# dafyomi

lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yehudah of Diskarta):</font></b> A Kal va'Chomer should teach 
          that dead children are not like live children regarding 
          Yibum!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> A child from a previous husband counts like a child 
               from the latter husband to disqualify a widow from 
               eating Terumah, but a dead child does not count like 
               a live child (to disqualify);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> A child from a previous husband does not count like 
               a child from the latter husband to exempt a widow 
               from Yibum, all the more so, a dead child should not 
               count like a live child (to exempt)!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Therefore, it says 'Its ways are ways of 
               pleasantness...' to teach that once she is exempted 
               from Yibum she is always exempt, even if the 
               children die.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  A Kal va'Chomer should teach that dead children are like 
          live children regarding Terumah!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> A child from a previous husband does not count like 
               a child from the latter husband to exempt a widow 
               from Yibum, but a dead child is like a live child 
               (to exempt);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> A child from a previous husband counts like a child 
               from the latter husband to disqualify a widow from 
               eating Terumah, all the more so, a dead child should 
               count like a live child (to disqualify)!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Therefore, it says 'she has no seed'. If her seed 
               died, this is fulfilled!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b></b>  A Kal va'Chomer should teach that a child from a previous 
          husband is like a child from the latter husband to exempt 
          a widow from Yibum!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> A dead child is not as a live child (to disqualify 
               from Terumah), but a child from a previous husband 
               counts like a child from the latter husband;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> A dead child is like a live child (to exempt from 
               Yibum), all the more so a child from a previous 
               husband should count like a child from the latter 
               husband!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Therefore, it says 'He (her latter husband) does not 
               have a son'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b></b>  A Kal va'Chomer should teach that a child from a previous 
          husband is not like a child from the latter husband to 
          disqualify a widow from eating Terumah!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> A dead child is like a live child (to exempt from 
               Yibum), but a child from a previous husband does not 
               count like a child from the latter husband;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> A dead child is not like a live child (to disqualify 
               from Terumah), all the more so a child from a 
               previous husband should not count like a child from 
               the latter husband!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Therefore, it says 'she does not have (seed)', i.e. 
               from any Yisrael!
<br>
<br><center><font color='ff0000' size='+1'><b>***<b>PEREK HA'ISHAH SHE'HALACH</b>***
</b></font></center><p><b>
<br><b></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>A FALSE REPORT OF A MAN'S DEATH</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> A man went overseas; they (really, one 
          witness) told his wife that he died. If she remarried and 
          her husband returned, the following fines apply:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> She may not remain with either man; she needs a Get 
               from both men; she does not receive from either man 
               a Kesuvah, nor Peiros (of her property), nor food, 
               nor Bala'os (compensation for depreciation, or 
               remnants) of her property. If she received, she must 
               return them;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If she has a child from either man, he is a Mamzer. 
               If she dies, neither husband becomes Tamei to engage 
               in her burial. Neither receives her Metzi'os (Hefker 
               objects that she finds) or earnings. Neither may 
               annul her vows;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> If she is a Bas Yisrael, she is disqualified from 
               Kehunah. If she is a Bas Levi, she is disqualified 
               from Ma'aser. If she is a Bas Kohen, she is 
               disqualified from Terumah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> The heirs of either husband do not inherit her 
               Kesuvah. If the husbands die, the brothers do 
               Chalitzah but not Yibum;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b></b> R. Yosi says, she receives a Kesuvah from her first 
               husband;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b></b> R. Elazar says, the first husband receives her 
               Metzi'os and earnings, and may annul her vows;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b></b> R. Shimon says, if the first husband dies and his 
               brother did Yibum or Chalitzah, he exempted the 
               Tzarah. If she has a child from the first husband, 
               he is not a Mamzer;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If she remarried (according to two witnesses,) without 
          (special) permission of Beis Din, she may return to her 
          first husband.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  If she was married through permission of Beis Din, she 
          must leave (both husbands) and she is exempt from a 
          Korban. If she was married without permission of Beis 
          Din, she must leave and bring a Korban;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Acting according to Beis Din exempts from a Korban.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  If Beis Din instructed her to remarry, and she was 
          Mekalkel (messed up), she must bring a Korban. She was 
          authorized only to remarry.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WITNESS IS BELIEVED</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara):</font></b> The Seifa says that if she married without 
          permission of Beis Din, she may return to her first 
          husband. 'Without permission' means according to 
          witnesses;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Inference:</font></b> The Reisha discusses with permission of Beis 
          Din, i.e. through one witness. This shows that one 
          witness is believed!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support #1 (Mishnah):</font></b> It became established to marry 
          based on a witness who heard from a witness, or a woman 
          who heard from a woman or slave.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This also shows that one witness is believed!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support #2 (Mishnah):</font></b> If one witness said 'You ate 
          Chelev' and the person denied it, he is exempt.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> He is exempt only because he denied it. 
               Had he been silent, the witness would have been 
               believed. This shows that one witness is believed 
               mid'Oraisa.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is the source that one witness is 
          believed?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Beraisa):</font></b> 'Or if his sin became known to him 
          (he brings a Korban)', but not if witnesses told him.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps he is exempt even if he does not 
               deny it!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> 'Or his sin became known to him' - he is 
               liable no matter how he found out.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> What is the case?
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  If two witnesses came and he did not contradict 
                    them, we do not need a verse to obligate him!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Rather, one witness came and he did not 
               contradict him. The witness is believed.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> Perhaps the witness is not believed. Rather, 
          his silence is admission to the witness' words!
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) THE TORAH'S WAYS ARE WAYS OF PLEASANTNESS</b></font><b>
<br>OPINIONS:</b> The Gemara teaches that a woman does not fall to Yibum when her husband's children die after her husband dies. Although her deceased husband now has no living offspring, the Torah exempts her from the obligation of Yibum because 'Deracheha Darchei No'am' -- the ways of the Torah are ways of pleasantness, and it would not be pleasant for a woman who was exempt from Yibum at the time of her husband's death to become obligated to do Yibum when the reason for her exemption is unexpectedly removed.
</p><p>
In what way would requiring her to do Yibum if all of her husband's children die constitute a 'lack of pleasantness'?
</p><p>
The Rishonim offer three explanations for why requiring her to do Yibum under such circumstances would constitute a lack of pleasantness.
</p><p>
(a) <b>RASHI</b> explains that if the woman would be obligated to do Chalitzah after she remarried another man (based on her initial exemption from Yibum), her act of Chalitzah with the brother of her first husband would cause her to become repulsive in the eyes of her present husband.
</p><p>
(According to this explanation, on what grounds is a woman exempt from Yibum when she does <i>not</i> remarry before the death of the children of her deceased husband? The answer is that according to Rashi, the principle of 'Deracheha Darchei No'am' teaches that the verses which discuss the Mitzvah of Yibum apply only when the husband has no children <i>at the time of his death</i>. Consequently, even when the husband's children die before the woman remarries, she is exempt from Chalitzah and Yibum since her husband had children at the time of his death.)
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RITVA</b> explains that if the woman would be required to leave her new husband (with a divorce) and perform Yibum or Chalitzah, this would be a lack of pleasantness. (Rav Aharon Yaffen, in his footnotes to the Ritva, writes that the <b>RAMBAN</b> and <b>RASHBA</b> (17b) seem to give the same explanation.)
</p><p>
Why does the Ritva assume that the woman would have to be divorced from her present husband in order to perform Yibum or Chalitzah? Why should she not be able to perform Chalitzah while she is married? Rav Aharon Yaffen explains that a divorce would be necessary in order to perform Chalitzah, because an act of Chalitzah is valid only in a situation in which Yibum is an option. Yibum is not an option when the woman is married. (The same situation exists in the case of a Me'uberes (35b-36a); since she cannot do Yibum, her Chalitzah is ineffective.)
</p><p>
However, the Gemara later (92b) implies that a woman who is married <i>may</i> perform Chalitzah. How does the Ritva understand the Gemara there?
</p><p>
Perhaps the Ritva means that her husband must divorce her until Chalitzah is performed simply because he is prohibited to live with a woman who is a Yevamah until she does Chalitzah. (Also, the Yavam might prefer to perform Yibum, and the present husband has no right to withhold from the Yavam the option of performing the Mitzvah of Yibum.)
</p><p>
(c) <b>TOSFOS</b> (2a, DH v'Achos Ishto) explains that it is not pleasant for a woman who was <i>permitted</i> to remarry to suddenly become obligated to perform Yibum.
</p><p>
Moreover, even if the obligation of Yibum is still upon her but her Zikah to <i>one</i> of the brothers has been removed (that is, he became invalidated from performing Yibum and Chalitzah), it is not 'ways of pleasantness' for the Zikah of that brother to be reinstated (since the woman assumed that she no longer had any connection to him; see Insights to Yevamos 30:1).
</p><p>



<font><b>3) REQUIRING AN 'ESHES ISH' TO DO YIBUM</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara teaches that a woman does not fall to Yibum when her husband's children die after her husband dies. Although her deceased husband now has no living offspring, the Torah exempts her from the obligation of Yibum because 'Deracheha Darchei No'am' -- the ways of the Torah are ways of pleasantness, and it would not be pleasant for a woman who was exempt from Yibum at the time of her husband's death to become obligated to do Yibum when the reason for her exemption is unexpectedly removed.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> explains that if the woman would be obligated to do Chalitzah after she remarried another man (based on her initial exemption from Yibum), her act of Chalitzah with the brother of her first husband would cause her to become repulsive in the eyes of her present husband. (See previous Insight.)
</p><p>
If the woman remarries before her husband's children die, why should any obligation of Yibum take effect at the time the children die? At that point, she is forbidden as an Ervah ('Eshes Ish') to the Yavam. Every Ervah is exempt from Yibum and Chalitzah, as the Gemara earlier (3b) derives from a Mah ha'Tzad or Hekesh (see Tosfos there, DH Mah Achos Ishah; the Gemara in Kidushin (68a) explicitly includes 'Eshes Ish' in Rebbi Yonah's 'Hekesh of the Arayos'). The exemption of an Ervah from Yibum should apply to the Ervah of 'Eshes Ish' as well. (<b>NODA B'YEHUDAH</b> EH 2:150; see also <b>REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b> to 16a.)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>NODA B'YEHUDAH</b> and <b>REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b> answer based on the words of <b>TOSFOS</b> (16a, DH Bnei Tzaros). Tosfos proves from the Gemara (16a) that when a woman who is a Shomeres Yavam marries another man and becomes an 'Eshes Ish,' the obligation of Yibum does not depart. This is in contrast to the law in the case of a woman who becomes an 'Achos Ishah' after she falls to Yibum (i.e. the Yavam marries her sister), in which case the obligation of Yibum <i>does</i> depart. Why is an 'Eshes Ish' different?
</p><p>
Tosfos gives two explanations:
</p><p>
1. Since the prohibition of 'Eshes Ish' is removable through the act of divorce, it is considered 'in our hands' to remove the prohibition, and therefore the obligation of Yibum remains. In contrast, the prohibition of 'Achos Ishah' is not 'in our hands' to remove, since it can be removed only through the death of her sister. Therefore, when the Shomeres Yavam becomes forbidden as 'Achos Ishah,' the Zikah for Yibum departs entirely.
</p><p>
2. Tosfos writes in the name of the <b><b><b>RI</b></b></b> that perhaps the verse, 'Lo Siheyeh Eshes ha'Mes ha'Chutzah l'Ish Zar' (Devarim 25:5), teaches that even if the Shomeres Yavam performs an act of Kidushin ('Siheyeh' is related to the word 'Havayah,' a reference to Kidushin) with another man, the Zikah for Yibum remains and she must divorce her husband and do Yibum with the Yavam. 
</p><p>
The Acharonim (<b>ACHIEZER</b> #2, <b>CHAZON ISH</b> 134:5, <b>KOVETZ HE'OROS</b> 4:6) point out that this explanation does not suffice to answer the question. Tosfos (10a, DH l'Olam) explicitly writes that an 'Eshes Ish' <i>can</i> exempt her Tzarah from Yibum (in a unique case in which one of the Tzaros is forbidden to the Yavam because she is an 'Eshes Ish' in relation to him, due to a condition in the divorce from a previous husband which excluded that Yavam from the Gerushin's allowance for her to marry all other men). Tosfos clearly differentiates between a woman who was an 'Eshes Ish' at the time she fell to Yibum and a woman who became an 'Eshes Ish' only after she fell to Yibum. A woman who was an 'Eshes Ish' at the time of the Nefilah certainly is exempt from Yibum (as derived from the Hekesh to 'Achos Ishah'). In contrast, when Tosfos (on 16a) writes that a married woman's status as an Ervah does not exempt her from Yibum (in contrast to the Ervah of 'Achos Ishah' which <i>does</i> exempt her from Yibum), he refers only to when she became an 'Eshes Ish' <i>after</i> she fell to Yibum. In such a case, the verse of 'Ne'esarah' does not apply to prohibit her forever (for the reasons Tosfos gives), and she may become permitted to do Yibum later (through the death of her husband or through divorce).
</p><p>
However, in the case of a woman who already remarried before the death of the children of her former, deceased husband, the answers of Tosfos should not apply. Rather, she should be exempt from Yibum because she is an 'Eshes Ish'! (The Noda b'Yehudah himself addresses this problem, but others refute his arguments. See Kovetz He'oros 6:8).
</p><p>
(b) <b>RAV AHARON YAFFEN</b> discusses the Noda b'Yehudah's question at great length in his notes to the Ritva on Yevamos (Mosad ha'Rav Kook, volume I, Milu'im 3:5). He suggests that perhaps Rashi maintains that at the moment of the death of her former husband's last child, the woman falls to Yibum <i>retroactively</i> from the time of her husband's death. If Rashi maintains that, at the moment the child dies, the woman falls to Yibum retroactively from the time of her husband's death (and not merely from the moment of the child's death), it emerges that her new marriage occurred <i>after</i> the Zikah for Yibum took effect. Consequently, this case <i>is</i> comparable to the case discussed by Tosfos (16a), and the logic of Tosfos suffices to explain why she is not exempt from Yibum because of her present marriage.
</p><p>
However, the words of Rashi (DH v'Lo Na'aseh) do not imply that she falls to Yibum retroactively, but rather that the Zikah takes effect at the moment her deceased husband has no children ('u'Ven Ein Lo').
</p><p>
(c) The <b>CHAZON ISH</b> (134:5) writes that if not for the words of Tosfos (16a), he would offer another answer for why a woman's present marriage does not exempt her from Yibum, based on simple logic:
</p><p>
The Zikah to Yibum gives the Yevamah a status of 'acquired' to the Yavam, like a Kinyan. The Kidushin which another man performs with her not only renders her an Ervah to the Yavam and prevents her from doing Yibum, but it causes her to become a Kinyan of the man who did the Kidushin. However, it is not reasonable to suggest that his act of Kidushin creates a new Kinyan and is able to remove the Kinyan which the Yavam already has with her. Rather, it is more logical that the Zikah of the Yavam remains and is not superseded by the new husband's Kinyan. (A logical argument carries more weight than even a Hekesh. See Insights to Yevamos 3:2.)
</p><p>
Perhaps this logic may be applied to the case of the Gemara here as well. Although the Zikah should take effect only when the husband's child dies (according to the Gemara's Havah Amina that Zikah exists in such a case), the <i>cause</i> for the Zikah certainly is nothing other than the death of her first husband.  It is not logical that a Kinyan she makes later, after the death of her husband, should prevent her from falling to Yibum when the child dies, because the cause of the Zikah preceded that Kinyan. Although an 'Eshes Ish' is also an Ervah, her status of Ervah is only a result of a Kinyan. Since that Kinyan cannot override the Kinyan of Zikah which preceded it, her status as an Ervah does not prevent the obligation of Yibum from taking effect.
</p><p>
This logic is sound even according to the Rashba and Ritva (2a), who (like Tosfos on 10a) accept the possibility that the Ervah of 'Eshes Ish' can cause, in theory, a woman and her Tzarah to become exempt from Yibum. The case in which they allow the Ervah of 'Eshes Ish' to exempt the woman from Yibum is one in which the Ervah of 'Eshes Ish' <i>preceded</i> the marriage of the deceased husband (whose death caused the Zikah). That case is not comparable to the case of the Gemara here in which the Ervah of 'Eshes Ish' <i>followed</i> the death of the deceased husband.
</p><p>
Tosfos (16a), who does not accept this reasoning and gives different explanations for why the Ervah of 'Eshes Ish' (which occurs after a woman falls to Yibum) does not exempt a woman from Yibum, follows his own reasoning as expressed elsewhere. Tosfos gives a different explanation for the exemption of 'Deracheha Darchei No'am' (see previous Insight) which is unrelated to whether Zikah persists after a woman marries someone else.
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WITNESS IS BELIEVED (cont.)</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (Seifa):</font></b> If two witnesses say 'You ate Chelev', 
          and he says 'I did not eat', he is exempt;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Meir says, he must bring a Korban.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Meir:</font></b> If two witnesses can sentence him to death, 
               which is stringent, all the more so they can 
               obligate him to bring a Korban, which is lenient!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Chachamim:</font></b> (He is believed, for) if he wanted (to 
               lie), he could say that he intentionally ate (to 
               exempt himself)!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> Why do Chachamim obligate a Korban in the 
               Reisha (when there is one witness)?
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Suggestion:</font></b> The witness is believed.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> Normally two witnesses are believed 
                    against one who contradicts them, yet Chachamim 
                    exempt in this case!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> We must say that his silence is like an 
               admission.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (to Question 4:e, 87b):</font></b> Reasoning teaches that 
          one witness is believed. If we were in doubt about a 
          piece of meat, whether it is Chelev or Shumen (permitted 
          fat), and one witness comes and says that it is 
          permitted, he is believed. The same applies here.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> Our case is different! The meat was never 
          Muchzak (established) to be forbidden. Here, she was 
          Muchzekes to be married, and two witnesses are needed (to 
          change the Chazakah) regarding a matter pertaining to 
          Arayos!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Our case resembles a piece of meat known to be 
               Chelev, and one witness says that he is sure that it 
               is Shumen. He is not believed.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rebuttal:</font></b> That is unlike our case! There, even if 100 
          witnesses say that it is Shumen, they are not believed. 
          Here, if two witnesses say that he died, they are 
          believed!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #3:</font></b> One witness is believed, just like he is 
          believed (to permit an established Isur) regarding Tevel, 
          Hekdesh, and Konamos (vows to forbid objects).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (part 1) Question:</font></b> What is the case of Tevel?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the Tevel belongs to the witness, he is believed 
               because it is b'Yado (even if it was Tevel he could 
               permit it by separating Terumah and Ma'aseros. Here, 
               if her husband is alive the witness cannot permit 
               her!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Rather, the Tevel belongs to someone else.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Conclusion - Objection:</font></b> If the Tana holds that Reuven can 
          take Terumah to exempt Shimon's produce without Shimon's 
          knowledge, the witness is believed because it is b'Yado;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If he holds that one cannot exempt Shimon's produce 
               without his consent, what is his source that the 
               witness is believed?! (Our question about the source 
               that one witness is believed applies to this case, 
               too!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (part 2) Question:</font></b> What is the case of Hekdesh?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If its Kedushah is monetary, he is believed because 
               it is b'Yado to redeem it!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If it is Kedushas ha'Guf (e.g. a Korban) that he 
               made Hekdesh, he is believed because it is b'Yado to 
               regret and annul his Hekdesh!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Rather, someone else was Makdish Kedushas ha'Guf. 
          The witness says that the owner annulled his Hekdesh.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Conclusion - Objection:</font></b> What is the Tana's source that 
          the witness is believed?!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (part 3) Question:</font></b> How does he learn from 
          Konamos?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If he holds that Me'ilah applies to Konamos and they 
               have monetary Kedushah, the witness is believed 
               because it is b'Yado to redeem it!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> He holds that Me'ilah does not apply to Konamos. 
          A mere Isur rests on them.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Conclusion - Objection:</font></b> If the witness made the vow he is 
          believed because it is b'Yado to annul the vow;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If someone else vowed and the witness says that the 
               person annulled his vow, what is the Tana's source 
               that the witness is believed?!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #4 (R. Zeira):</font></b> Because we are so stringent with 
          her in the end (our Mishnah puts 13 fines on her if her 
          husband returns after she married), we are lenient on her 
          in the beginning (surely she will not marry until she is 
          sure that he died. Our Gemara found no source to believe 
          within one witness in other cases, e.g. to obligate a 
          Korban or to say that a person annulled his Hekdesh.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> We should be not be stringent at the end, nor 
          lenient at the beginning!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> We were lenient to enable her to remarry.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>IF TWO WITNESSES SAID THAT HER HUSBAND DIED</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> She may not remain with either husband ...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav):</font></b> This applies only if she married based on the 
          testimony of one witness. If two witnesses testified, she 
          does not leave (the second husband).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Chachamim of Eretz Yisrael):</font></b> If the husband 
          returned, how can she remain married to another man?!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The case is, we do not recognize that the man who 
          returned is her husband.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, when she married based on one witness 
          why can't she stay married?!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The case is, two witnesses say 'he is her 
          original husband. We were with him from when he left 
          until now. You do not recognize him!'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Chisda):</font></b> 'Yosef recognized his brothers, and 
               they did not recognize him' - this teaches that he 
               left before his beard was complete, and now it was 
               complete.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Two witnesses say that he died and two 
          witnesses contradict them. One who has Bi'ah with her 
          must bring an Asham Taluy (she is a Safek Eshes Ish. Why 
          may she stay married?)!
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) PERMITTING AN 'ESHES ISH' TO REMARRY BASED ON THE TESTIMONY OF A SINGLE WITNESS </b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Mishnah (87b) discusses the case of a woman who receives word that her husband has died abroad. She marries another man, and then her first husband returns alive. The Gemara teaches that the Rabanan were lenient in such a case 'Mishum Iguna'; they permitted the woman to remarry based on the testimony of a single witness. Because of that leniency, however, the Rabanan imposed a number of severe stringencies upon her in the event that her husband is found to be alive, as described in the Mishnah (87b). The purpose of these stringencies is to ensure that she will meticulously verify the testimony of that witness and determine beyond any doubt that her husband indeed is dead.
<br>	
<br>Why did the Rabanan permit her to remarry based on the testimony of a single witness, when, according to the Torah, she is an 'Eshes Ish'? What authority do the Rabanan have to override the Isur d'Oraisa of 'Eshes Ish'?
</p><p>
(The Gemara later (89a-90b) teaches that although the Rabanan have the authority to override Torah law through 'Shev v'Al Ta'aseh,' an enactment which <i>passively</i> overrides a Torah law, they do not have the power to uproot a Torah law <i>actively</i>, through 'Kum va'Aseh.' Allowing a woman to marry another man is an active violation of Torah law.)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Mitoch) explains that the Rabanan are empowered to 'override,' but not 'uproot,' a Torah prohibition (unless it is done through 'Shev v'Al Ta'aseh,' as the Gemara on 90b teaches).
</p><p>
The difference between 'overriding' and 'uprooting' an Isur d'Oraisa is as follows. To 'uproot' an Isur means to do an act which everyone sees is contradictory to the Torah. In contrast, to 'override' an Isur refers to an act which seems to have some logical (if not Scriptural) basis and does not <i>appear</i> to contradict anything in the Torah. In the case of the Gemara here, there are grounds ('Ketzas Ta'am u'Semach,' as Tosfos writes) to assume that the woman's husband is dead, since a woman always investigates the matter before she marries another man. Hence, the Rabanan's allowance for her to remarry based on the testimony of a single witness is not considered an enactment that 'uproots' the Torah's prohibition of 'Eshes Ish,' but rather one that 'overrides' it.
</p><p>
According to Tosfos, the Gemara apparently accepts that this is one of the powers which the Torah grants to the Rabanan -- the authority to make enactments as they deem appropriate as long as they do not 'uproot' a law written in the Torah. When their enactment is based on sound judgment and reason, it is not called 'uprooting' Torah law. Since the Torah does not openly say <i>not</i> to accept such reasoning (and thus issuing such a ruling will not inadvertently lower the people's respect for the Torah or for the Rabanan), the Rabanan are empowered to institute any decree they deem necessary.
</p><p>
(b) <b>RASHI</b> in Shabbos (145b, cited by <b>REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b> in Gilyon ha'Shas) writes that in this situation the Rabanan uprooted the Kidushin retroactively ('Afke'inhu,' a concept the Gemara discusses later on 90b) in order to permit the woman to remarry. Thus, retroactively she was never married to the first man.
</p><p>
The <b>RITVA</b> and Rishonim ask that if she was never married to the first man, her marriage to the second man is a full-fledged marriage mid'Oraisa. However, the Gemara (91a) clearly implies that the <i>first</i> marriage, and not the second, is considered the real one.
</p><p>
The Rishonim (<b>ME'IRI</b> and <b>TESHUVOS HA'RASHBA</b> 1:1162) answer that according to Rashi, the Rabanan uprooted the first Kidushin <i>on condition</i> that the husband does not return alive. Their retroactive annulment of the Kidushin does not take effect if he eventually returns. (The reason why the woman may remarry in the meantime, even though the possibility exists that her first husband will return alive, is that there is a Chazakah that since now he is not present, he will not return. See Tosfos to Gitin 33a, DH Afke'inhu.)
</p><p>
(c) The <b>RITVA</b> cites the <b>RE'AH</b> who explains that the testimony of the single witness is not accepted as 'testimony' per se, but rather as a 'Giluy Milsa b'Alma' that the woman no longer has a husband. The Torah does not always require formal testimony of two witnesses as evidence. In some situations, any clear, circumstantial proof ('Anan Sehadi' -- '<i>we</i> bear testimony') suffices. The Torah empowered the Rabanan to decide what proof is considered clear enough to permit a woman to remarry. 
</p><p>
In the case of the Mishnah, the fact that a single witness testifies to the death of the husband is considered to be strong proof that the husband is dead, because a person would not lie in court about an indisputable fact which eventually will become known to all (through the return of the supposedly dead husband; the Gemara introduces this logic later on 93b). Additional proof is provided by the fact that a woman does not rely on the testimony of a single witness to remarry unless she has investigated the matter herself. Since the Rabanan decided that in this case there is sufficient circumstantial evidence of the death of her husband, the woman may remarry even mid'Oraisa. (See also <b>TOSFOS YESHANIM</b>.)
</p><p>
This might be the intention of the <b>RAMBAM</b> as well. In several places, the Rambam writes that the trustworthiness of a single witness is 'mi'Divreihem' (that is, mid'Rabanan; see Hilchos Edus 5:2 and Hilchos Yibum 3:11). However, in the end of Hilchos Gerushin (13:29) the Rambam writes, 'Do not wonder why the Rabanan permitted a most severe Ervah (Eshes Ish) to remarry based on the testimony of [a witness whose testimony the Torah normally does not accept, such as a single witness], because the Torah requires formal testimony of two witnesses and the other laws of testimony only for an event which can be known <i>only</i> through witnesses (for example, that one person killed another person, or that one person lent money to another person). In contrast, for a matter which eventually will become known on its own, the Torah does not require formal testimony, since it is very unlikely that a [normally invalid] witness would lie about such a matter.' The Rambam concludes, 'Therefore, the Rabanan were lenient in this matter and believed a single witness... in order that Jewish women should not remain Agunos.'
</p><p>
The Rambam's words need clarification. He opens and concludes his comments by saying that the single witness is believed mid'Rabanan (as he writes in other places), but in the middle of his comment he says that the witness is believed mid'Oraisa.
</p><p>
The <b>SHEV SHEMAITSA</b> (7:11) explains that although the witness is believed mid'Oraisa as the Rambam says, the Rabanan usually were very stringent with Isurim as severe as 'Eshes Ish' and they required two witnesses. In the case of a single witness who says that a woman's husband died, the Rabanan should have decreed that an 'Eshes Ish' may not remarry based on such uncertain testimony, and they should have required two witnesses, mid'Rabanan. The reason why they did not require two witnesses in this case was the consideration to prevent women from becoming Agunos.
</p><p>
This is the intent of the Rambam when he writes that the Rabanan were lenient, while at the same time the witness is believed mid'Oraisa. This also explains why the Rambam writes in Hilchos Yibum that a single witness is believed only 'Mishum Iguna.' When the Rambam (in Hilchos Edus) writes that a single witness is believed 'mi'Divreihem,' he means that it is not explicitly written in the Torah that a single witness is believed in this case, but rather the Rabanan derived it from the verses. (The Rambam consistently refers to such Halachos mid'Oraisa as 'mi'Divreihem.') The witness, however, is trusted mid'Oraisa. (The Rambam, unlike the Ritva, does not mention the logic that a woman thoroughly investigates the testimony of a witness, as the Gemara itself says, apparently because he understands (as the Gemara itself implies) that this logic is solely mid'Rabanan and does not affect the Halachah mid'Oraisa. The Ra'avad (ibid.) notes, like the Ritva, that this logic does serve to lend credence to the testimony of the single witness.)
</p><p>
(d) The <b>RAMACH</b> in his comments on the Rambam (end of Hilchos Gerushin) presents a different approach. He differentiates between the trustworthiness of a single witness (a Jewish male) whose testimony otherwise would be valid (i.e. if he would join with another valid witness) and that of a single witness whose testimony otherwise would not be valid witness (i.e. even if he would join with another witness, his testimony would not be valid). In the former case, the testimony is accepted to allow the woman to remarry mid'Oraisa (as the Ritva writes), while in the latter case, the witness is trusted only mid'Rabanan (as Tosfos writes).  (See also Insights to Yevamos 92:1:a.)
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rav Sheshes):</font></b> She married one of the witnesses 
          who say that he died. (He is sure that she is permitted, 
          so he may remain with her.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> She must bring an Asham Taluy (for she is 
          unsure. Why may she remain married?)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> She says that she is sure that he died.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, obviously she may stay married! (Why did 
          Rav have to teach this?)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Even R. Menachem b'Rebbi Yosi requires him to 
               divorce her only when she married after witnesses 
               said that her husband was alive. If she married 
               before the witnesses came, she may stay married!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> If two witnesses say that the husband 
               died and two say that he did not die, or two say 
               that she was divorced and two say that she was not 
               divorced, she may not remarry. If she married, she 
               may stay married;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> R. Menachem b'Rebbi Yosi says, if the witnesses came 
               before she remarried, she must leave. If they came 
               after she remarried, she may stay married.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> Rav discusses when witnesses came before she 
          married. He teaches that the Halachah does not follow R. 
          Menachem.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> Rav teaches that she may stay married only 
          because she married before the witnesses came. Had she 
          married after they came, she would have to leave. This is 
          like R. Menachem.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rava - Beraisa):</font></b> 'V'Kidashto (make a Kohen 
          virtuous)' - against his will. This teaches that if he 
          did not want to leave a woman forbidden to him, Dafno 
          (force him).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> What is the case? (Surely, the verse 
               teaches about a case that is not clear, i.e. when 
               two pairs of witnesses argue about whether or not 
               her husband died.)
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  If she did not marry a witness who says that he 
                    died, or if she is unsure, surely we force 
                    (even a Yisrael)!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Rather, she married one of her witnesses and 
               she is sure that her husband died, and the Beraisa 
               teaches that we make him divorce her!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> Isurim of Kehunah (if her husband is alive she 
          is a Zonah) are more stringent (than Eshes Ish).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> 'Dafno' means that we strive to find witnesses 
          (that the husband is alive) before he marries her, so he 
          will not marry her.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #3:</font></b> The case is, the witnesses came before she 
          married. This is like R. Menachem.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (to Question (g) - Rav Ashi):</font></b> Rav said that she 
          does not leave, i.e. the first man to whom she was 
          permitted.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(s)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> Rav already taught that!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah - R. Shimon):</font></b> If she was married without 
               permission (of Beis Din), she may return to her 
               first husband.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav):</font></b> This is the Halachah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(t)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Rav taught only one of these two teachings. The 
          other was inferred from the one that he taught, and was 
          said in his name.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHEN SHE CONTRADICTS THE WITNESS</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Shmuel):</font></b> She must leave only if she does not contradict 
          the witness. If she contradicts him, she may stay 
          married.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is the case?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If two witnesses say that he is alive, her dissent 
               means nothing!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> One witness says that he is alive.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Inference:</font></b> Had she not contradicted him, she would have 
          had to leave!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Ula taught that wherever the Torah believes one 
          witness (e.g. the witness who says that he died), he is 
          like two, and one witness (who says that he did not die) 
          cannot discredit the testimony of two!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> Shmuel discusses Pasul witnesses (who say he 
          did not die), like R. Nechemyah taught:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Nechemyah):</font></b> Wherever the Torah 
               believes one witness, we follow the majority 
               opinion. Two women against a man are like two men 
               against a man.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #3:</font></b> Really, the law is, if one Kosher witness 
          originally said that he died, even 100 women that 
          contradict him are like just one man (the first man's 
          testimony stands). The case is, she married based on the 
          testimony of a woman;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> We explain R. Nechemyah to say that wherever the 
               Torah believes one witness, we follow the majority 
               opinion. Two women against one woman are like two 
               men against a man, but two women against a man is an 
               even doubt.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHEN IS A 'GET' NEEDED</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> She needs a Get from both men.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Granted, she needs a Get from her first husband 
          (she was truly married to him).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Why does she need a Get from the second man? It was 
               mere Bi'as Zenus!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Huna):</font></b> This is a decree, lest people say that 
          the first husband divorced her and she married the second 
          man, and now she leaves him without a Get.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Seifa (92a)):</font></b> If they told her that her husband 
          David died and she became Mekudeshes to Levi and later 
          David returned, she may return to him.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> We should also decree there, lest people say that 
               the David divorced her, Levi was Mekadesh her, and 
               she leaves Levi without a Get!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> She needs a Get from Levi (to return to 
          David).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> If so, (it appears as if) David is Machazir 
          Gerushaso after she became Mekudeshes to someone else!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The Mishnah is like R. Yosi ben Kipar, who 
          forbids Machazir Gerushaso after she married someone 
          else, but permits if she only became Mekudeshes to 
          someone else.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Seifa):</font></b> Even if Levi gives her a Get, it does 
          not disqualify her from Kehunah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This implies that a Get is not required. If a Get 
               was required, it would disqualify her!
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE FINES FOR MARRYING IF HER HUSBAND RETURNS</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (to Question 4:d, 88b):</font></b> No Get is required in 
          the Seifa because people will not think a married woman 
          leaves without a Get. They will say that it was a 
          mistake, and they were never married.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Also in the Reisha (our Mishnah) we should not 
          require a Get, for people will say the marriage was a 
          mistake!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> In the Reisha we fined her that she needs a Get 
          from the second man.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> We should also fine her in the Seifa!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> In the Reisha she transgressed (by having 
          Nisu'in), so we fined her. In the Seifa she did not 
          transgress, so we did not fine her.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> She has no Kesuvah ...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  Kesuvah was enacted so that it should not be light in a 
          man's eyes to divorce his wife. Here, we want him to 
          divorce her!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> She does not receive fruits, food or 
          Bala'os...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b></b>  Provisions of the Kesuvah are like the Kesuvah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If she received (any of these) from either man 
          (she must return it).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> This is obvious!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> One might have thought that once she seized it, 
          we do not take from her. The Mishnah teaches that this is 
          not so.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONE WHO TAKES BAD 'TERUMAH'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> The child is a Mamzer...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> We do not separate Terumah from Tamei produce 
          on Tahor. If one did b'Shogeg, it is Terumah; if one did 
          so intentionally, his separation <i>has no effect</i>.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What does this mean?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rav Chisda):</font></b> It has no effect at all. Even the 
          (part he called) 'Terumah' reverts to be Tevel.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (R. Noson b'Rebbi Oshaya):</font></b> It has no effect to 
          permit the remainder, but what he separated becomes 
          Terumah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Rav Chisda disagrees, for if we say that it is 
               Terumah, the person might neglect to separate more 
               Terumah to fix the Tevel.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (against Rav Chisda - Mishnah):</font></b> If one separated 
          Terumah on gourds and it is found to be bitter, or on a 
          watermelon and it was found to be spoiled, it is Terumah 
          and he must take more Terumah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> There, he did not intend to take bad Terumah; he 
          did not sin. Here, he intended to take bad Terumah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Contradiction:</font></b> Here, if he was Shogeg what he separated 
          is Terumah. There it is Terumah, and he must take more 
          Terumah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> There, even though he did not intend to take bad 
          Terumah, he is somewhat negligent. He should have tasted 
          it!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (against Rav Chisda):</font></b> Here, b'Mezid it has no 
          effect. Elsewhere, it takes effect!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> (Produce that grew in a flowerpot is 
               Tevel (must be tithed) mid'Oraisa if the pot has 
               holes. If there are no holes, it is Tevel 
               mid'Rabanan.) If one was Torem from (what grew in) a 
               pot without holes on produce from a pot with holes, 
               it is Terumah, and he must Torem again.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> When the Terumah and the remainder grew in 
          different types of Kelim, he (understands that it is 
          invalid and) will agree to Torem again. Here, it all grew 
          the same way (just some is Tamei), he will not agree (to 
          Torem again).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> According to R. Noson, that it has no effect to 
          permit the produce on which it was separated, but it does 
          become Terumah, why is this different than the following 
          Mishnah?
