="k113a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; held the view: Had he wished to have a maid to wait upon him, would we not have allowed one to be bought for him?<a id="k113a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; How much more, [then, should his desire be fulfilled] here where there are two [reasons for complying with his request]!<a id="k113a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Hiyya b. Ashi stated in the name of Samuel: For [unwitting intercourse with] the wife of a deaf man<a id="k113a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; no <i>asham talui</i><a id="k113a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; is incurred.<a id="k113a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>
</p><p>
	It might be suggested that the following provides support to his<a id="k113a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; view: There are five who may not set apart <i>terumah</i>, and if they did so their <i>terumah</i> is not valid. These are they: A deaf man, an imbecile, a minor, he who gives <i>terumah</i><a id="k113a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; from that which is not his own, and an idolater who gave <i>terumah</i> from that which belonged to an Israelite; and even [if the latter gave it] with the consent of the Israelite his <i>terumah</i> is invalid!<a id="k113a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; He<a id="k113a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; holds<a id="k113a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; the same view is R. Eleazar. For it was taught: R. Isaac stated in the name of R. Eleazar that the <i>terumah</i> of a deaf man must not be treated<a id="k113a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; as profane, because its validity is a matter of doubt.<a id="k113a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; If he<a id="k113a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; is of the same opinion as R. Eleazar,<a id="k113a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; an <i>asham talui</i> also should be incurred!<a id="k113a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; It is necessary<a id="k113a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; [that the offence should be similar to that of eating] one of two available pieces [of meat].<a id="k113a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; But does R. Eleazar require [a condition similar to that of eating] one of two pieces? Surely, it was taught: R. Eleazar stated: For [eating] the suet of a koy<a id="k113a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; one incurs the obligation of an <i>asham talui</i>!<a id="k113a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Samuel is of the same opinion as R. Eleazar in one case<a id="k113a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; but differs from him in the other.<a id="k113a_51"><sup>51</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Others read: R. Hiyya b. Ashi stated in the name of Samuel: For [unwitting intercourse with] the wife of a deaf man the obligation of an <i>asham talui</i> is incurred.<a id="k113a_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; An objection was raised: There are five who may not set apart <i>terumah</i>!<a id="k113a_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; He<a id="k113a_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; holds the same view as R. Eleazar.<a id="k113a_55"><sup>55</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Ashi asked: What is R. Eleazar's reason? Is he positive that the mind of a deaf man is feeble but in doubt whether that mind is clear<a id="k113a_56"><sup>56</sup></a>
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k113b_1:" He cannot do anything rational."
,k113b_2:" Either always clear or always not clear."
,k113b_3:" Lit., 'sound'."
,k113b_4:" Whom he married when he was already suffering from his infirmity."
,k113b_5:" This question applies only to the view of R. Eleazar. (Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 796. n. 7). According to the Rabbis, as has been stated (<i>supra</i> 112b), a deaf man may divorce his wife, as he marries her, by gestures."
,k113b_6:" Either always clear or always not clear."
,k113b_7:" Since his mental powers do not change, he is as capable of giving divorce as contracting a marriage. He was either capable of both transactions or of neither."
,k113b_8:" It being possible that at the time of the betrothal or marriage he happened to be in a normal state, and his act was consequently valid, while at the time of the divorce he may happen to relapse into imbecility, in consequence of which his act can have no validity."
,k113b_9:" Teku, v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k113b_10:" Though it is impossible to ascertain whether she realizes the significance of her action."
,k113b_11:" Were she left unprotected by a husband, unscrupulous men might take undue advantage of her."
,k113b_12:" Deut. XXIV, 1 (hand = [H]. V. <i>infra</i> note 4)."
,k113b_13:" Lit., 'who has a hand' (v. <i>supra</i> note 3)."
,k113b_14:" The imbecile."
,k113b_15:" Deut. XXIV, 1."
,k113b_16:" The statement of R. Isaac concerning the imbecile."
,k113b_17:" Lit., 'not required (but)'."
,k113b_18:" That the divorce of an imbecile is only Rabbinically forbidden but Pentateuchally permitted."
,k113b_19:" The man who became an imbecile."
,k113b_20:" Lit., 'here'."
,k113b_21:" Lit., 'and what is different there that it was not taught forever'."
,k113b_22:" That if he was deaf he may not divorce his wife."
,k113b_23:" That if she was deaf she may be divorced."
,k113b_24:" Since the expression used in the reply was, A MAN&nbsp;&hellip; IS NOT LIKE A WOMAN."
,k113b_25:" Had it referred to the woman, the expression in the reply would have been, 'A woman&nbsp;&hellip; is not like a man'."
,k113b_26:" The man not having been mentioned at all."
,k113b_27:" The Rabbis."
,k113b_28:" Who is deaf."
,k113b_29:" It was to this statement that the Rabbis replied, THE OTHER ALSO IS IN A SIMILAR POSITION."
,k113b_30:" Which allows a deaf woman to be divorced."
,k113b_31:" Why should not a deaf man also be allowed to divorce his wife?"
,k113b_32:" According to which a woman may be divorced without her consent even though her betrothal was Pentateuchally valid."
,k113b_33:" When handing the letter of divorce to her."
,k113b_34:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 799, n. 13."
,k113b_35:" According to R. Johanan. What need, then, was there for Raba to state the obvious?"
,k113b_36:" Thus describing the document as one which has no relation whatsoever to divorce."
,k113b_37:" Lit., 'and that which he said thus, owing to'."
,k113b_38:" At divorcing her. Or, to save her from the shame of being divorced in public."
,k113b_39:" <i>Reshuth harabbim</i> [H]. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a> [Though the question arose on Sabbath they could not have been lost in a public domain on that day. BaH., therefore, rightly omits 'on a Sabbath'; nor did Rashi seem to have it, v. 114a s. v. [H], v.n. 9]."
,k113b_40:" I.e., in a place where, and on a day when carrying of objects is forbidden."
,k113b_41:" On Sabbath (Rashi). To consult him on the best way of getting the keys to the school house. "
}

txt:
<p>
or not clear,<a id="k113b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; though [in either case] it Is always in the same condition,<a id="k113b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; or is it possible that he has no doubt that the [deaf man's] mind is feeble and that it is not clear,<a id="k113b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; but [his doubt] here is due to this reason: Because [the deaf man] may sometimes be in a normal state<a id="k113b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; and sometimes in a state of imbecility? In what respect would this constitute any practical difference? &mdash; In respect of releasing his wife<a id="k113b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; by a letter of divorce.<a id="k113b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; If you grant that his mind is always in the same condition,<a id="k113b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; his divorce [would have the same validity] as his betrothal.<a id="k113b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; If, however, you contend that sometimes he is in a normal state<a id="k113b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; and sometimes he is in a state of imbecility, he would indeed be capable of betrothal; in no way, however, would he be capable of giving divorce.<a id="k113b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; What then is the decision? &mdash; This remains undecided.<a id="k113b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>
</p><p>
	IF SHE BECAME AN IMBECILE etc. R. Isaac stated: According to the word of the Torah, an imbecile may be divorced,<a id="k113b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; since her case is similar to that of a woman of sound senses [who may be divorced] without her consent. What then is the reason why it was stated that she may not be divorced? &mdash; In order that people should not treat her as a piece of ownerless property.<a id="k113b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>
</p><p>
	What kind [of imbecile, however, is here] to be understood? If it be suggested [that it is one] who is capable of taking care of her letter of divorce and who is also capable of taking care of herself, would people [it may be asked] treat her as if she were ownerless property! If, however, [she is one] who is unable to take care either of her letter of divorce or of herself, [how could it be said that] in accordance with the word of the Torah she may be divorced? Surely, it was stated at the school of R. Jannai, And giveth it in her hand<a id="k113b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; [only to her] who is capable of accepting her divorce,<a id="k113b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; but this one<a id="k113b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; is excluded since she is incapable of accepting her divorce; and, furthermore, it was taught at the school of R. Ishmael, And sendeth her out of his house,<a id="k113b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; only one who, when he sends her out, does not return, but this one<a id="k113b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; is excluded since she returns even if he sends her out! &mdash; This<a id="k113b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; was necessary<a id="k113b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; in respect of one who is capable of preserving her letter of divorce but is unable to take proper care of herself. Hence, in accordance with the word of the Torah, such an imbecile may well be divorced for, surely, she is capable of preserving her letter of divorce; the Rabbis, however, ruled that she shall not be dismissed in order that people might not treat her as a piece of ownerless property.
</p><p>
	Abaye remarked: This<a id="k113b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; may also be supported by deduction. For in respect of her<a id="k113b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; it was stated, IF SHE BECAME AN IMBECILE HE MAY NOT DIVORCE HER, while in respect of him<a id="k113b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; [the statement was]. HE MAY NEVER DIVORCE HER. In what respect [it may be asked] does he<a id="k113b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; differ [from her] that the statement [concerning him] is NEVER while in respect of her 'NEVER' is not mentioned?<a id="k113b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; The inference, then, must be that the one is Pentateuchal, the other Rabbinical.
</p><p>
	R. JOHANAN B. NURI ASKED etc. The question was raised: Was R. Johanan b. Nuri certain [of the law concerning] the man<a id="k113b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; and his question related to that of the woman, or is it possible that he was certain concerning that of the woman<a id="k113b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; and his question related to that of the man? &mdash; Come and hear: Since they answered him: A MAN WHO GIVES A DIVORCE IS NOT LIKE A WOMAN WHO IS DIVORCED. FOR WHILE A WOMAN MAY BE DIVORCED WITH HER CONSENT AS WELL AS WITHOUT IT, A MAN CAN GIVE A DIVORCE ONLY WITH HIS FULL CONSENT, it may be inferred<a id="k113b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; that his question related to the man.<a id="k113b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; On the contrary; since they said to him: THE OTHER ALSO IS IN A SIMILAR POSITION,<a id="k113b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; it may be inferred that his question related to the woman! &mdash; But [the fact is this]: R. Johanan b. Nuri was addressing [them<a id="k113b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; in the light] of their own statement. 'According to my view', [he argued], 'as well as a man<a id="k113b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; is incapable of giving a divorce, so also is a woman<a id="k113b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; incapable of receiving a divorce;<a id="k113b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; but according to your view,<a id="k113b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; why should there be a difference between a man and a woman?'<a id="k113b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; [To this] they replied: A MAN WHO GIVES A DIVORCE IS NOT LIKE A WOMAN WHO IS DIVORCED.
</p><p>
	R. JOHANAN&nbsp;&hellip; TESTIFIED etc. Raba stated: From the testimony of R. Johanan b. Gudgada<a id="k113b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; [it may be inferred that if a husband] said to witnesses, 'See this letter of divorce which I am giving [to my wife]', and to her he said,<a id="k113b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Take this bill of indebtedness', she is nevertheless divorced. For did not R. Johanan b. Gudgada imply that [the woman's] consent was not required?<a id="k113b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; Here also, then, her consent is not required. Is not this obvious!<a id="k113b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; It might have been assumed that since he said to her, 'Take this bill of indebtedness'<a id="k113b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; he has thereby cancelled [the letter of divorce], hence we were taught [that it remains valid, for] had he in fact cancelled it, he would have made his statement to the witnesses. Since, however, he did not make the statement to the witnesses he did not cancel it at all; and the only reason why he made that statement to her was<a id="k113b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; to conceal [his] shame.<a id="k113b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Isaac b. Bisna once lost the keys of the school house in a public domain<a id="k113b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; on a Sabbath.<a id="k113b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; When he came to R. Pedath<a id="k113b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; the latter said to him, 'Go and
</P>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k115a_1:" And as no one could have contradicted her, she would have been believed in saying that her husband was dead and she would have obtained her object; hence she is believed even when she reported that there was a war."
,k115a_2:" Alfasi: 'Since it was established that (in time of war) she speaks &hellip; the argument etc.'."
,k115a_3:" When her husband was involved in a war."
,k115a_4:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 3."
,k115a_5:" Brigands. in a time of war."
,k115a_6:" Lit., 'they caused a house to smoke upon us'."
,k115a_7:" Lit., upon us'."
,k115a_8:" Her husband."
,k115a_9:" This proves that her statement that her husband is dead is not accepted although it was through her that it became known that there ever was a state of war."
,k115a_10:" As she has not actually seen his death."
,k115a_11:" It is for this reason, and not because she is suspected of lying. that her evidence is not regarded as sufficient proof for establishing the death of her husband. In the case of a war, however, it may well be assumed that she had actually seen the death of her husband, since, had she desired to deceive, she need not have disclosed the fact that there ever was a war."
,k115a_12:" Circumstances similar to those of a war."
,k115a_13:" Which proves that a wife is believed when she states that her husband died in circumstances akin to war if these become known solely through her own evidence."
,k115a_14:" Since the incident did not happen in war time but only in analogous circumstances."
,k115a_15:" 'A.Z 25b; i.e., her sex is her protection against murder. When, therefore, her husband is attacked, unless there was actually a state of war, she does not flee to save her own life, but remains on the spot to the very end. Her evidence that her husband is dead may consequently be accepted as that of an eye witness. This, therefore, provides no proof that a wife is also believed if an actual state of war existed when her husband's death presumably occurred."
,k115a_16:" Lit., 'man'."
,k115a_17:" Who apparently attempted to rescue the bridegroom."
,k115a_18:" Hence it is possible that her husband did not die at all."
,k115a_19:" Cf. MS.M. Cur. edd. read 'and furthermore'."
,k115a_20:" How could he possibly compare the two cases?"
,k115a_21:" Lit., 'another man'."
,k115a_22:" Lit., 'and the fire consumed him'."
,k115a_23:" Lit., 'a blemish was born or produced on him'. He lost his hand."
,k115a_24:" In explanation of his disappearance."
,k115a_25:" Whose evidence is relied upon in allowing a married woman to marry again if he testified that her husband was dead."
,k115a_26:" Is his evidence accepted?"
,k115a_27:" Cf. <i>supra</i> note 10."
,k115a_28:" Lit., concerning a thing which is likely to be revealed, he does not lie'."
,k115a_29:" And he is believed."
,k115a_30:" Cur. edd. insert in square brackets. 'since she sometimes hates him'. Cf. readings cited by Wilna Gaon, Glosses."
,k115a_31:" Speaking in time of war from mere conjecture (cf. Rashal's emendation)."
,k115a_32:" Palestine."
,k115a_33:" Lit., 'entangled'. confused'."
,k115a_34:" V. <i>infra</i> 122a."
,k115a_35:" Lit., 'not?'"
,k115a_36:" In a condition similar to a state of war."
,k115a_37:" Even in a time of war."
,k115a_38:" If one witness is believed even when any part of the world is in actual state of war."
,k115a_39:" The expression used by R. Nehemiah."
,k115a_40:" From other countries."
,k115a_41:" Lit., 'entangled'. confused'."
,k115a_42:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a> s.v. <i>Talmid Hakam</i>."
,k115a_43:" R. Judah the Prince."
,k115a_44:" Cf <i>supra</i> 88b."
,k115a_45:" From which it follows that one witness is believed (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 811, n. 10) even in a time of war."
,k115a_46:" Rabbi's ruling in the case of the wives of the drowned scholars."
,k115a_47:" I.e., the sea."
,k115a_48:" I.e., all the limits cannot he seen from any one point on the shore. Cf. <i>infra</i> 121a."
