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It was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda. All of these oils with which the Sages said that one may not light on Shabbat, one may light with them on a Festival, with the exception of burnt oil, because one may not burn consecrated items on a Festival.,A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the ruling with regard to the obligation to mention Hanukkah in Grace after Meals? The dilemma is: Since it is merely an obligation by rabbinic law, do we not mention it? Or, perhaps due to publicity of the miracle, we mention it. Rava said that Rav Seḥora said that Rav Huna said: One does not mention it. And if, nevertheless, he comes to mention it, he mentions it in the blessing of thanksgiving. The Gemara relates that Rav Huna bar Yehuda happened by Rava’s house on Hanukkah. When, after eating, he came to recite Grace after Meals, he thought to mention Hanukkah in the blessing: Who builds Jerusalem. Rav Sheshet said to the yeshiva students: One mentions Hanukkah in Grace after Meals just as he does in the Amida prayer. Just as in the Amida prayer one mentions Hanukkah in the blessing of thanksgiving, so too, in Grace after Meals one mentions Hanukkah in the blessing of thanksgiving.,Based on the previous dilemma, an additional dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the ruling with regard to the obligation to mention the New Moon in Grace after Meals? The dilemma is: If you say that on Hanukkah, since it is only by rabbinic law, one need not mention it in Grace after Meals; perhaps the New Moon, which is by Torah law, one is required to mention it. Or, perhaps since it is not a day on which it is prohibited to perform labor, one need not mention it. The Sages disputed this matter: Rav said: One mentions the New Moon in Grace after Meals. Rabbi Ḥanina said: One does not mention it. Rav Zerika said: Take the halakha of Rav in your hand as authoritative, since Rabbi Oshaya holds in accordance with his opinion. As Rabbi Oshaya taught in a Tosefta: Days on which there is an additional offering sacrificed in the Temple, i.e., the New Moon and the intermediate days of a Festival; in the evening, morning, and afternoon prayers, one recites the eighteen blessings of the Amida prayer and says a passage pertaining to the event of the day during the blessing of Temple service. And if he did not recite it, we require him to return to the beginning of the prayer and repeat it. And on those days, there is no kiddush recited over the cup of wine at the start of the day, but there is mention of the day recited in Grace after Meals, in accordance with Rav’s opinion. Days on which there is no additional offering, i.e., Monday, and Thursday, and fast days, and non-priestly watches [ma’amadot], have a different legal status as detailed below.,Before drawing a conclusion, the Gemara seeks to clarify: Monday and Thursday, what is their purpose in this discussion, i.e., why are Monday and Thursday mentioned here if no special prayers are recited on those days? The Gemara explains: Rather, certainly the reference is to Monday and Thursday and Monday that are fast days for rain and of maamadot. On those days, in the evening, morning, and afternoon prayers, one recites eighteen blessings and recites a passage pertaining to the event of the day, i.e., the fast, in the blessing: Who listens to prayer. However, if one did not mention it, we do not require him to return to the beginning of the prayer and repeat it. And, on those days, there is no kiddush recited over a cup of wine, and there is no mention of the day recited in Grace after Meals.,An additional dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the ruling with regard to the obligation to mention Hanukkah in the additional prayer on Shabbat during Hanukkah or on the New Moon of Tevet, which falls during Hanukkah? The sides of the dilemma are: Do we say that since Hanukkah has no additional prayer of its own, and the additional prayer has no connection to Hanukkah, we do not mention it? Or, perhaps it is the essence of the day that is obligated in the mention of Hanukkah, in which case there is no distinction between the various prayers, and it should be mentioned in all four prayers, including the additional prayer on Shabbat and the New Moon. There is a dispute: Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda both said: One does not mention it. Rav Naḥman and Rabbi Yoḥanan both said: One mentions it.,Abaye said to Rav Yosef: This opinion of Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda is Rav’s opinion, as Rav Giddel said that Rav said: In the case of the New Moon that occurs on Shabbat, the one who recites the portion from the Prophets [haftara] on Shabbat need not mention the New Moon in the blessing, as, if it were not Shabbat, there would be no reading from the Prophets on the New Moon. The haftara is unrelated to the New Moon, and therefore the New Moon is not mentioned in the blessing. The same should be true with regard to mention of Hanukkah in the additional service on the New Moon, as, if it were not the New Moon, he would not be reciting the additional service on Hanukkah. Therefore, when he recites the additional prayer, he need not mention Hanukkah.,The Gemara rejects this comparison. Is this comparable? There, reading from the Prophets is not at all part of the service on the New Moon. Here, there is mention of Hanukkah in the evening, morning, and afternoon prayers. Rather, it is comparable to this: As Rav Aḥadvoi said that Rav Mattana said that Rav said: On a Festival that occurs on Shabbat, one who recites the portion from the Prophets during the afternoon service on Shabbat need not mention the Festival, as, if it were not Shabbat, there would be no reading from the Prophets during the afternoon service on a Festival. If so, even though there is a haftara during the morning service on a Festival, since they do not read from the Prophets in the afternoon, the reading is considered totally unrelated to the Festival and one does not mention the Festival. The same is true with regard to Hanukkah. One does not mention Hanukkah in the additional prayer.

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is not in accordance with any of these halakhot; rather, it is in accordance with that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: On Yom Kippur that falls on Shabbat, one who recites the day’s closing prayer [neila] must mention Shabbat even in that prayer, although neila is not recited every Shabbat. The reason for this is that on Yom Kippur, the day itself is obligated in four prayers, i.e., morning, additional, afternoon, and closing. When it occurs on Shabbat, one must mention Shabbat in each of the prayers. Apparently, on a day that has a unique character, that character is manifest in all sacred aspects of the day; those engendered by the day itself as well as those engendered by other factors.,The Gemara challenges this: It is difficult, as there is a contradiction between one halakha and another halakha. On the one hand, you said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. And, on the other hand, we hold that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, which contradicts the first halakha, as Rava said: On a Festival that occurs on Shabbat, the prayer leader who descends before the ark to recite the prayer abridged from the seven blessings of the Shabbat evening Amida prayer need not mention the Festival, as, if it were not also Shabbat, the prayer leader would not descend before the ark to recite this prayer during the evening prayer on a Festival. The Gemara reverts to the previous assumption that an element that does not arise from the essential halakhot of the day is considered foreign to it and is not mentioned.,This challenge is rejected: How can you compare? There, actually, even on Shabbat, the prayer leader need not repeat the prayer, just as the prayer is not repeated any other evening. It was the Sages who instituted repetition of the prayer due to concern for potential danger. The Sages sought to slightly delay those leaving the synagogue to enable people who came late to leave together with the rest of the worshippers. This was necessary because synagogues were often located beyond the city limits, and it was dangerous to walk alone at night. This repetition of the prayer does not stem from the obligation of the day but was instituted for another purpose. However, here, on Yom Kippur, it is the day that is obligated in four prayers, and therefore on each day that there are added prayers, one must mention the events that occurred on that day in those prayers just as he does in all the standard prayers.,And we learned in the mishna that one may not light with the sheep’s tail or with fat. Naḥum the Mede says that one may light using cooked fat. And the Rabbis say that one may not light with it whether or not it is cooked. The Gemara asks: Isn’t the opinion of the Rabbis identical to the unattributed opinion of the first tanna in the mishna? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to what Rav Beruna said that Rav said that one may light with cooked fat to which oil was added. One of the tannaim accepts this opinion as halakha and permits lighting with it, and the other prohibits it, and the opinions are not defined. Although it seems from the formulation of the mishna that they differ on this point, it is unclear what the opinion of each tanna is.,MISHNA: In continuation of the previous mishna, this mishna adds that one may not light with burnt oil on a Festival, as the Gemara will explain below. With regard to lighting Shabbat lamps, there were Sages who prohibited the use of specific oils. Rabbi Yishmael says that one may not light with tar [itran] in deference to Shabbat because tar smells bad and disturbs those in the house. And the Rabbis permit lighting with all oils for lamps as long as they burn properly; with sesame oil, with nut oil, with turnip oil, with fish oil, with gourd oil, with tar, and even with naphtha [neft]. Rabbi Tarfon says: One may light only with olive oil in deference to Shabbat, as it is the choicest and most pleasant of the oils.,GEMARA: With regard to the statement of the mishna that one may not light with burnt oil on a Festival, the Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? The Gemara answers: Because, in general, one may not burn consecrated items on a Festival. With regard to the fundamental principle that one may not burn consecrated items on a Festival, the Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Ḥizkiya said, and one of the Sages from the school of Ḥizkiya taught the same, that which the verse said: “And you shall let nothing of it remain until morning; but that which remains of it until morning you shall burn with fire” (Exodus 12:10), requires explanation. As the Torah did not need to state until morning the second time. It would have been sufficient to state: But that which remains of it you shall burn with fire. Rather, why does the Torah state until morning? The verse comes to provide him with the second morning for burning. Leftover meat of the Paschal lamb is not burned on the following morning, which is a Festival, but rather on the following day, the first of the intermediate days of the Festival. From there it is derived that burning consecrated items on a Festival is prohibited.,Abaye said: This is derived from another verse, as the verse said: “This is the burnt-offering of each Shabbat on its Shabbat” (Numbers 28:10). Only the burnt-offering of Shabbat is sacrificed on Shabbat, and not a weekday burnt-offering on Shabbat, and not a weekday burnt-offering on a Festival. Apparently, performing this mitzva is prohibited even on a Festival, since it was not explicitly enumerated among the actions permitted on a Festival.,Rava said: This is derived from a different verse, as the verse said with regard to the laws of a Festival: “No manner of work shall be done in them, save that which every man must eat, that alone may be done by you” (Exodus 12:16). From the word that, it is derived that for sustenance, one is permitted to perform prohibited labor on a Festival, but not for facilitators of sustenance. Although cooking is permitted, actions that involve prohibited labors for the purpose of facilitating cooking are prohibited. From the word alone, it is derived: And not circumcision performed not at its appointed time, i.e., a circumcision may be performed on a Festival only if it is on the eighth day. A circumcision that was postponed may not be performed on a Festival. It is possible that license to perform the postponed circumcision on a Festival could have been derived by means of an a fortiori inference. Therefore, the verse explicitly prohibited doing so. The same is true with regard to burning consecrated items. Although the Torah commands burning consecrated items, it was not permitted on a Festival since there is no obligation to do so specifically on that day.,Rav Ashi said: It is derived from a different source. In the verses that speak of the Festivals, as opposed to the term Shabbat, the term shabbaton (Leviticus 23:24) appears.
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The latter term is a positive mitzva to rest. And, if so, observance of a Festival is a mitzva that was commanded with both a positive mitzva to rest and a prohibition: “You shall do no manner of servile work” (Leviticus 23:8). And there is a principle that a positive mitzva, e.g., burning consecrated items whose time has expired, does not override a mitzva that was commanded with both a prohibition and a positive mitzva, e.g., observance of the Festival.,By inference, the conclusion is that, specifically on a Festival, lighting with burnt oil is prohibited. During the week one may well do so. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this distinction? It would be reasonable to say that it is prohibited to derive any benefit from teruma that became ritually impure. Rav said: Just as there is a mitzva to burn consecrated items that became ritually impure, so too, there is a mitzva to burn teruma that became ritually impure, and the Torah said: While it is being destroyed, derive benefit from it. The Gemara asks: Where did the Torah say this? Where is there an allusion to this in the Bible? The Gemara answers: It can be derived from the statement of Rav Naḥman, as Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: The verse said: “And I, behold, I have given you the charge of My terumot (Numbers 18:8). From the amplification of the plural: My terumot, it is derived that the verse is speaking of two terumot, one teruma that is ritually pure and one teruma that is ritually impure. And God said: “I have given you,” i.e., it shall be yours, and you may derive benefit from it. Since there is a stringent prohibition against eating it, the benefit permitted is to burn it beneath your cooked dish. Similar forms of benefit may also be derived from burning teruma.,And if you wish, say instead an alternative manner to derive this halakha, from the statement of Rabbi Abbahu, as Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is written in the confession of the tithes: I have not eaten thereof in my mourning, neither have I destroyed from it while impure” (Deuteronomy 26:14). By inference: From it you may not destroy, but you may destroy the oil of teruma that has become ritually impure. The Gemara asks: And say differently: From it you may not destroy, but you may destroy and derive benefit from burning consecrated oil that became ritually impure.,The Gemara responds: That possibility is unacceptable. Is it not an a fortiori inference? If with regard to the tithe which is lenient, the Torah said: Neither have I destroyed from it, while impure, items consecrated to the Temple, which are more stringent, all the more so that it is prohibited to burn it while ritually impure.,The Gemara rejects this: If so, that this matter is derived through an a fortiori inference, then, with regard to teruma as well, let us say that it is an a fortiori inference, as teruma is more stringent than tithes. If it is prohibited to benefit from tithes while they are burning, all the more so would one be prohibited to benefit from the teruma while it is burning. The Gemara answers: Doesn’t it say: From it? From there it is derived that there is an item excluded from the prohibition of burning in ritual impurity.,The Gemara asks: And what did you see that led you to conclude that “from it” comes to exclude teruma? Perhaps “from it” comes to exclude consecrated items. The Gemara replies: It is reasonable that I do not exclude consecrated items from the prohibition against benefiting from its burning, as with regard to consecrated items there are many stringent elements. Their Hebrew acronym is peh, nun, kuf, ayin, kaf, samekh, which is a mnemonic for the following terms. Piggul: With regard to an offering, if, during one of the services involved in its sacrifice, i.e., slaughter, receiving the blood, bringing it to the altar, sprinkling it on the altar, the priest or the one bringing the offering entertains the thought of eating the sacrifice at a time that is unfit for eating, it is thereby invalidated. Notar: Meat of a sacrifice that remained beyond its allotted time may not be eaten and must be burned. Korban meila: One who unwittingly derives benefit from consecrated items is required to bring a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated items. Karet:The punishment of one who eats consecrated items while ritually impure is karet. Asur leonen: An acute mourner, i.e., one whose relative died that same day and has not yet been buried, is prohibited to eat consecrated items. None of these halakhot applies to teruma. Therefore, consecrated items are more stringent than teruma, and therefore it is consecrated items that are not excluded from the prohibition against deriving benefit while ritually impure.,The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, it is teruma that I would not exclude from the prohibition, as, with regard to teruma, there are many stringent elements represented by the acronym mem, ḥet, peh, zayin, which is a mnemonic for the following: Mita: One for whom teruma is prohibited who ate it intentionally is punishable by death at the hand of Heaven. Ḥomesh: A non-priest, for whom teruma is prohibited, who unwittingly ate teruma is obligated to pay its value to the priest plus one-fifth of the sum.

And, teruma does not have the possibility of pidyon: redemption, as, once it is sanctified, it may not be redeemed and rendered non-sacred. And it is prohibited to zarim: non-priests may not eat it. These stringencies do not apply to consecrated items. The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, those stringencies that apply to consecrated items are more numerous than those that apply to teruma. Therefore, it is appropriate to be more stringent with consecrated items and exclude impure teruma from the prohibition against deriving benefit when burning it.,And if you wish, say instead a different reason, without counting the number of stringencies: Consecrated items are more stringent because one who eats them while ritually impure is punishable by karet, while in the case of teruma the punishment is death at the hand of Heaven. In this regard, the Torah is more stringent vis-à-vis consecrated items than it is vis-à-vis teruma. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that there is a different proof that one is permitted to benefit from teruma while it is burning. As the verse said: “The first fruits of your grain, of your wine, and of your oil, and the first of the fleece of your sheep shall you give him” (Deuteronomy 18:4). The Sages derived from this verse: Give the priest teruma that is ritually pure, that is fit for him to consume, and do not give the priest teruma that is suitable only for his fire, to be burned. By inference, ritually impure teruma is suitable for his fire, i.e., a priest may derive benefit from it.,We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yishmael says that kindling a lamp on Shabbat with tar is prohibited. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? Rava said: Because its odor is bad the Sages issued a decree prohibiting the use of tar, lest one forsake the light and leave. Abaye said to him: And let him leave. What obligation is there to sit next to the light? Rava said to him: Because I say that kindling Shabbat lights is an obligation, and one is required to eat specifically by that light in deference to Shabbat. As Rav Naḥman bar Rav Zavda said, and others say that it was Rav Naḥman bar Rava who said that Rav said: Kindling the Shabbat lamps is an obligation, whereas washing one’s hands and feet with hot water in the evening prior to Shabbat is merely optional. And I say: Washing is not merely optional; it is a mitzva even though it is not an obligation.,The Gemara asks: What mitzva is there? The Gemara explains that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: This was the custom of Rabbi Yehuda bar Elai: On Shabbat eve, they would bring him a bowl full of hot water and he would use it to wash his face, hands, and feet, and he would wrap himself, and sit in linen cloaks with ritual fringes, and he was like an angel of the Lord of hosts. He did all this in deference to Shabbat. And the Gemara relates that his students, who also sat wrapped in linen cloaks, would conceal the corners of their garments from him so that he would not see that they did not have ritual fringes on their garments. He said to them: My sons, did I not teach you with regard to the obligation to attach ritual fringes to a linen cloak: Beit Shammai exempt the linen sheet because at least part of the ritual fringes is always made from wool, and there is a Torah prohibition against a mixture of wool and linen that applies even to ritual fringes? And Beit Hillel obligate linen sheets in the mitzva of ritual fringes, as they hold that the positive mitzva of ritual fringes overrides the prohibition of mixing wool and linen. The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, and therefore the sheets require ritual fringes. And the students held: Although it is permitted by Torah law to attach ritual fringes to a linen garment, the Sages issued a decree that one may not do so due to garments worn at night. The Sages were concerned lest a person wear this cloak at night. Since one is not obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes at night, he would be wearing the prohibited mixture of wool and linen at a time when he is not fulfilling the mitzva of ritual fringes. Therefore, attaching ritual fringes made of wool to a linen garment is prohibited, even to a garment worn during the day.,Since bathing as preparation for enjoyment of Shabbat was discussed, the Gemara cites the homiletic interpretation of the verse describing those heading into exile: “And my soul is removed far off from peace, I forgot prosperity” (Lamentations 3:17). What is: And my soul is removed far off from peace? Rabbi Abbahu said: That is the lack of opportunity to engage in kindling the Shabbat lights, which a refugee is unable to do. I forgot prosperity, Rabbi Yirmeya said: That is the lack of opportunity to bathe in the bathhouse. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: That is the lack of opportunity to engage in washing one’s hands and feet in hot water. Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said: Prosperity is a pleasant bed and the pleasant bedclothes that are on it, which are not available in exile. Rabbi Abba said: That is a made bed, and a wife adorned, i.e., worthy of and suitable (Rashba) for Torah scholars.,Incidental to the discussion of prosperity, the Gemara mentions that on a similar topic, the Sages taught: Who is wealthy? Anyone who gets pleasure from his wealth, that is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The letters mem (Meir), tet (Tarfon), kuf (Akiva), samekh (Yosei) are a mnemonic for the tannaim who expressed opinions on this matter. Rabbi Tarfon says: A wealthy person is anyone who has one hundred vineyards, and one hundred fields, and one hundred slaves working in them. Rabbi Akiva says: Anyone who has a wife whose actions are pleasant. Rabbi Yosei says: Anyone who has a bathroom close to his table.,It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: One may not light on Shabbat with sap from balsam trees [tzori]. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? Rabba said: Since its pleasant smell diffuses, the Sages were concerned lest one forget and come to take some sap from it on Shabbat. That is tantamount to extinguishing the lamp, as removing oil from a burning lamp curtails the amount of time that it will burn. Abaye said to him:
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Let the Master say a different reason: Because tar is volatile, i.e., it is liable to evaporate quickly and cause a fire. The Gemara answers: He stated one reason and another: One, because it is volatile and potentially dangerous; and, furthermore, due to a decree lest one take sap from it.,The Gemara relates: A mother-in-law who hated her daughter-in-law said to her: Go adorn yourself with balsam oil. She went and adorned herself. When she came, her mother-in-law said to her: Go light the lamp. She went and lit the lamp. She caught fire and was burned.,Since balsam oil was discussed, the Gemara cites the verse: “But Nebuzaradan the captain of the guard left of the poorest of the land to be vinedressers and husbandmen” (Jeremiah 52:16). The Gemara explains the verse: With regard to vinedressers, Rav Yosef taught: These poorest of the land were the balsam collectors in the south of Eretz Yisrael, in the expanse from Ein Gedi to Ramata. And the husbandmen; these are the trappers of the snail [ḥilazon], from which the sky blue dye is produced in the north of the country, in the area between the Promontory of Tyre and Ḥaifa. Only a small number of poor people could barely eke out a living from these tasks, which involved mere gathering.,The Sages taught: One may not light with ritually impure untithed produce [tevel] during the week, and needless to say one may not light with it on Shabbat. On a similar note, one may not light with white naphtha during the week, and needless to say one may not light with it on Shabbat. Granted, with regard to white naphtha, its prohibition is understandable because it is volatile and potentially dangerous. However, with regard to ritually impure tevel, what is the reason that the Sages prohibited lighting with it?,The Gemara answers that the verse said: “And I, behold, I have given you the charge of My terumot (Numbers 18:8). From the fact that terumot is plural, the Sages derived that the verse is speaking of two terumot: Both teruma that is ritually pure and teruma that is ritually impure. Just as with regard to teruma that is ritually pure, you, the priest, have permission to benefit from it only from the time teruma was separated and onward, so too, with regard to teruma that is ritually impure, you have permission to benefit from it only from the time teruma was separated and onward. Since a portion of the untithed produce is teruma that has not yet been separated, it is prohibited even for a priest to use it.,The Gemara proceeds to discuss the matter of the Tosefta itself, the case of lighting with sap from balsam trees on Shabbat. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: One may not light with tzori on Shabbat. And Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar would also say: Tzori, which is one of the component spices of the incense in the Temple, is merely the sap that emerges from balsam trees, and is not part of the balsam tree itself. Rabbi Yishmael says: Anything that originates from the tree, one may not light with it; only materials that do not come from trees may be used. Rabbi Yishmael ben Beroka says: One may only light with a substance that emerges from the fruit. Rabbi Tarfon says: One may only light with olive oil alone.,The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri stood on his feet and, contrary to this statement, said: And what shall the people of Babylonia, who have only sesame oil, do? And what shall the people of Medea, who have only nut oil, do? And what shall the people of Alexandria, who have only radish oil, do? And what shall the people of Cappadocia, who have neither this nor that but only naphtha, do? Rather, you have a prohibition only with regard to those substances with regard to which the Sages said: One may not light with them. All other oils are permitted.,And one may light with fish oil and tar. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: One may light with gourd oil and naphtha. Sumakhos says: Among the substances that emerge from the flesh of living beings, one may light only with fish oil. The Gemara asks: The opinion of Sumakhos is identical to the opinion of the first tanna, who also permits lighting with fish oil. The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to what Rav Beruna said that Rav said: One is permitted to use molten fat to which oil was added for lighting. They disagree with regard to this halakha; however, their opinions are not defined and it is unclear which of them permits using it and which prohibits using it.,It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Anything that emerges from the tree does not have the legal status of an area of three by three fingerbreadths. Even if it is three by three fingerbreadths, it is not considered sufficiently large to become ritually impure. And, therefore, one may roof his sukka with it, as the roofing of his sukka may not be made from any material that can become ritually impure. This is the case for everything that originates from a tree with the exception of linen, which has a unique legal status. Abaye said:

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar and the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael essentially said the same thing, even though they said it in different ways. The Gemara elaborates: The statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar is that which we said: The only fabrics woven from plant materials that are considered bona fide fabrics are those made of linen. What is the statement of the tanna from the school of Rabbi Yishmael? As it was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: Since the word garments is stated in the Torah unmodified, without stating from what materials those garments were made, and the verse specified in one of its references to garments, in the halakhot of ritual impurity of leprosy, wool and linen: “And the garment in which there will be the plague of leprosy, whether it be a woolen garment, or a linen garment” (Leviticus 13:47), the conclusion can be drawn: Just as below, when it mentions a garment in the case of leprosy, the Torah is referring to one made of wool or linen, so too, all garments mentioned in the Torah are those made from wool or linen. Other fabrics are not classified as garments.,In contrast to Abaye, who viewed the opinions expressed by Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar and the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael as expressing the same idea, Rava said that the two opinions are not identical. There is a difference between them when the cloth is three by three handbreadths, with regard to other garments that are neither wool nor linen. As Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says explicitly: If it is less than three by three fingerbreadths, indicating that he is of the opinion that a cloth that is three by three handbreadths that is suitable for use even by wealthy people can become ritually impure. In his opinion, the uniqueness of linen fabric is not that it can become ritually impure, but rather that a linen rag, even if it is very small, can become ritually impure. The tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael is not of the opinion that other garments can become ritually impure.,In any case, based on the above, everyone agrees that, clearly, three by three fingerbreadths in a wool or linen garment can become ritually impure with the impurity of leprosy. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? The Gemara responds that it is derived as it was taught in a baraita with regard to this matter. When the Torah states: Garment, unmodified, I have derived that nothing other than a whole garment can become ritually impure. However, with regard to a cloth that is three by three fingerbreadths, from where do I derive that it is also included in this halakha? The verse states: “And the garment in which there will be the plague of leprosy” (Leviticus 13:47). From the addition of the word: And the garment [vehabeged], it is derived that all woven swatches are subsumed within the category of garment in this matter. The Gemara asks: And perhaps say that it comes to include a woven garment that is three by three handbreadths? The Gemara answers: That is inconceivable. Is that not derived through an a fortiori inference? As, now, even the threads of the warp or the threads of the woof can become ritually impure, is it necessary to mention that a cloth three by three handbreadths can become ritually impure as well? A garment that is three by three handbreadths is comprised of several warp and woof threads that can themselves become ritually impure.,The Gemara rejects this: If so, then let us also derive a cloth that is three by three fingerbreadths through the same a fortiori inference from the warp and woof threads. Rather, it must be that this a fortiori inference is flawed. Threads woven into fabric do not maintain their previous status as they are no longer suitable to be used as warp and woof threads. Rather, cloths that are three by three handbreadths, which are suitable for use by both the wealthy and the poor as they are multipurpose cloths, can be derived through an a fortiori inference, as they are certainly more significant than the warp and woof threads and they become ritually impure. However, cloths that are three by three fingerbreadths, which are suitable for use by the poor but are unsuitable for use by the wealthy, are not derived through an a fortiori inference. Therefore, the reason that they can become ritually impure is specifically because it was written in the Torah. Had it not been written in the Torah, we would not derive it through an a fortiori inference.,The Gemara also asks: Indeed, there is amplification in the Torah, derived from the term: And the garment, which is a generalization that comes to expand upon the details that follow. And say that it comes to include the ruling that cloth that is three by three handbreadths in garments made of materials other than wool or linen can become ritually impure. The Gemara answers: That is inconceivable. The verse said: A garment of wool or linen, indicating that a garment made of wool or linen, yes, it becomes ritually impure; a garment made of other materials, no, it does not become ritually impure. The Gemara asks: And say that when the verse excluded, it excluded specifically a garment that is three by three fingerbreadths; however, a garment that is three by three handbreadths can become ritually impure. The Gemara replies: Two exclusions are written; once it is stated: “A garment of wool or linen” (Leviticus 13:59), and it is also stated: “Whether it be a woolen garment, or a linen garment” (Leviticus 13:47). One verse comes to exclude cloth of three by three fingerbreadths, and one verse comes to exclude cloth of three by three handbreadths, to emphasize that a garment made of a material that is neither wool nor linen cannot become ritually impure at all. This corresponds to Abaye’s opinion that garments not made of wool or linen cannot become ritually impure.,The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rava, who said that the practical difference between the two opinions is with regard to cloth three by three handbreadths in other garments, that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar is of the opinion that they can become ritually impure, whereas the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael is not of the opinion that they can become ritually impure, in the case of a cloth that is three by three handbreadths in other garments,
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from where does Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar derive that it can become ritually impure? The Gemara answers: In his opinion, it is derived from the verse that speaks of the ritual impurity of creeping animals: “Or a garment, or skin, or sack” (Leviticus 11:32). The additional “or” comes to include items that are not generally included in the definition of garment. As it was taught in a baraita: From the fact that it says garment, I have derived nothing other than a whole garment; however, a swatch that is three by three handbreadths in other garments, from where is it derived that it can become ritually impure? The verse states: Or a garment.,The Gemara asks: And Abaye, who says that everyone agrees that other garments do not become ritually impure at all, this phrase: Or a garment, what does he do with it and what does it come to add? The Gemara answers: He needs it to include a small swatch of fabric that is three by three fingerbreadths made of wool or linen. Despite its size, it can become ritually impure from contact with creeping animals.,And Rava holds that there is no need for the verse to discuss that matter explicitly, as the Torah revealed in the case of leprosy that it is considered to be a garment, and the same is true with regard to the ritual impurity of creeping animals.,And Abaye holds that one cannot derive the halakhot of creeping animals from the halakhot of leprosy, as there is room to refute that comparison in the following manner: What comparison is there to leprosy, which has more stringent halakhot of ritual impurity, as even the warp and woof threads alone can become ritually impure from it, which is not the case with regard to ritual impurity from creeping animals? Therefore, even small scraps can become ritually impure from leprosy.,The other amora, Rava, says: If it should enter your mind to say that leprosy is more stringent, then the Torah should have written the halakha with regard to creeping animals, and let leprosy be derived from them. Ultimately, the two halakhot are paralleled to one another in the Torah. It would have been simpler to explicitly write the laws of creeping animals and to derive leprosy from them. Since that is not the case, it is proof that the halakhot of creeping animals can be derived from leprosy.,The other amora, Abaye, said that this contention is fundamentally unsound, as leprosy could not be derived from creeping animals because there is room to refute this idea and challenge: What is the comparison to the ritual impurity of creeping animals, which is more stringent than the ritual impurity of leprosy, as the creeping animal makes one ritually impure even in a case where it is a lentil-bulk, which is not true of other types of ritual impurity? Therefore, verses were necessary to teach about the ritual impurity of both creeping animals and leprosy.,Abaye said: This statement of the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael diverges from another statement of the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, as the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: From the fact that the verse says garment, I have derived nothing other than the halakha that a garment of wool or linen can become ritually impure. However, from where is it derived to include garments made of camels’ hair and rabbits’ wool, goats’ hair or the types of silk, the shirayin, the kalakh, and the serikin among the fabrics that can become ritually impure? The verse states: Or a garment. The word “or” serves as an amplification to include all types of fabric.,Whereas Rava said: There is no need to say that there is a dispute in this case between two tannaim from a single school. Rather, when this tanna from the school of Rabbi Yishmael, quoted above, is not of the opinion that there is ritual impurity in other garments, it is only with regard to a swatch that is three by three fingerbreadths; however, with regard to a cloth that is three by three handbreadths he is of the opinion that it becomes ritually impure. His previous statement came to exclude a small garment from becoming ritually impure. This statement is referring to a larger garment that is three by three handbreadths.,The Gemara asks: Isn’t Rava the one who said above that, in the case of three by three handbreadths in other garments, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar is of the opinion that they can become ritually impure, whereas the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael is not of the opinion that they become ritually impure? The Gemara answers: Rava retracted that opinion in order to reconcile the opinions of the tannaim of the school of Rabbi Yishmael. And if you wish, say instead a different answer: Rav Pappa said this statement and not Rava. Since Rav Pappa was the primary disciple of Rava, the Gemara attributed his statement to Rava.,Rav Pappa himself understood the first statement of the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael and stated it in a completely different manner. In his opinion, the derivation from the halakhot of leprosy, which concluded that even all nonspecific mentions of garments in the Torah refer to wool or linen, came to include the halakhot of diverse kinds, the Torah prohibition to wear clothing made from a mixture of wool and linen threads. He sought to prove that the halakhot of prohibited mixtures of threads apply only to wool and linen. The Gemara asks: Why does he require this derivation with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds? The fact that the prohibition is limited to wool and linen is explicitly written, as it is stated: “You shall not wear diverse kinds, wool and linen together” (Deuteronomy 22:11). The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, an additional derivation was necessary, as it would have entered your mind to say that this, the restriction of the prohibition of diverse kinds to wool and linen, applies specifically to a case when one uses them together in the manner of wearing them; however, in merely placing the garments upon oneself, any two kinds are prohibited. Therefore, it was necessary to derive that the garment mentioned is restricted to wool and linen.,This claim is rejected: And is it not an a fortiori inference? Just as in the case of wearing the garment, where one’s entire body derives benefit from the diverse kinds, you said that wool and linen, yes, are included in the prohibition, other materials, no, are not included; in the case of merely placing the garment upon himself, all the more so that the halakha should not be more stringent. Rather, certainly the halakha that was attributed to Rav Pappa is a mistake, and he did not say it.,Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak also said that those statements of the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael do not refer to the halakhot of ritual impurity. They refer to another topic. In his opinion, the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael came to say that just as the halakhot of leprosy are limited to garments made from wool or linen, so too, all

garments mentioned in the Torah are made from wool and linen. This comes to include the law of ritual fringes; the obligation of ritual fringes applies only to those materials. The Gemara asks: Why is that derivation necessary? With regard to ritual fringes it is written explicitly: “You shall not wear diverse kinds, wool and linen together” (Deuteronomy 22:11); and juxtaposed to it, it is written: “You shall make for you twisted fringes upon the four corners of your covering, with which you cover yourself” (Deuteronomy 22:12). From the juxtaposition of these two verses it is derived that the mitzva of ritual fringes applies only to garments to which the laws of diverse kinds apply. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak responded that the matter is not so clear, as it could have entered your mind to say in accordance with the statement of Rava. As Rava raised a contradiction: On the one hand, it is written: “And that they put with the fringe of each corner a thread of sky blue” (Numbers 15:39); apparently, the threads of the ritual fringes must be of the same type of fabric as the corner of the garment. However, in Deuteronomy, in the laws of ritual fringes, it is written in juxtaposition to the laws of diverse kinds: Wool and linen together. The ritual fringes may only be made of those materials. How can that contradiction be resolved? Rather, Rava says: Ritual fringes made of wool and linen exempt the garment and fulfill the obligation of ritual fringes whether the garment is of their own type, wool or linen, whether it is not of their own type. Whereas with regard to other types, a garment of their own type, they exempt; a garment not of their own type, they do not exempt. It would have entered your mind to explain this in accordance with the approach of Rava. Therefore, the tanna taught us that the obligation of ritual fringes applies only to wool and linen and not to other materials.,Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: According to the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, what is different about ritual impurity that he includes other garments not made of wool and linen because it is written: Or a garment, which is a term of amplification? Here too, in the matter of ritual fringes, say that it comes to include other garments from the phrase: Of your covering, with which you cover yourself. Rav Ashi answered: That amplification is necessary to include the garment of a blind person in the obligation of ritual fringes. As it was taught in a baraita, with regard to ritual fringes it is stated: “And it shall be unto you for a fringe, that you may look upon it and remember all the mitzvot of the Lord” (Numbers 15:39). The phrase: That you may look, comes to exclude a night garment, which cannot be seen and is therefore exempt from the mitzva of ritual fringes. The tanna continues: Do you say that the verse comes to exclude a night garment? Or is it only to exclude the garment of a blind person who is also unable to fulfill the verse: That you may look upon it? The tanna explains: When it says in Deuteronomy: Of your covering, with which you cover yourself, the garment of a blind person is mentioned, as he too covers himself with a covering. If so, then how do I fulfill the exclusion: That you may look upon it? It comes to exclude a night garment.,The Gemara asks: Since there is one verse that includes and another verse that excludes, what did you see that led you to include a blind person and to exclude a night garment in the obligation of ritual fringes? The Gemara answers: I include the garment of a blind person because it is, at least, visible to others, and I exclude a night garment because it is not even visible to others.,The Gemara asks: And say that this amplification does not come to include a blind person’s garments, but rather, as Rava said, to include other garments not made from wool or linen in the obligation of ritual fringes. The Gemara answers: It is logical to say that since the Torah is standing and discussing a garment made of wool or linen, it is certainly including another garment made of wool or linen. Therefore, an amplification with regard to the garment of a blind person made of wool or linen is derived. However, when the Torah is standing and discussing a garment made from wool or linen, is it reasonable to say that it is including other garments with them? Rather, other garments are certainly not derived from there.,The Gemara returns to discuss the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who disqualified even small cloths from being used as roofing in the sukka because they can become ritually impure. Abaye said: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar and Sumakhos said the same thing. The Gemara specifies: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar; that which we stated above. Sumakhos; as it was taught in a baraita: Sumakhos says: A sukka that he roofed with roofing made from spun thread is disqualified because spun thread can become ritually impure from leprosy.,In accordance with whose opinion is Sumakhos’ statement? It is in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as we learned in a mishna: Warp and woof can become ritually impure from leprosy immediately after they are spun; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: The warp can become ritually impure only after it is removed from the cauldron in which it is boiled, and it is only the woof that can become ritually impure immediately. However, the bundles of unprocessed flax can become ritually impure after they are bleached in the oven and their processing is at least half-completed. Sumakhos, the student of Rabbi Meir, adheres to his position.,MISHNA: Of all substances that emerge from the tree, one may light only with flax on Shabbat (Tosafot) because the other substances do not burn well. And of all substances that emerge from the tree, the only substance that becomes ritually impure with impurity transmitted by tents over a corpse is flax. If there is a dead body inside a house or a tent that is made from any materials that originate from a tree, everything in the house becomes ritually impure. However, only in the case of flax does the tent itself become impure.,GEMARA: The mishna mentioned flax as a material that comes from a tree. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that flax is called a tree? Based on appearance, it does not resemble a tree at all. Mar Zutra said: It is derived from that which the verse said: “And she had taken them up to the roof and hidden them under the trees of flax” (Joshua 2:6).,And we also learned in the mishna that with regard to any substance that emerges from the tree, the only substance that becomes ritually impure with impurity transmitted by tents over a corpse is flax. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? Rabbi Elazar said: The tanna learned a verbal analogy [gezera shava] between the word tent, written in the context of ritual impurity, and the word tent,
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written in the context of the Tabernacle. It is written here, in the discussion of the laws of ritual impurity: “This is the law: When a man dies in a tent, every one that comes into the tent, and everything that is in the tent, shall be impure seven days” (Numbers 19:14), and it is written there: “And he spread the tent over the Tabernacle, and put the covering of the tent above upon it; as the Lord commanded Moses” (Exodus 40:19). Just as below, with regard to the Tabernacle, the tent was made of linen and is considered a tent, so too, here, with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, only a tent made of linen is considered a tent. The Gemara asks: If so, derive the following from that same verbal analogy: Just as below the linen threads in the Tabernacle were specifically threads that were twisted and the threads were folded six times, so too, here, in all of the halakhot pertaining to a tent over a corpse, the threads must be twisted and their threads folded six times. The verse states the word tent, tent several times to amplify and include even a tent made of linen not identical to the Tabernacle. The Gemara asks: If the repetition of the word tent, tent several times amplifies, even all things should be included among those items that can receive ritual impurity as a tent. The Gemara answers: This amplification cannot be that far-reaching, as, if so, the verbal analogy of tent, tent, that teaches us to derive the tent over a corpse from the Tabernacle, what purpose does it serve if everything is included? Rather, certainly the amplification is not absolute. Through the combination of the verbal analogy and the amplification, it is derived that this halakha applies specifically to linen.,And perhaps say: Just as below, in the Tabernacle, there were beams supporting the tent, so too, here, in the laws of ritual impurity, a tent made of beams should also be considered a tent. The Gemara responds that the verse said: “And you shall make the beams for the Tabernacle of acacia wood, standing up” (Exodus 26:15). From the language of the verse, it is derived that the Tabernacle, i.e., the curtains alone, is called Tabernacle, and the beams are not called Tabernacle, because they merely facilitate the Tabernacle. The Gemara rejects this: But if that is so, based on an analysis of the language of the verse, it says there: “And you shall make a covering for the tent of rams’ skins dyed red and a covering of teḥashim above” (Exodus 26:14), then in that case, too, say that the covering is not considered a tent. If so, however, what of the dilemma raised by Rabbi Elazar: With regard to the hide of a non-kosher animal over a corpse, what is the ruling? Can it become ritually impure as a tent over a corpse? If the covering of the Tabernacle is not considered a tent, now, the hide of a kosher animal that covered the Tabernacle cannot become ritually impure. If that is so, is it necessary to mention that the hide of a non-kosher animal cannot become ritually impure? The Gemara answers: The cases are not comparable because it is different there, in the case of the covering of animal hides, because the verse subsequently restored its status as a tent by uniting the tent and its covering, as it is written: “They shall bear the curtains of the Tabernacle, and the Tent of Meeting, its covering, and the covering of taḥash that is upon it” (Numbers 4:25). The verse juxtaposes the upper to the lower covering; just as the lower covering is considered a tent, so too, the upper covering is considered a tent.,Rabbi Elazar’s dilemma was mentioned above, and now the Gemara discusses the matter itself. Rabbi Elazar raised a dilemma: With regard to the hide of a non-kosher animal over a corpse, what is the ruling? Can it become ritually impure as a tent over a corpse? The Gemara clarifies: What is the essence of his dilemma? Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The taḥash that existed in the time of Moses is at the crux of Rabbi Elazar’s dilemma. Was it non-kosher or was it kosher? Rav Yosef said: What is his dilemma? Didn’t we learn explicitly: Only the hide of a kosher animal was deemed suitable for heavenly service? Certainly, the taḥash was a kosher species.,Rabbi Abba raised an objection. Rabbi Yehuda says: There were two coverings for the Tabernacle, one made of the reddened hides of rams and one of the hides of teḥashim. Rabbi Neḥemya says: There was only one covering for the Tabernacle, half of which was made of rams’ hides and half from the hides of teḥashim. And teḥashim were similar to the species of undomesticated animals called tela ilan. The Gemara asks: But isn’t a tela ilan a non-kosher creature? The Gemara emends this statement: This is what Rabbi Neḥemya intended to say: It was like a tela ilan in that it was multicolored; however, it was not an actual tela ilan. There, the tela ilan is non-kosher, and here, the covering of the tent was made from kosher animals. Rav Yosef said: If so, that is the reason that we translate the word taḥash as sasgona, which means that it rejoices [sas] in many colors [gevanim].,Rava said that the proof that the hide of a non-kosher animal becomes ritually impure in a tent over a corpse is derived from here, as it was taught in a baraita that it is stated in the halakhot of ritual impurity of leprosy that the leprosy could be: “Either in the warp, or in the woof, whether they be of linen, or of wool; or in a hide, or in any thing made of hide” (Leviticus 13:48). The verse could have simply stated: Or hide, and it said instead: Or in a hide. The Sages said: These words, or in a hide, amplify to include the hide of a non-kosher animal as well as hide that was afflicted in the hands of a priest, i.e., before the owner showed it to the priest there was no leprosy but it became leprous while in the hands of the priest, that they too become ritually impure. If one cut pieces from each of these types and made of them a single cloth, from where is it derived that it can become ritually impure? The verse states from the broader amplification: Or in anything made of hide. The Gemara remarks: There is room to refute this parallel, rendering it impossible to derive the laws of ritual impurity imparted by a corpse from the laws of leprosy. What is the comparison to leprosy with regard to which the Torah is stringent, as even the warp and woof that have not been woven into a garment can become ritually impure from it, which is not the case in impurity imparted by a corpse?,Rather, one could say that he derived it from the laws of the ritual impurity of creeping animals, as it is stated with regard to them: “And upon whatsoever any of them, when they are dead, does fall, it shall be impure; whether it be any vessel of wood, or garment, or hide, or sack, whatsoever vessel it be, with which any work is done” (Leviticus 11:32). As it was taught in a baraita: From the use of the word hide, I have derived nothing other than the fact that the hide of a kosher animal becomes ritually impure from contact with a creeping animal; however, from where is it derived that the hide of a non-kosher animal can become ritually impure? This is derived from the amplification, as the verse states: Or hide. Since, with regard to the ritual impurity of creeping animals the laws of the hides of kosher and non-kosher animals are identical, it is derived that this is also true with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity imparted by a corpse. Once again, the Gemara says: There is room to refute this derivation and say: What is the comparison to creeping animals, as their legal status is stringent because they become ritually impure even if they are as small as a lentil-bulk, which is not true in the case of a corpse? In order for a corpse to transmit ritual impurity, it must be larger, an olive-bulk. Therefore, the Gemara says: If so, the case of leprosy can prove that the fact that creeping animals that are a lentil-bulk transmit impurity is not a factor in whether or not a non-kosher animal hide can become ritually impure. Leprosy that is a lentil-bulk does not transmit impurity and, nevertheless, the hide of a non-kosher animal becomes ritually impure from it. And the derivation has reverted to its starting point. The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case, as each case has its own unique stringencies. However, their common denominator is that hide, in general, is ritually impure in both cases, and the Torah rendered the hide of a non-kosher animal equal to the hide of a kosher animal in that it becomes ritually impure. I will also bring the additional halakha of a tent over a corpse made of the hide of a non-kosher animal, and in that case as well, the hide of a non-kosher animal will be rendered equal to the hide of a kosher animal.,Rava from Barnish said to Rav Ashi: There is still room to refute this statement and say: What is the comparison to leprosy and creeping animals? Their common denominator is that they both transmit ritual impurity when smaller than an olive-bulk. Can you say the same in the case of a corpse, which only transmits ritual impurity when it is at least an olive-bulk? Therefore, despite the differences between them, these two halakhot are both more stringent than the laws of ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, and the status of a non-kosher animal hide cannot be derived from them.,Rather, Rava from Barnish said it can be derived in the following manner:

It is derived through an a fortiori inference from goats’ hair. Although goats’ hair does not become ritually impure from leprosy, it does become ritually impure as a tent over a corpse; with regard to the hide of a non-kosher animal that becomes ritually impure from leprosy, is it not the case that it becomes ritually impure as a tent over a corpse?,Since the conclusion was that the hide of even a non-kosher animal can become ritually impure as a tent over a corpse, it is not necessary to assume that the covering of the Tabernacle was made specifically from the hide of a kosher animal. And, if so, that which Rav Yosef taught: Only the hide of a kosher animal was suitable for heavenly service, for what halakhais that relevant, as it is clearly not relevant to the Tabernacle? The Gemara replies: This halakha was stated with regard to phylacteries, which may be prepared only from the hide of a kosher animal. The Gemara asks: Phylacteries? Why did Rav Yosef need to state that halakha? It is written explicitly with regard to them: “And it shall be for a sign unto you upon your hand, and for a memorial between your eyes, that the law of the Lord may be in your mouth” (Exodus 13:9). The Sages derived from there that the phylacteries must be prepared from that which is permitted to be eaten in your mouth.,Rather, the Gemara explains that this halakha of Rav Yosef was said only with regard to the leather of the boxes that house the phylacteries, which must be crafted from the hide of a kosher animal. It was not referring to the parchment on which the portions of the Torah inserted into the phylacteries are written. The Gemara asks: Didn’t Abaye say: The obligation to make a letter shin protruding on the phylacteries of one’s head is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai? Since Torah law addresses the boxes of the phylacteries, presumably their legal status is parallel to that of the parchment and the prohibition against preparing them from the hide of a non-kosher animal is by Torah law as well.,Rather, the Gemara explains that Rav Yosef’s halakha comes to teach that one must tie the parchments upon which the portions of the Torah are written in the phylacteries with a kosher animal’s hair, as well as sew the phylacteries with a kosher animal’s sinews. The Gemara asks: The source of these halakhot is also a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai, as it was taught in a baraita: The requirement that phylacteries must be square is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai, as is the requirement that they must be tied with their hair and sewn with their sinews.,Rather, the Gemara says that Rav Yosef came to teach with regard to the halakha of the straps of the phylacteries. The Gemara asks: Didn’t Rabbi Yitzḥak say: The straps of the phylacteries must be black is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai? The Gemara responds: Although we learned this halakha, which states that the straps must be black, did we also learn that they must be from kosher animals? Rav Yosef was certainly referring to straps when he said that all heavenly service must be performed with the hides of kosher animals.,The Gemara asks: What is the halakhic conclusion reached about this matter of the taḥash that existed in the days of Moses? Rabbi Ela said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said that Rabbi Meir used to say: The taḥash that existed in the days of Moses was a creature unto itself, and the Sages did not determine whether it was a type of undomesticated animal or a type of domesticated animal. And it had a single horn on its forehead, and this taḥash happened to come to Moses for the moment while the Tabernacle was being built, and he made the covering for the Tabernacle from it. And from then on the taḥash was suppressed and is no longer found.,The Gemara comments: From the fact that it is said that the taḥash had a single horn on its forehead, conclude from this that it was kosher, as Rav Yehuda said in a similar vein: The ox that Adam, the first man, sacrificed as a thanks-offering for his life being spared, had a single horn on its forehead, as it is stated: “And it shall please the Lord better than a horned [makrin] and hooved ox” (Psalms 69:32). The word makrin means one with a horn. The Gemara asks: On the contrary, makrin indicates that it has two horns. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Despite the fact that it is vocalized in the plural, it is written mikeren without the letter yod to indicate that it had only a single horn. The Gemara asks: If so, let us resolve from the same baraita that just as it was derived from the ox of Adam, the first man, that an animal with one horn is kosher, derive that an animal with one horn is a type of domesticated animal. The Gemara answers: Since there is the keresh which is a type of undomesticated animal, and it has only a single horn, it is also possible to say that the taḥash is a type of undomesticated animal. This dilemma was not resolved.,MISHNA: The wick of a garment, i.e., cloth made into a wick for a lamp, that one folded it into a size and shape suitable for a wick, but did not yet singe it slightly in order to facilitate its lighting, Rabbi Eliezer says: This wick is ritually impure. With regard to the laws of ritual impurity, it can, like other garments, still become ritually impure and one may not light with it on Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva says: It is ritually pure and one may even light with it on Shabbat.,GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to ritual impurity, the reasons for their disagreement are clear and this is their dispute: Rabbi Eliezer holds that folding alone is ineffective in altering the identity of the garment and it retains its original status. It can become ritually impure like any other garment. Rabbi Akiva holds that folding is effective, and it negates its garment status, and therefore, it can no longer become ritually impure.,However, with regard to lighting on Shabbat what is at the crux of their dispute? Rabbi Elazar said that Rav Oshaya said, and Rav Adda bar Ahava said likewise: Here we are dealing with a cloth that is precisely three by three fingerbreadths and we are dealing with a Festival that occurred on Shabbat eve. And everyone is of the opinion that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that on a Festival one may only kindle a fire with whole vessels, as it is permitted to carry them and they do not have set-aside [muktze] status; however, one may not kindle a fire using broken vessels, i.e., vessels that broke on the Festival. Since they broke on the Festival itself, they are classified as an entity that came into being [nolad] on the Festival, and the halakha prohibits moving them. And, similarly, everyone is of the opinion that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Ulla, as Ulla said: One who lights a lamp must light most of the wick that protrudes from the lamp. Based on these assumptions, the dispute in the mishna can be understood as follows: Rabbi Eliezer holds that folding alone is ineffective in negating the wick’s vessel status, and once one lights only a small part of it, it thereby becomes a broken vessel, as part of it burns and the remainder is less than three by three fingerbreadths. A smaller cloth is no longer considered significant. Since he is required to light most of the protruding wick and, as mentioned above, it is prohibited to light broken vessels, he may not light the folded garment. And Rabbi Akiva held that folding is effective and, immediately when he folded it, the garment no longer has the status of a vessel. It was not considered a vessel even before he lit it, and when he lights it, it is as if he were lighting plain wood, not a vessel that broke on the Festival.,Rav Yosef said, that is what I learned: Three by three exactly. And I did not know to what halakha this was relevant. Rav Yosef received from his teachers that the baraita is referring to a case of three by three exactly, and he did not know why it was significant to establish the baraita in a case of exactly three by three and no more.,The Gemara adds incidentally: And from the fact that Rav Adda bar Ahava interpreted this mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, conclude from this that he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Did Rav Adda bar Ahava actually say this? Didn’t Rav Adda bar Ahava himself say:
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When a gentile carved out a vessel the size of a kav from a piece of wood on a Festival and thereby rendered it a new vessel, a Jew may burn the vessel on a Festival ab initio. And why may he do so? This new vessel that was made from the wood is an object that came into being [nolad] on a Festival, and is set-aside [muktze]. Since Rav Adda bar Ahava permitted doing so, apparently he holds that the laws of set-aside do not apply on a Festival, contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara answers: Rav Adda bar Ahava said this statement in explanation of the statements of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva in the mishna; however, he himself does not hold that way. Although he explained the opinions in the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, he himself does not hold that that is the halakha.,Rava said, this is the reasoning behind Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion with regard to lighting the wick: Because he holds that one may neither light on Shabbat using a wick that is not slightly singed and prepared for lighting nor light with rags that were not singed before Shabbat. If a person singes the wick slightly before lighting it, it will burn well. A wick that has not been singed does not burn well and will not show the appropriate deference to Shabbat. The Gemara asks: If so, that which Rav Yosef taught: Three by three exactly, to what halakha is it relevant? According to Rava’s explanation, the precise size of the garment used in making the wick is irrelevant. The Gemara responds: Rav Yosef’s statement was with regard to another matter, the halakhot of ritual impurity. As we learned in a mishna in tractate Kelim: Three by three fingerbreadths that they stated as the smallest sized garment that can become ritually impure, excludes the portion used for the hem, i.e., those threads that emerge at the edge of the garment and are sewn into a hem; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. And the Rabbis say: Three by three exactly, even including the hem. That is the context of Rav Yosef’s statement: Three by three exactly.,With regard to the statement cited above, Rav Yehuda said that Rav said that there is a dispute between the tannaim on this issue: One may only kindle a fire with whole vessels and one may not kindle a fire with broken vessels; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Shimon permits kindling a fire even with broken vessels. An additional halakha: One may kindle a fire with whole dates on a Festival, and if he ate them, he may not kindle a fire with their pits as they are set-aside; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Shimon permits kindling a fire with the pits. Furthermore, one may kindle a fire with whole nuts on a Festival, and if he ate them, he may not kindle a fire with their shells; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Shimon permits doing so.,The Gemara comments: And it was necessary to cite all three of these cases because each teaches a novel idea. As, had Rav taught us only the first halakha, we would have thought that it is specifically in that case, with regard to burning broken vessels, that Rabbi Yehuda said that it is prohibited, as initially it was a vessel and now it is a broken vessel, and therefore it is considered an object that came into being [nolad] and prohibited; however, dates, initially there were pits in the dates and now they remain pits, say that one may well do so. And had Rav taught us only with regard to date pits I would have said that they are prohibited because initially they were concealed within the fruit and now they are exposed, it is a case of an object that came into being and prohibited. However, nutshells, which initially were exposed and now are exposed, as they were before, say that one may well do so. Therefore, it was necessary to teach all of these cases.,And the Gemara adds: This halakha of Rav was not stated explicitly; rather, it was stated by inference based on conclusions drawn from Rav’s actions and not from his explicit statements. There was an instance where Rav ate dates on a weekday and threw the pits into the oven. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to him: Son of noblemen, the corresponding action, throwing pits into an oven, is prohibited on a Festival. The Gemara asks: Did Rav accept this halakha from him or did he not accept it from him?,Come and hear: When Rav came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he ate dates on a Festival and threw their pits to the animals so that they may eat them. Wasn’t it a case involving Persian dates, which are quality dates whose fruit comes completely off the pits, leaving the pits with no trace of fruit? Ostensibly, they are completely set-aside as they are of no use at all to people. And the fact that Rav threw the pits to the animals indicates that he did not accept this halakha from Rabbi Ḥiyya, and he holds that there is no prohibition in that case. The Gemara replies: No, this is a case involving Aramean dates whose fruit does not come off completely, and remnants of the date remain attached to the pit. These pits, since they are still fit for use due to their mother, i.e., the fruit itself, one is permitted to carry them.,Rav Shmuel bar bar Ḥana said to Rav Yosef: According to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that one may kindle a fire with whole vessels, and one may not kindle a fire with broken vessels, how it is possible to use whole vessels? Once they are ignited a bit, they become broken vessels, and when one turns the wood over to accelerate their ignition, he turns them over in a prohibited manner, as it is prohibited to light with broken vessels. The Gemara answers: This is a case where he acted in accordance with the statement of Rav Mattana. As Rav Mattana said that Rav said: Branches that fell from a palm tree into an oven on a Festival, since these branches were attached to the tree at the onset of the Festival, they are set-aside and it is prohibited to move them. Nevertheless, he can remedy the situation if he adds wood that was prepared for burning prior to the Festival, until the majority of the wood in the oven is not set-aside, and then kindles them. Since the majority of the wood is permitted, he need not concern himself with the minority. One may do the same when burning vessels by adding wood that is not set-aside.,Rav Hamnuna said a different explanation of the dispute in the mishna. In his opinion, here we are dealing with a garment that is smaller than three by three handbreadths, and they taught here halakhot established by the Sages with regard to insignificant small cloths.,And Rabbi Eliezer followed his line of reasoning expressed elsewhere, and Rabbi Akiva followed his line of reasoning expressed elsewhere. As we learned in a mishna in tractate Kelim: A cloth smaller than three by three handbreadths that was utilized to plug the bath, and to pour from a boiling pot, and to wipe the millstone, whether this cloth was expressly prepared for that purpose or whether it was not prepared, it can become ritually impure; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And Rabbi Yehoshua says: Whether it was prepared or whether it was not prepared, it is ritually pure, i.e., it cannot become ritually impure. Rabbi Akiva distinguishes between the cases and says: If it was prepared it is ritually impure, and if it was not prepared it is ritually pure. And Ulla said, and some say that Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Everyone agrees that a cloth this size, if one threw it into the garbage dump, it is ritually pure. His discarding of the cloth indicates that he no longer considers this cloth a garment and no longer considers it significant.

If one placed it in a box, everyone agrees that it can become ritually impure because his placing the cloth in a box indicates that he considers the cloth significant and is keeping it in order to use it. They only disagreed in a case where one hung the garment on a dryer, i.e., a stake in the wall, or where he placed it behind a door. Rabbi Eliezer held: From the fact that he did not throw it in the garbage dump, it is certainly on his mind and he is planning to use it. And what is the reason that he called it not prepared? It is because, relative to a cloth placed in a box, it is not considered prepared for use. And Rabbi Yehoshua held that since he did not place it in a box, certainly he has negated its garment status. And what is the reason that he called it prepared? Because relative to one thrown in the garbage, this garment is prepared for use, although, in fact, the cloth has already been negated. And Rabbi Akiva, in the case where he hung it on a dryer, held in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer that one has not yet negated it from use and it can therefore become ritually impure. In the case where he placed it behind a door, Rabbi Akiva held in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua that, in doing so, he negated its garment status, and it can no longer become ritually impure.,The Gemara comments: And Rabbi Akiva retracted his opinion in favor of the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua and held in accordance with his opinion. And from where do we know this? Rava said: From the term that we learned in our mishna: The wick of a garment [petilat habeged]. Why did it specifically teach: The wick of a garment? Teach that halakha using the phrase: A wick made from a garment. What is the reason that the mishna taught: A wick of a garment? It is because it remains a garment. Nevertheless, Rabbi Akiva deemed it ritually pure, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua.,MISHNA: The fundamental dispute in this mishna is with regard to the determination whether or not indirect acts of kindling and extinguishing fall within the parameters of the prohibition on Shabbat. The Rabbis said: A person may not pierce a hole in an eggshell and fill it with oil, and place it over the mouth of a lamp so that the egg will drip additional oil into the lamp and thereby extend the time that it burns. And this is the ruling even if it is not an actual egg but an earthenware vessel. And Rabbi Yehuda permits doing so. However, if the craftsman, who crafts ceramic vessels, attached the egg to the lamp from the outset, one is permitted to fill it with oil because it constitutes a single, large vessel. The Rabbis decreed that a person may not fill a bowl with oil, and place it beside the lamp, and place the unlit head of the wick into the bowl so that it draws additional oil from the bowl and thereby extend the time that the lamp burns. And Rabbi Yehuda permits doing so.,GEMARA: The Gemara comments on the fact that the mishna cited three cases that all share the same rationale: And it was necessary to cite all of the aforementioned cases because it is impossible to derive one from the other. As, had the Gemara only taught us the prohibition of an eggshell, I would have said that, specifically in that case, the Rabbis said that it is prohibited to do so. Since the egg is not dirty and disgusting, there is room for concern that one might come to take oil from it, which would be tantamount to taking oil from a burning lamp on Shabbat, because it causes the flame to be extinguished faster. However, an earthenware tube that is disgusting, say that the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Yehuda that there is no room for concern, and even according to their opinion it would be permitted. And, conversely, had the Gemara only taught us the prohibition of an earthenware tube, I would have said that, specifically in that case, Rabbi Yehuda says that one is permitted to do so because it is disgusting, as explained above; however, in that case of the eggshell that is not disgusting, say that he agrees with the Rabbis that it is prohibited. And had the Gemara taught us only those two cases of the eggshell and the earthenware tube, I would have said that, specifically in those cases, Rabbi Yehuda said that it is permitted because there is no separation between the lamp and the second receptacle. However, in the case of a bowl, which is separate, say that he agrees with the Rabbis that it is prohibited. And, conversely, had the Gemara only taught us in that case of the added bowl, I would have said that only in that case did the Rabbis say it is prohibited because it is separate. However, in these two cases of the eggshell and the ceramic tube, I would say that the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Yehuda and permit doing so. Therefore, it was necessary for the mishna to specifically state the halakha in each of the cases cited.,And we also learned in our mishna that if the craftsman attached the tube to the lamp from the outset, it is permitted to fill it with oil and use it. It was taught in a baraita that even if a homeowner attached it to the vessel before Shabbat by means of plaster or with dry potter’s clay, it is permitted. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we specifically learn in the mishna: If the craftsman attached it from the outset, not a layman? The Gemara answers: What is the meaning of craftsman in the mishna? It refers to any attachment similar to the attachment of the craftsman.,With regard to the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said to the Rabbis: One time we spent our Shabbat in the upper story of the house of Nit’za in the city of Lod. And they brought us an eggshell, and we filled it with oil, and pierced it, and left it over the lamp in order to extend its burning. And Rabbi Tarfon and other Elders were there and they did not say anything to us. Apparently, there is no prohibition. The Rabbis said to him: Do you bring proof from there? The legal status of the Elders who were sitting in the house of Nit’za is different. They are vigilant. There is no room for concern lest they use the oil in the eggshell and accelerate the extinguishing of the lamp. However, in every other circumstance, doing so is prohibited.,The Gemara relates: Avin from the city of Tzippori dragged a bench in an upper story, whose floor was made of marble, before Rabbi Yitzḥak ben Elazar. Rabbi Yitzḥak ben Elazar said to him: If I remain silent and say nothing to you, as Rabbi Tarfon and the members of the group of Elders were silent and said nothing to Rabbi Yehuda, damage will result, as it will lead to unfounded leniency in the future. Had they told Rabbi Yehuda at that time that it is prohibited to puncture the eggshell, he would not have disagreed with the Rabbis. He would not have mistakenly derived a general leniency. So too, here the Sages issued a decree on a marble-floored upper story due to a standard upper story with an earth floor. One who drags a bench on an earth floor will create a furrow.,On the topic of dragging, the Gemara relates that the Head of the Kenesset of Batzra dragged a bench before Rabbi Yirmeya the Great on Shabbat. Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: In accordance with whose opinion do you permit yourself to drag a bench on Shabbat? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? Say that Rabbi Shimon said his statement specifically with regard to large benches that are impossible to move from place to place in any other way, but in the case of small benches did he say that one is permitted to drag them? And this disagrees with the opinion of Ulla, as Ulla said: The dispute with regard to dragging is in the case of small benches; however, in the case of large benches, everyone agrees that one is permitted to drag them, as there is no other way to move them.,Rav Yosef raised an objection from what was taught in a baraita, Rabbi Shimon says: One may drag a bed, a chair, and a bench across the floor on Shabbat even though it creates a furrow, as long as he does not intend to create a furrow. This baraita teaches about large objects, like a bed, and teaches about small objects, like a chair. If so, this is difficult for both Rabbi Yirmeya the Great and for Ulla. Rabbi Yirmeya holds that Rabbi Shimon prohibits dragging even small furniture. Ulla holds that even Rabbi Yehuda permits dragging large pieces of furniture. According to his opinion, there is no need for Rabbi Shimon to state that it is permitted.,The Gemara answers that Ulla reconciles the objection in accordance with his reasoning and Rabbi Yirmeya the Great reconciles the objection in accordance with his reasoning. The Gemara explains: Ulla reconciles the objection in accordance with his reasoning: A bed, similar to a chair; the baraita is referring here to a small bed that can be carried like a chair, with regard to which there is a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Yirmeya the Great reconciles the objection in accordance with his reasoning: A chair, similar to a bed; the baraita is referring to dragging a heavy chair that cannot be moved in any other way.,Rabba raised an objection to Rabbi Yirmeya’s statement from that which we learned in a mishna: Clothing merchants who sell garments made of diverse kinds, a prohibited mixture of wool and linen, may sell them as they normally would to gentiles, and they may place the garments that they are selling on their shoulders and need not be concerned about the prohibition against wearing diverse kinds, as long as the merchant does not intend to benefit from the garments in the sun as protection from the sun, or in the rain as protection from the rain. However, the modest people, those who are particularly fastidious in performing mitzvot, would suspend the wool and linen garments on a stick behind them. And here, in the case of dragging benches, where it is possible to act like the modest people, as the clothes are similar to small benches, and nevertheless, when one does not intend to perform the prohibited action, Rabbi Shimon permits dragging even ab initio. Rabbi Shimon holds that one who does not intend to violate a prohibition need not take an alternative course of action due to concern that resulting from his action, the prohibited act might come to be performed. Based on that principle, it is clear that Rabbi Shimon would permit dragging small benches since one does not intend to create a furrow in dragging them. This is a conclusive refutation of the statement of Rabbi Yirmeya the Great, who held that dragging small objects is prohibited according to Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation. MISHNA: One who extinguishes the lamp on Shabbat because he is afraid due to gentiles, from whom he is hiding in his home, and due to thieves, or if one is afraid due to an evil spirit, i.e., he is depressed and prefers sitting in the dark, or if he extinguished the flame due to the sick person so that he will sleep, he is exempt. However, in a case where he extinguishes the flame in order to spare the lamp, spare the oil, or spare the wick, he is liable. Rabbi Yosei exempts him in all of those cases, as in his opinion no labor prohibited by Torah law is being performed by extinguishing the flame, except for the case where he seeks to spare the wick. Only in that case is extinguishing a creative action because he makes the wick into charcoal by extinguishing the flame.
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GEMARA: From the fact that it was taught in the latter clause of the mishna that one who extinguishes a flame on Shabbat is liable, conclude from it that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that one who performs a prohibited labor on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering even it is a labor that is not necessary for its own sake [melakha sheeina tzerikha legufa]. In the mishna, one does not extinguish the flame to achieve the product produced by extinguishing it. He does so to prevent the light from shining. If so, with what is the first clause of the mishna dealing? If it is referring to one who extinguished the flame due to a critically ill person, the term exempt is imprecise. It should have said permitted, as it is permitted even ab initio to perform a prohibited labor on Shabbat in a case of danger. And if it is speaking about a non-critically ill person, why is one who extinguished the flame exempt? It should have said that one is liable to bring a sin-offering.,The Gemara replies: Actually, the first clause was referring to a critically ill person, and it should have taught that it is permitted. And since the latter clause of the mishna had to teach that one is liable, in the first clause too, it taught employing the opposite term, exempt, so that the mishna would maintain stylistic uniformity. The halakha is, indeed, that not only is one exempt if he extinguished a light for a critically ill person, it is even permitted to do so ab initio. The Gemara asks: What of that which Rabbi Oshaya taught: If one wants to extinguish a flame on Shabbat for a sick person so he can sleep, he may not extinguish it, and if he extinguished it, he is not liable after the fact, but ab initio he is prohibited to do so? The Gemara answers: This is not similar, as that baraita is referring to a non-critically ill person and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that one who performs a prohibited labor not necessary for its own sake is exempt. Our mishna is referring to a critically ill person.,The Gemara relates: This question was asked before Rabbi Tanḥum from the village of Nevi: What is the ruling with regard to extinguishing a burning lamp before a sick person on Shabbat? The Gemara relates that Rabbi Tanḥum delivered an entire homily touching upon both aggadic and halakhic materials surrounding this question. He began and said: You, King Solomon, where is your wisdom, where is your understanding? Not only do your statements contradict the statements of your father David, but your statements even contradict each other. Your father David said: “The dead praise not the Lord, neither any that go down into silence” (Psalms 115:17); and you said: “And I praised the dead that are already dead more than the living that are yet alive” (Ecclesiastes 4:2). And then again you said: “For a living dog is better than a dead lion” (Ecclesiastes 9:4). These are different assessments of life and death.,He resolved the contradictions in the following manner: This is not difficult. That which David said: “The dead praise not the Lord,” this is what he is saying: A person should always engage in Torah and mitzvot before he dies, as once he is dead he is idle from Torah and mitzvot and there is no praise for the Holy One, Blessed be He, from him. And that is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Set free among the dead, like the slain that lie in the grave, whom You remember no more” (Psalms 88:6)? When a person dies he then becomes free of Torah and mitzvot.,And that which Solomon said: “And I praised the dead that are already dead”; he was not speaking of all dead people, but rather in praise of certain dead people. As when Israel sinned in the desert, Moses stood before the Holy One, Blessed be He, and he said several prayers and supplications before Him, and his prayers were not answered. And when he said: “Remember Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, Your servants” (Exodus 32:13), his prayers were answered immediately. Consequently, did Solomon not speak appropriately when he said: “Wherefore I praised the dead that are already dead”? Certainly the merit of the deceased forefathers is greater than that of the righteous people who are alive. Alternatively, the way of the world is such that when a flesh-and-blood prince issues a decree on the public it is uncertain whether they fulfill it and uncertain whether they do not fulfill it. And even if you want to say that they fulfill it, it is only during his lifetime that they fulfill it; after he dies they do not fulfill it. But Moses our teacher issued several decrees and instituted several ordinances, and they are in effect forever and ever. And, if so, is it not appropriate that which Solomon said: “Wherefore I praised the dead that are already dead”?,Alternatively, another explanation is given for the verse: “And I praised the dead that are already dead,” is in accordance with that which Rav Yehuda said that Rav said. As Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: What is the meaning of the verse that was written: “Work on my behalf a sign for good; that they that hate me may see it, and be put to shame” (Psalms 86:17)? David said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, forgive me for that sin in the matter of Bathsheba. He said to him: It is forgiven you. David said to Him: Show me a sign in my lifetime so that all will know that You have forgiven me. God said to him: In your lifetime I will not make it known that you were forgiven; however, in the lifetime of your son Solomon I will make it known.,When Solomon built the Temple and sought to bring the Ark into the Holy of Holies, the gates clung together and could not be opened. Solomon uttered twenty-four songs of praise, as in his prayer there are twenty-four expressions of prayer, song, etc. (I Kings 8), and his prayer was not answered. He began and said: “Lift up your heads, O you gates, and be you lifted up, you everlasting doors; that the King of glory may come in” (Psalms 24:7). Immediately, the gates ran after him to swallow him, as they thought that in the words: “King of glory” he was referring to himself, and they said to him: “Who is the King of glory?” (Psalms 24:8). He said to them: “The Lord strong and mighty, the Lord mighty in battle” (Psalms 24:8). And he said again: “Lift up your heads, O you gates, yea, lift them up, you everlasting doors; that the King of glory may come in. Who then is the King of glory? The Lord of hosts; He is the King of glory. Selah” (Psalms 24:9–10), and he was not answered. When he said: “O Lord God, turn not away the face of Your anointed; remember the good deeds of David Your servant” (II Chronicles 6:42), he was immediately answered, and a fire descended from Heaven (II Chronicles 7:1). At that moment, the faces of all of David’s enemies turned dark like the charred bottom of a pot. And all of Israel knew that the Holy One, Blessed be He, forgave him for that sin. And if so, is it not appropriate what Solomon said: “And I praised the dead that are already dead,” David, more than the living, Solomon, to whose request to open the gates of the Temple God did not respond?,And that is what is written: “On the eighth day he sent the people away, and they blessed the king, and went unto their tents joyful and glad of heart for all the goodness that the Lord had shown unto David His servant and to Israel His people” (I Kings 8:66). The Gemara explains: And went unto their tents, in accordance with the common expression: One’s house is his wife. It is explained that when they returned home they found their wives ritually pure from the ritual impurity of menstruation. Joyful means that they enjoyed the aura of the Divine Presence at the dedication of the Temple. And glad of heart means that the wife of each and every one of them was impregnated and gave birth to a male. The verse continues: For all the goodness that the Lord had shown unto David His servant and to Israel His people. Unto David His servant means that at that opportunity they all saw that God forgave him for that sin. And to Israel His people means that He forgave them for the sin of Yom Kippur, as they did not fast that year (see I Kings 8:65).,The Gemara continues: And that which Solomon said: “For a living dog is better than a dead lion” (Ecclesiastes 9:4), is in accordance with that which Rav Yehuda said that Rav said. As Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: What is the meaning of that verse which David said: “Lord, make me to know my end, and the measure of my days, what it is; let me know how short-lived I am” (Psalms 39:5)? It means that David said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, Lord, make me to know my end; in how long will I die? God said to him: It is decreed before Me that I do not reveal the end of the life of flesh and blood. He asked further: And the measure of my days; on what day of the year will I die? He said to him: It is decreed before Me not to reveal the measure of a person’s days. Again he requested: Let me know how short-lived I am; on what day of the week will I die? He said to him: You will die on Shabbat. David requested of God: Let me die on the first day of the week so that the honor of Shabbat will not be tarnished by the pain of death. He said to him: On that day the time of the kingdom of your son Solomon has already arrived, and one kingdom does not overlap with another and subtract from the time allotted to another even a hairbreadth. He said to him: I will cede a day of my life and die on Shabbat eve. God said to him: “For a day in your courts is better than a thousand” (Psalms 84:11); a single day in which you sit and engage in Torah is preferable to Me than the thousand burnt-offerings that your son Solomon will offer before Me on the altar (see I Kings 3:4).