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) WHO INHERITS A MARRIED KETANAH</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> In an attempt to prove that Beis Din may uproot a Mitzvah in the Torah, the Gemara cites a Beraisa which states that a man who is married to a Ketanah (a minor with whom Kidushin takes effect only mid'Rabanan) inherits the property of the Ketanah if she dies. He also may become Tamei for her if he is a Kohen. However, if the Torah states that a girl's father inherits her property, how could the Rabanan enact that her husband inherits her when the marriage is binding only mid'Rabanan? It must be that the Rabanan have the authority to uproot a Torah law.
</p><p>
The Gemara refutes this proof and says that the Ketanah's husband, and not her father, inherits her <i>not</i> because the Rabanan uprooted a Torah law, but because of the principle, 'Hefker Beis Din Hefker.'
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> explains that when the Gemara says that according to Torah law, a Ketanah's <i>father</i>, and not her husband, inherits her, it cannot mean literally that the father inherits his daughter. The only case in which the status of a Ketanah's marriage is mid'Rabanan is when her father died before he accepted Kidushin on her behalf, and other members of her family, such as her brothers, married her off instead. Rashi explains that the Gemara means that mid'Oraisa the <i>relatives</i> of her father inherit her. (The same presumably applies to the allowance for a Kohen to become Tamei for her. When the Gemara says that mid'Oraisa her 'father' may became Tamei for her, it does not mean literally her <i>father</i>, since he is no longer living.) 
</p><p>
<b>REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b> asks why Rashi needs to say that the Gemara refers to the father's relatives. The Gemara in Kidushin (44b) discusses the concept of 'Yesomah b'Chayei ha'Av' ('a girl who is an orphan while her father is still alive) -- it is possible for a Ketanah to get married while her father is still alive and yet the Kidushin takes effect only mid'Rabanan. Such a situation exists in a case in which the father already married her off once to one man, and then she was divorced and remarried another man. At the time she married the first husband, she left the domain of her father and he may no longer accept Kidushin on her behalf (as <b>RASHI</b> explains on 2b, DH v'Chulan she'Meisu, 12a, DH Mishum, and 107b, DH Kol she'Yecholah). Hence, her second marriage is only mid'Rabanan.
</p><p>
Why does Rashi not explain that the Gemara here refers to a case of 'Yesomah b'Chayei ha'Av' and that 'her father' refers literally to her father? Why does Rashi need to explain that the Gemara's words are imprecise and refer to her father's relatives?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER:</b> The <b>MISHNEH L'MELECH</b> (Hilchos Avel 2:7) asks another question. The Gemara attempts again to prove that the Rabanan may uproot a Torah law. It quotes the Beraisa's statement that the Kohen husband of a Mema'enes may become Tamei for the girl if she dies. Since the Ketanah's marriage to him is only mid'Rabanan, mid'Oraisa only her father may become Tamei for her. It must be that the Rabanan uprooted the Torah law that only her father may become Tamei for her. The Gemara refutes this proof and asserts that the husband indeed may become Tamei for her mid'Oraisa, because the Mema'enes has the status of a Mes Mitzvah for whom a Kohen may become Tamei. She is a Mes Mitzvah because no one (other than her husband) will have an interest in burying her since it is her husband who inherits her.
</p><p>
Why does the Gemara introduce this proof by saying that 'mid'Oraisa the father may became Tamei for his daughter'? If the Gemara means that mid'Oraisa the husband may not become Tamei for his Ketanah wife, it should say so explicitly and leave out mention of the father. Apparently, the Gemara means that the Rabanan's enactment not only gave the husband the responsibility to become Tamei and handle the burial of the girl, but it also <i>removed</i> that responsibility from the father (in the case of a 'Yesomah b'Chayei ha'Av'). 
</p><p>
However, what indication is there in the Beraisa that the Rabanan enacted that the father may no longer become Tamei for his daughter? What source teaches that the Rabanan took away the father's right to become Tamei for his daughter? <i>All</i> of her relatives should be obligated to bury her, including both her husband and her father. After she is married mid'Rabanan (or even mid'Oraisa), her father is obligated to become Tamei for her if she dies; no source mentions any exemption from this responsibility. (It is true that her brothers are not permitted to become Tamei for her after she is married, as the Torah states. Her father, however, must become Tamei for his daughter even if she is a Be'ulah, and certainly he should be obligated to become Tamei for her in this case.)
</p><p>
The <b>ARUCH LA'NER</b> answers that when the Gemara says that mid'Oraisa the father may become Tamei for her, it means that <i>if she would have had a father</i> he would have been the only one permitted to become Tamei for her mid'Oraisa. In this case, however, her father has died, and thus <i>no</i> Kohen -- including her husband -- should be permitted to become Tamei for her mid'Oraisa. This is the intent of the Gemara when it says that mid'Oraisa her father may become Tamei for her; mid'Oraisa, not only may her <i>husband</i> not become Tamei for her, but <i>no</i> Kohen may become Tamei for her. Accordingly, the Aruch la'Ner concludes that the father of a Ketanah who is a 'Yesomah b'Chayei ha'Av' <i>is</i> obligated to become Tamei for her, even after the Rabanan enacted that the husband may [also] become Tamei for her.
</p><p>
According to the Aruch la'Ner's explanation, the wording of the Gemara clearly implies that the Ketanah under discussion has no living father (as Rashi writes) and she is <i>not</i> a 'Yesomah b'Chayei ha'Av.'
</p><p>
Further proof that there is no father in this case may be adduced from the fact that the Gemara says that if the husband does not bury her, no one else will bury her because the husband inherits her. Why is there no one else to bury her? The Torah obligates the father to bury her even if he receives no inheritance! It must be that the Ketanah has no living father in this case. In contrast, the husband of a 'Yesomah b'Chayei ha'Av' perhaps is <i>not</i> permitted to become Tamei for her, since she is not like a Mes Mitzvah (because her father is obligated mid'Oraisa to bury her). Rashi explains that the discussion of the Gemara about the enactment that the husband may become Tamei for his wife who is a Ketanah implies that the case of the Beraisa refers to a Ketanah who has no father. (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> If one was Torem from a pot without holes 
               on a pot with holes, it is Terumah, but he (the 
               Kohen) may not eat (the Terumah) until he takes 
               Terumah and Ma'aser on it from other produce.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Our case is different because mid'Oraisa it is 
          Terumah, like R. Ilai taught:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Ilai):</font></b> 'You will not bear sin if you take the 
               best part' teaches that if one took bad Terumah on 
               good fruit, it is Terumah. If it was not Terumah, he 
               would bear no sin!
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>CAN 'CHACHAMIM' UPROOT A 'TORAH' 'MITZVAH'?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rabah to Rav Chisda):</font></b> Why do you say that it 
          had no effect at all?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> This is a decree. If we say that it is Terumah, 
          perhaps he will not separate more.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rabah):</font></b> Do we ever find that mid'Oraisa 
          something is Terumah, and Chachamim revert it to Chulin 
          lest a person be negligent?!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Can Chachamim uproot something from the Torah?!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Chisda):</font></b> You must agree that they can!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> The child from either man is a Mamzer.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Granted, the child from the second man is a Mamzer 
               mid'Oraisa; she is still married to the first man. 
               But the child from the first man is Kosher 
               (mid'Oraisa), and we (call him a Mamzer mid'Rabanan 
               and) permit him to a Mamzeres!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection (Rabah citing Shmuel):</font></b> The child is forbidden 
          to a Mamzeres. (He has only the stringencies of a Mamzer, 
          mid'Rabanan.)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Ravin):</font></b> He is forbidden to a Mamzeres. The Mishnah 
               calls him a Mamzer to teach that he may not marry a 
               Bas Yisrael.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rav Chisda (to Rabah):</font></b> You must agree that Chachamim can 
          uproot a Torah law! (The following 10 questions all seek 
          to prove this.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #1 (Beraisa) Question:</font></b> If a man was married 
          (mid'Rabanan) to a minor, from what point does he inherit 
          her (if she dies)?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #1 (Beis Shamai):</font></b> It is from when she becomes 
               a Na'arah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #2 (Beis Hillel):</font></b> It is after Chupah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #3 (R. Eliezer):</font></b> It is after they have Bi'ah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> From this time he inherits her, becomes Tamei to 
               engage in her burial, and she may eat Terumah (if he 
               is a Kohen).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> Do Beis Shamai really mean from when she 
               is a Na'arah, even if this is before Chupah?!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> They mean, when she becomes a Na'arah and 
               has Chupah.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  Beis Hillel hold that Chupah always works. Beis 
                    Shamai holds that it works only after Na'arus.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> R. Eliezer says from when she has Bi'ah. 
               Elsewhere he said that what a minor does has no 
               effect!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> He means, when she grows up and has Bi'ah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Summation of question):</font></b> (According to Beis Hillel, 
               if Chupah was before Na'arus) mid'Oraisa, her father 
               inherits her, and mid'Rabanan, her husband inherits 
               her!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Beis Din has power to make Hefker (declare money 
          ownerless);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Yitzchak):</font></b> We learn from 'Whoever will not come 
               ... by the counsel of the officers and Chachamim, 
               his property will be made Cherem'.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Elazar):</font></b> We learn from 'Asher Nichalu Elazar 
               ha'Kohen vi'Hoshua bin Nun v'Roshei ha'Avos l'Matos 
               Bnei Yisrael';
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  It mentions the leaders by the fathers to teach 
                    that just like fathers can bequeath like they 
                    wish to their children, also leaders can make 
                    the nation inherit like they wish.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #2:</font></b> (A Kohen is permitted and commanded to 
          become Tamei only for his seven close relatives.) The 
          Beraisa says that her husband mid'Rabanan becomes Tamei 
          to bury her. Mid'Oraisa, her father becomes Tamei for 
          her!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> She is like a Mes Mitzvah (any Kohen may bury an 
          unattended corpse).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> She is not a Mes Mitzvah!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> A Mes Mitzvah is one that has no one to 
               bury it. If one (who finds a Mes) calls and others 
               answer, this is not a Mes Mitzvah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Here, since her relatives do not inherit her, if 
          he calls, no one will answer (they will not want to bury 
          her. Tosfos - because she resembles a Mes Mitzvah, it 
          does not appear like Chachamim uproot the Torah. I heard 
          in the name of Rav Moshe Shternbuch that surely Chachamim 
          can uproot. The question is whether or not they ever did 
          so.)
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>A RABBINICALLY MARRIED GIRL MAY EAT 'TERUMAH'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #3:</font></b> She is allowed to eat Terumah (even though 
          mid'Oraisa she is a Zar)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> She may eat only Terumah mid'Rabanan.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #4 (Beraisa):</font></b> If a Zar ate Tamei Terumah, he 
          pays Chulin Tehorim (it becomes Terumah);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Sumchus says, if he paid Chulin Teme'im b'Shogeg, 
               the payment is valid. If he was Mezid, it is not 
               payment;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Chachamim say, in either case it is payment, and he 
               must pay also Chulin Tehorim.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> If he was Mezid, why is the payment 
               invalid? He should be blessed! He ate something that 
               a Kohen cannot eat when he is Tamei, and paid 
               something that a Kohen may eat when he is Tamei! 
               (Even though it becomes Terumah when the Kohen 
               receives it and then the Kohen cannot eat it, the 
               Zar paid more than the value of what he ate. Why is 
               he fined?)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer (Rava):</font></b> The Mishnah is abbreviated. It means 
               as follows:
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  If he ate Tamei Terumah, he pays anything. If 
                    he ate Tahor Terumah, he pays Chulin Tehorim;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> Sumchus says, if he paid Tamei Chulin b'Shogeg, 
                    the payment is valid. If he was Mezid, it is 
                    not payment;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b></b>Chachamim say, in either case it is payment, 
                    and he must pay also Chulin Tehorim.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Summation of Question #4:</font></b> Mid'Oraisa the payment is 
               valid. If the Kohen would be Mekadesh a woman with 
               it, she is Mekudeshes. Chachamim said that it is not 
               payment, and they permit an Eshes Ish to marry 
               someone else!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> No. 'It is not payment' means only that he must 
          also pay Chulin Tehorim.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> If so, Sumchus agrees with Chachamim!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Acha brei d'Rav Ika):</font></b> They argue about 
          whether or not we fine Shogeg lest one transgress b'Mezid 
          (and say that he was Shogeg).
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>REFRAINING FROM A 'MITZVAH'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #5 (Beraisa):</font></b> If Dam became Tamei and it was 
          thrown on the Mizbe'ach:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The Korban is Meratzeh if this was b'Shogeg, but not 
               if it was b'Mezid.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> The Tzitz is Meratzeh for Dam, meat and 
               Chelev that became Tamei, whether Mezid or Shogeg, 
               whether willingly or unwillingly, for an individual 
               or the Tzibur.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Summation of question:</font></b> Mid'Oraisa, in either case it 
               is Meratzeh. Chachamim decreed that b'Mezid it is 
               not Meratzeh. The Korban brought in its place is 
               Chulin ba'Azarah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (R. Yosi bar Chanina):</font></b> It was not Meratzeh to 
          permit eating the meat, but it was Mechaper (no other 
          Korban is brought).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #6:</font></b> In any case, the Mitzvah of eating the meat 
          is uprooted!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> 'V'Ochlu Osam Asher Kupar Bahem' teaches that 
               Kohanim eat and the owners receive Kaparah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Chachamim can command us to refrain from 
          performing a Mitzvah.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) PROOF THAT THE CHACHAMIM ARE EMPOWERED TO UPROOT A TORAH LAW</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTIONS:</b> The Gemara continues its attempt to prove that the Rabanan have the authority to uproot a law written in the Torah. The Gemara cites a Beraisa which discusses Tashlumei Terumah -- compensation paid by a Zar for deriving personal benefit from Terumah. In the case of the Beraisa, a Zar ate Terumah Tehorah and intentionally paid Terumah Teme'ah to the Kohen as compensation. Rebbi Meir maintains that his payment is not valid, 'Ein Tashlumav Tashlumin.' The Chachamim disagree and rule that his payment is accepted, but he must pay a second time with Terumah Tehorah.
</p><p>
The Gemara proves from Rebbi Meir's opinion that the Rabanan have the authority to uproot a law written in the Torah because, mid'Oraisa, a payment of Terumah Teme'ah is a valid payment, and yet the Rabanan disqualified it. The enactment of the Rabanan goes so far as to invalidate a Kidushin which the Kohen performed with the payment, and the woman whom he betrothed is <i>not</i> Mekudeshes (and she may marry another man and does not need a Get from the Kohen).
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Azil) questions this proof:
</p><p>
(a) Why does the Gemara infer that the Rabanan have the authority to uproot a Torah law from the fact that the Kidushin which the Kohen performed with the Terumah Teme'ah does not take effect? There is a far more obvious proof that the Rabanan may uproot a Torah law. Normally, the fruit paid as compensation by a Zar for inadvertently eating Terumah becomes Terumah mid'Oraisa itself. Here, Rebbi Meir states that mid'Rabanan the payment is not valid, and thus the decree of the Rabanan prevents it from becoming Terumah. That is, the Rabanan removed the status of Terumah from the payment even though mid'Oraisa it is Terumah! (This case is the same as the case cited by the Gemara in the beginning of the Sugya on 89a.)
</p><p>
(b) The Gemara's proof from the fact that the Kidushin does not take effect is problematic. In cases of monetary matters, the principle of 'Hefker Beis Din Hefker' applies; even if the Rabanan are <i>not</i> authorized to uproot Torah law, they <i>do</i> have the power to render a person's property ownerless, as the Gemara earlier teaches. Why does the Gemara prove from the fact that the Rabanan took away the payment from the recipient (the Kohen) that the Rabanan have the power to uproot a Torah law? 'Hefker Beis Din Hefker' is different and does not involve uprooting a Torah law!
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> answers that the Gemara cannot prove that the Rabanan have the authority to uproot a Torah law from the fact that the payment does not become Terumah according to Rebbi Meir, because Rebbi Meir does not say outright that it does not become Terumah. He says merely that the payment is not a valid payment, which means that the payment is returned to the payer, in contrast to the view of the Rabanan that the payment is kept by the recipient (and the payer must pay a second time). When the payment is returned to the payer, however, perhaps it retains the status of Terumah; the fact that it is not a valid payment and is returned does not mean that it loses the status of Terumah which it obtained at the moment it was given to the Kohen.
</p><p>
(b) <b>TOSFOS</b> answers the second question by explaining that the principle of 'Hefker Beis Din Hefker' does not apply in this case. The Rabanan do not utilize their power of 'Hefker Beis Din Hefker' to take away money from a recipient (in this case, the Kohen) which legally belongs to him and he did nothing to deserve losing it. In this case, it was the payer, and not the recipient, who did something wrong. Hence, the Rabanan did not apply 'Hefker Beis Din Hefker,' and the only reason why they took away the payment from the Kohen must be that their enactment has the ability to uproot the Torah law.
</p><p>
This answer of Tosfos is problematic for several reasons.
</p><p>
1. The <b>MAHARSHA</b> (in <b>MAHADURA BASRA</b>) asks that taking away the payment of Terumah Teme'ah from the Kohen in no way harms the Kohen or causes him a loss. On the contrary, taking it away is to his advantage. In order to give him a payment of a higher quality (Terumah Tehorah), the Rabanan took away the Terumah Teme'ah which he received originally so that the Zar will pay again with Terumah Tehorah. Since it is to the Kohen's benefit to have the Rabanan take away the Terumah Teme'ah from his possession, why did the Rabanan not apply 'Hefker Beis Din Hefker' in this case? (See <b>ARUCH LA'NER</b>.)
</p><p>
2. <b>REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b> points out that the Gemara seeks to prove that Rebbi Meir maintains that the payment is not valid, and that the Rabanan maintain that the money is taken away from the Kohen. If 'Hefker Beis Din Hefker' is not the reason for why the payment is taken away from the Kohen, then it must be that it is taken away because of the Rabanan's authority to uproot a Torah law. However, the same reason why the Rabanan do not utilize 'Hefker Beis Din Hefker' in this case should apply to their authority to uproot a Torah law: just as they do not apply 'Hefker Beis Din Hefker' so as not to harm the Kohen, they also should not take away his payment by uprooting the Torah law which says that the payment is valid! Conversely, if they have grounds to uproot a Torah law and revoke the payment even though they thereby harm the Kohen, they should also be able to take away the payment from him by applying 'Hefker Beis Din Hefker'!
</p><p>
3. The Gemara earlier contradicts the assertion of Tosfos that the principle of 'Hefker Beis Din Hefker' does not apply when it would involve taking away something from a person who did nothing wrong. The Gemara earlier says that in the case of a married Ketanah who dies, the Rabanan apply 'Hefker Beis Din Hefker' to take away her estate from the father and give it to her husband even though the father did nothing wrong in that case.
</p><p>
Perhaps these questions may be answered as follows.
<br>1. If the intent of the Rabanan was to make the Zar pay the Kohen the full amount with Tahor fruit, they did not need to take away the fruit that he already paid to the Kohen. They could have required merely that the Zar continue to pay the Kohen more until his payment equals the value of the Terumah Tehorah that he ate. There was no need to take away the Terumah Teme'ah that was already paid to the Kohen, and thus they did not apply 'Hefker Beis Din Hefker' in this case.
</p><p>
(One might ask that in the case of a person who separates Terumah from Tamei produce to exempt Tahor produce (89a), the Gemara suggests that the Rabanan uprooted the status of Terumah to <i>remind</i> its owner to separate Terumah a second time from Tahor produce, and they did not merely require him to separate additional Terumah to make up for the loss in value. However, that logic cannot be applied here, because making the Kohen return the payment to the Zar will not ensure that the Zar will pay the Tashlumei Terumah in full, since returning the payment causes no <i>harm</i> to the Zar. Uprooting the status of Terumah in the case of one who separates Terumah from Tamei produce for Tahor produce ensures that the owner will separate Terumah again, because he cannot eat the rest of his produce until he does so (for it is Tevel mid'Oraisa). Moreover, uprooting the Terumah in that case ('Min ha'Tahor Al ha'Tamei') is done for the sake of enforcing the laws of Terumah and not for the benefit of the Kohen, as will be explained below.)
</p><p>
2. Perhaps Rebbi Akiva Eiger's question may be addressed as follows. Tosfos does not mean that Rebbi Meir maintains that the Rabanan required only that the Kohen return the Terumah Teme'ah and they did not rescind its status as Terumah. Rather, Tosfos means that <i>one might have thought</i> that this is what Rebbi Meir means (in the words of Tosfos, 'Havah Matzi l'Meimar').
</p><p>
The Gemara proves that this is not the intention of Rebbi Meir from the fact that he says 'Ein Tashlumav Tashlumin,' the payment is not valid, which implies that the fruits paid to the Kohen <i>cannot</i> be used for Kidushin. Why should the Kohen not be able to use the money? The enactment of the Rabanan is for his benefit, so that he will receive the full value of the Terumah that the Zar ate. What point is there in taking away the money from him, either through 'Hefker Beis Din Hefker' <i>or</i> through uprooting a Torah law? 
</p><p>
The Gemara teaches that it must be that Rebbi Meir means something else when he says that the payment is not valid. He must mean that the Rabanan indeed revoked the status of Terumah from the payment such that the Tamei fruit which the Zar gave to the Kohen does <i>not</i> become Terumah in the first place. Consequently, the Kohen must give it back because is was given to him by mistake. It is not a valid Tashlumei Terumah; the Zar gave it to him only because he <i>thought</i> it was Tashlumei Terumah. Since, if the status of Terumah is uprooted, the payment was not the Kohen's in the first place, the Rabanan are not directly taking away anything directly from the Kohen by uprooting the status of Terumah from the Tashlumim. In this sense, uprooting the status of the Tashlumei Terumah is identical to the case in which the Rabanan uprooted the status of Terumah that was taken from Tamei produce to exempt Tahor produce (89a). In that case, too, if the owner gives the Kohen the invalid Terumah the Kohen must return it. He indirectly loses Terumah as a result of the enactment because what was separated improperly remains Tevel and does not have the status of Terumah at all.
</p><p>
(This idea may also be expressed as follows: If the enactment of the Rabanan was that the fruit does not become Terumah in the first place, this indicates that it was not enacted simply for the benefit of the Kohen (so that he should receive the full value of what the Zar ate). Rather, it was enacted to protect the honor of Terumah. By paying Tashlumei Terumah with fruits that are Tamei (and thus less valuable than the fruit he ate), the Zar degrades the honor of the Terumah that he ate, and that is why the Rabanan enacted that the payment is not valid. If this enactment would cause the Kohen to lose money indirectly (and perhaps even directly), the loss would not stop the Rabanan from enacting such an enactment since they deemed it important to ensure that proper respect is given to Terumah.)
</p><p>
3. The reason why the Rabanan applied 'Hefker Beis Din Hefker' and took away the Ketanah's inheritance from the father was because he willingly married off his daughter to a man while she was a Ketanah. He freely chose to give her away, knowing that he would thereby lose the right to inherit her. Therefore, the Rabanan applied 'Hefker Beis Din Hefker' to take away the money that he otherwise would have been entitled to receive. In the case of the Tashlumei Terumah, however, the Kohen has no choice in the matter, and thus the Rabanan do not take away his money through 'Hefker Beis Din Hefker.' (Moreover, the Gemara assumes at this stage that the enactment was made only for the Kohen's own benefit, and thus the Rabanan certainly are not interested in causing harm to the Kohen through their enactment.) (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rav Chisda:</font></b> I was going to ask you about other Mitzvos 
          that are uprooted:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Arel and Haza'ah (Chachamim decreed not to bring 
               Korban Pesach within seven days after being 
               circumcised, and not to sprinkle Mei Chatas on 
               Shabbos, even if this prevents one from bringing 
               Korban Pesach), a circumcision knife (one may not 
               transgress an Isur mid'Rabanan to bring, even if 
               this prevents Milah on day eight on Shabbos);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> A linen garment (is exempt from Tzitzis), the sheep 
               brought with Lechem ha'Panim on Shavuous (if they 
               were slaughtered Lo Lishmah, if it is Shabbos one 
               may not throw the blood), Shofar and Lulav (we do 
               not fulfill them on Shabbos);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Now that you answered that refraining from a Mitzvah 
               is not considered uprooting a Mitzvah, the same 
               answer applies to all of these.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #7 (Beraisa):</font></b> 'Listen to him', even if a prophet 
          tells you that now it is necessary to transgress a 
          Mitzvah, like Eliyahu (offered Shechutei Chutz) on Mount 
          Karmel!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> That is an exception, for it says 'Listen to 
          him'!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #8:</font></b> We should learn from it (that Chachamim may 
          uproot Mitzvos)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> There is different. It is to correct a breach. 
          (Yisrael were serving idolatry, so Eliyahu showed them 
          that 'Hash-m Hu ha'Elokim'.)
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>UPROOTING TO FIX A PROBLEM</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #9 (Beraisa - Rebbi):</font></b> If a man sent a Get with a 
          Shali'ach and disqualified the Get, it is void;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Shimon ben Gamliel says, he cannot disqualify it 
               or add conditions to it. If he could, Beis Din's 
               enactment has no power!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Summation of question:</font></b> Mid'Oraisa, the Get is 
               invalid. Because we are concerned for the power of 
               Beis Din, we permit a married woman to remarry!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Anyone who is Mekadesh does so according to 
          Chachamim's rules, and they retroactively uprooted the 
          Kidushin (of one who is Mevatel a Get).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Ravina):</font></b> This explains one who is Mekadesh with 
          money (retroactively the money was a gift). How can we 
          answer for one who was Mekadesh through Bi'ah?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Ashi):</font></b> Chachamim converted his Kidushin to 
          Bi'as Zenus.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #10 (Beraisa - R. Eliezer ben Yakov):</font></b> Beis Din 
          can lash and punish not according to Torah, not to 
          transgress Torah, but to make a fence for Torah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> A case occurred in which a man rode on a horse on 
               Shabbos in the days of the Yevanim, and Beis Din 
               stoned him. He did not deserve this, but it was 
               necessary at the time.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> It once occurred that a man had Bi'ah with his wife 
               under a fig tree, and was lashed for it. He did not 
               deserve this, but it was necessary at the time.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Fixing a breach is different (this is not called 
          uprooting. The question is not resolved.)
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>FINES WHEN HER HUSBAND RETURNS</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> (If her husband returned after she remarried,) 
          neither man becomes Tamei to engage in her burial.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is the source for this?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> A Kohen may become Tamei 'Ki Im <i>li'Sh'ero</i>'. We 
          learned that this refers to his wife;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Contradiction:</font></b> It also says 'A husband will not 
               become Tamei (for his wife)!'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Resolution:</font></b> He becomes Tamei for a permitted wife, 
               but not for a forbidden wife.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> Neither man receives her Metzi'os...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  Chachamim enacted that a man receives his wife's Metzi'os 
          to avoid resentment. Here, we are happy that there should 
          be resentment (to ensure that he divorce her)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> Nor her earnings ...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  Chachamim enacted that a man receives his wife's 
          earnings, because he feeds her. Here he does not feed 
          her, so he does not get her earnings.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> Neither man can annul her vows ...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b></b>  The Torah empowers a man to annul his wife's vows so she 
          should not become repulsive to him. Here, we want her to 
          be repulsive to him!
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) DONNING A FOUR-CORNERED GARMENT WITHOUT TZITZIS</b></font><b>
<br>OPINIONS:</b> The Gemara states that the Rabanan may override the Mitzvah of Tzitzis in a garment made of linen through a 'Shev v'Al Ta'aseh' -- a passive infraction (by requiring that a person <i>not</i> do something), and not through a 'Kum v'Aseh,' a positive action. 
</p><p>
Why is donning a four-cornered garment that has no Tzitzis considered a case of 'Shev v'Al Ta'aseh'? When the person dons a four-cornered garment that has no Tzitzis, he does an <i>act</i> ('Kum v'Aseh') of donning a garment without Tzitzis. 
</p><p>
(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH Kulhu) and other Rishonim explain that the Torah's commandment to wear Tzitzis entails placing Tzitzis on a garment which one is <i>already wearing</i>. Before he dons the garment, there is no Mitzvah to put Tzitzis on it (according to the opinion that the Mitzvah of Tzitzis is a 'Chovas Gavra' and applies only to a garment which is worn and not to a garment which is stored in a box). Therefore, when one places upon his body a four-cornered garment that has no Tzitzis, he transgresses no Mitzvah. He transgresses the Mitzvah only after the garment is upon him and he still refrains from tying Tzitzis onto it. This transgression, however, is through 'Shev v'Al Ta'aseh,' since the Mitzvah obligates him to tie Tzitzis to the garment and he passively refrains from doing so. (If he would don a four-cornered garment with no Tzitzis and then immediately begin to tie Tzitzis onto it, he would transgress no Mitzvah at all.)
</p><p>
The <b>TOSFOS HA'ROSH</b> quotes the <b>RITZBA</b> who says that according to this understanding, if one of the four Tzitziyos falls off of the garment on Shabbos, one is permitted to wear the garment even l'Chatchilah. Donning the four-cornered garment without Tzitzis is not a transgression of the Mitzvah, and after he dons it he is unable to tie Tzitzis to it because of the Melachah of tying on Shabbos. (He is not permitted to walk into a Reshus ha'Rabim or Karmelis while wearing the garment, because he is considered to be carrying the other three Tzitzis since they do not qualify as the Mitzvah without the fourth Tzitzis. Nevertheless, he is permitted to wear the garment inside his house, and even to don it l'Chatchilah. See also <b>SHITAH MEKUBETZES</b> to Menachos 37b, #4.)
</p><p>
(b) The <b>SHA'AGAS ARYEH</b> (#32) challenges the explanation of Tosfos and his ruling.
</p><p>
1. As Tosfos himself points out, the blessing which one recites upon donning a garment with Tzitzis -- 'l'His'atef ba'Tzitzis' -- implies that the Mitzvah is to actively wrap oneself in a garment with Tzitzis, and not merely to place Tzitzis on the garment once it is already being worn.
</p><p>
2. The Gemara in Shabbos (132b) teaches that a Mitzvas Aseh overrides a Lo Ta'aseh only in a manner 'similar to the way Tzitzis overrides the Lo Ta'aseh of Kil'ayim.' This general rule includes the condition that the Mitzvas Aseh must be fulfilled at the very moment the Lo Ta'aseh is transgressed in order for it to override the Lo Ta'aseh. According to Tosfos, however, the Lo Ta'aseh of Kil'ayim is transgressed <i>before</i> the Mitzvah of Tzitzis is fulfilled. Kil'ayim is transgressed through an act of 'Kum v'Aseh,' by actively donning a garment of Kil'ayim (as Tosfos proves from the Gemara in Berachos 20a). The Mitzvah of Tzitzis is fulfilled only <i>after</i> one has already donned the garment. Consequently, one transgresses the Isur of Kil'ayim <i>before</i> he fulfills the Mitzvah of Tzitzis, and thus the Mitzvas Aseh of Tzitzis should not override the Lo Ta'aseh of Kil'ayim.
</p><p>
3. The Sha'agas Aryeh suggests further that any transgression which must be <i>preceded</i> by an initial action is considered a transgression of 'Kum v'Aseh' even though no action is done at the time the actual transgression is committed. Accordingly, even if the Mitzvah of Tzitzis does not take effect until the garment is upon the person, wearing a four-cornered garment without Tzitzis still should be considered uprooting a Mitzvah through 'Kum v'Aseh,' since the transgression must be preceded by an initial action of donning the garment. He proves this from examples of Torah prohibitions which are transgressed passively (with no action), but for which Malkus nevertheless is administered (even though Malkus is administered only for <i>actively</i> transgressing a prohibition -- 'Lav she'Yesh Bo Ma'aseh').
</p><p>
For example, the Gemara in Nazir (40a) relates that if a Nazir sat in a closed box and was carried into a cemetery (according to the opinion that a box effectively separates between him and the Tum'ah), and another person came and removed the cover of the box, the Nazir transgresses the prohibition against becoming Tamei <i>and he receives Malkus</i> if he does not leave immediately. In that case, the initial action of entering the cemetery -- even though done in a permissible manner -- renders the act a 'Lav she'Yesh Bo Ma'aseh.' Similarly, the donning of a four-cornered garment should render the transgression one which is accomplished through a 'Kum v'Aseh.'
</p><p>
The Sha'agas Aryeh therefore suggests a different answer to the question of Tosfos. He writes that any time an act is forbidden not because of what <i>is</i> done, but because of what is <i>not</i> done, it is called a 'Shev v'Al Ta'aseh.'
</p><p>
In the case of one who wears a four-cornered garment without Tzitzis, the wrongful act is not that the person <i>is wearing</i> a garment without Tzitzis, but that he <i>has not tied</i> Tzitzis to the garment. Although the act of donning the four-cornered garment without Tzitzis is forbidden, what causes the prohibition is the fact that he did not tie Tzitzis to the garment. This is in contrast to the Isur of Kil'ayim, which one is considered to transgress through 'Kum v'Aseh' when he dons a garment that contains a forbidden mixture of Kil'ayim <i>not</i> because he fails to remove the garment from upon him, but because he has actively donned a garment of Kil'ayim.
</p><p>
Similarly, the Isur which prohibits a Nazir from entering a cemetery states that a Nazir may not <i>be</i> in a cemetery (as that is how the Torah describes the Isur) and not that a Nazir <i>must stay outside</i> of a cemetery. For this reason, the Isur which prohibits a Nazir from entering a cemetery is considered a 'Kum v'Aseh' and Malkus may be administered.
</p><p>
(According to this reasoning, one certainly is prohibited from donning a four-cornered garment without Tzitzis, even on Shabbos.)
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>FINES WHEN HER HUSBAND RETURNS (cont.)</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If she is a Bas Yisrael, she is disqualified 
          from Kehunah ...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> This is obvious!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The Chidush is that a Bas Levi is disqualified 
          from Ma'aser.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Forbidden Bi'ah does not disqualify a Bas Levi 
          from Ma'aser!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> If a Bas Levi was taken captive or had 
               Bi'as Zenus, she receives Ma'aser and may eat it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Sheshes):</font></b> This is a fine.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> A Bas Kohen is disqualified from Terumah ...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  She is disqualified even from Terumah mid'Rabanan.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> The heirs of either man do not inherit her 
          Kesuvah ...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> The Mishnah already said that she has no 
          Kesuvah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Papa):</font></b> Here it refers to Kesuvas Bnin Dichrim 
          (that her sons should receive her dowry).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> This is obvious!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> One might have thought that we fine only her, 
          since she sinned, but not her children. The Mishnah 
          teaches that this is not so.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If either man dies, his brothers do Chalitzah, 
          not Yibum.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The first man's brothers do Chalitzah mid'Oraisa; 
               mid'Rabanan, they may not do Yibum. The second man's 
               brothers do Chalitzah mid'Rabanan; they may not do 
               Yibum mid'Oraisa nor mid'Rabanan.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - R. Yosi):</font></b> She receives her Kesuvah from the 
          first husband ...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Huna):</font></b> The latter Tana'im in the Mishnah agree to 
          the laws of the earlier Tana'im, but the earlier Tana'im 
          argue with the laws of the latter Tana'im:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Shimon admits to R. Eliezer's law. R. Shimon does 
               not fine her regarding Bi'ah, the primary Isur (she 
               may do Yibum). All the more so, he does not fine her 
               regarding Metzi'os and earnings, which are monetary!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Eliezer argues with R. Shimon's law. R. Eliezer 
               does not fine her regarding Metzi'os and earnings, 
               which are monetary, but he fines Bi'ah, which is an 
               Isur.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Both of them admit to R. Yosi's law. They do not 
               fine her regarding Metzi'os and earnings, which 
               apply when she is with her husband. All the more so 
               they do not fine her regarding Kesuvah, which she 
               receives when she leaves.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> R. Yosi argues with their laws. He does not fine 
               Kesuvah, which she receives when she leaves, but he 
               fines Metzi'os and earnings, which apply when she is 
               with him (and all the more so Yibum, which is Isur).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Yochanan):</font></b> The earlier Tana'im agree to the laws of 
          the latter Tana'im, but the latter Tana'im argue with 
          laws of the earlier Tana'im.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Yosi admits to R. Eliezer's law. The Kesuvah is 
               given from him to her, and R. Yosi does not fine 
               this. All the more so he does not fine her Metzi'os 
               and earnings, which go from her to him!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Eliezer argues with R. Yosi's law. Metzi'os and 
               earnings, which go from her to him, he fines, but 
               not the Kesuvah, which is from him to her.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Both of them agree to R. Shimon. Kesuvah, Metzi'os 
               and earnings, which apply during his lifetime, they 
               do not fine, and all the more so Yibum, which is 
               after his death!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> R. Shimon argues with them. Yibum, which is after 
               his death, he does not fine, but he fines Metzi'os 
               and earnings and Kesuvah, which apply during his 
               lifetime.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHEN TWO WITNESSES LIED</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If she remarried without permission (but 
          rather, according to two witnesses) ...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Huna citing Rav):</font></b> This is the Halachah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Rav Nachman):</font></b> Why do you speak deceptively (as 
          if all agree to this)?! If you hold like R. Shimon, say 
          that the Halachah follows R. Shimon!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> He did not say so, for this would 
               connote that the Halachah follows R. Shimon also in 
               the Reisha (when married according to one witness, 
               Yibum or Chalitzah by brothers of the first husband 
               exempts the Tzarah).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> He should have said that the Halachah 
               follows R. Shimon's second law!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  This is left difficult.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #1 (Rav Sheshes):</font></b> Rav must have been dozing when 
          he said this! 'This is the Halachah' implies that others 
          argue (and forbid her to the first husband). What did she 
          do wrong (that she should be fined)?!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question #2 (Rav Sheshes):</font></b> A Beraisa proves that 
          Chachamim agree with R. Shimon!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa #1):</font></b> All Arayos (that married) do not 
               require a Get, except for an Eshes Ish was married 
               according to Beis Din (i.e. one witness).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> If she married according to two 
               witnesses, no Get is needed.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (to Question #2):</font></b> The Beraisa is like R. 