,k115a_49:" Even if fully qualified men had witnessed the accident, because it is possible that the man may have swum to, or the waters have cast him upon another part of the shore where he was rescued. As all the shore line cannot be seen from the point where he fell into the waters (v. <i>supra</i> n. 5) his rescue may have been effected, though none of the men of the locality have observed it"
,k115a_50:" The women who gave evidence. "
}

txt:
<p>
since, if she wished, she could have said that there was peace in the world;<a id="k115a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; or, perhaps. since a war was established [by her] she speaks<a id="k115a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; from conjecture.<a id="k115a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; and the argument. 'What motive could she have for telling a lie'<a id="k115a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; cannot come and impair an established principle? &mdash; Come and hear: [If a woman states]. 'They<a id="k115a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; set our house on fire',<a id="k115a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; or 'They filled the cave wherein we sheltered<a id="k115a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; with smoke, and he<a id="k115a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; died while I escaped'. she is not believed!<a id="k115a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; There it is different since she can be told,<a id="k115a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; 'As a miracle happened to you. so may a miracle have happened to him<a id="k115a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; also'.<a id="k115a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Come and hear: [If a woman states]. 'ldolaters fell upon us', or, 'robbers fell upon us,<a id="k115a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; and he<a id="k115a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; died while I escaped'. she is believed!<a id="k115a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp;&mdash; There<a id="k115a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; [her statement is believed] in accordance with the view of R. Idi. For R. Idi stated: A woman [carries] her weapons about her.<a id="k115a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>
</p><p>
	There was once a man whose bridal chamber caught fire at the close of his wedding feast, and his wife cried, 'Look at my husband, look at my husband!' When they came near they saw a charred body<a id="k115a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; that was prostrate [on the ground] and the hand [of a man]<a id="k115a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; lying [by it]. R. Hiyya b. Abin intended to give his decision [that the law in this case] is the same as [that where a woman stated]. 'They set our house on fire', or 'they filled the cave wherein we sheltered with smoke'. Raba, however, said: Are [the two cases at all] similar? There, she did not say. 'Look at my husband, look at my husband'!<a id="k115a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; while<a id="k115a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; here [those present actually saw] the charred body that was prostrate [on the ground] and the hand that was lying by it. And R. Hiyya b. Abin?<a id="k115a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; As to the charred body<a id="k115a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; that was prostrate [on the ground]. it may be suggested that a stranger<a id="k115a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; came to the rescue of [the burning man] and was himself burned,<a id="k115a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; while the hand which was lying [nearby, might be that of the bridegroom who] having been caught by the fire was mutilated;<a id="k115a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; and<a id="k115a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; in order [to hide his] shame he may have left the place and fled into the wide world.
</p><p>
	A question was raised: What is the law in respect of one witness<a id="k115a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; In time of war?<a id="k115a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; Is the reason why one witness is [elsewhere]<a id="k115a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; believed because no one would tell a lie which is likely to be exposed<a id="k115a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; and, consequently. here also [the witness] would not tell a lie;<a id="k115a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; or is it possible that the reason why one witness [is believed]<a id="k115a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; is because [the woman] herself makes careful enquiries and [only then] marries again. here. therefore.<a id="k115a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; [he would not be believed since a woman]<a id="k115a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; does not make sufficient enquiries before she marries again?
</p><p>
	Rami b. Hama replied. Come and hear: R. Akiba stated: When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year. I met Nehemiah of Beth Deli who said to me, 'I heard that in the Land of Israel<a id="k115a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; no one with the exception of R. Judah b. Baba permits a [married] woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness'. 'That is so', I told him' 'Tell them', he said to me. 'in my name: You know that this country is infested<a id="k115a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; with raiders; I have this tradition from R. Gamaliel the Elder: That a [married] woman may be allowed to marry again on the evidence of one witness'.<a id="k115a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; Now, what was meant by 'This country is infested with raiders'? Obviously that<a id="k115a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; 'although this country is in a state of confusion.<a id="k115a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; I have this tradition: That a [married woman] may be allowed to marry again on the evidence of one witness'! Thus it is evident that one witness is believed.<a id="k115a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; Said Raba: If so,<a id="k115a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; why should 'this country<a id="k115a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; be different?<a id="k115a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; He should [have said]. 'Wherever raiders exist'!-Rather, said Raba, it is this that was meant: 'You know that this country is infested<a id="k115a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; with raiders and it is impossible for me to leave my family and to come before the Rabbis; I have this tradition from R. Gamaliel: That a [married] woman may be allowed to marry again on the evidence of one witness
</p><p>
	Come and hear: Two learned men<a id="k115a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; once travelled with Abba Jose b. Simai on board a ship, which sank. And on the evidence of women, Rabbi<a id="k115a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; allowed their wives to marry again. [Now, evidence of death by] water is, surely, like [that of death in] war, and women, even a hundred of them, are legally equal to one witness,<a id="k115a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; and yet it was stated [that Rabbi] 'Allowed &hellip; to marry'!<a id="k115a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; And do you understand this?<a id="k115a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; Those<a id="k115a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; were waters without [a visible] end,<a id="k115a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; and [when a man is drowned in] waters without [a visible] end his wife is forbidden [to marry again]!<a id="k115a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; How, then, is this to be understood? [Obviously] that they<a id="k115a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; stated, '[The drowned men] were cast up in our presence
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k115b_1:" After their emerging from the water (cf. Tosaf. s.v. [H], a.l.)."
,k115b_2:" On their evidence of the men's death."
,k115b_3:" (If which the judges were well aware independently of the woman's evidence."
,k115b_4:" Which should prove that the sesame had not been returned to its owner."
,k115b_5:" Whose wives Rabbi permitted to marry on the assumption that the discovered bodies were theirs."
,k115b_6:" Who have the same identification marks. Similarly with the sesame in the jar, since it is of the same quantity as that of the deposited sesame it should be assumed to belong to the depositor and should, therefore, be returned to him."
,k115b_7:" When an identification mark exists, such as a letter on a cask or, as in the case of the sesame, the identity of quantities."
,k115b_8:" And replaced by similar contents."
,k115b_9:" Lit., 'sacrifice', i.e., consecrated."
,k115b_10:" Tithe."
,k115b_11:" A 'mixture' of <i>terumah</i> and unconsecrated produce. Others read, [H] <i>demai</i>, produce concerning which it is uncertain whether it had been tithed."
,k115b_12:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a> Produce of. which it is certain that the priestly and Levitical dues have not been given for it."
,k115b_13:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k115b_14:" During the Hadrianic persecutions that followed the Bar Kokeba revolt when the practice of Jewish laws was forbidden (cf <i>supra</i> p. 754. n. 9)."
,k115b_15:" M.Sh IV, 11. This proves that a mark is regarded as sufficient proof that the original contents were not removed and replaced by others!"
,k115b_16:" v. <i>supra</i> note 1."
,k115b_17:" Since most of the world's produce is unconsecrated."
,k115b_18:" And replaced by unconsecrated produce Much more so when a single letter only appears on the jar! V. M.Sh., <i>loc. cit</i>."
,k115b_19:" [H[ (cf. Pers. panah) 'protection'. People who might perhaps have no scruples about clandestinely consuming other peoples produce would nevertheless be afraid of meddling with sacred commodities."
,k115b_20:" [Term denotes elsewhere 'Exilarch'; here it is a proper name. V. Obermeyer, p. 183, n.l.]."
,k115b_21:" [H]. So Golds. against Rappaport in [H] p. 156ff. Cordova at that time, as during the Moorish reign and other periods of spanish history, may have formed an independent state. [Obermeyer p. 183 identifies the former with Kurdafad near Ktesifon on the left bank of tigris, and the latter with Apamea, a frontier town of Babylon on on the right bank of the Tigris]."
,k115b_22:" Even when it was not definitely known that there were two such persons in the same place."
,k115b_23:" Unless it was known that two such persons lived there. (Cf. <i>infra</i> 116a)."
,k115b_24:" Lit., 'whence'."
,k115b_25:" Cf. BaH."
,k115b_26:" [Me'iri: By side of the town Nehardea, which had been declared a free (Roman) colony and exempt from taxation, cf. A.Z., Sonc. ed. p. 50, n. 5.]."
,k115b_27:" So Rosh and [H]. Cur. edd., 'Androlinai'."
,k115b_28:" To decide whether the document may be given to the woman who claimed it as a valid one. [The reference must be to R. Judah I the prince, since the father of Samuel was no longer alive during the patriarchate of of R. Judah II (v. Obermeyer, p. 261, n. 4)]."
,k115b_29:" To ascertain whether there is no other person of the same name in that town. This obviously proves the soundness of Abaye's ruling."
,k115b_30:" As Abaye ruled."
,k115b_31:" R. Judah Nesi'ah."
,k115b_32:" Any Nehardean of that name might have left Nehardea for another town after giving the letter of divorce in question."
,k115b_33:" That he might not be chagrined by hearing that his enquiry was really futile and that there was in fact nothing for him to do but to accept the document as valid."
,k115b_34:" Lit., 'whence'."
,k115b_35:" So BaH.Cur. edd., 'Raba'."
,k115b_36:" And yet it was not doubted that the persons who held the notes were the men named, which proves that even the definite existence of other men of the same name in the same place need not be taken into consideration. This being the rule in monetary matters, it may be inferred that in religious matters, the uncertain existence at least of men of the same name need not be taken into consideration."
,k115b_37:" How' can he maintain his ruling in view' of the decision of Rabbah b. Abbuha. "
}

txt:
<p>
and we saw then, immediately [afterwards]',<a id="k115b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; and they also mention [his identification] marks. so that we do not rely upon them<a id="k115b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; but on the marks.<a id="k115b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>
</p><p>
	A man once deposited some sesame with another, [and when in due course] he asked him, 'Return to me my sesame, the other replied. 'You have already taken it'. 'But, surely'. [the depositor remonstrated, 'the quantity] was such and such and it is [in fact still] lying [intact] in your jar'.<a id="k115b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Yours', the other replied. 'you have taken back and this is different'. R. Hisda at first intended to give his decision [that the law in this case is] the same as that of the two learned men,<a id="k115b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; where we do not assume that those have gone elsewhere and these are others.<a id="k115b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; Raba, however, said to him: Are [the two cases] alike? There, the identification marks were given; but here, what identification marks can sesame have! And in regard to [the depositor's] statement [that their quantity] was such and such, it might be said that the similarity of quantities is a mere coincidence.
</p><p>
	Said Mar Kashisha b. R. Hisda to R. Ashi: Do we ever [in such circumstances]<a id="k115b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; take into consideration the possibility that [the contents of a vessel] may have been removed?<a id="k115b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; Surely we learned: If a man found a vessel on which was inscribed a Kof it is korban;<a id="k115b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; if a Mem, it is ma'aser;<a id="k115b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; if a Daleth it is demu'a;<a id="k115b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; if a Teth, it is <i>Tebel</i>;<a id="k115b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; and if a Taw, It is <i>terumah</i>;<a id="k115b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; for in the period of danger<a id="k115b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; they used to write a Taw for <i>terumah</i>!<a id="k115b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Said Rabina to R. Ashi: Do we not [in such circumstances]<a id="k115b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; heed the possibility that [the contents of a vessel] may have been removed? Read, then, the final clause: R. Jose said, Even if a man found a jar on which '<i>terumah</i>' was inscribed [the contents] are nevertheless regarded as unconsecrated, for it is assumed<a id="k115b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; that though it was in the previous year full of <i>terumah</i> it has subsequently been emptied!<a id="k115b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; But the fact is, all agree that the possibility of [the contents] having been removed must be taken into consideration. Here, however, they differ only on the following principle: One Master is of the opinion that had the owner removed [the contents from the jar] he would undoubtedly have wiped [the mark] off, while the other [maintains that] it might be assumed that he may have forgotten [to remove the mark] or he may also intentionally have left it as a safeguard.<a id="k115b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Resh Galutha Isaac,<a id="k115b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; a son of R. Bebai's sister, once went from Cordova to Spain<a id="k115b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; and died there. A message was sent from there [in the following terms]. 'Resh Galutha Isaac, a son of R. Bebai's sister, went from Cordova to Spain and died there. [The question thus arose] whether [the possibility that there might have been] two [men of the name of] Isaac is to be taken into consideration<a id="k115b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; or not? &mdash; Abaye said: It is to be taken into consideration:<a id="k115b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; but Raba said: It is not to be taken into consideration.<a id="k115b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Said Abaye: How<a id="k115b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; do I arrive at my assertion? &mdash; Because in<a id="k115b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; a letter of divorce that was once found in Nehardea it was written, 'Near the town of Kolonia,<a id="k115b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; I, David son of Nehilais,<a id="k115b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; a Nehardean, released and divorced my wife So-and-so', and when Samuel's father sent it to R. Judah Nesiah<a id="k115b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; the latter replied: 'Let all Nehardea be searched'.<a id="k115b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; Raba, however, said: If that were so<a id="k115b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; he<a id="k115b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; should [have ordered] the whole world to be searched!<a id="k115b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; The truth is that it was only out of respect for Samuel's father<a id="k115b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; that he sent that message. 
</p><p>
	Raba said: How<a id="k115b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; do I arrive at my assertion? Because in two notes of indebtedness that were once produced in court at Mahuza [the names of the parties] were written as Habi son of Nanai and Nanai son of Habi. and Rabbah<a id="k115b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; b. Abbuha ordered the collection of the debts on these bills. But, surely, there are many [men bearing the names of] Habi son of Nanai and Nanai son of Habi at Mahuza!<a id="k115b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; And Abaye?<a id="k115b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>
</P>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k118a_1:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 830. n. 9."
,k118a_2:" Even if she is the rival of the woman concerned."
,k118a_3:" V. <i>supra</i> note 5."
,k118a_4:" Even the first."
,k118a_5:" Why the second wife MAY NEITHER MARRY AGAIN."
,k118a_6:" Her rival."
,k118a_7:" There was no need to mention the case where she remained silent, which is obvious."
,k118a_8:" Lit., 'and that which she said'."
,k118a_9:" Since she went out of her way to contradict her rival and was not content to remain silent."
,k118a_10:" Lit.. 'she said'."
,k118a_11:" [H] v. marg. note. Cur. edd., [H]."
,k118a_12:" Judges XVI, 30. She is prepared herself to lose the right of marrying again in order that her rival also may thereby be deprived of her right."
,k118a_13:" Where. as in the second clause, one woman contradicts the other."
,k118a_14:" Lit.. 'it was taught'."
,k118a_15:" The view expressed in the first clause."
,k118a_16:" [According to R. Eleazar. R. Meir would forbid in the second clause remarriage to both women, because he admits a rival's contradictory evidence, whereas R. Judah and Simeon hold that a rival's contradiction is not admitted and hence they rule that both are permitted to marry. Similarly in the first clause, on R. Meir's view the first woman would not be allowed to marry, regard being had to the contradiction of her rival. On this assumption, the reason stated in the second clause for R. Judah's and R. Simeon's ruling, that neither denied the fact of the man's death, will have been advanced by them as an argument on the hypothesis that R. Meir's view, admitting the rival's contradiction, is accepted. [H]."
,k118a_17:" The view expressed in the first clause."
,k118a_18:" That the assertion of the second wife is not regarded as valid contradiction of the evidence of the first."
,k118a_19:" [In connection with the death of her husband in regard to which the laws of evidence have been considerably relaxed. <i>Var. lec</i>. 'the testimony of a rival']."
,k118a_20:" But as a mere outburst of malice, intended to injure her rival. The first evidence is, therefore, accepted."
,k118a_21:" Who explained that the first clause represents the view of those who differ from R. Meir, while R. Meir maintains that the first wife also is forbidden to marry again, because a rival's contradiction is admitted, v. p. 831, n. 21."
,k118a_22:" Which forbids remarriage, even where the contradictory evidence was given by the rival (v. <i>supra</i> p. 831. n. 7.)"
,k118a_23:" Who stated that R. Meir agrees with the ruling in the first clause that a rival's contradiction is admitted."
,k118a_24:" To marry again; since a woman may not tender evidence for her rival."