What did David do? Every Shabbat he would sit and learn all day long to protect himself from the Angel of Death. On that day on which the Angel of Death was supposed to put his soul to rest, the day on which David was supposed to die, the Angel of Death stood before him and was unable to overcome him because his mouth did not pause from study. The Angel of Death said: What shall I do to him? David had a garden [bustana] behind his house; the Angel of Death came, climbed, and shook the trees. David went out to see. As he climbed the stair, the stair broke beneath him. He was startled and was silent, interrupted his studies for a moment, and died.,Since David died in the garden, Solomon sent the following question to the study hall: Father died and is lying in the sun, and the dogs of father’s house are hungry. There is room for concern lest the dogs come and harm his body. What shall I do? They sent an answer to him: Cut up an animal carcass and place it before the dogs. Since the dogs are hungry, handling the animal carcass to feed them is permitted. And with regard to your father, it is prohibited to move his body directly. Place a loaf of bread or an infant on top of him, and you can move him into the shade due to the bread or the infant. And is it not appropriate what Solomon said: “For a living dog is better than a dead lion”. The ultimate conclusion of this discussion is that life is preferable to death. And now, with regard to the question that I asked before you; Rav Tanḥum spoke modestly, as, actually, they had asked him the question. A lamp is called ner and a person’s soul is also called ner, as it is written: “The spirit of man is the lamp [ner] of the Lord” (Proverbs 20:27). It is preferable that the lamp of a being of flesh and blood, an actual lamp, will be extinguished in favor of the lamp of the Holy One, Blessed be He, a person’s soul. Therefore, one is permitted to extinguish a flame for the sake of a sick person.,Since contradictions in Ecclesiastes were mentioned, the Gemara cites additional relevant sources. Rav Yehuda, son of Rav Shmuel bar Sheilat, said in the name of Rav: The Sages sought to suppress the book of Ecclesiastes and declare it apocryphal because its statements contradict each other and it is liable to confuse its readers. And why did they not suppress it? Because its beginning consists of matters of Torah and its end consists of matters of Torah. The ostensibly contradictory details are secondary to the essence of the book, which is Torah. The Gemara elaborates: Its beginning consists of matters of Torah, as it is written: “What profit has man of all his labor which he labors under the sun?” (Ecclesiastes 1:3), and the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai said: By inference: Under the sun is where man has no profit from his labor; however, before the sun, i.e., when engaged in the study of Torah, which preceded the sun, he does have profit. Its ending consists of matters of Torah, as it is written: “The end of the matter, all having been heard: Fear God, and keep His mitzvot; for this is the whole man” (Ecclesiastes 12:13). With regard to this verse, the Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: For this is the whole man? Rabbi Eliezer said: The entire world was only created for this person. Rabbi Abba bar Kahana said: This person is equivalent to the entire world. Shimon ben Azzai says and some say that Shimon ben Zoma says: The entire world was only created as companion to this man, so that he will not be alone.,And to the essence of the matter, the Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Its statements that contradict each other? It is written: “Vexation is better than laughter” (Ecclesiastes 7:3), and it is written: “I said of laughter: It is praiseworthy” (Ecclesiastes 2:2), which is understood to mean that laughter is commendable. Likewise in one verse it is written: “So I commended mirth” (Ecclesiastes 8:15), and in another verse it is written: “And of mirth: What does it accomplish?” (Ecclesiastes 2:2). The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as the contradiction can be resolved. Vexation is better than laughter means: The vexation of the Holy One, Blessed be He, toward the righteous in this world is preferable to the laughter which the Holy One, Blessed be He, laughs with the wicked in this world by showering them with goodness. I said of laughter: It is praiseworthy, that is the laughter which the Holy One, Blessed be He, laughs with the righteous in the World-to-Come.,Similarly, “So I commended mirth,” that is the joy of a mitzva. “And of mirth: What does it accomplish?” that is joy that is not the joy of a mitzva. The praise of joy mentioned here is to teach you that the Divine Presence rests upon an individual neither from an atmosphere of sadness, nor from an atmosphere of laziness, nor from an atmosphere of laughter, nor from an atmosphere of frivolity, nor from an atmosphere of idle conversation, nor from an atmosphere of idle chatter, but rather from an atmosphere imbued with the joy of a mitzva. As it was stated with regard to Elisha that after he became angry at the king of Israel, his prophetic spirit left him until he requested: “But now bring me a minstrel; and it came to pass, when the minstrel played, that the hand of the Lord came upon him” (II Kings 3:15). Rav Yehuda said: And, so too, one should be joyful before stating a matter of halakha. Rava said: And, so too, one should be joyful before going to sleep in order to have a good dream.,The Gemara asks: Is that so, that one should introduce matters of halakha joyfully? Didn’t Rav Giddel say that Rav said: Any Torah scholar who sits before his teacher and his lips are not dripping with myrrh due to fear of his teacher, those lips shall be burnt, as it is stated: “His lips are as lilies, dripping with flowing myrrh [shoshanim notefot mor over]” (Song of Songs 5:13)? He interpreted homiletically: Do not read mor over, flowing myrrh; rather, read mar over, flowing bitterness. Likewise, do not read shoshanim, lilies; rather, read sheshonim, that are studying, meaning that lips that are studying Torah must be full of bitterness. The Gemara explains: This is not difficult, there is no contradiction here, as this, where it was taught that one should introduce matters of halakha joyfully, is referring to a rabbi, and that, where it was taught that one must be filled with bitterness, is referring to a student, who must listen to his teacher with trepidation. And if you wish, say instead that this and that are referring to a rabbi, and it is not difficult. This, where it was taught that he must be joyful, is before he begins teaching, whereas that, where it was taught that he must be filled with bitterness and trepidation, is after he already began teaching halakha. That explanation is like that which Rabba did. Before he began teaching halakha to the Sages, he would say something humorous and the Sages would be cheered. Ultimately, he sat in trepidation and began teaching the halakha.,And, the Gemara continues, the Sages sought to suppress the book of Proverbs as well because its statements contradict each other. And why did they not suppress it? They said: In the case of the book of Ecclesiastes, didn’t we analyze it and find an explanation that its statements were not contradictory? Here too, let us analyze it. And what is the meaning of: Its statements contradict each other? On the one hand, it is written: “Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest you also be like him” (Proverbs 26:4), and on the other hand, it is written: “Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own eyes” (Proverbs 26:5). The Gemara resolves this apparent contradiction: This is not difficult, as this, where one should answer a fool, is referring to a case where the fool is making claims about Torah matters; whereas that, where one should not answer him, is referring to a case where the fool is making claims about mundane matters.,The Gemara relates how Sages conducted themselves in both of those circumstances. As in the case of that man who came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and said to him: Your wife is my wife and your children are my children, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Would you like to drink a cup of wine? He drank and burst and died. Similarly, the Gemara relates: There was that man who came before Rabbi Ḥiyya and said to him: Your mother is my wife, and you are my son. He said to him: Would you like to drink a cup of wine? He drank and burst and died. Rabbi Ḥiyya said with regard to the incident involving Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s prayer that his children will not be rendered mamzerim, children of illicit relations, was effective for him. As when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would pray, he said after his prayer: May it be Your will, O Lord, my God, that You will deliver me today from impudent people and from insolence. Insolence, in this case, refers to mamzerut. It was due to his prayer that that man burst and was unsuccessful in disparaging Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s children.,In matters of Torah, what is the case with regard to which the verse said that one should respond to a fool’s folly? As in the case where Rabban Gamliel was sitting and he interpreted a verse homiletically: In the future, in the World-to-Come, a woman will give birth every day, as it says: “The woman with child and her that gives birth together” (Jeremiah 31:7), explaining that birth will occur on the same day as conception. A certain student scoffed at him and said: That cannot be, as it has already been stated: “There is nothing new under the sun” (Ecclesiastes 1:9). Rabban Gamliel said to him: Come and I will show you an example of this in this world. He took him outside and showed him a chicken that lays eggs every day.,And furthermore: Rabban Gamliel sat and interpreted a verse homiletically: In the future, in the World-to-Come, trees will produce fruits every day, as it is stated: “And it shall bring forth branches and bear fruit” (Ezekiel 17:23); just as a branch grows every day, so too, fruit will be produced every day. A certain student scoffed at him and said: Isn’t it written: There is nothing new under the sun? He said to him: Come and I will show you an example of this in this world. He went outside and showed him a caper bush, part of which is edible during each season of the year.,And furthermore: Rabban Gamliel sat and interpreted a verse homiletically: In the future, the World-to-Come, Eretz Yisrael will produce cakes and fine wool garments that will grow in the ground, as it is stated: “Let abundant grain be in the land”. A certain student scoffed at him and said: There is nothing new under the sun. He said to him: Come and I will show you an example in this world. He went outside and showed him truffles and mushrooms, which emerge from the earth over the course of a single night and are shaped like a loaf of bread. And with regard to wool garments, he showed him the covering of a heart of palm, a young palm branch, which is wrapped in a thin net-like covering.,Since the Gemara discussed the forbearance of Sages, who remain silent in the face of nonsensical comments, it cites additional relevant examples. The Sages taught in a baraita: A person should always be patient like Hillel and not impatient like Shammai. The Gemara related: There was an incident involving two people
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who wagered with each other and said: Anyone who will go and aggravate Hillel to the point that he reprimands him, will take four-hundred zuz. One of them said: I will aggravate him. That day that he chose to bother Hillel was Shabbat eve, and Hillel was washing the hair on his head. He went and passed the entrance to Hillel’s house and in a demeaning manner said: Who here is Hillel, who here is Hillel? Hillel wrapped himself in a dignified garment and went out to greet him. He said to him: My son, what do you seek? He said to him: I have a question to ask. Hillel said to him: Ask, my son, ask. The man asked him: Why are the heads of Babylonians oval? He was alluding to and attempting to insult Hillel, who was Babylonian. He said to him: My son, you have asked a significant question. The reason is because they do not have clever midwives. They do not know how to shape the child’s head at birth.,That man went and waited one hour, a short while, returned to look for Hillel, and said: Who here is Hillel, who here is Hillel? Again, Hillel wrapped himself and went out to greet him. Hillel said to him: My son, what do you seek? The man said to him: I have a question to ask. He said to him: Ask, my son, ask. The man asked: Why are the eyes of the residents of Tadmor bleary [terutot]? Hillel said to him: My son, you have asked a significant question. The reason is because they live among the sands and the sand gets into their eyes.,Once again the man went, waited one hour, returned, and said: Who here is Hillel, who here is Hillel? Again, he, Hillel, wrapped himself and went out to greet him. He said to him: My son, what do you seek? He said to him: I have a question to ask. He said to him: Ask, my son, ask. The man asked: Why do Africans have wide feet? Hillel said to him: You have asked a significant question. The reason is because they live in marshlands and their feet widened to enable them to walk through those swampy areas.,That man said to him: I have many more questions to ask, but I am afraid lest you get angry. Hillel wrapped himself and sat before him, and he said to him: All of the questions that you have to ask, ask them. The man got angry and said to him: Are you Hillel whom they call the Nasi of Israel? He said to him: Yes. He said to him: If it is you, then may there not be many like you in Israel. Hillel said to him: My son, for what reason do you say this? The man said to him: Because I lost four hundred zuz because of you. Hillel said to him: Be vigilant of your spirit and avoid situations of this sort. Hillel is worthy of having you lose four hundred zuz and another four hundred zuz on his account, and Hillel will not get upset.,The Sages taught: There was an incident involving one gentile who came before Shammai. The gentile said to Shammai: How many Torahs do you have? He said to him: Two, the Written Torah and the Oral Torah. The gentile said to him: With regard to the Written Torah, I believe you, but with regard to the Oral Torah, I do not believe you. Convert me on condition that you will teach me only the Written Torah. Shammai scolded him and cast him out with reprimand. The same gentile came before Hillel, who converted him and began teaching him Torah. On the first day, he showed him the letters of the alphabet and said to him: Alef, bet, gimmel, dalet. The next day he reversed the order of the letters and told him that an alef is a tav and so on. The convert said to him: But yesterday you did not tell me that. Hillel said to him: You see that it is impossible to learn what is written without relying on an oral tradition. Didn’t you rely on me? Therefore, you should also rely on me with regard to the matter of the Oral Torah, and accept the interpretations that it contains.,There was another incident involving one gentile who came before Shammai and said to Shammai: Convert me on condition that you teach me the entire Torah while I am standing on one foot. Shammai pushed him away with the builder’s cubit in his hand. This was a common measuring stick and Shammai was a builder by trade. The same gentile came before Hillel. He converted him and said to him: That which is hateful to you do not do to another; that is the entire Torah, and the rest is its interpretation. Go study.,There was another incident involving one gentile who was passing behind the study hall and heard the voice of a teacher who was teaching Torah to his students and saying the verse: “And these are the garments which they shall make: A breastplate, and an efod, and a robe, and a tunic of checkered work, a mitre, and a girdle” (Exodus 28:4). The gentile said: These garments, for whom are they designated? The students said to him: For the High Priest. The gentile said to himself: I will go and convert so that they will install me as High Priest. He came before Shammai and said to him: Convert me on condition that you install me as High Priest. Shammai pushed him with the builder’s cubit in his hand. He came before Hillel; he converted him.,Hillel said to him, to the convert: Is it not the way of the world that only one who knows the protocols [takhsisei] of royalty is appointed king? Go and learn the royal protocols by engaging in Torah study. He went and read the Bible. When he reached the verse which says: “And the common man that draws near shall be put to death” (Numbers 1:51), the convert said to Hillel: With regard to whom is the verse speaking? Hillel said to him: Even with regard to David, king of Israel. The convert reasoned an a fortiori inference himself: If the Jewish people are called God’s children, and due to the love that God loved them he called them: “Israel is My son, My firstborn” (Exodus 4:22), and nevertheless it is written about them: And the common man that draws near shall be put to death; a mere convert who came without merit, with nothing more than his staff and traveling bag, all the more so that this applies to him, as well.,The convert came before Shammai and told him that he retracts his demand to appoint him High Priest, saying: Am I at all worthy to be High Priest? Is it not written in the Torah: And the common man that draws near shall be put to death? He came before Hillel and said to him: Hillel the patient, may blessings rest upon your head as you brought me under the wings of the Divine Presence. The Gemara relates: Eventually, the three converts gathered together in one place, and they said: Shammai’s impatience sought to drive us from the world; Hillel’s patience brought us beneath the wings of the Divine Presence.,The Gemara continues discussing the conduct of the Sages, citing that Reish Lakish said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And the faith of your times shall be a strength of salvation, wisdom, and knowledge, the fear of the Lord is his treasure” (Isaiah 33:6)? Faith; that is the order of Zeraim, Seeds, in the Mishna, because a person has faith in God and plants his seeds (Jerusalem Talmud). Your times; that is the order of Moed, Festival, which deals with the various occasions and Festivals that occur throughout the year. Strength; that is the order of Nashim, Women. Salvations; that is the order of Nezikin, Damages, as one who is being pursued is rescued from the hands of his pursuer. Wisdom; that is the order of Kodashim, Consecrated Items. And knowledge; that is the order of Teharot, Purity, which is particularly difficult to master. And even if a person studies and masters all of these, “the fear of the Lord is his treasure,” it is preeminent.,With regard to the same verse, Rava said: After departing from this world, when a person is brought to judgment for the life he lived in this world, they say to him in the order of that verse: Did you conduct business faithfully? Did you designate times for Torah study? Did you engage in procreation? Did you await salvation? Did you engage in the dialectics of wisdom or understand one matter from another? And, nevertheless, beyond all these, if the fear of the Lord is his treasure, yes, he is worthy, and if not, no, none of these accomplishments have any value. There is a parable that illustrates this. A person who said to his emissary: Bring a kor of wheat up to the attic for me to store there. The messenger went and brought it up for him. He said to the emissary: Did you mix a kav of ḥomton, a preservative to keep away worms, into it for me? He said to him: No. He said to him: If so, it would have been preferable had you not brought it up. Of what use is worm-infested wheat? Likewise, Torah and mitzvot without the fear of God are of no value.,On a related note, the Gemara cites a halakha that was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: A person who sells wheat may, ab initio, mix a kav of ḥomton into a kor of grain and need not be concerned that by selling it all at the price of grain he will be guilty of theft, as the kav of ḥomton is essential for the preservation of the wheat.,Rabba bar Rav Huna said: Any person who has Torah in him but does not have

fear of Heaven is like a treasurer [gizbar] to whom they gave keys to the inner doors of the treasury but they did not give keys to the outer door. With what key will he enter? Although the Torah is the inner key, without fear of Heaven one cannot gain access to the genuine Torah. Similarly, Rabbi Yannai would proclaim: Woe unto one who does not have a courtyard, and who makes a fence for the courtyard, i.e., a person who lacks fear of Heaven and is nevertheless involved in Torah study. Rav Yehuda said: The Holy One, Blessed be He, only created His world so that people would fear before Him, as it is stated: “And God has so made it that men should fear before Him” (Ecclesiastes 3:14).,The Gemara also related that Rabbi Simon and Rabbi Elazar were sitting. Rabbi Ya’akov bar Aḥa passed and went adjacent to them. One said to the other: Let us stand before him as he is a man who fears sin. The other said to him in response: Let us stand before him, as he is a man of Torah study. He said to him: I said to you that he is a man who fears sin, and you said me that he is a man of Torah study? The former is much greater praise than the latter.,The Gemara remarks: Conclude that Rabbi Elazar is the one who said that he is praiseworthy because he is a man who fears sin, as elsewhere he also spoke in praise of fear. As Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: The Holy One, Blessed be He, has in His world only fear of Heaven alone, as it is stated: “And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God ask of you, but to fear the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 10:12). And it is written: “And unto man He said: Behold [hen], the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom; and to depart from evil is understanding” (Job 28:28), as in the Greek language they call one hen. Apparently, fear of God is of primary importance. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude that Rabbi Elazar is the one who said so.,Rav Ulla taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Be not overmuch wicked” (Ecclesiastes 7:17)? This appears difficult, as, is that to say that only overmuch one should not be wicked; a little, one should be wicked? Rather, this can be understood based on the following adage: One who ate a clove of garlic and its odor spreads, should he again eat another clove of garlic so that its odor will spread further? If you were somewhat wicked, do not think that it is legitimate to continue and be very wicked.,Rava bar Rav Ulla taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “For there are no pangs [ḥartzubot] at their death and their body is sound” (Psalms 73:4)? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Is it not enough for wicked people that they are not anxious [ḥared] or sad [atzuv], ḥartzubot is an acronym of ḥared and atzuv, in anticipation of the day of their death, but also, their heart is as unyielding for them as the entrance to a hall is wide, and they devote no thought to it. And that is what Rabba said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “This is the way of them that are foolish and of those who after them speak approvingly, Selah” (Psalms 49:14)? It means that the wicked know that their path leads to eternal death, but they have fat on their kidneys that prevents that realization from entering their hearts. Lest you say that it is simply forgotten from them; therefore, the verse states: “And of those who after them speak approvingly, Selah” (Psalms 49:14). They are aware of their fate and speak of it, but it does not affect them.,We learned in the mishna that if one extinguished a flame on Shabbat because he sought to spare the lamp, the oil, or the wick, he is liable, but Rabbi Yosei exempts in all cases except in a case in which he extinguished the flame to spare the wick. The Gemara asks with regard to Rabbi Yosei: In accordance with whose opinion does he hold with regard to prohibited labor performed on Shabbat not for its own sake? If he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that one is liable for a prohibited labor performed on Shabbat not for its own sake, then even in all those cases he should also deem him liable. And if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that one is exempt for a prohibited labor performed on Shabbat not for its own sake, then even in the case of a wick he should also deem him exempt. Ulla said: Actually, Rabbi Yosei holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. However, Rabbi Yosei holds that with regard to every destructive action, if he dismantles in order to rebuild in the same place, then it is considered to be dismantling, and he is liable for having performed a prohibited labor on Shabbat. However, one who demolishes in order to build elsewhere it is not considered performance of the prohibited labor of dismantling. He merely performed a destructive act and is not liable. When one extinguishes the flame to spare the lamp or the oil, he does not do so in order to relight them. When he does so to spare the wick, he indicates that he intends to relight the wick.,Rabba said to him: That reasoning is implausible. After all, all labors prohibited on Shabbat, we derive them from the labors performed in the Tabernacle, and there it was a case of dismantling in order to build elsewhere. They would dismantle the Tabernacle and reconstruct it at the next encampment. Ulla said to Rabba: That is not a proof, as there, in the case of the Tabernacle, it is different. Since it is written: “At the commandment of the Lord they encamped” (Numbers 9:23). The time and place of their travels and their encampments were not determined by them but rather by the word of God. Consequently, when they took down the Tabernacle it was tantamount to demolishing in order to build in the same place. Since the demolition and the construction were both accomplished at the command of God, there was never a case of destruction without a constructive purpose.,And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Actually, Rabbi Yosei holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. And as far as the question, what is different about a wick, that can be answered as Rav Hamnuna said, and some say, Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Here, we are dealing with a wick that one must singe before lighting it in order to facilitate its burning, as, in that case, even Rabbi Shimon agrees that extinguishing the flame is prohibited, as, by doing so, he prepares a vessel for use. Rava said: That interpretation is also precise in the language of the mishna, as it was taught in the mishna that one who extinguished a wick is liable because he makes the wick into charcoal intentionally, and it was not taught because charcoal was made on its own. The Gemara concludes: Conclude from it that the mishna is to be understood in that manner.,MISHNA: This mishna concludes the aggadic treatment of the topic of kindling the Shabbat lights. For three transgressions women are punished and die during childbirth: For the fact that they are not careful in observing the laws of a menstruating woman, and in separating ḥalla from the dough, and in lighting the Shabbat lamp.,GEMARA: The Gemara asks: A woman who was not careful in observing the laws of menstruation, what is the reason that she is punished during childbirth? Rabbi Yitzḥak said: She sinned with regard to the chambers of her womb; therefore, she is afflicted in the chambers of her womb. The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to menstruation; but with regard to a woman who was not careful in separating ḥalla and in kindling the Shabbat lights, what is there to say? Rather, it must be explained in accordance with that which that Galilean taught before Rav Ḥisda. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: I placed a quarter [reviit] of a log of blood in you when you were formed, and about matters of the blood of menstruation I warned you.
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I called you first, as it is stated: “Israel is the Lord’s hallowed portion, His first fruits of the increase” (Jeremiah 2:3) and I warned you about matters of the first: “Of the first of your dough you shall set apart ḥalla for a gift” (Numbers 15:20). The soul that I have placed in you is called ner: “The spirit of man is the lamp [ner] of the Lord” (Proverbs 20:27), and I warned you about matters of the Shabbat lamp. If you fulfill these mitzvot, fine, and if not, then I will take your soul.,And, if so, what is different during childbirth? Why does the divine attribute of judgment punish them for dereliction in fulfillment of these mitzvot specifically then? The Gemara cites several folk sayings expressing the concept that when a person is in danger, he is punished for his sins. Rava said: If the ox fell, sharpen the knife to slaughter it. Abaye said: If the maidservant’s insolence abounds, she will be struck by a single blow as punishment for all her sins. So too, when a woman is giving birth and her suffering is great due to Eve’s sin of eating from the Tree of Knowledge, all the punishments for her own sins are added to that suffering. Rav Ḥisda said: Leave the drunk, as he falls on his own. Similarly, the time of birth is a time of danger, and if the Holy One, Blessed be He, does not come to her assistance at that time, that is sufficient to cause her death. Mar Ukva said: The shepherd is crippled, and the goats are running, and he cannot catch them. However, next to the gate, he speaks harsh words, and inside the pen he settles the account. Similarly, as long as a woman is in a healthy state, her sins are in abeyance, and she is not held accountable for them. However, when she is giving birth, which is a time of danger, she is held accountable for her sins and a calculation is made whether or not she is worthy of a miracle. Rav Pappa said: At the entrance to the stores, during a time of prosperity, brothers and loved ones abound. When a person is prospering financially, everyone acts like his brother or friend. However, at the gate of disgrace, during a time of loss and poverty, he has no brothers and no loved ones; everyone abandons him.,And the Gemara asks: And where are men examined? When are men vulnerable to judgment and held accountable for their actions? Reish Lakish said: When they are crossing a bridge. The Gemara wonders: Only when they are crossing a bridge and at no other time? Rather, say: Anything like a bridge, any place where danger is commonplace. On a similar note, the Gemara relates: Rav would not cross a river in a ferry in which a gentile sat. He said to himself: Perhaps a judgment will be reckoned with him, and I will be caught together with him when he is punished. Whereas, Shmuel would only cross in a ferry if there was a gentile in it. He said: Satan does not have dominion over two nations. He settles his accounts with people from each nationality separately.,Rabbi Yannai would examine the ferry and cross. The Gemara comments that Rabbi Yannai acted in accordance with his reasoning stated elsewhere, as he said: A person should never stand in a place of danger saying that they on High will perform a miracle for him, lest in the end they do not perform a miracle for him. And, moreover, even if they do perform a miracle for him, they will deduct it from his merits. Rabbi Ḥanin said: What is the verse that alludes to this? When Jacob said: “I am not worthy of all the mercies, and of all the truth, which You have shown unto Your servant” (Genesis 32:11), and he explains: Since You have bestowed upon me so much kindness and truth, my merits have been diminished. Similarly, the Gemara relates that Rabbi Zeira would not go out and walk among the palm trees on a day when there was a southern wind blowing due to the fear that the trees might fall on him.,In a similar vein, Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, said: A person should always pray that he will not become ill, as if he becomes ill they say to him: Bring proof of your virtue and exempt yourself. It is preferable for a person not to be forced to prove that he merits staying alive, as he might not be able to prove it. Mar Ukva said: What is the verse that alludes to this? As it says: “When you build a new house, then you shall make a parapet for your roof, that you bring not blood upon your house, if the fallen falls mimenu (Deuteronomy 22:8). He explains: Mimenu, from him proof must be brought. When one falls from his previous situation, it is his own responsibility to prove his innocence and emerge unharmed. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: What is the meaning of the phrase: If the fallen falls from it? This person was destined to fall from that roof from the six days of Creation, it was ingrained into nature. As, although he did not yet fall, the verse calls him fallen. Nevertheless, the owner of the house is indicted for this, as merit is engendered by means of the innocent and guilt by means of the guilty.,The Sages taught: One who became ill and tended toward death, they say to him: Confess, as all those executed by the courts confess. Even if he is dying of natural causes, it is worthwhile for him to consider his death atonement for his sins. The Sages said: When a person goes out to the marketplace where there are fights and disputes, he should consider himself as someone who has been handed over to a soldier [seradiyot]. If his head hurt, he should consider it as if they placed him in a chain [kolar] around his neck. If he climbed into bed and fell ill, he should consider himself as if they took him up to the gallows to be judged, as with regard to anyone who goes up to the gallows to be judged, if he has great advocates [peraklitin], he is spared, and if not, he is not spared.,And with regard to divine judgment, these are a person’s advocates: Repentance and good deeds. The Gemara comments: And even if there are nine hundred ninety-nine asserting his guilt and only one asserting his innocence, he is spared, as it is stated: “If there be for him an angel, an advocate, one among a thousand, to vouch for a man’s uprightness; then He is gracious unto him, and says: Deliver him from going down to the pit, I have found a ransom” (Job 33:23–24). Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, says: Even if there are nine hundred ninety-nine portions within that same angel accusing him, and one portion asserting his innocence, he is spared, as it stated: “An advocate, one among a thousand”. Even when the advocate who asserts his innocence finds only one-tenth of one percent of innocence in this man, even then, he is gracious unto him, and says: Deliver him from going down to the pit, I have found a ransom.,The Sages taught in a baraita: For three transgressions women die in childbirth [yoledot]. Rabbi Elazar has a different version and says that women die when they are young [yeladot]. These transgressions are those enumerated in the mishna: The halakhot of a menstruating woman, ḥalla, and Shabbat lights. Rabbi Aḥa says they are punished for the sin of laundering their children’s feces from clothing on Shabbat. And some say: Because they call the Holy Ark simply ark.,Similarly, we learned in a baraita that Rabbi Yishmael ben Elazar says: On account of two sins, ignoramuses [amei haaretz] die young (Rav Ya’akov Emden): Because they call the Holy Ark simply ark, and because they call the synagogue the house of the people. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says: Three crucibles potentially leading to death were created in the woman, and some say: Three accelerants of death. They are: Menstruation, ḥalla, and lighting the Shabbat lights. The Gemara explains that one version, accelerants of death, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who said that women die young. And the other one, crucibles of death, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who said that women die in childbirth.,Similarly, it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says: The halakhot of consecrated items, terumot, and tithes are themselves the essence of Torah and are extremely severe,

and they were given, among others, to ignoramuses to fulfill. When they are negligent in the performance of these mitzvot, they are punished for it.,It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: Due to the sin of vows unfulfilled a person’s wife dies. The allusion is as it is stated: “If you have not the wherewithal to pay, why should He take away your bed from under you?” (Proverbs 22:27). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Due to the sin of vows unfulfilled, children die when they are young, as it is stated: “Better is it that you should not vow, than that you should vow and not pay. Suffer not your mouth to bring your flesh into guilt, neither say you before the messenger that it was an error; wherefore should God be angry at your voice and destroy the work of your hands?” (Ecclesiastes 5:4–5). What is the work of a person’s hands? You must say that it is a person’s sons and daughters.,In order to clarify which sins cause one’s young children to die, the Gemara cites what the Sages taught in a baraita: For the sin of vows, one’s children die, this is the statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: For the sin of dereliction in the study of Torah. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the opinion of the one who said that one’s children die due to the sin of vows, as we stated above. However, according to the opinion of the one who said that one’s children die due to sin of dereliction in the study of Torah, what is the verse that supports this? The Gemara replies: As it is written: “In vain have I smitten your children; they received no morality” (Jeremiah 2:30). Children die because their fathers did not accept the morality, the Torah. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: According to the one who said that one’s children die because of the sin of vows, it can also be derived from here: In vain have I smitten your children; on matters of vanity, i.e., when one vows in vain and does not fulfill it. The Gemara asks: After all, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is Rabbi, and it was taught in a Tosefta that Rabbi said that one’s children die because of the sin of vows. How then could it be that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said that it is due to the sin of dereliction in the study of Torah? The Gemara answers: After he heard it from Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, he reconsidered and taught in accordance with Rabbi Elazar’s opinion.,On the same topic, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rabbi Yosei disagree. One said that children die due to the sin of not affixing a mezuza to one’s doorpost. And one said children die due to the sin of dereliction in the study of Torah. According to the one who said that children die because of the sin of not affixing a mezuza, his opinion there is based on an exegetical principle, which states that a verse is interpreted homiletically based on juxtaposition to the verse immediately preceding it and not on juxtaposition to the verse before the one preceding it. In this case, it says: “That your days may be multiplied, and the days of your children” (Deuteronomy 11:21), and the preceding verse says: “And you shall write them upon the doorposts of your house, and upon your gates” (Deuteronomy 11:20). And according to the one who said that children die due to the sin of dereliction in the study of Torah, that is because in his opinion the exegetical principle is that a verse is interpreted homiletically based on juxtaposition to the verse immediately preceding it, as well as to the verse before the one preceding it. In his opinion, the blessing of long life also relates to the verse before the one immediately preceding it: “And you shall teach them your children, talking of them” (Deuteronomy 11:19).,The tannaim Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda also disagreed about this. One said: Children die due to the sin of mezuza, and one said children die due to the sin of not affixing ritual fringes. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the opinion of the one who said that children die due to the sin of mezuza, it is based on the juxtaposition of the verses, as it is written: “And you shall write them upon the doorposts of your house, and upon your gates,” and it says thereafter: “That your days may be multiplied, and the days of your children”. However, according to the one who said that children die because of the sin of ritual fringes, what is the reason? What is the connection between these matters? Rav Kahana said, and some say that it was Sheila Mari: It is homiletically interpreted as is written: “Also in your corners is found the blood of the souls of the innocent poor” (Jeremiah 2:34). Due to one’s failure to affix ritual fringes to the corners of his garments, the innocent poor, young children, who have not had opportunity to sin, die. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: According to the one who said that children die because of the sin of mezuza, it is also derived from here, as it is written in the continuation of that verse: “You did not find them breaking in; yet for all these things”. We see that this punishment comes because they made entrances like a thief’s breach in the wall. They did not place mezuzot in their entrances.,Since the Gemara discussed the importance of the mitzva of ritual fringes, it cites that which Reish Lakish said: Anyone who is vigilant in performing the mitzva of ritual fringes merits that two thousand eight hundred servants will serve him in the World-to-Come. As it is stated: “Thus says the Lord of hosts: In those days it shall come to pass, that ten men shall take hold, out of all the languages of the nations, shall even take hold of the corner of the garment of him that is a Jew, saying: We will go with you, for we have heard that God is with you” (Zechariah 8:23). On each corner of a Jewish person’s garment with ritual fringes, ten people from each of the seventy nations will take hold. That totals seven hundred people on each corner; 2,800 people altogether.,Together with these statements, the Gemara cites a mnemonic for additional rabbinic adages with regard to punishments for various sins: Hate, ḥalla, teruma, stolen, judgment, oath, pouring, uncovering, and vulgarity. It was taught in a baraita, Rabbi Neḥemya says: Due to the sin of gratuitous hatred that one has for another, the punishment is great discord within a person’s home, and his wife miscarries, and his sons and daughters die when they are young. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said: Due to the sin of failure to separate ḥalla from the dough, no blessing takes effect on the grain gathered in the storehouse and a curse spreads to the prices of crops, which increase, and they plant seeds and others eat their yield, as it is stated: “I also will do this unto you: I will appoint terror [behala] over you, even consumption and fever, that shall make the eyes to fail and the soul to languish; and you shall sow your seed in vain, for your enemies shall eat it” (Leviticus 26:16). Do not read it behala; rather, read it as beḥalla. Due to negligence in the separation of ḥalla from the dough, these punishments come. And if they give ḥalla, they are blessed, as it is stated: “And the first of your dough you shall give unto the priest to cause a blessing to rest on your house” (Ezekiel 44:30).,They also said: Due to the sin of abrogation of terumot and tithes, the heavens are prevented from pouring down dew and rain, and expense prevails, and profit is lost, and people pursue their livelihood but do not attain it, as it is stated: “Drought and heat consume the snow waters; so does the netherworld those that have sinned” (Job 24:19). The Gemara asks: What is the inference? How is that concept derived from this verse? The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that it should be explained as follows: Due to the things that I commanded you during the summer, separating terumot and tithes from the summer crops, and you did not do them, the snow waters will be robbed from you during the rainy season. And if people give terumot and tithes, they are blessed, as it is stated: “Bring you the whole tithe into the storehouse, that there may be food in My house, and try Me now with this, says the Lord of Hosts, if I will not open you the windows of heaven, and pour you out a blessing, that there shall be more than sufficiency [ad bli dai]” (Malachi 3:10). The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: More than sufficiency [ad bli dai]? Rami bar Rav said that Rav said: It means that the abundance will be so great that your lips will be worn out [yivlu], similar to the word beli, from saying enough [dai].,Due to the sin of robbery, locusts emerge, and famine prevails, and people eat the flesh of their sons and daughters, as it is stated: “Hear this word, you cows of Bashan, that are in the mountain of Samaria, that oppress the poor, that crush the needy, that say unto their lords: Bring, that we may feast” (Amos 4:1). Afterward it says: “And I also have given you cleanness of teeth in all your cities, and want of bread in all your places” (Amos 4:6), which refers to famine. Rava said: The cows of Bashan; like those women of the city of Meḥoza,
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who eat and do nothing to support themselves, and cause their husbands to commit the sin of theft. And it is written: “I have smitten you with blight and mildew; the multitude of your gardens and your vineyards and your fig trees and your olive trees has the palmerworm devoured” (Amos 4:9). And it is written: “That which the palmerworm has left the locust has eaten; and that which the locust has left the cankerworm has eaten; and that which the cankerworm has left the caterpillar has eaten” (Joel 1:4). And it is written: “And one snatches on the right hand, and is hungry; and he eats on the left hand, and is not satisfied; they eat every man the flesh of his own arm [besar zeroo]” (Isaiah 9:19). Do not read it: The flesh of his own arm [besar zeroo]; rather, the flesh of his own offspring [besar zaro]. All the punishments for theft listed above were explicitly mentioned in the verses.,Furthermore, the Sages said that due to the sin of delay of justice, i.e., judges delay issuing their rulings due to personal considerations, and for distortion of justice, i.e., judges intentionally distort their verdicts, and for miscarriage of justice that results from negligence, and for dereliction in the study of Torah, violence and looting abound in the world, and pestilence and famine come, and people eat and are not sated, and they eat their bread measured by weight. As it is written: “And I will bring a sword upon you, that shall execute the vengeance of the covenant; and you shall be gathered together within your cities; and I will send the pestilence among you; and you shall be delivered into the hand of the enemy” (Leviticus 26:25). And covenant means nothing other than Torah, as it is stated: “If My covenant be not with day and night, if I have not appointed the ordinances of heaven and earth” (Jeremiah 33:25). The study of Torah is the mitzva practiced both day and night. And it is written with regard to this punishment: “When I break your staff of bread, ten women shall bake your bread in one oven, and they shall deliver your bread again by weight; and ye shall eat, and not be satisfied” (Leviticus 26:26). And it is written: “Even because they rejected My ordinances, and their soul abhorred My statutes” (Leviticus 26:43). All of these punishments result from breaching the covenant of the Torah and the perversion of justice.,Due to the sin of an oath taken in vain and a false oath, and desecration of God’s name, and desecration of Shabbat, wild beasts abound in the world, and domesticated animals cease to exist, and human beings decrease in number, and the roads become desolate, as it is stated: “And if in spite of these [beeleh] things you will not be corrected unto Me, but will walk contrary unto Me casually” (Leviticus 26:23). Do not read of these [beeleh]; rather, due to a vain oath [beala]. And it is written that the punishment for this is: “And I will send the beast of the field among you, which shall rob you of your children, and destroy your cattle, and make you few in number; and your ways shall become desolate” (Leviticus 26:22). And it is written with regard to a false oath: “And you shall not swear by My name falsely, so that you desecrate [veḥillalta] the name of your God: I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:12). And it is written with regard to desecrating the name of God: “And you shall not desecrate [teḥallelu] My Holy Name” (Leviticus 22:32). And it is written with regard to desecrating Shabbat: “Every one that desecrates it [meḥaleleha] shall surely be put to death” (Exodus 31:14). And derive by means of a verbal analogy [gezera shava] desecration [ḥillul] of Shabbat from desecration [ḥillul] of a false oath. Just as punishment for a false oath is desolation and wild beasts, one receives the same punishment for desecrating Shabbat and the name of God.,Due to the sin of bloodshed, the Holy Temple is destroyed, and the Divine Presence leaves Israel, as it says: “So you shall not pollute the land wherein you are; for blood, it pollutes the land; and no expiation can be made for the land for the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it. And you shall not defile the land which you inhabit, in the midst of which I dwell; for I the Lord dwell in the midst of the children of Israel” (Numbers 35:33–34). However, if you defile the land, you will not inhabit it, and I will not dwell in it.,Due to the sin of prohibited sexual relations, and idol worship, and failure to let the land lie fallow during the Sabbatical and Jubilee Years, exile comes to the world and they exile the Jewish people from their land, and others come and settle in their place. As it is stated with regard to illicit sexual relations: “For all these abominations have the men of the land done, that were before you, and the land is defiled; that the land expel not you also, when you defile it, as it expelled the nation that was before you” (Leviticus 18:27–28). And it is written: “And the land was defiled, therefore I did visit the iniquity thereof upon it, and the land expelled her inhabitants” (Leviticus 18:25). And it is written: “That the land expel not you also, when you defile it, as it expelled the nation that was before you”.,And with regard to idol worship it is written: “And I will cast your carcasses upon the carcasses of your idols” (Leviticus 26:30). And it is written: “And I will bring your sanctuaries unto desolation, and I will not smell the savor of your sweet odors” (Leviticus 26:31). “And you will I scatter among the nations, and I will draw out the sword after you; and your land shall be a desolation, and your cities shall be a waste” (Leviticus 26:33).,With regard to the sin of failure to observe the Sabbatical and Jubilee Years it is written: “Then shall the land be paid her Sabbaths, as long as it lies desolate, and you are in your enemies’ land; even then shall the land rest, and repay her Sabbaths” (Leviticus 26:34). And it is written: “As long as it lies desolate it shall have rest; even the rest which it had not in your Sabbaths, when you dwelt upon it” (Leviticus 26: 35).,Due to the sin of vulgar speech, troubles abound, and harsh decrees are renewed, and the youth among the enemies of Israel, a euphemistic reference to Israel, die, and orphans and widows cry out for help and are not answered, as it is stated: “Therefore the Lord shall have no joy in their young men, neither shall He have compassion on their fatherless and widows; for everyone is ungodly and an evildoer, and every mouth speaks wantonness. For all this His anger is not turned away, but His hand is stretched out still” (Isaiah 9:16).,The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of the phrase: But His hand is stretched out still? Rabbi Ḥanan bar Rava said: Everybody knows why the bride enters the wedding canopy. There is no secret revealed. Nevertheless, anyone who speaks vulgarly about it, even if they, on High, sealed for him a decree of seventy years of good fortune, they will reverse it to bad fortune because of this sin. And Rabba bar Sheila said that Rav Ḥisda said: Anyone who speaks vulgarly, they deepen Gehenna for him, as it is stated: “The mouth that speaks perversity is a deep pit: he that is abhorred of the Lord shall fall therein (Proverbs 22:14), i.e., Gehenna is deepened for one who speaks vulgarly. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Even one who hears vulgar speech and is silent is punished, as it is stated: “He that is abhorred of the Lord shall fall therein,” even if he himself does not speak at all.,And in a similar vein, Rav Oshaya said: Anyone who prepares himself to commit a sin, wounds and bruises emerge on him, as it is stated: “Sharp wounds for one devoted to evil; so do stripes that reach the inward parts” (Proverbs 20:30). And not only that, but he is sentenced to suffer from the disease of edema [hidrokan], as it is stated: So do stripes that reach the inward parts. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: A sign indicating one who committed a sin is the disease hidrokan, which afflicts the inner parts.,The Sages taught in a baraita: There are three types of hidrokan: The one that comes as punishment for sin is thick; and that which is the result of hunger is swollen, but not as thick; and the one caused by witchcraft is thin, and the flesh of the sick person becomes thin in other places.,The Gemara relates: Shmuel HaKatan fell ill with hidrokan. He said: Master of the Universe, who will draw lots, meaning, who will be able to determine that this hidrokan is not the consequence of sin? He was cured. Abaye also fell ill with hidrokan. Rava testified and said about him: I know about Naḥmani, Abaye, that he starves himself and that his hidrokan is the result of hunger. The Gemara relates that Rava fell ill with hidrokan, and they asked: But Rava did not starve himself, and there is no reason to suspect him of sin, and we cannot say that he contracted hidrokan because he did not relieve himself on time. Rava knew to relieve himself, as it is he who said: More have been killed due to the chamber pot, because they were not careful about relieving themselves in a timely manner, than those swollen due to starvation. The Gemara answers: Rava is different because the Sages compel him to remain in place against his will while he lectures. Since he could not relieve himself, he became sick with hidrokan.,On a related note, the Sages taught in a baraita that there are four signs: A sign of sin is hidrokan, a sign of gratuitous hatred is jaundice, a sign of arrogance is poverty, and a sign of slander is askara.,The Sages taught: Askara comes to the world as punishment

for neglecting to separate tithes. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: Askara comes as punishment for slander. Rava said, and some say that it was Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi who said it: What is the verse that alludes to this? “But the king shall rejoice in God; every one that swears by Him shall glory; for the mouth of them that speak lies shall be stopped” (Psalms 63:12). The punishment for lying is that the mouth will be stopped. Askara affects the mouth along with other parts of the body.,A dilemma was raised before those who were sitting in the study hall: Did Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, say that askara comes as punishment only for slander, or perhaps he said it was also for slander? Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which was taught in a baraita: When our Sages entered the vineyard in Yavne, Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Shimon were there, and a question was asked before them with regard to this plague of askara: Why does it begin in the intestines and end in the mouth? Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ila’i, who was the head of the speakers in every place, responded and said: Even though the kidneys advise, and the heart understands, and the tongue shapes the voice that emerges from the mouth, still, the mouth completes the formation of the voice. Therefore, the disease begins in the same place that slander begins and it ends in the mouth. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, responded and said: This disease ends in the mouth because one eats with it non-kosher things. They immediately wondered about this: Does it enter your mind to say that askara is caused by eating non-kosher food? Are those who eat non-kosher food so numerous? Rather, it comes as a punishment for eating foods that were not ritually prepared, i.e., were not tithed. Rabbi Shimon responded and said: This disease comes as a punishment for the sin of dereliction in the study of Torah.,They said to him: Women will prove that dereliction in the study of Torah is not the cause, as they are not obligated to study Torah and, nevertheless, they contract askara. He answered them: They are punished because they cause their husbands to be idle from the study of Torah. They said to him: Gentiles will prove that this is not the cause, as they also contract askara even though they are not obligated to study Torah. He answered them: They are also punished because they cause Israel to be idle from the study of Torah. They said to him: Children will prove that this is not the cause, for they are not at all obligated to study Torah and they also suffer from askara. He answered them: They are punished because they cause their fathers to be idle from the study of Torah. They said to him: School children will prove that this is not the cause, as they study Torah and, nevertheless, they suffer from askara.,The Gemara answers: There, it must be understood in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Guryon, as Rabbi Guryon said, and some say that it was Rav Yosef, son of Rabbi Shemaya, who said it: At a time when there are righteous people in the generation, the righteous are seized, i.e., they die or suffer, for the sins of the generation. If there are no righteous people in the generation, school children, who are also without sin, are seized for the sins of the generation. Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Ze’iri said, and some say that Rabbi Shimon ben Nezira said: What is the verse that alludes to this? “If you know not, you fairest among women, go your way forth by the footsteps of the flock and feed your kids, beside the shepherds’ tents [mishkenot]” (Song of Songs 1:8). And we say in explanation of this verse: They are the lambs that are taken as collateral [hamemushkanin], which is etymologically similar to the word mishkenot, in place of the shepherds. If the shepherds and leaders of the generation corrupt the multitudes, young children die because of their sins. With regard to the dilemma, conclude from it that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, said that the illness of askara also results from slander, as the baraita provides an additional cause of the illness. The Gemara comments: Indeed, conclude from it.,In this baraita Rabbi Yehuda is described as head of the speakers in every place. The Gemara asks: And why did they call him head of the speakers in every place? The Gemara relates that this resulted due to an incident that took place when Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon were sitting, and Yehuda, son of converts,sat beside them. Rabbi Yehuda opened and said: How pleasant are the actions of this nation, the Romans, as they established marketplaces, established bridges, and established bathhouses. Rabbi Yosei was silent. Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai responded and said: Everything that they established, they established only for their own purposes. They established marketplaces, to place prostitutes in them; bathhouses, to pamper themselves; and bridges, to collect taxes from all who pass over them. Yehuda, son of converts, went and related their statements to his household, and those statements continued to spread until they were heard by the monarchy. They ruled and said: Yehuda, who elevated the Roman regime, shall be elevated and appointed as head of the Sages, the head of the speakers in every place. Yosei, who remained silent, shall be exiled from his home in Judea as punishment, and sent to the city of Tzippori in the Galilee. And Shimon, who denounced the government, shall be killed.,Rabbi Shimon bar Yoḥai and his son, Rabbi Elazar, went and hid in the study hall. Every day Rabbi Shimon’s wife would bring them bread and a jug of water and they would eat. When the decree intensified, Rabbi Shimon said to his son: Women are easily impressionable and, therefore, there is room for concern lest the authorities torture her and she reveal our whereabouts. They went and they hid in a cave. A miracle occurred and a carob tree was created for them as well as a spring of water. They would remove their clothes and sit covered in sand up to their necks. They would study Torah all day in that manner. At the time of prayer, they would dress, cover themselves, and pray, and they would again remove their clothes afterward so that they would not become tattered. They sat in the cave for twelve years. Elijah the Prophet came and stood at the entrance to the cave and said: Who will inform bar Yoḥai that the emperor died and his decree has been abrogated?,They emerged from the cave, and saw people who were plowing and sowing. Rabbi Shimon bar Yoḥai said: These people abandon eternal life of Torah study and engage in temporal life for their own sustenance. The Gemara relates that every place that Rabbi Shimon and his son Rabbi Elazar directed their eyes was immediately burned. A Divine Voice emerged and said to them: Did you emerge from the cave in order to destroy My world? Return to your cave. They again went and sat there for twelve months. They said: The judgment of the wicked in Gehenna lasts for twelve months. Surely their sin was atoned in that time. A Divine Voice emerged and said to them: Emerge from your cave. They emerged. Everywhere that Rabbi Elazar would strike, Rabbi Shimon would heal. Rabbi Shimon said to Rabbi Elazar: My son, you and I suffice for the entire world, as the two of us are engaged in the proper study of Torah.,As the sun was setting on Shabbat eve, they saw an elderly man who was holding two bundles of myrtle branches and running at twilight. They said to him: Why do you have these? He said to them: In honor of Shabbat. They said to him: And let one suffice. He answered them: One is corresponding to: “Remember the Shabbat day, to keep it holy” (Exodus 20:8), and one is corresponding to: “Observe the Shabbat day, to keep it holy” (Deuteronomy 5:12). Rabbi Shimon said to his son: See how beloved the mitzvot are to Israel. Their minds were put at ease and they were no longer as upset that people were not engaged in Torah study.,Rabbi Pineḥas ben Ya’ir, Rabbi Shimon’s son-in-law, heard and went out to greet him. He brought him into the bathhouse and began tending to his flesh. He saw that Rabbi Shimon had cracks in the skin on his body. He was crying, and the tears fell from his eyes and caused Rabbi Shimon pain. Rabbi Pineḥas said to Rabbi Shimon, his father-in-law: Woe is me, that I have seen you like this. Rabbi Shimon said to him: Happy are you that you have seen me like this, as had you not seen me like this, you would not have found in me this prominence in Torah, as the Gemara relates: At first, when Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai would raise a difficulty, Rabbi Pineḥas ben Ya’ir would respond to his question with twelve answers. Ultimately, when Rabbi Pineḥas ben Ya’ir would raise a difficulty, Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai would respond with twenty-four answers.,Rabbi Shimon said: Since a miracle transpired for me, I will go and repair something for the sake of others in gratitude for God’s kindness, as it is written: “And Jacob came whole to the city of Shechem, which is in the land of Canaan, when he came from Paddan-aram; and he graced the countenance of the city” (Genesis 33:18). Rav said, the meaning of: And Jacob came whole, is: Whole in his body, whole in his money, whole in his Torah. And what did he do? And he graced the countenance of the city; he performed gracious acts to benefit the city. Rav said: Jacob established a currency for them. And Shmuel said: He established marketplaces for them. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He established bathhouses for them. In any event, clearly one for whom a miracle transpires should perform an act of kindness for his neighbors as a sign of gratitude. He said: Is there something that needs repair? They said to him: There is a place where there is uncertainty with regard to ritual impurity
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and the priests are troubled by being forced to circumvent it, as it is prohibited for them to become ritually impure from contact with a corpse. There was suspicion, but no certainty, that a corpse was buried there. Therefore, they were unable to definitively determine its status. Rabbi Shimon said: Is there a person who knows that there was a presumption of ritual purity here? Is there anyone who remembers a time when this place was not considered ritually impure, or that at least part of it was considered to be ritually pure? An Elder said to him: Here ben Zakkai planted and cut the teruma of lupines. In this marketplace Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, who himself was a priest, once planted lupines that were given to him as teruma. On that basis, the conclusion can be drawn that it was definitely ritually pure. Rabbi Shimon, like Jacob, also did so and took steps to improve the city and examined the ground (Tosafot). Everywhere that the ground was hard, he pronounced it ritually pure as there was certainly no corpse there, and every place that the ground was soft, he marked it indicating that perhaps a corpse was buried there. In that way, he purified the marketplace so that even priests could walk through it.,A certain Elder said in ridicule and surprise: Ben Yoḥai purified the cemetery. Rabbi Shimon got angry and said to him: Had you not been with us, and even had you been with us and were not counted with us in rendering this ruling, what you say is fine. You could have said that you were unaware of my intention or that you did not agree or participate in this decision. Now that you were with us and were counted with us in rendering this ruling, you will cause people to say that Sages are unwilling to cooperate with one another. They will say: If competing prostitutes still apply makeup to each other to help one another look beautiful, all the more so that Torah scholars should cooperate with each other. He directed his eyes toward him and the Elder died. Rabbi Shimon went out to the marketplace and he saw Yehuda, son of converts,who was the cause of this entire incident. Rabbi Shimon, said: This one still has a place in the world? He directed his eyes toward him and turned him into a pile of bones.,MISHNA: There are three things a person must say in his home on Shabbat eve at nightfall and not before. The mishna elaborates: He should ask the members of his household, have you tithed the crop that required tithing? Have you placed the eiruv for joining the courtyards and joining the Shabbat borders? If you have done so, light the lamp in honor of Shabbat. The Sages stated a principle: If the time arrives on Friday when there is uncertainty whether it is nightfall and uncertainty whether it is not yet nightfall, one may not tithe the crop that has definitely not been tithed, and one may not immerse ritually impure vessels in a ritual bath to render them ritually pure, and one may not light the Shabbat lights. However, one may tithe demai, doubtfully tithed produce, which must be tithed due to mere suspicion. And one may place an eiruv and insulate the hot water to be used on Shabbat.,GEMARA: The Gemara attempts to clarify: From where are these matters, that one must ask these questions in his home at nightfall of Shabbat, derived? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: As the verse said: “And you shall know that your tent is in peace; and you shall visit your habitation, and shall not sin” (Job 5:24). From here it is derived that one should visit his habitation, i.e., ask in his home, so that he will not come to sin. Rabba bar Rav Huna said: Although the Sages said that there are three things a person should, indeed he is required to, say in his home on Shabbat eve at nightfall, one must say them calmly so that the members of his household will accept them from him. If he says them harshly, his family members may mislead him and cause him to sin. Rav Ashi said: I did not hear this halakha of Rabba bar Rav Huna, but I fulfilled it based on my own reasoning.,The Gemara asks: This mishna itself is difficult, as it contains an internal contradiction. On the one hand, you stated initially that there are three things a person must say in his home before Shabbat at nightfall, and this means: At nightfall, i.e., before nightfall, yes, he should say those things; when there is uncertainty whether it is nightfall and uncertainty whether it is not yet nightfall, no, he should not say them. Even if one were to ask then, it is no longer permitted to correct these matters. And then it taught: When there is uncertainty whether it is nightfall and uncertainty whether it is not yet nightfall, one may place an eiruv. One may correct the situation even then. Why did the mishna restrict asking these questions to an earlier time?,Incidentally, prior to answering this question, the Gemara lists all of the other halakhot in tractate Shabbat stated by the Sage who answers the question, with the mnemonic: Self, pruning, bird, cord, silk.,Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: This is not difficult and there is no contradiction here. Here, at the beginning of the mishna, where it indicates that the eiruv can only be placed while it is still day, it is referring to the joining of Shabbat boundaries, which is based on a Torah law. Therefore, one must place this eiruv while it is definitely day. And here, where the mishna said that it is permitted even when it is uncertain whether or not it is already nighttime, it is referring to the joining of courtyards, which is more lenient and based merely on a stringency.,In connection to this, the Gemara cites the halakha that Rava said in order to emphasize the rabbinic aspect of the halakhot of eiruv: One to whom two people said: Go and place an eiruv, a joining of courtyards (Rabbeinu Ḥananel), for us. For one of them he placed an eiruv while it was still day, and for one he placed an eiruv at twilight, when it is uncertain whether it is day or night. The one for whom he placed an eiruv while it was still day had his eiruv eaten during twilight, and the one for whom he placed an eiruv during twilight had his eiruv eaten after nightfall. The principle is as follows: Whether or not an eiruv takes effect is determined at the moment that Shabbat begins. If one placed the eiruv beforehand, and it remains intact at the moment Shabbat begins, the eiruv is in effect. However, if the eiruv that was placed at the appropriate time was eaten during twilight, it is problematic. Twilight is a period of uncertainty. There is uncertainty whether it is day, and consequently the eiruv was not in place at the moment that Shabbat began, or whether it is night, and it was in place. In the latter case, there is still uncertainty as to whether or not the eiruv was in place prior to Shabbat, so that it could take effect at all. In that case, Rava ruled that both of them acquired the eiruv.,The Gemara is surprised by this: Whichever way you look at it, this ruling is difficult. If the twilight period is considered day, let the latter one acquire his eiruv, but let the first one not acquire his because his eiruv was eaten while it was still day. And if the twilight period is night, let the first one acquire his eiruv, but let the latter one not acquire his eiruv because his was not placed before Shabbat. In any event, it is impossible for the eiruv in both of these cases to be valid. The Gemara answers this according to Rava’s position: The status of twilight is uncertain, as it is unknown whether it is day, or night, or both, and uncertainty in the case of a rabbinic ordinance is ruled leniently. Therefore, in both cases the eiruv is acquired.,And Rava said: Why did they say that one may not insulate hot water even in something that does not add heat, but only retains the pre-existing heat, from nightfall on Friday? It is a decree lest one come to boil the pot on Shabbat. Abaye said to him: If so, if it is due to concern that one may boil it, then during twilight we should also issue a decree and prohibit insulating in something that does not add heat. Rava said to him: During twilight, there is no reason to be concerned because at that time most pots are boiling, as they have just been taken off of the fire. Later at night the pots cool down and it is conceivable that one may come to boil them in order to restore the heat.,And Rava said:

Why did the Sages say that one may not insulate hot water for Shabbat in something that adds heat, even while it is still day? It is a decree lest one come to cover it in hot ashes that contain a glowing ember. People may not differentiate between addition of heat by means of hot ashes and other additions of heat. Abaye said to him: Let him insulate it with hot ashes, what is the problem? Rava answered him: It is a decree lest one come to stoke the coals in order to make them burn on Shabbat and thereby violate a Torah prohibition.,The Sages taught a baraita which discusses the range of problems that arise with regard to the twilight period. Twilight is a period of uncertainty. It is uncertain whether it consists of both day and night, it is uncertain whether it is completely day, and it is uncertain whether it is completely night. Therefore, the Sages impose the stringencies of both days upon it. If there is a stringency that applies on either of the days, one is obligated to adhere to it during the twilight period.,Nevertheless, the definition of twilight is uncertain. And what is twilight? From when the sun sets, as long as the eastern face of the sky is reddened by the light of the sun. If the lower segment of the sky has lost its color, and the upper segment has not yet lost its color, that is the twilight period. If the upper segment has lost its color, and its color equals that of the lower one, it is night; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Neḥemya says: The duration of the twilight period is the time it takes for a person to walk half a mil after the sun sets. Rabbi Yosei says: Twilight does not last for a quantifiable period of time; rather, it is like the blink of an eye: This, night, enters and that, day, leaves, and it is impossible to calculate it due to its brevity.,It was taught in the baraita that the Master said: The Sages impose the stringencies of both days upon twilight. The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha was this stated? Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: With regard to the matter of ritual impurity, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to a zav who saw an emission for two consecutive days during twilight, it is unclear whether it should be considered as if he only saw the emission for a single day, as perhaps twilight of the first day was part of the following day, and twilight of the second day was part of the previous day; or, whether it should be considered as two days, attributing each twilight to either the previous or the following day; or, whether it should be considered three days, as it is possible to view the twilight period as two days. By Torah law, a zav who saw two emissions is ritually impure, and all of the stringencies of a zav apply to him. If he sees a third emission, he is liable to bring an offering as part of his purification ritual. Therefore, this zav, with regard to whom there is uncertainty whether he saw emissions for one day, two days, or three days, has uncertain status with regard to both ritual impurity and to sacrifice. If he saw an emission one day during twilight, he has uncertain status with regard to ritual impurity because it may be considered two days.,The Gemara comments on the baraita cited by the Gemara. This baraita is itself difficult, self-contradictory. Initially you said, what is twilight? From when the sun sets, as long as the eastern face of the sky is reddened by the light of the sun. By inference, if the bottom segment lost its color, and the upper one has not lost its color, it is night. And then the baraita taught: If the lower segment of the sky has lost its color, and the upper segment has not yet lost its color, that is the twilight period. There is an apparent internal contradiction in the baraita. Rabba said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: In order to resolve the contradiction, unify the two statements and teach it as follows: What is twilight? From when the sun sets, as long as the eastern face of the sky is reddened by the light of the sun. If the lower segment of the sky has lost its color and the upper segment has not yet lost its color, that is also the twilight period. Only if the upper segment lost its color, and it equals that of the lower one, is it night. And Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said otherwise: From when the sun sets, as long as the eastern face of the sky is reddened by the light of the sun, it is day. If the lower segment of the sky has lost its color, and the upper segment has not yet lost its color, that is the twilight period. If the upper segment lost its color and it equals that of the lower one, it is night.,And the Gemara remarks: In this dispute over the precise definition of twilight both Rabba and Rav Yosef follow their line of reasoning stated elsewhere. As it was stated: What is the measure of the duration of twilight? Rabba said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The time it takes to walk three parts of a mil. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of three parts of a mil? If you say that it refers to three halves of a mil, let him say a mil and a half. Rather, if you say that it means three-thirds of a mil, let him simply say one mil. Rather, it means three-quarters of a mil. And Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The duration of twilight is two parts of a mil. Again the Gemara asks: What is the meaning of two parts of a mil? If you say that it means two halves of a mil, let him simply say one mil. Rather, if you say that it means two-quarters of a mil, let him say instead: Half of a mil. Rather,
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it means two-thirds of a mil. The Gemara explains: What is the practical difference between them? The practical difference between them is half of one-sixth [danka], i.e., one-twelfth of a mil. Their disputes are consistent, as the duration of twilight according to Rav Yosef is shorter than its duration according to Rabba.,The Gemara comments: And with regard to the legal status of a wicker vessel their dispute is the opposite. In that case, the size of the vessel permitted by Rav Yosef is larger than the size of the vessel permitted by Rabba. As Rabba said with regard to a wicker vessel with a capacity of two kor, one is permitted to move it on Shabbat. And one with a capacity of three kor, one is prohibited to move it on Shabbat. It is much larger than the dimensions of a vessel and one is only permitted to move vessels on Shabbat. And Rav Yosef said: A vessel with a capacity of three kor, one is also permitted to move it, and only one with a capacity of four kor, it is prohibited to move.,Abaye said: I raised the dilemma before my Master, Rabba, when it was practical, when I actually needed to know what to do, and he did not permit me to move even a vessel with a capacity of two kor. The Gemara explains: In accordance with whose opinion did Rabba issue his practical halakhic ruling? In accordance with the opinion of this tanna that we learned in the mishna discussing the laws of ritual purity: A round straw barrel, and a round barrel made of reeds, and the cistern of an Alexandrian ship, which is a large vessel placed on a boat and filled with potable water, although these vessels have bottoms, i.e., they are receptacles, since they have a capacity of forty se’a of liquid, which is the equivalent of two kor of dry goods, they are ritually pure. Even if they come into contact with a source of ritual impurity, they do not become impure. Beyond a certain size, containers are no longer considered vessels and, consequently, cannot become ritually impure. Rabba held: Since with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity a vessel of two kor is not considered a vessel, it may not be moved on Shabbat. With regard to this mishna, Abaye said: Learn from it that the surplus of dry goods in a vessel relative to liquids is one-third of the contents of the vessel. It says in the mishna that a vessel that can hold forty se’a of liquid holds two kor of dry produce, which is the equivalent of sixty se’a.,The Gemara relates: Abaye saw that Rava was gazing westward on Shabbat eve to determine whether or not the sky was red and whether or not it was twilight. Abaye said to Rava: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that twilight is from when the sun sets, as long as the eastern face of the sky is reddened by the light of the sun? Why, then, are you looking westward? Rava said to him: Do you hold that the reference is actually to the eastern face of the sky? No, it is referring to the face of the sky that causes the east to redden, i.e., the west. Some say a different version of that incident. Rava saw that Abaye was gazing eastward. He said to him, do you hold that the reference is to the actual eastern face of the sky? The reference is to the face of the sky that causes the east to redden, i.e., the west. And your mnemonic is a window, as it is on the wall opposite the window that one can see how much sunlight is shining through.,With regard to that which was taught in the baraita that Rabbi Neḥemya says: The duration of twilight is the time it takes for a person to walk half a mil after the sun sets. Rabbi Ḥanina said: One who wants to know the precise measure of Rabbi Neḥemya’s twilight should do the following: Leave the sun at the top of Mount Carmel, as when one is standing on the seashore he can still see the top of Mount Carmel in sunlight, and descend and immerse himself in the sea, and emerge, and that is Rabbi Neḥemya’s measure of the duration of twilight.,Because of its similarity to Rabbi Ḥanina’s statement, the Gemara cites that which Rabbi Ḥiyya said: One who wants to see Miriam’s well, which accompanied the Jewish people throughout their sojourn in the desert, should do the following: He should climb to the top of Mount Carmel and look out, and he will see a rock that looks like a sieve in the sea, and that is Miriam’s well. Rav said: A spring that is portable, i.e., that moves from place to place, is ritually pure and is regarded as an actual spring and not as drawn water. And what is a movable spring? It is Miriam’s well.,Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: During Rabbi Yehuda’s twilight, ritually impure priests who want to immerse themselves during the day to become ritually pure, so that sunset will follow immersion and they will be permitted to eat teruma, can still immerse themselves during that period. According to this opinion, twilight is still considered to be day. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that true? If you say that it is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s own opinion, his opinion cited above is that twilight is a period of uncertainty. Therefore, one who immerses at that time may not eat teruma until after the sunset of the following day. Rather, the reference is to twilight of Rabbi Yehuda, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Priests can immerse then, as Rabbi Yosei considers that time to still be day, and sunset will follow.,The Gemara asks: It is obvious that according to Rabbi Yosei they are immersing themselves during the day. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the twilight of Rabbi Yosei is subsumed within and takes place at the end of the twilight of Rabbi Yehuda. When the twilight of Rabbi Yehuda ends, Rabbi Yosei’s twilight is also over. It is already night, sunset of that day has already passed, and there is no sunset to enable them to eat teruma. Therefore, he teaches us that Rabbi Yehuda’s twilight ends, and only thereafter does Rabbi Yosei’s twilight begin.,Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to the matter of Shabbat, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei with regard to the matter of teruma. The Gemara asks: Granted, concerning the statement that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to the matter of Shabbat, as like all other cases of uncertainty, the ruling is stringent with regard to Torah prohibitions. However, with regard to teruma, what is the case under discussion? If you say that it is referring to the matter of immersion, immersion is also a case of uncertainty with regard to a Torah law. Why would the ruling be more lenient in that case than in the case of Shabbat?