          Shimon.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> R. Shimon does not require a Get when she 
          married according to Beis Din!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa #2 - R. Shimon):</font></b> Beis Din considers (one 
               who remarried b'Isur due to) their ruling like a man 
               and a (married) woman who had Bi'ah with intent 
               (i.e. Mezid. She is forbidden to her husband);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If she remarried based on witnesses (and her husband 
               returned), this is like a man and a (married) woman 
               who had Bi'ah without intent (b'Shogeg. She is 
               permitted to her husband.)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> A Get is not required in either case.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> Beraisa #1 must be Chachamim!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> Really, Chachamim argue with R. Shimon. 
          Beraisa #1 is R. Shimon. We must explain Beraisa #2 
          differently:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Explanation #1 (Beraisa - R. Shimon):</font></b> Beis Din made 
               their ruling like a man who had Bi'ah with a 
               (single) woman with intent (for Kidushin). She needs 
               a Get (to marry someone else);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If she remarried (b'Isur) based on witnesses, this 
               is like a man who had Bi'ah with a (single) woman 
               without intent (for Kidushin). She does not need a 
               Get.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Explanation #2 (Rav Ashi):</font></b> The Beraisa discusses 
               only when she is forbidden to her husband, like we 
               explained above (h:1,2). It does not discuss the 
               need for a Get:
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  Beis Din made their ruling like a man and a 
                    (married) woman who were Mezid. She is 
                    forbidden to her husband;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> If she married based on witnesses, this is like 
                    a man and a (married) woman who were Shogeg. 
                    She is permitted to her husband.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) YIBUM WITH A WOMAN TO WHOM ONE'S BROTHER WAS NEVER REALLY MARRIED</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Mishnah (87b) states that when a woman marries another man under the assumption that her first husband died abroad, and then her first husband returns alive, she is prohibited to both men. The Mishnah adds that if either man dies with no children, the brother of that man must perform Chalitzah with the woman, and he may not perform Yibum. 
</p><p>
The Gemara explains that the brother of the first husband must perform Chalitzah because he is the brother of her real husband, and thus the Mitzvah d'Oraisa to perform Chalitzah or Yibum takes effect. He cannot perform Yibum, however, because the Rabanan penalized the woman and gave her the status of a Sotah mid'Rabanan (a Sotah, or woman who is suspected of being unfaithful to her husband, may not do Yibum when her husband dies). The brother of the second husband performs Chalitzah only mid'Rabanan; mid'Oraisa there is no need for Chalitzah since the second husband was never really married to her. The Gemara adds that for the brother of the second husband, Yibum is 'not mid'Oraisa [because she was not really married to the second husband], and not mid'Rabanan [because the Rabanan do not allow her to marry the brother of the second husband].'
</p><p>
The Gemara earlier (88b-89a) discusses why the second husband must give a Get to the woman when her first husband returns alive. The Gemara explains that the Rabanan instituted that a Get must be given as a penalty for the woman for not adequately investigating the matter to ensure that her husband was dead. In order that people not mistakenly assume that the first husband divorced the woman and her marriage to the second husband was valid, the Rabanan required that she receive a Get from the second husband.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> (89a, DH Kansuha, as explained by the <b>ROSH</b> 10:1) explains that the Rabanan penalized the woman and required that she receive a Get only when there is logical basis for such a penalty (such as the concern that people will think that she was divorced from the first husband and married to the second). The combination of a logical basis for a Get and grounds to penalize her for wrongdoing is what requires her to receive a Get. (See also the Gemara on 95b.)
</p><p>
If a penalty is not administered unless it has a logical basis, why is the brother of the second husband not allowed to perform Yibum? In the case under discussion, the second husband died before he was able to give her a Get. While the reason to penalize her (for marrying another man without adequately verifying that her first husband was dead) remains, that reason is not enough to prohibit her to the second man's brother without a logical basis. However, the logical basis (that people will think that her first husband divorced her and she was really married to the second man) does not justify prohibiting the brother of the second husband from performing Yibum. If it is true that the first husband divorced her and she was married to the second man, she <i>certainly</i> is allowed to perform Yibum with the brother of the second husband. If, on the other hand, she was not married to the second husband (which is the actual case), she still should be permitted to do Yibum with the second man's brother because she does nothing wrong by marrying the second man's brother -- she was never married to his brother ('Eshes Achiv')! (<b>MAHARSHA</b>, <b>REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b>)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>MAHARSHA</b> suggests that in the case of Yibum, the Rabanan administer a penalty even with no logical basis. This is because Yibum involves an act of Bi'ah which is 'Ikar Isura,' a primary act of Isur itself.
</p><p>
This answer is problematic, however, because Yibum has the status of 'Ikar Isura' only with regard to the brother of the first husband. (If the woman has relations with another man while married to the first husband, she is a Sotah and may not do Yibum when her husband dies.) There is no actual Isur with regard to the brother of the second man, since Yibum may be done with him (because she was never married to the second man, and thus she is not forbidden to his brother as 'Eshes Achiv'). (See <b>YASHRESH YAKOV</b>.)
</p><p>
(b) Perhaps in this case the Rabanan indeed instituted a penalty with no logical basis and prohibited the brother from doing Yibum. Although they relied on a logical basis when they required that the second husband give the woman a Get when her first husband returns, they did not rely on any logical basis when they prohibited the brother of the second husband from performing Yibum. The Rabanan have the authority to enact, with no logical basis, a 'passive' penalty which requires that a person <i>not</i> do an action (Yibum), while they must have a logical basis when they enact an 'active' penalty which requires that a person do some action (write a Get). (M. Kornfeld. The <b>YASHRESH YAKOV</b> offers a similar solution.)
</p><p>
(c) <b>RABEINU AVRAHAM MIN HA'HAR</b> (87b) explains that there is a logical basis for the Rabanan's enactment in the case of Yibum as well. The Rabanan prohibited the brother of the second husband from performing Yibum lest people mistakenly assume that the first husband divorced her, and the second husband married her <i>after he committed adultery with her</i> while she was still married to the first husband. In such a case, the second husband who committed adultery with her is forbidden from marrying her (because a Sotah is forbidden to the man with whom she committed adultery). Just as the brother of a Sotah's <i>husband</i> may not perform Yibum, the brother of a Sotah's <i>adulterer</i> may not perform Yibum (if the adulterer marries the Sotah and then dies with no children). The <b>CHELKAS MECHOKEK</b> (EH 17:150) and the <b>RASHASH</b> here suggest the same answer.
</p><p>
(Whether or not the brother of the adulterer is actually prohibited to perform Yibum is a question discussed at length by the Rishonim and Acharonim. See <b>TOSFOS</b> to 3b, DH l'Fi, and <b>MISHNEH L'MELECH</b>, Hilchos Yibum 6:19.)
</p><p>
(d) The <b>RASHASH</b> suggests that the Mishnah and the Gemara mean something else entirely. When the Gemara says that the brother of the second husband 'does not do Yibum mid'Rabanan,' it does not mean that he is not permitted to do Yibum, but rather that he has no <i>Mitzvah</i> to do Yibum. When the Gemara says 'he may not do Yibum, not mid'Oraisa and not mid'Rabanan,' it means that there is no <i>Mitzvah</i> for him to do Yibum, neither mid'Oraisa nor mid'Rabanan. 
</p><p>
Accordingly, if the brother of the second husband desires to marry her, he certainly may do so. However, if he marries her through an act of Bi'ah b'Ones or Bi'ah b'Shogeg (acts which are valid for Yibum but not for Kidushin), she does not require a Get from him. (That is, although the concern exists that people will assume she was married to the second man and they will think that the obligation of Yibum applies to her, the Rabanan did not go so far as to require a Get in a case where the brother performs Bi'as Ones or Bi'as Shogeg.)
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Explanation #3 (Ravina):</font></b> The Beraisa teaches only 
               about when a Korban is required:
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa - R. Shimon):</font></b> Beis Din made (people 
                    who transgressed through) their ruling like a 
                    man and a (married) woman who had Bi'ah 
                    b'Mezid; they do not bring a Korban;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> A woman who remarried (b'Isur) based on 
                    witnesses is like a man and a woman who had 
                    Bi'ah b'Shogeg; they bring a Korban.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #3:</font></b> Really, Beraisa #1 is Chachamim, but it must 
          be understood differently:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> Arayos do not require a Get, except for a 
               married woman that remarried based on (two witnesses 
               or) a ruling of Beis Din.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>IN WHAT CASES DO WE FINE FOR NEGLIGENCE?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Ula):</font></b> We do fine even when she is blameless!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> Any of the following invalidates a Get:
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  It was dated counting from the (start of) the 
                    reign of Rome, persia, Greece, or the building 
                    or destruction of the Mikdash;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> It was written in the east (of the city), but 
                    it says that it was written in the west, or 
                    vice-versa;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If a woman remarried based on such a Get, she may 
               not remain married to either husband, and all the 
               fines (of our Mishnah 87b) apply.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Summation of question):</font></b> She is fined even when she 
               is blameless!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> She is to blame. She should have read the Get!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rav Simi bar Ashi - Mishnah):</font></b> If Leah did Yibum 
          and then her Tzarah Sarah married (a stranger), and then 
          we learned that Leah is an Ailonis (so Sarah was 
          forbidden to marry), Sarah must leave her husband (or 
          Yavam, if she later did Yibum), and all the fines apply.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Sarah is fined even though she is blameless!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> No, she is to blame. She should have waited 
          (to see if Leah is an Ailonis).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Abaye - Mishnah):</font></b> If Leah was Ervah to the 
          Yavam and her Tzarah Sarah married (a stranger), and then 
          we learned that Leah is an Ailonis (so Sarah was 
          forbidden to marry), she must leave her husband (or 
          Yavam), and all the fines apply.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> She is fined even though she is blameless!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> No, she is to blame. She should have waited!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rava - Mishnah):</font></b> A scribe wrote a Get for a 
          man, and a receipt (for payment of the Kesuvah) for his 
          wife. By mistake, he gave to her the Get and gave to him 
          the receipt. Each gave the document he or she received to 
          the other. The mistake was realized only after she 
          remarried (she has the receipt and her husband has the 
          Get). She may not remain married to either husband, and 
          all the fines apply.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> She is fined even though she is blameless!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> No, she is to blame. She should have read the 
          Get!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Ashi - Mishnah):</font></b> If any of the following was changed 
          on a Get, it is invalid: his or her name, or the name of 
          his or her city;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If a woman remarried based on such a Get, she may 
               not remain married to either husband, and all the 
               fines apply.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> She is fined even though she is blameless!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> No, she is to blame. She should have read the 
          Get!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Ravina - Mishnah):</font></b> If he gave her a Get 
          Kare'ach (a special type of tied Get which Chachamim 
          enacted, but it lacks the required number of witnesses) 
          ... she may not remain married to either husband ...
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> She is fined even though she is blameless!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> No, she is to blame. She should have read the 
          Get!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b></b>  Rav Papa was about to permit a woman to return to her 
          husband, because she was blameless.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Rav Huna brei d'Rav Yehoshua):</font></b> All these 
          Mishnayos show that we fine her anyway!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Papa):</font></b> We answered that in all of them, she 
          was to blame!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Rav Huna):</font></b> Will we rely on these answers?!
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) AN 'AYLONIS' WHO EXEMPTS HER 'TZAROS' FROM YIBUM</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTIONS:</b> The Gemara presents two cases in which a woman was obligated to do Yibum but instead married another man under the mistaken assumption that Yibum was not required. In both cases, when it is discovered later that Yibum <i>was</i> required, she is penalized with all of the stringencies mentioned in the Mishnah (87b). 
</p><p>
In the first case, a woman's husband died childless, her Tzarah performed Yibum, and she went and married a second husband. Later it was discovered that her Tzarah was an Aylonis, to whom -- <b>RASHI</b> explains (DH v'Halchah) -- the laws of Yibum do not apply at all. Consequently, the obligation of Yibum rests with one of the other Tzaros, all of whom are prohibited to remarry until one of them does Yibum or Chalitzah.
</p><p>
In the second case, a woman's husband died childless, and she went and married a second husband because her Tzarah was an Ervah to the Yavam. The Mishnah in the beginning of Yevamos (2a) teaches that when one of the deceased man's wives is an Ervah to the Yavam, she exempts all of the other Tzaros from Yibum and Chalitzah. Later it was discovered that the Ervah was an Aylonis. <b>RASHI</b> (DH Halchu Tzaros) explains that since the Ervah was an Aylonis, her original Kidushin was done in error (since the man who married her assumed that she was healthy and he did not know that she was an Aylonis), and thus she was never married to the man who died and is not a candidate for Yibum at all.
</p><p>
Rashi implies that if Kidushin with an Aylonis would be valid, the Tzaros in this case indeed would be exempt from Yibum and would be justified in remarrying, since they are exempt from Yibum as Tzaros Ervah. (If this were not so, Rashi should have been consistent with his explanation of the first case and explained that the Tzarah is not exempt even if the Ervah turns out to be an Aylonis who <i>was</i> married properly to the deceased brother.)
</p><p>
Rashi's words are difficult to understand for several reasons.
</p><p>
(a) The Gemara earlier (12a-b) cites two opinions about whether an Aylonis exempts her Tzarah from Yibum. Rav Asi maintains that an Aylonis exempts her Tzarah from Yibum, even when the Aylonis is <i>not</i> an Ervah. Rava maintains that an Aylonis does <i>not</i> exempt her Tzarah from Yibum, even when the Aylonis <i>is</i> an Ervah.
</p><p>
Whose opinion does Rashi follow in his explanation of the Gemara here? In his first comment, Rashi writes that when one of the Tzaros is an Aylonis, only the Aylonis is exempt; the other Tzarah is obligated to do Yibum. Rashi clearly explains the Gemara according to the view of Rava that an Aylonis does <i>not</i> exempt her Tzarah.
</p><p>
Rashi's second comment, however, apparently follows the view of Rav Asi. Rashi implies that an Ervah who is an Aylonis does not exempt the Tzarah only because of the element of Mekach Ta'us involved. Had the husband known that she was an Aylonis at the time he married her, the marriage would have been valid and the Ervah would have exempted the Tzarah from Yibum. (<b>REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b>; see also <b>YASHRESH YAKOV</b>.)
</p><p>
(b) Rashi in Gitin (80a, the source for the Mishnah quoted by the Gemara here) explains in both cases that the reason why the Tzarah is not exempt from Yibum is because the man's marriage to the Aylonis was a Mekach Ta'us. Rashi there seems to rule like Rav Asi, because he implies that if the Kidushin would have taken effect, the Aylonis would have exempted the Tzaros. Rashi repeats this explanation earlier in Yevamos (2b, DH v'Chulan she'Meisu), where the Mishnah states that an Ervah who is an Aylonis does not exempt her Tzarah from Yibum. Rashi explains that it is because her Kidushin was a Mekach Ta'us.
</p><p>
Why does Rashi explain the Gemara according to the opinion of Rav Asi? The Gemara (12b) states clearly that the Halachah follows the view of Rava who says that an Aylonis does <i>not</i> exempt her Tzarah from Yibum! Rashi should explain that even if the marriage to the Aylonis was not considered a Mekach Ta'us, her Tzarah is still obligated to do Yibum because the laws of Yibum do not apply to an Aylonis. (<b>NIMUKEI YOSEF</b> 2b, in the name of the <b>RASHBA</b>)
</p><p>
(<b>REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b> (30b) explains that Rashi on 2b explains the Mishnah according to the Gemara's initial understanding, which is in accordance with Rav Asi's opinion. This is consistent with Rashi's general approach of explaining a Mishnah according to the Gemara's initial understanding of the Mishnah. However, this does not answer why Rashi explains the Gemara according to Rav Asi in the other places.)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>RAV SIMCHAH M'DESVI</b> (in his Hagahos printed in the back of the Vilna edition of the Gemara) answers that perhaps Rashi understands that there is a <i>third</i> opinion in the Gemara (12b) with regard to whether or not an Aylonis exempts the other wives from Yibum. After the Gemara there rules like Rava that a Tzarah of an Aylonis is obligated to do Yibum even if the Aylonis is an Ervah, the Gemara mentions the view of Ravin who maintains that a Tzarah of an Aylonis is obligated to do Yibum. The Gemara makes no mention of whether she must do Yibum even if the Aylonis is an Ervah. Perhaps Ravin maintains that the Tzarah of an Aylonis must do Yibum only when the Aylonis is not an Ervah, but when the Aylonis is an Ervah the Tzarah is exempt from Yibum and Rashi follows the opinion of Ravin.
</p><p>
This answer is somewhat forced because the Gemara does not imply that Rava and Ravin argue. Also, this answer does not address the second question.
</p><p>
(b) Perhaps both questions may be resolved with the following approach.
</p><p>
Although the Gemara (12b) rules like Rava even in a case in which the Aylonis is an Ervah, the Gemara has a strong question on Rava's opinion. The Gemara asks that the wording of the Mishnah does not support the view of Rava. The Mishnah states that an Aylonis who is an Ervah does not exempt the Tzarah when she was '<i>found</i> to be an Aylonis,' which implies that if the husband knew from the start that she was an Aylonis, she <i>does</i> exempt her Tzarah from Yibum. The Gemara answers that according to Rava the wording of the Mishnah must be emended to read 'was an Aylonis' instead of 'found to be an Aylonis.'
</p><p>
The Gemara's question, and its forced answer, imply that the Halachah does <i>not</i> follow Rava with regard to the Tzarah of an Aylonis who is an Ervah, since Rava's view in this matter is contradicted by the straightforward reading of the Mishnah. An Ervah exempts her Tzarah, even when the Ervah is an Aylonis. Support for this ruling is found in a Beraisa earlier in Yevamos (15a), in the words of the Tana Kama.
</p><p>
(When the Gemara (12b) says that 'even if the Aylonis was an Ervah her Tzarah is obligated to do Yibum,' it might not be referring to the Halachic ruling that immediately precedes this statement. Rather, the Gemara there is asking a question: '<i>Is this the Halachah</i> even in the case of a Tzarah of an Aylonis who is an Ervah?' Although the Gemara does not say that the Halachah is <i>not</i> like Rava in the case of an Aylonis who is an Ervah, Rashi chooses not to rule like Rava because of the question from the Mishnah which the Gemara there asks.)
</p><p>
According to this understanding, Rashi here does not contradict himself. An Aylonis does not exempt her Tzarah even if the man knew she was an Aylonis at the time of the Kidushin. However, if the Aylonis is an Ervah, she <i>does</i> exempt her Tzarah from Yibum. Therefore, Rashi must write that the reason she does not exempt her Tzarah from Yibum is because her marriage was a Mekach Ta'us. This also explains the words of Rashi on the Mishnah (2b) and in Gitin (80a), where the Mishnayos discuss an Aylonis who is an Ervah.
</p><p>
How, though, does this approach explain the second comment of Rashi in Gitin, where he writes that the Yibum of an Aylonis who is <i>not</i> an Ervah does not exempt the other Tzaros because the marriage to the Aylonis was a Mekach Ta'us? Even without the reason of Mekach Ta'us, the Aylonis cannot perform Yibum, and her Tzarah remains obligated to do Yibum.
</p><p>
Perhaps Rashi there gives the reason of Mekach Ta'us only for practical considerations. In Gitin, the case of the Aylonis who was an Ervah is mentioned <i>before</i> the case of the Aylonis who was not an Ervah. Since Rashi already explains the reason of Mekach Ta'us in the first case of the Mishnah, he repeats this reason in the second case. In the Gemara here, however, where the cases are cited in the opposite order, Rashi explains in the first case (where the Aylonis is <i>not</i> an Ervah) that the Tzarah is obligated because the Halachah is that an Aylonis does not exempt the Tzarah from Yibum. (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>PERMISSION OF 'BEIS DIN' TO REMARRY</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Ashi):</font></b> (If a woman remarried according to Beis Din,) 
          we are not concerned for rumors (that her husband is 
          still alive).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What sort of rumors does he discuss?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> It cannot be rumors that began after Nisu'in, for he 
               already taught this!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Ashi):</font></b> We are not concerned for rumors that 
               started after marriage.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> One might have thought that regarding a woman 
          permitted by Beis Din, this is like rumors that started 
          before Nisu'in (since there was doubt from the beginning, 
          and she should be forbidden). He teaches that this is not 
          so.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If she was married according to Beis Din (... 
          she is exempt from a Korban).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Ze'iri):</font></b> Based on what was taught in the Beis Medrash, 
          the Halachah does not follow the Mishnah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beis Medrash):</font></b> If Beis Din ruled that the sun set, 
               and later it shone, this was a mistake, not a 
               Hora'ah (ruling. Similarly, our Mishnah is a 
               mistake, not a Hora'ah).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Nachman):</font></b> The case of our Mishnah is a Hora'ah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (Rav Nachman, for himself):</font></b> In all of Torah, one 
          witness is not believed, but here, he is believed. This 
          is because it is a Hora'ah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava):</font></b> It must be a mistake!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If Beis Din permitted Chelev and blood, and later 
               forbade them, if they again permit them (without a 
               solid reason), we do not listen to them!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Here, if we permitted her to remarry based on one 
               witness, and then forbade her according to two 
               witnesses, and then a witness came and said that her 
               husband subsequently died, we permit her!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  Surely, it is because it was a mistake!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (Beraisa - R. Eliezer):</font></b> The law pierces the 
          mountain, and she brings a fat Chatas.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> If it was a mistake, we understand why she 
               brings a Korban. But if it was a Hora'ah, why does 
               she bring a Korban?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps R. Eliezer obligates an 
               individual who acted according to a (mistaken) 
               Hora'ah of Beis Din to bring a Korban!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> If so, why did he say 'the law pierces 
               the mountain'?! (This suggests that one might have 
               thought differently.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If Beis Din ruled that she may remarry (and 
          she was <i>Mekalkel</i>, she brings a Korban).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What does 'Kilkelah' mean?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (R. Elazar):</font></b> She had Bi'as Zenus.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (R. Yochanan):</font></b> She married someone she is 
          forbidden to, e.g. a widow married a Kohen Gadol, or a 
          divorcee or Chalutzah married a regular Kohen.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Elazar says that she brings a Korban for Bi'as 
               Zenus, all the more so she brings for a forbidden 
               marriage;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Yochanan exempts for Bi'as Zenus. She tells Beis 
               Din 'you told me that I am single!'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support (for R. Yochanan - Beraisa - R. Elazar):</font></b> If Beis 
          Din ruled that she may remarry and she was Mekalkel, e.g. 
          she married a Kohen Gadol, or she was a divorcee or 
          Chalutzah and she married a regular Kohen, she must bring 
          a Korban for every act of Bi'ah;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b></b>  Chachamim say, she only brings one Korban.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b></b>  Chachamim agree that if she married five men she must 
          bring a Korban for each one, since they are separate 
          bodies.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>FALSE TESTIMONY ABOUT A 'YEVAMAH'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> A woman's husband and their only son went 
          overseas. They told her that her husband died and then 
          her son died. She remarried. Later, they told her that 
          her son died first (so she was Zekukah l'Yibum). She must 
          leave her husband. Her children from him, both the first 
          and last, are Mamzerim.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If they told her (the first time) that her son died and 
          then her husband, and she did Yibum, and later they told 
          her that her husband died first, she must leave the 
          Yavam. Her children from him, both the first and last, 
          are Mamzerim;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  Witnesses told a woman that her husband died, and she 
          remarried. Later they told her that he was alive when she 
          remarried, but later he died. She must leave her husband, 
          and her first children from him are Mamzerim. Later 
          children are not Mamzerim;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  If witnesses told her that her husband died, and she 
          became Mekudeshes, and later, her husband returned, she 
          may return to him. Even if the second husband divorces 
          her, she is permitted to Kehunah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Elazar ben Masya says 'A woman divorced from her 
               husband (is forbidden to a Kohen)', not a woman 
               divorced from a man who is not her husband.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara) Question:</font></b> What does 'the first and last 
          children' mean?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> First children are those before the 
               latter report. Last are those after the latter 
               report.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> If so, the Mishnah should simply say that 
               her children are Mamzerim!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Indeed, it could have. Since the Seifa (c) 
          distinguishes between the first and last children, also 
          the Reisha mentions them.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> This Mishnah is R. Akiva, who says that Ein 
          Kidushin Tofsin b'Chayavei Lavin. Chachamim say that a 
          Mamzer does not result from a Yevamah who married a 
          stranger (anyone other than her Yavam).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why didn't it cite Chachamim to say that a 
          Mamzer does not result from Chayavei Lavin?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> These Chachamim hold like R. Akiva according to a 
          different Tana, who says that a Mamzer results from 
          Chayavei Lavin only if they are of She'er (kin).
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE ALLOWANCE FOR A WOMAN TO REMARRY BASED ON THE TESTIMONY OF ONE WITNESS</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara cites a dispute among Amora'im about the nature of the allowance for a married woman, an 'Eshes Ish,' to marry another man based on the testimony of a single witness that her first husband is dead. Ze'iri maintains that the Heter is not a Heter instituted by Beis Din on her behalf. Rather, it is the <i>Torah's</i> Heter which Beis Din merely applies when it believes that the husband indeed is dead. The husband's unforeseen return shows that Beis Din was mistaken.
</p><p>
Rav Nachman disagrees and says that Beis Din <i>does</i> institute its own Heter on behalf of the woman. It is the Rabanan (and not the Torah) who grant permission to the woman to remarry, and the husband's unforeseen return does not render their ruling an error. Rather, if the husband returns, the permission they granted to her to remarry is revoked.
</p><p>
Rava attempts to prove that Ze'iri's opinion -- that when the husband returns alive Beis Din is considered to have erred -- is correct. Rava asserts that if Beis Din would issue a ruling to permit a certain questionable food item, and then readdress the question and prohibit the food, and then permit it again, no one would rely on that Beis Din's ruling to eat the questionable item. The case of the Gemara here is the same type of case, and yet Beis Din's words are accepted: Beis Din permits the woman to remarry based on the testimony of a single witness, and when two witnesses come and testify that the husband is alive Beis Din prohibits her from remarrying, and when another single witness comes and says that her husband is dead Beis Din again permits her to remarry. Why does Beis Din revert to its initial ruling? If the Heter (to remarry based on the testimony of a single witness) originates not from the Torah but from the Rabanan, they would not retract their second ruling and permit her to remarry, lest people not take them seriously. It must be that the Heter is not an enactment of Beis Din, but rather a Torah law which Beis Din merely erred in applying.
</p><p>
Rava's proof for Ze'iri's opinion is unclear. When a second single witness testifies after the testimony of a pair of witnesses, the case should become one of 'Trei u'Trei' -- two against two, in which case the woman is not permitted to marry anyone other than one of the two witnesses who testify that her husband is dead (88b). This, however, is unrelated to whether the Heter is a specific enactment of the Rabanan or whether the Rabanan permitted her to remarry based on a mistake. In either case, the laws of 'Trei u'Trei' should apply here. What is Rava's proof for Ze'iri's opinion?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>RASHI</b> (DH Ki Hadar, as explained at length by the Rishonim) writes that the second single witness did <i>not</i> corroborate and uphold the testimony of the first single witness, and thus it is not a case of 'Trei u'Trei.' Rather, the second single witness said an entirely different testimony. He said that <i>now</i> the husband is dead, and that he was <i>not</i> dead at the time the first witness testified that he was dead. The testimony of the second witness provides <i>new</i> grounds on which to permit the woman to remarry.
</p><p>
Accordingly, Rava's intention is as follows: If the woman's allowance to remarry is a specific Heter instituted by the Rabanan, this means that although there is no compelling evidence that her husband is dead the Rabanan nevertheless permit her to remarry (Mishum Iguna). The Rabanan permit her based on the fact that the husband's whereabouts are unknown combined with the fact that a single witness says that he is dead. If the Heter is a specific enactment of the Rabanan, when two witnesses testify that the husband is still alive (and thereby require the woman to leave her second husband and to suffer all of the penalties of the Mishnah (87b)), she certainly will not want to get married again based on the testimony of another single witness with the same weak Heter of the Rabanan. Consequently, there is no point in issuing a Heter for her a second time. (This is the meaning of 'Lo Mashgechinan Lehu' -- the woman will not listen to the Heter of Beis Din since she has suffered from the Heter once before.)
</p><p>
In contrast, if the basis for her allowance to remarry is not a provision of Beis Din but because Beis Din feels that there is sufficient <i>proof</i> that her husband died, then even though Beis Din is found to be mistaken the first time (the single witness was lying and the woman did not investigate the matter before she remarried), nevertheless when another single witness comes to testify Beis Din has no reason to assume that <i>he</i> is a liar or that the woman did not investigate the matter this time. (The fact that Beis Din made a mistake once does not forfeit Beis Din's credence for all future rulings.) Therefore, Beis Din may permit her to remarry the second time a single witness testifies. (See Insights to Yevamos 88:1, where the reason why a single witness is trusted to permit a woman to remarry is discussed. Tosfos maintains that it is an enactment of the Rabanan and is not based on a law in the Torah. Other Rishonim maintain that the Torah permits the Rabanan to rely on circumstantial evidence in such a case. The Gemara here seems to discuss this very point. According to Ze'iri, it is not a Heter of the Rabanan, but rather the Rabanan's application of a Torah law. In contrast, Rav Nachman maintains that it is a Heter of the Rabanan -- even though mid'Oraisa there is not sufficient proof to permit her to remarry, the Rabanan nevertheless were lenient and allowed her to remarry.)
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RASHBA</b> cites <b>RABEINU MOSHE BAR YOSEF</b> who explains Rava's intention as follows. If the Rabanan's ruling to permit her to remarry is based on their own Heter, then in the event that they have contradictory evidence about her marital status they should rely on the <i>Chazakah</i> that the woman is an 'Eshes Ish' and may not remarry. Since until now the woman was forbidden to remarry, she should remain forbidden. Nevertheless, when the second single witness comes and supports the testimony of the first single witness, they create a situation of 'Trei u'Trei' and the Rabanan permit her to marry one of the witnesses.
</p><p>
Why, though, may she remarry if she has a Chezkas Isur? It must be that when the Rabanan permit her to remarry based on the testimony of one witness, they are not issuing a <i>Heter</i>, but rather the testimony of one witness is valid <i>proof</i> that the husband is dead. If two witnesses come and testify to the contrary, the Rabanan declare the testimony of the first witness -- and the ruling based on that testimony -- to have been a mistake.
</p><p>
The logic of Rabeinu Moshe bar Yosef may be understood as follows. If the allowance for the woman to remarry is a Heter of the <i>Rabanan</i>, this means that the Rabanan enacted that the first witness who comes is granted the trustworthiness of two witnesses to permit the woman to remarry. If, however, the single witness has the status of two witnesses, why does Beis Din not accept that witness' testimony when two other witnesses come and contradict him? If the case becomes one of 'Trei u'Trei,' Beis Din should at least permit the woman to marry the single witness, as Beis Din permits her to marry one of the witnesses when a second single witness later testifies that her husband died. (This may be the Gemara's intention when it cites an example from the case of a forbidden food. If the Rabanan prohibit a certain food which they once permitted, they cannot suddenly decide to embrace their original ruling and permit the food when <i>no further proof</i> has come to that effect.)
</p><p>
It must be that the first witness was <i>not</i> granted the trustworthiness <i>of two witnesses</i>. Rather, the Rabanan permitted her to remarry based on the testimony and trustworthiness <i>of a single witness</i>. That is, they did not <i>raise</i> the level of validity of a single witness' testimony (to consider it like the testimony of two witnesses); rather, they <i>lowered</i> the requirements for permitting a woman to remarry and accepted a single witness' testimony as sufficient proof. Consequently, when two witnesses testify, they override the testimony of the single witness. When another single witness then comes and corroborates the testimony of the first, he joins with the first to increase his degree of trustworthiness; their testimony together now counters the other set of two witnesses. 
</p><p>
In summary, if the allowance for the woman to remarry is a Heter enacted by the Rabanan, this means that the Rabanan enacted that the testimony of a single witness is to be treated like that of two witnesses. If the allowance for the woman to remarry is not due to an enactment of the Rabanan but rather it is the Torah's Heter which the Rabanan merely decide where (and where not) to apply, then the Torah permits the Rabanan to accept the testimony of a single witness even though they might be mistaken. (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
<b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>DOES KIDUSHIN TAKE EFFECT WITH A 'YEVAMAH'?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav):</font></b> 'Lo SiHYeH Eshes ha'Mes Chutzah l'Ish Zar' - 
          HavaYaH (Kidushin) does not take effect between a Yevamah 
          and a foreign man.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Shmuel):</font></b> Due to our ignorance, (if someone else was 
          Mekadesh her) she needs a Get (to marry anyone else).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Shmuel is unsure whether 'Lo Sihyeh' teaches (R. Tam 
               - only) that this is a Lav, or (also) that Ein 
               Kidushin Tofsin.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Ameimar):</font></b> The Halachah follows Shmuel.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Ashi):</font></b> According to this, if her Yavam is a Kohen 
          and she married Levi (a stranger), they do Chalitzah, and 
          she is permitted to Levi.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> We should not allow him to profit from his 
          sin!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Correction:</font></b> Rather, if her Yavam is a Yisrael, Levi gives 
          her a Get, and she is permitted to her Yavam.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav):</font></b> Ein Kidushin Tofsin with a Yevamah. Nisu'in takes 
          effect.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If Kidushin does not take effect, neither does 
          Nisu'in!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> Rather, she has neither Kidushin nor Nisu'in.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> 'She has Nisu'in' like Rav Hamnuna taught:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Hamnuna):</font></b> If a Shomeres Yavam had Bi'as Zenus 
               she is forbidden to her Yavam.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #3:</font></b> Nisu'in takes effect to require a Get. This is 
          a decree lest she be confused with a woman who remarried 
          based on one (false) witness.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Yanai):</font></b> They voted and concluded that Ein Kidushin 
          Tofsin with a Yevamah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (R. Yochanan):</font></b> A Mishnah teaches this!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> If David was Mekadesh a woman to take 
               effect (when it will be possible, i.e.) after he or 
               she converts or is freed, or after her husband dies, 
               or after her sister (David's wife) dies, or after 
               she will do Chalitzah, she is not Mekudeshes (even 
               afterwards. If Kidushin Tofsin b'Yevamah, it would 
               take effect.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (R. Yanai):</font></b> Correct! Had I not taught to you the 
          law, you would not have seen that the Mishnah teaches it!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Reish Lakish to R. Yochanan):</font></b> A great man praised you. 
          If not, I would have said that the Mishnah is like R. 
          Akiva, who says that Ein Kidushin Tofsin with Chayavei 
          Lavin (but Chachamim say that Kidushin Tofsin b'Yevamah)!