,k118a_25:" As during the lifetime of her husband. The evidence of the other which is regarded as invalid to enable the rival to marry again (v. <i>supra</i> n. 1) is equally invalid to deprive her of her right to the eating of <i>terumah</i>."
,k118a_26:" To forbid the rival to marry and to allow her to eat <i>terumah</i>."
,k118a_27:" For whom a daughter-in-law is ineligible to tender evidence."
,k118a_28:" To marry; though. at the time the evidence in her favour was given. the witness, according to whose evidence her husband died before her father-in-law, was no longer her daughter-in-law. The reason is explained <i>supra</i> 117b."
,k118a_29:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 3 mutatis mutandis."
,k118a_30:" The first (relating to a rival) and the second (relating to a mother-in-law)."
,k118a_31:" That the evidence of a rival is not accepted."
,k118a_32:" The deprivation of marital intercourse caused by a rival. Only 10 such circumstances, it is possible, did R. Tarfon discredit the evidence of a rival who might indeed be actuated by malice."
,k118a_33:" Lit., 'things in the world'."
,k118a_34:" That a daughter-in-law need not be suspected of deliberate lying because of some general grievance against her mother-in-law; and that consequently. though her evidence is not accepted in respect of relaxing the laws of marriage. it may be accepted in respect of enforcing the laws of <i>terumah</i>."
,k118a_35:" Who went to a country beyond the sea with her husband before any issue was born from their union."
,k118a_36:" On her return."
,k118a_37:" And may contract levirate marriage. Her evidence merely confirms the status in which she was already at the time of her departure. At that time as well as now she had no children to exempt her from the levirate obligations."
,k118a_38:" To be permitted to marry a stranger without previous <i>halizah</i> with the levir. The evidence of a woman is accepted only in respect of the death of her husband, where it is assumed that she takes all possible care to ascertain the fact of his death. it is not, however, accepted in respect of liberating her from a levir against whom she might have been nursing a personal hatred, so that she would, without making the necessary enquiries, be ready on the flimsiest of proofs to testify anything which enables her to get rid of him."
,k118a_39:" Owing to the status in which she has been confirmed."
,k118a_40:" Since note must be taken of her allegation."
,k118a_41:" <i>Infra</i> 118b, 119b. "
}

txt:
<p>
OR IF ONE WOMAN STATED. 'HE<a id="k118a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; IS DEAD', AND ANOTHER WOMAN<a id="k118a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; STATED,<a id="k118a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; 'HE IS NOT DEAD', SHE<a id="k118a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; MAY NOT MARRY AGAIN.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. The reason. then,<a id="k118a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; is because she said, 'HE IS NOT DEAD'; had she, however, kept silent she would presumably have been allowed to marry again; but [it may be objected], no rival may give evidence on behalf of her associate!<a id="k118a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; It was necessary [to teach the case where the OTHER WIFE SAID], 'HE IS NOT DEAD.<a id="k118a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; Since it might have been assumed that [their husband] was really dead and that by stating<a id="k118a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; 'HE IS NOT DEAD' she evidently<a id="k118a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; intended to inflict injury upon her rival in the spirit of<a id="k118a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; Let me<a id="k118a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; die with the Philistines,<a id="k118a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; we are informed [that she is nevertheless forbidden to marry again].
</p><p>
	IF ONE WIFE STATED, 'HE IS DEAD' etc. R. Meir should have expressed his disagreement in the first clause also!<a id="k118a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Eleazar replied: [The first clause] is a subject<a id="k118a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; in dispute and it<a id="k118a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; represents the opinion of R. Judah and R. Simeon.<a id="k118a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Johanan. however. stated that it<a id="k118a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; may be said [to represent even the view of] R. Meir, for in such a case even R. Meir agrees,<a id="k118a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; since in the case of testimony relating to a woman<a id="k118a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; the evidence [of the nature of] 'He is not dead' is not [regarded as a valid] contradiction,<a id="k118a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>
</p><p>
	We learned: IF ONE WITNESS STATED, HE IS DEAD' AND ANOTHER WITNESS STATED, HE IS NOT DEAD', OR IF ONE WOMAN STATED, 'HE IS DEAD AND ANOTHER WOMAN STATED, HE IS NOT DEAD', SHE MAY NOT MARRY AGAIN. Now according to R. Eleazar<a id="k118a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; it may well be explained that the anonymous statement [in the final clause]<a id="k118a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; is in agreement with R. Meir. According to R. Johanan,<a id="k118a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; however, there is a difficulty! &mdash; This is a difficulty.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. IF A WOMAN AND HER HUSBAND WENT TO A COUNTRY BEYOND THE SEA, AND SHE RETURNED AND STATED, MY HUSBAND IS DEAD'. SHE MAY BE MARRIED AGAIN AND SHE ALSO RECEIVES HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>. HER RIVAL, HOWEVER, IS FORBIDDEN.<a id="k118a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; IF [HER RIVAL] WAS THE DAUGHTER OF AN ISRAELITE [WHO WAS MARRIED] TO A PRIEST, SHE IS PERMITTED TO EAT <I>TERUMAH</I>;<a id="k118a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; SO R. TARFON. R. AKIBA, HOWEVER, SAID: THIS<a id="k118a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; IS NOT A WAY THAT WOULD LEAD HER OUT OF THE POWER OF TRANSGRESSION, UNLESS [IT BE ENACTED THAT] SHE SHALL BE FORBIDDEN BOTH TO MARRY AND TO EAT <I>TERUMAH</I>.
</p><p>
	IF SHE STATED, 'MY HUSBAND DIED FIRST AND MY FATHER-IN-LAW DIED AFTER HIM, SHE MAY MARRY AGAIN AND SHE ALSO RECEIVES HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>, BUT HER MOTHER-IN-LAWS<a id="k118a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; IS FORBIDDEN.<a id="k118a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; IF [THE LATTER] WAS THE DAUGHTER OF AN ISRAELITE [WHO WAS MARRIED] TO A PRIEST, SHE IS PERMITTED TO EAT <I>TERUMAH</I>; SO R. TARFON. R. AKIBA, HOWEVER, SAID.. THIS<a id="k118a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; IS NOT A WAY THAT WOULD LEAD HER OUT OF THE POWER OF TRANSGRESSION, UNLESS [IT BE ENACTED THAT] SHE SHALL BE FORBIDDEN BOTH TO MARRY AGAIN AND TO EAT <I>TERUMAH</I>.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. And [both statements<a id="k118a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; were] necessary. For If the first only had been stated, it might have been assumed that only in that did N. Tarfon maintain [his view],<a id="k118a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; since the grievance is personal.<a id="k118a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; but that in respect of a mother-in-law, the grievance against whom is merely general,<a id="k118a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; he agrees with N. Akiba.<a id="k118a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; And had the latter only been stated it might have been assumed that R. Akiba maintained [his view] there only, but that in the former case he agrees with R. Tarfon. [Hence both statements were] necessary.
</p><p>
	Rab Judah stated in the name of Samuel: The <i>halachah</i> is in agreement with R. Tarfon. Said Abaye: We also learned the same: [If a woman<a id="k118a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; states],<a id="k118a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; 'A son was given to me in a country beyond the sea, and my son died first while my husband died after him', she is believed.<a id="k118a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; [If, however, she states]. 'My husband [died first] and my son died after him', she is not believed,<a id="k118a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; though note must be taken of her statement, and she must, therefore, perform <i>halizah</i><a id="k118a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; but may not<a id="k118a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; contract the levirate marriage.<a id="k118a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; [From which it follows that] 'note must be taken of her statement', but that no note need be taken of the statement of a rival. Thus our point is proved.
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k118b_1:" If he has no desire to marry any of them."
,k118b_2:" I.e., the sum due to a woman on being divorced. (V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>)."
,k118b_3:" He need not give them more than the amount of one <i>kethubah</i> since he had betrothed no more than one woman. It is for the women themselves to come to an agreement on the disposal of that sum."
,k118b_4:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 2 mutatis mutandis."
,k118b_5:" Lit., was not stated'."
,k118b_6:" Of the Baraitha cited <i>infra</i>."
,k118b_7:" The full amount of her <i>kethubah</i>."
,k118b_8:" Tosef. Yeb. XIV."
,k118b_9:" R. Tarfon and R. Akiba."
,k118b_10:" And not those of 'betrothal' and robbery"
,k118b_11:" Not those if betrothal and 'robbery'."
,k118b_12:" Lit., and what'."
,k118b_13:" Lit., 'with the power'."
,k118b_14:" That the man must pay the amount if her <i>kethubah</i> to each one of the five women."
,k118b_15:" It is only Rabbinically that betrothal through cohabitation is forbidden. Pentateuchally it constitutes a proper <i>kinyan</i>."
,k118b_16:" Maintaining as he does that one single sum equal to the amount of the robbery exonerates the robber from all further liability."
,k118b_17:" Prohibition of robbery was specifically mentioned in the Pentateuch,"
,k118b_18:" And is exempt from levirate marriage and <i>halizah</i>. Her statement is accepted since thereby she is merely confirming the status in which she found herself before her departure. At that time she had a son who exempted her from the levirate bond; and now that her husband died before that son she is still entitled to the same exemption. Her admission of her son's death does not affect her status, since she is the only source of the information, and as her word is accepted in respect of the death it must be similarly accepted in respect of its date."
,k118b_19:" So that she is in consequence subject to the levirate bond."
,k118b_20:" Because her assertion would alter the status in which she was confirmed prior to her departure. Such alteration cannot be authorized in view of the possibility that her report might be due to a desire to marry the levir."
,k118b_21:" Since, at any rate, her statement has impaired her former status."
,k118b_22:" Before she may be permitted to marry a stranger."
,k118b_23:" She herself having testified that she was forbidden to the levir."
,k118b_24:" Who had no children at the time she left her home town."
,k118b_25:" On returning from across the sea."
,k118b_26:" And remains subject to the levirate bond and may perform <i>halizah</i> or contract levirate marriage. Her statement is accepted because it confirms the status in which she was established prior to her departure. Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 836. n. 11 mutatis mutandis."
,k118b_27:" So that, were her statement to be accepted, she would be exempt from the levirate bond to which, in virtue of her former status, she is still subject."
,k118b_28:" Cf. <i>supra</i> note 2 mutatis mutandis. As a rule, a woman is supposed to hate her brother-in-law."
,k118b_29:" V. <i>supra</i> n. 3."
,k118b_30:" V. <i>supra</i> n. 4."
,k118b_31:" V. <i>supra</i> n. 5."
,k118b_32:" Who was known to have no brother-in-law."
,k118b_33:" I.e., her mother-in-law, who was with her overseas, gave birth to a son during their stay there."
,k118b_34:" Since in either case she only confirms her former status. Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 836. n. 11 mutatis mutandis."
,k118b_35:" Her sister's husband's."
,k118b_36:" I.e., to marry him, which she is forbidden to do during the lifetime of her sister."
,k118b_37:" Cf. <i>supra</i> note 2 mutatis mutandis."
,k118b_38:" Whom the childless husband had asked to act on behalf of his wife, his intention being to spare her from the levirate obligations on his death. Elsewhere a divorce is invalid unless it had actually been delivered into the woman's hands or into those of an agent who was duly appointed by her."
,k118b_39:" To whom she would be subject in the absence of a letter of divorce."
,k118b_40:" Lit., 'in the place of'."
,k118b_41:" Since this is the ruling in our Mishnah both in the case where It is assumed that she loves the levir (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 837, n. 2) and in that where she is assumed to hate him (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 837. n. 10). it is obvious that it is uncertain whether a divorce given in the circumstance described by Raba is an advantage or a disadvantage to the woman. The legal position in such a case would consequently be that the woman would have to perform <i>halizah</i> but would not be permitted levirate marriage."
,k118b_42:" V. p. 838. n' 4."
,k118b_43:" Lit., 'in the place of'."
,k118b_44:" She might prefer a married life in quarrels to a peaceful life of separation."
,k118b_45:" Or 'together', 'as husband and wife'. V. following note."
,k118b_46:" A woman's maxim. She prefers an unhappy life in a married state to a happy one in solitude. [H] 'with a load of grief', 'in trouble' (last.). According to Rashi, [H] = 'two bodies' (cf. <i>supra</i> n. 4). Levy compares it with the Pers., tandu, 'two persons'."
,k118b_47:" A proverb. [H] a free woman,"
,k118b_48:" [H] 'flax-beater'; Aruk, [H] 'a watchman of vegetables'; a very poor and humble occupation."
,k118b_49:" To show her friends that she is a married woman. She is proud of her husband despite his lowly social status."
,k118b_50:" [H] 'dull', or 'ugly' (cf. last.); 'of a tainted family' (Rashi)."
,k118b_51:" Regarded as a cheap food."
,k118b_52:" For the sake of a married life, a woman willingly renounces all other pleasures. even the enjoyment of the poorest meal."
,k118b_53:" Lit., 'and all of them', those married to the unlovely types of husband mentioned."
,k118b_54:" Lit., 'and hang (it) on'. "
}

txt:
<p>
<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. IF A MAN BETROTHED ONE OF FIVE WOMEN AND HE DOES NOT KNOW WHICH OF THEM HE HAS BETROTHED, AND EACH STATES, 'HE HAS BETROTHED ME. HE GIVES A LETTER OF DIVORCE TO EVERY ONE OF THEM,<a id="k118b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; AND, LEAVING THE <I>KETHUBAH</I><a id="k118b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; AMONG THEM, WITHDRAWS;<a id="k118b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; SO R. TARFON. R. AKIBA, HOWEVER, SAID: THIS IS NOT A WAY THAT WOULD TAKE ONE OUT OF THE POWER OF TRANSGRESSION, UNLESS ONE GIVES TO EACH OF THEM BOTH A LETTER OF DIVORCE AND HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>.<a id="k118b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>
</p><p>
	IF A MAN ROBBED ONE OF FIVE PERSONS AND DOES NOT KNOW WHICH OF THEM HE HAS ROBBED, AND EACH ONE STATES. 'HE HAS ROBBED ME', HE LEAVES THE [AMOUNT OF] THE ROBBERY AMONG THEM AND WITHDRAWS;<a id="k118b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; SO R. TARFON. R. AKIBA, HOWEVER, STATED: THIS IS NOT A WAY THAT WOULD LEAD ONE OUT OF THE POWER OF SIN, UNLESS ONE PAYS [THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE ROBBERY] TO EVERY ONE [OF THE PERSONS INVOLVED].