Rather, it must be that the reference is with regard to eating teruma. Priests may not eat teruma until twilight is completed, which according to Rabbi Yosei’s opinion is slightly later than it is according to Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion.,With regard to the period of twilight, Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: When one can see one star in the evening sky, it is still day; two stars, twilight; three stars, night. That was also taught in a baraita: When one can see one star in the evening sky, it is still day; two stars, twilight; three stars, night. Rabbi Yosei said: This is neither referring to large stars that are visible even during the day, nor to small stars that are visible only late at night. Rather, it is referring to medium-sized stars.,Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Zevida, said: One who performs a prohibited labor during two twilights, one between Friday and Shabbat and one between Shabbat and the conclusion of Shabbat on Saturday night, is liable to bring a sin-offering for performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat whichever way you look at it. Whether we say that twilight is day or night, certainly one of those labors was performed on Shabbat. Rava said to his servant: You, who are not expert in the measures of the Sages, when the sun is at the top of the palm trees, light the Shabbat lights. His servant asked him: What should we do on a cloudy day, when the sun is not visible at the top of the trees? Rava said to him: In the city, watch the roosters because as evening approaches they sit on their beams. In a field, watch the ravens because they return to their nests as evening approaches. Alternatively, you can watch the plants [adanei] that turn westward in the evening. When they begin to turn westward evening is approaching.,The Sages taught in a baraita: They sound six blasts on Shabbat eve to announce that Shabbat is approaching. The Gemara details what each blast signifies. The first blast is in order to stop the people from work in the fields. The second blast is to stop those who are working in the city, and to inform the proprietors to close the stores. The third is to inform them to light the Shabbat light; that is the statement of Rabbi Natan. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The third blast is to inform those who don phylacteries throughout the day to remove their phylacteries, as one does not don phylacteries on Shabbat. And he pauses after the third blast for the length of time it takes to fry a small fish or to stick bread to the sides of the oven. One who forgot to do so and needs those foods for Shabbat may do so then. And he sounds a tekia, and sounds a terua, and sounds a tekia, and he accepts Shabbat. It is then that Shabbat begins in every sense.,Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: What shall we do to the Babylonian Jews? They stray from the custom, as they sound a tekia and a terua, and they accept Shabbat during the terua, i.e., upon hearing the blast of the terua. The Gemara asks about this: Do the Babylonians really sound only a tekia and a terua and no more blasts? If so, there are only five blasts and not six, as it was taught in the baraita. Rather, the correct version is: They sound a tekia, and they again sound a tekia, and then they sound a terua, and they accept Shabbat during the terua. They do so because they continue the custom of their fathers that was handed down to them.,Rav Yehuda taught to Rav Yitzḥak, his son: The second blast that is sounded before Shabbat is to inform people to light the light. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did he say this? It is neither in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan nor in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rather, certainly he told him that the third blast is in order to inform people to light the light, and in accordance with whose opinion did he say this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan.,On a similar note, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught in greater detail: Six blasts are sounded on Shabbat eve. When one begins sounding the first tekia, the people standing and working in the fields refrained from hoeing, and from plowing and from performing all labor in the fields. And those workers who work close to the city are not permitted to enter the city until those who work farther away come, so that they will all enter together. Otherwise, people would suspect that the workers who came later continued to work after the blast. And still, at this time, the stores in the city are open and the shutters of the stores, upon which the storekeepers would arrange their merchandise in front of the stores, remain in place. When he began sounding the second blast, the shutters were removed from where they were placed and the stores were locked and in the homes, however, hot water was still cooking on the stove and pots remained in place on the stove. When he began sounding the third blast, the one charged with removing food from the stove removed it, and the one charged with insulating hot water for Shabbat so that it would not cool off insulated it, and the one charged with kindling the Shabbat lights lit. And the one sounding the shofar pauses for the amount of time it takes to fry a small fish or to stick bread to the sides of the oven, and he sounds a tekia, and sounds a terua, and sounds a tekia, and accepts Shabbat.,Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, said: I heard that a person who was pressed for time and comes to light Shabbat lights after six blasts may light without concern, as even the moment of the sixth blast is not yet Shabbat. Proof for this is that the Sages provided the sexton of the synagogue a period of time to take his shofar, which he used to sound the blasts on a tall roof in the middle of the city, to his house. Clearly, during that interval it is not yet Shabbat. He said to him: If so, then you have rendered your statement subject to circumstances, and it would not apply uniformly to all. Shabbat would start at a different time in each place based on the distance between the site where the shofar is sounded and the home of the sexton. Rather, Shabbat began immediately after the final blast with no pause in between. The sexton had a concealed place on top of his roof, where he would sound the shofar, in which he would place his shofar because the consensus is that one may move neither the shofar nor the trumpets on Shabbat.,The Gemara asks with regard to this last halakha: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that the shofar may be moved on Shabbat, and the trumpets may not be moved? Rav Yosei said: This is not difficult, as one could say that here, where moving a shofar was permitted, it is referring to a shofar belonging to an individual. Because it has a use even on Shabbat, it may be moved. There, where moving a shofar was prohibited, it is referring to a shofar that belongs to a community. Because it has no use on Shabbat, it is, therefore, considered set-aside [muktze]. Abaye said to him: And in the case of an individual, for what permitted action is a shofar fit to be used on Shabbat? It is fit for use since it is suitable to give water with it
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to a child. Because the mouth of a shofar is bent, one can pour a little water at a time. If so, a shofar belonging to the community is also suitable to feed water to a poor infant whose sustenance is provided by the community. And furthermore, that halakha which was taught in a baraita: Just as one may move the shofar, so too one may move the trumpets, is contrary to that which was taught previously that there is a difference between moving the shofar and moving the trumpet. In accordance with whose opinion is that baraita? Rather, this is not difficult, as it can be explained that these three baraitot correspond to the three opinions with regard to these halakhot. This baraita, which permits moving the shofar but not the trumpet, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that the laws of set-aside apply to these items on Shabbat and one may not move a utensil whose only function is prohibited. Since a trumpet has no permitted use on Shabbat, it may not be moved. On the other hand, one is permitted to move a shofar, which can be used to feed a child. And that baraita, which permits moving both a shofar and a trumpet, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that the halakhot of set-aside do not apply to utensils of this kind on Shabbat. Whereas this other baraita, which prohibits moving both a shofar and a trumpet, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, who holds that one may not use a utensil whose primary function is prohibited on Shabbat, even for a permissible purpose.,However, this explanation raises a slight difficulty with regard to the statement that one may move neither a shofar nor a trumpet. There was no need to mention the trumpet. If one may not move a shofar, certainly he may not move a trumpet. However, it can be explained as follows: What is the shofar mentioned in this baraita? It refers to trumpets, in accordance with the statement of Rav Ḥisda, as Rav Ḥisda said: These three objects, their names changed since the Holy Temple was destroyed. That which was called trumpet was called shofar in later generations, and that which was called shofar was called trumpet in later generations. The baraita that was cited employed the style that switches trumpet and shofar, and they were mentioned in that order. Incidentally, the Gemara asks: What is the practical halakhic difference whether a shofar is called shofar or trumpet? The Gemara answers: It is significant with regard to the halakhot of shofar of Rosh HaShana. On Rosh HaShana one fulfills his obligation only by sounding a shofar. If one comes today and asks what instrument he should use to sound the requisite blasts, he should be told to use a trumpet.,The second object whose name was changed: That which was called willow [arava] was called in later generations tzaftzafa, and that which was called tzaftzafa was called willow. Here too the Gemara asks: What is the practical halakhic difference that emerges from the name change? The Gemara answers: With regard to the mitzva of the four species, referred to by the name of one of the species, as taking the palm branch, as one of the four species is a willow branch, not a tzaftzafa.,The third item whose name was changed: A large table that was originally called petora was called in later generations by the name previously used for a small table, petorata. And a petorata was called petora. And the Gemara asks: What is the practical halakhic difference that emerges from the change of name? The Gemara answers: With regard to the laws of buying and selling. A person who orders a petora should know that he ordered a small table and not a large one.,Abaye said: We too shall speak and comment on changes in the meaning of terms in our generation. What was called huvlila, the first stomach of animals that chew their cud, is, in recent generations, called bei kasei, the name of the animal’s second stomach. Similarly, what was once called in the past bei kasei is called huvlila in recent generations. What is the practical halakhic difference that emerges from this change of names? With regard to a needle that is found in the thick wall of the second stomach. In the halakhot of tereifot, one is prohibited to eat animals with a life expectancy of less than a year. It was established that if a needle punctured the wall of the second stomach from only one side, the animal is kosher. If the needle penetrated through the wall in a manner visible from both sides, the animal assumes the halakhic status of a tereifa. In the first stomach, even if the needle penetrated only one side of the wall, the animal assumes the halakhic status of a tereifa. Therefore, it is crucial to distinguish between the first and the second stomachs.,Rav Ashi said: We too shall speak of matters whose name changed over the generations. The city that, in biblical times, was called Babylon was called Bursif in later generations, and Bursif was called Babylon in later generations.

What is the practical halakhic difference that emerges from this change of names? It is in the area of women’s bills of divorce. With regard to bills of divorce, special care is devoted to ensuring that the name of the place where the bill is written is not altered. Therefore, it is important to be aware that Babylon underwent a name change in later generations.,,MISHNA: With regard to a stove that was lit on Shabbat eve with straw or with rakings, scraps collected from the field, one may place a pot of cooked food atop it on Shabbat. The fire in this stove was certainly extinguished while it was still day, as both straw and rakings are materials that burn quickly. However, if the stove was lit with pomace, pulp that remains from sesame seeds, olives, and the like after the oil is squeezed from them, and if it was lit with wood, one may not place a pot atop it on Shabbat until he sweeps the coals from the stove while it is still day or until he places ashes on the coals, so that the fire will not ignite on Shabbat. Beit Shammai say: Even after one has swept away the coals, it is only permitted to place hot water on it, as it is sufficiently hot and does not require additional cooking, but not cooked food. Since, in general, one prefers that food will cook more, there is concern lest he come to ignite the fire by stoking the coals. And Beit Hillel say: Both hot water and cooked food may be placed. Beit Shammai say: One may remove a pot from the stove on Shabbat but may not return it. And Beit Hillel say: One may even return it.,GEMARA: The students raised a dilemma with regard to the explanation of the mishna. That which we learned in the mishna: One may not place, does it mean that one may not return a pot that he took off the fire and wishes to return on Shabbat; however, to leave the pot from Shabbat eve into Shabbat, one may leave it even though this stove is not swept of its coals and its coals are not covered with ashes? And, according to this, whose opinion is it in this mishna? It is the opinion of Ḥananya. As it was taught in a baraita, Ḥananya says: Any food that has already been cooked to the extent of the food of ben Drosai, who would only cook his food the minimum amount necessary, one is permitted to leave it atop a stove on Shabbat even though the stove is not swept and not covered with ashes. Or perhaps, that which we learned in the mishna: One may not place, means one may not leave it on the fire from Shabbat eve. And if the coals in the stove were swept or covered with ashes, yes, one may leave the pot on the stove. And if not, no, one may not leave it, and all the more so one may not return it to the stove on Shabbat under any circumstances.,In order to resolve this dilemma, the Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution to this from the fact that two sections were taught in our mishna. In the first, Beit Shammai say: Hot water but not cooked food. And Beit Hillel say: Both hot water and cooked food. And in the second, Beit Shammai say: One may remove it but may not return it. And Beit Hillel say: One may even return it. Granted, if you say that when we learned in the mishna that one may not place it means that it is prohibited to leave it; in that case, the mishna is teaching as follows: With regard to a stove that was lit with straw or with rakings, one may leave cooked food on it. If it was lit with pomace or with wood, one may not leave the cooked food on it until he sweeps the coals out while it is still day or until he places ashes on it. And what may they leave? Beit Shammai say: Hot water but not cooked food. And Beit Hillel say: One may leave both hot water and cooked food on it. And just as they disagree with regard to leaving a pot on the stove, so too, they disagree with regard to whether or not it is permitted to return it to the stove. As Beit Shammai say: One may take the pot from the stove on Shabbat but may not return it to the stove at all. And Beit Hillel say: One may even return it.,However, if you say that when we learned in the mishna that one may not place, it means that it is prohibited to return it, then the mishna is teaching as follows: A stove that was lit with straw or with rakings, one may return cooked food onto it. If it was lit with pomace or with wood, one may not return cooked food to it until one sweeps the coals out while it is still day or until one places ashes on them. And what may they return? Beit Shammai say: Hot water but not cooked food. And Beit Hillel say: Both hot water and cooked food. Beit Shammai say: One may remove but may not return. And Beit Hillel say: One may even return. If in the first section the question of what may be returned was already addressed, why do I need this additional dispute in the second section? The gist of Beit Shammai’s statement that cooked food may not be returned to the stove is that one may remove but may not return. Apparently, the mishna can only be understood in accordance with the first explanation. The first clause discusses leaving and the latter clause discusses returning.
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The Gemara rejects this proof. Actually, you can say that in the first clause of the mishna we learned to return and the mishna is incomplete. A clause must be added to the mishna, and it teaches the following: With regard to a stove that was lit with straw or rakings, one may return a pot of cooked food to it. If it was lit with pomace or with wood, one may not return a pot to it until one sweeps the coals out while it is still day or until one covers the coals with ashes. However, to leave the pot on the flame on Shabbat, one may leave it, even though it is not swept and not covered with ashes. Through this addition, the continuation of the dispute can be understood as follows: And what may they leave? Beit Shammai say: Hot water but not cooked food. And Beit Hillel say: Both hot water and cooked food. Furthermore: And that return that I said to you at the start of the mishna is not according to everyone. Rather, it too is subject to a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, as Beit Shammai say: One may remove but not return. And Beit Hillel say: One may even return. The dilemma with regard to the interpretation of the mishna has not been resolved.,Come and hear another resolution to this dilemma from that which Rabbi Ḥelbo said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said that Rav said: They only taught that placing is permitted with regard to a stove as far as placing a pot atop it is concerned. However, placing a pot inside it is prohibited. Granted, if you say that we learned returning in the mishna, that is why there is a halakhic difference between placing a pot inside it and placing a pot atop it. If one returns it on Shabbat, placing it inside a stove that might have burning coals, there is concern that Shabbat would be desecrated. Therefore, it was only permitted to place cooked food atop the stove. However, if you say that we learned leaving in the mishna, what is the difference to me whether it is inside the stove and what is the difference to me whether it is atop it? Ultimately, he does nothing on Shabbat with the hot ashes in the stove. The Gemara rejects this proof: Do you think that Rabbi Ḥelbo is referring to the first clause of the mishna? No, he is referring to the latter clause of the mishna, which states: And Beit Hillel say that one may even return. And with regard to this Rabbi Ḥelbo said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said that Rav said: They only taught that one may return the cooked food atop the stove; however, inside it is prohibited. If so, there is still no resolution to the dilemma.,Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which was taught in the Tosefta: In the case of two adjoining stoves that share a common wall, in one of them, the coals were swept or covered with ashes, and in one the coals were not swept and not covered with ashes; the ruling with regard to leaving a pot atop them on Shabbat is as follows: One may leave food atop the one that was swept or covered with ashes, and one may not leave food atop the one that was not swept and not covered with ashes. And to the crux of the matter, what may one leave? Beit Shammai say: Nothing at all. They dispute the halakha cited above. And Beit Hillel say: One may leave hot water but not cooked food. However, if one removed the cooked dish from atop the stove, everyone, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agrees that one may not return it atop the stove; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. According to the tradition that he received, that is the issue disputed between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. Rabbi Yehuda says that the dispute is different. Beit Shammai say: One may leave hot water on it but not cooked food. And Beit Hillel say: One may leave both hot water and cooked food. Furthermore, Beit Shammai say: One may remove a pot from the stove on Shabbat but may not return it. And Beit Hillel say: One may even return it.,Granted, if you say that the case we learned in our mishna was with regard to leaving the pot on the stove, in accordance with whose opinion is our mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. However, if you say that the case we learned in our mishna was with regard to returning the pot to the stove, in accordance with whose opinion is our mishna? It is neither in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda nor with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. If you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, it is difficult for Beit Shammai in one respect. In our mishna, Beit Shammai permit some use of a stove on Shabbat; while according to Rabbi Meir in the baraita, Beit Shammai prohibit any use. And for Beit Hillel it is difficult in two respects. According to our understanding of the mishna, Beit Hillel permit both hot water and cooked food, contrary to Rabbi Meir’s version of their opinion as stated in the baraita. Similarly, in our mishna, Beit Hillel permit returning the pot to the stove, contrary to Rabbi Meir’s version of their opinion. If you explain that our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the baraita, it is difficult with regard to the issue of sweeping the coals and covering them with ashes. In the mishna, both Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai allow leaving it on a stove whose coals were not swept or covered with ashes. According to Rabbi Yehuda in the baraita, apparently a stove whose coals are neither swept nor covered with ashes may not be used at all. Since this interpretation leads to contradictions, it is preferable to explain the mishna in accordance with the other approach, so that the mishna will at least correspond to one opinion.,This claim is rejected: Actually, you can say that the case we learned in our mishna was with regard to returning the pot to the stove, and our tanna in the mishna holds in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda in one matter, and disagrees with him in one matter. He holds in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda in one matter, with regard to the matter of hot water and cooked food, and what may be taken from the stove and what may even be returned. And he disagrees with him in one matter: While our tanna in the mishna held that to leave a pot on a stove is permitted even though it is not swept or covered with ashes, Rabbi Yehuda held: With regard to permitting one to leave a pot on the stove as well, if the stove was swept or covered with ashes, yes, it is permitted; if it was not swept or covered with ashes, no, it is prohibited.,A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to a stove that was neither swept nor covered with ashes, what is the halakha with regard to permitting one to lean a cooked dish against it, so that it may be heated from the sides of the stove? The dilemma is: Was it only placing a pot inside it and atop it that is prohibited, but to lean the pot against it he may well do so? Or, perhaps, leaning is no different and it is prohibited in every case.,Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which was taught in a baraita: If there are two adjoining stoves, one that was swept or covered with ashes and one that was not swept and covered with ashes, one may leave cooked food atop the stove that is swept and covered with ashes on Shabbat. Apparently, it is permitted to lean a pot on a stove that was not swept, even though heat rises to it from the other stove. The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps that case of two adjoining stoves is different. Since the pot is elevated, the air affects it and cools it. Therefore, it is not comparable to actually leaning it against the stove.,Come and hear another resolution to this dilemma from that which Rav Safra said that Rav Ḥiyya said: If there is a stove whose coals one covered with ashes on Shabbat eve and it subsequently reignited on Shabbat, one may lean a pot against it, and leave cooked food on it, and remove food from it, and even return food to it. Conclude from this the following with regard to leaning, as well: If he covered them with ashes, yes, if he did not cover them with ashes, no, as the Gemara is speaking about a stove whose ashes were covered properly during the day. The Gemara rejects this proof too. And according to your opinion, that which was taught: One may remove the food from it, would you say there too that if he covered them, yes, and if he did not cover them, no? Everyone agrees that it is permitted to take the pot off of the stove even if it is not swept or covered with ashes. Rather, it must be understood that he taught permission to remove the pot due to the fact that it taught permission to return it. Here too, it taught permission to lean the pot due to the fact that it taught permission to leave the pot on the stove. Consequently, a conclusion cannot be drawn that leaning a pot on an unswept stove is prohibited.,The Gemara is astonished by this comparison. How can you compare them? There, one removes the pot from and returns it to one and the same place. Therefore, it taught removing due to returning, as one cannot return a pot before he removes it. However, here, where one leans the pot is in one place and where one leaves the pot is in one, another, place, there is no connection between the two. If the tanna did not intend to teach that leaning is permitted only on a swept stove, there would be no reason to mention permission to lean in conjunction with permission to leave. In any event, this is not an absolute proof, and the dilemma has not been resolved.,The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached with regard to this dilemma? Come and hear a resolution to this from that which was taught in the Tosefta: With regard to a stove that was lit with pomace or with wood, one may lean a pot of cooked food against it; however, one may not leave a pot inside it unless the stove is swept out or covered with ashes. Coals that dimmed or on which a strip of thinly beaten flax was placed and the fire did not ignite, it is as if it were covered with ashes, and one need not add more ashes to it. In any case, the conclusion is drawn from here that one is permitted to lean a dish of cooked food against a stove, even though it is not covered with ashes or swept out.,Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Naḥmani said that Rav Oshaya said: With regard to a stove that he covered with ashes and that reignited on Shabbat, one may leave hot water that was already completely heated and cooked food that was already completely cooked upon it. In that case, there is no need for additional cooking, and therefore there is no concern that one might come to stoke the coals and ignite the fire.

Conclude from this halakha that even when it is food that shrivels and improves by remaining on the fire, it is nevertheless permitted to leave it. The food is already completely cooked and there is no concern lest one come to stoke the coals and ignite the fire. Rabbi Oshaya did not distinguish between different types of foods in permitting this. The Gemara rejects this conclusion: Here, it is different because he covered the coals in the stove with ashes, and that is the reason that he is permitted to leave food on the stove. The Gemara asks: If so, what purpose was there to say this halakha? Is it to teach that if the coals are covered with ashes, there is no room for concern? That is obvious. The Gemara answers: The case where he covered it with ashes and it reignited on Shabbat was necessary and required additional articulation. Lest you say that since it reignited, it returns to its original status and is prohibited, therefore it taught us that this is not the case.,Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to a stove that he swept out or covered with ashes before Shabbat and subsequently reignited on Shabbat, one may leave hot water that was already completely heated and cooked food that was already completely cooked upon it, even if the coals were from the wood of a broom tree, which are very hot and long-burning. If so, conclude from this that even if food shrivels and improves while on the stove, it is permitted. The Gemara rejects this: Here, in this case, it is different because he covered it with ashes. Therefore, it is permitted to leave it on the stove. The Gemara asks: If so, what was the purpose of saying this halakha? The Gemara answers: Mention of the case where he covered it with ashes and it reignited on Shabbat was necessary. The Gemara challenges that explanation: This case is identical to the previous one. Why did Rabbi Yoḥanan find it necessary to repeat what was already said? The Gemara responds that there is a novel element in his statement. It was necessary to teach the case of coals from the wood of a broom tree. Even in a case of especially hot coals it is permitted.,Rav Sheshet said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to a stove that was lit with pomace or with wood, one may leave hot water on it even if the water has not yet been completely heated, and the same is true for cooked food even if it was not yet completely cooked. However, if one removed the food from the stove, one may only return it if he sweeps the coals out of the stove while it is still day, or if he places ashes on the coals. The reason for mentioning this halakha is because he holds that in our mishna we learned with regard to returning the cooked food to the stove; however, with regard to leaving a pot on top of the stove, if it was placed there while it was still day, one may leave it on the stove even if it is not swept and not covered with ashes.,Rava said: We already learned both aspects of Rav Sheshet’s halakha and there is no need to teach us something that was already stated explicitly in the mishna. We already learned that it is permitted to leave a pot on the stove. One may not put bread into the oven at nightfall and may not place cake on top of coals unless there is enough time before Shabbat that its surface will form a crust. However, if its surface already formed a crust before Shabbat, it is permitted to leave it even in an oven that was not swept and not covered with coals. Likewise, we also already learned in our mishna the second aspect of Rav Sheshet’s halakha that it is permitted to return the pot to the fire, as Beit Hillel say: One may even return. And it is clear that Beit Hillel only went so far as permitting the return of the pot in a stove that is swept or covered with ashes; however, in one that is not swept or covered with ashes, they did not permit doing so. If so, Rav Sheshet’s statement is superfluous. The Gemara answers: Rav Sheshet also only came to teach us the inference from the mishna and not to introduce new halakhot.,Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to a stove that was lit with pomace or with wood, on Shabbat eve one may leave a cooked dish that was already completely cooked, as well as hot water that was already completely heated, upon it and even if it is the type of food that when left for a prolonged period of time on the fire it shrivels and improves. There is no concern lest one come to stoke the coals. The Gemara relates that one of the Sages said to Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda: Isn’t it Rav and Shmuel who both say, contrary to your opinion, that if food shrivels and improves when placed on the stove, leaving it on there on Shabbat is prohibited?,Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said to him: Is that to say that I do not know that Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: If food shrivels and improves when left on the fire for an extended period, it is prohibited to leave it there? When I said to you that it is permitted to leave it, I said it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Rav Ukva from Meishan said to Rav Ashi: You, who are close to the place where Rav and Shmuel lived, act in accordance with the ruling of Rav and Shmuel; we will act in accordance with the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan.,Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is the ruling with regard to leaving food on the stove from Shabbat eve? Rav Yosef said to him: Didn’t they leave food for Rav Yehuda and he ate it? Apparently, it is permitted to do so. Abaye said to him: No proof can be brought from Rav Yehuda. Since he is in danger, as he is sick and needs hot food, even on Shabbat as well, it is permitted to heat up food for him. However, for me and you as well as for all other people what is the ruling? Rav Yosef said to Abaye: In Sura, they leave food on the stove from Shabbat eve, as Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak from Sura was a master of good deeds who was meticulous in his performance of mitzvot, and they would leave food for him and he would eat it. Rav Ashi said: I stood before Rav Huna and saw that they left fish fried in oil [kasa deharsena] for him atop the stove on Shabbat, and he ate the fish on Shabbat. And I do not know if his reason for doing so is because he holds that it is permitted to leave food that shrivels and improves when left on the stove for a long time. Or, if it is because this dish has flour in it, and therefore it shrivels and deteriorates. Everyone agrees that it is permitted to leave food atop the stove that shrivels and deteriorates.,Rav Naḥman said: Food that shrivels and improves when left on the stove, it is prohibited to leave it on the stove; if it shrivels and deteriorates, it is permitted. The principle in this matter is as follows: Any food that has flour in it shrivels and deteriorates, except for a cooked turnip dish, which, even though it has flour, shrivels and improves. And this applies only when there is meat in it, but when there is no meat in it, it shrivels and deteriorates. And when there is meat in it, too, we only said that it shrivels and improves when one does not need it for guests, but when one needs it for guests, it shrivels and deteriorates because it is not polite to serve guests overcooked food, which is not aesthetic. Furthermore: Leaving dishes made of figs [lafda], porridge, or dates on the stove causes them to shrivel and deteriorate.,They raised a dilemma before Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba:
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If one forgot a pot on Shabbat eve atop a stove and it cooked on Shabbat, what is the ruling in that case? Is one permitted to eat that food, or not? He was silent and did not say a thing to him. The next day, he emerged and publicly taught them the following halakha: With regard to one who cooks on Shabbat, if he did so unwittingly, he may eat it, and if he cooked intentionally, he may not eat it; and the halakha is no different.,The last part of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba’s statement is unclear. The Gemara asks: What is the practical halakhic meaning of the phrase: And it is no different? Rabba and Rav Yosef both said to interpret the phrase permissively in the following manner: One who cooks is one who performs an action. If he did so intentionally, he may not eat what he cooked. However, this one who forgot the pot on the stove, who does not perform an action, even if he intentionally left the pot on Shabbat eve, he may also eat the food. However, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that the phrase: And it is no different, should be interpreted restrictively in the following manner: It is one who cooks who will not come to deceive, as there is no room for suspicion that a person will intentionally cook on Shabbat. Therefore, if one cooks unwittingly, he may eat it. However, one who would come to deceive, intentionally leaving the pot on the stove and saying: I forgot it, the Sages penalize him and decree that if he did so unwittingly as well, he may not eat it.,The Gemara raises an objection to this statement from that which was taught in a baraita: One who forgot a pot atop a stove and it cooked on Shabbat, if he did so unwittingly, he may eat it; if he did so intentionally, he may not eat it. In what case is this statement said? It is in a case where the pot contains hot water that was not yet completely heated, and the same applies to cooked food that was not yet completely cooked. However, if it contains hot water that was already completely heated and cooked food that was already completely cooked, whether the pot was left there unwittingly, or whether the pot was left there intentionally, one may eat it; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.,Rabbi Yehuda says that there is a distinction: Hot water that was already completely heated is permitted because, in that case, the longer it remains on the fire, the more it shrivels, i.e., evaporates, and deteriorates. In that case, one would certainly not come to increase the heat because he would not want to lose more water through evaporation. However, cooked food that was completely cooked, it is prohibited to leave it on the fire because it shrivels and improves. There is room for concern that he will stoke the coals to increase the heat under the food. And there is a general principle: Anything that shrivels and improves, e.g., cabbage, and beans, and meat cut into small pieces is prohibited; and anything that shrivels and deteriorates is permitted.,In any event, it was taught in that baraita that in the case of cooked food that was not completely cooked, if it was cooked unwittingly, it is permitted. Granted, according to the opinion of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, this is not difficult. Although there is an apparent contradiction, as he prohibits eating from a pot that was unwittingly forgotten on the stove, and the baraita prohibits it only when it was left intentionally, he could explain the following: Here, the baraita, which permits eating it, was taught prior to the decree that was issued lest a person act deceitfully, whereas there, the halakha of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, was taught after the decree, which prohibited eating food even if it was forgotten unwittingly. However, according to the opinion of Rabba and Rav Yosef, who said to interpret the phrase permissively, whether he left it on the stove unwittingly or he did so intentionally, it is difficult. If this baraita was taught prior to the decree, the ruling with regard to when he did so intentionally is difficult, as Rabba and Rav Yosef permit eating the food even in that case. If this baraita was taught after the decree, the ruling with regard to when he did so unwittingly is also difficult, as Rabba and Rav Yosef permit eating the food in every case. No answer was found to this objection and the Gemara concludes: It is indeed difficult.,With regard to the matter itself, the Gemara asks: What is the decree that was discussed above in terms of the distinction between before the decree and after the decree? The Gemara says: This is the decree that Rav Yehuda bar Shmuel said that Rabbi Abba said that Rav Kahana said that Rav said: Initially, they would say: With regard to one who cooks on Shabbat, if it was unwitting, one may eat it; if it was intentional, one may not eat it. And the same is true with regard to one who forgets the pot atop the stove before Shabbat and it cooks on Shabbat. When the number of those who leave their pots intentionally and say we forgot to justify their actions, increased, the Sages then penalized those who forgot. Even one who forgets unwittingly may not eat it.,In the Tosefta cited earlier, which deals with one who forgot a pot atop the stove and the food cooked on Shabbat, Rabbi Meir ruled leniently and permitted both hot water that was completely heated and cooked food that was completely cooked, even when it was left on the stove intentionally. Rabbi Yehuda ruled stringently and distinguished between different cases. However, in the Tosefta cited at the beginning of the chapter, it was taught that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree with regard to the opinions of Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai as far as leaving food on the stove on Shabbat is concerned. Rabbi Meir says that it is completely prohibited to leave cooked food on the stove ab initio, even according to Beit Hillel who rule leniently. Rabbi Yehuda said that Beit Hillel ruled leniently and permitted doing so. There is a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Meir and the other statement of Rabbi Meir, and there is a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara responds: Between one statement of Rabbi Meir and the other statement of Rabbi Meir there is no contradiction. That which we learned: Rabbi Meir prohibits leaving cooked food under any circumstances, is speaking ab initio; whereas this, where he permits eating the food even if it was left on the stove intentionally, is speaking after the fact. Between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda there is also no contradiction. There, where he permitted leaving the food on the stove, it is referring to the case of a stove that was swept and covered with ashes, whereas here, where he prohibited doing so, is referring to the case of a stove that is not swept and covered with ashes.,A dilemma was raised before the Sages: One who transgressed and left his pot on the fire on Shabbat, what is his legal status? Did the Sages penalize him and prohibit him from eating the food, or did they not penalize him? Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which Shmuel bar Natan said that Rabbi Ḥanina said: When Rabbi Yosei went to the city of Tzippori, he found hot water that was left on the stove, and he did not prohibit them from drinking it. He found eggs shriveled from overcooking that were left on the stove on Shabbat and he prohibited them from eating them. Is this not referring to permitting and prohibiting their consumption for that same Shabbat? If so, apparently he prohibits eating cooked food that was intentionally left on the stove on Shabbat. The Gemara immediately rejects this assumption: No. Rather, he prohibited them from doing so ab initio the following Shabbat, but he did not prohibit them from eating the eggs on that same Shabbat.,The Gemara is surprised: From this statement it can be inferred that eggs shriveled from overcooking shrivel and improve when left on the fire for a long time, and that is the reason that Rabbi Yosei made a distinction between hot water, which he permitted leaving on the stove, and eggs, which he prohibited leaving on the stove. The Gemara replies: Yes, overcooking improves the eggs. As Rav Ḥama bar Ḥanina said: One time Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and I were guests in the same place, and they brought before us overcooked eggs that shriveled to the size of crab apples [uzradin] and we ate many of them. Apparently, extended cooking improves eggs. Therefore, when they are left on the fire on Shabbat there is room for concern lest one stoke the coals in order to shrivel them more.,We learned in the mishna: Beit Hillel say that one may even return a pot taken off the stove to the stove on Shabbat. Rav Sheshet said: According to the one who says

that one may even return it, doing so is permitted even on Shabbat and not only on Shabbat eve. And Rav Oshaya also holds: One may even return it even on Shabbat. As Rav Oshaya said: Once we were standing on Shabbat before Rabbi Ḥiyya the Great and we passed up to him a kettle [kumkemos] of hot water from the bottom floor [deyota] to the top floor, and we poured him a cup and returned the kettle to its place on top of the stove, and he did not say anything to us. Apparently, he is of the opinion that even on Shabbat it is permitted to return a pot to the stove.,Rabbi Zerika said that Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Tadai said: They only taught that it is permitted to return vessels with the food inside them when they are still in his hand; however, if he already placed them on the ground, he obviously regretted placing them on the fire and it is prohibited to replace them on the stove. Rabbi Ami said: That which Rabbi Tadai did and said, he did on his own, and not in accordance with the accepted halakha. Rather, Rabbi Ḥiyya said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said as follows: Even if one placed the pot on the ground, it is permitted to return it to the stove.,The Gemara remarks that Rav Dimi and Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda disagreed about this matter, and both stated their opinion in the name of Rabbi Elazar. One said that when they are still in his hand, it is permitted to return them to the stove; when they were already placed on the ground, it is prohibited to do so. And one said that even if one placed them on the ground, it is also permitted to return it to the stove. Ḥizkiya said in the name of Abaye: That which you said, that when it is still in his hand, it is permitted to return it to the stove; we only said that halakha when his original intention was to return it to the stove. However, when it was not his original intention to return it, and he reconsidered and decided to return it, it is prohibited to return it. This proves by inference that if one placed it on the ground, even if his intention was to return it, it is prohibited.,Some say a different version of what Ḥizkiya said in the name of Abaye: That which you said, if one placed it on the ground it is prohibited; we only said that halakha when it was not his original intention to return it. However, if his original intention was to return it, it is permitted. With regard to this matter, Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma: In a case where he neither placed them on the floor nor held them in his hand, but he hung them on a stick, what is the ruling? In a case where he placed it on top of a bed, what is the ruling? Similarly, Rav Ashi raised a dilemma: If one transferred them from one urn to another urn what is the ruling? The Gemara said: These dilemmas stand unresolved.,MISHNA: The halakhot that were stated with regard to a stove were specific to a stove’s unique structure and the manner in which it retains heat. However, with regard to other baking apparatuses, i.e., an oven or a kupaḥ, there are different rules. The mishna delineates: An oven that they lit even with straw or rakings, one may neither place a pot inside it nor atop it on Shabbat. Whereas a kupaḥ that was lit with straw or rakings, its legal status is like that of a stove, and one is permitted to place a pot atop it on Shabbat. If it were lit with pomace or with wood, its legal status is like that of an oven and it is prohibited to place a pot atop it on Shabbat.,GEMARA: With regard to that which we learned in the mishna that an oven that they lit even with straw or rakings, one may neither place a pot atop it nor inside it, Rav Yosef thought to say that when the mishna says inside it, it means actually inside it; and when it says atop it, it means actually atop it. However, to lean a pot against an oven, it may well be done. Abaye raised an objection to Rav Yosef from that which we learned in our mishna: A kupaḥ that was lit with straw or rakings, its legal status is like that of a stove. If it were lit with pomace or with wood, its legal status is like that of an oven, and it is prohibited. By inference: If it were like a stove, it would be permitted. With what circumstances are we dealing? If you say that he placed the pot atop the kupaḥ, and in what case? If you say it is referring to a case where it is not swept and covered with ashes; a stove that is not swept and covered with ashes, is it permitted even to place a pot atop it on Shabbat? Rather, isn’t it referring to a case where one seeks to lean a pot against a kupaḥ, and it taught: It is like an oven, and prohibited?,Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Here we are dealing with the cases of a kupaḥ that is swept and covered with ashes and an oven that is swept and covered with ashes, and the mishna is to be understood as follows: It is like an oven in the sense that, although it is swept and covered with ashes, it is prohibited to place a pot atop it; as, if its legal status were like that of a stove, when it is swept and covered it may well be done. The Gemara comments that there is a baraita that taught in accordance with the opinion of Abaye: An oven that one lit with straw and with rakings, one may not lean a pot against it, and needless to say one may not place a pot atop it, and needless to say one may not place a pot inside it, and, needless to say if it was lit with pomace or with wood it is prohibited. While with regard to a kupaḥ that was lit with straw or with rakings, one may lean a pot against it, but he may not place a pot atop it. If it was lit with pomace or with wood, one may not lean a pot against it.,Rav Aha, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: This kupaḥ, what are its circumstances? If it is considered like a stove, even if it was lit with pomace or with wood, it should also be permitted. And if it is considered like an oven, even with straw or with rakings, it should also not be permitted. Rav Ashi said to him: From a halakhic perspective, a kupaḥ has intermediate status. Its heat is greater than that of a stove; however its heat is less than that of an oven.,The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a kupaḥ? What are the circumstances of a stove in terms of the configuration of the vessels? Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: A kupaḥ is a small vessel that is similar to a stove; however, it only has one hole with enough space to place a single pot. A stove is like a double kupaḥ with enough space to place two pots. Abaye said, and some say that Rabbi Yirmeya said: We also learned this matter in a mishna dealing with the laws of ritual purity and impurity: An impure stove that was divided lengthwise is pure because it can no longer be considered a vessel. It is a broken vessel, and a broken vessel cannot become ritually impure. However, if the stove was divided widthwise, between the spaces for the pots, then it remains impure because it became two small stoves. However, a kupaḥ, whether it was divided lengthwise or whether it was divided widthwise, is pure because it can no longer be used as there is no way to put even a single pot on it. That is the difference between a kupaḥ and a stove.,MISHNA: In addition to the halakhot that deal with cooking on the fire on Shabbat, several related halakhot are discussed. The mishna says: One may not place a raw egg next to an urn full of hot water so that it will roast slightly. And one may not even wrap it in cloths, i.e., one may not heat the egg inside cloths that were heated in the sun. And Rabbi Yosei permits doing so in that case. And, similarly, one may not insulate it in sand or in road dust that was heated in the sun so that it will roast. Although there is no actual cooking with fire here, it is similar to cooking and the Sages issued a decree to prohibit doing so.,The mishna relates a story about the people of the city of Tiberias, and they ran a cold-water pipe [silon] through a canal of hot water from the Tiberias hot springs. They thought that by doing so, they could heat the cold potable water on Shabbat. The Rabbis said to them: If the water passed through on Shabbat, its legal status is like that of hot water that was heated on Shabbat, and the water is prohibited both for bathing and for drinking. And if the water passed through on a Festival, then it is prohibited for bathing but permitted for drinking. On Festivals, one is even permitted to boil water on actual fire for the purposes of eating and drinking.,GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: One who violated the halakha in the mishna and slightly roasted an egg next to an urn, what is the ruling? Rav Yosef said: One who slightly cooked an egg is liable to bring a sin-offering, as he performed the act of cooking on Shabbat, which is prohibited by Torah law. Mar, son of Ravina, said: We also learned something similar in the mishna:
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Any salted food item that was already placed in hot water, i.e., cooked, before Shabbatone may soak it in hot water even on Shabbat. And anything that was not placed in hot water before Shabbat, one may rinse it in hot water on Shabbat, but may not soak it, with the exception of old salted fish or the colias of the Spaniards [kolyas ha’ispanin] fish, for which rinsing with hot water itself is completion of the prohibited labor of cooking. Once it is rinsed in hot water, it does not require any additional cooking. The same is true with regard to an egg that was slightly cooked. Since it thereby becomes edible, one who brought it to that state has violated the prohibition of cooking. The Gemara sums up: Indeed, conclude from it that this is its meaning.,We also learned in the mishna according to the first tanna: And one may not wrap an egg in cloths that were heated by the sun in order to heat up the egg, and Rabbi Yosei permits doing so. And with regard to that which we learned in a mishna that one may place cooked food into a pit on Shabbat to protect it from the heat; and one may place good, potable water into bad, non-potable water so that it will cool; and one may put cold water out in the sun to heat it, the Gemara asks: Let us say that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei in our mishna and not the opinion of the Rabbis as represented by the first tanna in the mishna. The Rabbis prohibited heating food with the heat of the sun.,Rav Naḥman said: With regard to heating food in the sun itself, everyone agrees that one is permitted to place food in the sun to heat it, as it is certainly neither fire nor a typical form of cooking. Likewise, with derivatives of fire, i.e., objects that were heated by fire, everyone agrees that it is prohibited to heat food with them, as heating with them is tantamount to heating with fire itself. Where they argue is with regard to heating with derivatives of the sun, i.e., objects heated with the heat of the sun. This Sage, who represents the opinion of the Rabbis, holds that we issue a decree prohibiting a person to heat with derivatives of the sun due to derivatives of fire, which are prohibited. People have no way of knowing how the cooking vessel was heated. If the Sages permit the use of objects heated in the sun, people will come to permit use of objects heated by fire as well. And this Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that we do not issue a decree. Even though it is prohibited to heat with derivatives of fire, heating with derivatives of the sun is permitted.,We learned in the mishna: And one may not insulate it in sand or in road dust that was heated in the sun. The Gemara asks: And let Rabbi Yosei disagree with this halakha as well. If he holds that one is permitted to cook on Shabbat using objects heated by the sun, the same should apply with regard to sand. The Gemara cites two answers. Rabba said: Rabbi Yosei agrees with the opinion of the Rabbis in this case. The Sages issued a decree in this case due to concern lest one come to insulate it in hot ashes, which is certainly prohibited, if he is permitted to insulate food in sand or road dust. Insulating in sand and insulating in hot ashes appear to be very similar. Rav Yosef said: Rabbi Yosei prohibits it in this case because when insulating it in the sand, he displaces dirt. It is as if he dug a hole in the sand, which is prohibited. The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the answers proposed by Rabba and Rav Yosef? Apparently, the two answers lead to the same practical conclusion. The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them in the case of loose earth. Loose earth does not require digging a hole. According to Rav Yosef’s explanation, there is no reason to prohibit insulating food in loose earth, as displacing loose earth involves no prohibition. However if the decree was issued lest one insulate an egg in hot ashes, then it applies even in the case of loose earth.,The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in a baraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One may slightly roast an egg on a hot rooftop heated by the sun; however, one may not slightly roast an egg on top of boiling limestone. Granted, this works out well according to the opinion of the one who said that insulating an egg in sand is prohibited due to a decree lest he come insulate it in hot ashes. There is no reason to issue a decree on a hot rooftop, as it is not at all similar to hot ashes. However, according to the opinion of the one who said that the reason is because he is displacing dirt, let him issue a decree and prohibit warming an egg on the rooftop as well because there is sometimes dirt on the roof. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult because, in general, a rooftop does not have dirt, and there is no reason to issue a decree in uncommon cases.,Come and hear a different objection to the opinion of the amora from our mishna: The Sages prohibited the people of the city of Tiberias, who ran a cold-water pipe through a canal of hot water from the Tiberias hot springs, from using the water. Granted, according to the opinion of the one who said that the prohibition is due to a decree lest one insulate food in hot ashes, that is the reason that this was prohibited, as it is similar to insulating. The cold-water pipe was placed inside the hot water and was surrounded by it. However, according to the opinion of the one who said that the reason is because one displaces dirt, what is there to say to explain the prohibition?,The Gemara answers: Do you think that the story about Tiberias refers to the latter clause of the mishna? No, it refers to the first clause of the mishna, and it should be understood as follows: The Rabbis and Rabbi Yosei disagree with regard to wrapping an egg in cloths. The Rabbis say: One may not wrap it in cloths and Rabbi Yosei permits doing so. And the Rabbis said the following to Rabbi Yosei: Wasn’t the incident involving the people of Tiberias with derivatives of the sun, as the hot springs of Tiberias are not heated by fire, and nevertheless the Sages prohibited them from using the water? Rabbi Yosei said to them: That is not so. That incident involved derivatives of fire, as the hot springs of Tiberias are hot because they pass over the entrance to Gehenna. They are heated by hellfire, which is a bona fide underground fire. That is not the case with derivatives of the sun, which are not heated by fire at all.,On the same topic, Rav Hisda said:

From this action performed by the people of Tiberias and the fact that the Sages prohibited them from using the water, the conclusion is that the practice of insulating a pot in something that increases the heat over the course of Shabbat was abolished on Shabbat. And not only is i t prohibited to do so on Shabbat itself, but it is also prohibited while it is still day before Shabbat. Running pipes of cold water through hot water is similar to insulating water in something that adds heat. Ulla said: The halakha is in accordance with the people of Tiberias. Rav Naḥman said to him: The people of Tiberias have already broken their pipes. Even they reconsidered their position.,We learned in the mishna with regard to the incident, which related what the people of Tiberias did, that the legal status of water that was heated in the Tiberias hot springs is like that of water heated on Shabbat, and it is prohibited for use in bathing. The Gemara clarifies this matter: What type of bathing is this? If you say that it is referring to bathing one’s entire body, that is difficult. That would indicate that only water heated on Shabbat is prohibited for use in bathing one’s entire body; however, bathing one’s entire body in hot water heated before Shabbat is permitted. That cannot be. Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to hot water that was heated on Shabbat eve, one may use it the next day to wash his face, his hands, and his feet incrementally; however, not to wash his entire body? Rather, it must be that the bathing prohibited in the mishna with water heated on Shabbat is, in fact, washing his face, his hands, and his feet.,However, if so, say the latter clause of the mishna: On a Festival, the legal status of the water is like that of water that was heated by fire on a Festival, and it is prohibited for bathing and permitted for drinking. Even on a Festival, washing one’s face, hands, and feet is prohibited with this hot water. If so, let us say that we learned the unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. As we learned in a mishna, Beit Shammai say: A person may not heat water for his feet on a Festival unless it is also fit for drinking, and Beit Hillel permit doing so. According to Beit Hillel, it is permitted to heat water on a Festival for the purpose of washing one’s feet. According to the proposed interpretation of the term bathing in the mishna, as referring to washing one’s face, hands, and feet, our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. This is problematic, as the halakhic opinion of Beit Shammai is rejected and only rarely cited in an unattributed mishna.,Rav Ika bar Ḥananya said: In our mishna, we are dealing with water that was heated in order to rinse one’s entire body with it. Rinsing does not have the same legal status as bathing. And that which we learned in the mishna: Water that was heated on Shabbat is prohibited for bathing, from which it can be inferred that water heated before Shabbat is permitted for bathing on Shabbat, is in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the Tosefta. As it was taught in a Tosefta: One may neither rinse his entire body with hot water, even if it was heated before Shabbat, nor with cold water; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon permits doing so even with hot water because it was heated before Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda says: With hot water, it is prohibited; with cold water, it is permitted. According to Rabbi Shimon, it is completely prohibited to rinse with water that was heated on Shabbat itself. Consequently, our mishna, which does not differentiate between hot and cold water, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.,Rav Ḥisda said: This dispute over washing with water heated before Shabbat is specifically with regard to water in a vessel, as one might mistakenly think that it was heated on Shabbat, and there is then concern lest one permit the use of water heated with fire on Shabbat. However, when the water was collected in the ground, everyone agrees that it is permitted. The Gemara challenges this: Wasn’t the incident involving the people of Tiberias with regard to water in the ground, and nevertheless the Sages prohibited it? Rather, if this was stated, this is what was stated, i.e., this is the correct version of Rav Ḥisda’s statement: This dispute is specifically when the water is collected in the ground. However, when it is in a vessel, everyone agrees that it is prohibited.,Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha in this dispute is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Yosef said to him: Did you learn this from Rabbi Yoḥanan explicitly, or did you learn it by inference from something else that he said? The Gemara remarks: What was the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan from which this conclusion could be inferred? As Rav Tanḥum said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that Rabbi Yannai said that Rav said: Every place that you find two who disagree and each one of them establishes his opinion in a series of cases, and one of the Sages, a third one, adopts a compromise opinion and says that in some cases the halakha is in accordance with one, and in some cases the halakha is in accordance with the other, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the compromiser. This principle holds true except for the case of the ritual impurity of insignificant strips of material. In that case, even though Rabbi Eliezer is stringent, and Rabbi Yehoshua is lenient, and Rabbi Akiva compromises, the halakha is not in accordance with the statement of the compromiser: First, because Rabbi Akiva is a student of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua and lacks the authority to decide between the opinions of his rabbis. And furthermore, didn’t
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Rabbi Akiva reconsider and adopt Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion? In the dispute over the laws of bathing as well, the ruling should have been in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda because his is the compromise opinion. Therefore, Rav Yosef asked whether the ruling was based on that principle alone. The Gemara asks: And if the halakha was derived by inference, what of it? It is legitimate to draw conclusions by inference. The Gemara responds: Perhaps this principle, that the halakha is established in accordance with the compromise opinion, applies only in a mishna; but in a baraita, no, it does not apply. Perhaps the baraita is not a sufficiently reliable source to establish the halakha in accordance with the compromise opinion based on its formulation. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said to Rav Yosef: I heard it explicitly.,An amoraic dispute was stated: With regard to hot water that was heated on Shabbat evebefore Shabbat, Rav said: The next day, on Shabbat, one may wash his entire body with it; however, not all at once. Rather, he washes one limb at a time, in a departure from the standard practice, to remind him that it is Shabbat. And Shmuel said: They only permitted washing one’s face, his hands, and his feet with hot water, even if it was heated on Shabbat eve; however, they did not permit washing his entire body, even in increments. The Gemara raises an objection from what was taught in a baraita: Hot water that was heated on Shabbat eve, the next day one may wash his face, his hands, and his feet with it but not his entire body. This is a conclusive refutation of Rav’s opinion. Rav could have said to you: When the baraita says: Not one’s entire body, it means not his entire body at once, but one limb and then another limb until he washes his entire body is permitted. The Gemara asks: Doesn’t it say one’s face, his hands, and his feet, and no more? Rav answers: It means that one washes his body in a manner similar to the manner that one washes his face, his hands, and his feet, i.e., each limb separately, and they were cited as examples of washing one limb at a time.,The Gemara cites an additional proof. Come and hear from what was taught in a baraita: They only permitted to wash one’s face, his hands, and his feet with hot water that was heated before Shabbat. This poses a difficulty to Rav. Rav answers: Here too, this refers to washing one limb at a time, in a manner similar to the way one washes his face, his hands, and his feet.,The Gemara remarks: A baraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel: Hot water that was heated on Shabbat eve, the next day one may wash his face, his hands, and his feet with it but not his entire body, even one limb at a time. And, needless to say, this is the halakha with regard to hot water that was heated on a Festival. Rabba would teach this halakha of Rav in this language: Hot water that was heated on Shabbat eve, the next day, Rav said: One may bathe his entire body in it and exclude one limb to remind himself that today is Shabbat. They raised all of these conclusive refutations, with which they objected to the previous version of Rav’s statement, against him and the Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation.,Rav Yosef said to Abaye: Does Rabba act in accordance with this halakha of Rav? He said to him: I do not know. The Gemara asks: What is his dilemma? It is obvious that Rabba did not act in accordance with Rav’s statement, as Rav’s statement was conclusively refuted. The Gemara answers: Perhaps he did not hear, i.e., he did not know of the challenges or he did not consider them substantial. Perhaps, in his opinion, it is still reasonable to act in accordance with Rav’s statement.,The Gemara says: If so, there is still no room for the dilemma. And if Rabba did not hear this refutation, certainly he acted in accordance with Rav’s opinion, as Abaye said: In all halakhic matters of the Master, Rabba, he conducted himself in accordance with the opinion of Rav, except these three where he conducted himself in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. He ruled: One may not light from one Hanukkah lamp to another lamp, and one may untie ritual fringes from garment to garment, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the case of dragging. According to Rabbi Shimon, it is permitted to drag heavy objects, and there is no concern that, as a result, a ditch might be dug in the ground. In any case, it is certainly reasonable to say that he acted in accordance with the opinion of Rav in the case of bathing on Shabbat as well. The Gemara answers: His is not an absolute proof. Perhaps Rabba’s custom was that he acted in accordance with the stringencies of Rav and he did not act in accordance with the leniencies of Rav. Washing with hot water on Shabbat is one of Rav’s leniencies. Therefore, it is not clear how Rabba acted in practice.,The Sages taught in a Tosefta: A bathhouse whose openings were sealed on Shabbat eve so that the heat would not diminish, after Shabbat one may bathe in it immediately. If its openings were sealed on the eve of a Festival, the next day, on the Festival itself, one may enter and sweat in the heat produced by the hot water and emerge and rinse with cold water in the outer room of the bathhouse.,Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident in the bathhouse of Benei Berak, whose openings were sealed on the eve of a Festival. The next day, on the Festival itself, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya and Rabbi Akiva entered and sweated there, and emerged and rinsed themselves in the outer room. However, this bathhouse was unique because the hot water was covered by wooden boards and there was no concern lest a person bathe in the hot water. When this matter came before the Sages, they said: Even if its hot water is not covered by boards, it is permitted to sweat from the heat in the bathhouse. When the number of transgressors increased, the Sages began to prohibit this. However, the large bathhouses [ambatyaot] in cities, one may stroll through them as usual and need not be concerned about the prohibitions of Shabbat, even if he sweats while doing so.,And the Gemara asks: What are these transgressors? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of bar Kappara: Initially, people would bathe even on Shabbat in hot water that was heated before Shabbat. The bathhouse attendants began to heat water on Shabbat and say that it was heated before Shabbat. Therefore, the Sages prohibited bathing in hot water and permitted sweating. And they would still bathe in hot water and say: We are sweating, and that is why we entered the bathhouse. Therefore, the Sages prohibited sweating and permitted bathing in the hot springs of Tiberias. And people would still bathe in hot water heated by fire and say: We bathed in the hot springs of Tiberias. Therefore, they prohibited even the hot springs of Tiberias and permitted them to bathe in cold water. When the Sages saw that their decrees were not upheld by the people because of their stringency, they permitted them to bathe in the hot springs of Tiberias, and the decree prohibiting sweating remained in place.,In this context, Rava said: One who violates a decree of the Sages, it is permitted to call him a transgressor. Transgressor is not a term limited to one who violates a severe Torah prohibition. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did Rabba make this statement?