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>ACQUIRING SOMETHING WHICH IS NOT YET IN THE WORLD</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> The Mishnah cannot be R. Akiva. He holds that a 
          person may acquire Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam (something that 
          is not yet in the world so she would be Mekudeshes 
          later)!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> If a woman said to her husband 'what I 
               produce is Konam (forbidden like a Korban) to your 
               mouth', he need not annul this vow;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Akiva says, he must annul it, lest she produce 
               more than she is obligated. (Even though her 
               productivity is not yet in the world, her vow takes 
               effect!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Huna brei d'Rav Yehoshua):</font></b> The case is, she 
          said 'My hands are sanctified to their Maker'. Her hands 
          are in the world.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  This argues with Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak):</font></b> Each of the following Chacham 
          learned from his Rebbi that a person can acquire Davar 
          she'Lo Ba l'Olam: Rav Huna from Rav from R Yanai from R. 
          Chiya from Rebbi from R. Meir from R. Eliezer ben Yakov 
          from R. Akiva.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Huna):</font></b> If one sold the fruits that a date tree 
               will produce, before they come to the world he can 
               retract the sale. After they come to the world, he 
               may not retract the sale;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Nachman):</font></b> Even after they come to the world, he 
               can retract;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  Rav Nachman agrees that if the buyer took the 
                    fruit, we do not take it from him.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav):</font></b> If Reuven told Levi 'When I buy this field it 
               should become yours from now', Levi acquires it.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> R. Yanai's sharecropper used to bring to him a 
               basket of fruit every Erev Shabbos. Once he delayed 
               coming. R. Yanai took Ma'aser from his own fruits on 
               the fruit he expected to receive.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Support (R. Chiya - Beraisa):</font></b> 'In order that you 
               should learn to fear Hash-m all days' - this refers 
               to Shabbos and Yom Tov.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  We do not need a verse to permit taking Ma'aser 
                    in order to eat the Chulin. Tithing on Shabbos 
                    and Yom Tov is forbidden only mid'Rabanan!
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE PROHIBITION AGAINST SEPARATING TERUMOS AND MA'ASEROS ON SHABBOS</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara teaches that the Rabanan prohibited separating Terumos and Ma'aseros on Shabbos because the act involves 'Tiltul Muktzah,' handling Muktzah (Tevel is Muktzah).
</p><p>
Why does the Gemara give this reason? The Gemara in Beitzah (37a) implies that the prohibition is based on a Gezeirah which prohibits one from conducting business transactions (Mekach u'Memkar) on Shabbos. When one sanctifies an object, he thereby transfers its ownership to Hekdesh, a form of business transaction. Separating Terumos and Ma'aseros is prohibited for the same reason. <b>RASHI</b> in Beitzah (9a, DH Ochel v'Holech) mentions another reason for why it is prohibited: one who separates Terumos makes the produce edible, and thus it appears as though he fixes (Metaken) an item. Why does the Gemara here say that separating Terumos is prohibited because the act involves Tiltul Muktzah? (<b>REBBI AKIVA EIGER</b> in <b>GILYON HA'SHAS</b>)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER:</b> The <b>TOSFOS YOM HA'KIPURIM</b> in Yoma (83b) writes that separating Terumos is prohibited for <i>both</i> reasons. The prohibition of Metaken applies in a case in which one does not pick up or handle the Tevel (such as when the fruit is already separated into two piles and one merely needs to verbally designate one of the piles as the Terumah fruit).
</p><p>
However, if the reason of Metaken applies in every case of separating Terumos, why does the Gemara mention the less-frequent problem of Tiltul?
</p><p>
The Gemara means that although the Isur d'Rabanan of Tiltul is a very strong Isur and is on par with an Isur d'Oraisa (as the <b>TOSFOS YESHANIM</b> writes in Beitzah 3b), nevertheless it is only an Isur d'Rabanan and cannot be what the Torah refers to in the verse 'Lema'an Tilmad l'Yir'ah.' It goes without saying that the Isurim of Metaken and Mekach u'Memkar are certainly not the subject of the verse. The Gemara's intent is to emphasize that one should not think that Tiltul, which is derived from verses in Nevi'im and is thus forbidden 'mi'Divrei Kabalah' (Shabbos 123b), is considered an Isur d'Oraisa. (M. Kornfeld. See Insights to Yoma 83:2.)
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> Rather, the verse permits tithing in a case 
                    like R. Yanai's, even though it is like a 
                    matter that did not come to the world.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Yanai:</font></b> But I was shown in a dream 'A broken 
               stick'. Doesn't this refer to 'You have trusted on a 
               support, this broken stick'?!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Chiya:</font></b> No, it is 'A broken stick will not break 
               (... he will carry out the law to its truth)'.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - Rebbi):</font></b> 'Do not secure a slave to his 
               master' refers to one who bought a slave on 
               condition to free him.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak):</font></b> The case is, he 
                    wrote to him 'When I buy you, you are acquired 
                    to yourself from now'.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>9.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> If David was Mekadesh a woman to take 
               effect after he or she converts or is freed, or 
               after her husband dies, or after her sister (David's 
               wife) dies, or after she will do Chalitzah, she is 
               not Mekudeshes;
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>10. </font></b></b> R. Meir says, she is Mekudeshes.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>11. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Eliezer ben Yakov):</font></b> Even if he said, 
               'These detached fruits should be Terumah on these 
               attached fruits, or vice-versa, when they reach 
               one-third growth and are uprooted', when they grow a 
               third and are uprooted, this takes effect.
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>12. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> If a woman said to her husband 'what I 
               produce is Konam to your mouth', he need not annul 
               this vow;
<br>        <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>13. </font></b></b> R. Akiva says, he must annul it, lest she produce 
               more than she is obligated.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>DOES ONE WITNESS PERMIT A 'YEVAMAH'?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #1 - Question:</font></b> May a woman (whose husband had no 
          children) do Yibum based on one witness who said that her 
          husband died?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If the reason why one witness is believed to permit 
               a woman to remarry is because (if the husband is 
               alive) this is prone to become known, and people do 
               not lie about such things, here also, he would not 
               lie!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If it is because she investigates well before 
               marrying, here, sometimes she desires the Yavam and 
               she will not check well!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Sheshes - Mishnah):</font></b> If they told her that her 
          son died before her husband died, and she did Yibum, and 
          later they told her the husband died first, she must 
          leave her husband. Her children from him, both the first 
          and last, are Mamzerim;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> What is the case?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #1:</font></b> Two witnesses told her the first time, 
               and later two witnesses contradicted them.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Objection #1:</font></b> Why would we believe the second 
               witnesses and not the first?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Objection #2:</font></b> If so, the child would be a Safek 
               Mamzer!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps the Tana was not so exact.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection (Seifa):</font></b> The first children are 
                    Mamzerim but later children are not.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b></b>This shows that the Tana was exact!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Rather, one witness told her the first time, and 
          two contradicted him.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If not for the latter witnesses, one witness is 
               believed!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #2:</font></b> Surely, a woman may do Yibum if one witness 
          testified that her husband died. She herself is believed 
          to do Yibum when she says that he died!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> If a woman said 'my husband died' she may 
               remarry or (in a situation of Yibum) do Yibum.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> May a Yevamah marry l'Shuk if one witness 
          testified that her Yavam died?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If one witness is believed to permit a woman to 
               marry because (if the husband is alive) this is 
               prone to become known, and people do not lie about 
               such things, here also, he would not lie!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If we permit an Eshes Ish because she will 
               investigate well before marrying, here she might not 
               check well if she hates the Yavam!
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) DOES THE TESTIMONY OF A SINGLE WITNESS EXEMPT A WOMAN FROM YIBUM?</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara discusses whether the testimony of a single witness is accepted to permit a woman to remarry in cases other than that of the Mishnah (87b). The second version of the Gemara asserts that the testimony of a single witness certainly is accepted to allow the woman to do Yibum when he says that her husband died with no children. This is because a single witness is believed <i>more</i> than a woman is believed, and the law is that a woman alone is believed to say that her husband died without children and thereby permit herself to do Yibum (114b). What, though, is the law when a single witness testifies that a woman does <i>not</i> have to do Yibum (for example, he testifies that her Yavam died, or that her husband died before his children died). In such a case his testimony counters the Chazakah that she is permitted to do Yibum. Moreover, the woman herself is <i>not</i> believed to exempt herself from Yibum with such testimony, as the Mishnah later says.
</p><p>
The Gemara inquires whether the single witness should be believed because his testimony is 'Avida li'Geluyei' (the truth will eventually become known), or whether he is not believed because, in this case, the woman will not investigate the matter adequately because she prefers to be exempt from Yibum, since she hates the Yavam.
</p><p>
Why does the Gemara ask specifically about the law in this case, in which the single witness testifies against the Chazakah and says that the woman is <i>not</i> obligated to do Yibum? The Gemara should ask the same question about a case in which the single witness testifies that she <i>is</i> obligated to do Yibum, and his testimony counters a Chazakah that she is <i>exempt</i> from Yibum (for example, he testifies that her husband died after his children died). (<b>TOSFOS</b> DH Ki)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b>, in his first answer, explains that the two questions indeed are the same. The Gemara mentions the question of a witness who attempts to permit the woman to marry without Yibum because it happens to be that this was the question posed as a result of an incident which occurred at the time.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>RAMBAN</b> and other Rishonim suggest that the Gemara intentionally discusses a case in which the single witness attempts to <i>exempt</i> the woman from Yibum. One might have assumed that in such a case, the single witness certainly should be believed, because even if his testimony is wrong and the woman is actually obligated to do Yibum, she transgresses only a Lo Ta'aseh (the Isur of Yevamah la'Shuk) and not an Isur Kares. Furthermore, his testimony is about a matter (the Yavam's death) that is 'Avida li'Geluyei.' Therefore, the Gemara teaches that the witness nevertheless should not be believed because the woman herself might not have investigated the matter thoroughly.
</p><p>
(c) <b>TOSFOS</b> and the <b>RA'AVAD</b> (cited by the Ramban) suggest another explanation. The reason why a woman is not believed to permit herself to the Yavam (by testifying that her child died before her husband died) is <i>not</i> that she does not investigate the matter thoroughly. Her love for and desire to marry the Yavam is never strong enough to cloud her common sense and entice her to testify that her husband died without strong evidence to that effect. Why, then, is she not believed? She is not believed because the leniency of 'Mishum Iguna' does not apply in this case; she will not be in a situation of an 'Agunah' if she does not become permitted to the Yavam. Hence, when a single witness testifies that she is permitted to the Yavam, his testimony <i>combined with</i> the fact that a woman investigates the facts for herself provide enough grounds to be lenient to permit her to the Yavam (even when the leniency of 'Mishum Iguna' does not apply).
</p><p>
On the other hand, when a woman testifies that she is <i>not</i> obligated to do Yibum, not only is there no reason to apply the leniency of 'Mishum Iguna' (since, if she is not believed, she will not be left unable to marry -- she may marry the Yavam), but there is also a suspicion that she will not adequately verify that she is truly exempt from Yibum. Since she presumably hates the Yavam, she is suspected of neglecting to investigate whether she is indeed exempt from Yibum. Her hate <i>can</i> overcome her common sense; the emotion of hate tends to be more powerful than the emotion of love.
</p><p>
Consequently, when a single witness testifies on her behalf, his testimony is not accepted because the additional factor that the woman carefully investigates the facts for herself is not present. For this reason, the Gemara asks what the Halachah is only in a case in which the witness testifies that she is <i>exempt</i> from Yibum.
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>DOES ONE WITNESS PERMIT A 'YEVAMAH'?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1(Rav Sheshes - Mishnah #1):</font></b> A woman's husband 
          and son went overseas. They told her that her husband 
          died and then her son died. She remarried. Later, they 
          told her the son died first (so she needed to do Yibum or 
          Chalitzah). She must leave her husband. Children she had 
          from him, both the first and last, are Mamzerim.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> What is the case?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #1:</font></b> Two witnesses told her the first time, 
               and two witnesses later contradicted them.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Objection #1:</font></b> Why should we believe the second 
               witnesses more than the first?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Objection #2:</font></b> The child is only a Safek Mamzer!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps the Tana was not so exact.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection (Seifa):</font></b> The first children are 
                    Mamzerim, but later children are not.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b></b>This shows that the Tana was exact!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #2:</font></b> Rather, one witness told her the first 
               time, and later two not contradicted him.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> Had he not been contradicted, he would 
               have been believed!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection (and Answer #3 to Question a:1):</font></b> We can say 
          like Rav Acha bar Minyomi said (elsewhere), it is a case 
          of Edim Zomemim. (Two witnesses testified, and two others 
          said 'You could not have seen this, for you were with us 
          elsewhere at that time.')
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rav Mordechai - Mishnah #2):</font></b> A woman is not 
          believed to say 'My Yavam died' to marry a stranger, nor 
          to say 'My sister died' to marry her sister's husband.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> She is not believed, but one witness 
               would be believed!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection (Rav Ashi - Seifa):</font></b> A man is not believed to 
          say 'My brother died' so he will do Yibum, nor to say 'My 
          wife died' to marry her sister.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If you make the above inference, you should also 
               infer here that he is not believed, but one witness 
               is!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Objection:</font></b> Granted, Chachamim were lenient to 
               believe one witness to permit a woman lest she be an 
               Agunah (unable to remarry). This does not apply to 
               marrying one's wife's sister!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Rather, Mishnah #2 is like R. Akiva. Since 
               he holds that a child of Chayavei Lavin is a Mamzer, 
               we would have thought that a Yevamah is concerned 
               for her children and will check well before 
               marrying, so she should be believed;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  The Mishnah teaches that this is not so. She is 
                    concerned only for her own ruin, not for that 
                    of her children. (Tosfos 92b DH Aval - it is no 
                    Chidush according to Chachamim. Our Sugya 
                    permits a Yevamah to do Yibum even after she 
                    was Mezanah or married l'Shuk. Since she will 
                    not be fined, obviously she is not believed!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #3 (Rava):</font></b> A Kal va'Chomer teaches that one 
          witness is believed about a Yevamah:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> One witness permits Chayavei Kerisus (Eshes Ish), 
               all the more so he permits Chayavei Lavin!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (a Chacham):</font></b> A woman's credibility refutes your 
          reasoning!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> She is believed for Chayavei Kerisus (if she says 
               'my husband died'), but she is not believed for 
               Chayavei Lavin (to say that her Yavam died)!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> This is because sometimes she hates the Yavam, and 
               she will not check well. The same applies when one 
               witness says that the Yavam died!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - R. Elazar ben Masya):</font></b> 'And a woman divorced 
          from her husband (is forbidden to a Kohen)', not a woman 
          divorced from a man that is not her husband.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rav Yehudah:</font></b> R. Elazar ben Masya should have expounded a 
          pearl. Instead, he expounded shards!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What pearl should he have expounded?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Beraisa):</font></b> 'And a woman divorced from her husband 
          (is forbidden to a Kohen)', even if she was only divorced 
          from her husband (the Get says 'you are divorced from me 
          but not permitted to others)!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This is 'the scent of a Get' which forbids to 
               Kehunah.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>A MAN WHO MISTAKENLY MARRIED HIS WIFE'S SISTER</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> Reuven's wife Leah went overseas. They told 
          him that she died; he married her sister Rachel. Later, 
          Leah returned. She may return to him, and he is permitted 
          to Rachel's relatives, and Rachel is permitted to his 
          relatives. If Leah later died, he may marry Rachel;
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) A SECOND SET OF WITNESSES WHO SAY THAT 'THE OPPOSITE OCCURRED'</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara attempts to prove from the Mishnah (92a) that a single witness is believed to exempt a woman from Yibum. The Mishnah states that if testimony was given that her husband died before her son died (and thus she is exempt from Yibum), and then she remarried, and afterwards two other witnesses state that the opposite occurred (her son died before her husband died, and thus she is obligated to do Yibum), she must leave both husbands.
</p><p>
The Gemara asks, who gave the initial testimony that the woman may remarry? It cannot be that two witnesses testified, because when the second pair of witnesses testify they should not be able to override the first pair (rather, they create a situation of 'Trei u'Trei'). It must be that the initial testimony was given by a single witness, and when two witnesses come they are able to override his testimony.
</p><p>
The Gemara rejects this proof and asserts that the first testimony indeed was given by two witnesses. The reason why the second pair is able to override the testimony of the first pair is that the second pair of witnesses are Edei Hazamah who are believed to refute the testimony of (or, more accurately, disqualify) the first pair of witnesses, and thus the situation is not one of 'Trei u'Trei.'
</p><p>
The Gemara's assertion that the second pair of witnesses are Edei Hazamah is problematic. The Mishnah says that the second pair of witnesses testified that 'the opposite occurred' (the son died before the father died). This is <i>not</i> the testimony of Edei Hazamah. Edei Hazamah disqualify the first pair of witnesses by testifying that the first pair could not have seen the event about which they testify because they were not where they claimed to have been when they saw the event in question. The second witnesses do not testify that 'the opposite occurred' but merely that the first witnesses could not have seen the event. 
</p><p>
The Mishnah cannot mean that the second pair of witnesses said <i>two</i> things -- that the first pair was with them at the time the events occurred, and that the opposite occurred. Such testimony would not be able to make the other pair of witnesses Edim Zomemim. (See Makos 5a; <b>RAMBAM</b>, Hilchos Edus 18:2, and Lechem Mishneh.) (<b>ARUCH LA'NER</b>)
</p><p>
The Mishnah also cannot mean that there are <i>two</i> sets of witnesses which counter the testimony of the first pair, one which testifies that the first witnesses are Edim Zomemim, and one which testifies that the opposite occurred. The words of Rashi and the Rishonim clearly imply that in the Mishnah's case only <i>one</i> other set of witnesses came.
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER:</b> Perhaps when the Mishnah says that the second pair of witnesses testify that 'the opposite occurred,' it does not mean that those witnesses testify that they saw the opposite actually occur, but rather they say that the opposite <i>might</i> have occurred (because the first witnesses were with them in a different place and could not have the seen the event).
</p><p>
Why, though, should the Mishnah emphasize that the 'opposite' might have occurred (the son might have died before the father)? If the second pair of witnesses testified that the first pair are Edim Zomemim, there is a far greater concern -- the husband is still alive!
</p><p>
The answer is that the Mishnah means that the second pair of witnesses made the first into Edim Zomemim <i>only with regard</i> to the first pair's testimony about the timing of the death of the son. The husband certainly is dead, as the first pair testified, and the only point of doubt that remains is whether the son died before or after the father died. The Mishnah uses this case to demonstrate that if the son indeed died first, the children which the woman subsequently bears from another husband are Mamzerim, in accordance with the view of Rebbi Akiva who says that the children of a Yevamah la'Shuk are Mamzerim. (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If they told him that Leah died, he married Rachel, and 
          they told him that really, she died after the Nisu'in to 
          Rachel, the first child is a Mamzer, the latter is not;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  R. Yosi says, anyone who forbids others forbids to 
          himself. Anyone who does not forbid others does not 
          forbid to himself (this will be explained).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara) Inference:</font></b> The Mishnah applies even if Leah went 
          abroad with Rachel's husband (and the witness said that 
          both of them died), and when Reuven married Rachel, this 
          forbade Rachel to her husband. Still, this marriage does 
          not forbid Reuven to Leah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Suggestion:</font></b> Our Mishnah is unlike R. Akiva. He would 
          forbid Reuven to Leah, since she is the sister of his 
          divorcee!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> The only Ervah that requires a Get (if 
               married mistakenly) is an Eshes Ish who remarried 
               according to Beis Din;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Akiva adds Eshes Ach and Achos Ishto.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Since Rachel needs a Get from Reuven, she is like 
               his divorcee, so Reuven is forbidden to her sister 
               Leah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> If we explain the Beraisa like Rav Gidal, the 
          Mishnah can be like R. Akiva.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Gidal):</font></b> The case of Eshes Ach who needs a Get 
               is when Levi was Mekadesh Sarah, and he went 
               overseas. Levi's brother Yehudah heard that Levi 
               died, and Yehudah married (did Yibum with) Sarah.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  People will say that Levi's Kidushin was on 
                    condition and Yehudah properly married her.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> The case Achos Ishto is similar. Levi was Mekadesh 
               Sarah, and she went overseas. Levi heard that she 
               died, and married her sister.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  People will say that Levi's Kidushin was on 
                    condition and he properly married her sister.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Our Mishnah discusses Nisu'in. People will not say 
               there was a condition by Nisu'in (the husband would 
               not want to transgress Bi'as Zenus if the condition 
               is not fulfilled), so R. Akiva agrees that no Get is 
               needed.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>A MOTHER-IN-LAW AFTER THE WIFE DIES</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rav Ashi):</font></b> If the Mishnah is R. Akiva, it 
          should also teach Chamoso (his mother-in-law) after he 
          heard that his wife died. R. Akiva holds that one is not 
          Chayav Misah for Chamoso after his wife dies!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Yishmael):</font></b> 'You will burn him and them 
               (a woman and her mother)' - him and one of them (the 
               one whom he married after marrying the other);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Akiva says, (we burn) him and both of them.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> We understand according to Abaye, who says that they 
               agree about the Halachah, but argue only about how 
               do derive it. R. Yishmael holds that the verse 
               discusses only one Bi'as Isur. R. Akiva holds that 
               it discusses marrying Chamoso and her mother.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> But Rava says that they argue about Chamoso after 
               one's wife dies (R. Akiva expounds that one is 
               liable only if both women are still alive). R. Akiva 
               should have taught also about Chamoso!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Kahana):</font></b> Granted, R. Akiva says that one is 
          not Chayav Misah for her, but the verse did not permit 
          her!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why doesn't Reuven become forbidden to his wife 
          when he married Achos Ishto, just like a woman who 
          married after she heard that her husband died?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The cases are different. An Eshes Ish who is 
          Mezanah b'Mezid is forbidden mid'Oraisa to her husband, 
          so Chachamim decreed to forbid her for Shogeg;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Zenus b'Mezid with Achos Ishto does not forbid one 
               to his wife mid'Oraisa, so no decree was made for 
               Shogeg.
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) MARRYING ONE'S MOTHER-IN-LAW AFTER THE DEATH OF ONE'S WIFE</b></font><b>
<br>OPINIONS:</b> The Gemara cites a dispute between Rebbi Yishmael and Rebbi Akiva with regard to whether a man is punished for living with his wife's mother (Chamoso) after his wife has died. (This is according to Rava's understanding of the dispute.) The Gemara concludes that Rebbi Akiva, who maintains that one is punished with Sereifah only when he lives with his mother-in-law while his wife is alive, agrees that it nevertheless is <i>forbidden</i> even after the wife's death.
</p><p>
What prohibition remains after the wife's death? The verse in Parshas Kedoshim (Vayikra 20:14) which imposes the death penalty for one who marries a woman and her mother applies only when the wife is alive (according to Rebbi Akiva). What is the source to prohibit it even after the wife's death?
</p><p>
(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> (DH me'Isura, and 98b, DH Kalash), the <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Isurei Bi'ah 2:5), and the <b>RA'AVAD</b> (quoted by the <b>ME'IRI</b> in Sanhedrin 76b) write that the prohibition is an Isur of Kares and a Lo Ta'aseh, as derived from the verse in Parshas Acharei Mos (Vayikra 18:17) which imposes the punishment of Kares and a Lav for the act and which does not limit the Isur of Kares and Lav to when both women are alive.
</p><p>
(b) <b>RASHI</b> in Sanhedrin (76b, DH Rebbi Akiva), however, writes that according to Rebbi Akiva <i>no</i> Isur Kares or Lo Ta'aseh prohibits one from marrying his wife's mother after the death of his wife. His wife's mother is only 'Asur b'Arur' to him -- the Torah places a curse on a man who marries his mother-in-law (see Devarim 27:23); no explicit Torah prohibition forbids it. 
</p><p>
Support for the view of Rashi may be derived from the wording of the Gemara in Sanhedrin (as the <b>MAHARSHAL</b> here points out), which says that one who marries his mother-in-law after the death of his wife transgresses an 'Isura b'Alma' -- only a 'minor prohibition.' Additional support may be adduced from the Gemara later in Yevamos (98b), as <b>TOSFOS</b> there (DH Kalash) writes.
</p><p>
Rashi's opinion is shared by the <b>RASHBA</b> and <b>RAMBAN</b> (98b) who write that one who marries his mother-in-law after the death of his wife transgresses only an Isur Arur.
</p><p>
1. The <b>ARUCH LA'NER</b> here asks that there actually are <i>six</i> relatives who are forbidden by the Isur of 'Ishah u'Vitah': one's mother-in-law, <i>her</i> mother, and her mother-in-law; one's wife's daughter, her son's daughter, and her daughter's daughter. The verse of 'Arur,' however, refers to only one of those relatives -- one's mother-in-law. Consequently, there should be no prohibition or Arur at all against having relations with one's wife's daughter or granddaughter, or with one's wife's mother's mother or mother-in-law, after the death of one's wife!
</p><p>
If it is true that one's wife's mother's mother is permitted to him l'Chatchilah after the death of his wife, then the question of the Gemara returns: why does Rebbi Akiva not say that another Ervah needs a Get? In the case of a man who married a woman (with Kidushin) and then heard that she died, and he went and married her mother's mother (who was permitted to him l'Chatchilah since his wife was presumed to be dead), if his wife then returned alive he should be required to give a Get to her mother's mother. The Gemara has not answered its question that there is an additional Ervah which Rebbi Akiva could have included in his list.
</p><p>
The <b>RAMBAN</b> and <b>RASHBA</b> (98b) answer that the verse which teaches the Isur of Arur includes not only one's mother-in-law, but also her mother and her mother-in-law. (See Aruch la'Ner who suggests a different answer.)
</p><p>
2. However, this answer addresses only why Rebbi Akiva does not include one's wife's grandmother in his list of Arayos who need a Get if one marries them by accident under the presumption that his wife is dead. However, why does he not mention the Ervah of one's wife's daughter or granddaughter? When one presumes that his wife is dead and he marries his wife's daughter or granddaughter, he should be required to give her a Get since those relatives are permitted to him after his wife's death and the verse of Arur does not apply to them.
</p><p>
The <b>RAMBAN</b> and <b>RASHBA</b> (ibid.) explain that Rebbi Akiva's opinion that the prohibition of 'Ishah u'Vitah' is not in force after the death of one's wife applies <i>only</i> in the case of one's wife's mother or grandmother (the relatives discussed in the verse, 'Oso v'Es'hen,' Vayikra 20:14.) One's wife's daughter or granddaughter, in contrast, are <i>not</i> permitted after the death of one's wife.
</p><p>
However, the <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Isurei Bi'ah 2:7-8) understands that Rebbi Akiva refers to any of the Arayos in the two generations above <i>or below</i> one's wife, and not just to those in the two generations above his wife (i.e. his wife's mother and grandmother). According to the Rambam, in all of these cases Rebbi Akiva maintains that no Isur Sereifah applies.
</p><p>
Rashi also appears to agree with the Rambam in this regard. Rashi earlier (2a and 9b; see Insights to Yevamos 9:3) implies that one's wife's daughter or granddaughter becomes permitted to him after his wife's death. According to Rashi, since the Torah does not write an Arur in the case of one's wife's daughter or granddaughter, he should be permitted to marry her l'Chatchilah!
</p><p>
Apparently, Rashi indeed understands that the Arur that applies to one who lives with his wife's close relatives applies to all of the Arayos included in 'Es Ishah v'Es Imah.' Just as Rashi understands that the words 'Es Ishah v'Es Imah' (from which Rebbi Akiva derives that one's mother-in-law is permitted after the death of his wife) refer either to the wife and her mother or grandmother, or to the wife and her daughter or granddaughter, so, too, when the Torah writes 'Chosanto' (his mother-in-law) in the verse of the Arur it includes all of those included in 'Es Ishah v'Es Imah.'
</p><p>
(Although Rashi in Sanhedrin writes that the 'Isur' mentioned by Rebbi Akiva here means only an 'Arur,' the words of Rashi as quoted by the <b>TOSFOS YESHANIM</b> here and the <b>RITVA</b> (98b) state that after the death of one's wife, his mother-in-law <i>is</i> prohibited with Kares and a Lav, but not with Sereifah. They apparently infer this from the words of Rashi later (98b, DH Kalash), where Rashi writes that after the death of his wife the man is 'not punished with Sereifah' for living with his mother-in-law. This implies that an Isur Kares and a Lav <i>do</i> remain. However, the words of Rashi in our texts, both in Sanhedrin and in Yevamos, state otherwise and prohibit one's mother-in-law and one's wife's daughter after the death of his wife with only an Isur of Arur, but not with an Isur of Kares and a Lav.)
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>'BI'AH' WITH ONE'S WIFE'S SISTER</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is the source that if Reuven had Bi'ah 
          b'Mezid with Achos Ishto, Reuven is not forbidden to his 
          wife (Leah)?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Beraisa):</font></b> 'Osah' - Leah is forbidden through her 
          own Bi'ah (with a man other than her husband), but not 
          through Bi'ah of her sister (with Reuven).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  If not for the verse, we would have learned a Kal 
          va'Chomer:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> In a light Isur Bi'ah (Eshes Ish), the Oser (one who 
               forbids, i.e. her husband forbids her to all men) 
               becomes forbidden. All the more so, in a severe Isur 
               Bi'ah (Achos Ishto), the Oser (Leah, who forbids her 
               sister to Reuven) should become forbidden!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  R. Yehudah says, Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel agree that 
          one who has Bi'ah with Chamoso (his mother-in-law) 
          becomes forbidden to his wife. They argue only about 
          Bi'ah with Achos Ishto;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Beis Shamai say, this forbids his wife;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Beis Hillel say, it does not.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  R. Yosi says, Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel agree that one 
          that has Bi'ah with Achos Ishto permitted to his wife. 
          They argue only about Bi'ah with Chamoso:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Beis Shamai say, this forbids his wife;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Beis Hillel say, it does not.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> (Bi'ah with Achos Ishto does not forbid because) 
               initially, Reuven was permitted to all women, and 
               Leah was permitted to all men. After he was Mekadesh 
               her, he forbids her and she forbids him:
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  He forbids her more than she forbids him. He 
                    forbids her to all men in the world, and she 
                    only forbids him on her relatives.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> We learn from a Kal va'Chomer. He forbids her to all 
               men, yet Bi'ah b'Shogeg with someone forbidden to 
               her does not forbid her to (her husband, to) whom 
               she was permitted. She forbids him only to her 
               relatives, all the more so Bi'ah b'Shogeg with 
               someone forbidden to him does not forbid him to one 
               to whom he was permitted!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> This teaches about Shogeg. What is the 
               source if he sinned b'Mezid?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> 'Osah' - she is forbidden through her own 
               Bi'ah, but not through Bi'ah of her sister.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is R. Yehudah's reason?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Reish Lakish) Question:</font></b> 'You will burn he and 
          them' - do we burn everyone (even his wife, who did not 
          sin)?!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> The verse cannot teach that she is burned. 
               Rather, it teaches that she is forbidden.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> The Halachah does not follow R. Yehudah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b></b>  A man had Bi'ah with his mother-in-law; Rav Yehudah 
          lashed him.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  The man:</font></b> Didn't you teach that the Halachah does not 
          follow R. Yehudah?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rav Yehudah:</font></b> If the Halachah followed R. Yehudah, I would 
          forbid you to your wife permanently.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>'ESHES' 'ISH' IS A LIGHT 'ISUR'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> The Beraisa (1:c:1) mentioned a light Isur. 
          What is it?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rav Chisda):</font></b> It is Machazir Gerushaso after 
          Nisu'in with another man;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> When the latter husband had Bi'ah with her, this 
               forbade her to the first husband. When the first 
               remarried her and had Bi'ah with her (after the 
               second divorced her), he forbade her to the second 
               (he transgresses Machazir Gerushaso if he remarries 
               her).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rejection:</font></b> One cannot learn a Kal va'Chomer from Machazir 
          Gerushaso (to say that Bi'ah with Achos Ishto forbids 
          Ishto), for Machazir Gerushaso is more stringent:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Her body was defiled;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> The Isur can come through any man (Tosfos. Rashi 
               deletes this from the text);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> The Isur is permanent (but Achos Ishto is permitted 
               after Ishto dies).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Reish Lakish):</font></b> It is a Yevamah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> To whom is the Isur?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #1:</font></b> It is to a stranger, like Rav Hamnuna 
               taught:
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Hamnuna):</font></b> If a Shomeres Yavam had Bi'as 
                    Zenus she is forbidden to her Yavam.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> One cannot learn a Kal va'Chomer from a 
               Yevamah that had Bi'as Zenus. That case is more 
               stringent (than Achos Ishto):
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  Her body was defiled;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> The Isur applies to all men.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #2:</font></b> It is a Yevamah forbidden to the 
               brothers:
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  If Reuven gave to her a Ma'amar, he forbids her 
                    to the other brothers. If Shimon then had Bi'ah 
                    with her, he forbids her to Reuven.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> Why does the Beraisa say that Bi'ah with 
               the light Isur (forbids the Oser)? Even if Shimon 
               gave to her a Ma'amar, he forbids her to Reuven!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> The Beraisa is R. Gamliel, who says that a 
               Ma'amar does not take effect after a Ma'amar.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> Still, Shimon can forbid her by giving 
               her a Get or doing Chalitzah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #3 (R. Yochanan):</font></b> It is a Sotah.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> To whom is the Isur?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #1:</font></b> It is to her husband.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> Why does the Beraisa say that Bi'ah with 
               the light Isur forbids (the Bo'el (suspected 
               adulterer), who forbade her to her husband)? Even if 
               her husband divorced her, or said that he will not 
               give her to drink, she is (permanently) forbidden to 
               the Bo'el!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #2:</font></b> The Isur is to the Bo'el.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> This is not a light Isur. It is the 
               severe Isur of Eshes Ish!
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) 'BECOMING PROHIBITED TO THE ONE WHO MADE HER PROHIBITED TO THE OTHER'</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara seeks a case that fits the description of a man who lives with a woman who is prohibited to him, 'and that man causes her to become prohibited to the one who made her prohibited to him in the first place.' The Gemara suggests that this case refers to a Sotah who, after defying her husband's warning not to seclude herself with another man ('Stirah'), has relations with her husband (which is prohibited once she has become a Sotah). The act of prohibited relations with her husband causes her to become prohibited 'to the one who made her prohibited [to her husband]' in the first place -- the Bo'el (the suspected adulterer).
</p><p>
The Gemara rejects this suggestion. What causes the Sotah to become prohibited to the Bo'el is not the prohibited act of relations between her and her husband. Rather, she is prohibited to the Bo'el even if her husband does not have relations with her, but instead gives her a Get or refuses to let her drink the Mei Sotah. Hence, it is inaccurate to say that it is the prohibited act of relations with her husband which causes her to become prohibited to the Bo'el.
</p><p>
What was the Gemara's initial intention when it suggested that when the husband lives with his Sotah wife, he prohibits her to the Bo'el? The Bo'el is prohibited to her even before the husband lives with her; once she has secluded herself with him, she becomes prohibited to both her husband and the Bo'el! In what way did the Gemara assume that living with her husband makes her prohibited to the Bo'el? 
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) <b>TOSFOS</b> explains that although the Bo'el is prohibited to the Safek Sotah, if she drinks the Mei Sotah and verifies her innocence she will become permitted to him. Once the husband lives with her, however, he no longer is 'Menukeh me'Avon' and thus the Mei Sotah is not effective in determining the innocence of his wife. Accordingly, living with his wife causes her to become prohibited <i>permanently</i> to the Bo'el by depriving her of the ability to vindicate herself through drinking the Mei Sotah. This is the Gemara's intention in its initial assumption that the prohibited act of relations with her husband causes the Bo'el to become prohibited to her; it causes the Bo'el to become <i>more</i> prohibited to her than he was until now (i.e. permanently prohibited, and not just temporarily prohibited).
</p><p>
However, Tosfos questions this explanation. Why does the Gemara say that even if the husband merely declares that he does not want his wife to drink the Mei Sotah, he also causes her to become prohibited to the Bo'el? His refusal to give her the Mei Sotah now does not mean that she will <i>never</i> be able to prove her innocence. Perhaps her husband will change his mind and decide to give her the Mei Sotah to drink, at which time she will be able to prove her innocence. The possibility remains, therefore, that the Bo'el will become permitted to her.
</p><p>
Tosfos suggests a novel ruling based on this question. Tosfos suggests that if a husband says that he does not want his wife to drink the Mei Sotah, he may not change his mind. He is given only one opportunity to let her drink the Mei Sotah. Once he forfeits that opportunity, he may not bring her to the Beis ha'Mikdash to drink the Mei Sotah. 