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. Since BETROTHED was stated. and not<a id="k118b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; 'cohabited'. and since ROBBED was stated and not 'bought'. whose [view, it may be asked, is represented in] our Mishnah? Neither. [apparently. that of] the first Tanna<a id="k118b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; nor that of R. Simeon b. Eleazar!<a id="k118b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; For it was taught: R. Simeon b. Eleazar stated that R. Tarfon and R. Akiba did not differ [on the ruling that] where a man betrothed one of five women, and he does not know which of them he betrothed, he leaves the <i>kethubah</i><a id="k118b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; among them and withdraws;<a id="k118b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; they differ only in the case where cohabitation occurred, R. Tarfon ruling that the man leaves the <i>kethubah</i><a id="k118b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; among them and withdraws, while R. Akiba ruled [that the man is not exempt from transgression] unless he pays<a id="k118b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; everyone of them. R. Tarfon and R. Akiba. furthermore, did not differ on [the ruling that] where a person bought something from five men and does not know from which of them he bought, he may leave the price of the purchase among them and depart; they differ only in the case where a person robbed one of five men, R. Tarfon ruling that the man must deposit the amount of the robbery among them and may then depart, while R. Akiba ruled [that the man is not exonerated] unless he pays [the amount of the] robbery to everyone.<a id="k118b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; Now, since R. Simeon b. Eleazar said that they<a id="k118b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; do not differ in the case where a man betrothed or purchased, it may be inferred that the first Tanna is of the opinion that they<a id="k118b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; did differ. Whose [view then, is presented in our Mishnah]? If it is that of the first Tanna 'betrothal' and purchase should have been mentioned,<a id="k118b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; and if [it is that of] R. Simeon b. Eleazar cohabitation and 'robbery' should have been mentioned!<a id="k118b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; [Our Mishnah represents] in fact [the view of] N. Simeon b. Eleazar, but the meaning of<a id="k118b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; BETROTHED is betrothal through cohabitation'. BETROTHED was used in order to acquaint you how far R. Akiba is prepared to go,<a id="k118b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; as he imposes a penalty<a id="k118b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; even where one transgressed a Rabbinic prohibition<a id="k118b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; only; and ROBBED was taught in order to acquaint you how far N. Tarfon is prepared to go, as he imposes no penalties<a id="k118b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; even where one had transgressed a Pentateuchal prohibition.<a id="k118b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. A WOMAN WHO WENT WITH HER HUSBAND TO A COUNTRY BEYOND THE SEA, HER SON ALSO [GOING] WITH THEM, AND WHO CAME BACK AND STATED, 'MY HUSBAND DIED AND AFTERWARDS MY SON DIED', IS BELIEVED.<a id="k118b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; [IF, HOWEVER, SHE STATED.] 'MY SON DIED AND AFTERWARDS MY HUSBAND DIED'.<a id="k118b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; SHE IS NOT BELIEVED,<a id="k118b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; BUT NOTE IS TAKEN OF HER ASSERTION<a id="k118b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; AND SHE MUST, THEREFORE, PERFORM <I>HALIZAH</I><a id="k118b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; AND MAY NOT CONTRACT THE LEVIRATE MARRIAGE.<a id="k118b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>
</p><p>
	[IF A WOMAN<a id="k118b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; STATES].<a id="k118b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; 'A SON WAS GIVEN TO ME [WHILE I WAS] IN A COUNTRY BEYOND THE SEA' AND SHE ALSO ASSERTS, 'MY SON DIED AND AFTERWARDS MY HUSBAND DIED', SHE IS BELIEVED.<a id="k118b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; [IF, HOWEVER, SHE STATES]. 'MY HUSBAND DIED AND AFTERWARDS MY SON DIED.<a id="k118b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; SHE IS NOT BELIEVED,<a id="k118b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; BUT NOTE IS TAKEN OF HER ASSERTION<a id="k118b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; AND SHE MUST, THEREFORE, PERFORM <I>HALIZAH</I><a id="k118b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; BUT MAY NOT CONTRACT LEVIRATE MARRIAGE.<a id="k118b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>
</p><p>
	[19 F A WOMAN<a id="k118b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; STATES]. 'A BROTHER-IN-LAW WAS GIVEN TO ME [WHILE I WAS] IN A COUNTRY BEYOND THE SEA',<a id="k118b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; AND SHE ALSO STATES, 'MY HUSBAND DIED AND AFTERWARDS MY BROTHER-IN-LAW DIED OR 'MY BROTHER-IN-LAW DIED AND AFTERWARDS MY HUSBAND DIED', SHE IS BELIEVED.<a id="k118b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>
</p><p>
	IF A WOMAN AND HER HUSBAND AND HER BROTHER-IN-LAW WENT TO A COUNTRY BEYOND THE SEA, AND SHE [ON RETURNING HOME] STATED, 'MY HUSBAND DIED AND AFTERWARDS MY BROTHER-IN-LAW [DIED]' OR 'MY BROTHER-IN-LAW [DIED] AND AFTERWARDS MY HUSBAND [DIED]'. SHE IS NOT BELIEVED; FOR A WOMAN IS NOT TO BE BELIEVED WHEN SHE ASSERTS 'MY BROTHER-IN-LAW IS DEAD', IN ORDER THAT SHE MAY MARRY AGAIN. NOR [WHEN SHE STATES THAT] HER SISTER IS DEAD. IN ORDER THAT SHE MAY ENTER HIS<a id="k118b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; HOUSE.<a id="k118b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; A MAN ALSO IS NOT BELIEVED WHEN HE ASSERTS 'MY BROTHER IS DEAD', SO THAT HE MAY CONTRACT LEVIR' ATE MARRIAGE WITH HIS WIFE, NOR [WHEN HE ASSERTS THAT] HIS WIFE IS DEAD, IN ORDER THAT HE MAY MARRY HER SISTER.<a id="k118b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. Raba enquired of R. Nahman: What [is the legal position] if a husband transferred to his wife [through an agent]<a id="k118b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; the possession of a letter of divorce, where a brother-in-law<a id="k118b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; is in existence?<a id="k118b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; [Is the divorce], since she [usually] hates her brother. in-law, an advantage to her and [consequently valid, because] a privilege may be conferred upon a person in his absence; or is it possible [that the divorce], since she sometimes loves her brother-in-law, is a disadvantage to her and [consequently invalid because] no disadvantage may be imposed upon a person in his absence? The other replied. We have learned this: NOTE IS TAKEN OF HER ASSERTION AND SHE MUST, THEREFORE, PERFORM <I>HALIZAH</I>. BUT MAY NOT CONTRACT THE LEVIRATE MARRIAGE.<a id="k118b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; 
</p><p>
	Said Rabina to Raba: What [is the legal decision] if a husband transferred to his wife [through an agent]<a id="k118b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; the possession of a letter of divorce at a time<a id="k118b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; when a quarrel [raged between them]? [Is the divorce], since she has a quarrel with her husband, an advantage to her or [is it a disadvantage, since] the gratification of bodily desires is possibly preferred by her?<a id="k118b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Come and hear what Resh Lakish said: 'It is preferable to live in grief<a id="k118b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; than to dwell in widowhood'.<a id="k118b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Abaye said: 'With a husband [of the size of an] ant her seat is placed among the great'.<a id="k118b_47"><sup>47</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Papa said: Though her husband be a carder<a id="k118b_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; she calls him to the threshold and sits down [at his side].<a id="k118b_49"><sup>49</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Ashi said: If her husband is only a cabbage-head<a id="k118b_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; she requires no lentils<a id="k118b_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; for her pot.<a id="k118b_52"><sup>52</sup></a>
</p><p>
	A Tanna taught: All such women<a id="k118b_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; play the harlot and attribute the results<a id="k118b_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; to their husbands.
</P>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k116a_1:" In deciding the ownership of a note of indebtedness of the nature if the notes mentioned."
,k116a_2:" That the actual creditor had lost the note and that the man who produced it. whose name is the same as that of the creditor, had found it."
,k116a_3:" The remote and unlikely possibility of loss may. therefore, be completely disregarded."
,k116a_4:" That the holder of the note is not its owner, but only keeper or trustee for another man of the same name as his."
,k116a_5:" Since he knows full well that the keeper might at any moment claim to be the creditor."
,k116a_6:" In justification of the assumption that the man producing the note is not the real creditor."
,k116a_7:" The creditor when selling the note to the man who now utters it."
,k116a_8:" But did not transfer its possession by the usual <i>kinyan</i>. And, since the seller may withdraw' from the sale before legal transfer had taken place, it might be assumed that the creditor named in the note withdrew from the sale and that the man of the same name who now produces the note is not its owner even through purchase."
,k116a_9:" I.e., a note of indebtedness."
,k116a_10:" V. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a> The delivery of the note completes the legal transfer after which the seller can no longer withdraw. Cf Kid. 47b. p BB 76a. 77a."
,k116a_11:" [Hagronia. a suburb of Nehardea (Obermeyer p. 266)]."
,k116a_12:" In Nehardea; while the letter of divorce was written at Sura. Owing to the distance between the two towns it was impossible for him to have been in the one as well as in the other on the same day."
,k116a_13:" Where a search revealed that only one such person lived throughout that region."
,k116a_14:" V. <i>supra</i> n. 2."
,k116a_15:" Lit., 'what did he require'."
,k116a_16:" [The distance between Nehardea and Sura was about twenty parasangs, a travelling journey of two days. v. Obermeyer P. 251]."
,k116a_17:" Where it was definitely established that another man of such a name existed."
,k116a_18:" Dromedary (?) V. Mak., Sonc. ed., P. 21, n. 4."
,k116a_19:" Lit., 'or also'."
,k116a_20:" And so it was possible for him to be in both towns on the same day."
,k116a_21:" At Nehardea."
,k116a_22:" In Sura."
,k116a_23:" Shili and Hini were situated near each other (cf. Bezah 25b) on the South of Sura; v. B.B., Sonc. ed., p. 753' n. 6."
,k116a_24:" The place name entered in a legal document is not that of the locality where the transaction which it records took place or the instructions concerning its writing were given, but that of the locality where the document was written."
,k116a_25:" Which proves that it was customary for scribes to write legal documents in one place for people who gave them the necessary instruction in another."
,k116a_26:" Discussed <i>supra</i> 115b."
,k116a_27:" Lit.. 'all of them also'."
,k116a_28:" When they are angry. They do not mean it seriously. Why, then, should a woman, because of a momentary outburst, be suspected of inventing a tale about her husband's death?"
,k116a_29:" [H] (abr. [H]), lit.. 'the things never were'."
,k116a_30:" Why is not a wife in such a case believed if she states that her husband is dead?"
,k116a_31:" Out of hatred she might deliberately invent the tale that her husband was dead so that by marrying again she might become forbidden to him forever."
,k116a_32:" Though she might not deliberately tell an untruth, her hatred would prevent her from finding out what exactly happened to her husband if ever he was placed in a position of danger. The likelihood of his death would be regarded by ber as a certainty."
,k116a_33:" R. Hanina and R. Shimi. Is not her word mistrusted in either case? "
}

txt:
<p>
What possibility can be taken into consideration!<a id="k116a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; If that of loss,<a id="k116a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; one is surely careful with [a note of indebtedness];<a id="k116a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; if that of a deposit,<a id="k116a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; since the name of the one is like that of the other the former does not entrust the latter with such a deposit;<a id="k116a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; what then can be said?<a id="k116a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; That he<a id="k116a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; may only have delivered [the note] to him!<a id="k116a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Letters'<a id="k116a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; [it may be replied] are acquired by <i>mesirah</i>.<a id="k116a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>
</p><p>
	A letter of divorce was once found at Sura, and in it appeared this entry: 'In the town of Sura, I, Anan son of Hiyya. a Nehardean, released and divorced my wife So-and-so.' Now when the Rabbis searched from Sura to Nehardea [they found that] there was no other Anan son of Hiyya save one Anan son of Hiyya of Hagra<a id="k116a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; who was at that time at Nehardea, and witnesses came and declared that on the day on which the letter of divorce was written Anan son of Hiyya of Hagra was with them.<a id="k116a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; Said Abaye: Even according to me who hold that [the possibility of the existence of other men of the same name] is to be taken into consideration. no such possibility need be considered here,<a id="k116a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; for [even in respect of the only other man known to have that name] witnesses declared that he was at Nehardea;<a id="k116a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; how then could he [on the same day,] have been<a id="k116a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; at Sura!<a id="k116a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; Raba said: Even according to me who hold that [the possibility of the existence of other men of the same name] is not to be taken into consideration. [such possibility] must be considered here,<a id="k116a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; since [the man in question] may have gone [to Sura] on a flying camel,<a id="k116a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; or<a id="k116a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; [got there] by a miraculous leap,<a id="k116a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; or<a id="k116a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; he may have given verbal instructions<a id="k116a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; [for the letter of divorce to be written<a id="k116a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; on his behalf], as, [in fact] Rab said to his scribes, and R. Huna, similarly, said to his scribes: When you are at Shili<a id="k116a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; write [in any deed] 'At Shili', although the instructions were given to you at Hini,<a id="k116a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; and when you are at Hini,<a id="k116a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; write, 'At Hini', although the instructions Were given to you at Shili.<a id="k116a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>
</p><p>
	What is [the decision] in respect of the sesame?<a id="k116a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; R. Yemar ruled: [The possibility that it was removed and replaced by another lot] is not to be taken into consideration; Rabina ruled: It is to be taken into consideration; and the law is that it is to be taken into consideration.
</p><p>
	DISCORD BETWEEN HIM AND HER etc. What is to be understood by DISCORD BETWEEN HIM AND HER? Rab Judah replied in the name of Samuel: When [a wife] says to her husband. 'Divorce me!' Do not all women<a id="k116a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; say this?<a id="k116a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; Rather [this is the meaning]: When she says to her husband. 'You have divorced me!' Then let her be believed on the strength of R. Hamnuna's ruling; for R. Hamnuna ruled: If a woman said to her husband, 'You have divorced me'. she is believed, for it is an established principle that no woman would dare [to make such a false assertion] in the presence of her husband! &mdash; [Here it is a case] where she said. 'You have divorced me in the presence Of So-and-so and So-and-so', who. when asked, stated that this had never happened.<a id="k116a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>
</p><p>
	What is the reason in case Of DISCORD?<a id="k116a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; R Hanina explained: Because she is likely to tell a lie.<a id="k116a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Shimi b. Ashi explained: Because she speaks from conjecture.<a id="k116a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; What is the practical difference between them?<a id="k116a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k116b_1:" Lit., 'accustomed', i.e., introduced."
,k116b_2:" While the wife shewed no hatred towards him. As she does not hate him she would not invent a lie in order to get rid of him but would nevertheless readily believe that he was dead should he ever have found himself in a position of danger. She would not take the trouble to ascertain whether her conjecture was not groundless."
,k116b_3:" When he gives evidence that a husband died in normal circumstances."
,k116b_4:" And the widow is allowed to marry again."
,k116b_5:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 811, n. 13."
,k116b_6:" Hence he is believed."
,k116b_7:" V. <i>supra</i> note 3."
,k116b_8:" Lit., 'to him'."
,k116b_9:" Teku, v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k116b_10:" The Sages.,"
,k116b_11:" Who feels her loss and gives expression to it by her weeping and her torn garments. Others render 'sly'. 'one able to simulate' (cf. Golds.)."
,k116b_12:" Who is unconscious of her loss and consequently gives no outward expression to any grief. [H] may also be rendered 'foolish', 'silly', 'simpleton'. Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 11, second rendering."
,k116b_13:" Lit., 'but'."
,k116b_14:" Stating that her husband died in a country beyond the sea."
,k116b_15:" Cur. edd 'R'"
,k116b_16:" Since she did not manifest any signs of grief her remarriage should, according to R. Judah's ruling. have been forbidden!"
,k116b_17:" The Sages in our Mishnah and in the quoted Baraitha."
,k116b_18:" Rab Judah."
,k116b_19:" That a wife is believed when she states that her husband is dead,"
,k116b_20:" The reason is explained <i>infra</i>."
,k116b_21:" It being thus possible to verify the woman's statement."
,k116b_22:" [H]. Lit., 'in what is', The ruling of the Sages was given in connection with a particular case where it so happened that the woman returned from a harvest. The same ruling, however, is applicable in all circumstances. [The term generally denotes 'what usually happens'. It is in this sense that it seems to be taken by the T. J. quoted by Tosaf. (s.v [H]]): Why should the harvest (be different)? Said A. Mana: It is different in that an accident usually happens there on account of the scorching sun]."
,k116b_23:" That a wife's evidence regarding the death of her husband may be accepted only in circumstances similar to those of the original incident. (Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 4)."
,k116b_24:" Lit., 'I have but'."
,k116b_25:" The incident (cf. <i>supra</i> note 4) having occurred during the wheat harvest."
,k116b_26:" Why do they draw a distinction between a husband's death in the same, and in another country."
,k116b_27:" From place to place. Another interpretation: Many people knew the husband."
,k116b_28:" To bring a false report which could be easily disproved by one of (a) the travellers or (b) the men who knew the husband, Cf. n. 2."