Rabba’s statement is according to this tanna in the baraita, who referred to those who violated a rabbinic decree as transgressors.,It was taught in a Tosefta: In bathhouses in cities, one may stroll through them and, even if he sweats while doing so, need not be concerned. Rava said: This applies specifically to bathhouses in cities; but in villages, no, it does not apply. What is the reason for this distinction? Since the bathhouses in the villages are small, their heat is great, and even merely walking through them will certainly cause one to sweat.,The Sages taught: One may warm himself opposite a bonfire on Shabbat and emerge and rinse in cold water as long as he does not first rinse in cold water and then warm himself opposite the bonfire. This is prohibited because he thereby warms the water on his body and renders it lukewarm. The Sages also taught: A person whose intestines are painful may heat up a towel [aluntit] and place it on his intestines even on Shabbat. This is permitted as long as one does not bring a kettle of water and place it on his intestines on Shabbat, lest the water spill and he come to wring it out (Tosafot), which is a prohibited labor on Shabbat. And placing a kettle directly on his intestines is prohibited even on a weekday due to the danger involved. If the water is extremely hot it could spill and scald him.,Similarly, the Sages taught: One may bring a jug [kiton] full of cold water and place it opposite the bonfire on Shabbat; not so that the water will heat up, as it is prohibited to cook on Shabbat, rather to temper the cold, as one is permitted to render water less cold on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda says: A woman may take a cruse of oil and place it opposite the bonfire; not so the oil will cook, rather, so it will warm until it is lukewarm. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A woman may smear her hand with oil, and heat it opposite the fire, and afterward smear her young son with the heated oil, and she need not be concerned about cooking on Shabbat.,A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to heating oil in this manner on Shabbat, what is its legal status according to the first tanna, who permits doing so with water? Does he permit oil as well? Rabba and Rav Yosef both said that the opinion of the first tanna is to permit doing so in the case of oil. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that the opinion of the first tanna is to prohibit doing so. Rabba and Rav Yosef both said that the opinion of the first tanna is to permit doing so. The Gemara explains the dispute in the mishna: Oil, even though it is heated to the point at which the hand spontaneously recoils [soledet] from its heat, is permitted to be heated in this manner. The reason is because the first tanna holds that oil is not subject to the prohibition of cooking. Cooking oil to its boiling point requires a very high temperature; merely heating it is not considered cooking. And Rabbi Yehuda came to say that oil is subject to the prohibition of cooking; however, warming it to a lukewarm temperature is not tantamount to cooking it. Therefore, it is permitted to place a jar of oil near the fire in order to raise its temperature, though it is prohibited to heat it to the point of cooking. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel came to say that oil is subject to the prohibition of cooking, and warming it is tantamount to cooking it. He permitted it only in the specific case of a woman who smeared her hand with oil, heated it, and smeared her son with it.,Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The opinion of the first tanna is to prohibit doing so. He explains the dispute in the following manner: According to the first tanna, with regard to oil, even if the heat is not so great that the hand spontaneously recoils from it, it is prohibited to heat it. He holds that oil is subject to the prohibition of cooking, and warming it is tantamount to cooking it. And Rabbi Yehuda came to say, leniently, that warming it is not tantamount to cooking it. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel came to disagree with Rabbi Yehuda and to say that oil is subject to the prohibition of cooking, and warming it is tantamount to cooking it. The Gemara questions: According to this explanation, the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is identical to the opinion of the first tanna. What is the difference between them? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them in a case where this is done in a backhanded manner, i.e., not as it is typically done. According to the first tanna, it is totally prohibited to heat the oil, whereas according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, it is permitted to heat the oil in a backhanded manner.,Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said that the halakha is: With regard to both oil and water, heating either one to the point where the hand spontaneously recoils from it is prohibited. Heating either one to the point where the hand does not spontaneously recoil from it is permitted. The Gemara asks: And what are the circumstances in which a hand spontaneously recoils from it? Not all hands are equal in their sensitivity to heat. The Sage, Raḥava, said: Any water that could cause a baby’s stomach to be scalded is considered water from which the hand spontaneously recoils.,Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said: One time I followed Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi into the bathhouse on Shabbat to assist him, and I sought to place a jar of oil in the bathtub for him, to heat the oil somewhat before rubbing it on him. And he said to me: Take water from the bath in a secondary vessel and place the oil into it. The Gemara remarks: Learn from this comment of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi three halakhot: Learn from it that oil is subject to the prohibition of cooking. This explains why he prohibited placing it in the bathtub. And learn from it that a secondary vessel is not hot and does not cook. And learn from it with regard to oil that warming it is tantamount to cooking it.,The Gemara is astonished by this story: How did Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi do this? How did he teach his student halakha in the bathhouse? Didn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In all places, it is permitted to contemplate Torah matters except for the bathhouse and the bathroom? And if you say that he spoke to him in a secular language, didn’t Abaye say: Secular matters are permitted to be spoken in the sacred language, Hebrew, even in the bathhouse, and sacred matters may not be spoken in the bathhouse even in a secular language? The Gemara answers: It was permitted for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi to conduct himself in that manner because he was preventing an individual from violating a prohibition, which is different.,Know that this is so, as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: There was an incident where a student of Rabbi Meir followed him into the bathhouse on Shabbat and sought to rinse the floor in order to clean it. And Rabbi Meir said to him: One may not rinse the floor on Shabbat. The student asked if it was permitted to smear the floor with oil. He said to him: One may not smear the floor with oil. Apparently, preventing one from violating a prohibition is different. Here too, in the incident involving Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, preventing one from violating a prohibition is different and permitted.,Ravina said: Learn from it that one who cooks in the hot springs of Tiberias on Shabbat is liable, as the incident with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was after the decree, and he said to his student: Take hot water in a secondary vessel and place the oil into it. Had he cooked the oil in the hot water itself, he would have violated a Torah prohibition. Since the incident with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi took place after the Sages issued a decree to prohibit bathing in hot water on Shabbat, it must have taken place in a bath in the hot springs of Tiberias. The Gemara challenges this: Is that so? Didn’t Rav Ḥisda say that one who cooks in the Tiberias hot springs on Shabbat is not liable? The Gemara answers: There is no contradiction. What, too, is the meaning of the term liable that Ravina said? It does not mean that one who cooked in the hot springs of Tiberias is liable to be stoned or to bring a sin-offering like one who violates a Torah prohibition. Rather, it means liable to receive lashes for rebelliousness, which one receives for intentionally violating rabbinic decrees.,Rabbi Zeira said: I saw Rabbi Abbahu floating in a bath on Shabbat, and I do not know if he lifted his feet and was actually swimming in the water, or if he did not lift his feet. The Gemara questions Rabbi Zeira’s uncertainty. It is obvious that he did not lift his feet, as it was taught in a baraita: A person may not float in a pool full of water on Shabbat, and even if the pool was in a courtyard, where there is no room for concern lest he violate a prohibition. This is not difficult; this baraita is referring to a place
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that does not have embankments surrounding it. Since there are no partitions, it appears like an ocean or a river. That incident involving Rabbi Abbahu occurred in a place that has embankments and looks like a vessel. Therefore, the Sages did not prohibit it.,After citing what Rabbi Zeira related with regard to Rabbi Abbahu, the Gemara cites that Rabbi Zeira said: I saw that Rabbi Abbahu, while he was bathing, placed his hands over his genitals for the sake of modesty, and I do not know whether he touched them or did not touch them. The Gemara questions Rabbi Zeira’s uncertainty. It is obvious that he did not touch his genitals, as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: One who holds his penis and urinates it is as if he were bringing a flood to the world. He is liable to become aroused by that contact and that is an extremely severe transgression, comparable to the transgressions violated in the generation of the flood.,Abaye said: Nevertheless, no proof can be cited from that baraita. Perhaps the Sages rendered the legal status of this situation like that of a military unit, as we learned in a mishna: A military unit that entered a city, if it entered during peacetime, after the soldiers leave, the open barrels of wine are prohibited and the wine in them may not be drunk due to suspicion that the gentile soldiers may have poured this wine as a libation for idolatry. The sealed barrels are permitted. However, if the unit entered in wartime, both are permitted because in wartime there is no respite to pour wine for idolatry, and one can be certain that the soldiers did not do so. Apparently, since they are afraid, they do not pour libations. Here too, in the case of bathing, since he is afraid, he will not come to have impure thoughts. The Gemara asks: And what fear is there here that would prevent one bathing from having impure thoughts? The Gemara answers: Fear of the river. Since he needs to be careful that the water does not wash him away, he is too distracted to think of other matters.,The Gemara questions the story itself: And is that so? Is it permitted under any circumstances to cover one’s genitals while bathing? Didn’t Rabbi Abba say that Rav Huna said that Rav said: Anyone who places his hands over his genitals is as if he denies the covenant of our father Abraham? It appears as if he is covering himself to obscure the fact that he is circumcised. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as there is room to distinguish and say that this, the case where it is prohibited to cover oneself, is when he is descending into the river and there are no people facing him and he need not be concerned with modesty. In that case covering oneself is prohibited as he appears to be renouncing the covenant of Abraham. That, the case where, in certain circumstances, this prohibition does not apply, is when he is emerging from the river. When he emerges, he is facing the people on the riverbank and it is then permitted to cover himself in the interest of modesty, as that which Rava would do. He would bend over when he was naked. Rabbi Zeira would stand upright, in accordance with Rav’s statement that it is prohibited to appear to be renouncing the covenant of Abraham. When the Sages of the school of Rav Ashi descended into the river they stood upright. When they emerged from the river they bent over.,Speaking of bathing and its halakhot, the Gemara relates: Rabbi Zeira was avoiding being seen by his teacher, Rav Yehuda, as Rabbi Zeira sought to ascend to Eretz Yisrael and his teacher disapproved. As Rav Yehuda said: Anyone who ascends from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael transgresses a positive commandment, as it is stated: “They shall be taken to Babylonia and there they shall remain until the day that I recall them, said the Lord” (Jeremiah 27:22). Based on that verse, Rav Yehuda held that since the Babylonian exile was by divine decree, permission to leave Babylonia for Eretz Yisrael could only be granted by God. Rabbi Zeira did not want to discuss his desire to emigrate with Rav Yehuda, so that he would not be forced to explicitly disobey him. Nevertheless, he said: I will go and hear something from him and then I will leave. He went and found Rav Yehuda standing in the bathhouse and telling his servant: Bring me natron [neter] with which to wash, bring me a comb, open your mouths and let out air, and drink from the water of the bathhouse. Rabbi Zeira said: If I had come only to hear this matter from Rav Yehuda, it would suffice for me.,The Gemara analyzes the lessons learned from this story. Granted, when Rav Yehuda said: Bring me natron, bring me a comb, he was teaching us that mundane matters are permitted to be spoken in the bathhouse, even in the sacred language. When he said: Open your mouths and let out air, that too is in accordance with that which Shmuel said, as Shmuel said: Heat produces heat. The hot air that one inhales causes him to sweat more quickly. However, drink the water of the bathhouse, what benefit is there in doing that? The Gemara answers: As it was taught in a baraita: One who ate and did not drink at all, what he ate becomes blood and that causes the onset of intestinal disease. One who ate and did not walk four cubits after eating, what he ate rots and that causes the onset of bad breath. One who needs to defecate and ate is similar to an oven that was lit on top of its ashes. When ashes from a previous fire are not swept out, and new logs are placed on top of the old ones, it inhibits the burning and dirties the oven, and that causes the onset of odor of the filth of perspiration in a person. As far as our matter is concerned, the baraita teaches: One who bathed in hot water and did not drink from it is like an oven that was lit from the outside and not lit from the inside. The lighting is ineffective and the oven does not heat properly. Rav Yehuda told his servants to drink the hot water while bathing so that they would be heated from the inside and the outside. The baraita continues: One who bathed in hot water and did not rinse afterward with cold water is like iron that was placed in the fire and not placed afterward in cold water, which leaves the iron soft. And one who bathed and did not smear himself with oil afterward is like water that was poured on top of a barrel, and not into it. The water spills outside the barrel.,MISHNA: In this mishna, the Sages discuss two vessels used for heating water. With regard to a mulyar, a bronze vessel into which coals are placed in an outer compartment and water is placed into an adjacent inner compartment, whose coals were swept, one may drink from it on Shabbat. With regard to an antikhi, which is a vessel with a different configuration, even if its coals were swept, one may not drink from it on Shabbat.,GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a swept mulyar? The Gemara answers: A mulyar is the vessel, explained in the Tosefta on our mishna, that has water on the inside and coals on the outside. With regard to the identity of an antikhi there are different opinions. Rabba said that it refers to a stove. A space is created in the wall of a stove and filled with water. Since the stove is very hot, it is prohibited to use this water. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzhak said: An antikhi is a cauldron, i.e., a vessel made from two cauldrons stacked one on top of the other with coals in the bottom one and water in the upper one. These two different opinions have halakhic implications. The one who says that it is prohibited to use a vessel composed of two cauldrons, all the more so it is prohibited to use the space inside of a stove. And the one who says that it is prohibited to use the space inside a stove, a vessel composed of two cauldrons, no, it is not prohibited. It was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman: An antikhi, even if it was swept and covered with ashes, one may not drink from it on Shabbat because its copper heats it. The heating in an antikhi is by means of the coals beneath the water.,MISHNA: The Sages added to the laws of leaving food on a source of heat and cooking food on Shabbat: An urn that was emptied of its hot water on Shabbat, one may not place cold water into it so that the cold water will be heated. However, one may place cold water into an urn or into a cup that were emptied of their hot water in order to warm it but not in order to heat it.,GEMARA: The mishna seems to contradict itself. The first statement completely prohibits placing water into an urn, and later it was partially permitted. The Gemara asks: What is the mishna saying? Rav Adda bar Mattana said that it said the following: An urn that was emptied of its hot water, one may not put a small amount of water into it so that it will become very hot. However, one may put a large quantity of water into it in order to warm it. A large quantity of cold water will not be heated in those circumstances.

The Gemara questions this leniency: By putting cold water into the urn, doesn’t it harden the vessel? Cold water poured into a heated metal vessel reinforces the vessel. It is one of the stages in the labor of a blacksmith. How is it permitted to do something similar on Shabbat? The Gemara answers: This mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who stated a principle with regard to the laws of Shabbat: An unintentional act, i.e., a permitted action from which a prohibited labor inadvertently ensues, is permitted. Here too, his intention was to warm the water, not to reinforce the vessel. Abaye strongly objects to this explanation: Does it say in the mishna: An urn from which water was emptied? That would indicate that he sought to fill the vessel with other water and warm up that water. Rather, an urn that was removed was taught in the mishna, meaning that the urn was removed from the fire, not that the water was emptied from it.,Rather, Abaye said this is what the mishna is saying: An urn that was removed from the fire and contains hot water, one may not place a small quantity of water in it so that the water will become hot; rather, one may place a large quantity of water in it so that the water will become warm. And with regard to an urn from which water was removed; one may not place any water into it because he hardens the vessel by placing cold water into a hot vessel. And, according to this explanation, our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that an unintentional act from which a prohibited labor inadvertently ensues is prohibited on Shabbat.,With regard to the matter itself, Rav said: They taught that one is permitted to place cold water into an urn with hot water after it was removed from the fire, when his intention is only to warm the cold water. However, if he did this in order to harden the vessel, it is prohibited. And Shmuel said: Even if he does so in order to harden the vessel, it is also permitted. The Gemara wonders: Is hardening permitted ab initio? Isn’t it a full-fledged prohibited labor on Shabbat? Rather, if the dispute between Rav and Shmuel was stated, it was stated as follows. Rav said: They taught that it is permitted to add water only in a measure that is sufficient to warm the water, i.e., to only partially fill the vessel. However, filling it completely with a measure sufficient to harden the vessel is prohibited. And Shmuel said: Even a measure sufficient to harden the vessel
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is permitted, since one did not intend to perform that prohibited labor.,The Gemara asks: Is that to say that Shmuel, who permits adding water even in an amount sufficient to harden a vessel, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that one may perform an action that inadvertently results in a prohibited labor? Didn’t Shmuel say: One may extinguish a piece of white-hot metal in a public area on Shabbat so that the masses will not be injured? That is because the piece of white-hot metal is not actual fire and extinguishing it is prohibited by rabbinic decree, not Torah law. The Sages did not issue decrees in situations where there is concern for public safety. However, one may not extinguish a red-hot wood coal because extinguishing it is prohibited by Torah law. And if it would enter your mind that Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, it should even be permitted to extinguish wood as well. When one extinguishes the coal, he intends neither to perform a prohibited labor nor to derive any benefit. He merely intends to prevent the coal from causing injury. Extinguishing the coal is a labor not necessary for its own sake. Rabbi Shimon says that one who performs a labor not necessary for its own sake is exempt.,The Gemara responds: In the case of an unintentional act, Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. In the case of labor not necessary for its own sake, he holds that he is liable, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Ravina said: Therefore, a thorn in the public domain that is liable to cause injury, one may move it from there in increments, each less than four cubits, on Shabbat. Although the Torah prohibits carrying an object four cubits in the public domain on Shabbat, carrying less than four cubits is prohibited only by rabbinic law. From Shmuel’s statement, it is clear that the Sages did not issue a decree in any case where there is a threat to the masses. And, therefore, if the thorn was in a karmelit, where the prohibition to carry is by rabbinic law, one is permitted to carry it even more than four cubits.,We learned in the mishna: However, one may place water into an urn in order to warm it. The Sages taught in a baraita: A person may place hot water into cold water, but not cold into hot; this is the statement of Beit Shammai. In their opinion the cold water becomes heated by the hot water beneath it. And Beit Hillel say: Both hot into cold and cold into hot are permitted. However, Beit Hillel did not permit this in all cases. In what case is this said? It is in the case of a cup. However, in a bath with a lot of water, it is permitted to pour hot into cold but not cold into hot. And Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya prohibits even putting hot into cold. Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya in this matter.,Rav Yosef thought to say that the legal status of a basin [sefel], which is a vessel used for washing, is like that of a bath, and it is prohibited to pour water into it. Abaye said to him that Rabbi Ḥiyya taught a baraita: A basin is not like a bath in terms of pouring water into it. The Gemara asks: And according to what entered Rav Yosef’s mind initially, that a basin is like a bath with regard to this halakha, and Rav Naḥman said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya in this matter, does that mean that on Shabbat there is no possibility of washing with hot water? No all-encompassing prohibition of washing with hot water on Shabbat was ever taught.,The Gemara replies: Do you think that Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya is referring to the latter clause of the mishna? No, he is referring to the first clause of the mishna, where we learned that Beit Hillel permit both hot water into cold and cold water into hot, and Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya prohibits placing cold water into hot. The Gemara asks: If so, say that Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. Isn’t the halakha generally established according to Beit Hillel? The Gemara explains: He said the following: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not dispute this matter. Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya had a different tradition with regard to the opinions of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel.,Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: I saw that Rava was not strict in the case of a vessel and made no distinction between cold and hot. From where did he derive this leniency? From a baraita that Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: A person may place a jug of water into a basin of water, both hot into cold and cold into hot. Rav Huna said to Rav Ashi: There is a weakness in this proof, as perhaps there it is different because the vessel forms a partition between the hot and cold water. He is not pouring cold water into the basin itself but is placing a jug whose sides form a partition into the basin. He said to him: The term pour was stated in that baraita. This is the correct version: A person may pour a jug of water into a basin of water, both hot into cold or cold into hot. Therefore, there is no room to distinguish between the two cases.,MISHNA: In continuation of the discussion of vessels where the prohibition of cooking applies even though the vessels are not actually on the fire itself, the mishna establishes: A stew pot [ilpas] and a pot that were removed from the fire while they were still boiling, even if they were removed before Shabbat, one may not place spices into them on Shabbat itself. Even though the pot is not actually standing on the fire, the spices are still cooked in it because the pot is a primary vessel, i.e., a vessel whose contents were cooked on the fire.

However, one may place the spices into a bowl or into a tureen [tamḥui], which is a large bowl into which people pour the contents a stew pot or a pot. Bowls and tureens are both secondary vessels and food placed into them does not get cooked. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may place spices into anything on Shabbat except for a vessel that has in it something containing vinegar or brine of salted fish.,GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is Rabbi Yehuda referring to the first clause of the mishna and being lenient? According to that possibility, the mishna prohibits placing spices into any boiling pot and Rabbi Yehuda holds that this only applies if there is fish brine or vinegar inside the pot. Or perhaps he is referring to the latter clause of the mishna and is being stringent? The Rabbis said that one is permitted to place spices into a bowl or a tureen, and Rabbi Yehuda came to add a stringency and say that if the bowl or tureen contains vinegar or brine, it is prohibited to place spices into it.,Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which was taught explicitly in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: Into all stew pots one may place spices on Shabbat; into all pots, even those that are boiling, one may place spices, except for one that contains vinegar or brine. The baraita clearly indicates that Rabbi Yehuda disputes the first clause of the mishna and is being lenient.,Rav Yosef thought to say that salt is like a spice whose legal status is: In a primary vessel that was on the fire, salt gets cooked and therefore it is prohibited to place salt into it on Shabbat. And in a secondary vessel, into which the contents of a primary vessel were poured, salt does not get cooked. Abaye said to him: Didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya already teach that salt is not like a spice? Certainly he meant that in a secondary vessel it also gets cooked. And the Gemara remarks that this conclusion disputes the statement of Rav Naḥman, as Rav Naḥman said: Salt requires cooking for as long as the meat of an ox does, i.e., it requires extensive cooking.,And some say a very different version of this: Rav Yosef thought to say that salt is like a spice, i.e., in a primary vessel it gets cooked, whereas in a secondary vessel it does not get cooked. Abaye said to him: Didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya already teach that salt is not like a spice, meaning that in a primary vessel, it also does not get cooked? And that is precisely what Rav Naḥman said: Salt requires cooking for as long as the meat of an ox does.,MISHNA: From a discussion of the halakhot of insulation and preparation for Shabbat followed by a brief tangent dealing with the prohibited labor of cooking on Shabbat, the mishna proceeds to briefly discuss prohibitions relating to set-aside [muktze] items in terms of Shabbat lamps. One may not place a vessel beneath the oil lamp, the vessel containing the oil and the wick, on Shabbat in order to receive the oil that drips from the wick. And if one placed the vessel on Friday while it was still day, it is permitted. However, in any case, one may not make use of the oil on Shabbat because it is not from the oil prepared from Shabbat eve for use on Shabbat. The oil in the lamp was already set aside and designated solely for the purpose of lighting the lamp.,GEMARA: Rav Ḥisda said: Although the Sages said that one may not place a vessel beneath a hen preparing to lay an egg on Shabbat on an inclined surface, in order to receive its egg and prevent it from breaking when it falls; however, they permitted overturning a vessel onto an egg on Shabbat so that it will not be trampled and break. Rabba said: What is Rav Ḥisda’s reason? He holds that a hen is likely to lay its egg in a garbage dump and people or animals will oftentimes step on it, but it is not likely to lay its egg on an inclined surface where the egg could roll down and break. And in a common case of preservation, the Sages permitted overturning a vessel onto the egg that is located in the garbage dump to protect it from being broken. And in an uncommon case of preservation, i.e., placing a vessel beneath a hen to receive its egg so that it would not roll down an inclined surface, they did not permit doing so.,Abaye raised an objection to Rabba’s opinion from a baraita: And is it so that in an uncommon case of preservation they did not permit taking steps to protect the object on Shabbat? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: One whose barrel of untithed produce [tevel], which may not be eaten until it is tithed, broke on top of his roof on Shabbat, may bring a vessel and place it beneath the barrel so that the untithed produce is not lost. Even though eating untithed produce is prohibited on Shabbat, they permitted carrying a vessel to preserve it even in the uncommon case of a barrel that breaks. Apparently, even in an uncommon case of preservation the Sages permit taking the necessary steps. Rabba answered: This too, is a common case of preservation because it is an instance of new barrels [gulfei], which commonly break.,Abaye raised another objection to Rabba’s opinion from the last mishna in this chapter: One may place a vessel beneath the oil lamp in order to receive burning sparks of oil that drip from the burning wick even though this is not common. Rabba answered: Sparks are also common and therefore, it is a common case of preservation.
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Abaye raised another objection to Rabba’s opinion from a baraita: One may overturn a bowl on the oil lamp so that the flame will not set fire to the beam. Apparently, the Sages permitted moving a vessel, even though this is not a common case of preservation. Rabba answered him: This is a case of low-ceilinged houses in which fires are common.,And it is likewise difficult from a mishna: The beam of a roof that broke, one may support it with a bench and with the lengths of a bed frame so that it will not fall. Even though this is an uncommon case of preservation, it is permitted. Rabba answered: This is a case of new beams, which commonly break. This too is a common case of preservation.,And Abaye raised another objection from a mishna: One may place a vessel beneath a leak in the ceiling on Shabbat. Apparently, even an uncommon case of preservation is permitted. Rabba answered: This is a case of new houses, which frequently leak.,Rav Yosef said: This is the reasoning of Rav Ḥisda, who allowed covering a hen’s egg, but not placing a vessel underneath the hen, in order to receive the egg when it is laid: Because by receiving the egg in the vessel, he negates a vessel’s preparedness. Initially, the vessel was available for any use. Since it now contains an egg that may neither be used nor moved, the vessel too may no longer be carried. It is tantamount to breaking the vessel.,Abaye raised an objection to Rav Ḥisda’s opinion, just as he had to Rabba’s opinion, from the Tosefta: One whose barrel of untithed produce, which may not be eaten until it is tithed, broke on Shabbat, may bring another vessel and place it beneath the barrel so that the untithed produce is not lost. Even though eating untithed produce is prohibited on Shabbat, they permitted carrying a vessel to preserve it even in the uncommon case of a barrel that breaks. Apparently, one is permitted to negate the vessel’s preparedness. Rav Yosef said to him: This is not difficult. Fundamentally, untithed produce is available for use on Shabbat. As, if one sins and prepares it for use by tithing it on Shabbat, it is prepared and may be eaten and carried.,Abaye raised another objection from a mishna: One may place a vessel underneath the oil lamp in order to receive the burning sparks of oil that drip from the wick. Once the vessel is filled with the drops of oil, it will no longer be available. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Sparks have no substance. They burn and dissolve as they fall into the bowl and do not accumulate. Therefore, the vessel may still be used.,And he also raised another objection from a mishna: A beam that broke, one may support it with a bench and with the lengths of a bed frame so that it will not fall. By doing so, he negates the preparedness of the bench or bed frame. He answered: This is a case in which the bench is loosely supporting the beam and not supporting its entire weight. If one wants to do so, he can take the bench. Therefore, the preparedness of the bench is not negated.,And he also raised another objection from a mishna: One may place a vessel beneath a leak that is dripping from the ceiling on Shabbat. The dripping water has no use and is set-aside; therefore, the water negates the vessel’s preparedness. He answered him: This is a case of a leak that is suitable for drinking. Since it has a use, one is permitted to carry the water that is in the vessel. Consequently, he does not negate the vessel’s preparedness by placing it beneath the leak.,And he also raised another objection from a Tosefta: One may overturn a basket in front of chicks so that they can climb on and climb off of it. By doing so, he negates the vessel’s preparedness due to the chicks, as moving them is prohibited on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: Rav Yosef holds that it is permitted to move the basket on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that it is prohibited to move the basket? The Gemara replies: This prohibition was stated when they are still on it; however, once the chicks climbed off the basket, it may be carried immediately. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that even though they are no longer on it, it is prohibited to move the basket? Consequently, the vessel’s preparedness is negated. Rabbi Abbahu said: That baraita is referring to the unique case where the chicks remained on top of the basket for the entire twilightperiod on Shabbat eve. This is in accordance with the principle: Since it was set aside from use during twilight of Shabbat eve, it was set aside for the entire day of Shabbat. The status of every vessel, i.e., whether or not it may be used on Shabbat, is determined at twilight.,With regard to the basic halakha of a hen that lays an egg on Shabbat, Rabbi Yitzḥak said: Just as one may not place a vessel beneath a hen on Shabbat in order to receive its egg, so too, one may not overturn a vessel onto the egg so that it will not break. The Gemara explains that he holds: A vessel may only be carried on Shabbat for the sake of an object that may be carried on Shabbat. Since the egg may not be carried on Shabbat, it is prohibited to carry a vessel for its sake. The Gemara raises all of these objections that were raised to Rav Hisda’s opinion, which permitted doing so. And he answered: All of those halakhot are referring to cases where one needs to move the vessel that he is using for the set-aside item, because he requires its location. This is in accordance with the principle that once it is permitted, for whatever reason, to move any vessel, one may place it anywhere he chooses.,To clarify whether or not the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak is valid, come and hear what was taught in a baraita: With regard to both an egg that was laid on Shabbat and an egg that was laid on a Festival, one may neither move it to cover a vessel with it, nor to support the legs of a bed with it.However, one may cover it with a vessel so that it does not break. This is contrary to Rabbi Yitzḥak’s opinion. Here too, it is referring to a vessel that one seeks to move because he requires its location. Since he was permitted to move it from its place, he is also permitted to cover an egg with it.,Come and hear an additional proof from that which we learned: One may spread mats on top of stones on Shabbat. Apparently, it is permissible to move a vessel for the sake of something that may not be moved on Shabbat. The Gemara responds: This is a case of rounded rocks that are suitable to be used in the bathroom. Therefore, it is permitted to carry them on Shabbat.,Come and hear another proof from that which we learned: One may spread mats on top of bricks on Shabbat. Bricks may not be used on Shabbat. Nevertheless, one is permitted to carry mats for the sake of bricks that are prohibited for use on Shabbat. The Gemara replies: This is referring to a case of bricks that are not set aside for construction, but are left over from a completed building and are suitable for people to lean on them. Consequently, they are like other household vessels, and moving them and moving mats to protect them is permitted.,Come and hear another proof for this from that which we learned: One may spread a mat over a beehive on Shabbat in the sun due to the need to protect it from the sun, and in the rain due to the need to protect it from the rain, as long as he does not intend to trap the bees by covering them. In any event, apparently it is permitted to move a mat for the sake of the beehive even though the beehive itself may not be moved on Shabbat. The Gemara rejects this: With what are we dealing here? With a case where there is honey in the beehive. He is permitted to cover it for the sake of the honey. Rav Ukva from Meishan said to Rav Ashi: Granted, you could say this in the summer,

as there is honey in the beehive during the summer. However, during the rainy season in which there is not honey in the beehive, what can be said according to Rabbi Yitzḥak to explain why it is permitted to cover the beehive at that time? The Gemara answers: This halakha is only applicable in order to permit covering the beehive for those two honeycombs that remain in the hive even during the rainy season so that the bees can feed off of them. The Gemara asks: Aren’t these honeycombs set aside for the bees alone? The Gemara responds: This is a case where one thought of them before Shabbat and, in his mind, prepared them to be eaten. The Gemara asks: By inference, if one did not think about them, what would be the ruling? It would be prohibited to cover the beehive.,If so, this tanna who taught in that same baraita: As long as he does not intend to trap the bees, let him distinguish and teach with regard to that same halakha itself: In what case are these matters stated, that one is permitted to cover the hive? It is in a case where he thought of them before Shabbat. However, if he did not think of them, it is prohibited. The Gemara answers: This teaches us a novel understanding. Even though he thought of them before Shabbat, it is only permitted as long as he did not intend to trap them.,With regard to the matter itself, the Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, he does not hold that there is a prohibition of set-aside. Consequently, there is no distinction between the different beehives. If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, when he does not have intention to trap the bees, what of it? Doesn’t Rabbi Yehuda hold that even an unintentional act is prohibited? The Gemara replies: Actually, this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. What does: And as long as one does not intend to trap the bees, mean? It means that one should not make the mat like a trap. He must leave space so that the bees will not get trapped on their own.,Rav Ashi said that it can be resolved differently: Did the baraita teach: In the summer and in the rainy season? Actually, it taught: In the sun due to the sun and in the rain due to the rain. That can be interpreted as follows: In the days of Nisan and in the days of Tishrei, as then there is sun shining and there is also cold weather; and there is rain and there is honey in the beehives.,Rav Sheshet said to the Sages: Go out and tell Rabbi Yitzḥak in Eretz Yisrael: Rav Huna already explained your halakha in Babylonia. There is nothing novel in the principle that you established that a vessel may only be moved for the sake of something that may be moved, as Rav Huna said: One may make a partition for the dead for the benefit of a living person, and one may not make a partition for the dead for the benefit of the dead person. It is prohibited to move objects for the sake of a corpse because it is prohibited to move the corpse itself on Shabbat.,The Gemara asks: What is the practical application of this halakha? As Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said, and likewise the Sage, Sheila Mari taught in a baraita: A corpse that is laid out in the sun and there is concern that it will putrefy and smell, what can be done? Two people come and sit beside it. After a while, when they feel hot from beneath them, this one brings a bed and sits on it and that one brings a bed and sits on it on either side of the corpse, as they are permitted to carry the beds for their own use. When they feel hot from above them, they bring a mat and spread it over their heads. Then, this one stands his bed up so the mat will remain resting atop it and slips away and leaves, and that one stands his bed up and slips away and leaves, and a partition is then created over the corpse as if on its own without erecting it directly for the sake of the corpse. Apparently, the Sages did not permit carrying a mat to cover a corpse for the sake of the corpse. They only permitted doing so in an indirect manner for the benefit of the living.,Incidental to the mention of halakhot related to a corpse on Shabbat, the Gemara cites an amoraic dispute in which it was stated: A corpse that was laid out in the sun,Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: One turns it over from bed to bed until it reaches the shade. Rav Hanina bar Shelamiyya said in the name of Rav: One places a loaf of bread or an infant on the corpse and moves it. The corpse becomes a base for an object that one is permitted to move on Shabbat and, consequently, one may move the corpse due to the permitted object. The Gemara adds: In a case where there is a loaf or an infant, everyone agrees that it is permitted to use that method to move the corpse. Where they argue is in a case where he does not have a loaf or an infant. One Sage, Rav, holds: Moving an object in an atypical manner is considered a bona fide act of moving. Therefore, one may not move the corpse by passing it from bed to bed. And the other Sage, Shmuel, holds that moving an object in an atypical manner is not considered moving. Therefore, it is permitted to move a corpse by passing it from bed to bed.,With regard to this dispute between Rav and Shmuel, the Gemara remarks: Let us say that this dispute is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im in the Tosefta. The Rabbis said: One may not rescue a corpse from a fireon Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda ben Lakish said: I heard that one may rescue a corpse from a fire. The Gemara seeks to clarify the matter: What are the circumstances? If there is a loaf or an infant available, what is the rationale for the opinion of the first tanna, who prohibited rescuing the corpse from the fire? If there is not a loaf or an infant, what is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda ben Lakish who permits rescuing the corpse from the fire? Rather, is it not that they disagree over moving an object in an atypical manner? As this Sage, the first tanna, holds that moving an object in an atypical manner is considered moving. Therefore, it is prohibited to rescue the corpse in that manner. And this Sage, Rabbi Yehuda ben Lakish, holds that moving an object in an atypical manner is not considered moving. Therefore, it is permitted to rescue the corpse in this manner. The amoraic dispute deals with an issue already disputed by the tanna’im. The Gemara rejects this: No, everyone, both tanna’im, agrees that moving an object in an atypical manner is considered moving. Rather, this is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Lakish: Since a person is agitated about his deceased relative and is concerned about maintaining the dignity of the dead,
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if you do not permit him to move the corpse in an atypical manner, he will come to extinguish the fire. The Sages permitted performing an act prohibited by rabbinic law so that one will not come to transgress a Torah prohibition. Rabbi Yehuda ben Sheila said that Rav Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Lakish with regard to the issue of rescuing a corpse from a fire.,We learned in the mishna that one may not make use of the oil that drips from the candle on Shabbat because it is not among the oil prepared from Shabbat eve for use on Shabbat. With regard to this same issue, the Sages taught in a baraita: The remaining oil that is in the lamp or in a bowl in which a wick was burning is prohibited for use on Shabbat. However, Rabbi Shimon permits using the remaining oil as, according to his opinion, there is virtually nothing prohibited due to the prohibition of set-aside.,MISHNA: The dispute in this mishna seems to be a local one; however, it is the key to several halakhot in the area of the prohibition of set-aside [muktze]. One may move a new oil lamp on Shabbat but not an old one that was already used. A lamp that was used is covered with soot and unsuitable for use. It is therefore considered set aside from use due to its disgusting nature. Rabbi Shimon says: All oil lamps may be moved on Shabbat except for an oil lamp that is burning on Shabbat, due to the concern that it might be extinguished.,GEMARA: The Sages taught the dispute in the mishna in greater detail in a Tosefta: One may move a new oil lamp on Shabbat but not an old one; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: All oil lamps may be moved on Shabbat except for an oil lamp that they kindled on that Shabbat. Rabbi Meir does not hold that one must distance himself from objects that are disgusting. However, since the lamp was burning on Shabbat, it may not be moved, as it is an object set aside due to prohibition for the entire Shabbat. Rabbi Shimon says: All lamps may be moved except for an oil lamp that is burning on Shabbat. If the flame was extinguished, one is permitted to move it. However, a cup and a bowl and a lantern that are full of oil with a wick lit in them, one may not move them from their place even after the flame is extinguished. And Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: One may supply himself with oil from an extinguished candle and from the oil that drips from the lamp, and even while the lamp is burning.,Abaye said: Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds in accordance with the opinion of his father in one matter and disagrees with him in one matter. He holds in accordance with the opinion of his father in one matter, as he is not of the opinion that moving set-aside objects is prohibited. And he disagrees with him in one matter; as his father holds that if the flame was extinguished, yes, he may move it, if it was not extinguished, no, he may not move it. And Rabbi Eliezer holds: Even though the flame was not extinguished, it is permitted to carry the lamp and to use the oil that drips from it. In his opinion, doing so in no way extinguishes the flame and it is in no way comparable to extinguishing the flame.,Following Rabbi Shimon’s statement, it was taught in the Tosefta: However, a cup, and a bowl, and a lantern, one may not move them from their place. The Gemara asks: What is different about these, that even Rabbi Shimon prohibits moving them? Ulla said: In the latter clause of this Tosefta, we came back to explain the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda,who prohibits moving items that are set-aside.,Mar Zutra strongly objects to Ulla’s explanation: If so, what is the meaning of the word however in the phrase: However, a cup and a bowl, etc.? Rabbi Yehuda prohibited moving an oil lamp as well. In what way could the legal status of a bowl be any different? Rather, Mar Zutra said: Actually, this must be explained differently. That phrase was stated by Rabbi Shimon. And when Rabbi Shimon permitted moving a lamp, that was in the case of a small lamp, which he has in mind, i.e., he is certain that the flame will be extinguished on Shabbat and that he will have the opportunity to use the remaining oil that day. However, these, the bowl and the lantern, which have much oil, no, he does not expect them to be extinguished and he sets them aside from use for the entire Shabbat.,The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: Using the remaining oil that is in an oil lamp or in a bowl is prohibited on Shabbat, and Rabbi Shimon permits using it. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon does not distinguish between a candle and a bowl. The Gemara answers: There, where Rabbi Shimon permitted a bowl, was specifically in a case where it is similar to a lamp, i.e., a small bowl in which the flame will quickly extinguish. Here, where Rabbi Shimon prohibited using the oil remaining in a bowl, it is referring to a bowl that is similar to a cup, which is large.,Rabbi Zeira said: A metal candlestick [pamot] that was kindled on Shabbat, according to Rabbi Shimon, who permits moving a lamp, it is prohibited because it is large. Whereas, according to Rabbi Yehuda, who prohibits moving a lamp, a metal candlestick is permitted because it does not become disgusting (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). The Gemara asks: Is that to say that Rabbi Yehuda is of the opinion that an object that is set-aside [muktze] due to repugnance may not be moved, and he is not of the opinion that an object that is set-aside due to prohibition may not be moved, and therefore permits moving the candlestick? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: All metal candlesticks may be moved on Shabbat with the exception of a candlestick that was kindled on Shabbat itself? Apparently, he prohibits moving the metal candlestick, not because it is disgusting but because it is set-aside due to prohibition. Rather, if it was stated, it was stated as follows, Rabbi Zeira said: A metal candlestick that was kindled on Shabbat, everyone agrees that it is prohibited. One that was not kindled on Shabbat, everyone agrees that it is permitted because it is neither set aside due to prohibition nor set aside due to repugnance.,Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A bed which one designated to place money upon it may not be moved on Shabbat because it is set-aside. It is prohibited even though it no longer has money upon it. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak raised an objection to Rav Yehuda from our mishna: One may move a new oil lamp on Shabbat but not an old one.

He explains his objection: And just as a lamp, which is made for this purpose, for lighting, when he did not light it, he is permitted to move it, a bed, which is not made for that purpose, for placing money on it, all the more so moving it would be permitted. Rather, if it was stated, it was stated as follows: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A bed that one designated for money to be placed upon it, if one left money upon it one day, it becomes designated for that purpose and it is prohibited to move it on Shabbat. If one did not leave money upon it, it is permitted to move it on Shabbat. A bed, which one did not designate for money to be placed upon it, if there is money upon it on Shabbat itself, it is prohibited to move it on Shabbat. If there is not money on it, it is permitted to move it. And that is only when there was not money on it during the twilight period between Shabbat eve and Shabbat. If there was money on it at that time, the bed itself becomes set aside due to prohibition for the entire Shabbat, even if the money fell off the bed in the course of the day.,Ulla said: Rabbi Eliezer raised an objection to Rav’s statement from that which we learned in a mishna. This mishna deals primarily with the laws of ritual impurity and discusses the relationship between a wagon and its undercarriage [mukheni], the system of wheels and the frame at the base of the wagon. And the Sages said: The wagon’s undercarriage, when it is detachable from the wagon, it is not considered connected to it and they are considered independent units as far as the halakhot of ritual impurity are concerned. And it is not measured with it. This refers to calculating the volume of forty se’a, as a vessel with a volume larger than forty se’a does not have the legal status of a vessel and cannot become ritually impure. And the undercarriage likewise does not protect together with the wagon in a tent over the corpse. A large wagon is considered a tent in and of itself and the vessels inside the wagon do not become impure if the wagon is over a corpse. However, the undercarriage is not included with the wagon in this regard. If a hole in the wagon is sealed by the undercarriage, it is not considered sealed with regard to preventing ritual impurity. And, likewise, one may not pull the wagon on Shabbat when there is money upon it.,By inference: If there is not money on it, one is permitted to move the wagon even though there was money on it at twilight. In this mishna, the prohibition is contingent exclusively on whether or not there is money on the wagon at that time. The Gemara answers: That mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who is not of the opinion that there is a prohibition of set-aside. And Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Since according to Rabbi Yehuda there is a prohibition of set-aside, the wagon became set aside from use during the twilight period and remains prohibited for the entire Shabbat.
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The Gemara adds: So too, it is reasonable to say that Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as Rav said: One may place a lamp atop a palm tree on Shabbat eve to burn on Shabbat, and one may not place a lamp atop a palm tree on a Festival. Granted, if you say that Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in this matter; that is why there is a distinction between Shabbat and a Festival. Since the lamp is set-aside [muktze] on Shabbat one will not come to carry it. Since one is permitted to carry a lamp on a Festival, there is concern that one might climb the palm tree or make use of the tree on the Festival and thereby transgress the rabbinic prohibition against making use of something connected to the ground on a Festival. However, if you say that Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that the lamp is not set-aside even on Shabbat, what difference is there to me between Shabbat and a Festival? Ostensibly, there should be no distinction between the two.,The Gemara asks: And does Rav really hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that it is prohibited to move an object that is set-aside? Didn’t they raise a dilemma before Rav: What is the ruling with regard to moving a Hanukkah candle from before the ḥabarei, Persian Zoroastrian fire priests, on Shabbat? Those priests prohibited lighting fires on certain days. In order to prevent them from discovering that he lit Hanukkah candles it was necessary to quickly move them. And he said to them: One may well do so. Apparently, Rav does not hold that there is a prohibition of set-aside. The Gemara answers: This is not a proof, as exigent circumstances are different and Rav permitted this due to the danger involved. As Rav Kahana and Rav Ashi said to Rav on this matter: Is that the halakha? He said to them: Rabbi Shimon is worthy to rely upon in exigent circumstances like this one.,On this same matter Reish Lakish raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan: Wheat kernels that he sowed in the ground that have not yet taken root and he could still gather them, and eggs that were placed beneath the hen and the incubation process has begun, what is the halakha in these cases? Would Rabbi Shimon agree that in these cases it is prohibited for use on Shabbat? One side of the dilemma is: When is Rabbi Shimon not of the opinion that there is a prohibition of set-aside? In a case where one did not reject the object with his own hands, i.e., he did not perform an action setting the object aside. However, in a case where he rejected it with his own hands, he is of the opinion that there is a prohibition of set-aside. When he sowed the wheat, he rejected it with his own hands. The same is true with regard to the egg; by placing it under the hen to hatch, he actively rejected it. The other side of the dilemma is: Or, perhaps there is no difference between the cases and Rabbi Shimon holds that there is no prohibition of set-aside in either case. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: There is only a prohibition of set-aside, according to Rabbi Shimon, in the case of oil that is in the lamp while it is burning. Since it was set aside for its mitzva, the lighting of Shabbat candles, and it was also set aside for its prohibition, it is prohibited due to the concern that one might inadvertently extinguish the flame if he moves it while it is burning.,The Gemara asks: And does he not hold that the prohibition of set-aside applies to an object set aside only for its mitzva without any prohibition? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: One who roofed the sukka in accordance with its halakhic requirements and decorated it for aesthetic purposes with colored hangings and tapestries, and hung as decorations nuts, peaches, almonds and pomegranates, and grape branches, and wreaths made of stalks, wine, oils, and fine flour, it is prohibited to supply himself from them until the conclusion of the last day of the Festival. Since they were all set aside for the mitzva of sukka, all other uses are prohibited. And if one stipulated at the time that he hung them in the sukka that he is not designating them exclusively for this purpose, but he intends to use them for other purposes as well, their use is entirely in accordance with his stipulation. He is permitted to use them as he chooses.,And from where do we know that this unattributed baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? We ascertained this from a comparison to a baraita that was taught by Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef. As Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef taught before Rabbi Yoḥanan: One may not take wood from the sukka that was constructed for shade on any Festival, even if the wood fell from the sukka on the Festival. Because it is prohibited to destroy the sukka on the Festival, it was set aside before the Festival for the entire duration of the Festival. Rather, one may take wood only from what is beside the sukka, i.e., bundles of wood that are not being used for the sukka. When he placed them there, his intention was to use them during the Festival. And Rabbi Shimon permits taking wood even from the sukka itself, since he holds that there is no prohibition of set-aside. And Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon agree that taking wood from the sukka constructed for the Sukkot festival is prohibited during the Festival. And if one stipulated about the wood that he will be able to use it during the Festival, everything is in accordance with his stipulation. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon prohibits using an object that was set aside due only to a mitzva, even though it was not set aside due to a prohibition. Therefore, the Gemara emends Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement: There is no halakha of set-aside according to Rabbi Shimon except in a case similar to oil in the candle. It is not necessary that there be both a prohibited labor and a prohibition due to the mitzva. Rather, since it was set aside for the mitzva alone, it is thereby set aside for the prohibition. It was also stated: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There is only a prohibition of set-aside according to Rabbi Shimon in a case similar to oil in the candle while it is burning; since it was set aside for its mitzva, it was set aside for its prohibition.,Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: There is only a prohibition of set-aside according to Rabbi Shimon in the cases of dried figs and raisins alone. The case of one who takes figs and raisins up to his roof in order to dry them in the sun is the only situation in which Rabbi Shimon holds that they are prohibited on Shabbat due to the prohibition of set-aside. Since in the initial stages of the process they emit a bad odor and are unfit for consumption, one consciously sets them aside. The Gemara challenges: And other items are not included in the prohibition of set-aside? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: One who was eating figs and left some over and took them up to the roof to make them into dried figs, and likewise one who was eating grapes and left some over and took them up to the roof to make them into raisins, one may not eat them on Shabbat unless he designates them to be eaten before Shabbat. Otherwise, they are prohibited as set-aside. And you would say the same with regard to peaches, and quinces, and all other types of fruit that one left out to dry. It is prohibited to eat them all on Shabbat due to set-aside.,The Gemara seeks to clarify: Whose opinion is it in the baraita? If you say that it is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, this baraita is superfluous. If in a case where one did not reject it with his own hands, he holds that there is a prohibition of set-aside, in a case where he rejected it by his own hand, all the more so that it is prohibited. There is no need to articulate the halakha in this unique case.,Rather, isn’t this baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? Apparently, he expands the halakhot of set-aside beyond dried figs and raisins. The Gemara rejects this: Actually, this halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda who holds that there is a prohibition of set-aside. And the case cited here, where he was eating figs, is necessary in order to teach us a novel halakha. It may enter your mind to say that since one was in the course of eating, he does not require prior designation; and if he changed his mind he may immediately retrieve the dried figs that he placed on the roof. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that since he brought them up to the roof, he diverted his attention from them and they are completely set-aside.,On the same topic: Rabbi Shimon bar Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, raised a dilemma before his father, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi:

Unripe dates that are placed in baskets to ripen and until they are ripe can only be eaten with difficulty, according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, what is their legal status as far as moving them on Shabbat is concerned? Are they considered set-aside? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: There is only a prohibition of set-aside according to Rabbi Shimon in the cases of dried figs and raisins alone.,The Gemara challenges this: And does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi not hold that there is a prohibition of set-aside? Didn’t we learn in a mishna that on a Festival, before they are slaughtered, one may neither give water to, in order to ease removal of their hides, nor slaughter non-domesticated, desert animals, animals that are always grazing in the fields? Since people do not generally tend to them, they are considered set-aside and may not be used. However, one may give water to and slaughter domesticated animals. And it was taught in a baraita that these are non-domesticated, desert animals: Any animals that leave their sheds on Passover and only enter their sheds with the advent of the rainy season. Domesticated animals are any animals that go out to graze beyond the city limits, and come and sleep within the city limits. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: These and those are both domesticated. And these are the non-domesticated, desert animals that are prohibited due to the prohibition of set-aside: Any animals that graze in the grazing area and neither enter the town during the summer nor during the rainy season. It is these animals that it is prohibited to give water to or slaughter on a Festival. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that there is a prohibition of set-aside even in the case of animals.,Several resolutions are proposed to this contradiction: If you wish, say that these non-domesticated animals that graze in the grazing areas throughout the year are also considered like dried figs and raisins. Even Rabbi Shimon would agree to this halakha. And if you wish, say instead: When Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi told his son that answer, he was saying it to him in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and he himself does not hold that way.,And if you wish, say instead: In that baraita, he spoke to them in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis, and this is how his statement must be understood: In my opinion I do not hold that there is a prohibition of set-aside at all. However, according to your opinion, at least agree with me that animals that leave their sheds on Passover and only enter their sheds with the advent of the rainy season are domesticated. And the Rabbis said to him: No, those are non-domesticated animals.,As to the essential dispute with regard to the laws of set-aside, Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon who holds that there is no prohibition of set-aside. The Gemara asks: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this? Didn’t an Elder from Keruya, and some say that he was from Seruya, raise a dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to a hen’s roost, what is its legal status as far as moving it on Shabbat is concerned? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Isn’t the roost made exclusively for hens to be inside it? Since it is not designated for use by people, moving it is prohibited. Apparently, he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to set-aside. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? With a special case, when there is a dead chick in the roost. Moving the roost is prohibited due to the dead chick, which is set-aside.,The Gemara continues to ask: This works out well according to the opinion of Mar bar Ameimar in the name of Rav, who said: Rabbi Shimon agreed in the case of animals that died on Shabbat, that they are prohibited on Shabbat due to set-aside. However, according to the opinion of Mar, son of Rav Yosef, in the name of Rava, who said: Rabbi Shimon was in disagreement even in the case of animals that died, and said that they are permitted and are not prohibited as set-aside, what can be said? The Gemara responds: With what are we dealing here? With a case where there is an egg that was laid on Shabbat in the roost. Because it was laid on Shabbat it is considered set-aside, and using the egg is prohibited. The thought of using it never entered anyone’s mind before Shabbat.,The Gemara asks: Didn’t Rav Naḥman say: One who is of the opinion that there is a prohibition of set-aside, is also of the opinion that there is a prohibition of an object that came into being on Shabbat or on a Festival; and one who is not of the opinion that there is a prohibition of set-aside, is also not of the opinion that there is a prohibition of an object that came into being. This case is no different than other cases of set-aside. The Gemara responds: This is referring to a case where the roost has an egg with a chick in it. Even Rabbi Shimon would agree that moving an egg of that sort is prohibited since it is fit for neither human nor animal consumption.,This explanation was cited to explain that Rabbi Yoḥanan could hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. However, when Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rabbi Yosef, came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that there is a prohibition of set-aside. And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, that there is no prohibition of set-aside. Rav Yosef said: That is what Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. The inference is: They said; however, he himself does not hold that this is the halakha.,Abaye said to Rav Yosef: And you yourself did not hold that Rabbi Yoḥanan rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, even before Rav Yitzḥak came and cited this statement in his name? Didn’t Rabbi Abba and Rabbi Asi happen to come to the house of Rabbi Abba who was from the city Haifa, and a candelabrum fell onto Rabbi Asi’s cloak and he did not move it? What is the reason that he did not lift it? Is it not because Rabbi Asi was a student of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and Rabbi Yoḥanan holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that there is a prohibition of set-aside? Apparently, Rabbi Yoḥanan holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.,Rav Yosef said to Abaye: Candelabrum you say; are you citing a proof from the case of a candelabrum? A candelabrum is different because there is a unique halakha in that case. As Rabbi Aḥa bar Rabbi Ḥanina said that Rabbi Asi said that Reish Lakish issued a ruling in the city of Sidon: A candelabrum that can be moved in one of his hands, one is permitted to move it on Shabbat. However, if it is so heavy that one must move it with his two hands, it is prohibited to move it. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: We have permission to carry only in the case of an oil lamp, according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. However, with regard to a candelabrum, both one that is carried in one hand and one that is carried in two hands, it is prohibited to move it.,The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that there is a unique prohibition in the case of a candelabrum? Rabba and Rav Yosef both said: Since a person usually designates a fixed place for it due to its size and its use, it is considered a built-in part of the house, and moving the candelabrum is like dismantling the house. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: A groom’s canopy is an object for which a person designates a set place, and, nevertheless, Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: With regard to a groom’s canopy,
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it is permitted to assemble it and it is permitted to dismantle it on Shabbat. If a permanent object like that one may be assembled on Shabbat and there is no concern for the prohibition of building, all the more so it should not be considered building and dismantling in the case of a candelabrum. Rather, Abaye said: Here it is referring to a special candelabrum made of joints, removable parts, and there is concern lest it fall and break into its component parts when it is moved, and one may come to reassemble it, which would be tantamount to crafting a vessel on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: If so, if it is referring to that type of candelabrum, what is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish who permits moving the candelabrum?,The Gemara replies: It is not referring to a candelabrum that can actually be dismantled. Rather, what is the meaning of joints? Similar to joints, i.e., there are grooves in it and it appears as if it is made of different components. Therefore, in summary: With regard to a candelabrum made of actual joints, both one that is large and one that is small, it is prohibited to move it. In addition, a large candelabrum that has grooves, everyone agrees that it is prohibited to move it by rabbinic decree, which was issued due to a large candelabrum made of joints. Because it is common for a large candelabrum to be made of joints, if one saw someone carrying a large, grooved candelabrum, he would mistakenly assume that it had joints due to the similarity between them, and would mistakenly permit carrying a large candelabrum actually composed of joints. Where Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagree is in the case of a small candelabrum that has grooves. This Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that we issue a decree prohibiting moving even a small, grooved candelabrum due to a large one. And this Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that we do not issue a decree. Because a small candelabrum is not typically made of joints, everyone realizes that the grooves are strictly decorative.,The Gemara questions: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan state the following principle: The halakha is in accordance with an unattributed mishna? And we learned in the mishna that discusses ritual impurity of a wagon with a detachable undercarriage: The wagon’s undercarriage, when it is detachable from the wagon, it is not considered connected to it and they are considered independent units as far as the halakhot of ritual impurity are concerned. And it is not measured with it. This refers to calculating the volume of forty se’a, as a vessel with a volume larger than forty se’a does not have the legal status of a vessel and cannot become ritually impure. And the undercarriage likewise does not protect together with the wagon in a tent over the corpse. A large wagon is considered a tent in and of itself, and the vessels inside the wagon do not become impure if the wagon is over a dead body. However, the undercarriage is not included with the wagon in this regard. If a hole in the wagon is sealed by the undercarriage, it is not considered to be sealed with regard to preventing ritual impurity. And, likewise, one may not pull the wagon on Shabbat when there is money upon it.,By inference: If there is not money on it, one is permitted to move the wagon even though there was money on it at twilight. An object that was set aside at twilight is set aside for the entire Shabbat. In this mishna, moving the wagon is permitted. Clearly, the unattributed mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that there is no prohibition of set-aside. Why, then, did Rabbi Yoḥanan, who always rules in accordance with an unattributed mishna, not rule in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? Rabbi Zeira said: Let our mishna apply only to a case in which there was no money on the wagon throughout the entire duration of twilight. This strained interpretation is accepted so as not to contradict and reject Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement.,Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: One time, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi went to the town of Deyosfera, and issued a ruling with regard to a candelabrum in accordance with the ruling that Rabbi Shimon made with regard to an oil lamp. This description is insufficiently clear, therefore a dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does this mean that he issued a ruling in the case of a candelabrum, like the ruling that Rabbi Shimon made in the case of an oil lamp, to permit moving it? Or, perhaps, he issued a ruling in the case of a candelabrum to prohibit moving it, and in another case he ruled in accordance with the ruling that Rabbi Shimon made in the case of an oil lamp, to permit moving it. There was no resolution found to this dilemma and therefore it stands unresolved.,It is told that Rav Malkiya happened to come to the house of Rabbi Simlai and moved an extinguished oil lamp, and Rabbi Simlai became angry, as in his opinion it is prohibited to move an oil lamp because it is set-aside. Likewise, Rabbi Yosei the Galilean happened to come to the place of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, and moved an oil lamp, and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, became angry. The Gemara also relates that Rabbi Abbahu, when he happened to come to the place of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, he would move an oil lamp. However, when he happened to come to the place of Rabbi Yoḥanan, he would not move an oil lamp. The Gemara wondered: Whichever way you look at it there is a difficulty. If he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, let him act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda everywhere and refrain from moving the lamp. And if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, let him act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon everywhere and move the oil lamp. The Gemara answers: Actually, it can be explained that Rabbi Abbahu holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon; however, in deference to Rabbi Yoḥanan he did not act accordingly, so as not to act contrary to his ruling in the place where he was the authority.,With regard to the halakhot of moving lamps on Shabbat, Rav Yehuda said: With regard to an extinguished oil lamp, it is permitted to move it, whereas a naphtha lamp,it is prohibited to move it. Since the smell of naphtha is unpleasant, the lamp is used exclusively for lighting. Therefore, moving it is prohibited. Rabba and Rav Yosef both said: With regard to a naphtha lamp, too, it is permitted to move it.,The Gemara relates: Rav Avya happened to come to Rava’s house. His feet were dirty with clay and he put them on the bed before Rava. Rava became angry at him for dirtying the bed and, therefore, sought to torment him with questions that he could not answer. Rava said to him: What is the reason that Rabba and Rav Yosef both said that with regard to a naphtha lamp, too, that it is permitted to move it? Rav Avya said to him: Since it is suitable to cover a vessel with it. Rava said to him: But if that is so, all pebbles in the yard may also be carried ab initio on Shabbat, since it is suitable to cover a vessel with them. Rav Avya said to him: There is a distinction between these cases. This, the lamp, the status of a vessel applies to it and there are leniencies that apply to vessels with regard to the halakhot of set-aside. These, the pebbles, the status of a vessel does not apply to it, as they are a raw material. Carrying them is prohibited unless designated for a specific purpose before Shabbat. Was it not taught in a baraita that

bracelets, nose-rings and rings, although it is prohibited to go out into the public domain wearing them on Shabbat, they are like all the vessels that may be moved in the courtyard; in the private domain, one may move them and they are not set-aside. And Ulla said: What is the reason that it is permitted to move nose-rings in the yard? It is because the status of a vessel applies to it. Apparently, vessel status is sufficient to permit moving it on Shabbat. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Thank God that Rava did not embarrass Rav Avya and Rav Avya managed to successfully answer Rava’s questions.,Abaye raised a contradiction before Rabba citing two sources with regard to set-aside on Shabbat. It was taught in a baraita: With regard to the remaining oil that is in an oil lamp and in a bowl in which a wick was lit, it is prohibited to use it on Shabbat and Rabbi Shimon permits using it. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon is not of the opinion that there is a prohibition of set-aside. And a contradiction is raised from a parallel source, in which the Sages discussed the halakha of the firstborn of a kosher animal that developed a blemish on a Festival. The firstborn must be examinedto determine whether or not that type of blemish disqualifies the animal from being sacrificed as an offering. If it is disqualified, it may be redeemed, slaughtered, and eaten as non-sacred meat on the Festival. Rabbi Shimon says: Any firstborn animal whose blemish is not perceptible before the Festival is not among the animals prepared prior to the Festival for use on the Festival, and it is prohibited to slaughter it. Apparently, an item not prepared in advance has set-aside status according to Rabbi Shimon.,Rabba said to him: How can you compare these cases? There, in the case of the lamp, a person sits and anticipates when his candle will be extinguished. It is clear to him that it will be extinguished, and he can safely assume that a certain amount of oil will remain in the lamp or the bowl. Here, does a person sit and anticipate when a blemish will befall his animal? The owner of the animal says: Who says that a blemish will befall his animal? And even if you say that a blemish will befall it, who says that a permanent blemish that would enable it to be slaughtered will befall it? And even if you say that a permanent blemish will befall it, who says that a Sage will agree to engage in examining the blemish? Since there are so many uncertainties involved, if the blemish is not perceptible before the Festival, the possibility of the firstborn animal becoming available does not enter a person’s mind at all.,Rami bar Ḥama raised an objection to this last point from that which we learned in a mishna: One may nullify vows on Shabbat. A woman who vowed that certain food is prohibited to her, her husband can nullify her vow on Shabbat. And likewise one may request that a Sage find an opening to dissolve his vows, i.e., a factor that the one taking the vow failed to take into account or an element of regret, if that nullification or dissolution is for the purpose of Shabbat. The question arises: And why, after a man has nullified his wife’s vow, should she be permitted to eat that food? When the woman vowed not to eat that food, she consciously set it aside. Even if some way to dissolve the vow is found, the food should remain set-aside. On the basis of the same uncertainty that was raised above, say: Who says that her husband will agree to engage in nullifying her oath? Perhaps he will refuse to nullify it.,The Gemara answers: There, in the case of vows, it can be explained in accordance with that which Rav Pineḥas said in the name of Rava, who came to explain some of the fundamentals of the halakhot of vows, as Rav Pineḥas said in the name of Rava: Every woman who takes a vow, it is from the outset contingent on her husband’s consent that she takes the vow. Since she knows that her husband has the ability to nullify it, her vows are not absolute and their final validation comes only through her husband’s agreement. When a woman vows, she does not set aside the food absolutely from potential use.,Moreover, the Gemara cites proof for this from that which was taught: Come and hear: One may request that a Sage dissolve his vows for the purpose of Shabbat on Shabbat, i.e., one who vowed on Shabbat that eating on that day is prohibited for him. And why is he permitted to eat something that was prohibited to him by his vow? Say again: Who says that the Sage will agree to engage in dissolution of his vow? Consequently, one has certainly diverted his attention from the food, set it aside, and it should be prohibited to eat it. The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, there is a difference, as there, in the halakhot of vows, even if the Sage does not agree to engage in dissolution of his vow, he can suffice with renouncing the vow before three common people. Even though it is preferable to have a Sage dissolve his vow, in exigent circumstances one may turn to a court of three common people to dissolve it. He will certainly find a way to dissolve his vow. However, here, in the case of the firstborn animal, who says that the Sage will agree to engage in examination of the blemish? In the halakhot of firstborn animals only an ordained Sage, who received special license to do so, is authorized to verify that it is a permanent blemish and permit redemption and slaughter of the animal as a non-sacred animal.,Abaye raised a contradiction before Rav Yosef: Did Rabbi Shimon actually say that when a lamp is extinguished, it is permitted to move it on Shabbat? By inference: After it is extinguished, yes, moving it is permitted; so long as it is not extinguished, no, moving it is prohibited. What is the reason that it is prohibited to move a burning candle? It is due to concern that perhaps, as he moves the lamp, the flame will be extinguished. However, is Rabbi Shimon really concerned that a flame will be extinguished under those circumstances? Didn’t we learn that Rabbi Shimon stated a principle: An unintentional act, a permitted action from which an unintended prohibited labor ensues on Shabbat, since he did not intend to perform the prohibited action, is permitted? As it was taught in a baraita, Rabbi Shimon says: A person may drag a bed, chair, and bench on the ground, as long as he does not intend to make a furrow in the ground. Even if a furrow is formed inadvertently, one need not be concerned. Since that was not his intention, there is no prohibition according to Rabbi Shimon. Consequently, according to Rabbi Shimon there should be no prohibition in moving a burning candle, even though it may be extinguished. Since that is not the intention of the one moving it, no prohibition would be violated.,The Gemara answers that there is a distinction between the cases: In every case where if he intends to perform the action, there is a prohibition by Torah law, e.g. extinguishing a candle; even when he does not intend to do so, Rabbi Shimon issued a decree prohibiting it by rabbinic law. However, in every case where even if he intends to perform the action, there is merely a prohibition by rabbinic law, e.g., digging a furrow which is not a full-fledged act of plowing that is prohibited by Torah law, but is prohibited only by rabbinic law, when he does not intend to perform the action, Rabbi Shimon even permits performing this action ab initio.,Rava raised an objection to this distinction from that which we learned in a mishna: Clothing merchants who sell garments made of diverse kinds, a prohibited mixture of wool and linen, may sell them as they normally would to gentiles. A merchant may place the garments he is selling on his shoulders and need not be concerned about the prohibition against wearing diverse kinds, as long as the merchant does not intend to benefit from the garments in the sun as protection from the sun, or in the rain as protection from the rain. However, the modest people, those who are particularly meticulous in their performance of mitzvot, would suspend the wool and linen garments on a stick behind them. And here, isn’t it a case where if one intends to wear the clothing, there is a prohibition by Torah law, and even so when he does not intend to wear it, Rabbi Shimon permits it ab initio. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon does not distinguish between cases on that basis.,Rather, Rava said a different explanation for Rabbi Shimon’s prohibition in the case of an oil lamp:
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Leave the candle, oil, and wick, since they became a base for a prohibited object. Even Rabbi Shimon agrees that a flame burning on Shabbat is set-aside. Since it is prohibited to move the flame, moving the lamp, oil, and wick is also prohibited.,Rabbi Zeira said that Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that Rabbi Ḥanina said that Rabbi Romanus said: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permitted me to carry a coal pan with its ashes. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Asi: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say that? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: A person may carry his son in his hands and even if the son has a stone, which is prohibited to carry, in his hands; or, one may carry a basket with a stone inside it? And Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: We are dealing with a basket that is full of fruit. Due to the fruit, carrying the stone is also permitted. The reason for the leniency is because there is fruit inside the basket; however, if there is no fruit inside it, no, one may not move it. With regard to the coal pan that is filled with ashes, how can moving it be permitted according to Rabbi Yoḥanan?,“He was astonished for a while” (Daniel 4:16) and could not find an answer. And, ultimately, Rabbi Asi said: Here, too, it is referring to a case where the coal pan has bits of frankincense that were not yet burned. Due to those bits, moving the pan is permitted. Abaye said: Are small bits in the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi significant? Since they are not significant, they are nullified by the ashes and the mixture is entirely unsuitable for use.,And if you say: The bits are suitable for the poor. We will explain that the value of an object is determined not by its context, but by its intrinsic value. Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that there is a difference with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity between garments belonging to poor people, which can become ritually impure even if they are very small, and garments belonging to the wealthy, which are not considered significant unless they contain a larger amount of fabric? Garments the size of poor people’s clothing are for the poor, and garments the size of rich people’s clothing are for the rich; however, clothes of the poor for the rich are not significant. Apparently, the significance of an object is determined by its context and its owner. Rather, Abaye said an alternative explanation: The halakha here is just as it is in the case of a chamber pot of feces. Since it is disgusting, removing it from the house is permitted, even though clearly there is no use for it.,Rava said: There are two answers to reject this analogy: One, a chamber pot with feces is disgusting, and the coal pan is not disgusting. And furthermore: A chamber pot with feces is uncovered and smells, and the coal pan is covered. Rather, Rava said an alternative explanation: When we were at the house of Rav Naḥman we would move a coal pan [kanuna]on account of the ashes, and we did this even though there were broken pieces of wood on it. Since the ashes can be used to cover filth, it is not set-aside and the coal pan may be moved due to the ashes. Even if there were also broken sticks on the pan that are useless, nevertheless they are nullified by the ashes. The Gemara raises an objection to this last remark from that which was cited previously: And Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon agree that if there were fragments of a wick in the lamp, that it is prohibited to move it. Apparently, these fragments are not null and render the entire lamp set-aside. Abaye said: No proof can be cited from that baraita because they taught it in the Galilee, where oil is abundant and inexpensive. That is why broken wicks are not nullified relative to the oil (Rav Nissim Gaon).,The Gemara relates that Levi bar Shmuel found Rabbi Abba and Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya, who were standing at the entrance of Rav Huna’s house. Levi bar Shmuel said to them: What is the halakha with regard to reassembling a weaver’s loom, which was typically a collapsible frame, on Shabbat? He said to him: It may well be done. He came before Rav Yehuda, asking him the same question, and Rav Yehuda said to him that Rav and Shmuel both said: One who reassembles a weaver’s loom on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering, as he performed a labor prohibited by Torah law on Shabbat.,The Gemara raises an objection to the statement of Levi bar Shmuel from the Tosefta: One who reassembles the branch of a disassembled candelabrum on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering. With regard to the plasterer’s pole, which has several component parts, one may not reassemble it ab initio, and if he reassembled it, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, although it is prohibited. Rabbi Simai says: With regard to a rounded horn, which is a trumpet that can be dismantled and whose assembly is complicated, one who reassembled it is liable. However, a straight horn, which is easy to assemble, one who assembled it is exempt. Apparently, assembling an object that consists of several components on Shabbat is prohibited by Torah law, and one is liable to bring a sin-offering for doing so. The Gemara answers: They said that it is permitted in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it was taught in a baraita: A bed frame, which is a wooden frame through which the ropes of the bed were interlaced, and the legs of the bed, and the archer’s tablets [skibas], which refers to the part of a bow upon which one pulls the arrow back, if they were detached from the bed or from the bow, one may not reassemble them, and if he reassembled them he is exempt.