</p><p>
This novel proposal is problematic. As Tosfos himself points out, there is no source for such a law. Moreover, if this is the intention of the Gemara, the Gemara should not need to mention that her husband may prevent her from drinking the Mei Sotah in one of two ways -- by giving her a Get, or by declaring that he does not let her drink the Mei Sotah. The Gemara does not need to add that he can prevent her from drinking the Mei Sotah by giving her a Get; giving a Get is essentially the same as refusing to let her drink, and they are not two distinct ways of preventing her from drinking the Mei Sotah.
</p><p>
(b) <b>RASHI</b> makes no mention of the requirement that the husband be 'Menukeh me'Avon' in order for his wife to be allowed to drink the Mei Sotah. ('Menukeh me'Avon' is the rule that Tosfos invokes to explain why the husband may not have his wife drink the Mei Sotah once he has had relations with her after she became a Sotah.) Rashi apparently follows his own view as expressed elsewhere (58b and 85b; see Insights there). Rashi maintains that there is a Tana who does not agree with the requirement that the husband be 'Menukeh me'Avon' in order to have his wife drink the Mei Sotah. Rather, even after he lives with his wife he may give her the Mei Sotah to drink. Several Sugyos seem to follow the opinion of that Tana.
</p><p>
Accordingly, the Gemara here means that the husband <i>is</i> able to give the Mei Sotah to his wife even after he lives with her, in which case the original question returns: Why does the Gemara initially assume that when the husband lives with her, he causes her to become prohibited to the Bo'el? She already is prohibited to the Bo'el because she is a Safek Sotah!
</p><p>
The Gemara must mean that in a normal case of a Safek Sotah, when the husband does not live with his wife wrongfully, it is assumed that he plans to give her the Mei Sotah so that her innocence will be proven and she will become permitted to him again. An additional consequence of proving her innocence is that she becomes potentially permitted to the Bo'el. When, however, the husband has relations with her before her innocence is proven, he shows no regard for the fact that she is a Sotah and that he has no intention to give her the Mei Sotah to drink. Consequently, she remains prohibited to the Bo'el. The fact that her husband lives with her and shows that he does not care that she is a Sotah establishes a Chazakah that he will not give her the Mei Sotah. In that sense, he prohibits her to the Bo'el by having relations with her.
</p><p>
When the Gemara rejects the suggestion that it is the husband's act of relations which prohibits her to the Bo'el, because 'even if he says, 'I will not give her to drink,' and even if he divorces her' she is still prohibited to the Bo'el, the Gemara means that she is prohibited to the Bo'el merely by virtue of her status as a Safek Sotah, without any act on the part of her husband. The husband's act does not <i>create</i> a prohibition to the Bo'el. 
</p><p>
'Even if he divorces her' and permits her to all other men in the world, the Bo'el may not marry her, even if her husband did not live with her after she became a Sotah. 'Even if he says, 'I will not give her to drink'' means that even if the husband <i>dies</i> without agreeing to give her the Mei Sotah, and she now becomes permitted to the rest of the world, she is still prohibited to the Bo'el. (See Rashi, end of DH Iy Neima.)
</p><p>
Consequently, according to Rashi (in contrast to Tosfos' understanding of the Gemara), the Gemara provides no proof that a husband may not change his mind when he declares that he does not want his wife to drink the Mei Sotah. (The Gemara also provides no proof that the husband may not give her the Mei Sotah to drink after he divorces and remarries her; see Tosfos to 85b, DH ul'Rebbi, and Insights there.) The Gemara merely says that if he does not give her the Mei Sotah to drink and, as a result, she does not prove her innocence, she becomes prohibited to the Bo'el simply because of her initial act of Stirah with him. The fact that her husband had relations with her and shows that he does not intend to give her the Mei Sotah does not create any <i>new</i> prohibition to the Bo'el; it just shows that he does not plan to give her the opportunity to become permitted. That is why the Gemara rejects the suggestion that the Bo'el is 'the one who made her prohibited to him (the husband) in the first place.' (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #4 (Rava):</font></b> It is an Eshes Ish.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why is this called a light Isur?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The Oser does not forbid her his entire life.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support - (Beraisa - Aba Chanan) Suggestion:</font></b> Eshes Ish is 
          a light Isur, for the Oser does not forbid her his entire 
          life. One who has Bi'ah with her forbids her to the Oser. 
          If one has Bi'ah with a severe Isur, in which the Oser 
          forbids her his entire life, all the more so he should 
          forbid her!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> 'Osah' - Bi'as Zenus of an Eshes Ish 
               (Leah) forbids her, but Bi'ah of Leah's sister (with 
               Leah's husband) does not forbid Leah (to her 
               husband).
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>R. YOSI'S OPINION IN THE 'MISHNAH'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - R. Yosi):</font></b> Anyone who forbids others forbids to 
          himself. Anyone who does not forbid others does not 
          forbid to himself (this will be explained).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What does this mean?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> The first Tana said that if Reuven's 
               wife Leah and Giso (David, the husband of Leah's 
               sister Rachel) went overseas (and we heard that they 
               died and Reuven married Rachel), David's wife 
               becomes forbidden to David, and Reuven's wife is 
               permitted (to Reuven). R. Yosi says, just like 
               Reuven's wife is permitted, David's wife is 
               permitted.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> If so, he should have said 'anyone who 
               does not forbid to himself does not forbid to 
               others', and not 'anyone who does not forbid others 
               does not forbid to himself'!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Rather, just like his David's wife is forbidden, 
          also Reuven's wife is forbidden.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> This explains 'anyone who forbids to others 
          forbids to himself'. How do we explain 'anyone who does 
          not forbid to others does not forbid to himself'?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (R. Ami):</font></b> This refers to the Reisha. A woman 
          who married according to Beis Din must leave her husband, 
          and she is exempt from a Korban. If she married based on 
          (two) witnesses, she must leave her husband, and she must 
          bring a Korban. Great is the power of Beis Din that 
          exempts her from a Korban;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The first Tana says, whether Reuven married Achos 
               Ishto based on witnesses and she remains permitted 
               to her husband; or whether he married her according 
               to Beis Din, and she is forbidden to her husband, 
               Reuven remains permitted to his wife;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Yosi says, when he married her according to Beis 
               Din he forbids others, and he also forbids his own 
               wife on himself. When he married based on witnesses 
               he does not forbid others, and he does not forbid to 
               himself.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (R. Yitzchak Nafcha):</font></b> It refers to the Seifa. 
          R. Yosi distinguishes between when Leah was Mekudeshes to 
          Reuven and when she was Nesu'ah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The first Tana says, whether there was Kidushin or 
               Nisu'in, Rachel is forbidden (to David) and Leah is 
               permitted to Reuven;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Yosi says, if there was Nisu'in, we are not 
               concerned lest people say that Leah's Nisu'in was on 
               condition. (It is clear that the marriage to Rachel 
               was a mistake, so) he does not forbid to others 
               (people will not say that Rachel was divorced, 
               married Reuven, and now remarries David), and he 
               does not forbid his wife to himself;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> If there was Kidushin, we are concerned lest people 
               say that Leah's Kidushin was on condition (and it 
               was not fulfilled, and Reuven truly married her 
               after David divorced her), he forbids to others 
               (David), he even forbids to himself (Leah looks like 
               Achos Gerushaso).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yehudah citing Shmuel):</font></b> The Halachah follows R. 
          Yosi.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Rav Yosef):</font></b> Did Shmuel really say that?!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav):</font></b> A Yevamah is like an Eshes Ish;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Shmuel):</font></b> She is not like an Eshes Ish.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Huna):</font></b> The case is, Reuven was Mekadesh a woman 
               and went overseas. His brother Shimon heard that 
               Reuven died, and married her.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> Rav says that she is like an Eshes Ish, and she is 
               forbidden to Reuven. Shmuel says that she is not 
               like an Eshes Ish, and is permitted to Reuven.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b></b> (Shmuel is not concerned lest people say that 
               Reuven's Kidushin was conditional, and Shimon 
               properly married her, and now Reuven marries Eshes 
               Ach!)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Abaye):</font></b> Shmuel ruled like R. Yosi, but he did 
          not say that he explains the argument like R. Yitzchak 
          Nafcha. Perhaps he explains like R. Ami!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Abaye):</font></b> Even if he explains like R. Yitzchak, 
          perhaps he rules like R. Yosi regarding 'anyone who does 
          not forbid', but not regarding 'anyone who forbids'!
<br>

sjt:
<p>
<font><b>2) THE LENIENCY OF THE PROHIBITION OF 'ESHES ISH'</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara seeks a case that fits the description of a man who lives with a woman who is prohibited to him, 'and that man causes her to become prohibited to the one who made her prohibited to him in the first place.' Rava concludes that this statement refers to the case of an 'Eshes Ish.' When a man lives with another man's wife, he causes her to become prohibited to her husband -- who was the one who made her prohibited to every other man in the first place (by virtue of marrying her). 
</p><p>
The Beraisa (95a) derives a Kal v'Chomer from that case: if, in the case of a relatively less severe prohibition like 'Eshes Ish,' the man who has prohibited relations with the woman causes the person who created the prohibition in the first place (i.e. her husband) to become prohibited to her, then certainly in the case of a more severe Isur like 'Achos Ishto,' when the man has prohibited relations with the woman (his wife's sister), the person who caused the prohibition in the first place (his wife) should become prohibited to him.
</p><p>
The Gemara challenges the logic of the Kal v'Chomer. The Isur of 'Eshes Ish' is clearly <i>more</i> severe than the Isur of 'Achos Ishto' in many ways. The Gemara answers that the Isur of 'Eshes Ish' is less severe in the sense that it is possible to remove the Isur even in the lifetime of the one who causes the Isur (the husband): the Isur of 'Eshes Ish' is removed when her husband gives her a Get. In contrast, the Isur of 'Achos Ishto' cannot be removed during the lifetime of the one who causes the Isur (the wife), because a man is never permitted to marry the sister of his wife during his wife's lifetime. (Only after his wife dies may he marry her sister.)
</p><p>
The Gemara's answer is problematic. When the Gemara earlier seeks a case that fits the description of 'Ne'esar ha'Osrah,' it rejects the possibility that it refers to the Isur of 'Machzir Gerushaso' or to the Isur of 'Yevamah la'Shuk.' The Gemara gives various reasons for why those Isurim are not more lenient than the Isur of 'Achos Ishto.' One reason is that in the case of 'Yevamah la'Shuk,' the woman herself is 'Nitma ha'Guf'; it was the woman herself who did something wrong and thereby caused her husband to become prohibited to her, while in the case of 'Achos Ishto' it is the <i>sister</i> who sinned ('Nitma'), thereby making her sister prohibited to her husband. Another reason why the case of 'Yevamah la'Shuk' is more stringent is that the Isur of 'Yevamah la'Shuk' prohibits the woman to <i>all</i> men in the world, while the Isur of 'Achos Ishto' prohibits the woman to only one man (her sister's husband). For this reason, the Gemara says that 'Yevamah la'Shuk' cannot be called a 'more lenient' Isur than the Isur of 'Achos Ishto.'
</p><p>
Why, in the Gemara's conclusion here, does the Gemara now assert that the Isur of 'Eshes Ish' is less severe because it can be removed during the life of the one who makes her prohibited (the husband)? Why does the Gemara ignore all of the other objections which it raised earlier against making a Kal v'Chomer from 'Yevamah la'Shuk' and from 'Machzir Gerushaso'? Those objections also apply to making a Kal v'Chomer from the Isur of 'Eshes Ish.' (<b>TOSFOS</b> DH Ela)
</p><p>
Another difficulty is that the Isur of 'Yevamah la'Shuk' is also able to be permitted in the lifetime of the one who causes her to prohibited (the Yavam); the Yavam can permit her to marry anyone else by performing Chalitzah with her! Why does Rava say that the Beraisa refers specifically to an 'Eshes Ish'? The Beraisa could also refer to a 'Yevamah la'Shuk,' whose prohibition is more lenient than 'Achos Ishto' because it can be removed during the lifetime of the Yavam!
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER:</b> The <b>TOSFOS HA'ROSH</b> answers in the name of the <b>RIVA</b> that in the case of an 'Eshes Ish,' the fact that she can become permitted in the lifetime of her husband is such a significant leniency that it overrides any of the other stringent laws that may apply to her (such as the fact that the Isur is punishable with Chenek, it is a case of 'Nitma ha'Guf,' and it is 'Isurah b'Rov').
</p><p>
If this leniency overrides all of the stringencies, why does the Gemara not say the same thing about the Isur of 'Yevamah la'Shuk'?
</p><p>
The answer is that the Isur of 'Yevamah la'Shuk' is only an Isur Lav. The fact that an Isur Lav is able to become permitted in the lifetime of the one who causes the Isur is not such a significant leniency over the Isur of 'Achos Ishto.' As an Isur Lav, the Isur of 'Yevamah la'Shuk' is not as severe and thus can be removed, while the Isur of 'Achos Ishto' cannot be removed because it is an Isur Kares.
</p><p>
In contrast, the fact that the Isur of 'Eshes Ish' -- which is an Isur <i>Chenek</i>, and more severe than an Isur Kares -- nevertheless can be removed during the lifetime of the one who causes the Isur shows that the Isur is much less severe than the Isur of 'Achos Ishto,' despite the fact that 'Achos Ishto' is only an Isur Kares. This is why it is only in the case of the Isur of 'Eshes Ish' that the fact that the Isur is removable during the life of the one who causes it demonstrates the relatively lower degree of severity of that Isur.
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE ARGUMENT OF RAV AND SHMUEL</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #3 (Abaye):</font></b> Perhaps Rav and Shmuel do not argue 
          like Rav Huna explained. Rather, they argue about Rav 
          Hamnuna's law!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Hamnuna):</font></b> If a Shomeres Yavam had Bi'as Zenus 
               she is forbidden to her Yavam.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Rav says that she is like an Eshes Ish, and Bi'as 
               Zenus forbids her;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Shmuel says that she is not like an Eshes Ish, and 
               Bi'as Zenus does not forbid her.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #4 (Abaye):</font></b> Perhaps they argue about whether or 
          not Kidushin of a stranger takes effect on a Yevamah:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Rav says that she is like an Eshes Ish, and Ein 
               Kidushin Tofsin with her;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Shmuel says she is that not like an Eshes Ish, and 
               Kidushin takes effect on her.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> Rav and Shmuel already argued about this 
          (92b)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> They argued only once. Their argument here was 
          inferred from what they said there.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>A MAN WHO HEARD SEVERAL FALSE REPORTS</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> They told a man that his wife died, and he 
          married her paternal sister. They told him that this wife 
          died, and he married her maternal sister. They told him 
          that this wife died, and he married her paternal sister. 
          They told him that this wife died, and he married her 
          maternal sister.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If all were found to be alive he is permitted to his 
          first, third and fifth wives, and they exempt their 
          Tzaros (if he dies without children and one of them does 
          Yibum or Chalitzah). He is forbidden to his second and 
          fourth wives, and (if he dies without children) Yibum of 
          either of them does not exempt her Tzarah;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  If he had Bi'ah with the second wife after the first wife 
          died, he is permitted to his second and fourth wives, and 
          they exempt their Tzaros. He is forbidden to his third 
          and fifth wives, and Yibum of either of them does not 
          exempt her Tzarah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  A minor at least nine years old and one day forbids a 
          Yevamah to his (adult) brothers, and they forbid a 
          Yevamah to him (this will be explained). However, he 
          forbids only at the beginning, and they forbid at the 
          beginning or end.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  If the nine-year old did Bi'ah, he forbids her to the 
          brothers. If they then had Bi'ah with her, or gave a 
          Ma'amar or Get or did Chalitzah, they forbid her to him.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara) Question:</font></b> (Why does it say <i>if</i> he had Bi'ah 
          with the second wife after the first died?) He married 
          all (the last four) after he heard that the first died!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Sheshes):</font></b> It means, after his first wife 
          truly died.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>'BI'AH' OF A NINE-YEAR OLD</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> A nine-year old (forbids at the beginning, but 
          not at the end).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Contradiction (Rav Zvid bar R. Oshaya's Beraisa):</font></b> If one 
          gave a Ma'amar to his Yevamah, and later his nine-year 
          old brother had Bi'ah with her, she is forbidden.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> His Bi'ah forbids even at the end. His Ma'amar 
          forbids only at the beginning.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> His Bi'ah does not forbid at the end!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> He forbids only at the beginning, but 
               they forbid at the beginning or end. If the 
               nine-year old had Bi'ah...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The Mishnah is abbreviated; it means as follows:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> A nine-year old disqualifies at the beginning. Adult 
               brothers disqualify at the beginning and the end;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> This applies to a Ma'amar. Bi'ah disqualifies even 
               at the end. How is this? If a nine-year old had 
               Bi'ah with his Yevamah he disqualifies the brothers 
               from doing Yibum.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> The Ma'amar of a nine-year old does not 
          disqualify the brothers from doing Yibum!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> A nine-year old disqualifies in one way, 
               i.e. Bi'ah. (Adult) brothers forbid to him in four 
               ways, i.e. Bi'ah, Ma'amar, Get and Chalitzah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The Tana taught Bi'ah of a nine-year old because 
          it always forbids. He did not teach about his Ma'amar, 
          since it forbids only at the beginning.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> A nine-year old has (ability to forbid a 
          Yevamah to the brothers through) a Get.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Tachlifa bar Avimi):</font></b> He has a Ma'amar.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa - R. Meir):</font></b> He has a Get and a Ma'amar.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> R. Meir does not hold that he has a Get!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> They made Bi'ah of a nine-year old like 
               Ma'amar of an adult;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Meir says, they made Chalitzah of a nine-year old 
               like the Get of an adult.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> If R. Meir held that he has a Get, he should say, 
               they made his Chalitzah like his Get!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Huna brei d'Rav Yehoshua):</font></b> He has a Get, but 
          it is weaker than the Get of an adult;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Gamliel says that a Get does not take effect 
               after a Get. This is only when the second is no 
               stronger; but if an adult gave a Get after a minor 
               did, it takes effect;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Chachamim say that a Get takes effect after a Get. 
               This is only when the second is no weaker, but if a 
               minor gave a Get after an adult did, it is void.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE 'BI'AH' OF A NINE YEAR-OLD</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Mishnah discusses a case in which a nine year-old boy lives with his Yevamah, and then his nine year-old brother also lives with her. The Tana Kama rules that the woman becomes prohibited to both brothers. Rebbi Shimon rules that she remains permitted to the first Katan.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> asks, how is it that she remains permitted to the first Katan? When the second Katan lives with her she becomes a Sotah, for she committed adultery with him! Rashi adds that although the adulterer was a Katan, nevertheless his Bi'ah is considered a valid act of Bi'ah and her act is punishable with Misah. Rashi answers that when she lives with the second Katan, she does so b'Shogeg (inadvertently), unaware that the boy is not her husband, or unaware that the act is prohibited. Therefore, she does not become a Sotah and she remains permitted to her husband. 
</p><p>
Rashi apparently follows his own opinion as expressed in Kidushin (19a, DH d'mid'Oraisa; see Insights to Yevamos 39:2), that an act of Yibum performed by a nine year-old is considered a valid Yibum mid'Oraisa. Consequently, his act of Yibum creates a bond of Kidushin with the woman, who will become a Sotah if she lives with another man after she does Yibum with the nine year-old.
</p><p>
Nevertheless, Rashi's words are difficult to understand. Rashi writes that 'the Bi'ah of a nine year-old is a valid Bi'ah and she is executed for the act of Bi'ah (adultery) with a nine year-old.' However, the Gemara in Kidushin (19a) clearly states otherwise. The Gemara there derives from a verse that when a man commits adultery with the wife of a minor, the man and the woman are <i>exempt</i> from punishment. Even Rashi, who maintains that Kidushin d'Oraisa takes effect with a minor, the adulterers are not subject to Misah mid'Oraisa because the verse excludes them from punishment in such a case. (<b>TOSFOS YESHANIM</b>, <b>RABEINU AVRAHAM MIN HA'HAR</b>)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER:</b> The <b>MAHARSHA</b> and <b>YASHRESH YAKOV</b> explain that Rashi does not mean that in <i>this</i> case, in which the woman is married to a nine year-old, the woman may be executed for committing adultery with another nine year-old. Rather, Rashi means that in a case in which she is married to an <i>adult</i>, she is executed for committing adultery with a nine year-old. (This is similar to what Rashi writes on 51b, DH Bi'as Sheni.) Rashi simply intends to prove from the fact that a woman married to an adult man would be killed for committing adultery with a nine year-old that the Bi'ah of a nine year-old is considered a valid Bi'ah and can prohibit her to her husband.
</p><p>
Accordingly, Rashi here does not necessarily follow his view that the act of Yibum of a nine year-old is effective mid'Oraisa. Even if his act of Yibum is effective only mid'Rabanan and has the status of Ma'amar, Rashi still has a valid question when he asks that she should become prohibited to the minor <i>mid'Rabanan</i> if she lives with another man after the Yibum (as <b>TOSFOS</b> writes on 51b, DH Iy Bi'as Rishon).
</p><p>
Nevertheless, although Rashi's words here do not prove that a minor's act of Yibum is mid'Oraisa, Rashi elsewhere implies that the Yibum of a nine year-old is mid'Oraisa (Kidushin 19a, Nidah 45a, Sanhedrin 55a, DH Kan'ah; see Insights to Yevamos 39:2). The <b>RAMBAN</b> here points out that Rashi later on the page implies that a nine year-old's Yibum is <i>mid'Rabanan</i>. Rashi (DH Harei Zu Peturah) writes that a Katan cannot be <i>Mekadesh</i> a woman with an ordinary act of Kidushin until he develops signs of maturity (two hairs), and yet the Rabanan gave his act of <i>Yibum</i> the status of Ma'amar since she is already Zekukah to him. Rashi implies that the Rabanan <i>instituted</i> a new bond of Kidushin (mid'Rabanan), and did not <i>remove</i> a bond of Kidushin (that existed mid'Oraisa), when they said that a minor's Yibum has the status of Ma'amar (see Yashresh Yakov).
</p><p>
It is likely that Rashi here does not mean that the Rabanan <i>created</i> a new bond through the act of the minor's Yibum. Rather, Rashi means that if the Rabanan invalidated the Yibum d'Oraisa of a nine year-old and ruled that it does not create a real bond because an ordinary act of Kidushin done by a nine year-old is not effective, they should not have given it even the status of Ma'amar. They should have decreed that after the minor lives with his Yevamah, it is as if nothing happened and she remains a Yevamah and is permitted to the other brothers. Rashi addresses that question when he explains that since she is Zekukah to the minor, the Rabanan enacted that there is a bond between them, even though he is a minor.
</p><p>
Rash's question, however, is difficult to understand. Why does Rashi ask that the Rabanan should have instituted that the Yibum of a minor is completely invalid and does not have even the status of Ma'amar? Mid'Oraisa, the woman is married to the minor who did Yibum with her; she is an 'Eshes Ish' and needs a Get in order to marry anyone else. She certainly may not do Yibum with any of the other brothers after the minor has done Yibum with her. The minor's Yibum should be at least like Ma'amar with regard to prohibiting her to the other brothers.
</p><p>
The answer is that Rashi means that the Rabanan should have made the minor's act of Yibum like Ma'amar <i>only</i> with regard to prohibiting her from doing Yibum with the other brothers, and <i>not</i> with regard to anything else. There are other ramifications of Ma'amar that should <i>not</i> take effect as a result of the minor's act. For example, the Mishnah here teaches that the Rabanan prohibited the other brothers from doing Yibum with the wife of a minor who died after he did Yibum because of the prohibition of 'Eshes Shnei Mesim.' If the minor died after he did Yibum, the other brothers may not do Yibum with her because she remains partially Zekukah from the first brother who died (since a full-fledged Yibum mid'Oraisa was not performed with her) and she is also partially Zekukah from the second brother who died (the minor), who lived with her and is considered to have performed Ma'amar with her.
</p><p>
Rashi asks, why should the Yibum of the minor be afforded the status of Ma'amar in this case? A minor cannot marry, and thus when he dies after taking the Yevamah, she should be considered as though she falls to Yibum (to the other brothers) entirely from one brother (in this case, the first brother, who died before the minor died). Although mid'Oraisa the minor's Yibum is valid and thus the Yevamah may perform Yibum with a third brother because she falls to Yibum entirely from the second brother (the minor), mid'Rabanan she should have the status of one who falls entirely from the first brother (since a minor cannot marry) and the minor's act of Yibum should be ineffective (and thus she should still be permitted to do Yibum with a third brother). Why did the Rabanan institute that the Yibum of the minor has some validity and is judged as Ma'amar, which prohibits the third brother from doing Yibum with her? Rashi answers that since a Zikah-bond already exists between the minor and the Yevamah, the Rabanan allowed some measure of a marriage-bond (Ma'amar) to take effect.
</p><p>


<font><b>2) AGADAH: LIPS THAT QUIVER IN THE GRAVE</b></font><b>
<br></b>The Gemara relates that Rebbi Yochanan was upset with Rebbi Elazar because he did not quote the teachings of Rebbi Yochanan in his name. When one relates teachings in the name of the one who originally taught them, the original source of the teachings merits that his 'lips quiver in the grave' and he is considered still alive (Rashi).
</p><p>
Based on the Gemara here, the <b>MAHARSHA</b> (Mahadura Basra) suggests a novel interpretation for why Yakov Avinu was so upset at the news of Yosef's death. 
</p><p>
When Yakov Avinu heard that Yosef died, he refused to be comforted. He said, 'I will descend to the grave in mourning' -- 'Ki Ered El Beni Avel She'olah' (Bereishis 37:35). He did not say 'b'Yagon She'olah,' as he said when he protested the brothers' desire to take Binyamin to Mitzrayim (Bereishis 42:38), but rather '<i>b'Evel</i> She'olah.' Why did he use a different expression?
</p><p>
The Midrash relates that Yakov Avinu taught Yosef everything he learned from Shem and Ever (Bereishis Rabah 84:8, cited by Rashi to Bereishis 37:3). Accordingly, to Yakov Avinu the tragic report that Yosef had died meant that no one would be able to repeat his teachings after his death. This greatly worried him, as he feared that after his death he would 'have no mouth, like a mourner (Avel)' (Rashi to Bereishis 25:30) -- his lips would not continue to move with no one alive to repeat his teachings in his name.
</p><p>
When Yakov Avinu refused to be comforted '<i>because</i> (Ki) I will descend to the grave <i>in mourning</i>,' he meant, 'Although I might be comforted for the loss of my precious son, how can I be comforted for the loss I will endure after I reach the World of Truth, where I will be silent eternally <i>like mourner</i>?'
</p><p>
When Yakov Avinu was reunited with Yosef, he declared 'Amusah ha'Pa'am' -- 'Now I can die after having seen your face' (Bereishis 46:30). After he saw that Yosef was still alive, he was no longer afraid to die. He knew that Yosef would teach the Torah he had learned from his father, and thereby causing his father's lips to move in the grave and keeping his father alive even after his departure from this world. 
</p><p>
When Yosef sent gifts back to his father (after he revealed himself to his brothers and beckoned them to come to Mitzrayim), he selected gifts which would convey to his father that he need not fear eternal silence in the grave. The Gemara in Megilah relates that one of the gifts he sent to Yakov Avinu was old wine.
</p><p>
The Yerushalmi in Shekalim teaches that the pleasure the deceased experiences when one relates his teachings is comparable to the pleasure of a person 'who drinks old wine; even after he drinks it, the taste remains in his mouth for a long time.' When he sent a gift of 'Agalos' to his father, Yosef hinted that he did not forget any of his father's teachings; the 'Agalos' alluded to the last Halachic discussion which they had together before they were separated (Rashi to Bereishis 45:27). The gift of old wine indicated that Yosef would repeat Yakov's teachings after Yakov's death, and Yakov's lips would move in the grave, like one who drinks old wine and continues to have pleasure from the taste after the wine is finished. (See also Insights to Bechoros 31:3.)
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If Levi, a nine year old, had Bi'ah with his 
          Yevamah, and later his nine-year old brother Reuven had 
          Bi'ah with her, this forbids her to Levi;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b></b>  R. Shimon says, it does not forbid her;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b></b>  If a nine-year old had Bi'ah with his Yevamah Leah, and 
          then with her Tzarah, this forbids Leah to himself;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b></b>  R. Shimon says, it does not forbid her.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa - R. Shimon to Chachamim):</font></b> If Levi's Bi'ah is 
          considered Bi'ah (he acquired her), Reuven's Bi'ah has no 
          effect! If Levi's Bi'ah is not considered Bi'ah, the same 
          applies to Reuven (so his Bi'ah should not forbid her to 
          Levi)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b></b>  Our Mishnah is unlike Ben Azai;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - Ben Azai):</font></b> A Ma'amar takes effect after a 
               Ma'amar when there are two Yevamim and one Yevamah, 
               but not when there is one Yavam and two Yevamos. 
               (Our Mishnah considers Bi'ah of a nine year-old like 
               a Ma'amar, and says that there is Bi'ah after Bi'ah 
               even when there are two Yevamos.)
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>'YIBUM' OF A NINE-YEAR OLD</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If a nine year old had Bi'ah with his Yevamah 
          and he died, she does Chalitzah, not Yibum. If he married 
          a woman, she does not fall to Yibum;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If he had Bi'ah with his Yevamah Sarah, married Leah 
          after he became an adult, and then died:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If he did not have Bi'ah with Sarah in adulthood, 
               Sarah does Chalitzah, not Yibum. Leah may do 
               Chalitzah or Yibum;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Shimon says, the Yavam may do Yibum or Chalitzah 
               with either wife he wants, and does Chalitzah to the 
               other.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  A 20-year old who did not bring two hairs is like a 
          nine-year old.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara - Rava):</font></b> Chachamim say that Eshes Shnei Mesim (a 
          Yevamah who fell to Yibum from two brothers) does 
          Chalitzah, not Yibum. Do not say that this is only when 
          there is a Tzarah, and they decreed lest people say that 
          two Yevamos from one husband do Yibum. Here, there is no 
          Tzarah, and she must do Chalitzah, not Yibum!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If he married a woman and he died ...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  Our Mishnah teaches like a Beraisa does;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> If a lunatic or minor married and died, 
               his wife is exempt from Chalitzah and Yibum.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If he married after he became an adult...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> The Bi'ah of a nine-year old should be like an 
          adult's Ma'amar, and Leah should be forbidden to do Yibum 
          (like the Tzarah of a Yevamah who received a Ma'amar - 
          31b)!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rav):</font></b> Chachamim did not make Bi'ah of a 
          nine-year old like an adult's Ma'amar.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Shmuel and R. Yochanan):</font></b> It is like a Ma'amar!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> The above question is difficult for Shmuel and 
          R. Yochanan!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> Tana'im argue about whether or not the Tzarah 
          of Eshes Shnei Mesim may do Yibum.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The Tana of the Mishnah (31b) decrees lest people do 
               Yibum to both. He taught about an adult Yavam, and 
               the same applies to a minor;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Our Tana says that Bi'ah of a nine-year old is like 
               a Ma'amar, but we do not decree lest people do Yibum 
               also to the Tzarah. He taught about a minor, and the 
               same applies to an adult;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  He taught about a minor because he was 
                    discussing minors.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b></b>  R. Elazar said this teaching without attributing it to R. 
          Yochanan. R. Yochanan was upset when he heard about this.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Ami and R. Asi:</font></b> In the synagogue in Teverya, R. 
               Elazar and R. Yosi argued about a bolt with a pestle 
               at the end until they tore a Sefer Torah in their 
               anger.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> Surely, they did not tear a Sefer 
                    Torah!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Correction:</font></b> Rather, a Sefer Torah was torn in 
                    their anger.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Yosi ben Kisma was there, and said that it would 
               not be surprising if the Shul became a place of 
               idolatry. It did! (This shows that it is imprudent 
               to be angry!)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> R. Yochanan was even more adamant. 'Do you consider 
               R. Elazar to be my colleague (like the parties in 
               your story? He is my Talmid!'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Yakov bar Idi:</font></b> 'As Hash-m commanded Moshe his 
               servant, so Moshe commanded Yehoshua, and so did 
               Yehoshua, he did not omit one thing from everything 
               Hash-m commanded Moshe'.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  Did Yehoshua say about everything 'Moshe told 
                    me so'?! Rather, he expounded, and everyone 
                    knew that he learned his Torah from Moshe;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> Also R. Elazar your Talmid expounds, and 
                    everyone knows that it is your teachings!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Yochanan (to R. Ami and R. Asi):</font></b> Why don't you 
               know how to appease like our colleague, Idi's son?!
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>'DIVREI' 'TORAH' SAID IN A 'CHACHAM'S' NAME</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why was R. Yochanan so upset?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> This is like Rav Yehudah taught:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> 'I will dwell in your tent Olamim 
               (plural)' - can a person dwell in two worlds?!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> David requested of Hash-m that people should 
               say teachings in his name in this world;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (R. Yochanan):</font></b> When people in this world recite 
                    teachings of a dead Chacham, his lips move in 
                    the grave.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Yitzchak ben Ze'iri):</font></b> He learns from 'Your 
                    palate is like good wine. It agitates the lips 
                    of the sleeping as a pile of grapes';
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b></b>When you put your finger on a pile of grapes, 
                    it moves. Likewise, when people say teachings 
                    of Chachamim in their names in this world, 
                    their lips move in the grave.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>THE AGE OF ADULTHOOD</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> A nine-year old is like (a 20-year old who did 
          not bring hairs).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Contradiction (Mishnah):</font></b> If a 20-year old man did not 
          bring two hairs, they bring a proof that he is 20 and he 
          is a Seris. He does not do Chalitzah or Yibum;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If a 20-year old woman did not bring two hairs, they 
               bring a proof that she is 20 and she is an Ailonis. 
               She does not do Chalitzah or Yibum.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Rav said that the Mishnah discusses when he 
          brought Simanim of a Seris.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Support  (Rava):</font></b> The Mishnah says '...v'Hu (and that) he 
          is a Seris'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If he does not have Simanei Seris, when does he 
          become an adult?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Tana d'Vei R. Chiya):</font></b> He is an adult after (35,) the 
          majority of his (expected) years.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  When one who had not brought hairs would come before 
          Rava, if he was weak, he would tell them to make him 
          healthy. If he was well fed, he would tell them to thin 
          him out.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Sometimes pubic hairs fall off due of weakness, and 
               sometimes due to obesity.
<br>
<br><center><font color='ff0000' size='+1'><b>***<b>PEREK NOS'IN <b><b>AL</b></b> HA'ANUSAH</b>***
<br><font color='ff0000' size='+1'><b>
<br><p><b>
<br><b></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>ONLY KIDUSHIN FORBIDS RELATIVES</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> One may marry the relatives (mother, 
          grandmother, daughter, granddaughter and sister) of a 
          woman he raped or enticed. One who rapes or entices the 
          relative of his wife is Chayav (Kares);
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  A man may marry a woman raped or enticed by his father or 
          son;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  R. Yehudah forbids a woman raped or enticed by his 
          father.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara):</font></b> Our Mishnah teaches like the following Beraisa:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> If a man raped a woman, he may marry her 
               daughter. If he married a woman, he may not marry 
               her daughter.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Contradiction (Beraisa):</font></b> One who is suspected of Bi'ah 
          with a woman is forbidden to her mother, daughter and 
          sister.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> It is forbidden only mid'Rabanan.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> If it is forbidden mid'Rabanan, would the Tana 
          say 'one may marry (l'Chatchilah)'?!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> Our Mishnah discusses after the woman he was 
          suspected of died. Then it is permitted even mid'Rabanan.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is the source that a man may marry the 
          relatives of a woman he raped or enticed?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Beraisa):</font></b> Regarding all other Arayos it says 
          'Shechivah (lying)'. Regarding the forbidden relatives of 
          one's wife, it says 'Kichah', to teach that the Isur 
          applies only through marriage.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rav Papa):</font></b> Regarding one's sister, it says 
          'That will take his sister...'. Is the Isur only through 
          marriage, but Bi'ah without Kidushin is permitted?!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Abaye):</font></b> The Torah says 'Kichah' without 
          specifying. When it can apply to Kidushin, it does. When 
          it can apply (only) to Bi'ah, it means Bi'ah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (to Question (i) - Rava) Question:</font></b> 'Do not 
          reveal the Ervah of the daughter of <i>your</i> son or 
          daughter' implies that granddaughters (that are not 
          yours) from <i>her</i> (the mother of your children) are 
          permitted;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Contradiction:</font></b> It also says 'do not reveal the Ervah 
               of a woman and her daughter; do not take the 
               daughter of <i>her</i> son or daughter'!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Resolution (Rava):</font></b> The first verse refers to 
               children through rape. The second verse applies to 
               children through marriage.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps it is the opposite!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> Regarding Arayos it says 'She'er (kin)'. 