,k116b_29:" Cf. <i>supra</i> note 2 mutatis mutandis."
,k116b_30:" Cf'. <i>supra</i> n. 3 mutatis mutandis."
,k116b_31:" Do they not provide against the possibility of a wife's mendacity!"
,k116b_32:" From one country to another."
,k116b_33:" Cf. <i>supra</i> note 2 and note 3 mutatis mutandis."
,k116b_34:" Spoken of <i>supra</i>."
,k116b_35:" So MS.M. Cur. edd., 'Akiba'."
,k116b_36:" Cf. Num. XIX, 1ff."
,k116b_37:" Lit., 'cause them to ride'."
,k116b_38:" The Sages."
,k116b_39:" When enacting the prohibitions mentioned."
,k116b_40:" Tosef. Parah VIII, v. <i>supra</i>."
,k116b_41:" The authors of the first ruling in the Baraitha cited."
,k116b_42:" Since both hold that the restrictions apply not only to conditions which are exactly the same as those of the original incident but to any other condition also."
,k116b_43:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 3 mutatis mutandis, Is it likely. however, that the Rabbis and R. Hanania would differ from Beth Hillel and Beth Shammai respectively!"
,k116b_44:" Lit., 'we (as to) what we said'."
,k116b_45:" Restricting the law to conditions exactly similar to those of the original incident."
,k116b_46:" In the case of a wife's evidence on the death of her husband."
,k116b_47:" Transporting the water and ashes of purification."
,k116b_48:" Of course it does not matter."
,k116b_49:" Trusting the evidence of the wife in all cases, even where the conditions differ from those of the original incident."
,k116b_50:" Whether her husband was dead."
,k116b_51:" V. <i>supra</i> note 8."
,k116b_52:" Spoken of <i>supra</i>."
,k116b_53:" Cf Num. XIX, 1ff."
,k116b_54:" The minimum that causes defilement of objects that come in contact with it or that are placed in the same ohel (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>)."
,k116b_55:" A woman who reports her husband's death."
,k116b_56:" If the woman were not telling the truth she would still be a married woman and her second marriage would be illicit,"
,k116b_57:" Lit., 'that is light'. "
}

txt:
<p>
 &mdash; The practical difference between them arises in the case where [the husband] created<a id="k116b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; the discord.<a id="k116b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>
</p><p>
	The question was raised: What [is the law in respect of] one witness in a case of discord? Is the reason why one witness is [elsewhere]<a id="k116b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; believed<a id="k116b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; that he would not tell a lie which is likely to be exposed.<a id="k116b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; and consequently he would here also tell no lie;<a id="k116b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; or is it possible that the reason why one witness is believed elsewhere<a id="k116b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; is that [the woman] herself makes careful enquiries and [only then] marries again; here, therefore, [his evidence should not be accepted] since, as there was discord between husband and wife,<a id="k116b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; she would not make careful enquiries and yet would marry again? &mdash; This remains undecided.<a id="k116b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. JUDAH SAID: SHE IS NEVER etc. It was taught: They<a id="k116b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; said to R. Judah: According to your statement, only a woman of sound senses<a id="k116b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; would be allowed to marry again while an imbecile<a id="k116b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; would never be allowed to marry again! But the fact is that<a id="k116b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; the one as well as the other may be allowed to marry again.
</p><p>
	A woman<a id="k116b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; once came to Rab<a id="k116b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; Judah's <i>Beth din</i>. 'Mourn', they said to her, 'for your husband, rend your garments and loosen your hair'. Did they teach her to simulate!<a id="k116b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; They themselves held the same view as the Rabbis,<a id="k116b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; but in order that he<a id="k116b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; also should allow her to marry they advised her to do so. 
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. BETH HILLEL STATED: WE HAVE HEARD SUCH A TRADITION<a id="k116b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; ONLY IN RESPECT OF A WOMAN WHO CAME FROM THE HARVEST<a id="k116b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; AND [WHOSE HUSBAND DIED] IN THE SAME COUNTRY,<a id="k116b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; [THE CIRCUMSTANCES BEING THE SAME] AS THOSE OF A CASE THAT ONCE ACTUALLY HAPPENED. SAID BETH SHAMMAI TO THEM: [THE LAW IS] THE SAME WHETHER THE WOMAN CAME FROM THE HARVEST OR FROM THE OLIVE PICKING, OR FROM THE VINTAGE, OR FROM ONE COUNTRY TO ANOTHER, FOR THE SAGES SPOKE OF THE HARVEST ONLY [BECAUSE THE INCIDENT TO WHICH THEY REFERRED] OCCURRED THEN.<a id="k116b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; BETH HILLEL, THEREFORE, CHANGED THEIR VIEW [THENCEFORWARD] TO RULE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OPINION OF BETH SHAMMAI.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. It was taught: Beth Shammai said to Beth Hillel, According to your View,<a id="k116b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; one would only know the law concerning<a id="k116b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; the wheat harvest;<a id="k116b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; whence, however, [the law concerning] the barley harvest? And, furthermore, one would only know the law in the case where<a id="k116b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; one harvested; whence, however, [the law in the case where] one held a vintage, picked olives, harvested dates, or picked figs? But [you must admit] it is only the original incident that occurred at harvest time and that the same law is applicable to all [the other seasons]. So here also [we maintain that] the incident occurred with [a husband who died] in the same country. and the same law is applicable to all [other countries]. And Beth Hillel?<a id="k116b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; In the case of the same country. where people freely [move about].<a id="k116b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; she is afraid;<a id="k116b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; [coming. however]. from one country to another, since people do not freely [move about].<a id="k116b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; she is not afraid.<a id="k116b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; And Beth Shammai?<a id="k116b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Here<a id="k116b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; also caravans frequently [move about].<a id="k116b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>
</p><p>
	What was the original incident?<a id="k116b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp;&mdash; [It was that of] which Rab Judah spoke in the name of Samuel: It was the end of the wheat harvest when ten men went to reap their wheat and a serpent bit one of them and he died [of the wound]. His wife, thereupon, came and reported the incident to <i>Beth din</i>, who, having sent [to investigate]. found her statement to be true. At that time it was ordained: If a woman stated, 'My husband is dead', she may marry again; [if she said] 'My husband is dead [and left no issue]', she may contract the levirate marriage.
</p><p>
	Must it be suggested that R. Hanania b. Akabia<a id="k116b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; and the Rabbis differ on the same principle as that on which Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel differ? For it was taught: No man shall carry water of purification<a id="k116b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; and ashes of purification<a id="k116b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; across the Jordan on board a ship, nor may one stand on [the bank on] one side and throw them across to the other side, nor may one float them upon water nor may one carry them while riding<a id="k116b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; on a beast or on the back of another man unless his [own] feet were touching the [river] bed. He may, however, convey them across a bridge. [These laws are applicable] as well to the Jordan as to other rivers. R. Hanania b. Akabia<a id="k116b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; said: They<a id="k116b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; spoke<a id="k116b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; only of the Jordan and of [transport] on board a ship, as was the case in the original incident.<a id="k116b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; Must it, then, be assumed that the Rabbis<a id="k116b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; hold the same view as Beth Shammai<a id="k116b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; while R. Hanania b. Akabia holds the same view as Beth Hillel?<a id="k116b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; The Rabbis can answer you: Our ruling agrees with the view<a id="k116b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; of Beth Hillel also; for Beth Hillel maintained their opinion<a id="k116b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; only there,<a id="k116b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; since [the woman is believed only because] she fears [to tell an untruth, and it is only] in a place that is near that she fears while in a distant one she does not fear. Here,<a id="k116b_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; however, what matters it whether it is on the Jordan or on other rivers!<a id="k116b_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Hanania b. Akabia can also answer you: I may uphold my view even according to Beth Shammai; for Beth Shammai maintained their opinion<a id="k116b_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; only there<a id="k116b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; because [a woman] makes careful enquiries<a id="k116b_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; and [only then] marries again. Hence, what matters it whether the locality was near or far. Here,<a id="k116b_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; however, [the prohibition] is due to an actual incident; hence it is only [against transport] on the Jordan and on board a ship, where the incident occurred, that the Rabbis enacted their preventive measure, but against other rivers where the incident did not occur the Rabbis enacted no preventive measure.
</p><p>
	What was the incident?<a id="k116b_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; [It was that] which Rab Judah related in the name of Rab: A man was once transporting Water of purification<a id="k116b_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; and ashes of purification<a id="k116b_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; across the Jordan on board a ship, and a piece of a corpse, of the size of an olive,<a id="k116b_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; was found stuck in the bottom of the ship. At that time It was ordained: No man shall carry Water of purification and ashes of purification across the Jordan on board a ship.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. BETH SHAMMAI RULED: SHE<a id="k116b_55"><sup>55</sup></a>&nbsp; IS PERMITTED TO MARRY AGAIN AND SHE RECEIVES HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>. BETH HILLEL, HOWEVER, RULED: SHE IS PERMITTED TO MARRY AGAIN BUT SHE DOES NOT RECEIVE HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>. SAID BETH SHAMMAI TO THEM: YOU HAVE PERMITTED [WHAT MIGHT BE] THE GRAVE OFFENCE OF ILLICIT INTERCOURSE,<a id="k116b_56"><sup>56</sup></a>&nbsp; SHALL WE NOT PERMIT [THE TAKING OF HER HUSBAND'S] MONEY WHICH IS OF LESS IMPORTANCE!<a id="k116b_57"><sup>57</sup></a>&nbsp; BETH HILLEL ANSWERED THEM: WE FIND
</P>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k117a_1:" Though inheritance is a monetary affair, Only in order to save her from a life-long widowhood was a woman allowed on her own evidence to marry again. In monetary matters, however, the evidence of two eligible witnesses (cf. Deut. XIX. 15) is a sine qua non."
,k117a_2:" That she is entitled to her <i>kethubah</i>."
,k117a_3:" A woman who reported the death of her husband."
,k117a_4:" Of the deceased. Cf. <i>supra</i> 40a."
,k117a_5:" Beth Shammai, and later also Beth Hillel, in our Mishnah."
,k117a_6:" Deut. XXV, 6, explained Rabbinically to refer to the levir."
,k117a_7:" Hence he is also entitled to the inheritance."
,k117a_8:" She probably knows that her husband is alive and she has no intention of marrying again. All she aims at is the acquisition of the money."
,k117a_9:" And even marriage should, therefore, be forbidden to her,"
,k117a_10:" But her main purpose was matrimony. Hence both her requests should be granted."
,k117a_11:" Reading of Rashal, inserted in cur. edd, within square brackets."
,k117a_12:" Since she mentioned her <i>kethubah</i> first,"
,k117a_13:" She may have thought that it was the <i>kethubah</i> that releases her from her dead husband and it is for this reason that she mentioned it first. Cf. <i>supra</i> note 3'"
,k117a_14:" Teku. v. Glos,"
,k117a_15:" That her husband died."
,k117a_16:" Any woman."
,k117a_17:" The wife of her husband's brother, who becomes her rival if levirate marriage is contracted."
,k117a_18:" All these are assumed to be, for one reason or another, hostile to her and are therefore suspected of giving false evidence (cf. <i>supra</i> n. 8) in the expectation that she will marry again and thereby become forever forbidden to their relative, her first husband."
,k117a_19:" I.e., why are the relatives mentioned accepted as qualified bearers of her letter of divorce, (v. Git, 23b) and not as eligible witnesses to testify to the death of her husband?"
,k117a_20:" The letter of divorce,"
,k117a_21:" It is mainly the document itself that constitutes the validity of the divorce and not the eligibility of its bearer."
,k117a_22:" To give evidence that her husband was dead,"
,k117a_23:" From another wife who is not her mother-in-law."
,k117a_24:" I.e., her mother-in-law."
,k117a_25:" The daughter of that mother-in-law."
,k117a_26:" In the case of the daughter of her father-in-law,"
,k117a_27:" The daughter of her father-in-law is therefore eligible as a witness."
,k117a_28:" The daughter."
,k117a_29:" Lit., 'eats'."
,k117a_30:" Lit.,'wife's family'. In consequence of which she hates her and is, therefore, ineligible to be her witness."
,k117a_31:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 824. nn. 8 and 9."
,k117a_32:" That the daughter of a father-in-law is also ineligible as witness."
,k117a_33:" Since our Mishnah had enumerated five others. From this then it may be inferred that the daughter of a father-in-law is eligible."
,k117a_34:" The daughter."
,k117a_35:" So BaH. Cur. edd., 'of the father-in-law'."
,k117a_36:" Both, therefore, may be regarded as one. Hence the number five,"
,k117a_37:" Cur. edd., 'we learned'."
,k117a_38:" While our Mishnah enumerates only five."
,k117a_39:" Cur. edd., 'we learned'."
,k117a_40:" To the number of women who are ineligible to testify to the death of another woman's husband."
,k117a_41:" The stepmother of the woman in question."
,k117a_42:" The Sages."
,k117a_43:" Since a husband's daughter is ineligible as witness for a husband's wife it is obvious that the latter also, since both stand in the same relationship to one another, is equally ineligible as witness for the former. V. <i>infra</i> n. 6."
,k117a_44:" As a mother-in-law is precluded from giving evidence for her daughter-in-law so, it is obvious, is the latter (cf. <i>supra</i> n. 5) precluded from giving evidence for the former. There was no need, therefore, to enumerate all the four. The mention of two of these embraces the four."
,k117a_45:" Why in view of the explanation of the Rabbis does he enumerate seven?"
,k117a_46:" As the wife of her son and heir she would in due course become mistress of her possessions."
,k117a_47:" Her ineligibility, therefore, cannot be inferred from the other. Hence it was necessary specifically to mention her."
,k117a_48:" R. Judah."
,k117a_49:" Who, as was just explained, are not hostile to the others, and should, therefore, be eligible to give evidence for them!"
,k117a_50:" Lit., 'reveals', 'discloses'."
,k117a_51:" Her daughter-in-law."
,k117a_52:" Her father's wife; her stepmother."
,k117a_53:" Why, in view of R. Judah's explanation, do they omit the two from their list?"
,k117a_54:" prov. XXVII, 19. Hatred is mutual. As a husband's daughter hates her father's wife so does the latter hate the former; and the same reciprocity exists between a mother-in-law and her daughter-in-law. There was no need, therefore, to mention them all. The four are covered by the two."
,k117a_55:" Lit., 'this'."
,k117a_56:" Lit.. 'is written'."
,k117a_57:" Effort and success are interdependent as in water face answereth face. Or: The successful achievement of the student is dependent on the sympathy and understanding (the cheerful countenance) of the Master."
,k117a_58:" Palestine, which lay on the West of Babylon."
,k117a_59:" Lit.. 'that comes afterwards'. i.e., the mother of the levir and stepmother of the husband of the woman in question. who might become her mother-in-law if her husband died childless and she had to contract the levirate marriage with the levir."
,k117a_60:" Is she eligible as witness if she testifies that her stepson is dead in consequence of which the wife of the deceased must either marry her son or perform <i>halizah</i> with him and marry a stranger (Rashi). [R. Hananel (v. Lewin B. M. Ozar ha-Geonim, Yebamoth p. 334) explains the problem differently. viz., can a woman give evidence on behalf of her potential mother-in-law? Where. for instance, Jacob had two wives, Leah and Rachel, the former of whom bore him a son, Reuben, and the latter, Joseph; and the question arises whether the wife of Reuben may testify as to the death of Jacob, her father-in-law, permitting the remarriage of Rachel, her potential mother-in-law. For should her own husband Reuben die, she would have to contract levirate marriage with his brother Joseph. Rachel thus becoming her mother-in-law]."
,k117a_61:" For whom she tenders evidence."
,k117a_62:" As her future mother-in-law."