However, doing so is prohibited. And one may not fasten the pieces together forcefully, and if he fastens them, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for performing a labor prohibited by Torah law. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If it was loose and could be assembled with ease, it is permitted. Rabbi Abba and Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya relied on this opinion.,The Gemara relates: In the house of Rav Ḥama, Rava’s grandfather, there was a collapsible bed, similar to a weaver’s loom, and they would reassemble it on a Festival. One of the Sages said to Rava: What is your opinion? Do you hold that this is allowed because it is building in an atypical manner? In other words, one is not performing the prohibited labor of building since it is was not performed in the standard manner? Although there is no Torah prohibition, there is, in any case, a rabbinic prohibition. Rava said to him: I hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel who said that if it were loose, it is permitted even ab initio.,MISHNA: One may place a vessel beneath the oil lamp in order to receive burning sparks of oil that fall from the lamp so that they will not cause a fire. And he may not place water into the vessel because he thereby extinguishes the sparks.,GEMARA: The Gemara asks: How is it permitted to position this vessel to receive the sparks, doesn’t he thereby negate the vessel’s preparedness? It is no longer prepared for any use on Shabbat as the sparks accord it set-aside status. The opinion that negating the preparedness of a vessel is prohibited has already been stated. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Sparks have no substance. They burn immediately and do not leave behind any trace of oil in the vessel. Therefore, the vessel remains suitable to be moved.,And we also learned in the mishna that one may not place water into the vessel situated beneath the candle because he thereby extinguishes the sparks. The Gemara remarks: Is that to say that we learned an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said that even an action that causes extinguishing indirectly is prohibited? The extinguishing in this case, where water was placed into a vessel, was not accomplished by means of a direct action. His action only caused it to extinguish indirectly.,The Gemara rejects this question in astonishment: And how can you understand it in that manner? Say that Rabbi Yosei said that indirectly causing extinguishing is prohibited on Shabbat; on Shabbat eve did he say this? And if you say that here, too, it is referring to a case where he placed water in the vessel on Shabbat, wasn’t it taught in a baraita: One may place a vessel underneath an oil lamp to receive sparks that fall from the lamp on Shabbat, and, needless to say, placing it there is permitted on Shabbat eve? And one may not put water into the vessel because he will thereby extinguish the spark, even if he placed it there on Shabbat eve, and, needless to say, doing so is prohibited on Shabbat itself. Apparently, the prohibition in the mishna is not at all connected to Rabbi Yosei’s approach. Rather, Rav Ashi said: Even if you say that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, it is different here because, in this case, he is not only causing the spark to extinguish. He is hastening its extinguishing, as the sparks are extinguished immediately when they fall into the water (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). In this matter even the Rabbis would prohibit doing so.,,When a pot is removed from the fire on Shabbat eve it may be insulated in materials that preserve its heat, but not in materials that increase its heat. Raising the temperature of a pot is tantamount to cooking. The mishnayot that follow list those materials in which such a pot may be insulated on Shabbat eve and those materials in which it may not be insulated.

MISHNA: In what may one insulate a pot of cooked food on Shabbat eve, and in what may one not insulate it? One may neither insulate it in the solid residue of produce that has been pressed free of its oil, nor in manure, nor in salt, nor in lime, nor in sand, whether those materials are moist or whether they are dry. All of these materials spontaneously generate heat when piled for an extended period. Therefore, they add heat to a pot insulated in them.,And one may neither insulate a pot in straw, nor in the residue of grapes that have been pressed for their juice, nor in soft material, e.g., from tattered clothing, nor in grass, when these materials are moist. However, one may insulate a pot in them when they are dry.,GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Did we learn with regard to the residue of olives in the mishna, but the residue of sesame seeds that were pressed for their oil, which produces less heat, may well be used for insulating food on Shabbat eve? Or, perhaps, we learned with regard to the residue of sesame in the mishna, and all the more so insulating food in the residue of olives is prohibited?,Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from what Rabbi Zeira said in the name of one of the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai: With regard to a basket in which one insulated food in a permissible manner, e.g., in dry soft material or the like, it is prohibited to place it upon the residue of olives. Conclude from this that we learned with regard to the residue of olives in our mishna; however, insulating food in the residue of sesame is permitted.,The Gemara rejects this proof: Actually I can say to you that with regard to actual insulation, the residue of sesame is also prohibited. However, with regard to

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causing heat to rise, i.e., heating food that is not actually insulated in it, but merely resting upon it, the residue of olives causes heat to rise. Therefore, it is prohibited even to place cooked food upon it. However, the residue of sesame does not cause heat to rise to that extent. Therefore, it is permitted to place food upon it.,The Gemara relates an anecdote somewhat relevant to the previous discussion: Rabba and Rabbi Zeira happened to come to the house of the Exilarch on Shabbat, and saw this servant who placed a jug [kuza] of cold water on the mouth of a kettle filled with hot water. Rabba rebuked him for having acted contrary to the halakha. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabba: How is this case different from placing an urn on top of another urn, which is permitted on Shabbat? Rabba said to him: There, when he places one urn on top of another urn, he merely preserves the heat in the upper urn; therefore, it is permitted. Here, in the case where he places the jug of cold water on the mouth of a kettle, he is generating heat in the water in the upper vessel; therefore, it is prohibited.,The Gemara continues: Rabba then saw that same servant spread a kerchief [dastodar] over a vat of water and place a cup used to draw water from the vat, on the kerchief. Once again, Rabba rebuked him for having acted improperly. Rabbi Zeira said to him: Why did you rebuke him? Rabba said to him: Now, see what will happen. Ultimately, he saw that the servant was squeezing out the water that was absorbed by the kerchief, thereby violating a Torah prohibition. Nevertheless, Rabbi Zeira said to him: How is this case different from that of a cloth [parvanka], which one is permitted to spread over a vat even on Shabbat? Rabba said to him: There is a distinction between the two cases: There, in the case of the cloth, he is not particular about it; even if it gets wet, he will not come to squeeze it dry. Here, with regard to the kerchief, he is particular about it, and he will wring it so that it will not remain wet.,We learned in the mishna: And one may neither insulate a pot in straw, nor in the residue of grapes that were pressed for their juice, nor in soft material. Rav Adda bar Mattana raised a dilemma before Abaye: With regard to swatches of soft material in which he insulated a pot, what is the halakha with regard to moving that material on Shabbat? Ordinarily, swatches of materials of that kind are set-aside because they have no use. Therefore, moving them on Shabbat is prohibited. Do we say that since they are now being used to insulate a pot, they assume the legal status of a utensil, which may be moved on Shabbat?,Abaye said to him: Just because he does not now have a basket of straw in which to insulate his food, does he stand up and renounce his basket of soft material? Obviously, he would have preferred to insulate his food in straw, as it is less expensive. The only reason that he used that material was because there was no straw available at the time. However, he does not want the swatches of material to be used for any other purpose, lest it be ruined. Therefore, it remains set-aside.,The Gemara asks: Let us say that the following baraita supports him: One may insulate a pot of food on Friday afternoon in woolen fleece, in combed wool, in tabs of wool dyed purple, and in swatches of soft material; however, he may not move them. Apparently, this is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye.,The Gemara rejects this proof: If that is the reason, there is no conclusive argument, as it is saying in the baraita as follows: If, however, he did not insulate a pot in them, he may not move them on Shabbat. In that case, they remain earmarked for their own purpose and are therefore set-aside [muktze].,The Gemara questions this last assertion: If so, what is the reason to say that? Obviously, those materials are set-aside. The Gemara explains: Lest you say that all these materials are suitable for one to sit on them, and, consequently, their legal status is that of utensils, which may be moved. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that this is not so, and they may not be moved due to the prohibition of set-aside.,The Gemara relates that Rav Ḥisda permitted returning stuffing to the pillow from which it had fallen on Shabbat. Rav Ḥanan bar Ḥisda raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Ḥisda from a baraita: One may untie the neck opening of a shirt on Shabbat if it had been tied by the launderer; however, one may not open a new neck opening for the first time on Shabbat. And one may not place soft material into a pillow or into a cushion on a Festival, and, needless to say, one may not do so on Shabbat. This baraita contradicts the ruling issued by Rav Ḥisda.,The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This, the baraita is referring to new pillows, whereas that, the statement of Rav Ḥisda is referring to old pillows. Stuffing a pillow for the first time on Shabbat is prohibited because by so doing one fashions a new utensil. However, if the stuffing fell out of the pillow, refilling the pillow is permitted even on Shabbat.,The Gemara notes: That opinion was also taught in a baraita: One may not place soft material as stuffing into a pillow or into a cushion on a Festival, and needless to say one may not do so on Shabbat. However, if the stuffing fell out, it may be replaced even on Shabbat, and needless to say that doing so is permitted on a Festival.,Having raised the issue of opening a collar, the Gemara cites that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: One who opens a new neck opening in a shirt on Shabbat, by cutting through the fabric and threads that kept it closed, is liable to bring a sin-offering. By creating the opening, he renders the shirt fit to wear, thereby fashioning a utensil on Shabbat.,Rav Kahana strongly objects to this:

What is the difference between this and the stopper of a wine barrel, which the Sages permitted piercing on Shabbat in order to serve wine to guests? There, too, by piercing the stopper, he fashions a utensil. Rava said to him: The cases are not comparable: In this case, the neck opening of a shirt, it is considered a connection, i.e., it is an organic part of the weave of the fabric; whereas in that case, the stopper of the barrel, it is not considered a connection. Even though the stopper is sealed in place in the barrel, it is a separate entity. When the stopper is pierced, no new vessel is fashioned.,Rabbi Yirmeya raised a contradiction before Rabbi Zeira. We learned in a mishna: The basting of launderers, garments that a launderer sewed together with loose, temporary stitches to avoid losing them; and a ring of keys; and a garment that was sewn with a thread of diverse kinds, e.g., a woolen garment that was stitched with linen thread, which must be pulled out; even though they are attached only temporarily, as they will all eventually be separated, it is considered a connection with regard to issues of ritual impurity. If a source of ritual impurity comes into contact with one of the garments, they all become ritually impure, until one actually begins to untie them, thereby indicating that he does not want them attached. Apparently, even when these items are not in use, e.g., after the launderer finished laundering the clothes, it is also considered a connection.,And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a different mishna: With regard to a stick that one made into an axe handle, it is considered a connection between the stick and the axe with regard to issues of ritual impurity when in use. If the axe comes into contact with a source of ritual impurity, the stick also becomes ritually impure, and vice versa. By inference: Only when the axe is actually in use, yes, it is considered a connection; when the axe is not in use, no, it is not considered a connection.,Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yirmeya: There, in the case of the axe, when not in use, a person is likely to throw the stick into the wood pile, as he is not particular about keeping them together. Therefore, it is not considered a connection with regard to ritual impurity. Here, with regard to the items listed in the first mishna, even when not in use, he prefers that they remain attached. In that way, if they get dirty, he can launder them again, as it is easier to wash one connected unit than several smaller swatches of fabric. Therefore, it is considered a connection with regard to ritual impurity.,In Sura, they taught this following halakha in the name of Rav Ḥisda; in Pumbedita, they taught it in the name of Rav Kahana, and some say, it was taught in the name of Rava: Who is the tanna who taught this matter stated by the Sages: The status of anything connected to an object is like that of the object with regard to ritual impurity?,Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The tanna in question is Rabbi Meir, as we learned in a mishna: The receptacle for the cruse of oil, and the receptacle for the spices,and the receptacle for the lamp that are in the stove become ritually impure through contact, i.e., if the wall of the stove becomes ritually impure through contact with a creeping animal, the receptacles also become ritually impure. However, these receptacles do not become ritually impure through air space, i.e., if the creeping animal were inside the stove but did not come into contact with its walls, the stove itself becomes ritually impure, but the receptacles do not; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Shimon deems the receptacles ritually pure, even if the creeping animal came into actual contact with the stove.,The Gemara analyzes this dispute: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon; he holds that these receptacles are not considered like the stove itself, and therefore they do not become ritually impure when the stove becomes ritually impure. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, it is difficult. If he holds that they are considered like the stove itself, then even if the creeping animal was in the stove’s air space, the receptacles should also become ritually impure. If he holds that they are not considered like the stove itself, then even if the creeping animal came into contact with the stove, the receptacles should also not become ritually impure.,The Gemara answers: Actually, by Torah law, the receptacles are not considered like the stove itself, and the Sages are the ones who issued a decree that they become ritually impure due to their proximity to the stove. The Gemara asks: If the Sages issued a decree that they become ritually impure, then even in the case where the creeping animal does not come into contact with the walls of the oven, but is merely in its air space, the receptacles should also become ritually impure.,The Gemara answers: The Sages made a conspicuous distinction, so that one will not come to burn his teruma and other consecrated items because of it. There is a severe prohibition to destroy teruma or consecrated items. If teruma becomes ritually impure, there is an obligation by Torah law to burn it; however, teruma that is ritually impure only by rabbinic decree is still fit by Torah law and may not be destroyed. Since there is concern that people will come to burn teruma even when doing so is prohibited, the Sages made a distinction, imposing ritual impurity on the receptacles only if the source of impurity came into physical contact with the walls of the stove, and not if it merely entered the stove’s airspace. In that way, it is clear that the ritual impurity is by rabbinic decree, and one will not come to burn teruma and consecrated objects due to that impurity.,The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to scissors made of component parts that are made to come apart and the blade of a carpenter’s plane, which can be removed from its handle, it is considered a connection between the components with regard to contracting ritual impurity. If one part becomes ritually impure, the other part becomes ritually impure as well. However, it is not considered a connection with regard to the sprinkling of the water of a purification offering. When water of purification is sprinkled on these implements in order to purify them from ritual impurity contracted through contact with a corpse (see Numbers 19:17–19), the water must be sprinkled on each part individually.,The Gemara asks: Whichever way you look at it, there is a difficulty: If it is considered a connection, it should be so considered even with regard to sprinkling; and if it is not considered a connection, it should not be so considered even with regard to ritual impurity. Rava said: By Torah law, when in use, it is considered a connection, both with regard to ritual impurity and with regard to sprinkling. And when not in use, even if the parts are now together, since they are made to eventually come apart and are typically dismantled, it is neither considered a connection with regard to ritual impurity nor with regard to sprinkling.
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And the Sages issued a decree that it should be considered a connection with regard to ritual impurity even when not in use, due to ritual impurity when in use. If one component becomes ritually impure, the other component becomes ritually impure as well. And, as a further stringency, they issued a decree that it is not considered a connection with regard to sprinkling even when in use, due to sprinkling when not in use. The water of purification must be sprinkled on each part individually.,The mishna listed several materials in which food may not be insulated on Shabbat eve when those materials are moist. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is the mishna referring specifically to materials that are moist due to their own natural state, or is it referring perhaps even to materials that are now moist due to something else, e.g., because they were soaked by liquid?,Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from the materials listed in the mishna: And one may neither insulate a pot in straw, nor in the residue of grapes that have been pressed for their juice, nor in soft materials, nor in grass, when these materials are moist. Granted, if you say that the mishna is referring to materials that are moist due to something else, this can be well understood, as all of these materials can get wet. However, if you say that it is referring to materials that are moist due to their own natural state, where do you find soft materials that are moist due to their own natural state? Wool is dry in its natural state. The Gemara rejects this argument: The mishna is referring to a case where the material is made from wool plucked from between the thighs of the animal, as that wool is usually damp from sweat.,The Gemara continues with a similar question: And that which Rabbi Oshaya taught in a baraita: One may insulate a pot of hot food on Shabbat eve in a dry garment and in dry produce, but not in a moist garment or in moist produce. Where do you find a ruling pertaining to a cloth that is moist due to its own natural state? The Gemara answers: Here too, the baraita is referring to a case where the cloth was made from wool plucked from between the thighs of the animal. The wool was spun and the cloth was woven while the wool was still moist. Consequently, there is no conclusive proof whether the materials listed in the mishna are prohibited only when naturally moist or even if they are moist due to another source.,MISHNA: One may insulate a pot of hot food on Shabbat eve in clothing, in produce, in doves’ wings, in a carpenter’s wood-shavings, and in the chaff of fine flax. Rabbi Yehuda prohibits doing so when it is fine, and permits doing so when it is coarse.,GEMARA: Since doves’ wings were mentioned in the mishna, the Gemara cites a related story: Rabbi Yannai said: Donning phylacteries requires a clean body, like that of Elisha, Man of Wings. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the statement that donning phylacteries requires a clean body? Abaye said: It means that one may not break wind while donning them. Rava said: It means that one may not sleep in them.,The Gemara asks: And why did they call Elisha Man of Wings? Because on one occasion the evil kingdom of Rome issued a decree against Israel that, as punishment, they would pierce the brain of anyone who dons phylacteries. Nevertheless, Elisha would don them and defiantly go out to the marketplace. One day, an official [kasdor] who was appointed to enforce the decree saw him; Elisha ran away from him, and the official ran after him. When the official reached him, Elisha removed the phylacteries from his head and held them in his hand. The officer asked him: What is that in your hand? Elisha said to him: It is merely a dove’s wings. A miracle was performed: He opened his hand, and, indeed, it was found to be a dove’s wings. Therefore, in commemoration of this miracle, they would call him Elisha, Man of Wings.,The Gemara asks: And what is different about doves’ wings from those of other birds that led Elisha to say that he had doves’ wings in his hand? The Gemara answers: Because the congregation of Israel is likened to a dove, as it is stated: “You shall shine as the wings of a dove covered with silver and her pinions with yellow gold” (Psalms 68:14). Just as this dove, only its wings protect it and it has no other means of protection, so too the Jewish people, only mitzvot protect them.,We learned in the mishna: One may insulate food on Shabbat eve in a carpenter’s wood-shavings, and in the chaff of fine flax. Rabbi Yehuda prohibits doing so when it is fine, and permits doing so when it is coarse. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda referring to the carpenter’s wood-shavings, or is it referring to the chaff of flax?,The Gemara answers: Come and hear proof as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: The legal status of the chaff of fine flax is like that of manure, i.e., it adds heat. The Gemara comments: Conclude from it that Rabbi Yehuda is referring to the chaff of flax. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from it.,MISHNA: One may insulate cooked food on Shabbat eve in animal hides and may move those hides on Shabbat. So too, one may insulate food in wool fleece and, in contrast to hides, one may not move the fleece.How, then, does one act if he insulated food in fleece, and now wishes to remove the pot? He lifts the cover, which he is permitted to move, and the fleece falls by itself. He need not even touch it.,Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: If he placed the pot in a basket filled with fleece, he leans the basket on its side so that the fleece will fall to the side and takes the pot. Otherwise, there is concern lest the wool collapse when he lifts the pot from the basket. And then, he will be unable to replace the pot, as it is prohibited to move the wool to make room for the pot, since the wool is set-aside. And the Rabbis disagree and say: He may take the pot and afterward replace it.,GEMARA: The Gemara relates that Rabbi Yonatan ben Akhinai and Rabbi Yonatan ben Elazar sat, and Rabbi Ḥanina bar Ḥama sat with them, and they raised the following dilemma: Did we learn the halakha in the mishna that only the hides of a common homeowner may be moved; however, the hides of a craftsman, whose profession is processing hides, since he is particular that they not be ruined because they are essential to his work, one may not move them on Shabbat? Or, perhaps, we learned the halakha in the mishna that even the hides of a craftsman may be moved, and all the more so that hides of a common homeowner may be moved.,Rabbi Yonatan ben Elazar said to them: It stands to reason that we learned the halakha in the mishna with regard to the hides of a common homeowner; however, hides of a craftsman may not be moved, since he is particular about them. Rabbi Ḥanina bar Ḥama said to them that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said as follows:

My father was a tanner, and one Shabbat he said: Bring me hides and we will sit on them (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). In other words, even the hides of a craftsman may be moved on Shabbat.,The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: With regard to wooden boards belonging to a homeowner, one may move them on Shabbat; however, those belonging to a craftsman, one may not move them. And if, however, he thought to place bread upon them for guests, both these, the boards of the homeowner, and those, the boards of the craftsman, may be moved. Apparently, the raw materials of a craftsman may not be moved on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: Wooden boards are different in that one is particular about them that they not be damaged. Hides, on the other hand, are not damaged when one sits on them.,The Gemara cites another proof. Come and hear that which was taught in a different baraita: With regard to hides, whether they are tanned or whether they are not tanned, it is permitted to move them on Shabbat. The Sages said that tanned hides have a unique legal status, distinct from the status of hides that have not been tanned only with regard to ritual impurity. Only tanned hides become ritually impure. What, is it not saying that there is no difference whether they are hides belonging to a homeowner and there is no difference whether they are hides belonging to a craftsman; in both cases they may be moved on Shabbat? The Gemara rejects this argument: No, the baraita is referring exclusively to hides belonging to a homeowner.,The Gemara asks: But with regard to hides belonging to a craftsman, what is the halakha? Is it true that they may not be moved on Shabbat? If so, that which was taught in the baraita: The Sages said that the legal status of tanned hides is distinct from the status of hides that have not been tanned only with regard to ritual impurity; let the tanna of the baraita distinguish and teach within the halakhot of Shabbat itself, and say: In what case is this statement, that there is no distinction between whether or not the hides were tanned, said? It was stated specifically with regard to hides belonging to a homeowner. However, with regard to hides belonging to a craftsman, no, if they were tanned they may not be moved. The Gemara answers: Since the entire baraita is speaking with regard to hides of a homeowner, it would have been forced to elaborate at greater length to introduce the distinction with regard to the hides of a craftsman than it did to introduce the distinction with regard to ritual impurity.,The Gemara notes that this issue is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as it was taught in a baraita: With regard to hides belonging to a homeowner, one may move them on Shabbat, and those of a craftsman, one may not move them. Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to both these, the hides of a homeowner, and those, the hides of a craftsman, one may move them.,The Gemara relates that those same Sages who sat and discussed the issue of hides, sat again and they raised a dilemma: That which we learned in the mishna: The primary categories of labor, which are prohibited by Torah law on Shabbat, are forty-less-one; to what does this number correspond? That is to say, what is the source of this number?,Rabbi Ḥanina bar Ḥama said to them: They correspond to the labors in the Tabernacle. All types of labor that were performed in the Tabernacle are enumerated as primary categories of labor with respect to Shabbat. However, other labors, even if they are significant, are not enumerated among the primary categories of labor since they were not performed in the Tabernacle. Rabbi Yonatan, son of Rabbi Elazar, said to them that so said Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yosei ben Lakonya: They correspond to the instances of the words labor, his labor, and the labor of, that appear in the Torah a total of forty-less-one times.,Rav Yosef raised a dilemma: The term his labor is written with regard to Joseph: “And it came to pass about this time, that he came into the house to do his labor; and there was none of the men of the house there within” (Genesis 39:11). Is it included in the count of the thirty-nine instances or not? Abaye said to him: And let us bring a Torah scroll and count the instances of the word labor and thereby determine whether or not there are thirty-nine instances without that one. Didn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said in a case of similar uncertainty: They did not move from there until they brought a Torah scroll and counted them?,Rav Yosef said to Abaye: I cannot reach a conclusion relying solely on a count because there is another instance of the term labor, whose meaning is not clear to me. The reason I am uncertain is because it is written with regard to the Tabernacle: “For the labor they had was sufficient for all the work to do it, and too much” (Exodus 36:7). The question arises whether or not this mention of labor is included in the count of thirty-nine instances, i.e., whether or not it refers to actual labor. And if it does, that verse with regard to Joseph should be understood in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that the expression, to do his labor, is a euphemism. It means that it was to attend to his needs and engage in relations with Potiphar’s wife that he entered.,Or, perhaps, the verse relating to Joseph: “He came into the house to do his labor,” is included in the count, and it refers to actual labor. And this verse: “The labor they had was sufficient,” is saying the following: That they completed the preparatory labor, i.e., they brought all the materials, not that they engaged in the actual labor. Let the uncertainty stand unresolved.,With regard to the matter itself, it was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that the thirty-nine labors of Shabbat correspond to the labors performed in the Tabernacle. As it was taught in a baraita: One is only liable for performing a labor to which there was a corresponding labor in the Tabernacle. They sowed in order to grow dyes for the Tabernacle, and therefore you may not sow on Shabbat. They reaped, and therefore you may not reap on Shabbat.,They lifted the boards from the ground in the wilderness, which is a public domain, and placed them into the wagon, which is a private domain, and therefore you shall not carry objects in from the public domain to the private domain on Shabbat. They lowered the boards from the wagon to the ground, and therefore you shall not carry objects out from the private domain to the public domain on Shabbat. They took boards and other objects out and passed them from wagon to wagon, i.e., from one private domain to another private domain, and therefore you shall not take objects out from one private domain to another private domain on Shabbat.,The Gemara expresses astonishment with regard to the last clause of the baraita: One who takes an object out from one private domain to another private domain, what prohibited labor is he thereby performing? The Gemara answers: It was Abaye and Rava who both said, and some say that it was Rav Adda bar Ahava who said: This is referring to taking an object out from one private domain to another private domain via the public domain, as the space between the two wagons in the wilderness was a public domain.,We learned in the mishna: One may insulate food in wool fleece, and he may not move it. Rava said: This halakha that fleece may not be moved on Shabbat applies only to a case where one did not insulate food in it. Only in that case is it set-aside. However, if one insulated cooked food in it, he may move it. By insulating food in the fleece, he indicated that he intends to use it on Shabbat.,A certain Sage for whom it was his first day in that study hall raised an objection to Rava from our mishna: One may insulate food in wool fleece, and one may not move it. How, then, does he act if he insulated food in wool fleece and now wishes to remove the pot?
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He lifts the cover, which he is permitted to move, and the wool fleece falls by itself. Contrary to Rava’s statement, even wool fleece in which a person insulated food may not be moved on Shabbat.,Rather, if it was stated, it was stated as follows: Rava said: This halakha that wool fleece may not be moved on Shabbat applies only in a case where one did not designate it for insulating food. However, if he designated it for insulating food, one may move it, as in that case, it is no longer set-aside.,It was also stated that when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Ya’akov said that Rabbi Asi ben Shaul said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: This halakha that wool fleece may not be moved on Shabbat applies only in a case where one did not designate it for insulating food. However, if one designated it for insulating food, he may move it.,Ravina said: In fact, Rava’s statement can be understood as it was originally understood, i.e., one who insulated food in wool fleece may move it because it is considered designated for insulating food. In the mishna that indicates otherwise they taught about wool fleece taken from a merchant’s shelves [heftek]. That wool was certainly not designated for insulating food. It will be returned to those shelves to be sold. Therefore, it is set-aside for that purpose and may not be moved on Shabbat, even if it is used to insulate food. That was also taught in a baraita: With regard to wool fleece taken from a merchant’s shelves, one may not move it on Shabbat. And if a homeowner prepared the fleece to use it, one may move it.,With regard to the question of what can be done to permit use of items ordinarily set-aside on Shabbat, Rabba bar bar Ḥana taught the following baraita before Rav: With regard to hard branches of a palm tree that one cut for fire wood or for construction, and then he reconsidered their designation and decided to use them for sitting, he must tie the branches together on Shabbat eve. This allows him to move them on Shabbat like any other household utensil. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He need not tie them together and, nevertheless, he is permitted to move them. Rabba bar bar Ḥana taught the baraita, and he said about it that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.,On that same topic, it was stated that Rav said: He ties the branches together on Shabbat eve. And Shmuel said: If he merely has in mind on Shabbat eve that he wishes to sit on them on Shabbat, he need not tie them together. And Rav Asi said: If he even briefly sits on them on Shabbat eve, sitting on the branches is permitted the next day, even though he did not tie them together and even though he did not have that in mind.,The Gemara comments: Granted, Rav, he stated his opinion in accordance with the unattributed opinion of the first tanna of the baraita, and Shmuel, too, he stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. However, in accordance with whose opinion did Rav Asi state his opinion? Apparently, he disagrees with both tanna’im who expressed an opinion on the issue.,The Gemara explains: Rav Asi stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it was taught in the Tosefta: One may go out into a public domain on Shabbat with combed flax [pakorin] or combed wool covering a wound, when he previously dipped them in oil and tied them to the wound with twine. If he did not dip them in oil or tie them with twine, he may not go out into the public domain with them. And if he went out with them for a brief period on Shabbat eve while it was still day, even if he did not dip them in oil or tie them with twine, he is permitted to go out with them on Shabbat. Apparently, there is a tanna who maintains that using an item before Shabbat enables one to use it on Shabbat as well. No additional steps are necessary.,Rav Ashi said: We too have also learned in a mishna: Straw that is piled on a bed to be used for fuel or mixed with clay is set aside for that purpose and may not be moved. Therefore, one who seeks to lie on the bed may not move the straw with his hand, but he may move it with his body, as this is not the typical way of moving straw. However, if that straw had been designated as animal feed, or if there was a pillow or sheet spread over it on Shabbat eve while it was still day and he lay on it before Shabbat, he may move it with his hand. Apparently, even brief use before Shabbat suffices to permit use on Shabbat as well. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from it that there is a tannaitic opinion in accordance with which Rav Asi stated his opinion.,The Gemara asks: And who is the unnamed tanna who disagrees with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the baraita cited above? He holds that in order to use palm branches for sitting, one must perform an action, e.g., tie them together, before Shabbat? The Gemara answers: It is Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akiva, as when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Ze’iri said that Rabbi Ḥanina said: Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akiva once went to a certain place on Shabbat eve and found there hard branches of a palm tree that they had cut for fire wood. And he said to his disciples: Go out and have in mind that you will use them so that we will be permitted to sit on them tomorrow, on Shabbat. And, Ze’iri added, I do not know if the house where Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akiva went was the house of a wedding feast or if it was the house of mourning.,The Gemara explains: From the fact that Ze’iri said: I do not know whether it was the house of a wedding feast or the house of mourning, it may be inferred that this halakha applies specifically to the house of mourning or the house of a feast because they are preoccupied with other matters and do not have time to tie the wood. However, here, in ordinary circumstances, if he tied the branches together, yes, it is permitted to sit on them on Shabbat; if he did not tie them together, no, it is not permitted.,Rav Yehuda said: A person may bring a basket full of earth into his house on Shabbat eve, pour it on the floor, and use it for all his needs on Shabbat, e.g., to cover excrement. Mar Zutra taught in the name of Mar Zutra Rabba: That applies only if he designated a specific corner in his house for the earth.,The Sages said before Rav Pappa: In accordance with whose opinion was this last ruling taught, that designating a place for the earth is sufficient to permit its use on Shabbat? It must have been taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with respect to palm branches, as if it was taught in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, didn’t they say that in order to permit use of an object that is set-aside on Shabbat, we require an action, e.g., tying the palm branches together? Thought alone is insufficient.,Rav Pappa said to them: Even if you say that the halakha was taught in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, the Rabbis stated their opinion that we require an action, only with regard to something with which it is possible to perform a preparatory action. However, with regard to something with which it is not possible to perform a preparatory action, no, they did not require an action. Since it is not possible to perform a preparatory action with the earth, one is permitted to use the earth by means of thought alone.,The Gemara asks: Let us say that this issue, whether or not an action is required in that case, is parallel to a dispute among the tanna’im. As it was taught in one baraita: One may clean utensils on Shabbat with any type of cleaning agent, except for silver utensils with cream of tartar [gartekon], as that not only polishes the silver, but also smooths it. By inference: Cleaning with natron and sand is permitted.,Wasn’t it taught in the Tosefta: Cleaning with natron and sand is prohibited on Shabbat? What, is it not that they disagree with regard to this following point? That one Sage, who prohibits use of sand on Shabbat, holds that an action is required in order to permit the use of items that would otherwise be set-aside on Shabbat. Since it is impossible to perform an action with sand, its use is prohibited. And the other Sage, who permits use of sand, holds that an action is not required.,The Gemara rejects this argument: No, everyone agrees that an action is not required; and, nevertheless, it is not difficult. This baraita, which prohibits use of sand and natron, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda; that baraita, which permits their use, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.,The Gemara elaborates: This baraita, which prohibits use of sand and natron, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said with regard to the laws of Shabbat in general that an unintentional act is prohibited. It is prohibited to perform an otherwise permitted action from which an unintended prohibited labor ensues. Therefore, cleaning a silver utensil with sand or natron is prohibited because he thereby unintentionally smooths the utensil, which is prohibited on Shabbat. That baraita, which permits the use of sand and natron, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that an unintentional act is permitted.,The Gemara raises an objection: In what manner did you establish that baraita, which permits the use of sand and natron? You established it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. If so, say the latter clause of that same baraita: However, one may not wash his hair with them on Shabbat. And, if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, he permits doing so. As we learned in a mishna:

A nazirite, for whom it is prohibited to cut his hair, may wash his hair with sand and natron and separate it with his fingers; however, he may not comb it, as combing will certainly cause hair to fall out. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon permits washing hair even in a case where it is prohibited to cause hair to fall out; in his opinion, the fact that washing one’s hair might inadvertently cause that to happen is not a source of concern.,Rather, both this baraita and that baraita, which disagree with regard to cleaning silver utensils with sand and natron, are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that an unintentional act is prohibited. And there are two tanna’im in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. They disagree with regard to Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion. This tanna, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that sand and natron scrape and smooth the utensils. Therefore, their use on Shabbat is prohibited. And that tanna, also in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that sand and natron do not scrape and smooth the utensils. Therefore, their use on Shabbat is permitted.,The Gemara raises an objection: How did you establish that baraita? It was in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. If so, say the latter clause of the baraita: But his face, his hands, and his feet, it is permitted to wash with sand and natron. Doesn’t he thereby cause hair to fall out? It should be prohibited according to Rabbi Yehuda.,The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that the permission to wash one’s face with sand and natron refers to a child; and if you wish, say instead that it refers to a woman; and if you wish, say instead that it refers to a eunuch. All of them have no facial hair, and that is why there is no concern that use of sand and natron to clean their faces will cause hair to fall out.,The Gemara continues: Rav Yehuda said: Washing one’s face with powdered frankincense (Rav Hai Gaon) is permitted on Shabbat, even if he has a beard, as it does not cause hair to fall out. Rav Yosef said: Washing with the solid residue of jasmine from which its fragrant oil was squeezed is permitted. Rava said: Washing with ground pepper is permitted. Rav Sheshet said: Washing with berada is permitted on Shabbat.,The Gemara asks: What is berada? Rav Yosef said: It is a mixture of one-third aloe, one-third myrtle, and one-third violets. Rav Neḥemya bar Yosef said: Everywhere that there is a mixture with no majority of aloe, it may well be used. Even if the mixture contains more than a third aloe, as long as it constitutes less than a majority, it does not cause hair to fall out.,The Sages raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: What is the halakha with regard to splitting olives on a rock on Shabbat in order to wash with the oil that oozes from them (ge’onim)? He said to them: And did they permit doing so on a weekday? Rav Sheshet holds that crushing olives in that manner is prohibited even during the week because it involves ruining food. After the olives are split in that manner, they are no longer fit for consumption.,The Gemara comments: Let us say that Rav Sheshet disagrees with the opinion of Shmuel. As Shmuel said: A person may perform all his needs with bread, and he need not be concerned that it might be ruined. The Sages said in response: Rav Sheshet does not necessarily disagree with Shmuel. Using bread does not render it disgusting and inedible; splitting these olives renders them disgusting and inedible.,The Gemara relates that Ameimar, Mar Zutra, and Rav Ashi were sitting on Shabbat, and they brought berada before them for washing. Ameimar and Rav Ashi washed with it; Mar Zutra did not wash. They said to him: Doesn’t the Master hold in accordance with that which Rav Sheshet said: Washing with berada is permitted on Shabbat? Rav Mordekhai, who was also there, said to them: Except for him, the Master; i.e., do not draw conclusions from Mar Zutra, as he does not hold that one is permitted to use berada, even on a weekday.,Mar Zutra holds in accordance with that which was taught in a baraita: A person may scrape off dried excrement crusts and scabs of a wound that are on his flesh because of the pain that they are causing him. However, if he does so in order to clean and beautify himself, it is prohibited. According to the tanna of this baraita, it is prohibited to adorn or beautify oneself, as the verse: “Neither shall a man put on a woman’s garment” (Deuteronomy 22:5) prohibits dressing or conducting oneself in the manner of women.,The Gemara asks: And Ameimar and Rav Ashi, who permit use of berada, in accordance with whose opinion do they hold? They hold in accordance with that which was taught in a baraita: A person must wash his face, his hands, and his feet every day for the sake of his Maker, as it is stated: “The Lord has made everything for His own purpose” (Proverbs 16:4). Every beautiful thing that exists in the world sings the praise of God Who created beautiful things. Therefore, it is appropriate for one to beautify himself in praise of God.,We learned in the mishna: Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: If he placed the pot in a basket filled with fleece, he leans the basket on its side so that the fleece will fall to the side of the pot, and takes the pot. Otherwise, there is room for concern lest the wool collapse when he lifts the pot from the basket. Then he will be unable to replace the pot. It is prohibited to move the fleece to make room for the pot, since the fleece is set-aside. However, the Rabbis disagree and say: He may lift the pot and afterward replace it. Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: Everyone agrees, even the Rabbis, that if the cavity in which the pot had been placed was destroyed, its walls having collapsed inward, it is prohibited to return the pot to the basket.,The Gemara asks, based on what we learned in the mishna. And the Rabbis say: He may lift the pot and afterward replace it. The Gemara elaborates: What are the circumstances? If the cavity in which the pot had been placed was not destroyed, the Rabbis say fittingly that it is permitted to replace the pot; why would Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya prohibit the practice? Rather, is it not that the Rabbis permit returning the pot even though the cavity was destroyed? Apparently, that is the subject of the dispute in the mishna.,The Gemara rejects this: No, actually, everyone agrees that if the cavity was destroyed, it is prohibited to return the pot to the basket. The mishna is dealing with a case where the cavity was not destroyed, and here the tanna’im disagree with regard to whether or not one need be concerned lest, if one is allowed to remove the pot from the basket without tilting it to the side, the cavity be destroyed and he will come to return the pot to the basket anyway. One Sage, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, holds that one need be concerned lest the cavity be destroyed and he return the pot anyway; and the other Sage, a reference to the Rabbis, holds that one need not be concerned about that.,The Gemara records several rulings with regard to placing an object into another object that is set-aside. Rav Huna said: With regard to this fragrant daffodil branch that was kept in a pot of moist earth in the house; if on Shabbat eve one inserted it into the earth, then pulled it out,and then inserted it again into the earth, it is permitted to pull it out again on Shabbat.By inserting it and then pulling it out, he has already widened the cavity in which the branch was placed. There is no room for concern that when he pulls it out again on Shabbat he will cause earth to shift from its place. And if he did not do so on Shabbat eve, it is prohibited to pull it out on Shabbat.,Shmuel said: This knife that is stored between bricks; if one stuck it between the bricks on Shabbat eve, pulled it out, and then stuck it between the bricks, it is permitted to pull it out on Shabbat. And if he did not do so on Shabbat eve, it is prohibited to pull it out on Shabbat.,Mar Zutra, and some say Rav Ashi, said: Placing a knife between the branches of a hedge of reeds (ge’onim) may well be done and there is no concern lest one come to cut the reeds when he removes it.,Rav Mordekhai said to Rava: Rav Ketina raised a conclusive refutation of the opinions of Rav Huna and Shmuel from that which we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who conceals a turnip or radish in the ground beneath a vine for safekeeping, if some of its leaves were showing, allowing access to pull the turnip or the radish from the ground, he need neither be concerned;
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due to diverse kinds, i.e., that he violated the prohibition of planting food crops in a vineyard, as he did not commit an act of planting; nor due to concern that he violated the prohibition against working the land during the Sabbatical Year; nor due to tithes, i.e., that it would be considered as if he picked it from the ground and would be obligated to tithe it; and they may be taken from the ground on Shabbat. Even if most of the turnip or radish is underground, it is permitted to pull it from the ground on Shabbat. One need not be concerned about causing the earth to move. Apparently, this contradicts the opinions of Rav Huna and Shmuel, who were concerned about causing earth to move on Shabbat. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this is a conclusive refutation of the opinions of Rav Huna and Shmuel.,MISHNA: If one did not cover a pot of cooked food on Shabbat eve while it was still day, he may not cover it after dark. However, if one covered it while it was still day and it was uncovered on Shabbat, he is permitted to cover it even on Shabbat. One may fill a jug with cold water on Shabbat and place it beneath a pillow or a cushion to prevent it from getting warm.,GEMARA: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is permitted to insulate the cold food on Shabbat to keep it cold.There is no concern that this will lead one to insulate hot food on Shabbat to keep it hot. Rav Yosef said: What is Shmuel teaching us with this statement? We already learned in our mishna: One may fill a jug with cold water on Shabbat and place it beneath a pillow or a mattress to prevent it from getting warm.,Abaye said to him: He teaches us a great deal. As, if it had been learned from the mishna alone, I would have said that the ruling that one is permitted to insulate cold food applies only to something that is not ordinarily insulated when it is hot. However, something that is commonly insulated when it is hot, no, it may not be insulated even when it is cold. Therefore, Shmuel teaches us that this is allowed even in the case of something which is commonly insulated when it is hot.,Rav Huna said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: It is prohibited to insulate cold food on Shabbat to keep it cold. The Gemara raises an objection: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permitted cold food to be insulated on Shabbat? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This statement was made before he heard the ruling of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei; that statement in the baraita was made after he heard it. As in that incident where Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi sat and said: It is prohibited to insulate cold food on Shabbat to keep it cold, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said before him: Father permitted insulating cold food on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: I retract my previous statement, as the Elder, Rabbi Yosei, has already issued a ruling on this topic, and I defer to his ruling.,Rav Pappa said: Come and see how much they loved each other. Had Rabbi Yosei still been alive, he would have been subordinate to and sitting before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi as his student, as Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, who took his father’s place and was as great a Torah scholar as his father, was subordinate to and sitting before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi as his student. And, nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The Elder has already issued a ruling on this topic, and he deferred to Rabbi Yosei’s ruling.,Rav Naḥman said to Daru, his slave: Insulate cold food for me on Shabbat, so that it will not become warm, and bring me water that a gentile cook [kappeila] heated on a weekday, as the prohibition to eat food cooked by a gentile does not apply to water. When Rabbi Ami heard this, he became angry. Rav Yosef said: What is the reason that Rabbi Ami become angry? Rav Naḥman acted in accordance with the rulings of his teachers; in one matter in accordance with the ruling of Rav, and in one matter in accordance with the ruling of Shmuel.,The Gemara explains: In one matter in accordance with the ruling of Shmuel, as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is permitted to insulate cold food on Shabbat to keep it cold. In one matter in accordance with the ruling of Rav, as Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said that Rav said: Anything that is eaten as it is, raw, and cooking it is unnecessary, even if it was cooked it is not subject to the prohibition of food cooked by gentiles. Since water is commonly drunk uncooked, one may drink it even if it was boiled by a gentile.,The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ami became angry because he held that an important person is different. A distinguished person like Rav Naḥman should be stringent and distance himself from conduct that could be perceived, even mistakenly, as a prohibited act.,The Sages taught in the Tosefta: Although the Sages said that one may not insulate hot food, even in something that does not add heat after nightfall on Shabbat, if he comes to add to the material in which he insulated the food on Shabbat eve, he may add to it even on Shabbat. How should he do it? Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: He takes the sheets with which he insulated a pot and places the heavy blankets, which provide better insulation, in their place. Or, if he is concerned about excessive heat, he takes the heavy blankets in which the pot had been insulated and places the lighter sheetsin their place.,And likewise, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, in teaching an additional leniency, said: They prohibited insulating a pot on Shabbat to keep its contents warm when the food remains only in the same urn in which the water was boiled. However, if one emptied the water from that urn into another urn, it is permitted to insulate the second urn to keep the water warm. The reason for the ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is: It is prohibited to insulate a pot on Shabbat, due to concern lest one heat the food beforehand. Now that he has already taken steps to cool the water by pouring it from one urn to another, is there concern that he will boil it again on Shabbat?,And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If he insulated the pot and covered it with something that may be moved on Shabbat, or if he insulated it with something that may not be moved on Shabbat because it is set-aside and covered it with something that may be moved on Shabbat, he may take the pot to remove food and return it to its place and not be concerned.,However, if he both insulated it and covered it with something that may not be moved on Shabbat, or if he insulated it in something that may be moved on Shabbat and covered it with something that may not be moved on Shabbat, if the pot was partially exposed, he may remove the pot and the cover will fall on its own and then return it to its place. And if the pot was not partially exposed,

he may not remove the pot and then return it to its place.,Rabbi Yehuda says: The chaff of fine flax is like manure. Therefore, one may not insulate food in it even on Shabbat eve.,One may place a copper urn upon a copper urn, and one may place an earthenware pot upon an earthenware pot because the lower utensil will not heat the upper one. However, one may not place an earthenware pot upon a copper urn, or a copper urn upon an earthenware pot, as in that case there is concern that the upper utensil will be heated by the lower one. And one may seal the mouth of a pot with dough. All of the above may not be undertaken in order to heat the water, but only so that its heat will be maintained and it will not cool down.,And just as one may not insulate hot food to keep it warm, so too, one may not insulate cold food to keep it cold. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permitted insulating cold food on Shabbat.,And one may neither crush snow nor hail on Shabbat so that its water will flow and he will be able to drink it. That act involves creation of a new entity, water from ice, on Shabbat, which is prohibited. However, he may place the snow or the hail into a cup or a dish and allow it to melt on its own, and he need not be concerned.,,Due to the mitzva to rest one’s animals on Shabbat, one’s animal may not go out into the public domain bearing a burden. However, an object designated to protect the animal or to prevent it from fleeing is not considered a burden; therefore, an animal bearing objects that serve that purpose may go out into the public domain.

MISHNA: The mishna asks: With what may an animal go out into the public domain on Shabbat and with what may it not go out? A camel may go out on Shabbat with an afsar, and a naka may go out with a ḥatam, and a luvdekim may go out with a perumbiya. All these terms will be defined in the Gemara. And a horse may go out with a chain around its neck.,And, in general, all animals that typically have a chain around their necks when they go out to the public domain may go out with a chain on Shabbat and may be pulled by the chain.,If these chains contracted ritual impurity, one may sprinkle waters of purification on them and immerse them in their place on the animal, and they need not first be removed.,GEMARA: Several terms in the mishna were not clear to the Sages, and the Gemara asks: What is the meaning of naka with a ḥatam? Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: A white female camel (ge’onim) with an iron nose ring. And what is the meaning of luvdekim with a perumbiya? Rav Huna said: A Libyan donkey with an iron halter.,Having mentioned a Libyan donkey, the Gemara relates that Levi once sent money to Bei Ḥozai to procure for himself a Libyan donkey, which is reputed to be of superior quality. They bound his money, returned it, and sent him barley, to say that the strides of a donkey depend on the barley that it eats. If one provides his donkey with better feed, its performance will be as good as that of a Libyan donkey.,Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The students switched the details in the mishna before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and asked: What is the halakha with regard to this animal going out into the public domain with that which is permitted for that animal? For example, may a white female camel go out with a bit or a camel with an iron nose ring?,The Gemara explains: The case of a white female camel going out with a bit should not be a dilemma for you; since it is not sufficiently secured by a bit, it is regarded as a burden with which the animal may not go out. The case where there should be a dilemma for you is that of a camel going out to the public domain with a nose ring. What is the halakha in that case? The Gemara explains the dilemma: Is the halakha that since a bit alone suffices to secure a camel, an iron nose ring is considered a burden? Or, is the halakha perhaps that with regard to a device that provides excessive security we do not say that it is a burden?,Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi that so said father, Rabbi Yosei: Four animals may go out with a bit: The horse, and the mule, and the camel, and the donkey. What does this list come to exclude? Is it not coming to exclude a camel going out with a nose ring? Apparently, the dilemma is resolved. The camel may go out only with a bit. The Gemara rejects this proof: No, the list comes to exclude a white female camel going out with a bit.,It was taught in a baraita: A Libyan donkey and a camel may go out with a bit. The Gemara notes that the question whether or not an animal may go out into the public domain with excessive security is parallel to a dispute between the tanna’im, as it was taught in a baraita: A non-domesticated animal may not go out with a collar. Ḥananya says: It may go out with a collar and with anything that secures it.,The Gemara clarifies the case: With what are we dealing here? If you say that we are dealing with a large non-domesticated animal, does a collar suffice for it? Since it does not sufficiently secure the animal, it is considered a burden, and it is prohibited for the animal to go out with it on Shabbat. Rather, it must be dealing with a small non-domesticated animal. In that case, doesn’t a collar suffice for it? Why then does the anonymous first tanna hold that the animal may not go out with it?,Rather, is it not that the practical difference between their opinions is with regard to a cat? The anonymous first tanna of the baraita holds that since a small rope suffices for the cat, a collar is considered a burden with which the cat may not go out into the public domain. And Ḥananya holds that with regard to a device that provides excessive security, we do not say that it is a burden. The tanna’im disagree whether or not a device that provides excessive security is considered a burden. The Gemara concludes: Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Ḥananya. A device that provides excessive security is not considered a burden.,The Gemara relates that Levi, son of Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya, and Rabba bar Rav Huna were once going together on a road. Levi’s donkey on its own initiative went ahead of the donkey of Rabba bar Rav Huna. Rabba bar Rav Huna was offended because he was the greater Torah scholar, and he thought that Levi went first to assert that he considered himself the greater scholar. Levi said to himself: I will say something to him, so that

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he will be placated and will understand that it was not my intention to disrespect him. He said to him: An undisciplined donkey whose conduct is wicked like this one that I am riding, what is the ruling with regard to having it go out with a halter on Shabbat? Typically, in order to secure a donkey, a bit suffices and it does not require a halter. A halter constitutes excessive security. However, the question is whether or not a halter that provides excessive security for a wild donkey like this one is considered a burden with which it is prohibited to go out to the public domain on Shabbat. Rabba bar Rav Huna said to him: Even if the security is considered extraneous, your father said the following in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Ḥananya,who said that a device that provides excessive security is not considered a burden.,A Sage of the school of Menashiya taught a baraita: A goat in which one carved out a hole between its horns may go out with a bit on Shabbat. Because the bit is inserted through the hole, it will not become detached. Rav Yosef raised a dilemma: What is the ruling in a case where one inserted the bit through the goat’s beard? The Gemara explains the dilemma: Is the halakha that since, if the goat attempts to sever itself from the bit, it would cause it pain because the bit is attached to its beard, and therefore it will not come to sever it and the bit will remain in place? Or perhaps is the halakha that sometimes the knot will loosen and the bit will fall, and the goat’s owner will come to bring the bit and carry it four cubits in the public domain? No resolution was found to this dilemma. Let it stand unresolved.,We learned there in a mishna: And neither may a cow go out with a strap between its horns. Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said: Rav and Shmuel disagreed about this: One said: Whether it was placed for beauty, as an ornament, or whether it was placed to secure the cow, it is prohibited for the cow to go out with the strap between its horns. And the other one said: For beauty, it is prohibited; however, if it was placed to secure the cow, it is permitted.,Rav Yosef said: Conclude that Shmuel is the one who said that if the strap was placed for beauty it is prohibited; however, if it was placed to secure the cow it is permitted. As Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Ḥananya: A device that provides excessive security is not considered a burden. Therefore, an animal may go out on Shabbat with straps that provide excessive security.,Abaye said to him: On the contrary, conclude that Shmuel is the one who said that whether it was placed for beauty, as an ornament, or whether it was placed to secure the cow, it is prohibited. As Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The students exchanged the details in the mishna before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and asked: What is the halakha with regard to this animal going out into the public domain with that which is permitted for that animal? And Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: So said father, Rabbi Yosei: Four animals may go out with a bit: The horse, the mule, and the camel, and the donkey. Does this list not come to exclude a camel going out with a nose ring, as a nose ring provides excessive security beyond that required for a camel? Apparently, according to Shmuel, an animal may not go out on Shabbat with a device that provides excessive security, as it is considered a burden. Rav Yosef said to him: Delete this latter statement of Shmuel due to that first one.,The Gemara asks: And what did you see that led you to delete this latter statement due that first one? Delete that first statement due to this latter one. The Gemara explains: The first statement is supported as we find that Shmuel is the one who said : For beauty, it is prohibited; however, if it was placed to secure the cow, it is permitted, as it was stated that Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: Whether the strap was placed for beauty, or whether it was placed to secure the cow, it is prohibited. And Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said that Shmuel said: For beauty, it is prohibited; however, if it was placed to secure the cow, it is permitted.,The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: If its owner tied a red heifer with its reins that are attached to the bit, it remains fit for use in the purification ritual. And if it should enter your mind to say that a bit is considered a burden, why does a red heifer remain fit for use? The Torah explicitly stated: “Speak to the children of Israel, that they bring you a red heifer without defect, in which there is no blemish, and upon which never came a yoke” (Numbers 19:2). A red heifer is disqualified by a burden.,Abaye said: There, the baraita is referring to the case of a red heifer whose owner is leading it from city to city. When the animal is removed from its habitat, it requires additional security. In that case, tying the heifer with its reins is conventional rather than excessive security. Therefore, the bit is not considered a burden. Rava said: A red heifer, whose monetary value is high, is different and therefore secured more carefully than other cows. Ravina said: The baraita is referring to a red heifer that is rebellious and headstrong. Therefore, it requires added security.,We learned in the mishna: A horse may go out with a chain around its neck, and so too, all animals that typically have chains around their necks when they go out to the public domain may go out with chains on Shabbat and may be pulled by the chains. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: May go out, and what is the meaning of: May be pulled?Rav Huna said: These animals may go out either with the chain wrapped around their necks as an ornament, or they may be pulled by the chain. And Shmuel said: These animals may go out pulled by the chain; however, they may not go out with the chain wrapped around their necks as an ornament.,It was taught in a baraita: They may go out with the chains loosely wrapped around their necks, so that if the need arises, the animals will be able to be pulled by their chains. Rav Yosef said: I saw the calves of the house of Rav Huna go out into the public domain on Shabbat with their bits and with the reins wrapped around their necks.,When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Ḥanina said: The mules of the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi go out into the public domain with their bits on Shabbat. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does this mean that the mules went out with their bits and reins wrapped around their necks; or, does it mean that they were pulled by the reins?,Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from the following incident: When Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Ḥanina said: The mules [molaot] of the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi went out on Shabbat with their bits with the reins wrapped around their necks.,The Sages said before Rav Asi: That statement of Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda is not necessary. It may be derived from the statement of Rav Dimi. As, if it would enter your mind to say that Rav Dimi said that the mules of the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi went out on Shabbat pulled by their bits, it is difficult. There is nothing novel in that statement, as it may be derived from the statement that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said.,As Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The students switched the details in the mishna before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and asked: What is the halakha with regard to this animal going out into the public domain with that which is permitted for that animal? And Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: So said father, four animals may go out with a bit: The horse, and the mule, and the camel, and the donkey. Apparently, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, a mule may go out on Shabbat pulled by its bit.,Rav Asi said to them: This statement of Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda is necessary, as if it were derived from the statement of Rav Yehuda, who related that which Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, I would have said that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said that before him, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi did not accept it from him. Therefore, that statement of Rav Dimi teaches us that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi indeed accepted it from Rabbi Yishmael and his mules went out with their bits on Shabbat.,And if it had been derived only from the statement of Rav Dimi, I would have said that this applies only when the mule is pulled by its bit; however, if the reins are merely wrapped around the animal’s neck, no, the animal may not go out with it. Therefore, that statement of Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yehuda teaches us that the mules of the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi went out on Shabbat with their reins wrapped around their necks.,It was further taught in our mishna: If these chains contracted ritual impurity, one may sprinkle water of purification on them and immerse them in their place on the animal. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that these chains are fit to contract ritual impurity? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: A ring worn by a person is ritually impure. However, the ring of an animal, and rings of utensils, and all other rings not worn by people

are ritually pure.,Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said: Our mishna is referring to ornaments that were transformed from their original designation for a person’s adornment to an ornament designated for an animal’s adornment. They had once belonged to a person who later affixed them in order to attach a strap to an animal. Their original ritual impurity does not cease when they are attached to the animal.,And Rav Yosef said: Animals’ rings can become ritually impure since a person pulls his animal with them. Consequently, they are considered utensils used by people. Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: The metal animal prod becomes ritually impure? What is the reason that it becomes ritually impure even though it is an animal’s utensil? Since a person subjugates his animal with it, it is regarded as a utensil for use by a person; therefore, it can become ritually impure. Here too, with regard to chains, since a person pulls his animal with them, they are regarded as utensils for use by a person.,And we learned in our mishna: If the animals’ chains became ritually impure, one may immerse them while they are in their place on the animal, and they need not first be removed. The Gemara raises a question: Isn’t this an obstruction that renders the immersion invalid? The rings of the chain are firmly attached to the chain, and there is no room for the water of the ritual bath to completely surround the chain.,Rabbi Ami said: The mishna is referring to a case where he struck the rings of the chain with a hammer, widening them and thereby creating sufficient space to allow the water to surround the chain on all sides.,The Gemara asks: Let us say that Rabbi Ami holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef. As, if he held in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa, who said that our mishna is referring to ornaments that were transformed from their original designation for a person’s adornment to an ornament designated for an animal’s adornment, and therefore they can be ritually impure with impurity contracted while it was still a person’s ornament, it is difficult. Since he struck the chain, he performed an action which altered its identity, and the impurity would have ceased even without immersion.,As we learned in a mishna: All vessels descend into their state of ritual impurity by means of thought. Even though an unfinished vessel cannot become ritually impure, if the craftsman decided not to complete it, it immediately assumes the legal status of a completed vessel and can become ritually impure. However, they only ascend from their state of ritual impurity by means of a change resulting from an action. A ritually impure vessel, once it undergoes physical change, is no longer ritually impure. Hammering the rings is an action that effects physical change. Therefore, the chain should be ritually pure without immersion.,The Gemara rejects this argument: Actually, Rabbi Ami could interpret the mishna just as Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa did, as he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that an action performed to enhance a utensil is not an action capable of ridding that utensil of its ritual impurity, as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda said: He did not say that an action that effects a physical change purifies a utensil of its ritual impurity with regard to an action performed to enhance a utensil; rather, he made his statement with regard to an action performed to ruin the utensil.,It was taught in a baraita: The mishna is referring to a case where the rings attached to the chain are well spaced so that the water completely surrounds the rings of the chain with no obstruction.,It was taught in the Tosefta: A certain disciple from the Upper Galilee asked Rabbi Eliezer: I heard that one distinguishes between one type of ring and another type of ring. However, I do not know with regard to what halakha this distinction is made. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Perhaps you only heard that distinction with regard to the matter of Shabbat; a ring for adornment may be moved on Shabbat and other rings may not. As, with regard to the matter of ritual impurity, this ring and that ring are one and the same, and there is no distinction between them.,The Gemara raises an objection: And with regard to the matter of ritual impurity, are this and that one and the same? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: A ring worn by a person is ritually impure; however, the ring of an animal, and that of utensils, and all other rings not worn by people are ritually pure? Apparently, a distinction is made between different types of rings with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity as well. The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Eliezer was saying that statement to the disciple, he too was saying to him that with regard to ritual impurity there is no distinction between different types of rings worn by a person.,The Gemara raises another objection: And with regard to rings worn by a person, are this and that one and the same? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: A ring that one fashioned into a buckle at the end of a belt to wear it around his waist, or into a clasp to tie garments between his shoulders, is ritually pure? The Sages only said that a ring is ritually impure with regard to a ring worn on a person’s finger. Apparently, there is in fact a distinction between different rings worn by a person. The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Eliezer was saying that statement to the disciple, he too was saying to him that there is no distinction between different types of rings worn on a person’s finger.,The Gemara raises yet another objection: And with regard to rings worn on a person’s finger, are this and that one and the same? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: A ring made of metal and its seal is made of coral, is ritually impure? The primary component of the ring, metal, is the determining factor, and a metal utensil can become ritually impure. However, a ring that is made of coral and its seal is made of metal is ritually pure. Apparently, there is a distinction between different types of finger rings with regard to ritual impurity. The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Eliezer was saying that statement to the disciple, he too was saying to him that there is no distinction between different types of rings that are made entirely of metal.,And furthermore, that same disciple asked: I heard that one distinguishes between one type of needle and another type of needle. Still, I do not know with regard to what halakha this distinction is made. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Perhaps you only heard that distinction with regard to Shabbat. With regard to the prohibition of carrying from a private to a public domain, or vice versa, there is a distinction between a needle with an eye, for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering, and one without an eye, for which one is not. As, if you were to suggest that the distinction is with regard to ritual impurity, this, a needle with an eye, and that, a needle without an eye, are one and the same, and there is no distinction between them.,The Gemara raises an objection: And with regard to the matter of ritual impurity, are this and that one and the same? Are all needles alike? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: A needle whose eye or whose point was removed is ritually pure, as it is no longer fit for use? Apparently, there is a distinction between an intact needle and a broken one with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity. The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Eliezer was saying that statement to the disciple, he was referring to a whole needle. Indeed, there is no distinction between different types of whole needles with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity.,The Gemara raises another objection: And with regard to whole needles, are this and that one and the same? Is there no distinction between them? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: With regard to a needle that became rusty; if the rust inhibits the sewing, the needle is ritually pure; and if it does not inhibit the sewing, it is ritually impure. And the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai said: And that is the halakha that the needle cannot become ritually impure not only when it is impossible to push the needle through the fabric, but even when the mark of rusty needle is conspicuous in the stitching. Apparently, there is a distinction between different types of whole needles. The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Eliezer was saying that statement to the disciple, he was saying to him that there is no distinction between different types of needles that were smoothed and filed. He was not referring to rusty needles.,The Gemara raises yet another objection: And with regard to smoothed needles, are this and that one and the same? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: A needle, whether it has an eye and whether it does not have an eye, may be moved on Shabbat? And we only said that a needle with an eye is different with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity. Apparently, there is a distinction between different types of smoothed needles with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity.,The Gemara answers: Didn’t Abaye already interpret that baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava as referring to unfinished needles? If a needle is unfinished, and it has not been perforated to create an eye, it cannot become ritually impure because it is not yet a utensil. However, if the needle is finished, whether it has an eye and is used for sewing, or it does not have an eye and is used as a pin, it is regarded as a utensil and therefore can become ritually impure.,MISHNA: A donkey may go out on Shabbat with a saddlecloth that protects it from the cold when it is tied to the animal, and there is no room for concern lest it fall. Rams may go out levuvin. Ewes may go out sheḥuzot, kevulot, and kevunot. All of these terms are discussed and explained in the Gemara. She-goats may go out with their udders bound. Rabbi Yosei prohibits the animals from going out with all of these items, as he considers them burdens, except for the ewes that are kevunot.,Rabbi Yehuda says: Goats may go out on Shabbat with their udders bound to dry their milk supply and discontinue their lactation, in order to facilitate conception. In that case, they are tied with a tight, permanent knot, and there is no concern lest it fall in the public domain. However, they may not go out with their udders bound to conserve their milk, as in that case they are bound loosely.
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GEMARA: Shmuel said: And with regard to the halakha taught in our mishna that a donkey may go out on Shabbat with its saddlecloth, that only applies to a case where it was tied to the animal from Shabbat eve. Rav Naḥman said: The wording of our mishna is also precise in support of Shmuel’s statement, as it teaches later in the chapter: A donkey may not go out into the public domain on Shabbat with its saddlecloth when it is not tied to its back.,The Gemara clarifies the meaning of that mishna: What are the circumstances? If you say that the later mishna is referring to a case where the saddlecloth is not tied to the animal at all, that is obvious. There is concern lest the saddlecloth fall from the animal and its owner will come to bring it and carry it four cubits in the public domain. Rather, is it not referring to a case where the saddlecloth is presently tied to the animal, but it was not tied from Shabbat eve? By inference, conclude that the first clause, i.e., our mishna, which permits the animal to go out with its saddlecloth, is referring to a case where the saddlecloth was tied to the animal from Shabbat eve. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from it that this is the correct understanding.,That was also taught in a baraita: A donkey may go out on Shabbat with its saddlecloth when it was tied to the animal from Shabbat eve, and it may not go out with the saddle, even though it was tied to the animal from Shabbat eve. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The donkey may even go out with its saddle when it was tied to the animal from Shabbat eve, provided that he does not tie the strap with which the saddle is fastened around the donkey’s belly, and provided that he does not pass a strap under the animal’s tail, which is standard procedure when placing a burden on the animal.,Rav Asi bar Natan raised a dilemma before Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rav Ashi: What is the halakha with regard to placing a saddlecloth on a donkey on Shabbat in a private domain in order to warm the donkey with no intention to take it into the public domain? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said to him: It is permitted. Rav Asi bar Natan said to him: What is the difference between this and a saddle, which may not be moved on Shabbat? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi remained silent and did not answer.,Rav Asi bar Natan thought that Rabbi Ḥiyya was of the opinion that even a saddle may be placed on a donkey on Shabbat. He, therefore, raised an objection from a baraita: A saddle that is on a donkey on Shabbat, and its owner wishes to remove it, he may not move it with his hand to remove it; rather, he walks the animal back and forth in the courtyard, and the saddle falls on its own. Now even with regard to removing a saddle that is already on the animal’s back, you said no, one may not move it; is prohibiting one from placing the saddle on the animal necessary?,Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Asi: Leave Rabbi Ḥiyya, and do not raise an objection to his statement, as he agrees with his teacher. As Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: One may hang a basket with fodder around the neck of an animal on Shabbat, and by means of an a fortiori inference, derive that one may place a saddlecloth on an animal’s back on Shabbat. What is the a fortiori inference? Just as there, placing the basket of fodder so that the animal can eat without bending down, which is done for the animal’s pleasure, is permitted; here, placing the saddlecloth, which is done to prevent the animal from suffering from the cold, all the more so should be permitted.,Shmuel said: A saddlecloth is permitted; however, a basket with fodder is prohibited.Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef went and said the halakha of Rav before Shmuel. Shmuel said to him: If Abba, Rav, actually said that, he knows nothing at all about matters of Shabbat.,When Rabbi Zeira ascended to Eretz Yisrael he found Rabbi Binyamin bar Yefet who sat and said to him in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: One may place a saddlecloth on a donkey on Shabbat. Rabbi Zeira said to him: You have spoken well, and Aryokh explained the matter likewise in Babylonia.,The Gemara asks: Who is Aryokh? It is Shmuel. Didn’t Rav also say that one may place a saddlecloth on a donkey on Shabbat? With regard to a saddlecloth they agree. Why then did Rabbi Zeira attribute the ruling specifically to Shmuel? Rather, he heard Rabbi Binyamin bar Yefet conclude: However, one may not hang a basket with fodder around the neck of an animal on Shabbat. It was that part of the statement that led him to say: You have spoken well, and Aryokh explained the matter likewise in Babylonia.,The Gemara continues: In any case, everyone agrees that a saddlecloth is permitted. The question arises: How is a saddlecloth different from a saddle, which may not even be removed from the donkey? If the concern is for the animal’s suffering, why is it not permitted to remove the saddle? The Gemara answers: It is different there, as it is possible for the saddle to fall on its own. Therefore, there is no reason to permit its removal by hand.,Rav Pappa said: There is a distinction between the two cases: Here, where the Sages permitted placing a saddlecloth on a donkey on Shabbat, it is to warm the animal. There, where the Sages prohibited removing a saddle, it is to cool the animal. Placing the saddlecloth to warm the animal is permitted because otherwise it experiences discomfort from the cold. However, removing the saddle to cool the animal is prohibited because the animal does not experience discomfort from excessive heat. And that is the folk saying that people say: A donkey, even in the summer season of Tammuz, is cold. Therefore, seeing to the animal’s warmth is more important.,The Gemara raises an objection from the Tosefta to those who prohibit placing a basket with fodder around an animal’s neck on Shabbat: A horse may neither go out into the public domain on Shabbat with a fox’s tail that is placed as a talisman to ward off the evil eye nor with a string of red wool that is hung between its eyes as an ornament. Neither may a zav go out with his pouch that prevents his clothes from becoming sullied from his emissions, nor goats with a pouch that is on their udders so that they will not be scratched by stones, nor a cow with the muzzle that is on its mouth, nor foals with baskets of fodder that are around their mouths into the public domain. And an animal may neither go out with metal shoes that are on its feet, nor with an amulet that is placed on the animal to promote its good health, even if the amulet has proven effective. And this is a stricture that applies to animals beyond the strictures that apply to people, as a person is permitted to go out into the public domain with an amulet that has proved effective.,However, an animal may go out with a bandage that is on a wound, and with splints that are on a broken bone so that it will heal properly, and with the afterbirth hanging from its womb. And one may plug the bell hanging from an animal’s neck to prevent it from ringing, and then the animal may walk with it in the courtyard, which is a private domain, but not in a public domain.,In any case, it is taught here: Nor foals with baskets of fodder that are around their mouths into the public domain. By inference: It is specifically into the public domain that they may not go with fodder baskets in their mouths; however, in a courtyard, they may well walk with a basket of fodder. What? Is it not referring to large foals around whose necks fodder baskets are hung for their pleasure?,The Gemara answers: No, it is referring to small foals, and the baskets are hung to prevent their discomfort. The legs of a young foal are long and its neck is short. Consequently, eating from the ground is difficult. Hanging the fodder basket around its neck enables it to eat without bending down. The Gemara adds: This is also precise in the language of the Tosefta, as it teaches the case of the foals