               This is through marriage, not through rape.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah - R. Yehudah):</font></b> One is forbidden to a woman whom 
          his father raped.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Gidal):</font></b> R. Yehudah learns from 'A man...will not 
          reveal the Kenaf of his father' - one may not have Bi'ah 
          with a woman who had Bi'ah with his father.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> How do we know that this refers to a woman whom 
          the father raped?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> We learn from the previous passage, 'The man that 
          lied with (raped) her ...'
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Chachamim:</font></b> If this were immediately before it, we 
               would agree. Since they are not adjacent, we expound 
               the verse like Rav Anan:
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Anan):</font></b> The verse refers to the Shomeres 
                    Yavam of his father. 'Kenaf Aviv' is someone 
                    fit for his father (to do Yibum with).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> She is already forbidden to the son. It is 
               his uncle's wife!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> The verse adds a second Lav for Bi'ah with 
               her.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> She is already forbidden twice, for she is 
               a Shomeres Yavam!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #1:</font></b> The verse adds a third Lav.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #2:</font></b> After all the Yevamim die there is no 
               Isur of a Shomeres Yavam, so this verse adds a 
               second Isur.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE FAMILIAL TIES OF A 'GER'</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTIONS:</b> The Gemara teaches that after two brothers who share the same mother undergo conversion, they may not marry each other's former wives. The Rabanan prohibited them from marrying each other's wives as a Gezeirah lest people mistakenly assume that any Jew (and not just a Ger) is permitted to marry 'Eshes Achiv,' the wife of his brother. In contrast, when the two brothers share the same <i>father</i>, they <i>may</i> marry each other's former wives.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> explains that the basis for this difference is that no one will mistake the two Gerim (who do not share the same mother) for two ordinary Jewish brothers. People will assume that they do not really share the same father and are not really brothers, since Nochris women tend to live with numerous men and there is no way to prove who the father is. Hence, people will presume that they are permitted to marry each other's wives because they are not really brothers.
</p><p>
The Mishnah states that when a male and female convert give birth to a child whom they conceived before the woman converted ('Horaso she'Lo b'Kedushah'), sons born subsequently may <i>not</i> do Yibum with the first brother's wife (and he may not do Yibum with their wives). <b>RASHI</b> explains that a Ger does not have familial ties to his father, as the verse states, 'Zirmas Susim Zirmasam' (Yechezkel 23:20), and thus the first son is not considered to have the same father as his brothers.
</p><p>
(a) Why does Rashi offer two different reasons for why a Ger is not considered to be related to his father -- the reason of 'Zirmas Susim' and the reason of the mother's immorality?
</p><p>
Moreover, Rashi's source for his comment in the Mishnah here is the Gemara later (98a). The Gemara teaches that even twins who converted have no obligation to do Yibum for each other, even though they clearly share the same father, because of 'Zirmas Susim.' Why, then, does Rashi in the Gemara say that the reason they are not considered related to each other is the assumption that the mother lives with numerous men? Rashi should give the same reason that he gives in the Mishnah -- that a Ger is considered to have no familial ties.
</p><p>
The same question may be asked on Rashi earlier in Yevamos (42a, DH v'Yiftor). The Gemara there says that if a Nochri and Nochris who are married convert together, they are obligated to separate for three months in order to remove any doubt about the time of conception of a child born to them after their conversion. Rashi there explains that this separation period is necessary because if the child was conceived before the Gerus, he is prohibited from doing Yibum for the brothers born after the Gerus. He is prohibited because of the assumption that his Nochris mother is involved in immoral relations and thus he has a different father than the brothers conceived after the Gerus.
</p><p>
Why does Rashi give this reason for the requirement for converts to separate? Even if the woman was <i>not</i> involved in immoral relations and the child indeed was conceived from her husband and not from another man, the child still may not do Yibum for the brothers conceived after the Gerus. He is not considered to be related to them patrilineally because of 'Zirmas Susim Zirmasam.' (The <b>MAHARSHA</b> asks this question on the words of Rashi on 42a and leaves it unanswered, suggesting that 'perhaps a mistaken Talmid inserted these words into Rashi.' The <b>ARUCH LA'NER</b> concurs with this suggestion.)
</p><p>
(b) The Gemara later teaches that when Nochrim convert, even if they share the same mother they are not considered related to each other because 'Ger she'Nisgayer k'Katan she'Nolad Dami' -- a Ger who converts is like a newborn child.
</p><p>
If a Ger is like a newborn child, why does the Gemara (98a) and Rashi in the Mishnah say that the reason why a Ger is not considered related to his father is 'Zirmas Susim Zirmasam'? The Gemara and Rashi should say that the Ger is not related even to his brothers from the same mother because he is 'like a newborn child'!
</p><p>
(c) The Gemara's assertion that a Nochri is not considered related to his father's family because of 'Zirmas Susim Zirmasam' contradicts the Gemara earlier. The Gemara earlier (62b) proves that a Nochri <i>is</i> considered related to his father. Moreover, the Gemara in Kidushin (19b) says that mid'Oraisa a Nochri inherits the property of his father, a clear indication that they are related. (<b>HAGAHOS MAHARSHAM</b> in the name of the <b>SHO'EL U'MESHIV</b> 3:3:34)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>ARUCH LA'NER</b> and <b>RAV SIMCHAH M'DESVI</b> explain that when Rashi here says that brothers who converted who share the same father are permitted to marry each other's former wives (and the Rabanan did not prohibit them) because they probably do not share the same father, Rashi is <i>not</i> explaining the Halachic logic. Rather, Rashi is explaining <i>what people think</i>:
</p><p>
People are not aware of the principle of 'Ger she'Nisgayer k'Katan she'Nolad Dami,' and thus they will wonder why a Ger may marry his brother's former wife. Similarly , they are not aware of the principle of 'Zirmas Susim Zirmasam' and that the Torah removes the familial ties of the Ger. What explanation will people offer to justify the fact that brothers who are Gerim are permitted to marry each other's wives when they share the same father? Rashi answers that they will assume that the reason two Gerim brothers are permitted to marry each other's wives is because they do not really share the same father.
</p><p>
In truth, however, the reason why they are permitted to each other's wives is the principle of 'k'Katan she'Nolad Dami,' which permits them even when they share the same mother. The Rabanan, however, prohibited Gerim with the same mother from marrying each other's wives because people do not realize that it is the principle of 'k'Katan she'Nolad Dami' which permits them, and thus people will mistakenly permit an ordinary Jewish brother to marry his brother's wife.
</p><p>
This answer does not explain Rashi's comments earlier (42a), however, because there Rashi is not discussing what people will think. There he is discussing the actual Halachic reason for the requirement of a three-month separation period.
</p><p>
The <b>NODA B'YEHUDAH</b> (EH 1:23) suggests that the words of Rashi may be understood based on the words of the <b>NIMUKEI YOSEF</b> (3b of the pages of the Rif, DH d'Tanu Rabanan) cited by the <b>SHACH</b> (YD 269:6). The Nimukei Yosef writes that when two Gerim brothers were conceived before their mother's conversion ('Hora'asan she'Lo b'Kedushah') and born after their mother's conversion ('Leidasan b'Kedushah'), they are prohibited to marry each other's wives, as the Beraisa says, because they share the same mother. If, however, one brother was conceived before the mother's conversion and the other brother was conceived after her conversion, they are not considered related and are permitted to marry each other's wives. Apparently, the logic behind this ruling is that since one of the brothers was conceived before the Gerus and one after, they are considered as though they were born to different mothers. (The <b>ARUCH LA'NER</b> points out that this logic is mentioned by the Gemara here as a 'Havah Amina.')
</p><p>
Rashi earlier (42a) describes the relationship between one brother who was conceived before Gerus and another brother who was conceived after Gerus. Although, according to the Nimukei Yosef, they are not related through the mother and therefore are not prohibited to each other's wives mid'Oraisa, when Rashi there says that they are prohibited from doing Yibum, he means that they are prohibited <i>mid'Rabanan</i> from doing Yibum. 
</p><p>
Rav Acha bar Yakov, however, maintains that they are not prohibited mid'Rabanan from marrying each other's wives when they share both the same mother and father (because people look only at their father and assume that they have different fathers and are not really related). They are prohibited from marrying each other's wives only when they share <i>only</i> the same mother and not the same father. Accordingly, Rashi there writes that they probably do not have the same father because we may assume that the mother lived with numerous men. Since they have the same mother but not the same father, they are Asur mid'Rabanan from marrying each other's wives, and they may not do Yibum.
</p><p>
There are a number of difficulties with the answer of the Noda b'Yehudah. Rashi clearly disagrees with the opinion of the Nimukei Yosef (see Rashi to 97b, DH d'Af Al Gav; 98a, DH Nasa; see <b>RASHASH</b> here.) The Noda b'Yehudah himself notes this in <b>DAGUL MEREVAVAH</b> (YD 269). Indeed, the Acharonim point out that all of the Rishonim, including the Nimukei Yosef, concur with Rashi on this point. Therefore, it seems that the Nimukei Yosef earlier (on 3b) does not mean to say that two brothers are not considered to have the same mother when one was conceived before the mother's Gerus and one after her Gerus. (See <b>YASHRESH YAKOV</b>, <b>ARUCH LA'NER</b>.)
</p><p>
Moreover, according to the logic of the Noda b'Yehudah, in every case of two Gerim who share the same mother and father, they should be prohibited from marrying each other's former wives since it is assumed that they really do <i>not</i> share the same father (since the mother is involved in immoral relations) but only the same mother. Rav Acha bar Yakov, though, states that when they have the same father and mother they <i>are</i> permitted to marry each other's wives.
</p><p>
For these (and other) reasons the Acharonim reject the answer of the Noda b'Yehudah. 
</p><p>
(See below for another answer for the words of Rashi on 42a, based on the following answer to the second question on Rashi.)
</p><p>
(b) Rashi himself addresses why the Gemara here does not mention the reason of 'Ger she'Nisgayer k'Katan she'Nolad Dami.' Rashi (98a, DH Ha d'Amur) asserts that the principle of 'k'Katan she'Nolad Dami' applies only in the case of a Nochri who was born before his mother converted ('Leidaso she'Lo b'Kedushah'). If, however, he was conceived before his mother converted but was born after she converted, he is not considered a 'Katan she'Nolad Dami,' a newborn child with no parents, since he was born to a Jewish woman. When the Gemara later (98a) says that Nochrim have no familial ties because of 'Zirmas Susim Zirmasam,' it refers to a case of two twins who were conceived before the mother's conversion and born after her conversion. Similarly, in the Mishnah -- which discusses a child conceived before his mother's conversion and born after his mother's conversion -- Rashi gives the reasoning of 'Zirmas Susim Zirmasam' and not 'k'Katan she'Nolad Dami.'
</p><p>
Rashi's assertion is difficult to understand. The Gemara earlier (78a) states that if a pregnant Nochris immerses herself in a Mikvah for the sake of Gerus, the Tevilah is effective for her unborn child as well. The Gemara says that her immersion is effective for her fetus because the mother's body is not considered a Chatzitzah, an intervention, between the Mikvah and the fetus (according to the opinion that 'Ubar Lav Yerech Imo,' a fetus is not considered part of the mother's body). The Gemara there implies that the child is considered a Ger in his own right even when he is born <i>after</i> his mother's conversion. Why, then, does Rashi assert that he is <i>not</i> like a 'Katan she'Nolad' in such a case?
</p><p>
Perhaps Rava here follows his own view as expressed elsewhere. Rava maintains that 'Ubar Yerech Imo' -- a fetus <i>is</i> considered part of the mother's body (see <b>TOSFOS</b> to 78a, DH Ela), and that is why he does not consider the child a Ger when born after the mother's conversion.
</p><p>
Alternatively, even though the child is considered a Ger, as the Gemara there (78a) implies, he does not have the status of a 'Katan she'Nolad' because he was born to a woman who was Jewish at the time of his birth. His status is based on his birth, and not on his conception, and at the time of his birth he was already Jewish.
</p><p>
Perhaps this distinction applies to the other line of reasoning for why a Ger has no familial ties. Just as the principle of 'Ger she'Nisgayer k'Katan she'Nolad Dami' applies only when the child who later converts was both conceived and born while his mother was a Nochris, the principle of 'Zirmas Susim Zirmasam' also applies only when the child's father was a Nochri at the time of his <i>birth</i>. If the father converted together with the mother and was already Jewish at the time the child was born, perhaps the logic of 'Zirmas Susim Zirmasam' does not apply (since at the time of the child's birth his father was Jewish).
</p><p>
If this proposition is correct, it may explain why Rashi earlier (42a) writes that a son conceived before his parents' Gerus may not perform Yibum for brothers born after the Gerus because of the assumption that his Nochris mother is involved in immoral relations and thus he has a different father than the brothers conceived after the Gerus. 'Zirmas Susim Zirmasam' does not apply in such a case because the first son's father converted <i>before</i> his birth. Accordingly, the only reason why the brothers are prohibited to each other's wives is the Safek that the first son might have been conceived from a different father, and thus they are not eligible for Yibum. (This logic, which allows us to assume that the brothers are not related, does not apply to permit two brothers who are Gerim to marry each other's wives, because it is only a <i>possibility</i>, taken into account l'Chumra, that they have different fathers. It is not known for certain that they have different fathers. This is why the Gemara usually does not use the logic of the mother's promiscuity to permit Gerim brothers to marry each other's wives, but rather it uses the logic of 'Zirmas Susim Zirmasam.')
</p><p>
The above explanation describes Rashi's approach to the difference between 'Zirmas Susim Zirmasam' and 'Ger she'Nisgayer k'Katan she'Nolad Dami.' <b>TOSFOS</b>, however, has an entirely different approach.
</p><p>
<b>TOSFOS</b> in Bechoros (46a, DH Nisgayerah) writes that the only reason why Gerim are not considered related to each other is the principle, 'Ger she'Nisgayer k'Katan she'Nolad Dami,' and not the principle, 'Zirmas Susim Zirmasam.' Tosfos asserts that 'Zirmas Susim Zirmasam' is merely the Gemara's explanation for what people <i>think</i> (the same way Rashi uses the logic of the promiscuity of the Nochris). That is, the Rabanan did not prohibit two brothers who converted from marrying each other's wives, because people will not confuse two brothers who are Gerim with ordinary Jewish brothers. They will realize that the Gerim are <i>not</i> like brothers born Jewish, because of the principle of 'Zirmas Susim Zirmasam.' (Tosfos makes no mention of the logic that a Nochris tends to be promiscuous.)
</p><p>
(c) Why does the Gemara here state that a Nochri is not considered to have Halachic familial ties because of 'Zirmas Susim Zirmasam,' while the Gemara earlier (42a) proves that a Nochri <i>is</i> considered related to his family members? According to Tosfos in Bechoros (cited above), 'Zirmas Susim Zirmasam' is not a genuine Halachic argument. Rather, it is merely what people think when they justify to themselves why Gerim from the same father are permitted to marry each other's wives. Indeed, Tosfos cites the Gemara earlier (62b) -- which says that Nochrim are related to their fathers -- as proof against Rashi who says that 'Zirmas Susim Zirmasam' renders them unrelated.
</p><p>
Two approaches may be suggested to answer this question according to Rashi. Perhaps Rashi maintains that there is a difference between the relationship between Gerim from the same father with regard to an Isur Ervah (such as the prohibition against marrying each other's wives), and their relationship with regard to all other matters (such as inheritance and Piryah v'Rivyah).
</p><p>
Alternatively, perhaps Rashi maintains that 'Zirmas Susim Zirmasam' describes only a Ger's relationship relative to that of an ordinary Jew. When compared to an ordinary Jew, a Ger is not considered related to his original family members. However, before the two brothers convert, they are certainly considered fully related to each other. Only when a child conceived by Nochrim is compared to a full-fledged Jew does the principle of 'Zirmas Susim Zirmasam' apply. According to this understanding, Rashi is consistent with his opinion earlier (42a, as described above, end of answer (b)), in which he explains that 'Zirmas Susim' means simply that a Jew cannot be directly related to a Nochri. For this reason, if the father becomes a Ger before his child is born, they indeed are considered to be related and 'Zirmas Susim' does not apply.
</p><p>
However, one question remains. According to Rashi, even if 'Zirmas Susim' does not apply, a Nochri still should not be considered related to his father because there is a doubt about who his true father is (as Rashi writes 42a).
</p><p>
The answer to this question is as follows. When the Torah refers to a Nochri, it certainly knows who his real father is and thus it can write, 'Bal'adan ben Bal'adan' (cf. Melachim II 20:12) and 'Hadadrimon ben Tavrimon' (cf. Melachim I 15:18) When the Gemara discusses whether a Ger who had children before Gerus is required to have new children after Gerus in order to fulfill the Mitzvah of 'Piryah v'Rivyah,' it apparently refers to a situation in which the father knows for certain that the children are his. (For instance, he is confident that his wife was faithful, or he and his wife were locked in prison together, in which case he can assume that the child is his based on 'Rov'; see Chulin 11b). With regard to inheriting his father, even if the man who raised him is not his true father, there is no one else who has as strong a claim to the inheritance as the supposed son has, and thus he inherits his supposed father before anyone else does.
</p><p>


<font><b>2) THE SOURCE THAT A 'GER' IS LIKE A NEWBORN</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> According to the Gemara's second version, Rav Acha bar Yakov permits brothers who are converts to marry each other's wives even when they share only the same mother. He maintains that the brothers are not considered related to each other because of the principle, 'Ger she'Nisgayer k'Katan she'Nolad Dami' -- a Ger who converts is like a newborn child.
</p><p>
What is the source for this principle?
</p><p>
<b>OPINIONS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>CHASAM SOFER</b> (Chidushim, Yevamos 22a, and elsewhere) writes that he searched extensively for the source for this principle but found none.
</p><p>
(b) <b>RASHI</b> in Bava Kama (88a, DH Ger Ein Lo Chayas) implies that the source is the verse 'Zirmas Susim Zirmasam' (Yechezkel 23:20), from which the law is derived that once a Nochri converts he is no longer considered to be a member of his original family. (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>
(See <b>RAMBAM</b> in Perush ha'Mishnayos to Demai 6:10, who writes that 'mid'Oraisa a Ger does not inherit the property of his [Nochri] father because there is no familial relationship between them, as <i>the law separates between them</i> (sheha'Das Hivdil Beineihem).' Although the Rambam's intention needs further elucidation, his logic does not explain all of the Halachos to which 'Ger she'Nisgayer' applies.) (D. Zupnik)
</p><p>
(c) The <b>MESHECH CHOCHMAH</b> (Devarim 5:27) cites the question of the Chasam Sofer, and he proposes an ingenious solution for the source of the principle, 'Ger she'Nisgayer k'Katan she'Nolad Dami' as it applies to familial relationship. Immediately following the giving of the Torah, Hash-m commanded the Jewish men to return to their wives from whom they had separated temporarily at the time of the giving of the Torah: 'Return to your tents' (Devarim 5:27). Although before the Torah was given many Jews were married to close family members (such as Amram and Yocheved) whom the Torah later prohibited, Hash-m nevertheless commanded them to return to their spouses.
</p><p>
However, the Gemara (Yoma 75a, as cited by Rashi to Bamidbar 11:10) teaches that the Jewish people cried after the giving of the Torah because the Torah prohibited them from marrying close relatives. The Meshech Chochmah explains that they cried over <i>future</i> marriages that had now become forbidden to them. Those who were already married to close family members at the time they left Mitzrayim were permitted to remain with their spouses, because at the giving of the Torah they all underwent a process of Gerus and became Jewish, and thus they had the status of newborns. This is the source for the principle of 'Ger she'Nisgayer k'Katan she'Nolad Dami.'
</p><p>
The Meshech Chochmah's approach does not conform with the straightforward reading of the Sifri there (#90) which explains that they cried when they were commanded to separate from their relatives whom they had married before the giving of the Torah. Why, according to the Sifri, were they indeed not judged as 'Katan she'Nolad' when they formally became Jewish at the time the Torah was given? The <b>MAHARAL</b> (to Bereishis 46:10) addresses this question. He explains that Gerim who were converted 'by force,' as was the experience of the Jewish people at Har Sinai ('Kafah Aleihem Es ha'Har k'Gigis'), do not have the status of 'Katan she'Nolad.' The Maharal apparently intends to differentiate between the process of Gerus of the entire nation as a unit, and the process of Gerus of an individual. When an individual converts, he separates himself from his own nation to join the Jewish people and thus he has the status of a 'Katan she'Nolad.' (Alternatively, the Maharal may mean that one who accepts the Torah because he is required to do so is not considered one who severs himself from his past. Only a Ger who voluntarily accepts upon himself to leave his family and nation of origin and to join the Jewish people is considered a newborn.)
</p><p>
An allusion in the Torah that a Ger is 'k'Katan she'Nolad' may be the very word 'Ger.' Rabeinu Bachye explains in numerous places (Bereishis 31:39, Shemos 22:20, Vayikra 24:20) that the word 'Ger' stems from the word 'Gargir,' which means a single seed or grape (Yeshayah 17:6). Like a seed which is completely separated from the rest of the plant, a Ger severs himself from his past and his family. 
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
<b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>RIDDLES</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Riddle #1:</font></b> 'He is a paternal, but not a maternal, 
          brother, and he is my mother's husband, and I am the 
          daughter of his wife.' (How can this arise?)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rami bar Chama):</font></b> This is unlike R. Yehudah (who 
          forbids a man to marry a woman his father raped. The girl 
          speaking was born out of wedlock; her paternal brother 
          married her mother).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Riddle #2:</font></b> 'He is my brother, and my son; I am the sister 
          of the one I carry on my shoulder'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The case is, a Nochri had Bi'ah with his 
          daughter. (We prefer not to say that a Yisrael did so.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Riddle #3:</font></b> 'Shalom to you, my son; I am the daughter of 
          your sister'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The case is, a Nochri had Bi'ah with his 
          daughter's daughter.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Riddle #4 (asked to water carriers):</font></b> 'The one I carry is 
          my son, and I am the daughter of his brother.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b></b>  The case is, a Nochri had Bi'ah with his son's daughter.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Riddle #5:</font></b> 'Alas, my brother is my father, my husband, 
          the son of my husband and the husband of my mother, and I 
          am the daughter of his wife, and he does not give bread 
          to his brethren, the orphaned children of his daughter.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b></b>  The case is, a Nochri Ploni fathered a girl Plonis 
          through his mother, and later married Plonis, and Ploni's
	  father Almoni fathered children 
          through Plonis. (Ploni married Plonis, who is his 
          daughter and sister. Almoni died, and Ploni refused to 
          feed Almoni's children through Plonis, who are Ploni's 
          grandchildren and also his brothers.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Riddle #6:</font></b> 'I and you are brothers; I and your father are 
          brothers; I and your mother are brothers.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The case is, a Nochri fathered two girls from his 
          mother, and then fathered a son from one of his 
          daughters. The son's mother's sister says the above to 
          him.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Riddle #7:</font></b> 'We are siblings; I and your father are 
          siblings; I and your mother are first cousins.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> This can arise in a permitted way! Reuven, Shimon 
          and Levi are brothers. Reuven has two daughters; Shimon 
          married one of them and Levi's son married the other. 
          Shimon's son says thusly to the son of Levi's son.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>5) </font></b><font color='blue'>ARE CONVERTED RELATIVES PERMITTED TO EACH OTHER?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If a woman's sons converted with her, the sons 
          do not do Yibum or Chalitzah to each other's wives. This 
          is even if the first son was conceived before conversion 
          and born after conversion, and the second was conceived 
          and born after conversion;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  The same applies to a slave whose sons were freed with 
          her.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara):</font></b> The children of the slave Yudan were freed. Rav 
          Acha bar Yakov permitted them to marry each other's 
          wives.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Rava):</font></b> Rav Sheshes forbade this!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Acha bar Yakov:</font></b> He forbade, and I permit!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #1:</font></b> If they are paternal but not maternal 
          brothers, all agree that they are permitted;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  If they are maternal but not paternal brothers, all agree 
          that they are forbidden;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  They argue about brothers from the mother and father.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Rav Acha bar Yakov permits, since people view them 
               as paternal brothers. They call them the sons of 
               Ploni;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Rav Sheshes forbids, for people also call them the 
               sons of Plonis (their mother).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #2:</font></b> Rav Acha bar Yakov permits in all cases, even 
          when they are only maternal brothers.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is the reason?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> A convert is like a newborn baby.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Mishnah):</font></b> A woman whose sons converted with her 
          do not do Yibum or Chalitzah to each other's wives.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> They do not do Yibum because it is 
               forbidden!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> No, it is because Chalitzah and Yibum do not 
          apply. Their widows are free to marry strangers, or the 
          brothers.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection (Mishnah):</font></b> Even if the first son was conceived 
          before conversion...
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Version #1:</font></b> We understand if each man is forbidden 
               to his brother's wife. The Mishnah teaches that even 
               if the first was conceived before conversion and 
               born after conversion, and the second was conceived 
               after conversion', and it is as if they have 
               different mothers, still they are forbidden;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> But if each man is permitted to his brother's wife, 
               why does it say <i>even</i>'?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Even though both were born after conversion, and 
          people might confuse them with Yisraelim, we permit them 
          to each other's wives.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Version #2:</font></b> We understand if each man is permitted 
               to his brother's wife. The Mishnah teaches that even 
               though both were born after conversion, and people 
               might confuse them with Yisraelim, still we permit 
               them to each other's wives;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> But if each man is forbidden to his brother's wife, 
               why does it say '<i>even</i>'?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Even though the first son was conceived before 
          conversion and born after conversion, and the second was 
          conceived after conversion, and it is as if they have 
          different mothers, still they are forbidden.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Beraisa):</font></b> If two twins converted or were freed, 
          they do not do Chalitzah or Yibum to each other's wives, 
          and they are not liable for marrying each other's wife;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If they were conceived before conversion and born 
               after conversion, they do not do Chalitzah or Yibum 
               but they are liable for marrying each other's wife;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If they were conceived and born after conversion, 
               they are like Yisraelim in all respects.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> The Reisha teaches that they are not 
               liable for marrying each other's wives. This implies 
               that they are not liable, but it is forbidden!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Really, it is permitted. Since the Seifa says 
          that they are liable, the Reisha says that they are not 
          liable, for parallel structure.
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>ARE CONVERTS PERMITTED TO THEIR RELATIVES?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava):</font></b> People say that a Mitzri (Nochri) has no father. 
          This is not because they have Bi'ah wantonly, and we do 
          not know who the father is, but if we would know, we 
          would be concerned;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  Rather, even when we know, we are not concerned. Twins 
          come from the same drop of semen, just it split into two, 
          and the Beraisa teaches that they do not do Chalitzah or 
          Yibum!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Rather, the Torah considers the child to have no 
               father - 'Their flesh is flesh of donkeys, and their 
               seed is like that of horses'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> R. Yosi said that Niftaim the convert married 
          the wife of Ploni, his maternal brother. Chachamim said 
          that marriage does not apply to a convert.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Objection:</font></b> We cannot say that if he was Mekadesh a 
               woman it does not take effect!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Correction:</font></b> Rather, the Isur of Eshes Ach does not 
               apply.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> The case is, Ploni married her after he 
               converted.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> No, he married her before conversion.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, obviously she is permitted!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> One might have thought that we decree due to the 
          case when he married her after conversion. R. Yosi 
          teaches that we do not.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Beraisa - Ben Yosiyan):</font></b> I saw a convert who 
          married his maternal brother's wife. I asked who 
          permitted this;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> The convert:</font></b> Here are a woman and her seven children 
               that were permitted. R. Akiva sat on this rock and 
               said two things:
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  A convert may marry the wife of his maternal 
                    brother;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> 'Hashem's word to Yonah the second time' - He 
                    did not speak to him a third time.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> The Beraisa permits the wife of a 
               maternal brother, i.e. whom he married after 
               conversion.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> No, he married her before conversion.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, obviously she is permitted!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> One might have thought that we decree due to the 
          case when he married her after conversion. The Beraisa 
          teaches that we do not.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> The convert is believed to say that R. Akiva 
          permitted this!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> If a Chacham says a teaching (that 
               pertains to himself), we accept it only if he 
               already taught it before the case arose.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> This case was, he had already said the 
          teaching.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> Here he was believed, because the woman and 
          her seven children had already been permitted.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #3:</font></b> Here he was believed because he said another 
          teaching with it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> 'Hashem's word to Yonah the second time' - He 
          did not speak to him a third time.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> But it says, 'He (Yarav'am ben Yoash) returned 
          the border... like Hash-m said through Yonah'!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Ravina):</font></b> He spoke only twice with him 
          regarding Ninveh.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak):</font></b> 'Like Hash-m said 
          through Yonah', just like Ninveh was reversed from evil 
          to good, also in the days of Yerovom ben Yoash, Yisrael 
          reversed from evil to good.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>RELATIVES PERMITTED TO A CONVERT</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> If a boy was born after his mother converted, 
          but was conceived beforehand, he is considered a convert. 
          He is forbidden to maternal relatives, but not to 
          paternal relatives;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If he married his maternal sister or his father's 
          maternal sister, he must divorce her. If he married his 
          paternal sister or his father's paternal sister, they may 
          stay married;
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) THE REASON WHY A 'GER' MAY NOT MARRY HIS RELATIVES</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Beraisa states that a Ger who was conceived before his mother converted ('Horaso she'Lo b'Kedushah') and born after his mother converted ('Leidaso b'Kedushah') is prohibited from marrying his maternal relatives, such as his sister from his mother, or his mother's sister. He may marry only his relatives from his father's side.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> writes that the Rabanan prohibited the Ger from marrying his maternal relatives because if the Ger would be permitted to marry his maternal sister who was born before his mother converted, he might think that he is permitted to marry his maternal sister who was born <i>after</i> his mother converted. Such a marriage, however, is forbidden mid'Oraisa by the Isur of 'Achoso.'
</p><p>
However, Rashi earlier gives a different reason for why the Rabanan prohibited the Ger from marrying his maternal relatives. The Gemara earlier (97b) relates that Rav Sheshes prohibited the two sons of Yudan the maidservant from marrying each other's former wives (their sisters-in-law), even though the brothers were conceived and born before their mother converted. In that case, the reason for the prohibition could not have been a concern that they would permit themselves to marry siblings from their mother born after her Gerus. Since <i>they</i> were born before the Gerus they would not be related to any children born after the Gerus. Rather, they were prohibited from marrying their maternal relatives because, as Rashi there explains, people might mistakenly think that just as a Ger is permitted to marry his brother's wife, an ordinary Jew may also marry his brother's wife. This reason -- that people will confuse the laws of Arayos of a normal Jew with the laws of a Ger -- applies to the case of the Gemara here as well. Why does Rashi here give a different explanation for the prohibition? (<b>TOSFOS</b> DH Nasa)
</p><p>



<b>ANSWER:</b> Rashi understands that the prohibition which the Gemara here discusses cannot be based on the same reasoning as the prohibition in the case of the sons of Yudan the maidservant. The Beraisa specifically discusses a Ger born <i>after</i> his mother converted ('Leidaso b'Kedushah'). The implication of the Beraisa is that a Ger born <i>before</i> his mother converted would <i>not</i> be prohibited to marry his relatives, and the concern that people might confuse the Ger with a normal Jew does not apply to prohibit the Ger from marrying his relatives. (Tosfos has difficulty with the wording of the Beraisa and offers numerous solutions for how to explain it, but Rashi's explanation avoids Tosfos' question entirely.)
</p><p>
Why, though, does that concern not apply in this case?
</p><p>
1. <b>RAV ELAZAR MOSHE HA'LEVI HOROWITZ</b> suggests that the concern that people might confuse the laws of a Ger with the laws of a normal Jew is reason only to prohibit a Ger from marrying his relatives <i>l'Chatchilah</i> (such as in the case on 97b). The Beraisa here, however, states that a Ger who marries his sister must divorce her even b'Di'eved. This stringent ruling is due only to the Gezeirah that he might think that he is permitted to marry his sister born <i>after</i> their mother converted.
</p><p>
2. Rashi may understand that the concern that people will confuse a Ger with a normal Jew does not apply to <i>natural relatives</i>, such as one's sister. Every Jew knows that one is forbidden to marry his sister (see Shabbos 145b, Sanhedrin 7b). Only a relative through marriage, such as one's sister-in-law ('Eshes Achiv'), is subject to error; a Jew might mistakenly think that he is permitted to marry her when he sees that a Ger is permitted to marry such a relative. Accordingly, the reasoning which Rashi mentions earlier (97b) does not apply in the case of the Beraisa here.
</p><p>
On the other hand, the concern of the Beraisa here -- that the Ger will mistakenly think that he is permitted to marry his sister born <i>after</i> their mother converted when he sees that he is permitted to marry his sister born <i>before</i> their mother converted -- applies <i>only</i> to natural relatives. The Rabanan did <i>not</i> institute such a Gezeirah for a relative through marriage, as Rashi writes later (98b, DH u'Mutar). Thus, the two different prohibitions complement each other.
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  If he married his mother's maternal sister, he must 
          divorce her.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  R. Meir says, if he married his mother's paternal sister, 
          he must divorce her;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Meir says that he must divorce any relative on 
               the mother's side, but he may keep any relative on 
               the father's side.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  Chachamim say, he may keep her.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  He is permitted to the wife of his (maternal - Bach 
          deletes this from the text) brother, and the wife of his 
          father's brother, and all other Arayos are permitted;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This includes his father's wife.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  If he (any Nochri) married a woman and her daughter (and 
          later they all converted), he has Nisu'in with one and 
          divorces the other. L'Chatchilah, he should not do 
          Nisu'in (this will be explained).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #1:</font></b> If his (any Nochri's) wife dies, he is 
          permitted to his mother-in-law (Nimukei Yosef - even if 
          all three converted before she died);
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #2:</font></b> If his wife dies, he is forbidden to his 
          mother-in-law.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> The Beraisa says that he is permitted to his 
          brother's wife.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> The case is, his brother married her 
               after conversion.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> No, he married her before conversion.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, obviously she is permitted!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> One might have thought that we decree due to the 
          case when he married her after conversion. The Beraisa 
          teaches that we do not.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> If he married a woman and her daughter, he has 
          Nisu'in with one and divorces the other. L'Chatchilah, he 
          should not do Nisu'in.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> If he must divorce her, of course l'Chatchilah 
          he may not do Nisu'in!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The last clause refers to the cases in which he 
          may keep her. L'Chatchilah, he should not do Nisu'in.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa) Version #1:</font></b> If his wife dies, he is permitted 
          to his mother-in-law.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Version #2:</font></b> He is forbidden to her.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The latter version is like R. Yishmael, who says the 
               Isur of a mother-in-law is the same after the wife 
               dies. Chachamim decree regarding a convert;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> The former version is like R. Akiva, who says that 
               the Isur becomes lighter after the wife dies. 
               Chachamim did not decree regarding a convert.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>CHILDREN WHO BECAME MIXED UP</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> The children of five women got mixed up. These 
          children grew up and married women. One of the men died 
          without children. There is a five-way doubt about who is 
          his father. A (definite) son from each of four of the 
          five possible fathers does Chalitzah, and a son of the 
          fifth possible father does Yibum (or Chalitzah).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If another of the mixed-up men died, the man who did 
          Yibum and sons from three other (possible) fathers do 
          Chalitzah, and a son from one father does Yibum;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  Whenever a man from the mixture dies, his widow does 
          Chalitzah with four men and may do Yibum.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara):</font></b> The Chalitzos must be done before Yibum, lest 
          her husband was from a different father (than the Yavam), 
          and the 'Yibum' is really a Shomeres Yavam (improperly) 
          marrying a stranger.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> When a second man from the mixture died, why 
          must the man who did Yibum before do Chalitzah now? He 
          should be allowed to do Yibum again!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> We do not want one man to do Yibum to all of 
          them. Rather, one man from each father does Yibum once. 
          Perhaps each Yevamah will get her true Yavam.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> If some of them (have) brothers, some (have) 
          no brothers - the brothers do Chalitzah, those without 
          brothers do Yibum.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What does this mean?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Safra):</font></b> If some sons of the possible fathers 
          are (only Safek) paternal brothers to a man from the 
          mixture, and some are (perhaps only) maternal brothers, 
          the maternal brothers do Chalitzah, and the paternal 
          brothers do Yibum (or Chalitzah. I.e. if one of the 
          mothers had children from two different men, any child of 
          hers could be a maternal brother from a different 
          father.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> If some of the (possible) brothers are Kohanim 
          and others are not, the Kohanim do Chalitzah and the 
          others do Yibum (or Chalitzah);
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b></b>  If some brothers are Kohanim and others are (perhaps 
          only) maternal brothers, both do Chalitzah, not Yibum.