,k117a_63:" Hence she is ineligible as a witness for her. "
}

txt:
<p>
THAT ON HER EVIDENCE, THE BROTHERS MAY NOT ENTER INTO THEIR INHERITANCE.<a id="k117a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; SAID BETH SHAMMAI TO THEM: DO WE NOT LEARN THIS<a id="k117a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; FROM HER <I>KETHUBAH</I> SCROLL WHEREIN [HER HUSBAND] PRESCRIBES FOR HER, 'IF THOU BE MARRIED TO ANOTHER MAN, THOU WILT RECEIVE WHAT IS PRESCRIBED FOR THEE'! THEREUPON BETH HILLEL WITHDREW THIS OPINION, THENCEFORTH TO RULE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VIEW OF BETH SHAMMAI.
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. R. Hisda stated: If she<a id="k117a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; is taken in levirate marriage the levir enters into the inheritance<a id="k117a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; on her evidence. If they<a id="k117a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; made an exposition on the <i>kethubah</i>, shall we not make an exposition on the Torah? The All Merciful said, Shall succeed in the name of his brother,<a id="k117a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; and he has surely succeeded.<a id="k117a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Nahman ruled: If [a woman] came before <i>Beth din</i> and stated, 'My husband is dead; permit me to marry again'. permission must be granted her to marry again. and she is given her <i>kethubah</i>. [If she demanded]. 'Give me my kethubah', she must not be permitted even to marry. What is the reason? Because she came with her mind intent on the kethubuh.<a id="k117a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>
</p><p>
	The question was raised: What is the ruling [where she said], 'Permit me to marry and give me my kethubah'? Has she come with her mind intent on the <i>kethubah</i>, since she specified her <i>kethubah</i><a id="k117a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; or [is it assumed that] a person [naturally] lays before the <i>Beth din</i> all the claims he has!<a id="k117a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; And<a id="k117a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; should you find [a reason for deciding in her favour because] a person submits whatever claim he has to the <i>Beth din</i>, [the question still remains as to] what [is the law where she stated]. 'Give me my <i>kethubah</i> and permit me to marry'? [Is it assumed that] in this case<a id="k117a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; she has undoubtedly come with her mind bent on the <i>kethubah</i>. or is it possible [that she mentioned her <i>kethubah</i>] because<a id="k117a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; she did not know by what means she becomes permitted [to marry again].<a id="k117a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; This is undecided.<a id="k117a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. ALL ARE REGARDED AS TRUSTWORTHY TO GIVE EVIDENCE<a id="k117a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; FOR HER<a id="k117a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; EXCEPTING HER MOTHER-IN-LAW. THE DAUGHTER OF HER MOTHER-IN-LAW, HER RIVAL, HER SISTER-IN-LAW<a id="k117a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; AND HER HUSBAND'S DAUGHTER.<a id="k117a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; WHEREIN LIES THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN [THE ADMISSIBILITY OF] A LETTER OF DIVORCE AND [THAT OF THE EVIDENCE OF] DEATH?<a id="k117a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; IN THAT THE WRITTEN DOCUMENT<a id="k117a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; PROVIDES THE PROOF.<a id="k117a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. The question was raised: What [is the law in regard to the eligibility<a id="k117a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; of] the daughter of her father-in-law?<a id="k117a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; Is the reason [for the ineligibility] of the daughter of her mother-in-law because there is a mother<a id="k117a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; who hates her she<a id="k117a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; also hates her; here,<a id="k117a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; however, there is no mother who hates her?<a id="k117a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; Or is it possible that the reason [for the ineligibility] of the daughter of her mother-inlaw is because she<a id="k117a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; believes that the other squanders<a id="k117a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; the savings of her mother; there,<a id="k117a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; then, she also believes that she squanders<a id="k117a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; the savings of her father-in-law?<a id="k117a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; 
</p><p>
	Come and hear: 'All are regarded as trustworthy to give evidence for her<a id="k117a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; excepting five women'; but if that were so<a id="k117a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; [the number should] be six!<a id="k117a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; It is possible that the reason [for the ineligibility] of the daughter of her mother-in-law is because she<a id="k117a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; believes that the other squanders the savings of her mother<a id="k117a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; [and, therefore] there is no difference between the daughter of her mother-in-law and the daughter of her father-in-law.<a id="k117a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; But, surely. it was taught.<a id="k117a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Excepting seven women'!<a id="k117a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; This is the view of R. Judah. For it was taught:<a id="k117a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Judah adds<a id="k117a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; also a father's wife<a id="k117a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; and a daughter-In-law. They<a id="k117a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; said to him: A father's wife<a id="k117a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; is, in fact, included in the expression 'a husband's daughter',<a id="k117a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; and a daughter-in-law is obviously included in the expression 'her mother-in-law'.<a id="k117a_44"><sup>44</sup></a>
</p><p>
	And R. Judah?<a id="k117a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; - Because one can well understand why a mother-in-law should hate her daughter-in-law, since the former believes that the latter squanders her Savings,<a id="k117a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; but why should a daughter-in-law hate her mother-in-law!<a id="k117a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; Similarly one may well understand why a husband's daughter hates her father's wife, since the former believes that she is squandering her mother's savings, but why should a father's wife hate her husband's daughter!<a id="k117a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>
</p><p>
	Why, then, does he<a id="k117a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; add the two?<a id="k117a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; But [this is the true explanation]: Why does a daughter-in-law hate her mother-in-law? Because the latter reports<a id="k117a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; to her son all that she<a id="k117a_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; does. [Similarly] a father's wife also hates her husband's daughter because the latter reports<a id="k117a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; to her father all that she<a id="k117a_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; does. And the Rabbis?<a id="k117a_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; As in water face answereth to face, so the heart of man to man.<a id="k117a_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp; And R. Judah? &mdash; The text<a id="k117a_55"><sup>55</sup></a>&nbsp; applies<a id="k117a_56"><sup>56</sup></a>&nbsp; to [the study of] the words of the Torah.<a id="k117a_57"><sup>57</sup></a>
</p><p>
	R. Aha b. 'Awya said: In the West<a id="k117a_58"><sup>58</sup></a>&nbsp; they asked: What is the ruling in respect of a potential<a id="k117a_59"><sup>59</sup></a>&nbsp; mother-in-law?<a id="k117a_60"><sup>60</sup></a>&nbsp; Does it occur to her that [this woman's]<a id="k117a_61"><sup>61</sup></a>&nbsp; husband might die [without issue] and she<a id="k117a_62"><sup>62</sup></a>&nbsp; would thereby be subject to the levir, and therefore. she<a id="k117a_62"><sup>62</sup></a>&nbsp; hates her;<a id="k117a_63"><sup>63</sup></a>&nbsp; or does it not?
</P><hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k117b_1:" To marry again; <i>infra</i> 118a. The evidence as to the death of her husband is not admissible though the witness. since her own husband was dead at the time she gave her evidence, was no longer her daughter-in-law."
,k117b_2:" The witness's."
,k117b_3:" And both women are still related to one another as mother-in-law and daughter-in-law."
,k117b_4:" Lit., 'and what she said thus'."
,k117b_5:" Who if she married again would not any longer be able to live with her first husband, the father-in-law of the witness."
,k117b_6:" Cf. <i>supra</i> p. 827. n. 14."
,k117b_7:" Her mother-in-law."
,k117b_8:" When her husband and son returned from their foreign travels."
,k117b_9:" By reporting to her son all the doings of his wife. It is thus obvious that a daughter-in-law is not believed as a witness for her mother-in-law, though the cause of her hatred (the return of her husband and his mother's gossip) is still a thing of the future and at the time her evidence is given, potential only. From this it follows that a potential mother-in-law also is equally ineligible as a witness for her potential daughter. in-law."
,k117b_10:" Since in that case the woman for whom evidence is given was already her mother-in-law."
,k117b_11:" The daughter-in-law."
,k117b_12:" This case, therefore, provides no proof that a woman hates one who had never been her mother-inlaw and whose annoyances she had never experienced."
,k117b_13:" Who had gone to a country beyond the sea."
,k117b_14:" prior to the appearance of the one witness."
,k117b_15:" Even after he tendered his evidence."
,k117b_16:" Why the woman in the first clause of our Mishnah may live with the man she married."
,k117b_17:" Whose husband's death was reported by the first witness."
,k117b_18:" Since our Mishnah only states that SHE NEED NOT BE DIVORCED and does not state that she may marry again."
,k117b_19:" As is the case here, where one witness testifies to the death of a husband (cf. <i>supra</i> 88b)."
,k117b_20:" Lit., 'behold here'."
,k117b_21:" In our case, that of the second witness."
,k117b_22:" Lit., 'in the place of'."
,k117b_23:" In the first instance, the first witness whose evidence had been accepted as valid as that of two."
,k117b_24:" Sot. 31b, Keth. 22b, <i>supra</i> 88b. Why then should not the woman be directly permitted to marry again?"
,k117b_25:" The original [H], lit., 'she shall (or need) not go out', may bear this meaning as well as that given in our Mishnah."
,k117b_26:" Because the decision of <i>Beth din</i> had been issued before the second witness appeared. Had he arrived prior to the issue of the decision, the evidence of the first witness, as it had not yet been accepted. would have had no greater validity than his,"
,k117b_27:" That the woman MUST &hellip; BE DIVORCED,"
,k117b_28:" Lit., 'in the place of',"
,k117b_29:" As is the case in the second clause of our Mishnah."
,k117b_30:" Where the two witnesses were, e.g.. relatives or slaves."
,k117b_31:" As in the case, e.g.. spoken of in the first clause of our Mishnah."
,k117b_32:" As the accepted law of valid evidence is in such cases suspended, the evidence of any ineligible witnesses (cf. <i>supra</i> n. 7) is admitted,"
,k117b_33:" Hence the necessity for the ruling of our Mishnah. In the absence of such a ruling it would have been assumed that the evidence of ineligible witnesses is here also inadmissible."
,k117b_34:" I.e., ineligible witnesses who, after the woman had married again, stated that her husband was not dead,"
,k117b_35:" As the evidence of a single witness when it is opposed to that of a previous witness whose evidence had already been accepted (cf. <i>supra</i> p. 828, n. 18) is completely disregarded, so is the evidence of the hundred women if it conflicts with that of the first eligible witnesses."
,k117b_36:" And, on her evidence, the widow was permitted to marry again. As two women subsequently opposed the statement of the one, the marriage must be annulled by a letter of divorce."
,k117b_37:" Of a valid evidence, i.e., as that of one witness."
,k117b_38:" The evidence of two women against that of one man would, therefore, have the same validity as that of one witness against another, spoken of in the first clause of our Mishnah. and the widow would have retained her first status of permissibility. v. <i>supra</i> 88b."
,k117b_39:" Is it not obvious that two witnesses are relied upon when they are opposed by one witness only!"
,k117b_40:" Though the two witnesses are ineligible. their evidence against that of the one witness, since they form the majority, is accepted, and the widow is permitted to marry again."
,k117b_41:" The ruling in the second clause of our Mishnah which, as has just been explained, teaches this very principle."
,k117b_42:" As in the second clause where, owing to the majority principle, the woman is forbidden to marry again."
,k117b_43:" As in the final clause under discussion, where, by following the majority. the woman is allowed to marry again."
,k117b_44:" Of our Mishnah, to indicate that in all cases the majority is to be followed."
,k117b_45:" Of a man who has gone to a country beyond the sea."
,k117b_46:" Her rival."
,k117b_47:" V. p. 830. n. 9'"
,k117b_48:" Lit.. 'this and this'."
,k117b_49:" Their husband."
,k117b_50:" V. p. 830. n. 9'"
,k117b_51:" Before the <i>Beth din</i>, on the evidence of the first witness, had allowed the woman to marry again. >"
}

txt:
<p>
	Come and hear: If a woman stated. 'My husband died first and my father-in-law died after him'. she may marry again and she also receives her <i>kethubah</i>. but her mother-in-law is forbidden.<a id="k117b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; Now, why is her<a id="k117b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; mother-in-law forbidden? Is it not because it is assumed that neither her<a id="k117b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; husband died nor did her father-in-law die<a id="k117b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; and that by her statement<a id="k117b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; she intended to damage the position of her mother-in-law.<a id="k117b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; hoping that [as a result]<a id="k117b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; she<a id="k117b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; would not in the future<a id="k117b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; come to torment her!<a id="k117b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; There<a id="k117b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; it may be different because she<a id="k117b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; has experienced her annoyance.<a id="k117b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. IF ONE WITNESS STATED, ['THE HUSBAND<a id="k117b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; IS] DEAD', AND THEREUPON HIS WIFE MARRIED AGAIN, AND ANOTHER CAME AND STATED 'HE IS NOT DEAD'. SHE NEED NOT BE DIVORCED. IF ONE WITNESS SAID. 'HE<a id="k117b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; IS DEAD AND TWO WITNESSES SAID. 'HE IS NOT DEAD', SHE MUST, EVEN IF SHE MARRIED AGAIN, BE DIVORCED. IF TWO WITNESSES STATED, 'HE<a id="k117b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; IS DEAD', AND ONE WITNESS STATED, HE IS NOT DEAD', SHE MAY, EVEN IF SHE HAD NOT YET DONE SO,<a id="k117b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; MARRY AGAIN.<a id="k117b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. The reason<a id="k117b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; then is because [the woman]<a id="k117b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; MARRIED AGAIN; had she, however, not married would she<a id="k117b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; not have been permitted to marry? But Surely. 'Ulla stated: Wherever the Torah declared one witness credible,<a id="k117b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; he is regarded<a id="k117b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; as two witnesses, and the evidence of one man<a id="k117b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; against that<a id="k117b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; of two men<a id="k117b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp; has no Validity!<a id="k117b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; It is this that was meant: IF ONE WITNESS STATED ['THE HUSBAND IS] DEAD' and after his wife had been permitted to marry again ANOTHER CAME AND STATED 'HE IS NOT DEAD', she is not to be deprived of<a id="k117b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; her former status of permissibility.<a id="k117b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>
</p><p>
	IF ONE WITNESS SAID, 'HE IS DEAD', Is this not obvious?<a id="k117b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; For the evidence of one man against that Of<a id="k117b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; two men<a id="k117b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; has no validity! &mdash; [This ruling' is] required only in the case of ineligible witnesses<a id="k117b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; [this being] in accordance with the view of R. Nehemiah. For it was taught: R. Nehemiah stated, 'Wherever the Torah declares one witness credible,<a id="k117b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; the majority of statements is to be followed,<a id="k117b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; and [the evidence of] two women against that of one man is given the same validity as that of two men against one man'.<a id="k117b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>
</p><p>
	And if you prefer I might reply: Wherever one eligible witness came first, even a hundred women<a id="k117b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; are regarded as one witness.<a id="k117b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; But [here it is such a case] as, for example, where a woman witness came in the first instance;<a id="k117b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; and [the statement] of R. Nehemiah is to be explained thus: R. Nehemiah stated, 'Wherever the Torah declares one witness credible, the majority of statements is to be followed, and [the evidence of] two women against one woman is given the same validity as that of two men against one man; but [the evidence of] two women against that of one man is regarded as half<a id="k117b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; and half.<a id="k117b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>
</p><p>
	IF TWO WITNESSES STATED, 'HE IS DEAD' etc. What does this teach us?<a id="k117b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; [A ruling] in respect of ineligible witnesses, [the principle being the same] as that of R. Nehemiah who follows the majority of statements.<a id="k117b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; But is not this exactly the same [as the previous clause]!<a id="k117b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; It might have been assumed that the majority is followed only when the law is thereby made more stringent,<a id="k117b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; but not [where it leads] to a relaxation of the law;<a id="k117b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; hence we were taught [the final clause],<a id="k117b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>
</p><p>
	<P><B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. IF ONE WIFE<a id="k117b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; SAID ['HER HUSBAND IS] DEAD' AND THE OTHER WIFE<a id="k117b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; SAID, 'HE IS NOT DEAD, THE ONE WHO SAID, 'HE IS DEAD' MAY MARRY AGAIN AND SHE ALSO RECEIVES HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>, WHILE THE ONE WHO SAID, 'HE IS NOT DEAD, MAY NEITHER MARRY AGAIN NOR IS SHE TO RECEIVE HER <I>KETHUBAH</I>. 