similar to the case of an amulet worn for healing purposes. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that this is the correct understanding.,The Gemara further examines the baraita cited earlier. The Master said: Nor may an animal go out with an amulet on Shabbat, even if the amulet proved effective. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in a mishna: One may not go out on Shabbat with an amulet that has not proved effective? By inference: If the amulet proved effective, he may well do so. The Gemara answers: Here too, it is referring to an amulet that has not proved effective.,The Gemara asks: Doesn’t the baraita teach: Even if the amulet proved effective? The Gemara answers: The baraita is referring to an amulet that proved effective for a person, and did not prove effective for an animal. The Gemara wonders: Is there an amulet that proved effective for a person and is not effective for an animal? Healing an animal should be easier than healing a person. The Gemara answers: Yes, an amulet aids a person, who is under the protection of an advocate angel [mazal]; however, it does not aid an animal, which is not under the protection of an advocate angel.,The Gemara poses a question: If so, that the baraita is referring to an amulet that did not prove effective for an animal, but if the amulet proved effective, the animal may indeed go out into the public domain with it; what is the meaning of the phrase in the Tosefta: And this is a stricture that applies to animals beyond the strictures that apply to people? The halakha is the same with regard to both people and animals. If the amulet has proven effective, even an animal may go out with it on Shabbat. If it has not proven effective, even a person may not go out with it. The Gemara responds: Do you hold that this statement is referring to an amulet? It is referring to a shoe; an animal may not go out with a shoe on Shabbat, but a person may.,With regard to whether and to what extent the discomfort of animals is a factor taken into consideration on Shabbat, the Gemara says: Come and hear that which was taught in a baraita: One may smear on oil and scrape off a scab on Shabbat for a person, and one may not smear on oil and scrape off a scab for an animal. Is it not referring here to a case where there is a wound, and he smears on oil and scrapes the scab due to the discomfort caused by the wound, and nevertheless it was permitted exclusively for a person and not for an animal? The Gemara rejects this argument: No, it is referring to a case where the wound has already ceased and healed, and he smears oil and scrapes due to the pleasure caused by the treatment.,The Gemara cites an additional proof: Come and hear that which was taught in the following baraita: With regard to an animal suffering from heart congestion that restricts its blood supply and whose temperature has risen, one may not stand it in water so that it will cool off. However, with regard to a person suffering from heart congestion that restricts his blood supply, one may stand him in water so that he will cool off. Apparently, the suffering of an animal is of no concern. Ulla said: Here, the Sages issued a decree prohibiting all healing on Shabbat due to the crushing of herbs for medicinal purposes, which is prohibited by Torah law. The Sages prohibited cooling the animal in water lest one come to grind the ingredients used in the preparation of medicine.,If so, the same decree should also apply in the case of a person. It should be prohibited to stand a sick person in water to cool him off due to the rabbinic prohibition against engaging in healing on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: In the case of a person, it appears as if he entered the water merely to cool off, not necessarily to cure an illness.,The Gemara asks: If so, say in the case of an animal as well that it appears as if it entered the water merely to cool off, not necessarily to cure an illness. The Gemara answers: An animal does not typically enter the water on its own to cool off. Neither does one typically stand an animal in water to cool it off unless it serves some healing purpose. Apparently, due to a decree, the Sages were stringent and prohibited standing the animal in water even if it will die as a result.,The Gemara now asks: Do we really issue a decree for an animal? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: If an animal were standing beyond the Shabbat limit, a situation in which it is prohibited to go fetch it, he may call the animal and it will come to him on its own? And we do not issue a decree to prohibit calling the animal, lest he come to bring it himself. Apparently, the Sages did not issue a decree in a case where one could incur a loss and there is no actual transgression committed. Here too, it should not be prohibited to stand his animal in water due to a decree lest he come to grind herbs and thereby violate a Torah prohibition.,And Ravina said: No proof can be cited from this case, as here it is a situation where the animal’s Shabbat limit was subsumed within the limit of its owner. The animal strayed beyond its own Shabbat limit, which is determined by the Shabbat limit of the shepherd entrusted with its herding. However, the animal remained within the Shabbat limit of its owner, which extended beyond that of the shepherd. Consequently, the owner is permitted to call the animal so that it will return on its own. Even if he forgets and goes out to fetch the animal, he will not have gone beyond his Shabbat limit. The fact that the animal itself went beyond its Shabbat limit is of no concern.,Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The matter of the decree due to crushing herbs is itself subject to a dispute between the tanna’im. As it was taught in a baraita: In the case of an animal that ate vetch, which caused a life-threatening case of constipation, one may not run it around in the courtyard to loosen its bowels due to the decree prohibiting healing. Rabbi Oshaya deems it permitted. Apparently, the tanna’im disagree whether or not healing is prohibited with regard to animals. The Gemara adds that Rava taught: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Oshaya.,The Master said: Neither may a zav go out with his pouch, which prevents his clothes from becoming sullied by his emissions, nor goats with the pouch that is on their udders. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a different baraita: Goats may go out with the pouch that is on their udders?,Rav Yehuda said: This is not difficult. This baraita is referring to a pouch that is tied tightly to the udder. It is permitted because there is no concern that the pouch will fall. That baraita is referring to a pouch that is not tightly tied. It is prohibited because of the concern that the pouch will fall and a person will come to retrieve it.,Rav Yosef said: Have you removed the tanna’im from the world? This is subject to a disagreement between the tanna’im, as we learned in our mishna: She-goats may go out with their udders bound. Rabbi Yosei Rabbi Yosei prohibits the animals from going out with all of these items, as he considers them burdens, except for the ewes that are kevunot. Rabbi Yehuda says: Goats may go out on Shabbat with their udders bound to dry their milk supply and discontinue their lactation in order to facilitate conception, as in that case, they are tied with a tight, permanent knot. However, they may not go out with their udders bound to conserve the milk, as in that case they are bound loosely. Apparently, there are tanna’im who rule leniently with regard to attaching pouches to the udders of goats and permit the practice, and others prohibit doing so.,And if you wish, say instead: Both this baraita and that baraita were taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and nevertheless it is not difficult. Here, where the goats are permitted to go out with a pouch on their udders, the baraita is referring to a case where it was done to dry their milk supply. There, where goats are prohibited to do so, the baraita is referring to a case where it was done to conserve the milk.,The Gemara adds: It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving the goats belonging to the residents of a house in Antioch whose udders were especially large and they would drag along the ground. And they made pouches for them so that their udders would not get scratched.,The Gemara cites a related baraita in which the Sages taught: There was an incident where one man’s wife died, and she left him a son to nurse, and he did not have money to pay the wages of a wet-nurse. And a miracle was performed on his behalf, and he developed breasts like the two breasts of a woman, and he nursed his son.,Rav Yosef said: Come and see how great this person is that a miracle of that magnitude was performed on his behalf. Abaye said to him: On the contrary, how dishonorable is this person that the order of creation was altered on his behalf. A miracle was indeed performed on his behalf; however, it was performed in a demeaning and unpleasant manner.,Rav Yehuda added and said: Come and see how difficult it is to provide for a person’s sustenance. It is so difficult that the order of creation had to be altered on his behalf, which was apparently easier than providing him a source of financial support. Rav Naḥman said: Know that it is so, as miracles are often performed on a person’s behalf; however, it has not yet happened that food was miraculously created in a person’s home.,The Gemara relates another unusual story. The Sages taught: There was an incident involving one man who married a one-armed woman, and he did not realize that she was one-armed until the day that she died. Rav said: Come and see how modest this woman was that her husband did not realize this about her. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to him: That is typical conduct for her, as a woman typically covers herself. All the more so a one-armed woman makes sure to cover her defect. Rather, say: How modest was this man that he did not recognize this in his wife.,We learned in our mishna: Rams may go out levuvin. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of levuvin? Rav Huna said: Tied [tutri] in pairs. The Gemara explains: From where may it be inferred that this word levuvin is a term of closeness? As it is written: “You have drawn me near [libavtini], my sister my bride” (Song of Songs 4:9).,Ulla said: Levuvin refers to animal hide that one ties over the hearts [lev] of rams so that wolves will not attack them. The Gemara asks: Do wolves attack rams but do not attack ewes? Why is this protection provided only to males? The Gemara answers: Because the males walk at the head of the flock. The Gemara asks: Do wolves attack the head of the flock but not the rear of the flock? Rather, the wolves prey specifically on the rams because they are plump. The Gemara asks: Are there no plump ones among the ewes? And furthermore, do the wolves know how to distinguish between these, the plump ones, and those, the thin ones? Rather, the wolves prey specifically on the rams because they raise their noses and walk while looking to both sides. The wolves think that they are preparing to attack them.,Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Levuvin refers to animal hide that one ties under their male organ so that they will not mount the females. And from where do we derive that meaning? Because the latter clause states: Ewes may go out sheḥuzot.What is the meaning of sheḥuzot? It means that they fasten [she’oḥazin] their tails with animal hide so that the males may mount them more easily. It is reasonable to explain that the first clause refers to an action undertaken so that the males will not mount the females, and the latter clause to an action undertaken so that the males will mount them.,The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that this word sheḥuzot is a term of exposure? The Gemara answers: As it is written in the description of a wicked woman: “And behold there met him a woman
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with the attire of a harlot [shit zona] and wily of heart” (Proverbs 7:10). Sheḥuzot can be interpreted as an acronym of the words shit zona, attire of a harlot, with the letters tav and ḥet, which are similar in form, interchanged.,We learned in the mishna: Ewes may go out kevulot. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of kevulot? It means that they bind their tails down with animal hide so that the males will not mount them. The Gemara explains: From where may it be inferred that this word kavul is a term meaning does not produce fruit? As it is written, when Solomon gave a portion of land to Hiram, he complained: “What cities are these which you have given me, my brother? And he called them the land of Kavul to this day” (I Kings 9:13).,What is the meaning of the land of Kavul? Rav Huna said: That the people living there were bound [mekhubalin] and surrounded by silver and gold. Rava said to him: If so, is that what is written: “And Hiram came out of Tyre to see the cities which Solomon had given him, and they pleased him not” (I Kings 9:12)? Because the people there were bound in silver and gold, the cities were not pleasing in his eyes? Rav Huna said to him: Yes, indeed, it was precisely the abundant wealth that displeased Hiram. Since the people were wealthy and delicate, they did not perform labor. Hiram was seeking people whom he could enlist in the service of the king.,Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It was a sandy [ḥomton] expanse of land. And why was it called Kavul? It is because the leg sinks into it up to the ankle [kavla]. And people say in describing poor quality land: Land that is bound [mekhabela] shut, i.e., that does not produce fruit.,We learned in the mishna: Ewes may go out kevunot. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of kevunot? It is that they covered [mekhabnin] the animal to produce fine wool. Sheep were wrapped in cloth from the day they were born so that their wool would remain perfectly clean and it could be used in fashioning especially fine wool garments. As we learned in a mishna: The color of a leprous sore [se’et] is like that of white wool. The Gemara asked: What is white wool? Rav Beivai bar Abaye said: Like the clean wool of a newborn lamb, which they cover from birth to produce fine wool.,Our mishna continues: And the she-goats may go out with their udders bound. Rabbi Yosei prohibits doing so. Rabbi Yehuda distinguishes between a case where the udders were bound to dry the milk supply and a case where they were bound to conserve the milk. It was stated that the amora’im disagreed with regard to the ruling in this dispute: Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.,And there are those who teach this halakha independent of the mishna. Rav said: If the udders were bound to dry the milk supply it is permitted, and not if they were bound to conserve the milk. And Shmuel said: Both this and that are prohibited.,And there are those who taught this dispute with regard to this baraita: Goats may go out with their udders bound to dry the milk supply but not to conserve the milk. In the name of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira they said: That is the halakha, based on the letter of the law, but who can cast lots to determine by sight alone which udder is bound to dry the milk supply and which was bound to conserve the milk? And since one cannot distinguish between them, the Sages said: Both this and that are prohibited. Shmuel said, and some say Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira. In terms of practical halakha, according to all versions of the disagreement, Shmuel holds that it is prohibited in both cases. When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the anonymous first tanna of the mishna. He permits goats to go out with their udders bound in all cases.,MISHNA: And with what may an animal not go out into the public domain on Shabbat? A camel may not go out with a saddlecloth, nor may it go out akud or ragul, which are different ways of tying its legs together, as will be explained in the Gemara. And likewise, tying all other animals in those manners is prohibited.,And likewise, one may not tie camels one to the other and pull the lead camel, thereby pulling the others after it. However, he may place the ropes tied to each of the camels in his hand and pull them all, provided that he does not intertwine the ropes.,GEMARA: It was taught in the Tosefta: A camel may not go out with a saddlecloth tied to its tail alone. However, it may go out with a saddlecloth tied to both its tail and its hump, as in that case one can assume that the saddlecloth will not fall off. Rabba bar Rav Huna said: A female camel may go out with a saddlecloth tied to its afterbirth. Because any movement of the saddlecloth will cause pain, the animal will not attempt to detach it. Therefore, there is no room for concern lest it fall.,We learned in the mishna: A camel may not go out akud or ragul. Rav Yehuda said: Akud means that the animal’s foreleg and hind leg are bound together, similar to the binding of Isaac, son of Abraham, with regard to whom the term vaya’akod is employed. Ragul means that one may not bend the lower part of the foreleg onto the upper foreleg and tie it. That was done so that the camel would have the use of only three legs and would be unable to run away.,The Gemara raises an objection from the following baraita: Akud means that the animal’s two forelegs and two hind legs are bound together. Ragul means that one may not bend the lower part of the foreleg onto the upper foreleg and tie it. The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda holds in accordance with this tanna, as it was taught in a baraita: Akud means that either the animal’s foreleg and hind leg or its two forelegs and two hind legs are bound together. Ragul means that one may not bend the lower part of the foreleg onto the upper foreleg and tie it.,The Gemara asks: And this baraita and Rav Yehuda’s statement are still not the same. Granted, the first clause, the first case of akud, and the last clause, the case of ragul, work out well. The baraita and the opinion of Rav Yehuda correspond. However, the middle clause is difficult. According to the baraita, when the animal’s two forelegs and two hind legs are bound together, that is also considered akud, contrary to Rav Yehuda’s opinion.,Rather, Rav Yehuda stated his opinion in accordance with this tanna, who said in a baraita: Akud means that the animal’s foreleg and hind leg are bound together, similar to the binding of Isaac, son of Abraham. Ragul means that one may not bend the lower part of the foreleg onto the upper foreleg and tie it.,We learned in the mishna: And one may not tie camels one to the other and pull the lead camel, thereby pulling the others after it. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? Rav Ashi said: Because he appears like one going to the market [ḥinga] to sell merchandise or to deliver a caravan of camels. In deference to Shabbat, one may not create that impression.,The mishna continues: However, he may place the ropes tied to each of the camels in his hand and pull them all, provided that he does not intertwine the ropes. Rav Ashi said: This prohibition was taught not with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat but only with regard to the halakhot of prohibited mixtures of diverse kinds. The Gemara asks: Diverse kinds of what? If you say that it is referring to the prohibited mixture of the diverse kinds of man and animal, i.e., a person may not be tied to an animal, just as plowing with the diverse kinds of an ox and a donkey is prohibited, that is difficult. Didn’t we learn in a mishna: A person is permitted to plow and to pull a wagon together with all animals, as the prohibition is limited to diverse kinds of animals?,Rather, the problem here is one of diverse kinds of ropes. If one rope is made of wool and another of linen, it is prohibited to intertwine them because that would create a forbidden mixture of the diverse kinds of wool and linen. However, this too is difficult, as, wasn’t it taught in a baraita: One who attaches a swatch of wool and a swatch of linen with a single stitch or knot, it is not considered a connection with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds? All the more so in this case, where the ropes are not tied together at all but are merely intertwined, it should not be considered a connection.,The Gemara answers: Actually, the problem here is one of diverse kinds of ropes, and the mishna is saying as follows: Provided that he does not intertwine the ropes and tie them together. Ropes that are intertwined and tied together constitute a double knot, which is considered a connection with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds of wool and linen.,Shmuel said that there is another restriction that applies to pulling camels with ropes on Shabbat. It is only permitted provided that a handbreadth of the rope does not hang below his hand to avoid the appearance that he is carrying a rope in his hand on Shabbat. The Gemara raises an objection: Didn’t a Sage of the school of Shmuel teach a baraita: Provided that two handbreadths of the rope do not hang below his hand?,Abaye said: Now that Shmuel said one handbreadth, and a Sage of the school of Shmuel taught two handbreadths, it is reasonable to conclude that Shmuel came to teach us the practical halakha. Even though the tanna’im permitted pulling the camel as long as there is less than two handbreadths of rope hanging below his hand, in practice, one should be stringent and not leave even one handbreadth hanging.

The Gemara raises an objection: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: This is only permitted provided that he raises the rope one handbreadth from the ground? Apparently, there is no restriction with regard to the length of rope that may hang below the person’s hand. The Gemara answers: When this baraita was taught, it was taught with regard to the length of rope between the camel and the person holding it. That part of the rope may not sag to the ground; rather, it must be raised at least one handbreadth so that it is clear that the rope is attached to the camel.,MISHNA: This mishna lists additional objects with which an animal may not go out into the public domain on Shabbat: A donkey may neither go out with the saddlecloth when it is not tied to its back, nor with a bell even if it is plugged to prevent it from ringing, nor with a ladder that is around its neck, nor with a strap that is around its leg.,And the roosters may not go out with strings and not with a strap on their feet, which are tied there as a sign of ownership. And the rams may not go out with a small wagon under their tails, as it was common practice to put a small wagon under the tails of grown sheep so that the tail would not be injured by dragging on the ground.,And ewes may not go out ḥanunot, nor may a calf go out with a gimon, nor may a cow go out with the skin of a hedgehog [kupar], nor with a strap between its horns. The mishna relates that Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya’s cow would go out on Shabbat with a strap between its horns, contrary to the will of the Sages.,GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that a donkey may not go out on Shabbat with a saddlecloth if it was not tied to its back. The Gemara explains: What is the reason? As we stated above, there is room for concern that when not secured, the saddlecloth is liable to fall off the animal’s back, and its owner may come to retrieve the saddlecloth in the public domain.,We also learned in the mishna: A donkey may not go out with a bell even if it is plugged to prevent it from ringing. The reason is that the animal’s owner appears like one going to the market, who adorns his donkey with bells in honor of market day.,It was also taught in the mishna: Nor with a ladder that is around its neck. Rav Huna said: This refers to a device tied to the jaw. For what purpose does the owner do so to the animal? For a circumstance in which the animal has a wound, so that it does not chafe it again and exacerbate the wound.,The mishna continues: Nor with a strap that is around its leg. The Gemara explains: What purpose does this strap serve? The owner does so to the animal to protect its strides. If its legs are slightly bent so that they knock against each other when the animal walks, a strap is tied there to prevent injury.,We learned further in the mishna: And the roosters may not go out with strings. For what purpose does the owner place the strings? He does so to the roosters as a sign indicating to whom they belong, so that they will not be confused with other roosters.,The mishna continues: Nor with a strap on their feet. The Gemara explains that the owner does so to the roosters so that they will not break vessels. When their legs are tied, they jump around less and cause less damage. The mishna teaches: Rams may not go out with a small wagon under their tails. The Gemara explains that these wagons were placed there in order that their tails will not be injured.,The mishna teaches: And ewes may not go out ḥanunot. The Gemara relates that Rav Aḥa bar Ulla sat before Rav Ḥisda and he sat and he said: From when they shear the wool off the animal, they soak a soft swatch of wool or some other material in oil and place it on the animal’s forehead so that it will not catch cold until its wool grows back. Ḥanunot refers to animals with those swatches. Rav Ḥisda said to him: If so, you turned the animal into the Exilarch, Mar Ukva. That is treatment fit for him, not for a shorn sheep.,Rather, Rav Pappa bar Shmuel sat before Rav Ḥisda, and he sat and he said: At the time that the animal crouches to give birth, those tending to the animal soak two swatches of wool in oil, and place one on the animal’s forehead and the other on its womb so that it will be warmed. Ḥanunot refers to animals with those swatches. Rav Naḥman said to him: If so, you turned the animal into Yalta, my wife, who descended from the house of the Exilarch. That is treatment fit for her, not for an animal.,Rather, Rav Huna said: There is a certain tree in the cities on the sea shore, and ḥanun is its name. Those tending to the animal bring a wood chip from the tree and place it in the animal’s nose so that it will sneeze and the worms on its head will fall. The Gemara asks: If so, not only ewes but also rams should be given this treatment. The Gemara answers: Since the rams butt heads with each other, the worms fall in any event. Shimon the Nazirite said: Ḥanunot is referring to animals into whose nose the chip of a broom tree would be placed.,The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the explanation of Rav Huna that it is the chip taken from the ḥanun tree, that is why the mishna teaches the halakha employing the term ḥanunot. However, according to the explanations proposed by the other Sages, what is the reason that the mishna employed the term ḥanunot? The Gemara explains: Because we do something to the animals that indicates that we have mercy on them; hanunot in the sense of merciful.,We learned in the mishna: And a calf may not go out on Shabbat with a gimon. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: A calf with a gimon? Rav Huna said: A small yoke is placed on the calf in order to train it from an early age to bear a yoke. Rabbi Elazar said: From where is it inferred that this term gimon is a term of bending? As it is written: “Is it to bow down his head like a bulrush [agmon]” (Isaiah 58:5). There is an etymological similarity between the words gimon and agmon.,The mishna continues: And a cow may not go out on Shabbat with the skin of a hedgehog placed over its udder. The Gemara explains that the owner does this to the cow so that creeping animals will not suckle from it.,It was also taught in the mishna: And not with a strap that is between its horns. The Gemara notes: If this is explained according to the opinion of Rav, whether the strap was intended as an ornament or whether it was intended to secure the animal, it is prohibited for the cow to go out into the public domain with it. If this is explained according to the opinion of Shmuel, if the strap was intended as an ornament, it is prohibited; if it was intended to secure the animal, it is permitted.,The mishna relates that the cow of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya would go out on Shabbat with a strap between its horns, contrary to the will of the Sages. The Gemara asks: Did Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya have only one cow? Didn’t Rav say, and some say that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya would tithe from his herds 12,000 calves each and every year? There were 120, 000 calves born in his herds annually. There is no way, then, to speak of the cow of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.,The Gemara answers: It was taught in the Tosefta: The cow was not his; rather, it was his neighbor’s. And because he did not protest her conduct and tell her that doing so is prohibited the cow was called by his name to his discredit, as if it were his.,It was related that Rav, and Rabbi Ḥanina, and Rabbi Yoḥanan, and Rav Ḥaviva taught the statement cited below. The Gemara comments: Throughout the order of Moed, wherever this pair of Sages is mentioned, exchange Rabbi Yoḥanan and insert Rabbi Yonatan in his place. In any event, they said: Anyone who had the capability to effectively protest the sinful conduct of the members of his household and did not protest, he himself is apprehended for the sins of the members of his household and punished. If he is in a position to protest the sinful conduct of the people of his town, and he fails to do so, he is apprehended for the sins of the people of his town. If he is in a position to protest the sinful conduct of the whole world, and he fails to do so, he is apprehended for the sins of the whole world.,Rav Pappa said: And the members of the household of the Exilarch were apprehended and punished for the sins of the whole world. Because their authority extends across the entire Jewish world, it is in their hands to ensure that nobody commit a transgression. As indicated by that which Rabbi Ḥanina said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “The Lord will enter into judgment with the Elders of His people and its princes, saying: It is you who have eaten up the vineyard; the robbery of the poor is in your houses” (Isaiah 3:14)? The question arises: If the princes sinned by committing robbery,
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what did the Elders, i.e., the Sages of that generation, do that was considered a sin? Rather, say: God will enter into judgment with the Elders because they did not protest the sinful conduct of the princes.,The Gemara relates: Rav Yehuda was sitting before Shmuel when this woman came and cried before Shmuel about an injustice that had been committed against her, and Shmuel paid no attention to her. Rav Yehuda said to Shmuel: Doesn’t the Master hold in accordance with the verse: “Whoever stops his ears at the cry of the poor, he also shall cry himself, but shall not be heard” (Proverbs 21:13)? He said to him: Big-toothed one, your superior, i.e., I, your teacher, will be punished in cold water. The superior of your superior will be punished in hot water. Mar Ukva, who sits as president of the court, is responsible for those matters.,And from where is it derived that this responsibility is incumbent upon the house of the Exilarch? As it is written: “House of David, so says the Lord: Execute judgment in the morning, and deliver him that is robbed out of the hand of the oppressor, lest My fury go forth like fire, and burn so that none can quench it because of the evil of your doings” (Jeremiah 21:12). The Exilarch is a direct descendant of the house of David.,With regard to the issue of reprimand, it was related that Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Simon: Let the Master reprimand the members of the house of the Exilarch, as Rabbi Simon had some influence over them. Rabbi Simon said to him: They will not accept reprimand from me. Rabbi Zeira said to him: Let my master reprimand them even if they do not accept it.,As Rabbi Aḥa, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: Never did a promise manifesting a good attribute emerge from the mouth of the Holy One, Blessed be He, and He later retracted it and rendered it evil, except with regard to this matter, as it is written: “And the Lord said to him: Go through the midst of the city, through the midst of Jerusalem, and set a mark [tav] upon the foreheads of the men that sigh and that cry on account of all the abominations that are done in her midst” (Ezekiel 9:4).,The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to the angel Gabriel: Go and inscribe a tav of ink on the foreheads of the righteous as a sign so that the angels of destruction will not have dominion over them. And inscribe a tav of blood on the foreheads of the wicked as a sign so that the angels of destruction will have dominion over them.,The attribute of justice said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, how are these different from those? He said to that attribute: These are full-fledged righteous people and those are full-fledged wicked people. The attribute of justice said to Him: Master of the Universe, it was in the hands of the righteous to protest the conduct of the wicked, and they did not protest.,He said to that attribute: It is revealed and known before Me that even had they protested the conduct of the wicked, they would not have accepted the reprimand from them. They would have continued in their wicked ways. The attribute of justice said before Him: Master of the Universe, if it is revealed before You that their reprimand would have been ineffective, is it revealed to them? The Holy One, Blessed be He, retracted His promise to protect the righteous and decided that those who failed to protest would also be punished.,And that is the meaning of that which is written: “Slay utterly old and young, both maid, and little children, and women; but come not near any man upon whom is the mark; and begin at My Sanctuary” (Ezekiel 9:6). And it is written in that same verse: “Then they began with the elderly men who were before the house”. Rav Yosef taught: Read not: My Sanctuary [mikdashi], rather: Those sanctified to Me [mekudashai]. These are people who observed the whole Torah in its entirety from alef through tav. And immediately: “And, behold, six men came from the way of the higher gate, which lies toward the north, and every man with his weapon of destruction in his hand; and one man among them was clothed in linen, with a writer’s inkwell by his side; and they went in and stood beside the bronze altar” (Ezekiel 9:2).,The Gemara asks: Was there a bronze altar in the Temple in the time of Ezekiel? Already in the days of Solomon there was only a stone altar. Rather, this should be understood as a figure of speech. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to them: Begin from the place where they recite songs of praise before Me. This is a reference to the Levites in the Temple whose musical instruments are made of bronze. And who are the six men mentioned here? Rav Ḥisda said: Fury, Wrath, and Rage, and Destroyer, and Breaker, and Annihilator, six angels of destruction.,The Gemara asks further: And what is different about the letter tav,that it was inscribed on the foreheads of the righteous? Rav said: Tav is the first letter of the word tiḥye, you shall live, indicating that the righteous shall live. Tav is also the first letter of the word tamut, you shall die, indicating that the wicked shall die. And Shmuel said: The letter tav is the first letter of the word tama, ceased, indicating that the merit of the Patriarchs has ceased and will not help the wicked. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The letter tav is the first letter of the word taḥon, will have mercy, indicating that due to the merit of the Patriarchs God will have mercy on the righteous.,And Reish Lakish said: The letter tav is the last letter of the seal of the Holy One, Blessed be He, as Rabbi Ḥanina said: The seal of the Holy One, Blessed be He, is truth [emet], which ends with the letter tav. Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said: The letter tav teaches that these are people who observed the entire Torah from alef through tav.,With regard to the statement that the merit of the Patriarchs has ceased, the Gemara asks: From when did the merit of the Patriarchs cease? Rav said: From the days of the prophet Hosea, son of Beeri, as it is stated: “And now I will uncover her lewdness in the sight of her lovers, and none shall deliver her out of My hand” (Hosea 2:12). Israel will no longer be saved by the merit of the Patriarchs.,And Shmuel said: The merit of the Patriarchs ceased since the days of Hazael, as it is stated: “And Hazael, king of Aram, oppressed Israel all the days of Jehoahaz” (II Kings 13:22). And it is written there: “And the Lord was gracious to them, and had compassion on them, and turned toward them because of His covenant with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and would not destroy them; neither has He till now cast them away from His presence” (II Kings 13:23). That was the last time that the merit of the Patriarchs was mentioned.,Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The merit of the Patriarchs ceased since the days of Elijah the Prophet, as it is stated: “And it came to pass at the time of the evening sacrifice, that Elijah the Prophet came near and said, Lord, God of Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, let it be known this day that you are God in Israel, and that I am Your servant, and that I have done all these things at Your word” (I Kings 18:36). By inference: Let it be known this day and not afterward because the merit of the Patriarchs will cease today.,And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The merit of the Patriarchs ceased since the days of Hezekiah, as it is stated: “For the increase of the realm and for peace without end, upon the throne of David, and upon his kingdom to order it, and to establish it with judgment and with justice; from now and forever the zeal of the Lord of hosts performs this” (Isaiah 9:6). That is to say, from this point on, the merit of the Patriarchs will not protect Israel, leaving only the zeal of the Lord.,The Gemara continues its discussion of punishment in general and the relationship between a person’s actions and the punishments meted out against him in particular: Rav Ami said: There is no death without sin; were a person not to sin, he would not die. And there is no suffering without iniquity.,The Gemara adduces proof to these assertions: There is no death without sin, as it is written: “The soul that sins, it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son; the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him” (Ezekiel 18:20). A person dies only because of his own sins and not because of some preexistent sin. And there is no suffering without iniquity, as it is written: “Then I will punish their transgression with the rod and their iniquity with strokes” (Psalms 89:33).

The Gemara raises an objection from the following baraita: The ministering angels said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, why did You penalize Adam, the first man, with the death penalty?He said to them: I gave him a simple mitzva, and he violated it. They said to Him: Didn’t Moses and Aaron, who observed the whole Torah in its entirety, nevertheless die? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to them, citing the verse: “All things come alike to all; there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked; to the good and to the clean, and to the unclean; to him who sacrifices, and to him who does not sacrifice; as is the good, so is the sinner; and he who swears, as he who fears an oath” (Ecclesiastes 9:2). Apparently, death is not dependent upon one’s actions. Everyone dies.,The Gemara answers: Rav Ami stated his position in accordance with this tanna, as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: Even Moses and Aaron died due to their sin, as it is stated: “And the Lord spoke to Moses and Aaron: Because you did not believe in Me, to sanctify Me in the eyes of the children of Israel, therefore you shall not bring this congregation in to the land which I have given them” (Numbers 20:12). Had you believed in Me and spoken to the rock as commanded, your time would not yet have come to leave the world. Apparently, even Moses and Aaron died due to their sins.,The Gemara raises an objection from what was taught in the following baraita: Four people died due to Adam’s sin with the serpent, in the wake of which death was decreed upon all of mankind, although they themselves were free of sin. And they are: Benjamin, son of Jacob; Amram, father of Moses; Yishai, father of David; and Kilab, son of David. And all of them were learned through tradition, except for Yishai, father of David, with regard to whom there is an explicit verse interpreted homiletically, as it is written: “And Absalom placed Amasa in charge of the army in place of Joab, and Amasa was the son of a man named Ithra the Israelite, who had taken to himself Abigail the daughter of Nahash, sister of Zeruiah, the mother of Joab” (II Samuel 17:25).,The Gemara asks: And was Abigal the daughter of Nahash? Wasn’t she the daughter of Yishai, as it is written: “And Yishai begot his firstborn Eliab, and Abinadab the second, and Shimea the third, Nethanel the fourth, Raddai the fifth, Ozem the sixth, David the seventh: and their sisters were Zeruiah and Abigail. And the sons of Zeruiah: Abishai, and Joab, and Asahel, three. And Abigail bore Amasa; and the father of Amasa was Jether the Ishmaelite” (I Chronicles 2:13–17)? Apparently, Abigail was the daughter of Yishai. Rather, the verse states that Abigail was the daughter of Nahash in order to teach us that she was the daughter of one who died on account of Adam’s sin with the serpent [naḥash], though he himself was free of sin.,The Gemara now clarifies the matter: Who is the tanna of the baraita that states that four people did not die due to their own sins? If you say that it is the tanna who taught the conversation between the ministering angels and God, it is difficult, as weren’t there also Moses and Aaron who did not die due to their own sins? Rather, it must be Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who holds that even Moses and Aaron died because of their own sins. Learn from it then that, in principle, he agrees that there is death without sin and there is suffering without iniquity, and this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Ami. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation.,Having mentioned the sins of some of the significant ancestors of the Jewish people, the Gemara now addresses several additional ancestors. Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: Anyone who says that Reuben sinned with Bilhah is nothing other than mistaken, as it is stated: “And it came to pass, when Israel dwelt in that land, that Reuben went and lay with Bilhah his father’s concubine; and Israel heard of it. Now the sons of Jacob were twelve” (Genesis 35:22). The fact that the Torah stated the number of Jacob’s sons at that point in the narrative teaches that, even after the incident involving Bilhah, all of the brothers were equal in righteousness. Apparently, Reuben did not sin. How then do I establish the meaning of the verse: “And he lay with Bilhah his father’s concubine”? The plain understanding of the verse indicates sin. This verse teaches that Reuben rearranged his father’s bed in protest of Jacob’s placement of his bed in the tent of Bilhah and not in the tent of his mother Leah after the death of Rachel. And the verse ascribes to him liability for his action as if he had actually lain with Bilhah.,It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: This righteous person, Reuben, was saved from that sin of adultery, and that action did not come to be performed by him? Is it possible that his descendants are destined to stand on Mount Eival and say: “Cursed be he that lies with his father’s wife; because he uncovers his father’s skirt. And all the people shall say, amen” (Deuteronomy 27:20), and this sin will come to be performed by him? Is it conceivable that the members of a tribe would curse their ancestor? How then do I establish the meaning of the verse: “And he lay with Bilhah his father’s concubine”? It is understood as follows: He protested the affront to his mother. He said: If my mother’s sister Rachel was a rival to my mother, will my mother’s sister’s concubine be a rival to my mother? He immediately stood and rearranged her bed so that Jacob would enter Leah’s tent.,Aḥerim say: He rearranged two beds, one of the Divine Presence and one of his father. And that is the meaning of that which is written: “Unstable as water, you shall not excel; because you went up to your father’s bed; then you did defile it; he went up to my bed [yetzui]” (Genesis 49:4). Do not read it as yetzu’i, in the singular; rather, read it as yetzuai, my beds, in the plural, referring to both the bed of his father and to the bed of the Divine Presence, which rests in the tents of the righteous.,The Gemara notes that the matter of Reuben’s innocence is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. As it was taught in a baraita: The verse states: “Unstable [paḥaz] as water, you shall not excel”. The Sages understood paḥaz as an acronym. Rabbi Eliezer says that it means: You were impulsive [pazta], you were liable [ḥavta], and you acted contemptuously [zalta]. Rabbi Yehoshua says that it means: You trampled the law [pasata al dat], you sinned [ḥatata], and you were promiscuous [zanita]. Rabban Gamliel says: The acronym does not refer to Reuben’s sin. It refers to his repentance: You prayed [pilalta], you trembled in fear [ḥalta], and your prayer shone forth [zarḥa].,Rabban Gamliel said: We still need the explanation of the Modaite, as Rabbi Elazar HaModa’i said: Reverse the order of the letters in the word paḥaz and then interpret it homiletically: You shook [zizata], you recoiled [hirtata]; the ḥet in paḥaz is interchanged with the letter heh, so that you would not sin, and the sin flew [parḥa] from you. Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Elazar HaModa’i are of the opinion that Reuben did not sin. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua held that he did. Rava said, and some say that Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said: Reverse the letters in paḥaz and interpret: You remembered [zakharta] the punishment for that offense, you made yourself gravely ill [ḥalita] in order to refrain from sinning, and you successfully withdrew [peirashta] from sinning.,The Gemara prefaces the following statements of Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani with a mnemonic: Reuben, the sons of Eli, the sons of Samuel, David, Solomon, and Josiah.,Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: Anyone who says that the sons of Eli sinned is nothing other than mistaken, as it is written: “And the two sons of Eli, Hophni and Pinehas, were there priests of the Lord” (I Samuel 1:3).,The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yonatan holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav, as Rav said: Pinehas did not sin. And the verse juxtaposes Hophni to Pinehas; just as Pinehas did not sin, so too Hophni did not sin. The Gemara asks: How, then, do I establish the meaning of the verse: “Now Eli was very old, and heard all that his sons did to all Israel; and how they lay with the women that assembled at the door of the Tent of Meeting” (I Samuel 2:22), which indicates otherwise? The Gemara answers: Since the sons of Eli delayed sacrificing the bird-offerings of women who had given birth, a pair of doves brought as part of the purification process, and this delay caused the women not to go to their husbands in timely fashion, the verse ascribes to Hophni and Pinehas liability as if they had lain with them. They were guilty of nothing more than negligence and carelessness.,The Gemara now examines the matter itself of Rav’s statement cited in the course of the previous discussion. Rav said: Pinehas did not sin, as it is stated: “And Ahijah, the son of Ahitub, Ichabod’s brother, the son of Pinehas, the son of Eli, was the Lord’s priest in Shiloh, wearing an ephod” (I Samuel 14:3). Is it possible that sin came to Pinehas’ hand and, nevertheless, the verse traces the lineage of his grandson, Ahijah, back to him?,Wasn’t it was already stated with regard to those who engage in promiscuous relations: “The Lord will cut off from the man that does this, him that is awake and him that answers from the tents of Jacob, or any to present an offering to the Lord of hosts” (Malachi 2:12). The Sages interpreted the verse homiletically: If the sinner is an Israelite, he will not have among his descendants one who is sharp and awake among the Sages, or even one among their disciples who can answer questions. And if he is a priest, he will not have a son who will present a meal-offering. If Pinehas had sons and grandsons serving as priests, conclude from it that Pinehas did not sin.,The Gemara asks: However, isn’t it written: “And how they lay [yishkevun] with the women”. The verb yishkevun is in the plural, indicating that both sons were guilty. The Gemara answers: It is written without a vav so that it can be read as yishkeven in the singular, i.e., how he lay, indicating that only one of them sinned.,The Gemara asks further: Isn’t it written that Eli said: “No, my sons [banai]; for it is not a good report that I hear; you make the Lord’s people to transgress” (I Samuel 2:24). The fact that Eli referred to his sons in the plural indicates that they both sinned. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It is written in a manner that can be read as my son [beni] in the singular.,The Gemara raises another question: Isn’t it written: “You make the Lord’s people to transgress [ma’avirim] in the plural, indicating that both sons were guilty. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Here too, the word is written without a yod so that it can be read as: You cause the Lord’s people to transgress [ma’aviram] in the singular, indicating that only one of them sinned.,The Gemara raises one last challenge: Isn’t it written: “Now the sons of Eli were scoundrels; they knew not the Lord” (I Samuel 2:12), indicating that they were both sinners. The Gemara answers: Since Pinehas should have protested Hophni’s conduct, but he did not protest, the verse ascribes to him liability as if he too had sinned.,Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: Anyone who says
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that the sons of Samuel sinned is nothing other than mistaken, as it is stated: “And it came to pass, when Samuel was old that he made his sons judges over Israel…And his sons walked not in his ways but sought after unjust gain, and took bribes, and perverted justice” (I Samuel 8:1–3). By inference: In his ways they did not walk, however, they did not sin either. They were not the equals of their father, but they were not sinners.,However, how then do I establish the meaning of the verse: “And they sought after unjust gain,” indicating that they were sinners? It means that they did not conduct themselves in accordance with the actions of their father. As Samuel the righteous would travel to all places where the people of Israel were located and sit in judgment in their towns, as it is stated: “And he went from year to year in circuit from Beth-El, and Gilgal, and Mitzpa, and judged Israel in all those places” (I Samuel 7:16). And, however, they did not do so and travel from place to place. Rather, they sat in their own cities in order to enhance the fees collected by their attendants and scribes. Therefore, the verse ascribes to them liability as if they sinned by seeking ill-gotten gains and bribes.,The Gemara notes that this matter is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. As it was taught in a baraita that the verse states: “And they sought after unjust gain”. Rabbi Meir says: This means that they vocally demanded their portions of the tithe due them as Levites, abusing their position to the detriment of other Levites. Rabbi Yehuda says: They imposed upon local homeowners to sell their merchandise and support them. Rabbi Akiva says: They took an extra basket of tithes, beyond that which was their due, by force. Rabbi Yosei says: They took only the gifts due them; however, they took them by force. They acted improperly, as a Levite is required to wait until he is given his gifts and may not take them.,Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: Anyone who says that David sinned with Bathsheba is nothing other than mistaken, as it is stated: “And David succeeded in all his ways; and the Lord was with him” (I Samuel 18:14). Is it possible that sin came to his hand and nevertheless the Divine Presence was with him?,However, how then do I establish the meaning of the rebuke of the prophet Nathan: “Why have you despised the word of the Lord, to do that which is evil in My sight? Uriah the Hittite you have smitten with the sword, and his wife you have taken to be your wife, and him you have slain with the sword of the children of Ammon” (II Samuel 12:9), indicating that David sinned? The Gemara answers: David sought to do evil and have relations with Bathsheba while she was still married to Uriah but did not do so.,Rav said: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who descends from the house of David, seeks to teach the verse in favor of David. With regard to that which is written: “Why have you despised the commandment of the Lord to do evil,” Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: This evil mentioned with regard to David is different from all other evils in the Torah; as with regard to all other evils in the Torah, it is written: And he did evil, and here it is written: To do evil. This unique phrase indicates that David sought to do evil but did not actually do so. His intentions were improper; however, his actions were proper.,That which is written: “Uriah the Hittite you have smitten with the sword,” means that you could have judged him before the Sanhedrin as one guilty of treason against the throne, and you did not judge him in that manner. Instead, you had him executed in a manner that deviated from the generally accepted principles of judgment. With regard to that which is written: “And his wife you have taken to be your wife”; it means that you have rights of marriage with her, as by law Bathsheba was already divorced from Uriah.,As Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: Anyone who goes to a war waged by the royal house of David writes a conditional bill of divorce to his wife. That was done to prevent a situation in which the soldier’s wife would be unable to remarry because the soldier did not return from battle and there were no witnesses to his fate. The conditional bill of divorce accorded her the status of a divorcee and freed her to remarry. As it is stated: “And carry these ten cheeses to the captain of their thousand, and to your brothers bring greetings and take their pledge [arubatam]” (I Samuel 17:18).,What is the meaning of arubatam? Rav Yosef taught: It refers to matters that are shared [hame’oravim] between him, the husband, and her, the wife, i.e., marriage. The verse should be read: Take the bill of divorce that determines the status of the relationship between husband and wife. As, apparently, it was customary for men at war to send their wives a conditional divorce, since Uriah later died, Bathsheba retroactively assumed divorced status from the time that he set out to war. She was not forbidden to David.,With regard to that which is written: “And him you have slain with the sword of the children of Ammon,” it means: Just as you are not punished for soldiers killed by the sword of the children of Ammon in the course of the war, so too you are not punished for the death of Uriah the Hittite.,What is the reason that David was not liable for the death of Uriah? Because Uriah was a traitor against the throne. As he said to David: “And my lord Joab and the servants of my lord are encamped in the open fields” (II Samuel 11:11). In the presence of the king, one may not refer to another as his lord. Doing so is treason.,Rav said: When you analyze the matter of David, no sin that he committed is found in his lifetime, except for that involving Uriah. As it is written: “Because David did that which was right in the eyes of the Lord, and turned not aside from any thing that He commanded him all the days of his life, save only in the matter of Uriah the Hittite” (I Kings 15:5).,Abaye the Elder raised a contradiction between one statement of Rav and another statement of Rav: Did Rav actually say this? Didn’t Rav say: David accepted a slanderous report? Just as it is prohibited to relate a slanderous report, it is similarly prohibited to accept it. This contradiction remains unresolved, and it is difficult.,The Gemara now examines the matter itself with regard to Rav’s statement cited in the course of the previous discussion. Rav said: David accepted a slanderous report, as it is written with regard to David’s search for a surviving son of Jonathan: “And the king said to him, to Ziba, Saul’s slave: Where is he? And Ziba said to the king: Behold, he is in the house of Machir, the son of Ammiel, in Lo-Devar [belo devar]” (II Samuel 9:4). Ziba indicated to David that Jonathan’s son was inconsequential, lacking any matter [lo devar] of Torah. And it is written: “Then King David sent, and fetched him out of the house of Machir, the son of Ammiel, from Lo-Devar [milo devar]” (II Samuel 9:5). That verse can be read that after sending for him, David found him filled with matters [melo devar] of Torah.,Now, after David saw that Ziba was a liar, when Ziba once again slandered Jonathan’s son, Mephibosheth, why did David accept his report? As it is written that when David fled from Absalom, he met Ziba: “And the king said: And where is your master’s son? And Ziba said to the king: Behold, he is staying in Jerusalem, as he said: Today shall the house of Israel restore to me the kingdom of my father” (II Samuel 16:3). And from where do we derive that David accepted Ziba’s slanderous report? As it is written: “Then said the king to Ziba: Behold, all that belongs to Mephibosheth is yours. And Ziba said: I humbly beseech you that I may find favor in your sight, my lord, O king” (II Samuel 16:4).,And Shmuel said: David did not accept Ziba’s slanderous report without substantiation. Rather, he himself saw conspicuous matters in Mephibosheth that indicated that Ziba was right. As it is written: “And Mephibosheth, the son of Saul, came down to meet the king, and he had neither dressed his feet, nor trimmed his beard, nor washed his clothes from the day the king departed until the day he came back in peace” (II Samuel 19:25). David thought that he was mourning the fact that he had returned in peace. And it is written: “And it came to pass, when he came to Jerusalem to meet the king, and the king said to him: Why did you not go with me, Mephibosheth? And he answered: My lord, O king, my servant deceived me; for your servant said: I will saddle me a donkey, and I will ride on it, and go to the king; because lame is

your servant. And he slandered your servant to my lord the king; but my lord the king is like an angel of God: Do therefore what is good in your eyes” (II Samuel 19:26–28). “And the king said to him: Why do you speak any more of your matters? I have said: You and Ziba shall divide the estate. And Mephibosheth said to the king: Let him even take all, seeing that my lord the king is come back in peace to his own house” (II Samuel 19:30–31). Mephibosheth said to David as follows: I had hoped for your return, saying: When will he come in peace, and yet you do this to me, giving Ziba half of my estate? It is not against you that I have grievances, but against He who brought you back in peace. Mephibosheth’s own statement substantiates Ziba’s report about him.,This is what is written: “And the son of Jonathan was Meriv-Baal” (I Chronicles 8:34). The Gemara asks: And was Meriv-Baal his name? Wasn’t his name Mephibosheth? However, since he entered into a quarrel [meriva] with his Master [ba’al], i.e., God, and complained about God having saved David, a Divine Voice emerged and said to him: Quarrelsome one, the son of a quarrelsome one; you are just like your father, Saul. The Gemara explains: Quarrelsome one; that which we just said that Mephibosheth complained to God about His salvation of David. The son of a quarrelsome one; as it is written: “And Saul came to a city of Amalek and quarreled in the valley” (I Samuel 15:5). And Rabbi Mani said: Saul quarreled with God with regard to matters of the valley, saying: For the murder of even a single person, there is a commandment to break the neck of a heifer in a valley to atone for the crime (see Deuteronomy 21:1–9); why then must all these Amalekites be killed?,To the matter at hand: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: When David said to Mephibosheth: You and Ziba shall divide the estate, a Divine Voice emerged and said to him: Rehoboam and Jeroboam shall divide the kingdom.,Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Had David not accepted Ziba’s slanderous report about Mephibosheth, the kingdom of the house of David would not have been divided, Israel would not have worshipped idols because of Jeroboam, and we would not have been exiled from our land.,Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: Anyone who says that King Solomon sinned is nothing other than mistaken, as it is stated: “And his heart was not perfect with the Lord his God, as was the heart of David, his father” (I Kings 11:4). By inference: Solomon’s heart was not equal to the heart of David, his father; however, he also did not sin.,However, how then do I establish the meaning of the verse: “For it came to pass, when Solomon was old, that his wives turned away his heart after other gods” (I Kings 11:4)? That verse is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Natan; as Rabbi Natan raised a contradiction between the two parts of the verse. On the one hand, it is written: “For it came to pass, when Solomon was old, that his wives turned away his heart after other gods”. On the other hand, isn’t it written: “And his heart was not perfect with the Lord his God, as was the heart of David his father,” indicating that Solomon’s heart was not equal to the heart of David his father; however, he also did not sin? Rather, the verse says as follows: For it came to pass, when Solomon was old, that his wives turned away his heart, in an attempt to spur him to go after other gods; however, he did not go after them.,The Gemara asks: Isn’t it written: “Then did Solomon build [yivne] an altar for Kemosh, the abomination of Moab, in the hill that is before Jerusalem, and for Molech, the abomination of the children of Ammon” (I Kings 11:7), indicating that Solomon did in fact stray after idols? The Gemara answers: This can be understood to mean that Solomon sought to build an altar for idols but did not build it.,The Gemara objects: But now if that is the way to understand the future tense verb form yivne, what of another instance where the same form is employed: “Then did Joshua build [yivne] an altar to the Lord God of Israel in Mount Eival” (Joshua 8:30)? There too, would you say that Joshua sought to build an altar but did not build one? Rather, there, in the case of Joshua, it means that he actually built it. Here too, with regard to Solomon, it means that he actually built the altar.,Rather, this verse should be understood as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says: The verse states: “And the altars that were before Jerusalem, which were on the right hand of the Mount of Olives, which Solomon the king of Israel had built for Ashtoret the abomination of the Zidonim, and for Kemosh the abomination of Moab, and for Milkom the abomination of the children of Ammon, did the king defile” (II Kings 23:13). All these were destroyed by Josiah.,The Gemara asks: Is it possible that the righteous king Asa came and did not destroy them, and the righteous king Jehosaphat came and did not destroy them until Josiah came and destroyed them? Didn’t Asa and Jehosaphat destroy all the idolatry in Eretz Yisrael? Rather, the verse juxtaposes the earlier ones, i.e., Solomon, to the later ones, i.e., Josiah. Just as the later ones, Josiah, did not effect the destruction of the altars, as it was done by his predecessors, and nevertheless the verse attributes it to him to praise him as if he had destroyed all those altars, so too, the earlier ones, Solomon, did not effect the construction, and nevertheless the verse attributes it to him to disgrace him as he did not prevent their construction.,The Gemara raises another question. Isn’t it written: “And Solomon did evil in the sight of the Lord” (I Kings 11:6), clearly indicating that Solomon sinned? Rather, since he should have protested against the conduct of his wives, i.e., their involvement in idolatry, but he did not protest, the verse ascribes to him liability as if he had sinned.,Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It would have been preferable for that righteous man, Solomon, to be a servant tasked with drawing water and hewing wood for another matter, i.e., idolatry, and not have the verse write about him: “And he did evil in the sight of the Lord,” even though he did not.,Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: When Solomon married Pharaoh’s daughter, she brought to him a thousand musical instruments and said to him: This is the way we do it for this idolatry, and this is the way we do it for that idolatry, and he did not protest that talk.,Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: When Solomon married Pharaoh’s daughter, the angel Gabriel descended from heaven and implanted a reed into the sea, and a sandbar grew around it, growing larger each year, and upon it the great city of Rome was built, which became God’s instrument to punish Israel.,It was taught in a baraita: On that very day that Jeroboam introduced two golden calves, one in Beth-El and the other in Dan, a single small hut was constructed, which was the first house constructed there. And that was the inauguration of Italy of Greece.,Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: Anyone who says that Josiah sinned is nothing other than mistaken, as it is stated: “And he did that which was right in the sight of the Lord, and walked in all the way of David his father, and turned not aside to the right hand nor to the left” (II Kings 22:2). However, how then do I establish the meaning of the verse: “And like him was there no king before him that returned to the Lord with all his heart, and with all his soul, and with all his might, according to all the Torah of Moses; neither after him arose there any like him” (II Kings 23:25)? The verse states: Josiah returned to the Lord. Apparently, in his early days he was a sinner, and later he returned to God.,The Gemara answers: The reference here is not to repentance for actual sins that Josiah committed. Rather, in every judgment that he issued from the age of eight,when he was crowned, until the age of eighteen, he returned the money to the parties whom he judged liable, due to concern that in his youth he may not have judged the cases correctly. And lest you say that he took from this one, whom he exonerated, and gave to that one, whom he found culpable, therefore the verse states: Returned to the Lord with all his might [me’odo], i.e., with all his money. It means that he gave those he judged liable in his youth from his own money.,The Gemara notes that Rabbi Yonatan disagrees with Rav, as Rav said: There is no greater penitent than Josiah in his generation, and there is one in our generation. The Gemara asks: And who is the great penitent in Rav’s generation? The Gemara answers: He is Abba, father of Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba, and some say it is Aḥa, brother of Abba, father of Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba, as the Master said: Rabbi Abba and Aḥa were brothers.,Rav Yosef said: And there is another great penitent in our generation. And who is he? He is Okvan, son of Neḥemya the Exilarch. And that is the one also known as Natan detzutzita, i.e., from whose head sparks emerged. Rav Yosef said: I was once sitting at the lecture delivered on the Festival [pirka] and I was dozing. And I saw in a dream how an angel stretched out his hands and received Natan detzutzita, demonstrating that his repentance was accepted.
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MISHNA:

The mishna lists items that a woman may or may not carry into, or wear in the public domain on Shabbat. This depends the particular object is considered an ornament, which she may wear, or merely a burden for the woman, which she may not. Even if it is considered an ornament, there is still concern that she might remove it and carry it in her hand in the public domain, which is prohibited by Torah law.

With what items may a woman go out into the public domain on Shabbat and with what items may she not go out?,A woman may neither go out with strings of wool, nor with strings of flax, nor with strips of any other materials that a woman braids in the hair of her head. And a woman may not immerse in a ritual bath with them in her hair until she loosens them. When the strings or strips are tight, the water cannot reach her hair unobstructed, invalidating her immersion.,And, likewise, a woman may neither go out with the ornament called totefet, nor with sarvitin that are not sewn into her head covering, nor with a kavul into the public domain.,And, likewise, a woman may neither go out with a city of gold ornament, nor with a katla ornament, nor with nose rings, nor with a ring that has no seal on it, nor with a needle that is not perforated, which are merely for decorative purposes.,And if she unwittingly went out wearing any of these, she is not liable to bring a sin-offering. According to Torah law, a woman is permitted to go out into the public domain wearing ornaments. However, the Sages decreed that a woman may not go out wearing certain ornaments, lest she remove them to show them to another and inadvertently carry them four cubits in the public domain.,GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Immersion, who mentioned anything about that? The mishna is dealing with the halakhot of Shabbat, so why did it mention the halakhot of immersion?,Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that Rabba bar Avuh said: When the mishna states the halakha, it employs the style known as: What is the reason. The mention of immersion is an explanation, not a superfluous addition. The mishna should be understood as follows: What is the reason that a woman may neither go out with strings of wool nor with strings of flax? It is because the Sages said that on weekdays she may not immerse with them until she loosens them. And since on weekdays she may not immerse with them until she loosens them, on Shabbat she may not go out with them, lest a situation requiring immersion for the purpose of a mitzva come about, and she untie them, and come to carry them four cubits in the public domain.,Rav Kahana raised a dilemma before Rav: With regard to strings made into hollow chains, what is the halakha? Is it permissible for women to go out into the public domain with them on Shabbat or not? It depends on whether they are considered an interposition to immersion. Rav said to him: Woven, you say? With regard to anything woven, the Sages did not issue a decree. Because water reaches the hair unobstructed, there is no need to loosen the hollow chain and there is no concern lest she carry it in the public domain. It was also stated that Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: With regard to anything woven, the Sages did not issue a decree.,And some say that Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: I saw that my sisters are not particular about removing them, and they bathe even with woven chains tied in their hair. Apparently, water reaches the hair. Therefore, the chain is not an interposition with regard to immersion.,The Gemara asks: What practical difference is there between this version and that version of the resolution of the dilemma?,The Gemara explains: There is a practical difference between them in a case where the chains are dirty. According to this version, in which you said: With regard to anything woven, the Sages did not issue a decree, these too are woven. And according to that version, in which you said that it is due to the fact that his sisters were not particular; in this case, since they are dirty, she is particular about them and will certainly remove them when she washes. Therefore, she is required to do so when immersing in a ritual bath as well.,We learned in a mishna in tractate Mikvaot: And these are the objects that interpose for a person: Strings of wool, and strings of flax, and the straps that are on the girls’ heads. Rabbi Yehuda says: Strings of wool and strands of hair do not interpose because the water reaches the hair through them. Rav Huna said: And we learned all these, strings of wool and flax, in a case where they are used to tie the hair on the girls’ heads.,Rav Yosef strongly objects to this halakha of Rav Huna: To exclude what other places in the body did Rav Huna say this? If you say that it comes to exclude strings tied to the neck, and then, strings made of what material does it exclude? If you say that it comes to exclude strings of wool, now, the mishna stated that soft strings of wool on top of hair, which is relatively hard, interpose and invalidates the immersion. With regard to soft strings on top of the soft flesh of the neck, is it necessary to say that they interpose?,Rather, say that Rav Huna’s statement came to exclude strings of flax. A similar difficulty arises: Now the mishna stated that hard strings of wool on top of hair, which is hard, interposes and invalidates the immersion. If so, with regard to hard strings on top of the soft flesh of the neck, is it necessary to say that they interpose?,Rather, Rav Yosef said, this is the reason that Rav Huna restricts the concern for interposition to strings tied in her hair and not around her neck: Because a woman does not strangle herself when adorning herself with a string or straps around her neck. Therefore, she never tightens the strings or straps to the extent that water cannot reach the skin.,Abaye raised an objection to the explanation of Rav Yosef from a baraita: The girls may go out into the public domain on Shabbat with strings in their ears. Young girls would have their ears pierced, but earrings were not placed in their ears until they were older. Instead, they inserted strings so that the holes would not close. However, they may not go out with straps around their necks. And if you say that the principle: A woman does not strangle herself, is halakhically valid, why may they not go out into the public domain with straps around their necks? They are not tied tight and do not constitute an interposition that invalidates immersion.,Ravina said:

Here we are dealing with a broad, ornamented strap [katla] hanging around the neck, to which a small bib is attached. A woman does strangle herself with a katla because the strap is broad and tightening it does not cause pain. She tightens it because it pleases her that she will appear fleshy. It was considered beautiful to have flesh protrude from the katla.,In the same mishna in tractate Mikvaot, Rabbi Yehuda says: Strings of wool and strands of hair do not interpose and invalidate the immersion because the water reaches through them.,Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to strands of hair. However, the halakha is not in accordance with his opinion with regard to wool strings.,Abaye said to him: By saying that the halakha is in accordance with Rav Yehuda, by inference the Rabbis disagree with regard to strands of hair. However, no opinion stating that strands of hair constitute an interposition is cited in the mishna.,And if you say that had we not heard from the first tanna that he is speaking of strands of hair, Rabbi Yehuda would also not have spoken about them. Apparently, the first tanna prohibited strands of hair, and Rabbi Yehuda disagreed with him. Nevertheless, it could be explained otherwise. And, perhaps he prefaced what he was saying to the Rabbis with the phrase: Just as. Just as you agree with me that strands of hair do not interpose, agree with me that strings of wool also do not interpose. The fact that he mentioned strands of hair does not indicate a dispute; on the contrary, it is an attempt to establish a consensus with regard to the halakha.,Indeed, it was stated that Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: The Rabbis agree with Rabbi Yehuda with regard to strands of hair.,This opinion was also taught in a baraita: Strings of wool interpose. Strands of hair do not interpose. Rabbi Yehuda says: Both strings of wool and strands of hair do not interpose.,Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The language of the mishna is also precise, as we learned in a mishna in our chapter: A woman may go out with strands of hair whether they are from her own hair or whether they are from the hair of another. Whose opinion is expressed in this mishna? If you say that it is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, even strings of wool should also have been permitted. Rather, is it not the opinion of the Rabbis; and conclude from it that with regard to strands of hair, they do not disagree? The Gemara determines: Indeed, conclude from it.,The mishna said that a woman may not go out with the ornament called a totefet. The Gemara asks: What is a totefet? Rav Yosef said: A packet of spices to ward off the evil eye.,Abaye said to him: And let the legal status of this packet be like that of an effective amulet, whose effectiveness is proven, and it should be permitted, as an effective amulet may be moved on Shabbat.,Rather, Rav Yehuda said in the name of Abaye: A totefet is an appuzainu, an ornament worn on the forehead. This opinion was also taught in a baraita: A woman may go out with a gilded hairnet worn to hold the hair in place, and with the totefet, and with the sarvitin that are fastened to the hairnet, since a woman would not remove her head covering to show her friend those ornaments.,And they said: Which is a totefet and which is sarvitin? Rabbi Abbahu said: Totefet is that which goes around her forehead from ear to ear. Sarvitin are those attached to the net that reach down to her cheeks.,Rav Huna said: Poor women make these ornaments from different types of colored materials. Wealthy women make them of silver and of gold.,We learned in the mishna that a woman may not go out with a kavul. Rabbi Yannai said: This kavul, I do not know what it is. Is it the seal of a slave, who would have a seal on his clothing identifying him as a slave, about which we learned in our mishna that it is prohibited, but a cap of wool that a woman places on her hair, she may well go out wearing it? Or, perhaps we learned in our mishna that going out with a cap of wool is prohibited and all the more so that going out with the seal of a slave is prohibited.,Rabbi Abbahu said: It is reasonable to say in accordance with the one who said that we learned about a cap of wool in the mishna. And this opinion was also taught in a baraita: A woman may go out with a kavul and with an istema to the courtyard on Shabbat. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: She may even go out with the kavul into the public domain. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: Anything that is worn beneath the hairnet, a woman may go out into the public domain with it, since a woman will not uncover her hair even to show off an ornament while in the public domain. Anything that is worn over the hairnet, like an ornamental hat, a woman may not go out with it. From the context and proximity of the halakha dealing with kavul to the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, apparently a kavul is a wool cap worn under the net.,Since istema was mentioned in the baraita, the Gemara asks: What is an istema? Rabbi Abbahu said: Istema is a beizyunei. However, Rabbi Abbahu’s explanation employed a term from the Aramaic dialect spoken in Eretz Yisrael, which was not understood in Babylonia. Therefore, they asked there: What is a beizyunei? Abaye said that Rav said: It is a small hat or ribbon used to gather hairs that protrude [kalya paruḥei] from the headdress.,The Sages taught in the Tosefta that three things were said with regard to an istema: There is no prohibition of a mixture of diverse kinds, wool and linen, in it. Since it is made of hard felt and not woven together, the prohibition of diverse kinds does not apply to material of that kind. And it does not become impure with the ritual impurity of leprosy. Only woven garments can become impure with leprosy. And women may not go out with it to the public domain on Shabbat.,In the name of Rabbi Shimon they said: Also,
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the rabbinic decree prohibiting adorning brides with bridal crowns to commemorate the destruction of the Temple does not apply to an istema.,Earlier, the Gemara cited Rabbi Abbahu’s opinion that the kavul mentioned in the mishna, which one may not wear into the public domain on Shabbat, is a woolen cap. And Shmuel said: It is the seal of a slave that we learned about in the mishna. The Gemara asks: And did Shmuel actually say this? Didn’t Shmuel say: A slave may go out on Shabbat with a seal that is around his neck but not with a seal that is on his clothes? Apparently, Shmuel holds that one may go out into the public domain with a slave’s seal. How, then, could he say that kavul in the mishna, with which one may not go out into the public domain, is referring to the seal of a slave?,The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This, where Shmuel said that one may go out with a slave’s seal on Shabbat, is referring to a case where his master made it for him. The slave will not remove it because he fears his master. Therefore, there is no concern lest he carry it. However, that, where the mishna said that it is prohibited to go out with a kavul, which according to Shmuel is the seal of a slave, is referring to a case where he made it for himself to indicate to all who his master is so that he may enjoy his master’s protection. In that case, since it is dependent solely upon his discretion, there is concern lest he remove the seal and carry it. Therefore, the Sages prohibited going out with it into the public domain.,The Gemara asks: In what case did you establish this statement of Shmuel? It is in the case of a seal that his master made for him. If so, why may he not go out with a seal on his clothes? There too, since his master made it for him he will not remove it.,The Gemara answers: There the concern is that perhaps the seal will be severed, and the slave will fear his master and fold his cloak and place it on his shoulders so that his master will not see that he has no seal on his clothing. That concern is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef; as Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who goes out into the public domain with a cloak folded and resting on his shoulders on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering. That is not the manner in which one wears a garment; it is the manner in which one carries a burden.,And this is like that which Shmuel said to Rav Ḥinnana bar Sheila: All of the Sages affiliated with the house of the Exilarch may not go out on Shabbat with sealed cloaks [sarbal], i.e., garments with seals on them, except for you, since the people of the Exilarch’s house are not particular with regard to you. The Sages affiliated with the Exilarch were officially considered servants of the house and would wear the seal of the house of the Exilarch. Therefore, it was prohibited for them to go out into the public domain on Shabbat with a cloak bearing the Exilarch’s seal, lest the seal break and, in fear of the Exilarch, they remove the cloak, fold it, place it on their shoulders, and carry it on Shabbat. Only Rav Ḥinnana bar Sheila was permitted to go out with this seal on Shabbat since the people of the Exilarch’s house were not exacting with him. Even if he wore clothing with no seal, they would not consider it an act of insubordination against the Exilarch.,The Gemara discusses the matter itself: Shmuel said that a slave may go out with a seal that is around his neck but not with a seal that is on his clothes. That opinion was also taught in a baraita: A slave may go out with a seal that is around his neck but not with a seal that is on his clothes.,The Gemara raises a contradiction from another baraita: The slave may neither go out with a seal that is around his neck nor with a seal that is on his clothes on Shabbat, and both this and that cannot become ritually impure. And he may not go out with a bell that is hung around his neck; however, he may go out with a bell that is on his clothes, and both this and that can become ritually impure.,And an animal may neither go out with a seal that is around its neck, nor with a seal that is on its clothes, nor with a bell that is on its clothes, nor with a bell that is around its neck since with regard to an animal these are considered burdens not ornaments. Both this, the seal, and that, the bell, cannot become ritually impure because animal ornaments and utensils do not fall into the category of objects that can become ritually impure. Apparently, it is even prohibited for a slave to go out with a seal around his neck, contrary to Shmuel’s opinion.,The Gemara answers: Say that this baraita, which permits going out, is referring to a case where his master made him the seal. Since he fears removing it, there is no concern that he will come to carry it. That baraita, which prohibits going out, is referring to a case where he made it for himself and there is concern lest he come to remove it and carry it.,The Gemara rejects this resolution: No, both this and that are referring to a case where his master made it for him. The difference can be explained differently. And here, where it was prohibited, it is referring to a seal of metal, and here, where it was permitted, it is a seal of clay. And as Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: With an object about which his master is particular, one may not go out on Shabbat, lest it become detached from the garment, and fear of his master lead the slave to carry it in his hand. With an object about which his master is not particular, one may go out with it.,The Gemara adds: So too, it is reasonable to understand the baraita from the fact that it teaches there: This seal and that seal cannot become ritually impure. Granted, if you say it is referring to a metal seal, it is possible to understand the novel aspect of the baraita as follows: These are the objects that cannot become ritually impure; however, their vessels made of the same material can become ritually impure.,However, if you say that we learned with regard to seals of clay, can it be similarly inferred that these seals are the objects that cannot become ritually impure; however, their vessels made of the same material can become ritually impure?,Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: Vessels of stone, vessels of dung, and vessels of earth that are not made into earthenware can neither become ritually impure by Torah law nor by rabbinic law? Apparently, even an actual vessel made of clay cannot become ritually impure. Rather, learn from it that this baraita is referring to utensils made of metal. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from it.,In that same baraita the Master said that the slave may not go out with a bell that is around his neck, but he may go out with a bell that is on his clothes.,The Gemara asks: With a bell that is around his neck, why may he not go out? It is due to concern lest it be severed and he come to carry it. If so, with a bell on his clothes too, let us be concerned lest it be severed and he come to carry it.,The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? With a case where the bell is woven into the garment, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, as Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Anything that is woven into a garment, the Sages did not issue a decree prohibiting going out with it on Shabbat.,In the baraita cited earlier, it was taught that the Master said: An animal may neither go out with a seal that is around its neck, nor with a seal that is on its clothes, nor with a bell that is on its clothes, nor with a bell that is around its neck. Both this and that cannot become ritually impure.,The Gemara asks: And does a bell of an animal not become ritually impure? The Gemara proceeds to raise a contradiction from that which was taught in another baraita: The bell of an animal can become ritually impure,

and the bell of a door is ritually pure. The door itself is not considered a vessel. It is considered part of the house, and therefore its status is like that of the house. The house is attached to the ground, and therefore it cannot become ritually impure. Everything connected to it, including the bell, assumes that status.,If one took the bell of a door and converted it into a bell for an animal, it can become ritually impure; however, if one took the bell of an animal and converted it into a bell for a door, even though he attached it to the door and even fastened it with nails, it can still become ritually impure because all utensils descend into their state of ritual impurity by means of thought alone, i.e., as a result of a decision to designate them for a specific purpose through which they will become susceptible to ritual impurity, they receive that status immediately. However, they only ascend from their state of ritual impurity by means of an action that effects physical change to the vessel itself. A change in designation alone is ineffective. This baraita states that an animal bell can become ritually impure, contrary to that which was taught in the previous baraita.,The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This baraita, where it was taught that the bell can become ritually impure, is referring to a case where it has a clapper [inbal]. That baraita, where it was taught that the bell cannot become ritually impure, is referring to a case where it does not have a clapper.,The Gemara asks: Whichever way you look at it, this is difficult. If the bell is a vessel, then even though it has no clapper it should be susceptible to ritual impurity. If it is not a vessel, does a clapper render it a vessel?,The Gemara answers: Yes, the clapper can determine the bell’s status with regard to ritual impurity, in accordance with that which Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said. As Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: From where is it derived that a metal vessel that produces sound is considered a vessel and can become ritually impure? As it is stated: “Every thing that passes through the fire, you shall make it pass through the fire, and it shall be clean; nevertheless, it shall be purified with the water of sprinkling; and all that does not pass through the fire you shall make to go through water” (Numbers 31:23). And the Sages interpret the verse homiletically: Every thing [davar], even speech [dibbur]; in other words, even an object that makes a sound you shall pass through fire to purify it because it is a vessel.,However, the matter can be clarified further. In what case did you establish the baraita; in the case of a bell that does not have a clapper? If so, say the middle clause of that baraita: And he may not go out with a bell that is hung around his neck; however, he may go out with a bell that is on his clothes, and both this and that can become ritually impure. If it is referring to a bell that does not have a clapper, can it become ritually impure?,The Gemara raises a contradiction from the Tosefta: One who makes bells for the mortar used to crush spices, and for the cradle, and for mantles of Torah scrolls, and for coverings of small children, if they have a clapper they can become ritually impure, and if they do not have a clapper they are ritually pure and cannot become impure. If after they became ritually impure their clappers were removed, their ritual impurity still remains upon them. Apparently, even with regard to bells used by people, the original existence of a clapper determines whether or not the bell is considered a vessel.,The Gemara answers: This applies only to the bells of a small child, since they are placed on him to produce sound. If the bell does not make a sound, it serves no purpose and, consequently, cannot become ritually impure. However, with regard to an adult, the bell is an ornament for him even though it does not have a clapper.,It was taught in the Tosefta that the Master said: If their clappers were removed after they became ritually impure, their ritual impurity still remains upon them. The Gemara wonders: For what use are they suited after their clappers are removed? They are essentially broken and should therefore become ritually pure. Abaye said: The reason that their impurity remains is because a common person is able to replace the clapper into the bell. According to Abaye, with regard to any vessel that comes apart, if a common person is capable of reassembling it and it does not require the expertise of a craftsman, it is not considered broken and its ritual impurity is not nullified.,Rava raised an objection to this explanation from that which was taught: The connection between the bell and the clapper, this is a connection. Therefore, if they are detached from each other, the bell should be considered broken.,And he adds: And if you say that when employing the term connection, it is saying as follows: Even though it is not connected, it has the legal status as if it were connected. Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: The connection between the different parts of scissors made of different parts that are made to come apart and the connection between the blade of a carpenter’s plane, which can be removed from its handle, and its handle are considered a connection with regard to contracting ritual impurity? If one part becomes ritually impure, the other parts become ritually impure as well. The baraita continues: However, they are not considered a connection with regard to the sprinkling of the waters of a purification offering. When waters of purification are sprinkled on these implements in order to purify them from ritual impurity imparted by a corpse (see Numbers 19:17–19), the water must be sprinkled on each part individually.,The Gemara asks: Whichever way you look at it, there is a difficulty: If it is considered a connection, they should be considered connected even with regard to sprinkling; and if they are not considered a connection, they should not be so considered even with regard to ritual impurity.,And Rabba said: By Torah law, when in use, they are considered a connection, both with regard to ritual impurity and with regard to sprinkling. And when not in use, even if the parts are connected, since they are made to come apart and they are commonly dismantled, they are neither considered a connection with regard to ritual impurity nor with regard to sprinkling. And the Sages issued a decree that they should be considered a connection with regard to ritual impurity even when not in use, due to ritual impurity when in use. If one component becomes ritually impure, the other component becomes ritually impure as well. And, as a further stringency, they issued a decree that they should not be considered a connection with regard to sprinkling even when in use, due to sprinkling when not in use. The waters of purification must be sprinkled on each part individually. Nevertheless, this type of connection with regard to ritual impurity is only relevant when the two parts are actually connected. When the parts are separate, even if they can be reattached easily, the vessel is considered broken. This contradicts Abaye’s explanation.,Rather, Rava said: It should be explained differently:
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It is considered a vessel since a bell without a clapper is suited to strike on earthenware and produce a sound of similar quality to that produced by a clapper. If so, even when the clapper is removed, the bell may still be used for its original purpose.,It was also stated that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: It is considered a vessel, since a bell without a clapper is suited to strike on earthenware. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is considered a vessel, since it is suited for use to give water to a child to drink.,And with regard to the essence of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement, the Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yoḥanan not require that the vessel’s new usage must be of the same type as the original labor in order for it to retain its ritual impurity after it has undergone change? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: “Every bed on which a zav is lying is ritually impure and every vessel on which he is sitting shall be ritually impure” (Leviticus 15:4). I might have thought, based on this verse, that if one overturned a vessel the size of a se’a and sat on it, or overturned a vessel the size of a half-se’a [tarkav] and sat on it, the vessel would become ritually impure. Therefore, the verse states: On which the zav is sitting, i.e., that which is designated for sitting, excluding that vessel with regard to which one says to the zav: Stand and we will perform our labor with the vessel. In that case, because the vessel is primarily used for purposes other than sitting, it does not become ritually impure even when the zav sits on it.,There is a dispute between the amora’im on this matter: Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to ritual impurity imparted by treading [midras], i.e., the halakhot pertaining to a zav or to a menstruating woman who sits or lies down on an object, one states the principle: Stand and we will perform our labor to maintain the purity of the vessel. However, one does not state with regard to one who is ritually impure due to a corpse: Stand and we will perform our labor to maintain the purity of the vessel. In other words, an object that became ritually impure through contact with a corpse and was subsequently broken, since it is possible to use it for some other purpose, it remains a vessel and susceptible to ritual impurity. However, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even with regard to one who is ritually impure due to a corpse, one states the principle: Stand and we will perform our labor to maintain the purity of the vessel. According to his opinion, a vessel that is no longer suited for its initial use, even though it serves another purpose, is considered broken. Therefore, the bell, since it is no longer suited for ringing, remains ritually pure according to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion, even though it remains suited for drinking water.,The Gemara answers: Reverse the opinions in the first dispute: It was not Rabbi Yoḥanan who gave that reason; it was Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina. The Gemara asks: And what did you see that led you to reverse the first? Reverse the opinions of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar in the latter dispute, and avoid a contradiction in the statements of Rabbi Yoḥanan in that way.,The Gemara answers: That is because we learned elsewhere that Rabbi Yoḥanan requires that the vessel’s new use will be of the same type as the original labor. His opinion here is consistent with his opinion there. As it was taught in a baraita: The shoe of an animal, if it is made of metal, can become ritually impure. The Gemara asks: For what use by people is it suited? Vessels designated for animal use do not become ritually impure unless they have some use for people. Rav said: It is suited for use as a vessel from which one could drink water in war when there are no other available vessels. And Rabbi Ḥanina said: It is suited for use as a vessel from which one could smear oil on his body during a war. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: When he flees from the battlefield he places it on his foot and runs over thorns and the thistles. Apparently, the only use for the shoe of an animal that would render it capable of becoming ritually impure when used by a person is use of the same type as the original labor.,The Gemara asks parenthetically: What is the practical difference between the explanation of Rav and that of Rabbi Ḥanina? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them in a case where the sandal is repulsive and dirty. In Rav’s opinion, since one would not drink water from it, it cannot become ritually impure. According to Rabbi Ḥanina, since one could still use it to spread oil on his body, it can become ritually impure.,What is the practical difference between the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan and that of Rabbi Ḥanina? There is a practical difference between them in a case where the shoe is heavy. It is suited for spreading oil; it is not suited for one to place on his foot. Therefore, it cannot become ritually impure according to Rabbi Yoḥanan.,We learned in the mishna: And neither may a woman go out on Shabbat to the public domain with a city of gold. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: With a city of gold? Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Jerusalem of Gold, a gold tiara engraved with a depiction of the city of Jerusalem,

like the one that Rabbi Akiva made for his wife.,And on this subject, the Sages taught in the Tosefta: A woman may not go out into the public domain on Shabbat with a city of gold ornament.And if she went out with it into the public domain she is liable to bring a sin-offering; that is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: She may not go out with it ab initio, and if she went out she is exempt. And Rabbi Eliezer says: A woman may go out with a city of gold ornament ab initio.,The Gemara explains: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Rabbi Meir holds that it is considered a burden and not an ornament, and one who carries a burden into the public domain is liable to bring a sin-offering. And the Rabbis hold that it is an ornament. Why, then, did they prohibit going out into the public domain wearing it? They are concerned lest she remove it, and show it to another, and come to carry it in the public domain. And Rabbi Eliezer holds: Whose manner is it to go out with a city of gold ornament? Only an important woman, and in that case there is no concern, as an important woman does not remove ornaments and show them to others.,After discussing going out into the public domain on Shabbat with a city of gold ornament, the Gemara discusses other ornaments. There is a dispute among amora’im with regard to a kelila, which is a tiara-like ornament. Rav prohibited going out with it, and Shmuel permitted doing so.,The Gemara sets the parameters of the disagreement: With a kelila made of metal, everyone agrees that it is prohibited to go out into the public domain. Where they disagree is in the case of a woven fabric inlaid with metal. One Sage, Rav, holds that in that type of ornament the metal is the primary element, and it is prohibited. And one Sage, Shmuel, holds that the woven fabric is the primary element, and it is consequently permitted.,Rav Ashi taught this disagreement with a lenient interpretation, as he said: With a kelila of woven fabric, everyone agrees that it is permitted to go out into the public domain. Where they disagree is in the case of a metal ornament. One Sage, Rav, holds that it is prohibited because there is concern lest she remove it, and show it to another, and come to carry it in the public domain. And one Sage, Shmuel, holds that it is permitted. Whose manner is to go out with a kelila ornament? Only an important woman;and an important woman does not remove ornaments and show them to others.,On the same topic, Rav Shmuel bar bar Ḥana said to Rav Yosef who, due to illness, forgot his learning: You explicitly said to us in the name of Rav: With regard to a kelila, it is permitted to go out into the public domain on Shabbat.,The Gemara relates that one day they said to Rav: A great, tall man came to Neharde’a and he was limping. And he taught: With a kelila, it is permitted to go out into the public domain on Shabbat. Rav said: Who is a great, tall man who limps? Levi. Conclude from this that Rabbi Afes passed away and Rabbi Ḥanina is sitting at the head of the yeshiva in Eretz Yisrael in his place. And, consequently, Levi had no one before whom to sit and study and he came here. As long as Rabbi Afes headed the yeshiva, Rabbi Ḥanina would sit outside the study hall. Entering the study hall would indicate that he accepted the authority of Rabbi Afes. Rabbi Ḥanina, who was a great man, refused to do so. In deference to Rabbi Ḥanina, Levi would sit with him as a colleague outside the study hall. When Levi arrived from Eretz Yisrael, it was clear that Rabbi Afes must have died. Levi, who considered himself Rabbi Ḥanina’s equal in terms of both scholarship and age, did not want to defer to Rabbi Ḥanina’s authority and decided to go to elsewhere, to Babylonia.,The Gemara asks: How did Rav arrive at that particular conclusion? And perhaps Rabbi Ḥanina died and Rabbi Afes remained standing in his position at the head of the yeshiva as he stood previously; and Levi had no one with whom to sit outside the study hall, and that is why he came here? The Gemara answers that that could not be the case for two reasons. First, if it were so, that Rabbi Ḥanina died, Levi would have been subject to the authority of Rabbi Afes. It was only in deference to Rabbi Ḥanina that Levi did not enter the study hall. And furthermore, it could not be that Rabbi Ḥanina died and did not reign as head of the yeshiva, as when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi died, he said in his dying testament: Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Ḥama, shall sit at the head of the yeshiva. And of the righteous it is written: “You will decree a saying and it will be established for you, and the light will shine on your ways” (Job 22:28). Since the statement that Rabbi Ḥanina will serve at the head of the yeshiva crossed the lips of a righteous person, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, it is inconceivable that it would not have been realized.,The Gemara returns to the subject of kelila. When Levi taught in Neharde’a that with the kelila ornament, one is permitted to go out into the public domain on Shabbat, twenty-four women wearing the kelila ornament went out into the public domain from all of Neharde’a. When Rabba bar Avuh taught in Meḥoza that the kelila ornament is permitted, eighteen women wearing the kelila ornament went out from one alleyway. Meḥoza was a wealthy mercantile city, and many women there owned precious jewelry.,Rav Yehuda said that Rav Shmuel said: With a precious gilded belt [kamra], a woman is permitted to go out into the public domain on Shabbat. Some say that he was referring to a belt made of woven fabric and inlaid with gold. And Rav Safra said: It is permitted just as it is permitted in the case of a gilded cloak.,And some say that it is referring to a belt made entirely of metal. And Rav Safra said: It is permitted just as it is permitted to go out into the public domain on Shabbat with the belt of kings made entirely of gold.,Ravina said to Rav Ashi: With regard to going out with a gilded belt over another belt [hemyana], what is the halakha? He said to him: Two belts you said; it is certainly uncommon to wear two belts. Therefore, one of them is a burden.,Rav Ashi said: This short cloak; if it has short straps with which to tie it, it is permitted to go out with it, and if not, it is prohibited.,We learned in the mishna: And a woman may not go out on Shabbat with a katla. The Gemara explains: What is a katla? A type of small bib hung from the neck. The nezamim mentioned in the mishna with which a woman may not go out on Shabbat refer to nose rings, not earrings.,We learned in the mishna: Nor with a ring that has no seal on it. By inference: If it does have a seal on it, she is liable to bring a sin-offering. She is only exempt from bringing a sacrifice when she goes out with a ring that does not have a seal on it, which is an ornament; however, a ring with a seal on it, typically used by men for sealing documents, is considered a burden for a woman on Shabbat. Apparently, that ring is not an ornament.,The Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna in tractate Kelim: Women’s ornaments can become ritually impure. And these are women’s ornaments: Bibs; earrings; and rings; and a ring whether it has a seal on it or whether it does not have a seal on it; and nose rings. Apparently, even a ring that has a seal on it is considered a woman’s ornament.,And Rabbi Zeira said: This is not difficult. Rather, this ruling in our mishna, which distinguishes between a ring with a seal and a ring without a seal, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya; that ruling in the mishna in tractate Kelim, which does not distinguish between rings, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.,As it was taught in a baraita: If the ring were made of metal and its seal was made of coral, it can become ritually impure because the primary component of the ring is metal, a material that can become ritually impure. If the ring were made of coral and its seal of metal, it is ritually pure and cannot become ritually impure. Rabbi Neḥemya deems it ritually impure, as Rabbi Neḥemya would say: With regard to a ring, follow its seal; if the seal were made of material that can become ritually impure, the entire ring can become ritually impure, and if it were made of material that cannot become ritually impure, the entire ring remains pure. The same is true with regard to a yoke of an animal: Follow its rods. Rods are placed in the yoke to fasten it to the animal; the component material of the rods determines whether or not the entire yoke can become ritually impure.
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With a hanging board, follow its nails, upon which the objects hang. With a ladder, follow its rungs. With a large scale, follow its chains and not its baseplates. And the Rabbis say, with regard to all of these vessels, everything follows the support. The legal status of the object is not determined by the component of the vessel most significant in terms of function. It is determined by the component most significant in terms of structure. Therefore, according to Rabbi Neḥemya there is a distinction, even in the halakhot of Shabbat, between a ring with a seal and a ring without a seal, as in his opinion the seal constitutes the primary function of the ring. However, the Rabbis hold with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity that the essential part of the ring is the ring itself, not the seal. Therefore, they permit going out into the public domain on Shabbat even with a ring that has a seal.,Rava said: This contradiction can be resolved in another manner. The mishna dealing with the halakhot of ritual impurity taught with regard to the two types of rings disjunctively, i.e., referring to different circumstances: A ring that has a seal on it can become ritually impure because it is a man’s ornament; a ring that does not have a seal on it can become ritually impure because it is a woman’s ornament.,Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said an additional resolution to the contradiction between the mishnayot: Are you raising a contradiction from the halakhot of ritual impurity to the halakhot of Shabbat? The underlying principles of these areas of halakha are totally different. With regard to ritual impurity, the Torah stated: “All vessels with which labor is done” (Numbers 31:51), and a ring with a seal is a vessel and can therefore become ritually impure. However, with regard to Shabbat, the Torah stated that the prohibition is due to the fact that the object is a burden. Therefore, in a case where there is not a seal on it, it is an ornament and may be worn in the public domain. In a case where there is a seal on it, it is a burden and may not be worn.,We also learned in the mishna: Nor with a needle that is not perforated. The Gemara asks: For what use is that type of needle suited? Rav Yosef said: Since a woman gathers her hair and pins it to her hairnet with the unperforated needle.,Abaye said to him: And if so, let the needle be like a ritually pure garter and consequently be permitted. There is a type of garter, a strap that ensures that a woman’s stockings will not fall, that cannot become ritually impure. A woman is permitted to go out into the public domain wearing it on Shabbat even if it is ornamented. For reasons of modesty, a woman will certainly not remove her garter or display it in the public domain. Similarly, with regard to the needle, the assumption is that a woman will not loosen her hair in the street.,Rather, Rav Adda from the city of Naresh explained before Rav Yosef: Since a woman parts her hair with it. The Gemara asks: On Shabbat, when it is prohibited to comb one’s hair, for what use is this needle suited? Rava said: There is a gold plate on the other end of the needle. On a weekday, she uses it to part her hair. On Shabbat, she inserts the needle into her head covering and lays the gold plate against her forehead for ornamental purposes.,MISHNA: A man may not go out on Shabbat with a spiked sandal, as will be explained in the Gemara. And he may not go out with a single sandal when there is no wound on his foot. And he may neither go out with phylacteries, nor with an amulet when it is not from an expert, but rather it was written by someone who has not established a reputation as an expert in writing amulets that are effective for those who carry them. And he may neither go out with shiryon, nor with a kasda, nor with maggafayim. These terms will be explained in the Gemara. And if he went out into the public domain with any of these, he is not liable to bring a sin-offering.,GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reason that the Sages prohibited going out with a spiked sandal on Shabbat?,Shmuel said: They were those who eluded the decrees of religious persecution, and after one of the wars they were hiding in a cave. And those hiding said: One who seeks to enter the cave may enter, but one who seeks to leave the cave may not leave. One leaving has no way to determine whether or not the enemy is lying in wait outside the cave. Therefore, leaving could reveal the presence of those hiding in the cave.,It happened that the sandal of one of them was reversed, the front of the sandal was in the back, and his footprints appeared like the steps of one leaving the cave. They thought that one of them left and feared that their enemies saw him and were now coming upon them to attack. In their panic, they pushed one another and killed one another in greater numbers than their enemies had killed among them. To commemorate this disaster that resulted from a spiked sandal, they prohibited going out into the public domain with it.,Rabbi Elai ben Elazar says that the reason for the decree was different. Once they were sitting in a cave and heard the sound of a spiked sandal atop the cave. They thought that their enemies had come upon them. They pushed one another and killed one another in greater numbers than their enemies had killed among them.,Rami bar Yeḥezkel said that the reason for the decree was different. They were sitting in a synagogue and they heard the sound of a spiked sandal from behind the synagogue. They thought that their enemies had come upon them. They pushed one another, and killed one another in greater numbers than their enemies had killed among them.,To commemorate that disaster which occurred due to a spiked sandal, at that time they said: A person may not go out with a spiked sandal. The Gemara asks: If so, on a weekday it should also be prohibited. The Gemara answers: When this incident occurred, it was on Shabbat. Therefore, they issued the decree prohibiting the spiked sandal specifically in parallel circumstances. The Gemara challenges: If so, on a Festival wearing a spiked sandal should be permitted. Why, then, did we learn in the same mishna:

One may send garments as a gift on a Festival, whether they are sewn or whether they are not sewn, because any object fit for any use on a Festival may be sent as a gift. However, one may neither send a spiked sandal nor an unsewn shoe on a Festival, since using them is prohibited. Apparently, one may not wear a spiked sandal on a Festival.,The Gemara explains: What is the reason that The Sages prohibited wearing a spiked sandal on Shabbat? It is because there is an assemblage of people. On a Festival too, there is an assemblage of people. The Gemara asks: On a communal fast day, there is an assemblage of people; wearing a spiked sandal should be prohibited then, as well. The Gemara answers: When this incident occurred, it was on a day when there was an assemblage of prohibition, i.e., a day on which performing labor is prohibited. Here, a fast day, is a day when there is an assemblage of permission, a day on which performing labor is permitted, and the two are not comparable. However, extending the scope of commemorative decrees to apply to comparable situations, e.g., from Shabbat to the Festivals, is acceptable.,And this is true even according to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akiva, who said in the following case that a decree issued due to a specific set of circumstances is applied only to those specific circumstances. The ashes of the red heifer were once transported across the Jordan River in a boat. A source of ritual impurity was discovered at the bottom of the boat. The Sages sought to issue a decree prohibiting transport of the ashes of the red heifer over any body of water, sea or river, over a bridge, or in a boat. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akiva said that decrees that are issued due to a specific event apply only to precisely those circumstances. Therefore, he said: They only prohibited transporting the ashes of a red heifer in the Jordan River and in a boat, and like the incident that occurred. However, even according to this approach, which limits restriction, that applies only to the Jordan River and not to other rivers. This is because it is different from other rivers in several respects, e.g., width and depth. However, a Festival and Shabbat are similar to one another, as it was taught in the mishna: The halakhic difference between a Festival and Shabbat is only with regard to preparation of food.,Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The Sages taught that a spiked sandal is prohibited only when the nails were placed in the sandal to strengthen its form; however, if they were placed in the sandal for beauty, it is permitted. The Gemara asks: And with how many nails is it considered to be for beauty? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Five on this sandal and five on that one. And Rabbi Ḥanina said: Seven on this one and seven on that one.,Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rav Shemen bar Abba: I will explain it to you: According to my opinion, when inserting nails for beauty, two are inserted from here, its outer side, one near the toes and one near the heel, and two are inserted from there, its inner side, one near the toes and one near the heel, and one is inserted on its straps; and for Rabbi Ḥanina, three from here, and three from there, and one on its straps.,The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: For an uneven sandal, whose soles are not straight, one makes seven nails on the bottom to straighten it, and it is then permitted for use on Shabbat; that is the statement of Rabbi Natan. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permits straightening the sandal with thirteen nails.,The Gemara notes: Granted, according to Rabbi Ḥanina, there is no problem, as he stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan. However, Rabbi Yoḥanan, in accordance with whose opinion did he state his opinion? Neither of the tanna’im agrees with his opinion. The Gemara answers: He stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Nehorai, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Nehorai says: With five nails inserted into the sole, it is permitted to go out into the public domain on Shabbat; and with seven nails, it is prohibited to go out into the public domain on Shabbat.,The Sage, Ifa, said to Rabba bar bar Ḥana: You, who are students of Rabbi Yoḥanan, act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. We will act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina.,Rav Huna raised a dilemma before Rav Ashi: With a sandal that has five nails inserted into the sole, what is the halakha with regard to going out into the public domain? He said to him: Even with seven nails it is permitted. He asked further: With nine, what is the halakha? He said to him: Even with eight it is prohibited.,That shoemaker raised a dilemma before Rabbi Ami: If one sewed the sole and attached it to the sandal from within, what is the halakha? May he go out into the public domain after inserting nails into it? Rabbi Ami said to him: It is permitted, and I do not know the reason.,Rav Ashi said: And does the Master not know the reason? It is obvious. Since he sewed it from within, it is no longer a sandal, it is a shoe. With regard to a sandal, the Sages issued a decree; with regard to a shoe, the Sages did not issue a decree.,Rabbi Abba bar Zavda raised a dilemma before Rabbi Abba bar Avina: If he shaped the nail like tongs [kelavus] by bending a nail with two sharp ends and sticking both ends into the sandal, what is the halakha? May he go out into the public domain with it on Shabbat? He said to him: It is permitted. It was also stated that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: If he shaped it like tongs it is permitted.,Rav Sheshet said: If he covered the entire sole in nails, so that contact with the ground will not wear it away, it is permitted to go out with that sandal on Shabbat, since it is no longer the spiked sandal with regard to which they issued a decree.,It was taught in the Tosefta in accordance with the opinion of Rav Sheshet: A man may not go out with a spiked sandal, and may not walk with it even from house to house within his courtyard, and may not even walk from bed to bed within his house. However, since the decree was issued with regard to circumstances identical to a specific incident, it only applies to wearing the sandal. Therefore, one may carry the sandal to cover a vessel with it and to support the legs of the bed with it. And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, prohibits using it for other purposes as well. If most of its nails fell out, and four or five remain in it, it is permitted to go out with it. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permits going out into the public domain with the sandal, even if up to seven nails remain in it. If he covered it with leather from beneath the wood frame of the sandal and inserted nails into it from above, it is permitted. If he made the nail like a tong, or made one end flat like a platter [tas], or sharpened it like a peg, or covered it entirely with nails so that contact with the ground will not wear it away, it is permitted to go out with it.,The Gemara analyzes the Tosefta cited in support of Rav Sheshet’s opinion. This Tosefta itself is difficult, as it is self-contradictory. On the one hand you said: If most of its nails fell out it is permitted; apparently, that is the halakha even though many nails remain in the sole. And, however, subsequently it was taught in the Tosefta, without specifying the number of nails that were there from the outset: With four or five nails, yes, going out is permitted; however, with more nails, no, it is prohibited.,Rav Sheshet said: This is not difficult, and it can be resolved as follows: Here, where it was permitted to go out wearing the sandal if the majority of nails fell out, it is referring to a case where they were broken, i.e., the heads of the nails were broken off while most of the nail remained embedded in the sole. In that case, it is clearly evident that most of the nails fell out. Here, where it was permitted only if four or five nails remain, it is referring to a case where they were totally removed and only the nails that remain in the shoe are visible.,The Gemara continues its detailed analysis of the Tosefta: It was taught that if most of the nails in the sandal came out and only four or five nails remain, it is permitted to go out wearing it. The Gemara asks: Now, if it was mentioned that when five nails remain, going out is permitted, is it necessary to mention four? Rav Ḥisda said that the Tosefta means: If four nails remain from the nails in a small sandal, and if five nails remain from the nails in a large sandal, going out is permitted.,It was taught in the Tosefta: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permits up to seven. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that for a sandal with an uneven sole, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permits up to thirteen? The Gemara answers: An uneven sole is different. Since the nails are inserted for the purpose of straightening the sole, it does not have the legal status of a spiked sandal.,The Gemara notes: Now that you have arrived at this new explanation that a sandal with an uneven sole has a different legal status, for Rabbi Yoḥanan, who stated, contrary to the opinions of the tanna’im in this baraita, that the number of nails permitted in each sandal is five, this baraita is also not difficult. He could explain that a sandal with an uneven sole is different and requires additional nails. However, in the case of a sandal with an even sole, even the other tanna’im would not permit that many.,Rav Mattana said, and some say Rav Aḥadvoi bar Mattana said that Rav Mattana said: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who completely prohibited moving a spiked sandal. The Gemara asks: That is obvious. Isn’t there a halakhic principle that in a dispute between an individual and the many, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the many? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, is more reasonable in this case, and therefore the halakha should be ruled in accordance with his opinion. Rav Mattana teaches us that that is not the halakha.,Rabbi Ḥiyya said: If not for the fact that they would call me: Babylonian who permits prohibitions, I would permit the insertion of many nails into a spiked sandal. The Gemara asks: And how many nails would he have permitted? In Pumbedita they said: Twenty-four nails. In Sura they said: Twenty-two. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: And this is your mnemonic to remember which opinion was stated in Sura and which opinion was stated in Pumbedita: Until Rabbi Ḥiyya came from Pumbedita to Sura he lost two nails from his shoe. Since the route that Rabbi Ḥiyya took from Pumbedita to Eretz Yisrael passed through Sura, one could say: Due to the rigors of the journey, two nails fell from the sandal of Rabbi Ḥiyya between Pumbedita and Sura.,It was taught in the mishna: And he may not go out with a single sandal when there is no wound on his foot.
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By inference: If there is a wound on his foot, he may go out with one sandal. In that case, with a sandal on which of his feet does he go out? Rav Huna said: With a sandal on the foot that has a wound on it. Apparently, he holds: A sandal is made for the purpose of avoiding pain. Typically, a person wears sandals only in order to avoid the pain of walking on stones and the like. When he is seen with only one sandal, it is clear that he is oblivious to that pain and the only reason that he is wearing the sandal is due to the wound on his foot. Consequently, no one will suspect that he went out wearing two sandals and that if he is wearing one, he must be carrying the other one.,And Ḥiyya bar Rav said: He goes out with a sandal on the foot that does not have a wound on it. Apparently, he holds that the sandal is made for the purpose of providing comfort, and he wears it on his healthy foot. And it does not arouse suspicion because, with regard to that foot on which there is a wound, its wound indicates that he is unable to wear a sandal on that foot, and it is clear that he left the other sandal at home.,The Gemara comments: And Rabbi Yoḥanan also holds that the opinion of Rav Huna, which maintains that one only wears sandals to avoid pain, is correct. As Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rav Shemen bar Abba, his attendant: Give me my sandal. He gave him the right sandal. He said to him: You have rendered this foot as one with a wound. In Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion, one must always put on his left shoe first. One who puts on the right shoe first is no longer permitted to put on the left shoe. By handing him his right sandal, he is forcing Rabbi Yoḥanan to go out with one sandal, leading onlookers to conclude that he has a wound on that foot. That incident corresponds to Rav Huna’s opinion that one wears the sandal on the wounded foot.,The Gemara rejects this: And perhaps, he holds in accordance with the opinion of Ḥiyya bar Rav, which maintains that one wears the sandal on the healthy foot, and he is saying as follows: By handing me my right shoe, you have rendered my left foot, on which I have no shoe, as one with a wound. No proof can be cited from that incident, as Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion cannot be ascertained from the exchange with his attendant.,And Rabbi Yoḥanan follows his regular line of reasoning. As Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Just as one dons phylacteries, so too, one puts on shoes. Just as phylacteries are placed on the left arm, so too, when putting on shoes one begins with the left foot.,The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion from a baraita: When one puts on his shoes, he puts on the right shoe first and afterward puts on the left shoe.,Rav Yosef said: Now that it was taught in a baraita in this manner, and Rabbi Yoḥanan stated the halakha in that manner, one who acted this way acted properly, and one who acted that way acted properly, as each custom has a basis.,Abaye said to him: Why is the Gemara certain that Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees with the baraita? Perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan had not heard this baraita, and had he heard it, he would have retracted his opinion. And even if he heard it, perhaps he heard it and held that the halakha is not in accordance with that mishna. In any case, it is necessary to rule in accordance with one of the opinions.,Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: And one who fears Heaven fulfills both opinions. And who is this God-fearing person? Mar, son of Rabbana. How does he conduct himself? He puts on his right shoe and does not tie the laces. And then he puts on his left shoe and ties it, and then afterward ties the laces of his right shoe. Rav Ashi said: I saw that Rav Kahana was not particular with regard to the order in which he put on his shoes.,After citing this excerpt from Hilkhot Derekh Eretz with regard to putting on shoes, the Gemara cites the entire matter. The Sages taught: When one puts on his shoes, he puts on the right shoe first and afterward puts on the left shoe because the right always takes precedence. When he removes them, he removes the left and afterward he removes the right, so that the right shoe will remain on the foot longer.,When one washes his feet, he washes the right first and afterward he washes the left. And one who wishes to spread oil on his feet spreads oil on the right first and afterward spreads oil on the left. And one who wishes to spread oil on his entire body, spreads oil on his head first because it is the king of all his other limbs.,We learned in the mishna: And he may neither go out with phylacteries. Rav Safra said: Do not say that this halakha is only in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that Shabbat is not an appropriate time to don phylacteries, i.e., it is prohibited to don phylacteries on Shabbat, and that is the reason that one may not go out into the public domain with them. Rather, even according to the one who said that Shabbat is an appropriate time to don phylacteries, he may not go out with them due to the concern lest he come to carry them in his hand in the public domain, which is prohibited by Torah law.,And some teach the statement of Rav Safra as referring to the latter clause of the mishna: And if he went out into the public domain with phylacteries he is not liable to bring a sin-offering. Rav Safra said: Do not say that this halakha is only according to the opinion of the one who said that Shabbat is an appropriate time to don phylacteries, and therefore he does not violate a Torah prohibition by going out into the public domain with phylacteries and is not liable to bring a sin-offering. Rather, even according to the opinion of one who said that Shabbat is not an appropriate time to don phylacteries, he is not liable to bring a sin-offering. What is the reason that he is exempt? Donning phylacteries is performed in the manner of wearing a garment or an ornament. Although one may not use phylacteries on Shabbat, there is no Torah prohibition against moving them.,We learned in the mishna: Nor with an amulet when it is not from an expert. Rav Pappa said: Do not say that the meaning of the mishna is that one may only go out with an amulet if the person who wrote it is an expert and the amulet has proven effective. Rather, if the person who wrote it is an expert, even though the amulet has not proven effective, he may go out with it.,The Gemara comments: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Nor with an amulet when it is not from an expert, and it does not teach: When the amulet is not effective. Apparently, it is sufficient if the writer of the amulet is an expert, even if the effectiveness of the amulet has not been proven. The Gemara comments: Indeed, learn from it.,The Sages taught in the Tosefta: What is an effective amulet? It is any amulet that healed one person once, and healed him again, and healed him a third time. That is the criterion for an effective amulet, and it applies to both a written amulet and an amulet of herbal roots; both if it has proven effective in healing a sick person who is dangerously ill, and if it has proven effective in healing a sick person who is not dangerously ill. It is permitted to go out with these types of amulets on Shabbat.,And an amulet was not only permitted in a case where one has already fallen due to epilepsy and wears the amulet in order to prevent an additional fall. Rather, even if one has never fallen, and he wears the amulet so that he will not contract the illness and fall, he is permitted to go out with it on Shabbat is permitted.,And he may tie and untie it even in the public domain, as long as he does not tie it

to a bracelet or a ring and go out with it into the public domain. The reason for the prohibition is due to the appearance of transgression, as, in that case, it appears that he is wearing the amulet strictly for ornamental purposes, which is prohibited.,With regard to the definition of an effective amulet as one which healed one person three times, the Gemara raises an objection. Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: Which is an effective amulet; any amulet that healed three people as one?,The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This, where it was taught in the baraita that the amulet must have healed three different people, is referring to proving the expertise of the man who wrote it. Once his amulets have proven themselves by healing three different people stricken with different illnesses, clearly the one who wrote them is an expert. That, where it was taught in the Tosefta that even if the amulet healed one person three times, is referring to proving that the amulet is effective in fulfilling its designated purpose.,Rav Pappa said: It is obvious to me in a case where three amulets were written for three people and effectively healed each three times that both the man who wrote them is proven an expert and the amulet is proven effective. Likewise, it is obvious to me that in the case of one who writes three amulets for three people and healed each one time, the man is proven to be an expert; however, the amulet is not proven effective. Similarly, if one wrote one amulet for three people and it healed them, the amulet is proven effective, while the man who wrote it is not thereby proven an expert.,Rav Pappa raised a dilemma: Three amulets for one person, what is the status of the amulet and the one who wrote it in that case? The amulet is certainly not proven effective; however, with regard to the man who wrote it, is he proven an expert or is he not proven an expert? This is the dilemma: Do we say that the person is an expert since the amulet that he wrote healed the person who was ill? Or, perhaps we say that it was the fortune of that sick man who received the influence of the writing of the amulet, but a different person would not be healed? The Gemara concludes: Let this dilemma stand unresolved.,A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Do amulets have an element of sanctity, or perhaps they have no element of sanctity? The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha is this dilemma relevant? If you say it is relevant with regard to rescuing them from fire on Shabbat, there is a clear resolution to the dilemma. Come and hear what was taught: The blessings and the amulets, even though there are letters of holy names and many matters that are in the Torah written in them, one may not rescue them from the fire, and they burn in their place.,Rather, the dilemma is relevant with regard to the matter of interment of sacred documents. Must an amulet no longer in use be buried, or may it be discarded? However, with regard to the matter of interment as well, come and hear a resolution from what was taught: If one of the names of God was written even on the handles of the vessels and even on legs of the bed, he must cut off the name and bury it, as one must be exacting with regard to the name of God, wherever it is written.,Rather, the dilemma was raised with regard to whether or not it is permitted to enter the bathroom with them. What is the halakha? Do they have sanctity, and it is therefore prohibited? Or, perhaps they have no sanctity, and it is permitted? Come and hear a resolution from that which we learned in our mishna: Nor with an amulet, when it is not from an expert. By inference: If it is from an expert, he may go out with it.,And, if you say that amulets have an element of sanctity, at times he will need to go to the bathroom, will be required to remove the amulets, forget that he removed them, and come to carry them four cubits in the public domain. Since the mishna did not address these complications, apparently amulets do not have an element of sanctity in that regard and one may enter the bathroom with them. The Gemara rejects this: With what we are dealing here? With an amulet made of herbal roots that certainly has no sanctity.,The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: This is the case with regard to both a written amulet and an amulet of herbal roots, indicating that their halakhot are equal? Rather, with what we are dealing here? With a person who is dangerously ill. Because of the life-threatening situation, he is permitted to enter the bathroom with his amulet, despite the resulting degradation of the Holy Name. Wasn’t it taught in the same baraita that the halakha applies to both a sick person who is dangerously ill and a sick person who is not dangerously ill, indicating that they share the same status in this regard?,Rather, since the amulet heals, even though he holds it in his hand, he may well go out with it too. In terms of healing, there is no difference whether the amulet is hanging around his neck or whether it is in his hand; just as they permitted him to wear it around his neck on Shabbat, so too they permitted him to carry it in his hand.
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But wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Oshaya says with regard to an amulet: As long as he does not hold it in his hand and carry it four cubits in the public domain? Apparently, even with regard to an amulet, there is a distinction between wearing it and carrying it.,Rather, with what are we dealing here? With an amulet that is covered in leather. Since the writing itself is covered, the name of God is not degraded when the amulet is brought into the bathroom with him.,The Gemara objects. There is writing on the scrolls of phylacteries, which is covered in the leather of boxes housing the scrolls, and nevertheless it was taught in a baraita: One who enters a bathroom while wearing phylacteries must remove the phylacteries at a distance of four cubits and only then enter. There is no halakhic difference whether or not the writing is covered.,The Gemara rejects this: There, with regard to phylacteries, the prohibition to enter the bathroom is not due to the sacred writing on the scrolls inside the phylacteries. Rather, it is due to the letter shin that protrudes from the leather of the boxes housing the scroll in the phylacteries of the head, as Abaye said: The source of the requirement of the shin of the phylacteries is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. It is required by Torah law. And, Abaye said: The knot in the shape of the letter dalet in the straps of the phylacteries of the head is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. And, Abaye said: The letter yod of the phylacteries is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. It is due to those letters that one must safeguard the sanctity of the phylacteries and refrain from taking them into the bathroom.,We learned in the mishna: And he may neither go out with shiryon, nor with a kasda, nor with maggafayim. These terms were not understood, and therefore the Gemara explains them:,Shiryon is a coat of mail [zerada], armor made of scales. Kasda: Rav said that it is a leather hat [sanvarta] worn under a metal helmet. Maggafayim: Rav said they are leg armor worn beneath the knee.,MISHNA: A woman may neither go out to the public domain with a perforated needle, i.e., a standard needle with an eye, nor with a ring that has a seal on it, nor with a kulyar, nor with a kovelet, the identity of which will be discussed in the Gemara, nor with a flask of balsam oil.,And if she did go out into the public domain, she is liable to bring a sin-offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir, who holds that in doing so she violated the Torah prohibition of carrying a burden in the public domain on Shabbat. And the Rabbis exempt one who goes out on Shabbat with a kovelet and with a flask of balsam oil. In their opinion, these are ornaments, and therefore they do not fundamentally violate the Torah prohibition of carrying in the public domain on Shabbat.,GEMARA: With regard to that which we learned in the mishna that a woman may not go out on Shabbat with a ring that has a seal, and by inference that she may go out with a ring without a seal, Ulla said: And the reverse of these halakhot is true with regard to a man. A man who wears a ring with a seal in the public domain is exempt. However, if he wears a ring without a seal, he is liable to bring a sin-offering as it is not considered an ornament for a man. Based on that statement, the Gemara concludes: Apparently, Ulla holds that every object that is suitable for a man is not suitable for a woman, and an object that is suitable for a woman is not suitable for a man.,Rav Yosef raised an objection from the Tosefta: Shepherds may go out on Shabbat in garments made of sacks. And not with regard to the shepherds alone did the Sages say that they are permitted to go out in sacks on Shabbat; rather, any person may do so. However, the Sages taught the halakha with regard to shepherds because it is the standard practice of shepherds to go out in sacks. Apparently, although a sack is not a typical garment for most people, it is permitted even for one who is not a shepherd and would not generally wear it. Based on the same principle, although men do not generally wear women’s ornaments and women do not generally wear men’s ornaments, since occasionally a man might wear an ornament belonging to a woman or vice versa, each should be permitted to go out into the public domain with the ornament of the other.,Rather, Rav Yosef said: Ulla holds that women are a people unto themselves. The difference between the standard practice of men and women is greater than the difference between the standard practice of practitioners of different professions.,Abaye raised an objection to Rav Yosef’s statement from the Tosefta: One who finds phylacteries outside of the city on Shabbat should don them and bring them into the city one pair at a time. This applies to both a man and a woman. And if you say that women are a people unto themselves, isn’t the mitzva to don phylacteries a time-bound, positive mitzva, as there are times when the mitzva to don phylacteries is not in effect? And the following is a halakhic principle: Women are exempt from every time-bound, positive mitzva. If, in fact, the clothing and ornaments of a man are not suitable for a woman under any circumstances, why is a woman permitted to don the phylacteries and bring them into the city on Shabbat? Shouldn’t that be considered a prohibited act of carrying?,The Gemara answers: There, with regard to phylacteries, Rabbi Meir holds that night is an appropriate time to don phylacteries, and Shabbat and Festivals are similarly an appropriate time to don phylacteries. Consequently, the mitzva of phylacteries is a positive mitzva that is not time bound; and in every positive mitzva that is not time bound, women are obligated. Therefore, women are permitted to don the phylacteries and bring them into the city.,With regard to Rabbi Meir’s ruling in the mishna that a woman is liable by Torah law if she goes out into the public domain wearing a ring with a seal, the Gemara asks: Isn’t it considered carrying out in a backhanded manner? A ring with a seal is not an ornament for a woman; it is an object like any other. One typically carries objects holding them in his hand. Wearing an object around one’s finger is atypical. There is no Torah prohibition violated when a labor is performed in an atypical manner.,Rabbi Yirmeya said that we are dealing in the mishna with a woman who is a treasurer for charity. A woman with that occupation typically wears a ring with a seal on her finger in order to perform her job. She does not, though, wear it as an ornament. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: You answered and explained why, in the case of a woman, she would be liable to bring a sin-offering. However, in the case of a man who wore a ring without a seal, what is there to say? Why should he be liable?,Rather, Rava said that there is a different reason: Sometimes a person gives his wife a ring that has a seal on it to take it to his house and place it in a box for safekeeping, and, in order to ensure that she does not lose the ring, the woman places it in on her hand, i.e., on her finger, until she reaches the box. And, likewise, sometimes a woman gives her husband a ring that does not have a seal on it to take it to a craftsman to repair it, and the husband places it on his hand, i.e., on his finger, until he reaches the craftsman. The purpose of wearing these rings is not for ornamentation. Nevertheless, it is considered a typical manner of carrying them.,We learned in the mishna: Nor with a kulyar, nor with a kovelet. The Gemara asks: What is a kulyar? Rav said: A brooch with which a woman fastens the collar of her garment. Kovelet: Rav said that it is a bundle of fragrant herbs [pilon]. And, similarly, Rav Asi said: A bundle of fragrant herbs.,The Sages taught in a baraita: A woman may not go out on Shabbat with a bundle of fragrant herbs, and if she did go out she is liable to bring a sin-offering, as she violated a Torah prohibition; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: She may not go out ab initio; however, if she went out, she is exempt. Rabbi Eliezer says: A woman may go out with a bundle of fragrant herbs even ab initio.,The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Rabbi Meir holds that it is a burden. Therefore, one who takes it out into the public domain on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering. And the Rabbis hold that it is an ornament. Nevertheless, they prohibited going out with it ab initio due to concern lest she remove the bundle of herbs from its place, and show it to others, and come to carry it in the public domain. And Rabbi Eliezer holds: Whose practice is it to place fragrant herbs on herself? A woman whose odor is foul. But a woman whose odor is foul does not remove and show the bundle to others because, by doing so, her odor will be detected, a situation that she would prefer to avoid. And, therefore she will not come to carry it four cubits in the public domain.,This baraita cites the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who permits, even ab initio, going out into the public domain with a bundle of herbs. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in another baraita: Rabbi Eliezer exempts a woman who goes out on Shabbat with a bundle of herbs and with a flask of balsam oil? With regard to the halakhot of Shabbat, exempt means that although it is not prohibited by Torah law, it is prohibited ab initio by rabbinic law.,The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. When Rabbi Eliezer made this statement, it was when he was addressing the statement of Rabbi Meir. When Rabbi Eliezer made that statement, it was when he was addressing the statement of the Rabbis. To clarify: When he was addressing the statement of Rabbi Meir, who said that she is liable to bring a sin-offering, he said to him that she is exempt from bringing the sacrifice. When he was addressing the statement of the Rabbis, who said that she is exempt but it is prohibited ab initio, he said that it is permitted even ab initio.

And to what statement of Rabbi Meir is the Gemara referring? As it was taught in a baraita: A woman may not go out on Shabbat with a key that is in her hand, and if she went out she is liable to bring a sin-offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Eliezer exempts a woman who goes out with a bundle of fragrant herbs and with a flask of balsam oil [palyaton].,The Gemara finds the statement of Rabbi Eliezer difficult: A bundle of fragrant herbs; who mentioned anything about that? Rabbi Meir did not mention a bundle of herbs; why did Rabbi Eliezer mention it in his response?,The Gemara answers that the baraita is incomplete and it teaches the following: And likewise, with a bundle of fragrant herbs, and likewise with a flask of balsam oil she may not go out, and if she went out she is liable to bring a sin-offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Eliezer exempts in the cases of a bundle of fragrant herbs and a flask of balsam oil. In what case is this statement said? In a case where the vessels have perfume in them; however, in a case where they do not have perfume in them, she is liable for carrying the flask out into the public domain on Shabbat.,Rav Adda bar Ahava said: That is to say that one who carries out a measure of food that is less than the measure that determines liability on Shabbat, but he does so in a vessel, he is liable. Although he is not liable for carrying the food out into the public domain, he is liable for carrying out the vessel. In that case, the vessel is not subordinate to the food, and therefore it is significant. Since the case of the flask in which there is no perfume is comparable to the case in which there is less than the required measurement of food in a vessel, and it was taught in the case of the flask that she is liable even though the fragrance of the perfume remains in the vessel, it stands to reason that one who carries a vessel containing less than a measure of food is also liable.,Rav Ashi said: That is no proof because, in general, I would say to you that he is exempt in a case where there is less than the measure that determines liability for food. However, it is different here, in the case of the empty flask of perfume as, in that case, there is no substance at all. Because the vessel is completely empty, he is liable for carrying the flask.,Related to the mention of perfume, the Gemara cites several statements. It is stated: “That drink wine in mizrekei, and anoint themselves with the chief ointments; but they are not grieved for the hurt of Joseph” (Amos 6:6). Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: “The chief ointments” is balsam oil.,Rav Yosef raised an objection from the Tosefta: Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava issued a decree on balsam oil as well, prohibiting its use due to mourning over the destruction of the Temple, and the Sages did not agree with him. And if you say that balsam oil is the chief ointment cited in the verse, and the decree was issued due to the pleasure it provides, why didn’t the Sages agree with his decree? Doesn’t the verse criticize those who do not feel the pain of the people?,Abaye said to him: And according to your reasoning, that which is written in the same verse: “That drink wine in mizrekei”; Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi disagree over the meaning of the term mizrekei. One said: They are multi-spouted vessels [kenishkanin], wine vessels with spouts from which several people can drink at one time, and one said that they throw [mezarkin] their cups to one another in joy and jest. Is that also prohibited? Didn’t Rabba bar Rav Huna visit the house of the Exilarch and see the Exilarch drink from a multi-spouted vessel, and Rabba bar Rav Huna did not say anything to him?,Rather, the principle is as follows: With regard to any matter in which there is an element of pleasure and in which there is an element of joy, the Sages issued a decree prohibiting it due to mourning over the destruction of the Temple. However, with regard to a matter in which there is an element of pleasure and in which there is no element of joy, the Sages did not issue a decree. Since there is no element of joy in balsam oil, even though it is precious and pleasurable, they did not issue a decree prohibiting it.,The Gemara interprets additional verses related to the critique of the leadership of Samaria. It is stated: “That lie upon beds of ivory and stretch [seruḥim] upon their couches and eat the lambs out of the flock and the calves out of the midst of the stall” (Amos 6:4). Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: This term, seruḥim, interpreted homiletically, teaches that their sin was that they would urinate before their beds while naked.,Rabbi Abbahu ridiculed that interpretation: If so, that this is the meaning of the term seruḥim, is this the meaning of that which is written: “Therefore now they shall go into exile at the head of the exiles and the revelry of those seruḥim shall pass away” (Amos 6:7), because they urinate before their beds while naked they will be exiled at the head of exiles? Although doing so is revolting, a punishment so severe is certainly excessive.,Rather, Rabbi Abbahu said: This verse is referring to a grave sin. These are people who would eat and drink with each other, and join their beds to each other, and swap wives with each other, and defile their beds with semen that was not theirs. That is the meaning of seruḥim upon their couches. For those severe transgressions they deserved to be exiled at the head of exiles.,On a related note, Rabbi Abbahu said, and some say it was taught in a baraita: Three matters bring a person to a state of poverty as a divine punishment from Heaven: One who urinates before his bed while naked, and one who demeans the ritual washing of the hands, and one whose wife curses him in his presence.,The Gemara explains: With regard to one who urinates before his bed while naked, Rava said: We only said this prohibition in a case where he turns his face toward his bed and urinates toward it; however, if he turns his face and urinates toward the outer portion of the room, we have no problem with it.,And where one turns his face toward his bed, too, we only said this prohibition in a case where he urinates on the ground; however, if he urinates into a vessel, we have no problem with it since that is not considered disgusting.,With regard to one who demeans the ritual washing of the hands,Rava said: We only said this statement in a case where he does not wash his hands at all; however, if he washes his hands and does not wash them with a significant amount of water, we have no problem with it.,The Gemara notes: And that is not so, as Rav Ḥisda said: I wash my hands with handfuls of water and they gave me in reward handfuls of prosperity. Apparently, in order to garner the benefits of ritual washing of his hands, one should use a significant amount of water.,With regard to one whose wife curses him in his presence, Rava said: This is referring to a case where she curses him over matters relating to her ornaments, i.e., she complains that he does not provide her with jewelry. The Gemara comments: And that applies only when he has the resources to buy her jewelry but does not do so; however, if he does not have sufficient resources he need not be concerned.,Since the Gemara spoke of sins in the First Temple era, it continues to explain other verses with similar content. Rava, son of Rav Ilai, interpreted the following verse homiletically. What is the meaning of that which is written: “The Lord says because the daughters of Zion are haughty and walk with outstretched necks and wanton eyes, walking and mincing as they go and making a tinkling with their feet” (Isaiah 3:16)?
“Because the daughters of Zion are haughty,” indicates that they would walk with upright stature and carry themselves in an immodest way.
“And walk with outstretched necks,” indicates that they would walk in small steps, heel to toe, so onlookers would notice them.
“Wanton eyes,” indicates that they would fill their eyes with blue eye shadow and beckon.
“Walking and mincing [tafof] as they go,” indicates that the wealthy women would walk a tall woman alongside a short one so that the tall woman would stand out. This is derived from the interchangeability of the letters tet and tzadi; tzafo, meaning, in this case, to be seen.
“Making a tinkling [te’akasna] with their feet,” Rabbi Yitzḥak from the school of Rabbi Ami said: This teaches that they would place myrrh and balsam in their shoes and would walk in the marketplaces of Jerusalem. And once they approached a place where the young men of Israel were congregated, they would stamp their feet on the ground and splash the perfume toward them and instill the evil inclination into them like venom of a viper [ke’eres bakhos].,What was their punishment for these sins? As Rabba bar Ulla taught: “And it shall come to pass that instead of a sweet smell, there shall be a stench; and instead of a belt, a rope; and instead of well-set hair, baldness; and instead of a fine dress, a girding of sackcloth; instead of beauty, a brand” (Isaiah 3:24).
He explains: “And it shall come to pass that instead of a sweet smell there shall be a stench,” indicates that the place that they would perfume became decaying sores.
“And instead of a sash, a rope [nikpe],” indicates that the place where they were girded with a sash became covered with many bruises [nekafim].
“And instead of well-set hair, baldness,” indicates that the place where they would style their hair became bald spots.
“And instead of a fine dress [petigil], a girding of sackcloth,” indicates that the orifices [petaḥim] that lead to pleasure [gil] will become a place for a girding of sackcloth.
“Instead of beauty, a brand [ki],” Rava said: That is the popular expression that people say: Instead of beauty, a sore [kiva].,With regard to a different verse: “The Lord will smite with a scab the crown of the head of the daughters of Zion and the Lord will lay bare their secret parts” (Isaiah 3:17). And the Lord will smite with a scab the crown of the heads of the daughters of Zion; Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: This teaches that there was an outbreak of leprosy among them. It is written here, scab [sippaḥ], and it is written there, among the types of leprosy: “For a sore, and for a scab [sappaḥat], and for a bright spot” (Leviticus 14:56).,With regard to the verse: And the Lord will lay bare their secret parts [pot’hen ye’areh], Rav and Shmuel disagree. One says: It means that they, i.e., their innards, were poured out [ye’areh] like a jug. And one says: That their orifices [pitḥeihen] were covered with hair as thick as a forest [ya’ar].,On the topic of the sins of Jerusalem and the abundance that existed before its destruction, Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The people of Jerusalem were people of arrogance. They would couch their crude behavior in euphemisms. A person would say to another: On what did you dine today? Well-kneaded bread or bread that is not well-kneaded? On white wine or
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on black wine? Sitting on a wide divan or on a narrow divan? With a good friend or a bad friend? And Rav Ḥisda said: And all these allude to promiscuity. These are all euphemisms for different types of women. Well-kneaded bread refers to a woman who is not a virgin; white wine refers to a fair-complexioned woman; a wide divan refers to a fat woman; a good friend refers to a good-looking woman.,On the topic of Jerusalem, Raḥava said that Rabbi Yehuda said: The logs of Jerusalem used for fuel were from the cinnamon tree, and when they would ignite them, their fragrance would waft through all of Eretz Yisrael. And since Jerusalem was destroyed, these fragrant logs were buried, and only a sliver the size of a grain of barley remains, and it is located in the treasury of [gazzai] Tzimtzemai the queen.,MISHNA: Just as it is prohibited for a woman to carry out certain items unique to a woman into the public domain, the Sages said that a man may neither go out on Shabbat with a sword, nor with a bow, nor with a shield [teris], nor with an alla, nor with a spear. And if he unwittingly went out with one of these weapons to the public domain he is liable to bring a sin-offering.,Rabbi Eliezer says: These weapons are ornaments for him; just as a man is permitted to go out into the public domain with other ornaments, he is permitted to go out with weapons.,And the Rabbis say: They are nothing other than reprehensible and in the future they will be eliminated, as it is written: “And they shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks; nation will not raise sword against nation, neither will they learn war anymore” (Isaiah 2:4).,With regard to women’s ornaments, they added that a garter placed on her leg to hold up stockings is pure and cannot become ritually impure as a utensil, and she may even go out with it on Shabbat.,However, ankle chains, which were also women’s ornaments, can become ritually impure, and she may not go out with them on Shabbat.,GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the term alla? It means club [kulpa].,We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: These weapons are ornaments for him. It was taught in a baraita that elaborates on this subject: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Eliezer: And since, in your opinion, they are ornaments for him, why are they to be eliminated in the messianic era? He said to them: They will not be needed anymore, as it is stated: “Nation will not raise sword against nation” (Isaiah 2:4). The Gemara asks: And let the weapons be merely for ornamental purposes, even though they will not be needed for war. Abaye said: It is just as in the case of a candle in the afternoon. Since its light is not needed, it serves no ornamental purpose. Weapons, too; when not needed for war, they serve no ornamental purpose either.,And this baraita disagrees with the opinion of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: The only difference between this world and the messianic era is subjugation of the exiles to other kingdoms, from which the Jewish people will be released. However, in other respects, the world will remain as it is, as it is written: “Because the poor will not cease from within the land” (Deuteronomy 15:11). Society will not change, and wars will continue to be waged.,However, this baraita supports the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba who disagrees with Shmuel. As Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said: All of the prophets only prophesied with regard to the messianic era; however, with regard to the World-to-Come it was stated: “No eye sees, God, except You, that which He will do for he that waits for Him” (Isaiah 64:3). What will be in the World-to-Come cannot be depicted even by means of prophecy.,And some say the disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis was different. They said to Rabbi Eliezer: Since in your opinion they are ornaments for him, why will they be eliminated in the messianic era? He said to them: Even in the messianic era they will not be eliminated. And that is in accordance with that which Shmuel stated that the world will remain fundamentally the same, and he disagrees with Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba.,Abaye said to Rav Dimi, and some say it was to Rav Avya, and some say Rav Yosef said to Rav Dimi, and some say it was to Rav Avya, and some say Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer who said: These weapons are ornaments for him? As it is written: “Gird your sword upon your thigh, mighty one, your glory and your splendor” (Psalms 45:4), indicating that a sword is considered an ornament.,The Gemara relates that some time later Rav Kahana said to Mar, son of Rav Huna: Is that really a proof? This verse is written in reference to matters of Torah and should be interpreted as a metaphor. He said to him: Nevertheless, a verse does not depart from its literal meaning, although there may be additional homiletical interpretations.,Rav Kahana said about this: When I was eighteen years old and had already learned the entire Talmud, and yet I did not know that a verse does not depart from its literal meaning until now. The Gemara asks: What is Rav Kahana teaching us with that statement? The Gemara answers: He comes to teach that a person should first learn and then understand the rationale.,Zarot is a mnemonic acronym for Elazar [zayin], Reish Lakish [reish], and their students [vav, tav], the amora'im who interpreted the verse in Psalms cited above,Rabbi Yirmeya said that Rabbi Elazar said: Two Torah scholars who sharpen one another in halakha; the Holy One, Blessed be He, ensures success for them, as it is written: “And in your majesty [vahadarkha] prosper, ride on, in behalf of truth and meekness and righteousness; and let your right hand teach you tremendous things” (Psalms 45:5). The Sages said:
Do not read “and your majesty [vahadarkha],” rather, by changing some of the vocalization and the letters, read it as and He will sharpen you [veḥidedkha], and ultimately you will be successful.
Moreover, they who act in that manner will rise to prominence, as it is written: “Prosper, ride on”.
I might have thought even if one engages in the study of Torah not for its own sake; therefore, the verse states: “On behalf of truth”.
I might have thought that one would be rewarded with prosperity even if he became arrogant; therefore, the verse states: “Meekness and righteousness”.
And if they do so in the proper manner they merit the Torah that was given with the right hand of the Holy One, Blessed be He, as it is written: “And let your right hand teach you tremendous things” (Psalms 45:5).,Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: They are rewarded with the matters stated with regard to the right hand of the Torah. As Rava bar Rav Sheila said and some say Rav Yosef bar Ḥama said that Rav Sheshet said: What is the meaning of that which is written, “Length of days is in her right hand and in her left hand are riches and honor” (Proverbs 3:16)? Is that to say, however, that in her right there is length of days, but there are not riches and honor? Rather, it means: Those who relate to it with the skilled right hand, i.e., who study Torah for its own sake and with proper intentions, there is length of days and all the more so riches and honor for them. Whereas, those who relate to it with the unskilled left hand, there are riches and honor; there is not length of days.,Rabbi Yirmeya said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Two Torah scholars who are agreeable to each other when engaging in discussions of halakha, the Holy One, Blessed be He, listens to them, as it is stated: “Then they that feared the Lord spoke [nidberu] one with another; and the Lord hearkened, and heard, and a book of remembrance was written before Him, for them that feared the Lord, and that thought upon His name” (Malachi 3:16). And the term speech [dibbur] means nothing other than calm, as it is stated: “He subdues [yadber] people under us” (Psalms 47:4). He will cause the nations to submit to the Jewish people leading to a period of calm. Here too the term dibbur indicates calm and agreeability.,The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase in that verse: “And those who thought of His name”? Rabbi Ami said: Even if one merely planned to perform a mitzva, and ultimately due to circumstances beyond his control did not perform that mitzva, the verse ascribes him credit as if he performed it.,The Gemara continues in praise of those who perform mitzvot: Rav Ḥinnana bar Idi said: Anyone who performs a mitzva as it was commanded, others do not apprise him of bad tidings, as it is stated: “He who keeps the commandment shall know no evil thing” (Ecclesiastes 8:5).,Rav Asi, and some say Rabbi Ḥanina said: Even if the Holy One, Blessed be He, issued a decree, He may abrogate it, as it is stated: “For the word of the King has authority and who may say to Him: What do You do?” (Ecclesiastes 8:4). And, although this indicates that even though the King, God, issued a decree, juxtaposed to it is the verse: “He who guards the commandment shall know no evil thing” (Ecclesiastes 8:5). For one who observes mitzvot properly, the decree is abrogated and he will know no evil.,Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Two Torah scholars who listen to each other in the discussion of halakha, the Holy One, Blessed be He, hears their voice, as it is stated: “You who dwell in gardens, the companions heed your voice, cause me to hear it” (Song of Songs 8:13).,And if they do not do so, i.e., they do not listen to each other, they cause the Divine Presence to depart from among Israel, as it is stated in the following verse: “Run away, my beloved, and be like a gazelle or a young hart upon the mountains of spices” (Song of Songs 8:14).,Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Two individual Torah scholars who, while studying together, cause one another to err [madgilim] in halakha [Tosafot], nevertheless, the Holy One, Blessed be He, loves them, as it is stated: “And his banner [vediglo] over me is love” (Song of Songs 2:4). Rava said: And that is only true in a case where they know the foundation of the law, and their error resulted from the lack of more sophisticated knowledge. And that is only true in a case where they do not have a prominent person in the city from whom they could learn without error.,Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: One who loans another money is greater than one who gives him charity. And the one who places money into a common purse, i.e., one who enters into a partnership with a needy person, is the greatest of them all, since in that case the needy person is not embarrassed when receiving the assistance.,Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Even if a Torah scholar is as vengeful and begrudging as a snake, wrap him tightly around your waist, i.e., keep him close, because you will benefit from his Torah. On the other hand, even if an am ha’aretz is righteous, do not dwell in his neighborhood, as his righteousness does not compensate for the fact that he is ignorant.,Rav Kahana said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said, and some say Rav Asi said that Reish Lakish said, and some say Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Anyone who raises an evil dog within his home prevents kindness from entering into his home, since poor people will hesitate to enter his house. As it is alluded to in the verse: “To him that is afflicted [lamas],

kindness from his friend and awe of the Almighty will leave” (Job 6:14), since in the Greek language they call a dog lamas. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: One who keeps an evil dog in his home even divests himself of fear of Heaven, as it is stated at the end of that verse: “And awe of the Almighty will leave”.,The Gemara relates: A certain pregnant woman who entered to use the oven in a certain house to bake, the dog in that house barked at her, and her fetus was displaced. The owner of the house said to her: Do not be afraid because his teeth have been removed and his claws have been removed. She said to him: Take your goodness and throw it on the thorns. Your encouragement is useless as the fetus has already been displaced and will certainly die.,On a related note, Rav Huna said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Rejoice young man in your youth, and let your heart cheer you in the days of your youth, and walk in the ways of your heart and in the sight of your eyes; but know that for all these things God will bring you to judgment” (Ecclesiastes 11:9)? Until here, “the sight of your eyes,” these are the words of the evil inclination; from here on, “but know that, etc.,” these are the words of the good inclination.,Reish Lakish said: Until here, the verse refers to matters of Torah. One is provided the opportunity to study and involve himself in the Torah and rejoice in its innovations; from here on, “but know that, etc.,” it refers to good deeds. One will ultimately stand trial for that which he studied and did not implement.,We learned in the mishna that a garter is pure. Rav Yehuda said: Garter; that is a bracelet worn on the arm.,Rav Yosef raised an objection: It is stated here that a garter is pure and a woman may go out with it on Shabbat, while a bracelet is ritually impure. It is mentioned explicitly in the verse enumerating the spoils of the war with the Midianites: “And we have brought the Lord’s offering, what every man has gotten, of jewels of gold, armlets, and bracelets, signet rings, earrings, and girdles, to make atonement for our souls before the Lord” (Numbers 31:50). Earlier in that chapter it is written with regard to the spoils: “Purify yourselves on the third day and on the seventh day both you and your captives” (Numbers 31:19). Apparently, a bracelet can become ritually impure.,Rather, this is what Rav Yehuda is saying: A garter on the leg is in place of a bracelet on the arm. It goes around the leg to hold a stocking in place just as a bracelet goes around the arm. However, unlike a bracelet, a garter cannot become ritually impure because it is not an ornament. It simply holds up the stocking.,The Gemara relates: Ravin and Rav Huna were sitting before Rav Yirmeya. And Rav Yirmeya was sitting and dozing as the two students conversed. And Ravin sat and said: The difference between a garter and ankle chains is that a garter is worn on one leg, and ankle chains are worn on two legs.,Rav Huna said to him: These garters and those ankle chains are both worn on two legs. And when she wears garters on both legs they place a chain between them, and they become vessels with the legal status equal to that of ankle chains.,And Ravin asked: And does the chain that is connected to it render it a vessel? If a garter without a chain is not considered a vessel, why would the addition of a chain render it a vessel that can become ritually impure?,And if you say the reason for this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani, as Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: From where is it derived that a metal vessel that makes a sound is considered a vessel and can become ritually impure? As it is stated: “Every thing that passes through the fire, you shall make it pass through the fire, and it shall be clean; nevertheless it shall be purified with the water of sprinkling; and all that does not pass through the fire you shall make to go through water” (Numbers 31:23). And the Sages interpret the verse homiletically: Every thing [davar], even speech [dibbur]; in other words, even an object that makes a sound shall pass through fire to become purified because it is a vessel.,However, this case is not similar. Granted, there, they require the vessel for the purpose of its sound and it performs an action. However, here, what action does the chain perform? Although it creates a sound, the chain serves no purpose.,He said to him: Here, too, the chain is performing a purposeful action, as Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There was one family in Jerusalem whose daughters’ strides were lengthy, and as a result their hymen membranes would fall away. In order to solve this problem they made them ankle chains and they hung a chain between them so that their strides would not be so large and, indeed, their hymen membranes would no longer fall away. Meanwhile, Rabbi Yirmeya awoke from their voices and said to them: Correct, and Rabbi Yoḥanan said likewise.,On the topic of ritual impurity, the Gemara relates: When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: From where is it derived that a woven fabric of any size can become ritually impure? It is derived from the frontplate [tzitz] of the High Priest, which is considered a vessel despite its small size.,Abaye said to him: And is the frontplate a woven fabric? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: The frontplate is made like a kind of smooth plate of gold, and its width is two fingerbreadths, and it encircles the forehead from ear to ear. And on it is written in two lines: Yod heh, i.e., the Tetragrammaton, above, and kodesh lamed, i.e., sacred to, below. Thus, the words: Sacred to God, were written on the frontplate. In deference to the name of God, it would be written on the top line, and the words: Sacred to, on the line below.,And Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: I saw it in the Caesar’s treasury in the city of Rome and Sacred to God was written on one line. In any case, since the frontplate is a gold plate, how can it serve as a source for ritual impurity in fabrics?,When Rav Dimi ascended to Neharde’a, he sent to the yeshiva students: The statements I said to you with regard to woven fabrics of any size becoming ritually impure regardless of their size, they are my mistake. However, this is what they said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: From where is it derived that an ornament of any size can become ritually impure? It is derived from the frontplate. And from where is it derived that a woven fabric of any size can become ritually impure? It is derived from the verse: “Or a garment or leather or sack; any vessel with which any work is done must be put into water and it shall be unclean until evening, then it shall be clean” (Leviticus 11:32). From the extraneous phrase, “or a garment,” it is derived that any garment, regardless how small, falls into this category.,Similarly, the Sages taught in a baraita: A woven fabric of any size can become ritually impure, and an ornament of any size can become ritually impure. An object that is half woven fabric and half ornament of any size can become ritually impure. And a sack is added to the category of garment; it too is ritually impure due to woven fabric.,Rava said in explanation of the baraita: A woven fabric of any size is ritually impure as derived from the phrase “or a garment”. An ornament of any size is ritually impure, as derived from the halakhot of the frontplate. A woven fabric and an ornament of any size is ritually impure, as derived from that which is stated: “And Moses and Elazar the priest took the gold from them, all vessels with which labor is done” (Numbers 31:51). Any object that can be utilized for any action falls into the category of: All vessels with which labor is done.,One of the Sages said to Rava: That verse is written with regard to Midian. There it is referring specifically to ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, and how is it possible to derive from that halakhot of ritual impurity in general?,Rava said to him: He derived by means of a verbal analogy