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>'YIBUM' OF MEN OF UNKNOWN FATHERS</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> Due to Safek, a man can (be obligated to) do 
          Chalitzah to his mother, to his sister, and to his 
          daughter.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Case 1 - his mother:	Reuven and Shmuel were born to 
               Leah and Chanah, respectively, and then Leah and 
               Chanah each had another son, and these sons became 
               mixed up. Reuven married Chanah and Shmuel married 
               Leah, and Reuven and Shmuel died without children. 
               Each of the mixed up children does Chalitzah to both 
               women. It turns out, each did Chalitzah to his 
               mother (and his Yevamah).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Case 2 - his sister:</font></b> Reuven was born to Yakov and 
               Leah, and Leah was widowed or divorced and had a 
               daughter from another man. This daughter became 
               mixed up with another girl. Yakov also had two sons 
               from Esther; each of these sons married one of the 
               mixed up girls, and died without children. Reuven 
               does Chalitzah to both girls, one of whom is his 
               sister.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Case 3 - his daughter:</font></b> Reuven's daughter became 
               mixed with another girl. Reuven's two brothers 
               married the two girls, and died without children. 
               Reuven does Chalitzah to both women, one of whom is 
               his daughter.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa - R. Meir):</font></b> A man and his wife can give birth to 
          children from five different nations:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If a Yisrael bought a slave couple with two 
               children, and one of them converted, one of their 
               children is a Nochri, and one is a convert;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If the parents immersed to become Kanani slaves and 
               had a child, the child is a slave;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> If the mother was freed and she had conceived 
               through her 'husband', the child is a Mamzer;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> If the father was freed and they had a child, their 
               five children are a Nochri, convert, slave, Mamzer 
               and Yisrael.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What do we learn from this?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> It teaches that the child of a Nochri or slave 
          from a Yisraelis is a Mamzer.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> A man can sell his father to collect his 
          mother's Kesuvah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  The case is, a Yisrael bought a slave couple with a son. 
          The master freed the mother and married her, and gave all 
          his property to her son. The son sells his father to 
          enable his mother to collect her Kesuvah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What do we learn from this?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> The Beraisa is like R. Meir. It teaches that 
          even though slaves are Metaltelim, there is a lien on 
          them to pay a Kesuvah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> (The Beraisa is like Chachamim who argue with 
          R. Meir). It teaches that slaves are like land.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>CHILDREN WHO BECAME MIXED UP</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> Leah's son was mixed up with her 
          daughter-in-law's son. The children grew up and married 
          women and died. A son of the daughter-in-law does 
          Chalitzah, not Yibum. The widow is either his brother's 
          wife, or the wife of his father's brother;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  A son of Leah does Yibum or Chalitzah. The widow is 
          either his brother's wife, or his nephews wife (who is 
          permitted).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  If a Kosher son died (without children):
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If Leah's son died, each Safek (mixed-up child) does 
               Chalitzah but not Yibum. The widow is either his 
               brother's wife, or his uncle's wife;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If the daughter-in-law's son died, one Safek does 
               Chalitzah, and the other does Yibum (or Chalitzah. 
               The widow is either his brother's wife, or his 
               nephew's wife.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  If the son of a Kohen became mixed with his Shifchah's 
          son, both of them may eat Terumah. They receive one share 
          at the granaries;
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) A 'SAFEK KOHEN' WHO OFFERS A KORBAN</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTIONS:</b> The Mishnah teaches that if the baby of a Kohenes and the baby of her maidservant become mixed up, each son has the status of a Safek Kohen and Safek Eved. When they reach adulthood, they are to grant emancipation to each other, and then each one remains a Safek Kohen and Safek Yisrael. Consequently, they do not receive gifts of Kodshim which ordinary Kohanim are entitled to receive. However, ordinary Kohanim are not entitled to take away the Kodshim of those sons, because each son may claim that he is a Kohen. Similarly, if they have an animal that is a Bechor, they are not required to give it to a Kohen. Rather, they may let it graze until it develops a blemish and then they may eat it themselves.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> offers two explanations for the Mishnah's statement that 'we do not give them Kodshim, but we may not take Kodshim away from them.' According to Rashi's first explanation, the 'Kodshim' to which the Mishnah refers is the meat of Korbanos. 
</p><p>
The two Safek Kohanim certainly may not offer Korbanos on the Mizbe'ach themselves, because of the doubt that they might be Zarim. On the other hand, when they have an obligation to offer a Korban, Beis Din cannot take it away from them and force them to give it to the Kohanim who serve in the Beis ha'Mikdash at that moment, thereby entitling those Kohanim to the parts of the animal which are given to the Kohanim who offer it (the hide and parts of the meat). Rather, since each son is a Safek Kohen, he may claim that he has the right to offer the Korban himself and to keep the hide and meat. Although he may not actually offer the Korban himself, he has three options from which to choose:
</p><p>
1. He may give it to the Kohanim of the Mishmar which is serving in the Beis ha'Mikdash at the moment and stipulate that those Kohanim must return to him the hide and meat.
</p><p>
2. He may designate any Kohen as a Shali'ach to bring the Korban on his behalf, even a Kohen whose Mishmar is not presently serving in the Beis ha'Mikdash. (A Kohen does not have to wait until his Mishmar to bring his own Korban. Therefore, the Safek Kohen may appoint as his Shali'ach any definite Kohen, who will bring the Korban on his behalf even though his Mishmar is not presently serving.)
</p><p>
3. He may wait until the arrival of the turn of Mishmar to which he wants to give his Korban, and give his Korban to the benefit of that Mishmar.
</p><p>
This is Rashi's first explanation of the Mishnah.
</p><p>
According to Rashi's second explanation, the 'Kodshim' to which the Mishnah refers is not Korbanos, but Bechor and Chermei Kohanim. A Bechor and Chermei Kohanim are not given to the Safek Kohanim because of their doubtful status as Kohanim. If, however, they are in possession of their own Bechor or Chermei Kohanim, other Kohanim may not take it away from them. Rather, out of doubt they may keep the Charamim, and they may let the Bechor graze until it develops a blemish. They are advised not to bring the Bechor as a Korban, because if they do the Kohen who offers it will keep it for himself and not give it to them. 
</p><p>
Rashi explains why he does not accept the first explanation. He writes that it does not seem logical that the Safek Kohen should be able to appoint a Shali'ach to bring his Korban for him. Since he cannot bring the Korban himself, he does not have the authority to appoint a Shali'ach to do so. Consequently, there is no way for him to retain the hide or meat by having the Kohen of his choice bring it for him.
</p><p>
There are a number of difficulties with Rashi's explanation (as the <b>ARUCH LA'NER</b> points out).
</p><p>
(a) According to Rashi's second explanation, if the Safek Kohen gives his Bechor to a Kohen, the Kohen will keep it for himself, and therefore he is advised to let the animal graze and develop a blemish. Rashi's words imply that the Safek Kohen is permitted to eat the Bechor before it develops a blemish, but he may not do so because the Kohen to whom he would give it (if he would be a Vadai Yisrael) will not consent to let him eat it. However, in his next comment (DH u'Vechoro), Rashi writes that an unblemished Bechor may be eaten only by a definite Kohen and not by a Safek Kohen!
</p><p>
(b) Rashi rejects the first explanation on the grounds that a Safek Kohen is unable to appoint a Shali'ach to bring a Korban for him. Rashi earlier mentions that the Safek Kohen has three options with regard to offering his Korban. One of those options is to appoint a Shali'ach, while another option is to give it to the present Mishmar of Kohanim and stipulate that they return to him the hide and meat. A third option is to give it to whichever Mishmar he desires when that Mishmar's turn arrives. Why, then, does Rashi reject the first explanation, when the other two options are still valid?
</p><p>
Indeed, in the following comment of Rashi (DH u'Vechoro), Rashi discusses why one may not give an unblemished Bechor to a Kohen with the stipulation that he return the hide and meat to the owner. It seems that Rashi <i>does</i> accept the first option as valid. Why, then, does Rashi reject the first explanation on the grounds that stipulating that the Kohen return the hide and meat to the owner is not a valid option?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The Mishnah in Bechoros (32b) records a dispute between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel about whether a non-Kohen is permitted to eat the meat of a Bechor. Beis Hillel maintains that not only may a Zar eat it, but even a Nochri may eat it. Beis Shamai maintains that only a Kohen may eat it. Rashi's statement here that a Bechor may be eaten only by Kohanim clearly follows the opinion of Beis Shamai.
</p><p>
Why, though, does Rashi explain the Mishnah only according to Beis Shamai and not according to Beis Hillel? The answer is that according to the first explanation of Rashi, the Mishnah can be understood <i>only</i> according to the view of Beis Shamai, because only Beis Shamai requires that the Safek Kohen wait for the Bechor to develop a blemish. According to Beis Hillel, the Safek Kohen may eat the Bechor himself before it has a blemish; he could give it to a Kohen with the stipulation that the Kohen give him back the meat. The Mishnah must be following Beis Shamai's opinion that only a Kohen may eat the Bechor, and thus the only way for the Safek Kohen to eat the meat is by waiting for the Bechor to develop a blemish.
</p><p>
When Rashi, in his second explanation, advises that the Safek Kohen should not give the Bechor to a Kohen because the Kohen will keep it for himself and not let the Safek Kohen eat it, he means that according to the second explanation the Mishnah may follow the view of Beis Hillel who <i>permits</i> a non-Kohen to eat the Bechor. In his next comment (DH u'Vechoro), Rashi returns to his first explanation. Since the first explanation follows the view of Beis Shamai, Rashi writes that a non-Kohen may not eat the Bechor.
</p><p>
Further evidence that Rashi (DH u'Vechoro) returns to his first explanation is his repetition of his comment that the Safek Kohen may stipulate that the hide and meat of the Korban be returned to him, an option which the second explanation does not accept.
</p><p>
(b) From Rashi's words (in DH u'Vechoro) it is evident that he follows the first explanation, and that is why he mentions the possibility of stipulating with the Kohen that the hide and meat be returned (as mentioned in (a) above). The second explanation, however, does not permit such a stipulation, because a Safek Kohen may not appoint a Kohen as a Shali'ach to bring his Korban. Why, though, can he not give it to one of the Kohanim in the present Mishmar with a stipulation that the Kohen return to him the hide and the meat?
</p><p>
The answer seems to be that if the Safek Kohen gives the animal to a Kohen to offer on his behalf, that Kohen (unless appointed as a Shali'ach) is entitled to assert his claim to the animal and keep it for himself (by invoking the principle of 'ha'Motzi me'Chavero Alav ha'Re'ayah'). Consequently, if the Kohen in the present Mishmar is not the Safek Kohen's Shali'ach, once he receives the Korban he does not have to return anything to the Safek Kohen, because he may claim that the person is a Zar and not a Kohen. This is Rashi's intention when he says that 'the Kohen who offers the Bechor will keep the meat for himself.'
</p><p>
For the same reason, the Safek Kohen does not have the option to wait for, and give his Korban to, the Mishmar of his choice. Let us first analyze this option. This option does not seem to be unique to a Safek Kohen. Any Zar should be able to wait for the arrival a specific Mishmar to which to give his Korban, as long as he is careful not to delay the giving of the Korban for too long and transgress the prohibition of Bal Te'acher. What is unique about the Safek Kohen in this regard? (<b>RASHASH</b>)
</p><p>
Apparently, a Zar may <i>not</i> wait to give his Korban to the Mishmar of his choice. Once the Korban has already been designated, the Gizbar (treasurer) of the Beis ha'Mikdash has the authority to requisition it from the owner and bring it to the Beis ha'Mikdash to be offered. In contrast, the Safek Kohen may object to the Gizbar, in which case the Gizbar is not entitled to take the Korban from him. The Safek Kohen may claim that he is a Kohen and that he has appointed a Kohen from another Mishmar to serve as his Shali'ach to bring the Korban. Hence, the Gizbar is not empowered to take possession of the Korban for the present Mishmar.
</p><p>
If, however, the Safek Kohen cannot appoint a Shali'ach to bring his Korban, the Kohanim of a later Mishmar have no more of a right to bring his Korban than the Kohanim of the present Mishmar. Hence, the Gizbar may requisition the Korban for the Beis ha'Mikdash immediately. The Safek Kohen can prevent the Gizbar from taking his Korban only if he is able to appoint a Kohen as his <i>Shali'ach</i>. This is why Rashi's second explanation rejects the assertion that the Safek Kohen may defer giving the Korban to the Gizbar until the arrival of the Mishmar of his choice. (M. Kornfeld)
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  They may not become Tamei Mes. They cannot marry Kosher 
          or Pasul women.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  If they grew up and freed each other, the following laws 
          apply to each:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> He marries a woman fit for a Kohen;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> He may not become Tamei. If he did, he is not 
               lashed;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> He may not eat Terumah. If he ate, he does not pay 
               the principal, nor an added fifth;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> He does not receive a share of Terumah at the 
               granaries. He sells Terumah that he separates from 
               his own produce, and keeps the money;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b></b> He does not get a share of Kodshim of the Mikdash. 
               If he comes to offer a Korban, we do not seize it 
               from him;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b></b> He is exempt from giving Matanos (the foreleg, jaw 
               and stomach of a Chulin animal);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b></b> His firstborn animals graze until they get a 
               blemish;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b></b> We put on him the stringencies of a Kohen and of a 
               Yisrael.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara) Question:</font></b> Why are the definite children called 
          Kesherim? The ones who are mixed are not illegitimate!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Papa):</font></b> Indeed, it should say 'the definite 
          children.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If the daughter-in-law's son died, one Safek 
          does Chalitzah, and the other does Yibum.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b></b>  Chalitzah must be done before Yibum. A Safek cannot do 
          Yibum first, lest he is from the mother-in-law, and they 
          transgress Yevamah l'Shuk (a Shomeres Yavam having Bi'ah 
          with a stranger).
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>A 'KOHEN' WHO BECAME MIXED UP WITH A SLAVE</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If a Kohen's son became mixed up ...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Obviously, they only get Echad (one share) at 
          the granaries!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> It should say, they get a share only if they are 
          k'Echad' (together). This is like the opinion that we 
          distribute Terumah to a slave only if his master is with 
          him:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Yehudah):</font></b> We distribute Terumah to a 
               slave only if his master is with him;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Yosi says, he can say, if I am a Kohen, give for 
               my sake. If I am a slave, give me for my master.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> In R. Yehudah's area, receiving Terumah was grounds 
               to establish a person to have proper lineage (for 
               marriage). In R. Yosi's area, it was not.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa - R. Elazar bar Tzadok):</font></b> I only testified once, 
          and they established a slave as a Kohen based on my 
          testimony.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> This cannot be! Hash-m does not allow a pitfall 
          to come even through the animals of Tzadikim, all the 
          more so, through Tzadikim themselves!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Correction:</font></b> Rather, they sought to establish a slave as a 
          Kohen based on his testimony;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> He saw a man receive Terumah in R. Yosi's region, 
               and testified in R. Yehudah's region.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> There are 10 categories to whom we do not 
          distribute Terumah at the granaries: a deaf person, 
          lunatic or minor; a Tumtum or Androginus; a slave or 
          woman; an Arel or Tamei; and a Kohen married to a Pesulah 
          (a woman forbidden to him).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> In every case we send to their houses, except for a 
               Tamei or a Kohen married to a Pesulah.
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>PEOPLE WHO DO NOT RECEIVE 'TERUMAH' AT THE GRANARIES</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> We understand why almost all of these do not 
          receive:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> A deaf person, lunatic or minor lacks understanding;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> A Tumtum or Androginus is a creation unto himself 
               (it disgrace Terumah to give to him);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> If a slave would receive, people might assume that 
               he has proper lineage (for marriage);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> An Arel or Tamei is repulsive;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b></b> A Kohen married to a Pesulah is fined;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b></b> But why doesn't a woman receive?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (Rav Papa or Rav Huna brei d'Rav Yehoshua):</font></b> We 
          are concerned lest she continue to receive after she is 
          divorced.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2 (The other of Rav Papa and Rav Huna):</font></b> We are 
          concerned lest she come to be secluded with a man.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is the practical difference between these 
          reasons?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> They argue about a place close to the city 
          (people would know if she was divorced) where people are 
          not commonly found (seclusion is a problem);
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> They argue about a place far from the city 
          (people would not know if she was divorced) where people 
          are common (seclusion is not a problem).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> In every case we send Terumah to their houses, 
          except for a Tamei or a Kohen who married a Pesulah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b></b>  We do send to an Arel.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If this is because he is Anus (he cannot 
          circumcise himself due to danger, e.g. his brothers died 
          through Milah), the same applies to a Tamei!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> An Arel is totally blameless. A Tamei could have 
          been more careful.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> A slave or woman does not receive Terumah at 
          the granaries. In a place where they receive, we give 
          first to the woman, and send her away.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What does this mean (we said that they do not 
          receive!)?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Where Ma'aser Oni is distributed, we give to a 
          woman first, because of disgrace.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rava):</font></b> At first, when a man and a woman would come 
               for judgment, I would hear the man's case first, 
               because he is obligated in (all) Mitzvos.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Now that I heard the above law, I hear the woman's 
               case first, because of disgrace.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>AFTER THEY FREE EACH OTHER</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> When they grow up ...(if they freed each other 
<br>          ...)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Why is this a matter of choice? If they do not 
          free each other, they cannot marry a slave or a Bas 
          Yisrael!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rava):</font></b> The Mishnah should say that we force them 
          to free each other.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> They have the stringencies ...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What does this teach?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Papa):</font></b> When one of them brings a Minchah 
          (flour offering), a Kometz (handful) is offered on the 
          Mizbe'ach like a Yisrael's Minchah, and the Shirayim 
          (remainder) are not eaten, like a Kohen's Minchah;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The handful is offered by itself, and the Shirayim 
               by themselves.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> (If he is a Yisrael, the remainder is 
          permitted.) Whenever part of a Korban was offered and 
          this permits the rest, a Lav forbids burning the Shirayim 
          on the Mizbe'ach!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (R. Yehudah brei d'R. Shimon ben Pazi):</font></b> He 
          burns it as if it was wood, like R. Elazar taught:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Elazar):</font></b> '(You may not burn permitted 
               Shirayim) l'Re'ach Nicho'ach' (l'Shem Korban), but 
               you can burn as if it were wood.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b></b>  This is only according to R. Elazar. According to 
          Chachamim, how can we answer?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> We do like R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon):</font></b> The Kometz is 
               offered by itself, and the Shirayim are scattered in 
               the place where ashes from the Mizbe'ach are placed.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Even Chachamim argue with R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon 
               only regarding a Kohen's Chatas, since it can be 
               offered. Here, they admit.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>A CHILD WHO MAY BE FROM THE FIRST OR SECOND HUSBAND</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If a woman remarried without waiting three 
          months and gave birth (nine months after leaving her 
          first husband), we do not know if the baby was born after 
          nine months from the first husband; or after seven months 
          from the second husband;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If she had (definite) sons from both husbands, (if the 
          Safek dies) they do Chalitzah, not Yibum. If a definite 
          son dies, the Safek does Chalitzah, not Yibum.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) A KOHEN IN DOUBT ABOUT THE IDENTITY OF HIS FATHER</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> Shmuel maintains that a Gezeirah d'Rabanan prohibits a Kohen who does not know the identity of his father from serving in the Beis ha'Mikdash, even though he knows that the man who fathered him was a Kohen. Although he is a valid Kohen and has the laws of Kohen apply to him, he may not perform the Avodah in the Beis ha'Mikdash. 
</p><p>
The Gemara explains that the Gezeirah d'Rabanan applies only when the Kohen's doubt is due to the fact that his mother was involved in promiscuous relations. The Gezeirah does not apply when the doubt about his father's identity arose for reasons unrelated to promiscuity. For example, his mother was married to one Kohen who died, and she married another Kohen before waiting three months and gave birth to a son seven months later. The son is a 'Safek Ben Tish'ah la'Rishon, Safek Ben Shiv'ah la'Sheni' -- there is a doubt whether his father was the first Kohen or the second Kohen. In such a case, he is permitted to perform the Avodah.
</p><p>
The Gemara attempts to disprove Shmuel's assertion that the Rabanan prohibited a Kohen from serving in the Beis ha'Mikdash when he is in doubt about the identity of his father even when that doubt arose as a result of his mother's promiscuity. The Gemara cites the Mishnah (100a) which states that a Kohen who is a 'Safek Ben Tish'ah la'Rishon, Safek Ben Shiv'ah la'Sheni' may not become Tamei for either of his two possible fathers upon their deaths. The Gemara asks, why does the Mishnah need to prohibit him from becoming Tamei for the first possible father? In the case of a woman who married a second Kohen after the death of her first husband who was a Kohen, there is no need to teach that the son may not become Tamei for his mother's first husband (who might be his father) -- he was not yet born at the time his father died! If the Mishnah refers to a case in which the woman married a second Kohen after her first husband <i>divorced</i> her, the son should be allowed to become Tamei for the first man regardless of who his actual father is: if he is the son of the first man, he may become Tamei for him because he is his real father, for whom a Kohen is allowed to become Tamei. If he is the son of the second man, he has the status of a Chalal (born from a prohibited union between a Kohen and a divorcee), and a Chalal is permitted to become Tamei!
</p><p>
The Gemara asserts, therefore, that the doubt about the identity of the Kohen's father must be due to his mother's promiscuity. The first Kohen was not married to her at all and thus he did not have to divorce her, and he is still alive when she marries the second Kohen. The son does not know who his true father is. Accordingly, the Mishnah teaches that even though the son does not know who his father is because of his mother's promiscuity, he still may serve in the Beis ha'Mikdash.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> (DH Ela Lav b'Znus) writes that when the Gemara says that she was involved in illicit relations, it means that she was promiscuous with <i>both</i> the first Kohen and the second Kohen.
</p><p>
Why does Rashi write that <i>both</i> men lived illicitly with the woman? It suffices to say that she was promiscuous with only the first Kohen, and that she married the second Kohen! As long as she was not married to the first Kohen she is not a divorcee, and her child, if his father is the second Kohen, is not a Chalal. (<b>MAHARSHA</b>)
</p><p>
In fact, the Mishnah clearly states that after she lived with the first Kohen, 'she married [another Kohen] and gave birth.' According to Rashi's explanation, the term 'she married' in the Mishnah is imprecise and really means that she had illicit relations with him. Why does Rashi alter the straightforward meaning of the Mishnah?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>MAHARSHA</b> explains that Rashi's words are imprecise. He means that the significant point is that the woman's relationship with the first Kohen was one of promiscuity and not marriage. Whether her relationship with the second Kohen was one of promiscuity or one of marriage is not relevant.
</p><p>
This answer is difficult to accept. Why does Rashi write that she had illicit relations with both men if it is not necessary to explain the Gemara that way? (<b>YASHRESH YAKOV</b>)
</p><p>
(b) The <b>BEIS SHMUEL</b> (EH 3:16) suggests that Rashi understands that when the Gemara says that the Gezeirah d'Rabanan (according to Shmuel) applies only in a case in which the son is in doubt about his father's identity because of his mother's promiscuity, it means that the mother was promiscuous with <i>both</i> Kohanim (with all of the possible men who might be his father). If she was promiscuous with only one Kohen, the Gezeirah does not disqualify the son from performing the Avodah, because one of the possible fathers was indeed married to her.
</p><p>
However, the Beis Shmuel himself questions this approach. If the Gezeirah disqualifies the son from Avodah only when his mother had illicit relations with all possible fathers, why does the Gemara not give a simple answer for its question on Shmuel: the second Kohen was married to her and did not have illicit relations with her? In that case, since one of the possible fathers was married to her the Gezeirah should not apply! It must be that the Gezeirah applies even when only one of the possible fathers had illicit relations with her.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>CHELKAS MECHOKEK</b> (EH 3:12) explains that Rashi's intention is to address a different question. If the first Kohen had illicit relations with her and the second Kohen married her, then the rule of 'Rov Be'ilos Achar ha'Ba'al' (see 69b) should apply. That rule states that the child was most likely fathered by the man to whom she was married, and not by the man with whom she had illicit relations.
</p><p>
This rule normally applies to a case in which a woman committed adultery while married and was then found to be pregnant. The rule of 'Rov Be'ilos Achar ha'Ba'al' states that the child is assumed to be her husband's child and was not conceived through adulterous act.
</p><p>
However, the Acharonim (Beis Shmuel and others) point out that this rule applies only when the woman had illicit relations while she was married. In this case, however, she was promiscuous with the first Kohen <i>before</i> she was married to the second Kohen, and thus there is no more reason to assume that the child was fathered by the second Kohen (to whom she is now married) than by the first Kohen (with whom she was promiscuous). (Moreover, the only possibility that the child's father is the woman's husband (the second Kohen) is that he was conceived on the very first day of the marriage, since he was born after seven months of pregnancy. This is an unlikely possibility which certainly counteracts the application of the rule 'Rov Be'ilos Achar ha'Ba'al.')
</p><p>
(d) The <b>YASHRESH YAKOV</b> and <b>ARUCH LA'NER</b> explain that Rashi's intention is to address a different question. When a woman has illicit relations, she is careful to be 'Mis'hapeches' (to turn herself over) to avoid pregnancy (35a; see also Rashi to 69b, DH Aval b'Znus). Since it is assumed that she was 'Mis'hapeches' after her act of Z'nus with the first Kohen, and since she married the second Kohen, there are grounds to assume that the second Kohen is the true father of the child.
</p><p>
Why, then, is there any doubt? It must be that she was promiscuous with <i>both</i> men. The fact that she became pregnant shows that she was not 'Mis'hapeches,' and thus there is an equal possibility that either Kohen is his father.
</p><p>
(Rashi may have derived this point from the fact that the Gemara does not give the answer which the Beis Shmuel suggests, that perhaps Shmuel's Gezeirah applies only when the mother had illicit relations with both potential fathers, while the Mishnah refers to a case in which the mother had illicit relations with only the first potential father. The fact that the Gemara does not offer this answer indicates that when only one of the potential fathers had illicit relations and not the other, the child's paternity indeed is attributed to the second father, and there is no doubt about his lineage. Therefore, this must not be the case which the Mishnah discusses.)
</p><p>
(e) <b>RAV YAAKOV</b> D. HOMNICK proposes an original explanation for the words of Rashi.
</p><p>
He first questions the Gemara's distinction between the case of a doubt that arose due to the mother's promiscuity and a doubt that arose due to the mother's remarrying within three months of her first marriage. Why does the Gemara assert that the Gezeirah d'Rabanan that prohibits the Kohen from serving in the Beis ha'Mikdash applies only when the doubt about the identity of his father arose due to the mother's promiscuity, but not when the doubt arose due to the mother's marriage to a second Kohen within three months of her first marriage? In both cases, the Kohen's patrilineal lineage is in question, and the Gemara derives from a verse that a Kohen must have clarity and certainty about his patrilineal lineage -- 'Zar'o Meyuchas Acharav.' Whether the mother remarried too early or whether she was promiscuous, the Kohen has a doubt about who his father is and thus the requirement for 'Zar'o Meyuchas Acharav' is not fulfilled!
</p><p>
The answer is that it is true that the Rabanan enacted that the Kohen may not serve in the Beis ha'Mikdash unless he has definite knowledge about his patrilineally descent. However, their enactment was made not on the Kohen who was born (and who has a doubt about the identity of his father), but on the Kohen who <i>bore</i> him. That is, the Rabanan imposed a penalty on the Kohen who did an act that created a doubt about the lineage of his offspring, and they gave his offspring the status of a Chalal d'Rabanan. Accordingly, they imposed the penalty only on a Kohen who did an improper act -- an act of promiscuity, but not on a Kohen who did nothing wrong. Hence, if the second Kohen was <i>married</i> to the woman, the Gezeirah d'Rabanan does not apply to him (i.e. to disqualify his offspring) since he did nothing wrong. (Even though he married her before three months had passed from the time of her first marriage, he is not penalized for this since the very act of marriage was an act of a Mitzvah.)
</p><p>
Moreover, the first Kohen with whom the woman lived out of wedlock did nothing to create a doubt about the lineage of his offspring. Even if their illicit union led to the birth of a son, that son is a Kohen who knows exactly who his father is. Rather, the Rabanan's penalty is solely due to the improper conduct of the <i>second</i> Kohen who lived with the woman illicitly (before three months had passed from the time she lived with the first Kohen). 
</p><p>
Therefore, there is no basis for the suggestion that the Gezeirah d'Rabanan should apply in a case in which the woman lived illicitly with the first Kohen but married the second. It applies <i>specifically</i> in a case in which the woman was promiscuous with <i>both</i> Kohanim, as Rashi writes.
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  If he had brothers from both possible fathers (and not 
          from his mother), he may do Chalitzah or Yibum to their 
          widows; if he died, a brother from one possible father 
          does Chalitzah, and a brother from the other possible 
          father may do Yibum.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  If one possible father was a Yisrael and the other was a 
          Kohen, the Safek has the following restrictions:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> He marries a woman fit for a Kohen;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> He may not become Tamei. If he did, he is not 
               lashed;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> He may not eat Terumah. If he ate, he does not pay 
               the principal, nor an added fifth;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> He does not receive a share of Terumah at the 
               granaries. He sells Terumah that he separates from 
               his own produce, and keeps the money;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b></b> He does not get a share of Kodshim of the Mikdash. 
               If he comes to offer a Korban, we do not seize it 
               from him;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b></b> He is exempt from giving Matanos (the foreleg, jaw 
               and stomach of a Chulin animal);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b></b> His firstborn animals graze until they get a 
               blemish;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b></b> We put on him the stringencies of a Kohen and of a 
               Yisrael.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b></b>  If both possible fathers are Kohanim, he is an Onen when 
          either of them dies, and they are Onenim when he dies;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b></b>  He does not become Tamei to engage in burying them, and 
          they do not become Tamei to engage in burying him. He 
          does not inherit them, but they inherit him. He is exempt 
          if he hits or curses either of them;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  He goes to the Mikdash at the time when each of them goes 
          to serve, but he does not receive a portion of the 
          Korbanos;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If they are from the same Mishmar (division) of 
               Kohanim, he receives a portion.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara):</font></b> Chalitzah must be done before Yibum. One may 
          not do Yibum first, lest he is from the other father, and 
          they transgress Yevamah l'Shuk.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>4) </font></b><font color='blue'>A 'KOHEN' MUST HAVE KNOWN LINEAGE</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Shmuel):</font></b> If 10 Kohanim were together and one separated 
          and had Bi'ah with a woman, the resulting child is a 
          Shtuki (silenced).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Regarding what is the child a Shtuki?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> He need not teach that he is Shtuki (denied) from 
               inheriting his father's property. This is obvious, 
               for we do not know which is his father!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Rather, we silence him from Kehunah. 'To him and 
          his sons after him' - a Kohen must know his father, and 
          this child does not.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rav Papa):</font></b> How will you expound what Hash-m 
          said to Avraham - '(Lihyos Lecha lEilokim) and to your 
          children after you'?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Hash-m warned him not to marry a Nochri or slave, 
          lest his seed follow her.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Beraisa):</font></b> (If a woman did Yibum within three 
          months (of the death) and gave birth nine months,) the 
          child is fitting to be a Kohen Gadol.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The child does know which is his father!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The need to be able to trace lineage is only 
          mid'Rabanan. The verse is only an Asmachta. Chachamim 
          decreed only about Zenus, not regarding marriage.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Chachamim did not decree about Zenus!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> If a woman remarried without waiting 
               three months and gave birth...
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> How did she leave her first husband?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #1:</font></b> He died.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection (Seifa):</font></b> The Safek is an Onen when they 
               (his possible fathers) die, and they are Onenim when 
               he dies.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  Granted, the son is an Onen when the second 
                    husband dies, and when the bones of the first 
                    husband are gathered.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> But how can <i>they</i> be Onenim when the Safek 
                    dies? The first husband died before the Safek 
                    was born!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #2:</font></b> Rather, the first husband divorced her. 
               She did not wait three months after the Get.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection (Seifa):</font></b> He may not become Tamei to engage 
               in burying them, and they may not become Tamei to 
               engage in burying him.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  Granted, they cannot become Tamei to bury him, 
                    for each is in doubt whether or not this is his 
                    son.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> Granted, the son can't become Tamei for the 
                    second husband. Perhaps it is not his father!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b></b>But why can't the son become Tamei for the 
                    first husband? If it is his father, this is a 
                    Mitzvah. If it is not his father, the son is a 
                    Chalal (his mother was divorced), so he may 
                    become Tamei!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>7.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer #3:</font></b> Rather, the first man never married his 
               mother, they just had Zenus. The Mishnah says, she 
               did not wait three months after Ba'alah (her 
               husband). It means, after Bo'alah (the man who had 
               Bi'ah with her).
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>8.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Summation of question (against Shmuel - Seifa):</font></b> The 
               son goes to the Mikdash with the Mishmar of each 
               possible father.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1 (and Answer #4 to Question (2) - Rav Shemaya):</font></b> 
          His mother left her first husband through Mi'un (so she 
          was permitted to remarry a Kohen).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If she did Mi'un, she could not give birth 
          (from her first husband, since she was a minor)!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Bivi - Beraisa):</font></b> Three women use a 
               contraceptive wad to prevent pregnancy: a minor, a 
               pregnant woman, and a nursing woman. (Rashi - they 
               may use a wad at the time of Bi'ah; Tosfos - they 
               must use a wad after Bi'ah.)
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  A minor does so, lest she get pregnant and die;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> A pregnant woman does so lest the fetus get 
                    mashed;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>iii. </font></b></b>A nursing woman does so lest pregnancy force 
                    her to wean her baby, and it will die.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Meir says, a girl between 11 and 12 years uses a 
               wad. If she is younger or older, she has Bi'ah 
               normally.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Chachamim say, at any age she has normal Bi'ah. 
               Shamayim will have mercy on her - 'Hash-m guards the 
               simple.'
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The case is, her Kidushin was on condition, and 
          it was not fulfilled.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> If a married woman was Mezanah and 
               'She was not grabbed', she is forbidden. Had she 
               been forced, she would be permitted. There is a case 
               in which even though she was not forced, she is 
               permitted, i.e. mistaken Kidushin.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Even if she has a child, she may do Mi'un and leave 
               her husband.
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>A SON WHO DOES NOT KNOW WHICH IS HIS FATHER</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If both of them were Kohanim...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa):</font></b> If the son wounded or cursed one possible 
          father and then the other, or both at once, he is killed;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  R. Yehudah says, if he wounded or cursed both at once, he 
          is killed. If not, he is exempt.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Contradiction (Beraisa - R. Yehudah):</font></b> If he wounded or 
          cursed them at once, he is exempt.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Tana'im argue about R. Yehudah's opinion.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is the reason for the opinion that 
          exempts?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (R. Chanina):</font></b> The Torah discusses cursing Hash-m, 
          and cursing a parent. Just like one is liable for cursing 
          Hash-m alone, one is liable for cursing one parent alone 
          (and this is impossible here);
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> We equate wounding to cursing.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> He goes to the Mikdash with the Mishmar of 
          each father (but does not get a share of Kodshim).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> Since he does not get a share, why does he go?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> This is no question. He goes to do a Mitzvah!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Correction:</font></b> Rather, why does it say 'he goes up (i.e. he 
          must)', as opposed to '<i>if</i> he went up...'?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (R. Acha bar Chanina):</font></b> He must go up to avoid 
          blemishing the family.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> If both fathers are in the same Mishmar...
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> When they are from different Mishmaros he 
          receives no share, since each Mishmar can dispel him by 
          saying '(perhaps) you are from the other Mishmar'. Also 
          when they are from the same Mishmar, each Beis Av can 
          dispel him! (Each Mishmar is divided into six Batei Av; 
          each serves a different day.)
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Rav Papa):</font></b> If the fathers are from the same 
          Mishmar and Beis Av, he receives one portion.