</p><p>
	IF ONE WIFE<a id="k117b_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; STATED, 'HE IS DEAD' AND THE OTHER STATED. 'HE WAS KILLED', R. MEIR RULED: SINCE THEY CONTRADICT ONE ANOTHER THEY MAY NOT MARRY AGAIN. R. JUDAH AND R. SIMEON RULED: SINCE BOTH<a id="k117b_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; ADMIT THAT HE<a id="k117b_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; IS NOT ALIVE, BOTH MAY MARRY AGAIN.
</p><p>
	IF ONE WITNESS STATED, 'HE<a id="k117b_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; IS DEAD', AND ANOTHER WITNESS STATED.<a id="k117b_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; 'HE IS NOT DEAD',
</P>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
notes:
 ntes={k121a_1:" So that the man who inflicted the wounds was not the direct cause of death. Hence he is not to be exiled, though the wife of the victim may well be allowed to marry again on the evidence of the infliction of such mortal wounds."
,k121a_2:" Where no wind can penetrate."
,k121a_3:" According to the first explanation. since no aggravation could have resulted from wind, the offender must be condemned to exile. According to the second explanation he is exonerated, since it is possible that the convulsive movements of the victim brought on his death."
,k121a_4:" Aggravation by wind is possible, while the bringing on of death by the victim himself cannot be assumed."
,k121a_5:" While the first Tanna requires the evidence to be based on an examination of the corpse within three days of death, R. Judah allows it, in certain circumstances, even after three days."
,k121a_6:" Disregarding the evidence under certain conditions even within three days."
,k121a_7:" [H], Heb [H] cf. Targum on Gen. II, 14."
,k121a_8:" [The bridge on the Southern Tigris connecting the great trading route between Khuzistan and Babylon during the persian period; v. Obermeyer pp. 68ff]."
,k121a_9:" Pl. of <i>shoshbin</i>, groomsman'. The <i>shoshbin</i> acted as best men or companions of the groom, to whom they also brought wedding gifts (<i>shoshbinuth</i>)."
,k121a_10:" R. Judah b. Baba."
,k121a_11:" R. Dimi and Raba."
,k121a_12:" Of the corpse, the decay of which consequently sets in later than in the case of a corpse on dry land. Hence it is possible in such circumstances to identify a person even after three days from the time of his death."
,k121a_13:" And changes appearance."
,k121a_14:" This is explained by Abaye <i>infra</i>."
,k121a_15:" It being possible that the man was thrown up by the water after a day or two; and that he was restored to life. V. <i>infra</i> n. 8."
,k121a_16:" Lit., 'and he went up'."
,k121a_17:" In R. Meir's opinion it is possible for one to live in water for a day or two; and the first clause of our Mishnah is in agreement with this view."
,k121a_18:" I.e., to waters 'that had a visible end' (cf. <i>supra</i> note 5)."
,k121a_19:" R. Jose is of the opinion that no human being can survive so long (v. p. 854, n. 8) in water, and death may, therefore, be regarded as a certainty. In the case of water 'that has no visible end', however, he agrees with R. Meir, since it is possible that the body was thrown up on a distant shore where it was restored to life."
,k121a_20:" V. Sanh., Sonc. ed. p. 151, n. 1."
,k121a_21:" V. <i>supra</i> p. 851, n. 17."
,k121a_22:" V. p. 852, n. 1."
,k121a_23:" V. p. 852, 11. 2."
,k121a_24:" This is explained by Abaye <i>infra</i>."
,k121a_25:" V. p. 854, n. 6."
,k121a_26:" It being assumed that the man was not rescued from the water. Any rescue, had it been effected, since all the shores are visible, would have been observed from the point where the drowning occurred."
,k121a_27:" This is explained by Abaye <i>infra</i>."
,k121a_28:" Since the man might have been rescued on another shore which was not visible from the point where the drowning occurred."
,k121a_29:" Lit., 'four winds'. A person observing a drowning accident would not depart as long as there was any hope of rescue, and, as all the shores were visible and no rescue was observed, it may be regarded as a certainty that the drowned man was dead, and his wife may, therefore, be permitted to marry again."
,k121a_30:" For permitting a married woman to remarry."
,k121a_31:" V. p. 855 n. 12."
,k121a_32:" Lit., 'they lowered', and the man was rescued."
,k121a_33:" Prov. XII, 21. Rab was spared the injustice of placing the innocent R. Shila under the ban."
,k121a_34:" Ibid. Xl, 14. The counsel of Samuel saved Rab from a wrong action."
,k121a_35:" [Constructed on the shore to retain the fish washed into it by the overflowing river]."
,k121a_36:" Lit., 'a great mourning in his house'."
,k121a_37:" If such an incident as that related by Rabbi is possible."
,k121a_38:" [There is not sufficient fish to warrant the construction of a pond (Me'iri)]."
,k121a_39:" Lit., 'that he went up'"
,k121a_40:" Lit., 'he has a voice'."
,k121a_41:" Of his wife to another man."
,k121a_42:" <i>Talmud Hakam</i>, v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>"
,k121a_43:" R. Akiba."
,k121a_44:" Thus avoiding its force."
,k121a_45:" Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 6"
,k121a_46:" Lit., 'that was tossed in the sea'."
,k121a_47:" [G] in Asia Minor."
,k121a_48:" Lit., 'vomited me out'."
,k121a_49:" That he is dead."
,k121a_50:" To enable his wife to marry again. "
}

txt:
<p>
have brought on his death,<a id="k121a_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; What is the practical difference between these [two explanations]? &mdash; The case where one cut [another man's organs] in a house of marble<a id="k121a_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; and the latter made some convulsive movements,<a id="k121a_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; or also where he cut his organs out of doors and the latter made no convulsive movements.<a id="k121a_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp;
</p><p>
   	R. JUDAH &hellip; SAID: NOT ALL etc. The question was raised: Does R. Judah b. Baba differ [from the first Tanna] in relaxing the law<a id="k121a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp; or does he differ from him in imposing a greater restriction?<a id="k121a_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Come and hear: A man was once drowned at Karmi and after three days he was hauled up at Be Hedya, and R. Dimi of Nehardea allowed his wife to remarry. And again, it happened that a man was drowned in the Tigris<a id="k121a_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; and after five days he was hauled up to the Shebistana bridge<a id="k121a_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; and, on the evidence of the <i>shoshbinim</i>,<a id="k121a_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; Raba permitted his wife to marry again &mdash; Now, if you grant that he<a id="k121a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; differs [from the first Tanna] in relaxing the law, they<a id="k121a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; might well have acted in accordance with the ruling of R. Judah b. Baba. If you should contend, however, that he<a id="k121a_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; differed in imposing a greater restriction, in accordance with whose view [it may be asked] did they<a id="k121a_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; act? &mdash; Waters are different because they cause contraction.<a id="k121a_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp; But, surely, you said that 'waters [are different since they] irritate the wound'! &mdash; That applies only where a wound exists, but where no wound exists waters cause contraction. This, furthermore, applies only where the witnesses saw the body as soon as it was brought up, but if it remains some time, it swells.<a id="k121a_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp;
</p><p>
   	<B><I>MISHNAH</I></B>. IF A MAN FELL INTO THE WATER, WHETHER IT HAD [A VISIBLE] END<a id="k121a_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; OR NOT, HIS WIFE IS FORBIDDEN [TO MARRY AGAIN].<a id="k121a_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; SAID R. MEIR: IT ONCE HAPPENED THAT A MAN FELL INTO A LARGE CISTERN AND ROSE TO THE SURFACE<a id="k121a_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; AFTER THREE DAYS.<a id="k121a_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; SAID R. JOSE: IT ONCE HAPPENED THAT A BLIND MAN DESCENDED INTO A CAVE.<a id="k121a_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; TO PERFORM RITUAL ABLUTION WHILE HIS GUIDE WENT DOWN AFTER HIM; AND AFTER WAITING LONG ENOUGH FOR THEIR SOULS TO DEPART, PERMISSION WAS GIVEN TO THEIR WIVES TO MARRY AGAIN.<a id="k121a_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; ANOTHER INCIDENT OCCURRED AT ASIA<a id="k121a_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; WHERE A MAN WAS LOWERED INTO THE SEA, AND ONLY HIS LEG WAS BROUGHT UP,<a id="k121a_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; AND THE SAGES RULED: [IF THE RECOVERED LEG CONTAINED THE PART] ABOVE THE KNEE [THE MAN'S WIFE] MAY MARRY AGAIN,<a id="k121a_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; [BUT IF IT CONTAINED ONLY THE PART] BELOW THE KNEE, SHE MAY NOT MARRY AGAIN.<a id="k121a_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp;
</p><p>
   	<B><I>GEMARA</I></B>. Our Rabbis taught: If a man fell into water, whether it had [a visible] end<a id="k121a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; or not, his wife is forbidden [to marry again];<a id="k121a_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; so R. Meir. But the Sages ruled: [If he fell into] water that has [a visible] end,<a id="k121a_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; his wife is permitted [to marry again],<a id="k121a_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; but [if into water] that has no [visible] end<a id="k121a_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; his wife is forbidden [to marry again].<a id="k121a_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp;
</p><p>
   	What is to be understood by 'has [a visible] end'? &mdash; Abaye replied: [An area all the boundaries of which] a person standing [on the edge] is able to see in all directions.<a id="k121a_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp;
</p><p>
   	Once a man was drowned in the swamp of Samki, and R. Shila permitted his wife to marry again. Said Rab to Samuel: 'Come, let us place him under the ban'.<a id="k121a_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; 'Let us first', [the other replied,] 'send to [ask] him [for an explanation]'. On their sending to him the enquiry: '[If a man has fallen into] water which has no [visible] end. is his wife forbidden or permitted [to marry again]'? he sent to them [in reply], 'His wife is forbidden' &mdash; 'And [they again enquired] is the swamp of Samki regarded as water that has [a visible] end or as water that has no [visible] end?' &mdash; 'It is', he sent them his reply, 'a water that has no [visible] end'. 'Why then did the Master [they asked] act in such a manner?'<a id="k121a_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; 'I was really mistaken', [he replied]; 'I was of the opinion that as the water was gathered and stationary it was to be regarded as "water which has [a visible] end", but the law is in fact not so; for owing to the prevailing waves it might well be assumed that the waves carried [the body] away'.<a id="k121a_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; Samuel thereupon applied to Rab the Scriptural text, There shall no mischief befall the righteous,<a id="k121a_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; while Rab applied to Samuel the following text: But in the multitude of counsellors there is safety.<a id="k121a_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp;
</p><p>
   	It was taught: Rabbi related how it once happened that while two men were casting nets in the Jordan one of them entered a subterranean fish pond<a id="k121a_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; and when the sun had set he could not find the entrance of the cave. His companion, after waiting long enough for his soul to depart, returned and reported the accident to his household. On the following day when the sun rose [the first man] discovered the entrance of the cave, and on returning he found his household in deep mourning<a id="k121a_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; 'How great', exclaimed Rabbi, 'are the words of the Sages who ruled [that if a man fell into] water which has [a visible] end his wife is permitted [to marry again, but if into water] which has no [visible] end, his wife is forbidden'.If so,<a id="k121a_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; then also in the case of water which has [a visible] end the possibility of having remained in a subterranean fish pond should be taken into consideration! &mdash; It is not usual for a subterranean fish pond to be found with water which has [a visible] end.<a id="k121a_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp;
</p><p>
   	R. Ashi said: The ruling of the Rabbis [that where a man has fallen into] water which has no [visible] end his wife is forbidden [to marry again]. applies only to an ordinary person but not to a learned man for, should he be rescued.<a id="k121a_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp; the fact would become known.<a id="k121a_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; This, however, is not correct; for there is no difference between an ordinary man and a learned man. <i>Ex post facto</i>, the marriage<a id="k121a_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; is valid; <i>ab initio</i>, it is forbidden.
</p><p>
   	It was taught: R. Gamaliel related, 'I was once travelling on board a ship when I observed a shipwreck and was sorely grieved for [the apparent loss of] a scholar<a id="k121a_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; who had been travelling on board that ship. (And who was he? &mdash; R. Akiba.) When I subsequently landed, he<a id="k121a_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; came to me and sat down and discussed matters of halachah. "My son", I asked him, "who rescued you?" "The plank of a ship", he answered me, "came my way, and to every wave that approached me I bent my head" &mdash; 44 Hence the Sages said that if wicked persons attack a man let him bend his head to them.<a id="k121a_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; At that hour I exclaimed: How significant are the words of the Stages who ruled [that if a man fell into] water which has [a visible] end, [his wife] is permitted [to marry again; but if into] water which has no [visible] end, she is forbidden'.
</p><p>
   	It was taught: R. Akiba related, 'l was once travelling on board a ship when I observed a ship in distress,<a id="k121a_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; and was much grieved on account of a scholar who was on it. (And who was it? &mdash; R. Meir.) When I subsequently landed in the province of Cappadocia<a id="k121a_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; he came to me and sat down and discussed matters of halachah. "My son", I said to him, "who rescued you?" &mdash; "One wave" he answered me, "tossed me to another, and the other to yet another until [the sea] cast me<a id="k121a_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; on the dry land". At that hour I exclaimed: How significant are the words of the Sages who ruled [that if a man fell into] water which has [a visible] end, [his wife] is permitted [to marry again; but if into] water which has no [visible] end, she is forbidden'. Our Rabbis taught: If a man fell into a lion's den, no evidence<a id="k121a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; may be legally tendered concerning him;<a id="k121a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; but if into a pit full of serpents and scorpions, evidence<a id="k121a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; may legally be tendered concerning him.<a id="k121a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; R. Judah b. Bathyra ruled: Even [if he fell] into a pit full of serpents and scorpions, no evidence<a id="k121a_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; may legally be tendered concerning him,<a id="k121a_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; since the possibility must be taken into consideration
</P>
	
<hr noshade size="1" width="100%"><P></P>
	


lvr: 31
dfh: b
notes:
 ntes={k121b_1:" Tosef. Yeb. XIV."
,k121b_2:" Why, in view of R. Judah b. Bathyra's reason, does he admit evidence of death in the latter case?"
,k121b_3:" Of the falling body."
,k121b_4:" The serpents and scorpions."
,k121b_5:" In a lion's den, however, there is much more space, and the body might sometimes fall to one side and the animals, if they happened to be full, would leave it untouched."
,k121b_6:" Standing over the fire."
,k121b_7:" The oil when, owing to the fall of the body, it flows over the sides of the boiler into the fire beneath it."
,k121b_8:" Lit., 'it causes to burn'."
,k121b_9:" The wine (cf. <i>supra</i> n. 9)."
,k121b_10:" And, owing to the cooling caused by the liquid, the man might be saved from actual death."
,k121b_11:" The Rabbis, represented by the view of the first Tanna."
,k121b_12:" Hence the ruling that evidence of death may be accepted in the case of a fall into a hot boiler whether the contents be oil or wine."
,k121b_13:" In the natural course of events the man could not survive long in a cistern. If his death were not caused by the water, some other causes would inevitably bring it about. V. <i>infra</i>."
,k121b_14:" I.e., why should not the man be able to survive if he could keep his head above the water?"
,k121b_15:" Esth. IV, 16, which shews that it is possible to live for a considerable time without food or drink."
,k121b_16:" Malkoth (v. <a href=\"../tglossary.html\">Glos.</a>); for taking a false oath. It is impossible for a human being to live for three days without sleep."
,k121b_17:" In three days' time, accordingly, a man who had fallen into a cistern would inevitably succumb to fatigue and the physical necessity for sleep, and would in the natural course of events be drowned."
,k121b_18:" If no one can withstand the necessity for sleep, why does not R. Meir, in the circumstances mentioned, admit the evidence?"
,k121b_19:" In the cistern mentioned in our Mishnah."
,k121b_20:" Where the man might have slept in comparative safety."
,k121b_21:" Why do they, in such circumstances, admit the evidence?"
,k121b_22:" The arches."
,k121b_23:" Too slippery for anyone to sleep upon them in safety."
,k121b_24:" [H] rt. [H] 'to clutch', 'to twist'."
,k121b_25:" [H] 'wells' or 'ditches'. Cf. Rashi and Jast."
,k121b_26:" He was engaged In the benevolent occupation of digging wells for the benefit of the pilgrims to Jerusalem who visited the Temple on the occasion of the three major Festivals of the year. The ordinary wells did not suffice for the large influx of men and cattle on these festive occasions."
,k121b_27:" Famous for his miraculous powers of cure and rescue through the efficacy of his prayers. Cf. Ber. 34b, Ta'an. 24b. V. B.K., Sonc. ed. p. 287, n. 11."
,k121b_28:" [H], lit., 'peace'."
,k121b_29:" Lit., 'she went up'."
,k121b_30:" Lit., 'a male of ewes'. &mdash; The ram of Isaac (Rashi)."
,k121b_31:" Lit., 'was appointed for me'."
,k121b_32:" Abraham (Rashi)."
,k121b_33:" Well-digging. V. <i>supra</i> p. 859, n. 13."
,k121b_34:" Lit., 'shall stumble', 'come to grief'."
,k121b_35:" Nehonia's."
,k121b_36:" PS. L, 3, stormeth = [H] rt. [H] 'hair'. V. next note."
,k121b_37:" Lit., 'like a thread of a hair', [H] (v. <i>supra</i> n. 4)."
,k121b_38:" Of God's strict dealing with the righteous."
,k121b_39:" Ps. LXXXIX, 8; cf. parallel passage B.K. 50a."
,k121b_40:" To tender evidence of death, and to enable the widow to marry again."
,k121b_41:" The children spoken of in our Mishnah."
,k121b_42:" To carry out what they said they were going to do, and that the man in question was in fact not dead. How then could such unreliable evidence be acted upon!"
,k121b_43:" Or 'locust'."
,k121b_44:" For fun. Cf. <i>supra</i> n. 10."
,k121b_45:" The children spoken of in our Mishnah."
,k121b_46:" That the evidence is invalid."
,k121b_47:" The idolater's."
,k121b_48:" To marry again."
,k121b_49:" The motive of the witness."
,k121b_50:" By Amoraim."
,k121b_51:" Resh Lakish."
,k121b_52:" Cf. n. on [H] <i>supra</i> 105b."
,k121b_53:" [H], so Aruk and Beth Joseph in Eben ha-Ezer XVII. Cur. edd., 'he permitted them with'."
,k121b_54:" Maintaining that even in the latter case the evidence is invalid."
,k121b_55:" Lit., 'our Mishnah wherein it was taught'."
,k121b_56:" From which it follows that if his Intention was not to act as witness his testimony is accepted."
,k121b_57:" How can one make a statement the object of which is not even to affirm (i.e., to give evidence) that a certain thing had happened, and such a statement nevertheless be accepted as legally reliable?"
,k121b_58:" [H] lit., 'speaks according to his innocence'; he is merely reporting what he had seen."
,k121b_59:" Hiwa's."
,k121b_60:" An idolater."
,k121b_61:" Lit., 'and they did not say anything to her'."
,k121b_62:" The acquiescence in the action of Hasa's wife."
,k121b_63:" Lit., 'that which the Rabbis said'."
,k121b_64:" Hasa's"
,k121b_65:" Lit., 'yes'."
,k121b_66:" Lit., 'not'."
,k121b_67:" [H], grass used as fodder for cattle."
,k121b_68:" The wife of the Israelite whom the idolater claimed to have killed."
,k121b_69:" To obtain his ruling as to whether she may marry again. "
}

txt:
<p>
that he might be a charmer.<a id="k121b_1"><sup>1</sup></a>&nbsp; But the first Tanna?<a id="k121b_2"><sup>2</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Owing to the pressure<a id="k121b_3"><sup>3</sup></a>&nbsp; they<a id="k121b_4"><sup>4</sup></a>&nbsp; injure him.<a id="k121b_5"><sup>5</sup></a>&nbsp;
</p><p>
   	Our Rabbis taught: [If a man] fell into a burning furnace, evidence may be legally tendered concerning him, [and also if he fell] into a boiler that was full of [boiling]<a id="k121b_6"><sup>6</sup></a>&nbsp; wine or oil, evidence may be legally tendered concerning him. In the name of R. Aha It was stated: [If the man fell into a hot boiler] of oil, evidence may legally be tendered concerning him, because it<a id="k121b_7"><sup>7</sup></a>&nbsp; adds fuel to the fire;<a id="k121b_8"><sup>8</sup></a>&nbsp; [but if into one] of wine, no evidence may legally be tendered concerning him, because it<a id="k121b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; extinguishes [the fire].<a id="k121b_10"><sup>10</sup></a>&nbsp; They,<a id="k121b_11"><sup>11</sup></a>&nbsp; however, said to him: At first it<a id="k121b_9"><sup>9</sup></a>&nbsp; extinguishes [the fire to a certain extent] but eventually it causes it to burn [with greater vehemence].<a id="k121b_12"><sup>12</sup></a>&nbsp;
</p><p>
   	SAID R. MEIR: IT ONCE HAPPENED THAT A MAN FELL INTO A LARGE CISTERN etc. It was taught: They said to R. Meir, 'Miracles cannot be mentioned [as proof]'.<a id="k121b_13"><sup>13</sup></a>&nbsp; What [did they mean by] 'miracles'?<a id="k121b_14"><sup>14</sup></a>&nbsp; If it be suggested because he neither eats nor drinks, surely [it may be pointed out], It is written in Scripture, <i>And fast ye for me, and neither eat nor drink [three days]</i>!<a id="k121b_15"><sup>15</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Rather because he does not sleep. For R. Johanan stated: [A man who said]. 'I take an oath that I will not sleep for three days' is to be flogged<a id="k121b_16"><sup>16</sup></a>&nbsp; and he may sleep at once.<a id="k121b_17"><sup>17</sup></a>&nbsp; What then is R. Meir's reason?<a id="k121b_18"><sup>18</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; R. Kahana replied: There were<a id="k121b_19"><sup>19</sup></a>&nbsp; arches above arches.<a id="k121b_20"><sup>20</sup></a>&nbsp; And the Rabbis?<a id="k121b_21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; They<a id="k121b_22"><sup>22</sup></a>&nbsp; were of marble.<a id="k121b_23"><sup>23</sup></a>&nbsp;
</p><p>
   	And R. Meir? &mdash; It is hardly possible that the man did not hang<a id="k121b_24"><sup>24</sup></a>&nbsp; on to [the arches] and doze a while.
</p><p>
   	Our Rabbis taught: It once happened that the daughter of Nehonia the well<a id="k121b_25"><sup>25</sup></a>&nbsp; -digger<a id="k121b_26"><sup>26</sup></a>&nbsp; fell into a large cistern, and people went and reported [the accident] to R. Hanina b. Dosa.<a id="k121b_27"><sup>27</sup></a>&nbsp; During the first hour he said to them, 'All is well'.<a id="k121b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; In the second hour he again said, 'All is well'.<a id="k121b_28"><sup>28</sup></a>&nbsp; In the third he said to them, 'She is saved'.<a id="k121b_29"><sup>29</sup></a>&nbsp; 'My daughter', he asked her, 'who saved you?' &mdash; 'A ram<a id="k121b_30"><sup>30</sup></a>&nbsp; came to my help<a id="k121b_31"><sup>31</sup></a>&nbsp; with an aged man<a id="k121b_32"><sup>32</sup></a>&nbsp; leading it'. 'Are you', the people asked him, 'a prophet?' &mdash; 'I am', he replied, 'neither prophet nor the Son of a prophet; but should the [beneficent] work in which the righteous is engaged<a id="k121b_33"><sup>33</sup></a>&nbsp; be the cause of disaster<a id="k121b_34"><sup>34</sup></a>&nbsp; to his seed!' R. Abba stated: His<a id="k121b_35"><sup>35</sup></a>&nbsp; son nevertheless died of thirst; for it is said in Scripture, <i>And round about Him it stormeth mightily</i>,<a id="k121b_36"><sup>36</sup></a>&nbsp; which teaches that the Holy One, blessed be He, deals strictly with those round about Him even to a hair's<a id="k121b_37"><sup>37</sup></a>&nbsp; breadth. R. Hanina said, [Proof<a id="k121b_38"><sup>38</sup></a>&nbsp; may be adduced] from here: <i>A God dreaded in the great council of the holy ones, and feared of all them that are round about Him</i>.<a id="k121b_39"><sup>39</sup></a>&nbsp;
</p><p>
   	MISHNAH. EVEN [A MAN ONLY] HEARD WOMEN SAYING, 'SO-AND-SO IS DEAD', THIS SHOULD SUFFICE FOR HIM.<a id="k121b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; R. JUDAH SAID: EVEN IF HE ONLY HEARD CHILDREN SAY, 'BEHOLD WE ARE GOING TO MOURN FOR A MAN NAMED SO-AND-SO AND TO BURY HIM' [IT IS SUFFICIENT].<a id="k121b_40"><sup>40</sup></a>&nbsp; WHETHER [SUCH STATEMENT WAS MADE] WITH THE INTENTION [OF TENDERING EVIDENCE] OR WAS MADE WITH NO SUCH INTENTION [IT IS VALID]. R. JUDAH B. BABA SAID: WITH AN ISRAELITE [THE EVIDENCE IS VALID] EVEN IF THE MAN HAD THE INTENTION [OF ACTING AS WITNESS]. IN THE CASE OF AN IDOLATER, HOWEVER, THE EVIDENCE IS INVALID IF HIS INTENTION WAS [TO ACT AS WITNESS].
</p><p>
   	GEMARA. Is it not possible that they<a id="k121b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; did not go?<a id="k121b_42"><sup>42</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Rab Judah replied in the name of Samuel: [Our Mishnah deals with a case] where they<a id="k121b_41"><sup>41</sup></a>&nbsp; Say, 'Behold we are returning from the mourning for, and the burial of So-and-so'.Is it not possible that a mere ant<a id="k121b_43"><sup>43</sup></a>&nbsp; had died and that the children gave it the man's name?<a id="k121b_44"><sup>44</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; [It is a case] where they<a id="k121b_45"><sup>45</sup></a>&nbsp; say, 'Such and such Rabbis were there' or 'such and such funeral orators were there'.
</p><p>
   	IN THE CASE OF AN IDOLATER, HOWEVER &hellip; IF HIS INTENTION WAS etc. Said Rab Judah in the name of Samuel: This<a id="k121b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; was taught only in the case where it was his<a id="k121b_47"><sup>47</sup></a>&nbsp; intention to enable [the woman] to be permitted,<a id="k121b_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; but if his intention was merely to give evidence his testimony is valid. How could this<a id="k121b_49"><sup>49</sup></a>&nbsp; be ascertained? &mdash; R. Joseph replied: If he came to Beth din and stated. 'So-and-so is dead, allow his wife to marry again', such evidence is one where his intention was to enable [the woman] to be permitted,<a id="k121b_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; [but if he stated], 'He is dead', and nothing more, his intention was merely to give evidence.
</p><p>
   	So It was also stated:<a id="k121b_50"><sup>50</sup></a>&nbsp; Resh Lakish said, This<a id="k121b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; was taught only in the case where it was his intention to enable [the woman] to be permitted,<a id="k121b_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; but if his intention was merely to give evidence his testimony is valid.
</p><p>
   	Said R. Johanan to him:<a id="k121b_51"><sup>51</sup></a>&nbsp; Did it not happen with Oshaia Berabbi,<a id="k121b_52"><sup>52</sup></a>&nbsp; that he opposed<a id="k121b_53"><sup>53</sup></a>&nbsp; eighty-five elders saying to them that, 'This<a id="k121b_46"><sup>46</sup></a>&nbsp; was taught Only in the case where it was his intention to enable [the woman] to be permitted<a id="k121b_48"><sup>48</sup></a>&nbsp; but if his intention was merely to give evidence his testimony is valid', but the Sages did not agree with him!<a id="k121b_54"><sup>54</sup></a>&nbsp;
</p><p>
   	But according to the ruling in our Mishnah, that<a id="k121b_55"><sup>55</sup></a>&nbsp; IN THE CASE OF AN IDOLATER, HOWEVER, THE EVIDENCE IS INVALID IF HIS INTENTION WAS [TO ACT AS WITNESS],<a id="k121b_56"><sup>56</sup></a>&nbsp; how is it possible [for the idolater's testimony ever to be accepted]?<a id="k121b_57"><sup>57</sup></a>&nbsp; &mdash; Where he makes a statement at random;<a id="k121b_58"><sup>58</sup></a>&nbsp; as was the case where one went about saying, 'Who of the family of Hiwai is here? Who is here of the family of Hiwai? Hiwai is dead!', and R. Joseph allowed his<a id="k121b_59"><sup>59</sup></a>&nbsp; wife to marry again.
</p><p>
   	A man<a id="k121b_60"><sup>60</sup></a>&nbsp; once went about saying, 'Alas for the valiant rider who was at Pumbeditha, for he is dead'; and R. Joseph, or it might be said, Raba, allowed his wife to marry again.
</p><p>
   	A man once went about saying, 'Who of the family of Hasa is here? Hasa is drowned!' [On hearing this] R. Nahman exclaimed, 'By God, the fish must have eaten Hasa up!' Relying on R. Nahman's exclamation, Hasa's wife went and married again, and no objection was raised against her action.<a id="k121b_61"><sup>61</sup></a>&nbsp;
</p><p>
   	Said R. Ashi: From this<a id="k121b_62"><sup>62</sup></a>&nbsp; it may be inferred that the ruling of the Rabbis<a id="k121b_63"><sup>63</sup></a>&nbsp; that [if a man had fallen into] water which had no [visible] end, his wife is forbidden [to marry again] applies only ab initio, but if someone had already married her, she is not to be taken away from him.
</p><p>
   	Others read: R. Nahman allowed his<a id="k121b_64"><sup>64</sup></a>&nbsp; wife to marry again; for he said, 'Hasa was a great man, and had he come up [out of the water] his rescue would have become known'. The law, however, is not so. For there is no difference between a great man and one who is not great &mdash; [In either case] it is permitted<a id="k121b_65"><sup>65</sup></a>&nbsp; <i>ex post facto</i> and forbidden<a id="k121b_66"><sup>66</sup></a>&nbsp; <i>ab initio</i>.
</p><p>
   	A certain idolater 'once said to an Israelite, 'Cut some grass<a id="k121b_67"><sup>67</sup></a>&nbsp; and throw it to my cattle on the Sabbath; if not, I will kill you as I have killed So-and-so, that son of an Israelite, to whom I said, "Cook for me a dish on the Sabbath", and whom, as he did not cook for me, I killed'. His wife<a id="k121b_68"><sup>68</sup></a>&nbsp; heard this and came to Abaye.<a id="k121b_69"><sup>69</sup></a>&nbsp; As he kept her waiting
</P>