<br>
<br><center><font color='ff0000' size='+1'><b>***<b>PEREK MITZVAS CHALITZAH</b>***
</b></font></center><p><b>
<br><b></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHAT MAKES A VALID 'CHALITZAH'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Mishnah):</font></b> The Mitzvah of Chalitzah is with three judges, 
          even if all are commoners;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b></b>  If Chalitzah was done with a Min'al (a soft leather 
          shoe), it is Kesherah. If it was done with Anpilya (a 
          slipper or sock), it is invalid. If it was done with a 
          sandal that has a heel, it is Kesherah; if it has no 
          heel, it is invalid;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b></b>  From the knee and below, it is Kesherah; from the knee 
          and above, it is invalid;
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  If he did Chalitzah with a sandal which is not his, or a 
          sandal of idolatry, or of wood, or a left sandal on his 
          right foot, it is Kesherah. If the sandal was too big to 
          walk with, or so small that it does not cover the 
          majority if his foot, it is Kesherah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Gemara) Question:</font></b> Since three commoners suffice, why 
          does the Mishnah say 'judges'?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> The Mishnah teaches that we require three who can 
          help the Yavam and Yevamah to recite the proper verses, 
          like judges can.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  Our Mishnah teaches like the following Beraisa:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa):</font></b> The Mitzvah of Chalitzah is with three 
               who can help them recite the verses, like judges;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Yehudah says, it is with five.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is the source of the first Tana?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer (Beraisa):</font></b> 'Zekenim' must be at least two. A Beis 
          Din never has an even number, so we add one.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Yehudah says, it says 'Zekenim' twice, making 
               four. To avoid an even number, we add one.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What does the first Tana learn from the extra 
          occurrence of 'Zekenim'?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> This teaches that even commoners may be used.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Yehudah learns this from the fact that it says 
               'l'Einei (ha'Zekenim)'.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> We learned that 'l'Einei' excludes blind people. If 
               we required judges, we would not need a verse to 
               exclude blind people!
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yosef):</font></b> Just like Beis Din must be clean 
                    in righteousness, they must be clean from any 
                    blemish - 'You are totally beautiful, my 
                    beloved; there is no blemish in you.'
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) HITTING TWO PEOPLE AT THE SAME TIME</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara cites a Beraisa which states that when a person who is a 'Safek Ben Tish'ah la'Rishon, Safek Ben Shiv'ah la'Sheni' (he is unsure which of two men is his real father) hits both possible fathers at once, he is liable for punishment. If he hits one after the other, his liability depends on the dispute among Tana'im about whether 'Hasra'as Safek' is considered a proper Hasra'ah.
</p><p>
In what way does the person hit both possible fathers at the same moment? <b>RASHI</b> (DH b'Vas Achas) explains that he takes a long stick, swings it, and hits both at the same time.
</p><p>
However, <b>RASHI</b> in Chulin (82b) suggests a simpler explanation for how the son hits both possible fathers at the same time. He hits one of the men with one hand and, simultaneously, the other man with his other hand.
</p><p>
<b>RASHI</b> in Makos (16a) offers an even simpler explanation. He hits both possible fathers in the normal manner (with his dominant hand, one after the other), but he does so 'Toch Kedei Dibur' -- within a very short amount of time, so that the Hasra'ah serves to make him liable for both beatings.
</p><p>
Why does Rashi give three different explanations for how a person can hit two men at the same time ('b'Vas Achas')? What advantage does each explanation have over the other? (See <b>NEHOR SHRAGA</b>.)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) Rashi apparently is bothered by a different problem with each explanation, and in the different Sugyos he chooses to explain 'b'Vas Achas' in different ways in order to avoid the problems with the other two ways of explaining it. Since each explanation has its own advantage, in each Sugya Rashi chooses the explanation which he feels is the best explanation in the context of that Sugya. The advantages of each approach may be as follows:
</p><p>
1. The simplest explanation is that the child hits both men 'Toch Kedei Dibur.' Rashi's basis for this explanation is the law that the Hasra'ah does not need to be given immediately before the act of the transgression, but it may be given a few seconds before the transgression as long as it is within 'Toch Kedei Dibur' of the transgression.
</p><p>
Rashi here in Yevamos and in Chulin rejects that explanation because he understands that the Hasra'ah works 'Toch Kedei Dibur' only when a single act is done within a few seconds of the Hasra'ah. To make the person liable for a second act, a second Hasra'ah is necessary, even though that second act is also done 'Toch Kedei Dibur.' For this reason, Rashi here and in Chulin does not explain that 'b'Vas Achas' means that both beatings occurred within 'Toch Kedei Dibur.'
</p><p>
(A source for this understanding may be the Gemara in Makos 20b, where the Gemara writes that if a person pulls out his hair in mourning (Kore'ach Korchah) five times, one after the other, with only a single Hasra'ah before all five acts, he is liable for only one set of Malkus. The Gemara implies that even if all of the acts were done 'Toch Kedei Dibur,' only one set of Malkus is administered. See Tosfos there, and Insights to Nazir 38:2.)
</p><p>
2. The reason why Rashi here explains that 'b'Vas Achas' means that the son uses one stick to hit both men at the same time, and he does not explain that the son uses both of his hands to hit both men at the same time, is as follows. The use of both hands would be considered <i>two</i> different actions. Even if those two actions would occur simultaneously, the Hasra'ah would apply only to one of them. For two actions, two Hasra'os are necessary.
</p><p>
Alternatively, Rashi maintains 'Iy Efshar l'Tzamtzem' -- it is not possible for two events to occur at exactly the same time. When the son hits the two men with his two hands, one action necessarily precedes the other, and thus he is not liable for hitting them 'b'Vas Achas.' When he hits them both with a single swing of a stick, however, he performs one action, and thus the Hasra'ah is able to make him liable for two different results of a single action.
</p><p>
3. Rashi in Chulin explains that the son hits the two men with his two hands. Why does Rashi there not explain that he hits them both with one stick? Rashi there chooses to give the simpler case, in which he hits them with two different hands rather than with one stick. 
</p><p>
Rashi in Chulin maintains that there is no way to explain the case according to the opinion that maintains 'Iy Efshar l'Tzamtzem.' If one cannot do two acts at exactly the same moment, even hitting two people with a single stick will not cause the Hasra'ah to apply to both hits, since one of the two people inevitably was hit before the other. The fact that the two hits came from a single swing is not sufficient reason for the Hasra'ah to apply to both hits, according to Rashi in Chulin; the fact that they were brought about by the same <i>swing</i> does not make them into a single action. Two hits are always called two actions. Since the only way to understand the Beraisa which discusses hitting both men at the same time is to say that the hits occur simultaneously, the Beraisa must maintain 'Efshar l'Tzamtzem.' 
</p><p>
(The underlying difference in opinion expressed by Rashi in Chulin and by Rashi in Yevamos might involve whether Hasra'ah is defined as a warning that the person not do a particular <i>action</i> (Rashi in Yevamos), or as a warning that the person not do a particular <i>transgression</i> (Rashi in Chulin). According to the former definition, a single Hasra'ah can apply to two transgressions that stem from a single action, while according to the latter definition it cannot.) (See also Insights to Chulin 82:5.)
</p><p>
(b) <b>RAV YAAKOV</b> D. HOMNICK offers a different approach to understanding the words of Rashi. 
</p><p>
The Gemara in Chulin (82b) discusses a case in which a person eats a k'Zayis of each Gid ha'Nasheh (right and left) of an animal. Rebbi Yehudah, who maintains that only one of the two Gidim is forbidden, maintains that he is punished with one set of Malkus and not two. The Gemara asks that if the transgressor was warned with a separate Hasra'ah before he ate each Gid ha'Nasheh, Rebbi Yehudah should exempt him from punishment entirely, because Rebbi Yehudah maintains that Hasra'as Safek is not a valid Hasra'ah (and when each Hasra'ah was given, there was a doubt whether the Gid ha'Nasheh that the person was about to eat was the forbidden one). The Gemara concludes that only one Hasra'ah was given, immediately before the person ate both Gidim. Since one of the two Gidim was definitely forbidden, the Hasra'ah is considered a Hasra'as Vadai.
</p><p>
The Gemara's objective there is to prove that when a person is warned with a single Hasra'ah before he performs two acts, one of which is certainly forbidden, he is liable for punishment even though the warning did not specify which of the acts was forbidden. Why, though, is such a Hasra'ah valid, if the witnesses who give the warning do not know which act is the forbidden one? It must be that whether or not a Hasra'ah is a Hasra'as Safek depends not on what the <i>witnesses</i> know, but rather on what the <i>wrongdoer</i> knows. That is, Hasra'as Safek exists only when the wrongdoer can claim -- after he received the Hasra'ah and committed the act -- that he did not know for certain that his act was forbidden. When, however, he cannot make such a claim (because at least one of his two acts clearly constitutes a transgression), the Hasra'ah is not a Hasra'as Safek, even though the witnesses do not know exactly which act is the forbidden one.
</p><p>
Since this is the Chidush of the Gemara there, the case (of a son who hits two men, one of whom is his father) which the Gemara cites to prove that such a Hasra'ah is not considered a Hasra'as Safek must involve a single Hasra'ah given before the person performs <i>two</i> acts, one of which is definitely a transgression. Accordingly, Rashi there explains that the case of the son who hits the two men refers specifically to when he performs <i>two acts</i> of hitting.
</p><p>
This is also the view of the Gemara in Makos, in which Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish argue whether Hasra'as Safek is a valid Hasra'ah. The Gemara cites support for the view of Reish Lakish (who maintains that Hasra'as Safek is not a valid Hasra'ah) from the Beraisa in which Rebbi Yehudah says that one who hits his two doubtful fathers is punished only when he hits them 'b'Vas Achas,' in which case the Hasra'ah is a Hasra'as Vadai and is valid.
</p><p>
The Gemara there says that Reish Lakish is consistent with his view that Hasra'as Safek is not a valid Hasra'ah when he rules 'Kiyemo v'Lo v'Kiyemo.' This means that the punishment of Malkus administered for the transgression of a Lav ha'Nitak l'Aseh (a Lav for which the Torah prescribes a Mitzvas Aseh for the sinner to perform to correct the effects of the Lav) is contingent upon whether the sinner subsequently fulfills ('Kiyemo') the Mitzvas Aseh associated with the Lav or does not fulfill it ('Lo Kiyemo'). That is, at the moment the person committed the transgression he became liable for Malkus, but he is given the opportunity to perform a Mitzvas Aseh in place of receiving Malkus. Accordingly, the Hasra'ah he received before the transgression was a Hasra'as Vadai (because he definitely sinned and definitely became liable for Malkus). The Gemara there apparently maintains, like the Gemara in Chulin, that even though the witnesses who give the Hasra'ah are in doubt whether or not he will subsequently fulfill the Aseh and exempt himself from Malkus, the Hasra'ah is measured according to what the <i>sinner</i> knows. Since the sinner knew that he was doing an act that would make him liable for Malkus if he would opt not to fulfill the Aseh, it is considered a Hasra'as Vadai.
</p><p>
Accordingly, Rashi there explains that the son hit the two men with <i>two</i> acts, because the Gemara there maintains that Hasra'as Safek is defined as a lack of knowledge on the part of the sinner, and not a lack of knowledge on the part of the witnesses. Hence, when a person performs two acts of hitting with one Hasra'ah, the Hasra'ah is considered a Hasra'as Vadai and he is liable, since one of his acts definitely constituted a transgression, even though the witnesses did not know which one.
</p><p>
In contrast, the Gemara here in Yevamos quotes a Beraisa which maintains that Rebbi Yehudah <i>exempts</i> the son who hits the two men 'b'Vas Achas.' The Gemara asks what his reason is for exempting the son in this case (Rashi explains that the Gemara understands that the Hasra'ah in that case is considered a Hasra'as Vadai, and thus the son should be liable). What is the Gemara's question? Perhaps the case is one in which the son did two separate acts of hitting, and since there is not a separate Hasra'ah for each act, the Hasra'ah is considered a Hasra'as Safek. It must be that the Gemara understands that the son did a single act of hitting (with a long stick), and thus the Hasra'ah was given for a single act which certainly constituted a transgression, since one of the men is his father (and hence the Gemara's question, why is he exempt).
</p><p>
 
</p><p>
<font><b>2) WHAT TYPE OF BEIS DIN IS NEEDED FOR CHALITZAH</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara attempts to prove whether Chalitzah must be performed in the presence of judges who are Mumchim, or whether Hedyotos suffice. Rebbi Yehudah proves that Hedyotos suffice from the fact that the verse 'l'Einei' (Devarim 25:9) excludes blind people from serving as Dayanim for Chalitzah. It must be that Hedyotos suffice for Chalitzah, because if Mumchim would be necessary no verse would be needed to exclude blind Dayanim; one of the requirements for serving on the Sanhedrin is that the Dayan Mumcheh be 'free of any physical blemish.' It must be that Hedyotos suffice, and that is why the verse must teach that a blind man may not serve as a Dayan for Chalitzah.
</p><p>
This law -- that members of the Sanhedrin may not be blind -- is a specific requirement in the Sanhedrin, the twenty-three judges who preside over cases of Dinei Nefashos, corporal and capital crimes. How, then, can Rebbi Yehudah prove from this law that Mumchim are not necessary for Chalitzah? Perhaps this law proves merely that Chalitzah does not require Dayanim who are fit to judge Dinei Nefashos. Mumchim, however, are necessary. Perhaps Chalitzah is like Dinei Mamonos, monetary matters, for which Mumchim are necessary (see Sanhedrin 2a) but for which a blind Dayan is valid. (<b>RITVA</b>)
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The <b>RITVA</b> (see also the <b>NIMUKEI YOSEF</b> to Sanhedrin 32b) answers that a different verse teaches that in order to judge Dinei Mamonos, the Dayan must have at least one good eye and cannot be completely blind (Sanhedrin 34b). With regard to Chalitzah, the verse says 'l'Einei' ('eyes' in the plural form), which implies that for Chalitzah the Dayan is valid as long as he is not blind in <i>both</i> eyes (that is, he is acceptable if he is blind in one eye). If Mumchim who are qualified to judge Dinei Mamonos are required for Chalitzah, then even without the verse of 'l'Einei' it is clear that the Dayan cannot be blind in both eyes, since that is one of the requirements of Mumchim for Dinei Mamonos. It must be that Mumchim are not required at all for Chalitzah.
</p><p>
Why, then, does the Gemara cite the verse which teaches that members of the <i>Sanhedrin</i> may not be blind? It should cite instead the verse which teaches that a Dayan even for <i>Dinei Mamonos</i> may not be blind in two eyes. The Ritva answers that the Gemara indeed could have mentioned that verse, but it preferred to cite the Beraisa of Rav Yosef which states that the Dayan must be 'free of any physical blemish.' The Beraisa means that not only must a member of the <i>Sanhedrin</i> be free from any physical blemish (i.e. he must be able to see with both eyes), even a Dayan for <i>Dinei Mamonos</i> must be able to see with at least <i>one</i> of his eyes.
</p><p>
(b) Many Acharonim cite the words of the Nimukei Yosef and reject his approach categorically, primarily because it is not at all implied by the words of the Gemara. (See <b>VILNA GA'ON</b> in Seder Chalitzah #5; <b>KETZOS HA'CHOSHEN</b> 7:2; see also <b>NESIVOS HA'MISHPAT</b> who defends the Nimukei Yosef but who did not see the Ritva.)
</p><p>
The <b>KETZOS HA'CHOSHEN</b> suggests that according to those who require Mumchim for Dinei Mamonos, the Mumchim indeed must qualify for Dinei Nefashos as well. He bases this assertion on the words of the <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Sanhedrin 4:10) who writes that Semichah is granted only to a person who is fit to judge even Dinei Nefashos.
</p><p>


lvr: 31
dfh: b
trd:
</p><p>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What does the first Tana learn from 'l'Einei'?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> This teaches like Rava taught:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Rava):</font></b> 'She will spit l'Einei ha'Zekenim' - the 
               judges must see the spit leave the Yevamah's mouth.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> R. Yehudah also needs to expound this!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> He does!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so, what is his source that commoners 
          suffice?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> He learns from 'b'Yisrael' - any Yisrael.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What do Chachamim learn from 'b'Yisrael'?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(s)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> This teaches like Rav Shmuel bar Yehudah taught, 
          'b'Yisrael' - in a Beis Din of Yisrael, and not in a Beis 
          Din of converts.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> R. Yehudah learns this from another occurrence of 
               the word '(Va'Yikra Shemo) b'Yisrael (Beis Chalutz 
               ha'Na'al)'.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> Chachamim expound that 'b'Yisrael' to teach as 
               follows:
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Beraisa - R. Yehudah):</font></b> A Chalitzah was done in 
                    front of R. Tarfon. He told everyone to say, 
                    'The one whose shoe was removed'.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> R. Yehudah learns this from 'And his name will 
                    be called'.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>HOW MANY JUDGES ARE REQUIRED FOR 'CHALIZTAH'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> If so (we learn two judges from 'Zekenim'), all 
          should expound 'They will call to him' to require two 
          more judges, and 'They will speak to him' to require two 
          more, making nine in all according to R. Yehudah, and 
          seven according to Chachamim!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> Those words teach different laws:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> 'They will call to him' - and not their messenger;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> 'They will speak to him' - they give him good 
               counsel:
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  If he is young and she is old, or vice-versa, 
                    they tell him not to do Yibum. Rather, he 
                    should marry someone his own age and not bring 
                    quarrels into his home.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava citing Rav Nachman):</font></b> The law is, Chalitzah is done 
          in front of three, since a Stam (anonymous) Mishnah says 
          this.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Rava):</font></b> If so, the same should apply to Mi'un!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> Mi'un and Chalitzah are done in front of 
               three.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> Perhaps this is the Halachah!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection (Beraisa - Beis Shamai):</font></b> Mi'un requires a 
               Beis Din of expert judges;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b></b> Beis Hillel say, it may be done in Beis Din or out 
               of Beis Din;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b></b> Both agree that three are required;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>6.  </font></b></b> R. Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah and R. Elazar b'Rebbi Yosi 
               say, two suffice.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Nachman):</font></b> The Halachah follows them (two 
                    suffice).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #1:</font></b> There is only one Stam Mishnah about Mi'un. 
          There are two Stam Mishnayos about Chalitzah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> There also, there are two Stam Mishnayos!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah):</font></b> If she did Mi'un or Chalitzah in front of 
               a judge he may marry her, for he is part of a Beis 
               Din (of three, therefore we do not suspect that he 
               permitted her in order to marry her).
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #2:</font></b> Rather, there are only two Stam Mishnayos 
          about Mi'un, but there are three about Chalitzah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> What difference does it make if there is one, 
          two or three Stam Mishnayos?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer #3 (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak):</font></b> Rather, Rav Nachman 
          said that three suffice because even R. Yehudah retracted 
          and agreed to this;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Mishnah - R. Yosi):</font></b> Semichah (leaning on the Korban 
               for a mistaken ruling of the Sanhedrin; 
               alternatively, ordination) of judges and Eglah 
               Arufah (beheading a calf to atone for a murder) 
               require three judges;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> R. Yehudah says, they require five;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> Chalitzah and Mi'un require three.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  R. Yehudah does not argue about Chalitzah. We 
                    must say that he retracted.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava):</font></b> The judges must fix a place for Chalitzah - 'His 
          Yevamah will ascend to the gate to the elders'.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(k)</font></b></b>  Rav Papa and Rav Huna brei d'Rav Yehoshua supervised a 
          Chalitzah with five judges.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(l)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> This is like R. Yehudah, but he retracted!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(m)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> They used five to publicize the matter.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(n)</font></b></b>  Rav Kahana asked Rav Ashi to be one of five judges for 
          Chalitzah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(o)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rav Kahana:</font></b> Once, Rav Yehudah asked me to be one of five 
          judges for Chalitzah
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rabanan:</font></b> Why are five needed?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Yehudah:</font></b> This is to publicize the matter.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(p)</font></b></b>  Rav Yehudah asked Rav Shmuel bar Yehudah to be one of 
          five judges for Chalitzah, to publicize the matter.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rav Shmuel bar Yehudah:</font></b> 'B'Yisrael' requires a Beis 
               Din of Yisrael, not of converts, and I am a convert!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(q)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Rav Yehudah:</font></b> I would force someone to pay money on the 
          word of someone (as honest) as Rav Shmuel bar Yehudah,.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(r)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Objection:</font></b> This cannot be! 'According to two witnesses a 
          matter will be established'!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(s)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Correction:</font></b> Rather, I would not allow collection of a 
          document (Rashi; Tosfos - without an oath) if he said 
          that the document was paid.
<br>


lvr: 31
dfh: a
trd:
<b><font color='blue'>1) </font></b><font color='blue'>FOR WHAT CAN A CONVERT BE A JUDGE?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rava):</font></b> Mid'Oraisa, a convert can judge a case between 
          converts. It says 'You will put on yourself a king ... 
          amidst your brethren' - on you, a ruler must be amidst 
          your brethren, but a convert can judge converts.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If one's mother is a Yisrael, he can even judge a 
               Yisrael;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> For Chalitzah, both parents must be from Yisrael - 
               'His name will be called in Yisrael'.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>2) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHAT IS NEEDED FOR 'CHALITZAH'</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rabah citing Rav):</font></b> If Eliyahu would come and say that we 
          do Chalitzah with a Min'al (a soft leather shoe), we 
          would heed him. If he would say that we do not do 
          Chalitzah with a sandal, we would not heed him, because 
          we are accustomed to using a sandal.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yosef citing Rav):</font></b> If Eliyahu would say that we do 
          not do Chalitzah with a Min'al, we would heed him. If he 
          would say that we do not do Chalitzah with a sandal, we 
          would not heed him, because we are accustomed to using a 
          sandal.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is the difference between these two 
          versions?
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> According to Rabah, we may not use a Min'al 
          l'Chatchilah. According to Rav Yosef, we may.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (against Rav Yosef - Mishnah):</font></b> If they did 
          Chalitzah with a Min'al, it is Kesherah,
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> This connotes that it is b'Di'eved!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> No, it is even l'Chatchilah. Since the Seifa says 
          that if it was done with an Anpilya (a slipper or sock) 
          it is invalid even b'Di'eved, the Reisha also discusses 
          b'Di'eved.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(g)</font></b></b>  Tana'im argue about whether a Min'al may be used 
          l'Chatchilah:
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (Beraisa - R. Yosi):</font></b> An elder said that he saw R. 
               Yehudah ben Beseira oversee many Chalitzos.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Yosi:</font></b> Did he use a Min'al or a sandal?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> The elder:</font></b> Is a Min'al really Kesherah? (The Torah 
               said a shoe, not a Min'al! - some texts delete this)
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>4.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> R. Yosi:</font></b> If so, why did R. Meir say that if 
               Chalitzah was done with a Min'al, it is Kesherah?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>5.  </font></b></b> R. Yakov says, R. Meir permits a Min'al 
               l'Chatchilah.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(h)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question:</font></b> What is the reason for the opinion that a 
          Min'al is only b'Di'eved?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Suggestion:</font></b> (Chalitzah must be 'me'Al (from) 
               Raglo'.) The top of a Min'al is considered me'Al his 
               foot, and the straps (Rashi; Aruch - the leather 
               covering) is me'Al of me'Al (from on top of)' his 
               foot.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Rejection:</font></b> If so, the Chalitzah should be invalid 
               b'Di'eved!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(i)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> It is a decree, lest one use a torn (Rashi; Aruch 
          - loose) Min'al, or a half-Min'al.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(j)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav):</font></b> Had I not seen R. Chiya oversee a Chalitzah using 
          a sandal with laces, I would have allowed only an Arab 
          sandal, that is tight-fitting.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> Even though our sandals are tied, we tie a thin rope 
               to make it an ideal Chalitzah.
<br><b>
<br></b><b><b><font color='blue'>3) </font></b><font color='blue'>WHAT IS CONSIDERED TAKING OFF THE SHOE?</font></b>
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(a)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  (Rav Yehudah):</font></b> Once most of the heel is removed the 
          Yevamah is permitted.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(b)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (Beraisa):</font></b> If the straps of a Min'al or sandal 
          were untied, or if he removed most of his foot, the 
          Chalitzah is invalid.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Inference:</font></b> It is invalid only because he removed the 
               majority. Had she removed it, it would be valid!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> The majority of the foot is required, not most of 
               the heel!
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(c)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Answer:</font></b> 'Most of the foot' refers to most of the heel;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> The Tana calls it 'foot' because it supports the 
               foot.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(d)</font></b></b>  This supports R. Yanai;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> (R. Yanai):</font></b> Whether he untied the shoe and she 
               removed it, or she untied the shoe and he removed 
               it, the Chalitzah is invalid. She must untie the 
               shoe and remove it.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(e)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Questions (R. Yanai):</font></b> If she tore the shoe off, what is 
          the law? If she burned the shoe, what is the law?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b></b> If Chalitzah require exposing the foot, this was 
               done;
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b></b> If the shoe must be removed, this was not done.
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>3.  </font></b></b> These questions are unresolved.
<br> <b>    <b><font color='darkgreen'>(f)</font></b><font color='darkgreen'>  Question (R. Nechemyah):</font></b> If he is wearing two shoes, one 
          on top of the other, what is the law?
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>1.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Question:</font></b> What is the case?
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  If she removed the outer shoe, and left the 
                    inner shoe, surely it is Pasul. We require 
                    'me'Al Raglo', not from on top of his foot!
<br>       <b>   <b><font color='darkgreen'>2.  </font></b><font color='darkgreen'> Answer:</font></b> Rather, she tore the outer shoe and removed 
               the inner shoe, and left the outer shoe on his foot;
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>i. </font></b></b>  If removal of the shoe is required, this was 
                    done.
<br>             <b>  <b><font color='darkgreen'>ii. </font></b></b> If she must expose the foot, this was not done.
<br>
<br>

sjt:
<font><b>1) HALACHAH: A SHOE OR A SANDAL</b></font><b>
<br>OPINIONS:</b> The Gemara records a Machlokes Tana'im whether a 'Min'al,' shoe, may be used for Chalitzah, or whether only a 'Sandal' may be used. The Gemara mentions an incident wherein Rebbi Yosi met a certain elder from the town of Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseirah and asked him what type of footwear Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseirah used when he presided over Chalitzah procedures. The elder answered him rhetorically, 'Is one permitted to do Chalitzah with a Min'al?'
</p><p>
The elder's testimony implied that Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseirah did <i>not</i> permit the use of a shoe for Chalitzah. Accordingly, in practice only a sandal should be used, and not a shoe. 
</p><p>
Today, however, the common practice is to use a <i>shoe</i> for Chalitzah. Why is a shoe used, contrary to the Gemara's conclusion and contrary to the practice of Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseirah?
</p><p>
(a) The <b>ROSH</b> and <b>NIMUKEI YOSEF</b> (in the name of the <b>BA'ALEI HA'TOSFOS</b>) cite the Yerushalmi which records a slightly different version of the encounter between Rebbi Yosi and the elder. The elder answered, 'Is there a sandal in our village?' implying that Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseirah used a <i>shoe</i>, and not a sandal, because sandals were not commonly worn in his village.
</p><p>
The Rishonim explain that the Yerushalmi does not necessarily disagree with the Bavli's version of the story. In practice, both are correct: A shoe should not be used l'Chatchilah, but in a place where the common form of footwear is a shoe and not a sandal, a shoe may be used. Nowadays, everyone wears shoes, and thus Chalitzah may be performed with a shoe.
</p><p>
(b) The <b>ME'IRI</b> and <b>TUR</b> (in the name of the <b>SEFER HA'MITZVOS</b>) write that the contemporary shoe is similar to the sandal of the times of the Gemara. The contemporary shoe is made from a single piece of leather, is somewhat stiff, and has long straps, and therefore the Gezeirah not to use a shoe because of 'Min'al Merupat' (see below) does not apply.
</p><p>
However, both this explanation and the previous one do not fully justify the use of contemporary shoes for Chalitzah in all places, such as places where sandals are commonly worn, and places where the shoe is made of soft leather.
</p><p>
(c) The <b>KORBAN NESANEL</b> (12:3:8) writes that the reason why the Chachamim enacted that a shoe not be used for Chalitzah does not apply nowadays. The Chachamim enacted that a shoe not be used for Chalitzah due to the concern that one might use a shoe which is half-broken ('Min'al Merupat'). Such a shoe is usable for walking but is not valid for Chalitzah. The Gezeirah of 'Min'al Merupat' applied only in the times of the Chachamim. In those times, when the Beis Din would not have a special shoe readily available to use for Chalitzah, they would ask someone present to remove his shoe and give it to them for use for Chalitzah (as the Gemara records on 103b). Today, however, only the special shoe that is kept in Beis Din and is designated exclusively for Chalitzah is used. Since such a shoe is not commonly used for walking, there is no fear that it will become torn through overuse.
</p><p>
(d) The <b>RAMBAM</b> (Hilchos Yibum 4:6) rules that a shoe may be used for Chalitzah even l'Chatchilah. The Rambam understands that the Yerushalmi's version of the incident disagrees with the Bavli's version, and he rules in accordance with the Yerushalmi's version. (According to the Girsa of the Vilna Ga'on here, the Bavli's version and the Yerushalmi's version are the same. See also Kesef Mishneh.)
</p><p>


<font><b>2) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A SHOE AND A SANDAL</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTIONS:</b> The Gemara suggests that one reason for why a shoe may be invalid for Chalitzah is that the strap which fastens it to the foot is 'Me'al d'Me'al' -- it is wrapped over the top of the shoe and does not directly cover the foot. (As such, when the strap is loosened to remove the shoe, it is not loosened from the foot but from the top of the shoe.) The Gemara concludes that this is not a valid reason to disqualify a shoe from use for Chalitzah, because in any case the shoe eventually is removed from the foot. Instead, the reason why a shoe may not be used for Chalitzah is that one might use a shoe which is partially torn ('Merupat').
</p><p>
(a) What is the difference in the physical appearance between a sandal and a shoe? Why do the two concerns which the Gemara suggests ('Me'al d'Me'al' and 'Merupat') apply only to a shoe and not to a sandal?
</p><p>
(b) The Gemara continues its discussion of the type of sandal valid for Chalitzah. It says that a sandal with 'Shintzin' is less preferable than a sandal of an Arab merchant ('Taiya') because the merchant's shoe fits the foot more snugly. The Gemara adds that when an ordinary sandal is used for Chalitzah, even if it has a 'Chumresa' (to tighten the sandal to the foot) one should tie a string around the sandal to tighten it to the foot, to ensure that the Chalitzah is done properly. What exactly is the difference between these different types of sandals?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWERS:</b>
<br>(a) The Rishonim offer various explanations for the difference between a shoe and a sandal. 
</p><p>
1. <b>RASHI</b> implies that both the shoe and the sandal are covered footwear (that is, they have leather uppers, which the Gemara calls the 'Panta'). The primary difference between a shoe and a sandal is that the leather sole and leather upper of the shoe is soft, whereas the leather sole and leather upper of the sandal is stiff and inflexible (making it somewhat like a wooden shoe).
</p><p>
In order to tighten the shoe onto the foot, thick straps ('Arkesa') which are affixed to the edges ('Oznayim') of the sole are folded over the top of the shoe from one side to the other (and pulled through loops on the opposite side). The straps thereby cover the entire shoe and secure it to the foot. These straps, when wrapped around the shoe, are what the Gemara calls 'Me'al d'Me'al,' since they cover the leather upper of the shoe. Even if the shoe is half torn, the straps can be used to tighten the shoe onto the foot, and that is why the Gemara says that a 'Min'al Merupat' is usable for walking.
</p><p>
The sandal, in contrast, is made from a very stiff leather. Affixing straps to the edges of the sole, in the same way that straps are affixed to a shoe, would not secure the sandal to the foot; the straps would not be able to bend the hard leather edges of the sandal or the hard top of the sandal to secure them tightly around the foot. Instead, laces are affixed to the back of the sandal (to the raised ankle support, as on today's ankle-high shoes) and tied around the ankle. They are laced tightly to the shin to prevent the sandal from slipping off. 
</p><p>
Since the laces are not tied on top of the leather upper, there is no problem of 'Me'al d'Me'al.' If the sandal is torn, its stiffness prevents it from being tightened to the foot by straps, and thus a torn sandal is completely unusable (and thus there is no problem of 'Merupat'). 
</p><p>
2. The <b>RITVA</b> and other Rishonim (see <b>ME'IRI</b>, p. 371-372) explain that the difference between a shoe and a sandal is that a shoe is comprised of two or three pieces -- an upper ('Panta'), together with a sole and an ankle support, whereas the sandal has only a leather bottom and no upper. The Me'iri proves this from the fact that the Gemara consistently refers to a shoe as something which 'covers his foot' ('Chofeh Es Raglo'), and a sandal as something which 'receives the foot' ('Mekabel Es Rov ha'Regel' -- see end of 102b). Because the edges of the sandal are slightly raised around the foot, it appears as though it is 'receiving,' or holding, the foot.
</p><p>
The shoe is tied with laces (similar to today's shoes). The part of the shoe in which the laces are inserted is called the 'Panta' (or 'Oznayim'). Since the laces are tied on top of the shoe, there is a problem of 'Me'al d'Me'al.'
</p><p>
If the shoe tears (that is, the front of the shoe, above the toes, tears), it still can be worn somewhat comfortably. Since it has a partial covering, it remains usable even if it is torn (<b>ME'IRI</b>). Alternatively, even if it is not usable as a shoe because the top is torn, the bottom is still usable as a sandal (<b>RITVA</b>).
</p><p>
The sandal, in contrast, has straps which are tied to loops ('Oznayim') at the edges of the leather sole, and which cover the foot and extend behind the ankle. They then are tied either on top of the foot or higher up on the shin. Since the straps are wrapped directly around the foot or lower leg, there is no problem of 'Me'al d'Me'al.' If the sandal (the piece of leather that serves as the sole) tears, it is rendered unusable because the foot treads unprotected on the rough ground.
</p><p>
(b) The Rishonim also offer various explanations for the difference between a sandal with 'Shintzin,' a sandal of a Taiya, and a sandal with 'Chumresa.' All opinions seem to agree that the difference between these sandals is how tightly they are secured to the foot. The sandal with 'Shintzin' is the least tight, and the Taiya's sandal is the most secure, while the sandal with 'Chumresa' ('our sandal') is of average tightness. What is the exact difference between these types of sandals?
</p><p>
1. <b>RASHI</b> explains that 'Shintzin' refers to a simple strap, like a drawstring, used to tie the neck of the sandal around the leg. It is not knotted, and thus it is easy to loosen and to extract the foot.
</p><p>
A sandal of a Taiya, in contrast, has long straps which wrap around the leg and firmly secure the sandal to the foot.
</p><p>
The 'Chumresa' is a knotted shoelace which tightens the neck of the sandal to the leg. It is looser than the sandal of the Taiya, but it is not as loose as the 'Shintzin.' The Gemara explains that to make it more secure to the foot, one should wrap and tie a string around the neck of the sandal and the leg (in place of the long strap which it does not have). That string is removed as part of the Chalitzah process.
</p><p>
2. The <b>RITVA</b> explains that the 'Shintzin' are interlocking loops which keep the shoe on the foot (in place of shoelaces). The sandal of the Taiya has straps that wrap around the leg, as Rashi explains.
</p><p>
The 'Chumresa' on 'our sandals' refers to a tight ring through which the straps which serve as shoelaces are inserted. The ring holds the straps in place so that they not loosen. By moving the ring higher or lower on the shoelaces, the shoe can be made tighter or looser. When such a sandal is used, one ties a string around the foot to make it similar to a sandal of a Taiya, so that it should be clear that the act of Chalitzah removes the sandal from a state of fitting securely to the foot.
</p><p>


<font><b>3) BURNING THE SHOE OFF OF THE FOOT</b></font><b>
<br>QUESTION:</b> The Gemara discusses different ways of removing the shoe from the foot in the Chalitzah procedure. The Gemara questions whether the Chalitzah is valid when the Yevamah rips or burns the shoe off of the Yavam's foot instead of untying it and removing it in the normal manner. The Gemara also questions whether the Chalitzah is valid when the Yevamah pulls off the innermost of two shoes which the Yavam is wearing on one foot, while she leaves the outer shoe in place.
</p><p>
The Gemara answers that it depends on whether the Torah requires that she specifically <i>remove</i> the shoe ('Chalitzah'), or that she merely <i>expose</i> the foot.
</p><p>
What is the Gemara's question? The Torah explicitly states 'v'Chaltzah' (Devarim 25:9), a clear directive that she must <i>remove</i> the shoe. Why does the Gemara even suggest that burning it off might be valid?
</p><p>
<b>ANSWER:</b> The <b>ARUCH LA'NER</b> explains that the Gemara's question is based on the presence of two apparently contradictory phrases in the verse. The verse says, 'v'Chaltzah' ('and she shall remove [the shoe]'), which implies that she must remove the shoe without tearing or burning it. However, the verse also says, 'Me'al Raglo' ('from upon his foot'), which implies that the objective is to <i>expose</i> the foot, and the manner in which it is done is not relevant.
</p><p>
Accordingly, the Gemara's question is which phrase is meant by the Torah to be the significant one, 'v'Chaltzah' or 'Me'al Raglo'? (Although the Gemara elsewhere derives a different Halachah from the words, 'Me'al Raglo' (that is, the part of the leg on which the shoe must be tied), the Gemara now suggests that the word 'Raglo' is extra and must be teaching that the Yevamah need only expose the foot, since the Torah could have written 'me'Alav' ('from upon it') without the extra word 'Raglo.')
</p><p>