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from the word vessel written there, with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, and the word vessel written with regard to the halakhot of other impurities.,It was taught in the baraita that a sack is added to the category of “garment”; it too is ritually impure due to woven fabric. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that a garment is not a woven fabric? Rather, the statement should be emended and say as follows: A sack made from goat hair is added to the category of garment; even though it is not woven it can nevertheless become ritually impure. The Gemara asks: For what is a garment made of unwoven goat hair suitable? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Since a poor person occasionally braids three goat hairs and hangs it on his daughter’s neck as an ornament.,The Sages taught a detailed halakhic exposition of that verse in a different baraita. From the fact that the verse mentioned sack, I have only derived that a whole sack can become ritually impure. From where is it derived to include even reins [kilkeli] and a saddle band fastened under the horse’s belly in the category of those objects that can become ritually impure? The verse states: “Or sack”; “or” teaches that the verse is referring to items similar to a sack as well. I might have thought, on that basis, that I should include even the ropes and measuring cords. The verse states: “Sack,” just as a sack is spun and woven, so too, everything that is spun and woven can become ritually impure. Ropes and measuring cords are not made from spun threads, and they are certainly not woven.,The baraita continues: Now, it says with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity imparted by a corpse: “And every garment and all that is made of skins and all work of goats’ hair and all things made of wood you shall purify” (Numbers 31:20). This verse comes to include reins and the band under the horse’s belly within the category of: All work of goats’ hair. They too can become ritually impure.,I might have thought that I would include even the ropes and thin cords in this category. The Gemara begins with a logical analysis. And it may be inferred logically to the contrary, that a rope cannot become impure. The verse deemed impure an object that came in contact with a creeping animal, and it deemed impure an object that came in contact with a corpse. Just as when it rendered an object impure from contact with a creeping animal it only rendered impure objects spun and woven, as stated above; so too, when it rendered impure an object from contact with a corpse, it only rendered impure objects spun and woven.,There is room to distinguish: Are these indeed comparable? If the Torah was lenient with regard to the ritual impurity of an object that came in contact with a creeping animal, which is a less severe form of impurity, saying that ropes do not become impure from contact with that form of ritual impurity, will we be lenient with regard to ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, which is more severe? Perhaps, since impurity imparted by a corpse is more severe, even objects not woven and spun, e.g., ropes, become ritually impure from contact with it. Therefore, the verse states garment and leather, garment and leather to establish a verbal analogy.,The term garment and leather is stated with regard to ritual impurity imparted by a creeping animal: “And whatever any of them falls upon when they are dead will be impure whether it be any vessel of wood, or a garment, or leather, or sack, whatever vessel it be with which any work is done it must be put into water and it will be impure until evening, then it will be clean” (Leviticus 11:32). And garment and leather is stated with regard to ritual impurity imparted by a corpse. Just as garment and leather stated with regard to a creeping animal only rendered impure objects that are spun and woven, so too, garment and leather stated with regard to a corpse only rendered impure objects that are spun and woven.,Utilizing the same verbal analogy, one could say: And just as garment and leather stated with regard to a corpse rendered impure any object that is the work of goats’ hair, so too, garment and leather stated with regard to a creeping animal rendered impure any object that is the work of goats’ hair.,I have only derived from this verbal analogy that an object that comes from goats can become ritually impure; from where do I derive to include an item that comes from a horse’s tail or from a cow’s tail? The verse states: Or a sack, and anything like a sack, i.e., these other items as well.,The Gemara asks: Didn’t you already derive ritual impurity with regard to reins and a saddle band from this verse? How can ritual impurity for items that come from a horse’s tail and a cow’s tail be derived from the same verse?,The Gemara answers: That applies only before the verbal analogy was cited; now that the verbal analogy was cited, the verse is rendered extraneous. The fact that any item that falls in the category of: “And all work of goats’ hair,” can become ritually impure is derived from the verbal analogy. Reins and a saddle bands are included in the category of work of goats’ hair. Therefore, they need not be derived from that phrase. Consequently, a different halakha can be derived from that extraneous phrase: Objects that come from a horse’s tail or a cow’s tail can become ritually impure.,The baraita continues: And I have derived that an object made from a horse’s tail can become impure only with regard to a creeping animal; however, with regard to a corpse, from where is this derived?,The Gemara begins with a logical analysis. And it may be inferred logically that this is so. The Torah rendered impure a sack that came into contact with a corpse and rendered impure a sack that came into contact with a creeping animal. Just as when the Torah rendered items that came into contact with a creeping animal impure it made the legal status of that which comes from a horse’s tail and a cow’s tail equal to the legal status of that which is made from goats’ hair, i.e., that it contracts ritual impurity, so too when the Torah rendered impure items that came into contact with a corpse, it made the legal status of that which comes from a horse’s tail and a cow’s tail equal to the legal status of that which is made from goats’ hair.,The Gemara rejects this: Are these indeed comparable? If the verse added additional objects to the category of ritual impurity that lasts until nightfall, e.g., the impurity imparted by a creeping animal, which is extensive, will we add additional objects to the category of ritual impurity that lasts for seven days, which is limited to the case of impurity from a corpse? The fact that items made of a horse’s tail or a cow’s tail are added to the already broad category of ritual impurity that lasts until nightfall is not necessarily an indication that they are to be added to the category of ritual impurity that lasts seven days.,The verse states: Garment and leather, garment and leather to establish a verbal analogy. Garment and leather is stated with regard to ritual impurity imparted by a creeping animal, and garment and leather is stated with regard to ritual impurity imparted by a corpse. Just as with regard to the garment and leather stated in the halakhot of a creeping animal the Torah rendered the legal status of an item made from a horse’s tail or a cow’s tail equal to the legal status of that which is made from goats’ hair, so too, with regard to the garment and leather stated in the halakhot of a corpse, the Torah rendered the legal status of an item made from a horse’s tail or a cow’s tail equal to the legal status of that which is made from goats’ hair.,The Gemara notes: And it must be that the words garment and leather are free. Those terms must be superfluous in their context. The Torah included those terms for the express purpose of establishing the verbal analogy. A verbal analogy that is based on otherwise extraneous terms cannot be logically refuted. Because if these terms are not free, the verbal analogy can be refuted: What is unique to a creeping animal? Its ritual impurity is stringent in that it renders objects ritually impure even by means of contact with a lentil-bulk of a creeping animal. That is not the case with regard to a corpse, which is less severe in that it renders objects ritually impure only by means of contact with an olive-bulk of a corpse. Unless the terms are free, the analogy can be refuted.,Indeed [la’ei], they are free. The Gemara proves that the terms garment and leather are extraneous in their context. Now, since ritual impurity from contact with a creeping animal is juxtaposed to ritual impurity from contact with semen, as it is written: “And whoever touches anything that is impure by the dead or a man from whom semen is emitted” (Leviticus 22:4), and juxtaposed to that is the verse: “Or whoever touches any creeping animal which makes him impure, or a person who may make him impure with any impurity that he has” (Leviticus 22:5). And it is written in the halakhot of the ritual impurity of semen: “And every garment and every hide on which the semen is must be washed with water and will be impure until evening” (Leviticus 15:17). Since the verses appear next to each other, the halakhot of each can be derived from the other. Consequently, the words garment and leather, which the Torah wrote with regard to a creeping animal, why do I need them? The relevant halakha could be derived from the halakhot of seminal impurity. Learn from it that garment and leather were mentioned to render them free.,The Gemara comments: And still, it is free only from one side of the verbal analogy. Although the terms garment and leather stated with regard to ritual impurity imparted by a creeping animal are extraneous in their context, and the relevant halakha could have been derived in another manner, those terms stated with regard to ritual impurity imparted by a corpse are not extraneous in their context. This verbal analogy is only free from one side. It works out well according to the opinion of the one who said, with regard to a verbal analogy that is free from only one side, one can derive from it and cannot refute it logically. However, according to the opinion of the one who said that one can derive from a verbal analogy of this kind and one can refute it logically, what can be said?,The Gemara answers: Garment and leather stated with regard to impurity imparted by a corpse are also free. Now, since a corpse is juxtaposed with semen, as it is written: “And whoever touches anything that is impure by the dead or a man whose semen is emitted from him” (Leviticus 22:4); and it is stated with regard to semen: “And every garment and every hide” (Leviticus 15:17); the terms garment and leather, which the Torah wrote with regard to ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, why do I need them? Learn from it that they are mentioned in order to render them free. These terms are extraneous in their context, and were written for the purpose of the verbal analogy with the halakhot of creeping animals.,The Gemara interprets verses written with regard to the Midianite war discussed above: “And we have brought an offering before the Lord what every man has gotten of jewels of gold, chains, and bracelets, rings, agil, and kumaz, to make atonement for our souls before the Lord” (Numbers 31:50). Rabbi Elazar said: Agil is a mold in the shape of a woman’s breasts worn over them as an ornament. Kumaz is a mold in the shape of the womb.,Rav Yosef said: If so, that is the reason that we translate kumaz into Aramaic as maḥokh, meaning an item that leads to foolishness. Rabba said to him: This meaning is learned from the verse itself; kumaz is an acronym for: Here [kan] is the place of [mekom] lewdness [zimma].,Later in that chapter, it is written: “And Moses was angry with the officers of the host, the captains over thousands, and captains over hundreds, who came from the battle” (Numbers 31:14); Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said that Moses said to Israel: Perhaps you have returned to your original sinful behavior, when you sinned with the daughters of Moab and Midian at Shittim? They said to him: “Not one man of us is missing” (Numbers 31:49), we remain as wholesome in deed as we were. He said to them: If so, why do you need atonement? The princes brought these ornaments to atone for their souls. They said to him: If we have emerged from the grasps of actual transgression, we have not emerged from the grasps of thoughts of transgression. Immediately, they decided: “And we have brought an offering before the Lord”.,The Sage of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: For what reason did Israel in that generation require atonement? Because

they nourished their eyes from nakedness.,With regard to the verse that lists the ornaments, Rav Sheshet said: For what reason did the verse list outer ornaments, i.e., a bracelet, with inner ornaments, i.e., a kumaz? To tell you that anyone who gazes upon a woman’s little finger is considered as if he gazed upon her naked genitals. The atonement was for the sin of looking.,MISHNA: The mishna continues to discuss those items with which it is permitted to go out and those items with which it is prohibited to go out on Shabbat. A woman may go out with strands of hair that she put on her head, whether they are from her own hair that she made into a wig, or whether they are from the hair of another, or whether they are from the hair of an animal.,And a woman may go out with an ornament called totefet, and with sarvitin when they are sewn and will not fall.,She may go out on Shabbat with a woolen cap or with a wig to the courtyard, although not to the public domain. And likewise she may go out with a cloth that is in her ear, and with a cloth in her sandal, and with a cloth that she placed due to her menstrual status.,She may go out on Shabbat with pepper, or with a grain of salt, or anything placed in her mouth for healing or for preventing bad odor, as long as she does not put these objects in her mouth for the first time on Shabbat. And if it fell out she may not replace it.,A false tooth as well as (Ramban) a gold tooth, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permits going out with it, and the Rabbis prohibit doing so.,GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that a woman may go out with different strands of hair. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to cite all of the cases. If the mishna taught us only with regard to her own hair, I would have said that she may go out with it because it is not repulsive, as it is her own hair; therefore, there is no concern lest she come to remove the strands and carry them in the public domain. However, the hair of another, which is repulsive and a different color from hers, say no, she may not go out with it, due to concern lest she be embarrassed, remove it, and come to carry it in the public domain.,And if the mishna taught us that she is permitted to go out with the hair of another, I would have said that she may go out with it because it is hair of her own kind. Therefore, it is not repulsive in her eyes and she will not come to remove it. However, the hair of an animal, since it is not of her own kind, say no, she may not go out with it due to concern lest she remove it. Therefore, it is necessary to cite all three cases.,It was taught in the Tosefta: It is permitted as long as a girl does not go out with the hair of an elderly woman, and an elderly woman does not go out with the hair of a girl.,The Gemara challenges: Granted, the Gemara cited the case of an elderly woman who goes out with the hair of a girl, as it is a reasonable scenario because it is flattering for her to look young. However, why would a girl go out with the hair of an elderly woman? Since it is demeaning for her to appear elderly, it is an unlikely scenario. The Gemara answers: Since the mishna taught the case of an elderly woman with the hair of a girl, it also taught the improbable case of a girl with the hair of an elderly woman.,It was taught in the mishna that a woman may go out with a woolen cap or with a wig to the courtyard. Rav said: With regard to all ornaments and garments with which the Sages prohibited going out into the public domain on Shabbat, it is also prohibited to go out with them into the courtyard due to the concern lest she forget and go out to the street, with the exception of a woolen cap and a wig.,Rabbi Anani bar Sason said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: All ornaments have the same legal status as a woolen cap and may be worn into the courtyard.,We learned in the mishna that it is permitted to go out with a woolen cap or a wig into the courtyard. Granted, according to the opinion of Rav the matter works out well, as the mishna allows one to go out into a courtyard only with a woolen cap and a wig. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Anani bar Sason, it is difficult. The Gemara answers: In whose name did Rabbi Anani bar Sason say his halakha? In the name of Rabbi Yishmael bar Yosei, and Rabbi Yishmael bar Yosei is a tanna and, as such, has the authority to dispute the determination in the mishna.,The Gemara asks: And according to Rav, what is different about these, the woolen cap and the wig, that the mishna permitted going out into the courtyard with them? Ulla said: So that she will not become unappealing to her husband. That would be the result if all ornamentation was prohibited. As it was taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And of her that is sick in her menstrual status [niddata]” (Leviticus 15:33), the Elders of the early generations said that this verse comes to teach us that the menstruating woman should be distanced from her husband in all senses, like a person ostracized [menudeh] by the Sages. This includes that she may not paint her eyes blue, and she may not rouge [pokeset] her face, and she may not adorn herself with colorful clothing. Until Rabbi Akiva came and taught: If you do so, you are making her unappealing to her husband, and her husband will consequently divorce her. Therefore, extreme strictures should not be instituted. Rather, what is the meaning of that which the verse states: “And of her that is sick in her menstrual status”? She shall remain prohibited in her menstrual status even after the flow of blood has stopped until she immerses in the water of a ritual bath.,Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Wherever the Sages prohibited an action due to the appearance of prohibition, even in the innermost chambers, where no one will see it, it is prohibited. When prohibiting an action, the Sages did not distinguish between different circumstances. They prohibited performing the action in all cases.,The Gemara raises an objection. We learned in the mishna that an animal belonging to a Jew may not go out on Shabbat with a bell around its neck, even though it is plugged and makes no sound, due to the appearance of prohibition, as it appears as if he were taking the animal to the marketplace. And it was taught in another baraita: He may plug the bell on the animal’s neck and walk with it in the courtyard. Apparently, although the Sages prohibited this action due to the appearance of prohibition, they permitted it in the courtyard.,The Gemara answers: It is subject to a dispute between tanna’im in this matter, as it was taught in a baraita:
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One whose clothes fell into water on a Festival may not dry them in the conventional manner; however, he may spread them out in the sun, but not before the people, who may suspect that he laundered his clothes on Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon prohibit doing so even in a place concealed from view. Apparently, the Sages disagree whether or not an action prohibited due to the appearance of prohibition is prohibited everywhere.,We learned in the mishna that a woman may go out on Shabbat with a cloth that is in her ear. Rami bar Yeḥezkel taught: And that is specifically in a case where the cloth is tied to her ear and she will not come to carry it.,The mishna continues: A woman may go out with a cloth that is in her sandal. Rami bar Yeḥezkel taught: And that is specifically in a case where the cloth is tied to her sandal.,We learned in the mishna: A woman may go out with a cloth that she placed due to her menstrual flow. Rami bar Ḥama considered saying that it is permitted specifically in a case where it is tied between her thighs. Rava said: It is permitted even though it is not tied to her; since it is repulsive, she will not come to carry it even if it falls.,Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma before Rabbi Abba: If she made herself a handgrip in which she could hold the cloth, what is the halakha? Since she does not have to touch the cloth with her bare hand, is there concern that she will come to carry it or not? He said to him: It is permitted. It was also stated that Rav Naḥman bar Oshaya said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If she made herself a handgrip it is permitted.,Rabbi Yoḥanan went out with a cloth in his ear to the study hall on Shabbat, and his colleagues are in disagreement with him and rule that it is prohibited to do so because it was not tied to his ear. Rabbi Yannai went out with it, a cloth in his ear, to a karmelit, an intermediate domain, neither public nor private. And all the Sages of his generation are in disagreement with him. The Gemara asks: Didn’t Rami bar Yeḥezkel teach: And that is specifically in a case where the cloth is tied to her ear? How could these Sages ignore this halakha? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; this, where it was taught that certain Sages went out with a cloth, is in a case where it was stuck tightly in their ears. Therefore, it was permitted even though it was not tied. That, where Rami bar Yeḥezkel said that going out with a cloth is permitted only when it is tied, is in a case where it was not stuck tightly in his ear.,We learned in the mishna: A woman may go out with pepper and with a grain of salt in her mouth. The Gemara explains: She places pepper in her mouth to prevent mouth odor and a grain of salt to treat a toothache. With regard to that which we learned in the mishna: A woman may go out on Shabbat with any thing that she places in her mouth: This refers to ginger or, alternatively, to cinnamon [dartzona].,We learned in the mishna that the Sages disagree whether or not a woman may go out on Shabbat with a false tooth and a gold tooth; Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permits doing so and the Rabbis prohibit doing so. Rabbi Zeira said: They only taught the dispute with regard to a gold tooth. Since it is precious, she might remove it from her mouth to show her friends and come to carry it. However, with regard to a silver tooth,which is less precious, there is no concern that she will remove it from her mouth. Everyone agrees that it is permitted. That opinion was also taught in a baraita: With regard to a tooth made of silver, everyone agrees that it is permitted. With regard to a tooth of gold, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permits going out with it and the Rabbis prohibit going out with it.,Abaye said: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and Rabbi Eliezer, and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar all hold that anything that makes her unappealing when removed, she will not come to remove it and show it to others. Therefore, it is permitted for her to go out with it.,The Gemara elaborates: The opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is that which we just stated. The opinion of Rabbi Eliezer is as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer exempts a woman who went out with a bundle of fragrant herbs and with a flask of balsam oil, since a woman whose odor is foul does not remove and show the bundle to others.,The opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar is as it was taught in a baraita. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: Anything that is worn beneath the net, a woman may go out into the public domain with it, since a woman will not uncover her hair while in the public domain even to show off an ornament. Anything that is worn over the net, e.g., an ornamental hat, a woman may not go out with it, since there is concern that she will remove it and carry it.,MISHNA: A woman may go out with a sela coin that she ties on a wound on her foot. The young girls may go out with strings, and even with wood chips that are in the holes in their ears so that the holes will not seal. Young girls would have their ears pierced, but earrings were not placed in their ears until they were older. Jewish women in Arab countries may go out veiled, with a scarf covering their face, and Jewish women in Media may go out with cloaks fastened with stones. And, any person in any place is permitted to go out on Shabbat clothed in that way; however, the Sages spoke in the present, addressing prevalent situations. A woman may fasten her cloak on a stone by inserting a small stone and wrapping her cloak around it, as she would with a button. And likewise, she may do so on a nut or on a coin, as long as she does not fasten her cloak with them on Shabbat ab initio.,GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the tzinit with regard to which the mishna taught that a woman may go out with a coin tied to it on Shabbat? The Gemara explains: It is a wound on the sole of her foot.,The Gemara asks: What is different about a sela? Why specifically is a coin placed on the wound? If you say that any object that is hard is beneficial for her, make an earthenware shard for her instead. Rather, it is beneficial due to the rust on the coin. If so, make a small silver plate for her. Why specifically a coin? Rather it is beneficial due to the image engraved on the coin. If so, make her an unminted coin and engrave an image on it. Abaye said: Learn from it that all these factors together are beneficial for her.,The mishna taught that the young girls may go out with strings. The Gemara relates that Shmuel’s father did not allow his daughters to go out with strings, and did not allow them to lie next to each other, and he made ritual baths for them in the days of Nisan and mats in the Euphrates River in the days of Tishrei. Since the water was shallow and the riverbed muddy, he placed mats on the riverbed so that they could immerse without getting dirty.,The Gemara analyzes the conduct of Shmuel’s father: He did not allow them to go out with strings. Didn’t we learn in the mishna that the girls may go out with strings? The Gemara answers: The strings with which the daughters of Shmuel’s father went out were colorful ones, and he was concerned that because the strings were beautiful they would come to remove them to show them to others and carry them.,He did not allow them to lie next to one another. Let us say that this supports the opinion of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna said: Women who rub against one another motivated by sexual desire

are disqualified from marrying into the priesthood. The act renders a woman a zona. It is prohibited for a priest to marry her (Tosafot).,The Gemara rejects this: No, that is not necessarily so. Perhaps the reason for Shmuel’s father’s insistence was because he thought to prevent them from lying next to one another so that they would not become accustomed to sleeping with a foreign body, which could stimulate sexual desire.,And he made a ritual bath for them in the days of Nisan. This supports the opinion of Rav, as Rav said: When rain falls in the West, Eretz Yisrael, the great witness attesting to that fact is the Euphrates, as the water flow in the Euphrates increases after the rainy season. The rainfall in northern Babylonia, where the source of the Euphrates is located, is essentially parallel to the rainfall in Eretz Yisrael. The increased water flow of the Euphrates in the spring is the result of the rainfall in the winter. Shmuel’s father held that immersion in the Euphrates would not purify them. A river maintains its status as a river in terms of purification through immersion only if it is established that the rain water that fell would not exceed the naturally flowing spring water. In the halakhot of ritual baths, there are two manners of purification. The first is the immersion in a place where water is gathered, e.g., collected rainwater that does not flow and remains in place. The second is immersion in flowing waters in their natural state, e.g., a spring or a river. However, rainwater purifies only when it is collected; it does not purify when it is flowing.,And he disagrees with his son Shmuel, as Shmuel said: The river is blessed from its riverbed (ge’onim); the additional water in the river is not from rainfall but rather from subterranean sources. And this statement of Shmuel disagrees with another ruling that he himself issued, as Shmuel said: The water purifies when flowing only in the Euphrates during the days of Tishrei alone. Since rain does not fall in the summer, only then is it clear that the water is in fact river water.,We learned in the mishna: A woman may fasten her cloak on a stone, and on a nut, and on a coin, as long as she does not fasten her cloak with them ab initio on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: Didn’t you say in the first clause of this halakha in the mishna that a woman may fasten, indicating that she is permitted to do so even ab initio? How do you explain the contradiction? Abaye said: In the latter clause of the mishna we have arrived at the case of a coin, one of the examples cited in the mishna. The halakha with regard to a coin is the exception. Because a coin is set-aside from use on Shabbat, one might conclude that it may not be used at all; nevertheless, it is only prohibited to fasten the cloak on the coin ab initio on Shabbat itself.,Abaye raised a dilemma: What is the halakha with regard to a case where a woman employs artifice to circumvent the halakha and fastens her garment on a nut in order to take the nut out in a permissible fashion to her young child in the public domain on Shabbat?,The Gemara notes: This is a dilemma according to the one who said that one may employ artifice when there is a fire on Shabbat. One is permitted to wear several layers of garments to take them out of a burning house on Shabbat. And this is a dilemma according to the one who said that one may not employ artifice when there is a fire on Shabbat.,The Gemara elaborates: This is a dilemma according to the one who said that one may employ artifice when there is a fire on Shabbat, as the cases are distinct. Perhaps there, artifice is permitted because if you do not permit him to take the garments out of the burning house in that manner, he will come to extinguish the fire. However, here, if you do not permit the woman to employ artifice and take the nut out to her child in the public domain, she will not come to take it out.,Or perhaps, even according to one who said that one may not employ artifice in the case of a fire, there is a distinction between the cases. There, in the case of a fire, wearing garments is the typical manner in which one takes clothing out to the public domain. However, here, utilizing a nut as a button is not the typical manner in which one takes a nut out to the public domain. Since no Torah prohibition is violated by doing so, say that she may well employ artifice to take the nut out to her son. The Gemara concludes: Let this dilemma stand unresolved.,MISHNA: One with an amputated leg may go out on Shabbat with his wooden leg, as it has the legal status of a shoe; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
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And Rabbi Yosei prohibits going out into the public domain with the wooden leg, since he does not consider it to have the legal status of a shoe.,And if the wooden leg has a receptacle for pads, a concave space at the top of the leg into which pads are placed to cushion the amputated leg, it assumes the status of a wooden vessel and can become ritually impure.,And his supports, which are shoes that one who had both of his feet amputated places on his knees in order to walk on his knees, if a zav wears them, they are subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading. A zav is a primary source of ritual impurity. If he touches a vessel it assumes first-degree ritual impurity status. However, vessels on which he treads, sits, lies, or leans become primary sources of ritual impurity, provided they are designated for that purpose. These supports are vessels designated for treading. And one may go out with them into the public domain on Shabbat since they have the legal status of shoes. And one may enter the Temple courtyard with them. Although, generally, wearing shoes in the Temple courtyard is prohibited, in this regard, the supports do not have the legal status of shoes.,However, if one who is crippled to the extent that he cannot walk at all sits on a chair that is attached to him, places supports on his hands, and propels himself along with his hands, his chair and supports are subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading. And one may not go out with them on Shabbat, and one may not enter the Temple courtyard with them.,Loketamin, which will be explained in the Gemara, are ritually pure in the sense that they cannot become ritually impure because they are not vessels, and one may not go out with them on Shabbat.,GEMARA: Rava said to Rav Naḥman: How did we learn the dispute in our mishna? Does Rabbi Meir rule that the amputee may go out with a wooden leg and foot and Rabbi Yosei prohibits him from doing so? Or is it Rabbi Meir who prohibited him from doing so, and Rabbi Yosei’s opinion is the lenient one? Rav Naḥman said to him: I don’t know. And Rava asked: What is the halakha in this matter? Rav Naḥman said to him: I don’t know.,It was stated: Shmuel said that the correct reading of the mishna is: An amputee may not go out, and Rabbi Yosei permits him to do so. And, likewise, Rav Huna said that the correct reading of the mishna is: An amputee may not. Rav Yosef said: Since Shmuel said that the correct reading of the mishna is: An amputee may not, and Rav Huna said: An amputee may not, we will also learn the mishna: An amputee may not.,Rava bar Shira strongly objects to this: And did they not hear that Rav Ḥanan bar Rava taught the mishna to Ḥiyya bar Rav before Rav in a small room [kituna] in the school of Rav: An amputee may not go out on Shabbat with his wooden leg; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Yosei permits going out with it. And Rav signaled him with a hand gesture to reverse the opinions, Rabbi Meir permits going out and Rabbi Yosei prohibits doing so. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: And the mnemonic to remember which tanna permits and which tanna prohibits is samekh samekh. The letter samekh appears both in the name Yosei and in the Hebrew word for prohibits [oser]. In that way, one remembers that Rabbi Yosei is the one who prohibits it.,The Gemara comments: And even Shmuel, who said that the correct reading of the mishna is: An amputee may not, and Rabbi Yosei permits it, reversed his opinion. As we learned in a mishna: The ḥalitza ceremony, which frees a childless widow from the obligation to enter into levirate marriage with her brother-in-law, involves the widow removing her brother-in-law’s sandal from his foot. If she removed a sandal that is not his, or a wooden sandal, or the sandal of the left foot that was on his right foot, the ḥalitza is valid.,And we said: Who is the tanna who holds that a wooden sandal is considered a shoe for this purpose? Shmuel said: It is Rabbi Meir, as we learned in a mishna: An amputee may go out with his wooden leg, this is the statement of Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Yosei prohibits doing so. Ultimately, Shmuel accepted Rav’s reading of the mishna.,And Rav Huna also reversed his opinion, as it was taught in a baraita: With regard to a plasterers’ sandal worn by those who work with lime and would cover their leather shoes with a shoe woven from straw or reeds so that the leather shoes would not get ruined by the lime. If the plasterer is a zav and walks with his shoes covered, the shoe covering is subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading, as the legal status of that sandal is that of a shoe. A woman may perform ḥalitza with it, and one may go out with it on Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis did not agree with him.,The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that they agreed with him? Rav Huna said in resolution of this apparent contradiction: Who is the Sage whose opinion is referred to in the phrase: They agreed with him? It is Rabbi Meir. And who is the Sage whose opinion is referred to in the phrase: They did not agree with him? It is Rabbi Yosei. Even Rav Huna accepted Rav’s reading of the mishna that Rabbi Yosei prohibits going out with a wooden leg.,Rav Yosef said: Who is the Sage whose opinion is referred to in the phrase: They did not agree with Rabbi Akiva? It is Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri. As we learned in a mishna: A receptacle made of straw and a tube made of reeds, Rabbi Akiva deems these vessels capable of becoming ritually impure, and Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri deems them pure, i.e., incapable of becoming ritually impure because they are not vessels. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, straw objects are not considered vessels fit for use.,It was taught in a baraita that the Master said: A plasterers’ sandal is subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading. The Gemara asks: How could that be? These sandals are not made for walking. Rav Aḥa bar Rav Ulla said: They are used for walking, as, at times, the plasterer walks in them until he reaches his house.,We learned in the mishna: And if the wooden leg has a receptacle for pads, it is capable of becoming ritually impure. Abaye said: It is subject to ritual impurity due to contact with ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, and it is not subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading. If a zav uses a wooden leg it merely assumes first-degree ritual impurity status, since he cannot lean all his weight on it. Rava said: The artificial foot is even subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading.,Rava said: From where do I derive to say this halakha? As we learned in a mishna: The wagon of a small child utilized to teach him to walk (Tosafot) is subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading, since its purpose is to lean on it. And Abaye said: The two cases are not comparable. There, in the case of the wagon, he leans all his weight on it; here, in the case of the wooden leg, he does not lean all his weight on it.,Abaye said: From where do I derive to say this halakha? As it was taught in a baraita: A walking stick, typically used by the elderly, is pure, i.e., incapable of becoming ritually impure from any form of ritual impurity. Apparently, an object upon which one does not lean all his weight is not subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading.,And how does Rava respond to this proof? He says that there is a distinction between the cases: There, in the case of a walking stick used by the elderly,

it is made merely to align his steps and straighten his posture. He does not completely lean all his weight on it. Here, in the case of a wooden leg, it is made to lean on, and in fact he leans all his weight on it.,It was taught in the mishna that the supports of a zav and his chair are subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading, and one may not go out with them on Shabbat, and one may not enter into the Temple courtyard with them.,The tanna, who recited mishnayot before Rabbi Yoḥanan, taught the opposite halakha in the mishna: One may enter into the Temple courtyard with them.,Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: I teach that a woman may perform ḥalitza with this support, as it has the legal status of a shoe in every sense, and you say that one may enter the Temple courtyard? Teach the mishna in the following manner: One may not enter into the Temple courtyard with them.,We learned in the mishna that loketamin are pure. The Gemara asks: What are loketamin? Rabbi Abbahu said: They are wooden toys in the shape of a donkey one carried on the shoulders, creating the impression that the donkey is riding him. Rava bar Pappa said: They are stilts used to avoid getting dirty when walking in mud or for amusement. Rava bar Rav Huna said: They are masks [peramei].,MISHNA: Young boys may go out on Shabbat with knots as a folk remedy and princes with bells. And any person is permitted to go out on Shabbat with those objects; however, the Sages spoke in the present, addressing situations that were prevalent.,GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that young boys may go out on Shabbat with knots. The Gemara asks: What are these knots? Adda Mari said that Rav Naḥman bar Barukh said that Rav Ashi bar Avin said that Rav Yehuda said: They are garlands of the madder plant that are tied for their medicinal qualities.,Abaye said: Mother, actually his foster mother, said to me about the healing properties of madder: Three garlands maintain the illness at its present state and prevent it from worsening, five garlands heal the illness, and seven are effective even against sorcery.,Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: And that benefit provided by the madder plant is specifically in a case where one on whom the knots were tied does not look at the sun and the moon, and does not see rain, and hears neither the sound of clanging iron, nor the sound of the hen, nor the sound of footsteps. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: If that is the case, the remedial powers of the madder fell in a pit, i.e., if so many conditions exist, for all intents and purposes it provides no benefit at all.,The Gemara asks: If these knots in the madder plant have remedial qualities, why specifically were boys mentioned in the mishna? Even girls can benefit from the cure as well. By the same token, why specifically were young boys mentioned in the mishna? Even adults can benefit from the cure as well.,Rather, what are these knots? Like that which Avin bar Huna said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said: A son who has longings for his father and has a difficult time leaving him, the father takes a strap from the right shoe and ties it on the boy’s left arm as a talisman to help the child overcome his longings. These feelings are more common in small children and especially in boys for their fathers, as fathers were more involved in raising their sons than they were in raising their daughters. Therefore, the Sages allowed specifically young boys to go out with these knots. With regard to this practice, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: And your mnemonic for where to tie the strap is phylacteries, which are tied by the right hand on the left arm. And the opposite, tying the strap from the left shoe onto his right arm, is dangerous because it will exacerbate his longings.,On the topic of the use of various forms of healing and medicinal practices and their permissibility on Shabbat, the Gemara cites additional statements by that Sage on these topics. Avin bar Huna said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said: With regard to overturning an empty cup in which there had been hot water and placing it on one’s navel for healing purposes on Shabbat, he may well do so.,And Avin bar Huna said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said: It is permissible to smear oil and salt on oneself on Shabbat.,As in this case of Rav Huna, who departed from the house of Rav, and Rav, who departed from the house of Rabbi Ḥiyya, and Rabbi Ḥiyya, who departed from the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, when they were drunk, the rabbi would bring oil and salt and rub them on the palms of their hands and the soles of their feet and say: Just as this oil is clear, so let the wine of so-and-so, son of so-and-so, his mother, become clear. In other words, let them become sober. And if he could not bring oil and salt, or if they did not work, he would bring the sealing clay of a barrel and soak it in water and say: Just as this sealing clay is clear, so let the wine of so-and-so, son of so-and-so, become clear.,And Avin bar Huna said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said: It is permitted to strangle, i.e., tightly bandage the neck of one whose vertebra was dislocated in order to reset it, on Shabbat.,And Avin bar Huna said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said: With regard to tightly swaddling a baby born on Shabbat in order to align any limbs that may have been dislocated in birth, one may well do so.,There were different versions with regard to the halakhot of Avin bar Huna. Rav Pappa taught two halakhot with regard to children in his name and Rav Zevid taught one halakha with regard to a child in his name. The Gemara explains: Rav Pappa taught two halakhot with regard to children, and he taught both of them in the name of Avin bar Huna, i.e., the halakha with regard to knots and the halakha with regard to swaddling. Rav Zevid taught one halakha with regard to a child. The first, with regard to knots, he taught in the name of Avin bar Huna. And this, with regard to swaddling, he taught in the name of Rabba bar bar Ḥana, as Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: With regard to tightly swaddling a baby on Shabbat, one may well do so.,The Gemara cites additional statements said by Abaye in the name of the woman who raised him with regard to remedies. Abaye said, Mother said to me: All incantations that are repeated are intoned using the name of the mother of the one requiring the incantation, and all knots tied for the purpose of healing are tied on the left.,And Abaye said, Mother said to me: All incantations for which the number of times they must be intoned is specified, one recites them as they are specified; and those for which the number of times they must be intoned is not specified, one recites them forty-one times.,The Sages taught in a baraita: One may go out with a preservation stone, which prevent miscarriages, on Shabbat. They said in the name of Rabbi Meir that one may go out even with the counterweight of a preservation stone; i.e., a stone or another object that was weighed against and found equivalent to the weight of the preservation stone, which is also effective. And this leniency applies not only to a woman who miscarried in the past and is concerned that she may miscarry again; rather, it applies even to a woman who never miscarried and is concerned lest she miscarry for the first time. And it applies not only to a woman who is aware that she is pregnant; rather, it applies even if a woman suspects that she may become pregnant and miscarry. Rav Yeimar bar Shelamya said in the name of Abaye: And this applies only when he happened upon an object that was found equal to the preservation stone when he weighed it against that stone, not when one alters the object to equal the weight of the preservation stone. Abaye raised a dilemma: With regard to a counterweight to the counterweight, i.e., one who finds an object and determines its weight by weighing it against the counterweight of the preservation stone, what is its legal status? May a woman go out into the public domain with it? The Gemara concludes: Let this dilemma stand unresolved.,And Abaye said, Mother said to me: To heal a fever of one day, let one take a pale, i.e., newly minted, dinar and go to the salt pools, and weigh its weight in salt against it, and let him bind the salt to the opening of the neckline of his garment with a thread made of hair.,And if this remedy is not effective, let him sit at a crossroads, and when he sees a large ant carrying something, he should take the ant and place it in a copper tube, and close it with lead, and seal it with sixty seals, and shake it, and lift it, and say to it: Your burden is upon me and my burden, my fever, is upon you. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Huna, said to Rav Ashi: And perhaps a different person already found this ant and used this remedy to end his illness. In that case, by accepting the burden of the ant, he is bringing another’s illness upon himself. Rather, let him say to the ant: My burden and your burden are upon you.,And if that remedy is not effective, let him take a new jug, and go to the river, and say to it: River, river, lend me a jug of water for a guest who happened to come to me. And let him turn it around his head seven times, and pour out the water behind him, and say to it: River, river, take back the water that you gave me because the guest who happened to come to me came on its day and left on its day.,Rav Huna said:
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For tertian fever, which afflicts one every three days, let one bring seven thorns from seven palm trees, and seven slivers from seven beams, and seven pegs from seven bridges, and seven types of ashes from seven ovens, and seven types of dust from seven door sockets, the hole in which the hinge of the door revolves, and seven types of tar from seven boats, and seven cumin seeds, and seven hairs from the beard of an old dog, and let him bind it to the opening of the neckline of his garment with a thread made of hair.,Rabbi Yoḥanan said: For healing a burning fever, let one take a knife that is made entirely of iron, including the handle, and let him go to a place where there is a bush and tie a string of hair to it.,On the first day, let him carve the bush a little, and recite: “And an angel of the Lord appeared to him in a flame of fire from within the bush and he looked and behold the bush was aflame in fire and the bush was not consumed” (Exodus 3:2). On the following day, let him carve the bush a little more and recite: “And Moses said: I will turn aside now, and see this great sight, why the bush is not burned” (Exodus 3:3). On the following day, let him carve the bush a little more and recite: “And the Lord saw that he turned aside to see and God called to him within the bush and said: Moses, Moses, and he said: Here I am” (Exodus 3:4).,Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: And let him say: “And the Lord said: Do not come close, take off your shoes from your feet, for the place on which you stand is holy ground” (Exodus 3:5). This verse is more suited to be recited as an incantation to cure a fever. Rather, on the first day, let him recite the first two verses: “And an angel of the Lord appeared to him in a flame of fire from within the bush and he looked and behold the bush was aflame in fire and the bush was not consumed,” as well as, “And Moses said: I will turn aside now and see”. And on the following day, let him recite: “And the Lord saw that he turned aside to see”. And on the following day, let him recite: “And the Lord said: Do not come close, take off your shoes from your feet, for the place on which you stand is holy ground” (Exodus 3:5).,And when he carves the bush, let him lower himself and cut it close to the ground, and recite as follows: The bush, the bush; not because you are higher than all trees did the Holy One, Blessed be He, rest His Divine Presence upon you. Rather, it is because you are lower than all trees did the Holy One, Blessed be He, rested His Divine Presence upon you. And just as the fire saw Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah and fled from before them, so too, let the fire of the fever see so-and-so, son of so-and-so, his mother, flee from before him.,For healing boils, let him recite as follows: Baz, Bazya, Mas, Masya, Kas, Kasya, Sharlai, and Amarlai, these are the angels who were sent from the land of Sodom and this was all in order to heal painful boils. Bazakh, Bazikh, Bazbazikh, Masmasikh, Kamon, Kamikh, may your appearance remain with you, may your appearance remain with you, i.e., the boils should not grow redder. May your place remain with you, i.e., they should not spread, may your, the boils’, seed be like one who is barren and like a mule that is not fruitful and does not multiply, so too, do not increase and do not multiply in the body of so-and-so, son of so-and-so.,For healing a wound, let him recite as follows: A drawn sword and a readied sling, its name shall not be ache, sickness, and pains.,To be saved from a demon, let him recite as follows: You were stopped up, stopped up you were. Cursed, broken, and excommunicated be the demon called bar Tit bar Tamei bar Tina as Shamgaz, Merigaz, and Istemai.,To be saved from the demon of the bathroom, let him recite as follows: On the head of a lion and on the nose of a lioness we found the demon named bar Shirika Panda. With a bed of leeks I felled him, and with the jaw of the donkey I struck him.,We learned in the mishna that princes may go out with bells, and the same is true for anyone else. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who holds that all people of Israel are permitted to conduct themselves like princes with regard to going out with precious ornaments? Rabbi Oshaya said: It is Rabbi Shimon, who said: All of Israel are princes. Therefore, precious ornaments are suitable for every person of Israel. They will neither remove them to show to others nor will they remove them due to concern that people will think them pretentious. Rava said: The mishna is referring to a case where the bell is woven into his garment, obviating the concern lest he remove it, and the halakha in the mishna is in accordance with the statements of all tanna’im, not merely the statement of Rabbi Shimon.,MISHNA: One may go out on Shabbat with a locust egg, and with a fox tooth, and with a nail from the crucified, for the purpose of healing; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Rabbis prohibit using these remedies even during the week, due to the prohibition of following the ways of the Amorite. These are superstitious beliefs and the customs of gentiles from which one must distance oneself.,GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that in Rabbi Meir’s opinion one may go out on Shabbat with a locust egg, and a fox tooth, and with a nail from the crucified as a talisman or a cure. The Gemara explains the nature of each: One may go out with a locust egg, as they use it as a talisman to cure an earache; and with a fox tooth, as they use it as a talisman for sleep; the tooth of a live fox for one who sleeps too much to wake him up, and the tooth of a dead fox for one who does not sleep. And one may go out with a nail from the crucified, as they use it as a talisman for curing infection.,We learned in the mishna that going out with those objects is permitted on Shabbat for the purpose of healing; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.,With regard to the halakha in the mishna, the Gemara cites Abaye and Rava, who both said: Anything that contains an element of healing and seems to be effective does not contain an element of the prohibition against following the ways of the Amorite. There is no cause for suspicion of one who engages in their practice, gentile or Jew.,The Gemara asks: Is that to say by inference that if it is does not contain an element of healing, it does contain an element of the prohibition against following the ways of the Amorite? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: A tree that sheds its fruit prematurely, one paints it and colors it with red paint and loads it with stones? Granted, he is permitted to load it with stones because that action produces an actual benefit, i.e., he does that so that its strength will weaken. Sometimes a tree sheds its fruits prematurely due to excessive blossoming. Sustaining those blossoms taxes the tree, rendering it incapable of sustaining the fruits that grow from the blossoms. The stones were used to slightly weaken the tree when blossoming, thereby reducing the number of blossoms that the tree must nourish. However, painting it with red paint, what healing is he performing with that action?,The Gemara explains: He does so so that people will see the tree and pray for mercy for it. As it was taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And the leper in whom the plague is, his clothes shall be ripped and the hair of his head shall grow long and he will put a covering upon his upper lip and will cry: Impure, impure” (Leviticus 13:45). The leper publicizes the fact that he is ritually impure because he must announce his pain to the masses, and the masses will pray for mercy on his behalf. Ravina said: In accordance with whose opinion do we hang bunches of unripe dates on a palm tree that casts off its dates? According to that tanna who taught that one must publicize his pain to the masses.,The tanna recited the chapter of the Tosefta discussing the actions of the Amorites before Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin said to him: All those enumerated there contain an element of the prohibition against following the ways of the Amorite, except for these: One who has a bone in his throat brings a bone from the same species as the bone that is stuck in his throat, and places it on his skull, and says as follows: One by one descend and be swallowed, swallow and descend one by one. That does not contain an element of the prohibition against following the ways of the Amorite.,For a fish bone stuck in the throat, let him say as follows: You are stuck like a needle, locked as a shutter, go down, go down.

After some discussion of the ways of the Amorite, the Gemara cites additional statements from the Amorite chapter in the Tosefta and from other sources on this topic. One who says: My fortune be fortunate [gad gaddi] and be not weary by day or by night; that statement contains an element of the ways of the Amorite. Rabbi Yehuda says: That is more severe than the ways of the Amorite, as gad is nothing other than a term of idolatry, as it is stated: “And you that forsake the Lord, that forget My holy mountain, that prepare a table for Gad, and that offer mingled wine in full measure unto Meni” (Isaiah 65:11). Gad gaddi is a form of prayer to an idol.,One who requests that he be called by his wife’s name and she be called by his name for good fortune, his request contains an element of the ways of the Amorite.,One who says: Let my barrels be strengthened [donu danei], that contains an element of the ways of the Amorite. Rabbi Yehuda says: That is more severe than the ways of the Amorite, as Dan is nothing other than a term of idol worship, as it is stated: “They that swear by the sin of Samaria and say: As your god Dan lives” (Amos 8:14).,One who hears a raven calling and is concerned about a bad omen and says to the raven: Scream, and says to the female raven: Whistle and turn your tail to me for the best; those statements contain an element of the ways of the Amorite.,One who says: Slaughter this rooster that calls out in the evening and says: Slaughter this chicken that calls out like a male rooster; those statements contain an element of the ways of the Amorite.,One who says: I will drink and leave over, I will drink and leave over, so that his wine will increase; that statement contains an element of the ways of the Amorite.,One who cracks eggs on a wall and smears them in front of the chicks; that series of actions contains an element of the ways of the Amorite.,And one who stirs the pot in front of chicks as an auspicious practice so they do not die; that action contains an element of the ways of the Amorite.,A woman who dances and counts the chicks until she reaches the number of seventy-one chicks, so they won’t die; her action contains an element of the ways of the Amorite.,A woman who dances to ensure that the kutaḥ, a spice made from whey salt and bread, that she is preparing will be successful, and a woman who silences bystanders to ensure that the lentils will cook properly, and a woman who screams to ensure that the pearl barley will cook properly; all these contain an element of the ways of the Amorite.,A woman who urinates in front of her pot so it will cook quickly; that action contains an element of the ways of the Amorite.,But one may put a chip of mulberry wood and shards of glass in the pot so it will cook quickly, as doing so is effective and not merely superstition. And the Rabbis prohibit shards of glass not due to superstition; rather, due to the danger involved if the glass is not strained out completely.,The Sages taught in the Tosefta: One may place a lump of salt into a candle so it will burn brightly; that is effective and not merely for good fortune, so there is no element of the ways of the Amorites involved. And similarly, one may put mud or clay under a candle so it will burn longer.,Rav Zutra said: He who covers an oil lamp or who uncovers a kerosene lamp for no purpose violates the prohibition: Do not destroy, since by doing so the fuel burns more quickly.,One who says while drinking: Wine and life to the mouth of the Sages, this does not fall into the category of the ways of the Amorite. There was an incident with Rabbi Akiva who made a banquet for his son, and over each and every cup he brought he said: Wine and life to the mouth of the Sages, wine and life to the mouth of the Sages and to the mouth of their students.,,MISHNA: The Sages stated a significant principle with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat: One who forgets the essence of Shabbat, i.e., one who is entirely ignorant of the mitzva of Shabbat according to Torah law, and performed numerous prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot, is liable to bring only one sin-offering for all those labors when he becomes aware that those actions were prohibited. One who knows the essence of Shabbat but forgets which day is Shabbat, i.e., one who lost track of the days of the week, and performs numerous prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable to bring a sin-offering for each Shabbat when he becomes aware that he performed those actions on Shabbat. One who is aware that the day is Shabbat but temporarily forgot that certain labors were prohibited and performed numerous prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable to bring a sin-offering for each
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and every primary category of labor that he performed. One who performs numerous prohibited labors subsumed under a single category of labor is liable to bring only one sin-offering.,GEMARA: The Gemara attempts to clarify the language of the mishna and asks: Why did the mishna teach the phrase: A significant principle? If you say it is because of the following reason, it is problematic.
Here, because the tanna wants to teach in a mishna later in the chapter with regard to a matter that includes two halakhot employing the term: Furthermore, they stated another principle; therefore, in this mishna, which relates to a greater number of halakhot, he taught employing the term: A significant principle.
And with regard to the Sabbatical Year as well, because in a later mishna (Shevi’it 7:2) the tanna wants to teach: Furthermore, another principle, at the beginning of the chapter he taught employing the phrase: A significant principle. There too, the choice of language is understood.
However, with regard to the halakhot of tithes, where the mishna (Ma’asrot 1:1) states two principles one after the other, the tanna taught later in the same mishna: And furthermore, they stated another principle, and even so, at the beginning of the mishna the tanna did not teach: A significant principle, opting instead to say simply: They stated a principle.,Rabbi Yosei bar Avin said that the term: A significant principle, is not dependent on the existence of another principle; rather, it is dependent on the significance of the principle. Therefore, with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat and the Sabbatical Year, which include primary categories and subcategories, the tanna taught in the mishna: A significant principle. With regard to the halakhot of tithes, which do not include primary categories and subcategories and all its halakhot are on equal footing, he did not teach employing the term: A significant principle. The Gemara asks: And according to the variant reading of the mishna taught by bar Kappara, who taught the phrase: A significant principle, with regard to tithes, what primary categories and subcategories are there with regard to tithes?,Rather, isn’t this the reason the Mishna employs the term: A significant principle; because it is significant relative to other principles? The scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for desecrating Shabbat is greater than the scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for desecrating the Sabbatical Year. As the halakhot of Shabbat are in effect both with regard to plants that are detached from the ground and with regard to those that are attached, while the halakhot of the Sabbatical Year with regard to detached plants, they are not in effect, but with regard to attached plants they are in effect. And the scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for desecrati0n of the Sabbatical Year are greater than the scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for violating the halakhot of tithes. As, by Torah law, the halakhot of the Sabbatical Year are in effect both with regard to human food and with regard to animal food, while the halakhot of tithes are in effect with regard to human food, but with regard to animal food they are not in effect.,And according to the opinion of bar Kappara, who taught the phrase: A significant principle, with regard to tithes as well: The scope of the materials for which one warrants punishment for violating the halakhot of tithes is greater than the scope of the materials for which one warrants punishment for violating the halakhot of pe’a. As, by rabbinic law, the obligation of tithes is in effect with regard to both figs and vegetables, while the obligation of pe’a is not in effect with regard to figs and vegetables. As we learned in a mishna in tractate Pe’a: They stated a principle with regard to pe’a: Anything that is food, and is protected, and grows from the ground, and is gathered as one, and one brings it in to storage to preserve is obligated in pe’a.,The Gemara explains that which is excluded by each criterion in the mishna. Food, to exclude the aftergrowths of woad [satis] and madder. As these plants are used for dyeing and not for food, the obligation of pe’a does not apply to them. And protected, to exclude ownerless crops, which by definition are not protected. And grows from the ground, to exclude truffles and mushrooms, which, unlike other plants, do not draw sustenance from the ground. And is gathered as one, to exclude the fig tree whose fruit is gathered throughout an extended period, as the figs do not all ripen together. And one brings it in to storage to preserve; to exclude vegetables, which cannot be stored for lengthy periods.,While, with regard to tithes, we learned in a mishna: They stated a principle with regard to tithes: Anything that is food, and is protected, and grows from the ground is obligated in tithes; we did not learn with regard to tithes, the following criteria: Gathered as one, and which one brings in to storage to preserve. Apparently, figs and vegetables are obligated in tithes, making the scope of the materials obligated in tithes greater than the scope of those obligated in pe’a.,The mishna discusses an individual who forgets the very essence of Shabbat. The Gemara seeks to understand how a Jew could forget the very existence of Shabbat. It was Rav and Shmuel who both said: Our mishna is referring to both a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and never educated and a convert who converted among the gentiles and never learned the halakhot of Shabbat. However, one who once knew of the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot is liable for each and every Shabbat, as we learned in the mishna with regard to one who knows the essence of Shabbat. The Gemara seeks to clarify this approach. We learned in our mishna: One who forgets the essence of Shabbat. Doesn’t this phrase indicate by inference that he was aware of Shabbat originally? In order to forget one must have previously been aware. This poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav and Shmuel. The Gemara refutes this: No, what is the meaning of: One who forgets the essence of Shabbat? That the essence of Shabbat was always forgotten from him, i.e., he never knew it.,The Gemara further asks: However, based on that understanding, in the case of one who knew the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot, what is the halakha? Is he liable for each and every Shabbat? If so, instead of the mishna teaching the next halakha: One who knows the essence of Shabbat and performs many labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every Shabbat, let it teach: One who knew the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot and, all the more so, one who knows the essence of Shabbat would be liable for each Shabbat. The Gemara answers: According to the opinion of Rav and Shmuel, what is the meaning of the phrase: One who knows the essence of Shabbat? One who once knew the essence of Shabbat and has now forgotten it.
The Gemara raises another difficulty: But if he did not forget the essence of Shabbat, and he knows that today is Shabbat, what would the halakha be? Certainly he would be liable for each and every prohibited labor. If so, instead of teaching the halakha: One who knows that it is Shabbat and performs many labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable for each and every labor, let the mishna teach the halakha: One who knows the essence of Shabbat is liable for each and every labor that he performs and all the more so that one who is aware that today is Shabbat would be liable for each labor. Rather, when our mishna refers to forgetting, it is referring to a case where he knew and ultimately forgot. And the case described by Rav and Shmuel also has the same legal status as one who knew and ultimately forgot. And it was stated as follows: It was Rav and Shmuel who both said: Even a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and a convert who converted among the gentiles have the same legal status as one who knew and ultimately forgot, and they are liable to bring a sin-offering for their unwitting transgression, even though they never learned about Shabbat.,And it was Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish who both said: He is liable to bring a sin-offering specifically if he knew of the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot. However, a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and a convert who converted among the gentiles are exempt from bringing a sin-offering. They have the legal status of one who performed the prohibited labor due to circumstances beyond his control. The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in a baraita: They stated a significant principle with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat: One who forgets the essence of Shabbat, i.e., one who does not know that there is a mitzva of Shabbat in the Torah, and performs many prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable to bring only one sin-offering. How so? With regard to a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and a convert who converted among the gentiles and does not know the essence of Shabbat; and if he performed many prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot, he is only liable to bring one sin-offering for all his unwitting transgressions. And he is liable to bring one sin-offering for all the blood he unwittingly ate before he learned of the prohibition; and one sin-offering for all the forbidden fat that he ate; and one for all the idolatry that he worshipped. And Munbaz, one of the Sages, deems him exempt from bringing any sacrifice.,And Munbaz deliberated before Rabbi Akiva as follows: Since one who commits a transgression intentionally is called a sinner in the Torah and one who commits a transgression unwittingly is called a sinner, just as one who commits the transgression intentionally is liable for punishment only in a case where he had prior knowledge that it was prohibited, so too, one who commits the transgression unwittingly is liable to bring a sin-offering only in a case where he had prior knowledge. However, the action of one who had no prior knowledge at all is not considered unwitting; rather, it has the same legal status as an action performed due to circumstances beyond one’s control, and he is completely exempt. Rabbi Akiva said to him: I will elaborate upon your statement and follow your reasoning to its logical conclusion and thereby test the validity of your reasoning. If so, just as one who commits the transgression intentionally is liable for punishment only in a case where he had the awareness that he was sinning at the time that he performed the action, so too, with regard to one who commits the transgression unwittingly, say that he is only liable to bring a sin-offering in a case where he had awareness that he was sinning at the time that he performed the action. If that is the case, it is no longer an unwitting transgression.,Munbaz said to him: Yes, there is nothing unusual about that. In my opinion it is correct and all the more so now that you have elaborated upon my statement. Awareness at the time that one is performing the action is one of the criteria of my definition of an unwitting transgression, as will be explained below. Rabbi Akiva said to him: According to your statement, since while performing the action one is aware that it is prohibited, his action is not called unwitting; rather, it is a full-fledged intentional transgression.,Returning to our issue: In any case, as an example of one who forgot the essence of Shabbat, it was taught: How so? A child who was taken captive. Granted, according to the opinion of Rav and Shmuel it works out well, as they consider the legal status of a child taken captive equal to that of one who unwittingly forgot the essence of Shabbat. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who consider the legal status of a child taken captive equal to that of one who committed the action due to circumstances beyond his control and is therefore exempt, it is difficult because he is liable to bring a sin-offering according to the opinion of the Rabbis in the baraita. Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish could have said to you: Isn’t there the opinion of Munbaz who deemed him exempt in that case? We stated our opinion in accordance with the opinion of Munbaz.,The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Munbaz? Is it based entirely upon the fact that the Torah refers to sinners, both intentional and unwitting, as sinners? The Gemara explains that the source for the opinion of Munbaz is as it is written: “The native of the children of Israel, and the stranger who lives among them, there shall be one law for you, for one who acts unwittingly” (Numbers 15:29), and adjacent to it is the verse: “And the person who acts with a high hand, whether a native or a stranger, he blasphemes God, and that soul shall be cut off from the midst of his people” (Numbers 15:30). The Torah juxtaposes unwitting transgression to intentional transgression. Just as one who commits the transgression intentionally is only liable in a case where he had prior knowledge, so too, one who commits the transgression unwittingly is only liable in a case where he had prior knowledge.,The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis do with the juxtaposition derived from that verse: One law? The Gemara answers: They require it for that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi taught his son. It is written: “There shall be one law for you, for one who acts unwittingly.” And it is written:
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“And if you err, and do not perform all these commandments that God spoke to Moses” (Numbers 15:22). The Sages understood this verse as referring specifically to the laws of idolatry. And it is written: “And the person who acts with a high hand, he blasphemes God and that soul shall be cut off from the midst of his people” (Numbers 15:30), from which we learn that all the mitzvot are derived from this juxtaposition to idolatry. Just as there, with regard to idolatry, the reference is to a matter which, for its intentional violation, one is liable to be punished with karet, as it is stated: “And that soul shall be cut off,” and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering; so too, any matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to be punished with karet, for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.,The Gemara asks: However, according to Munbaz, who holds that included in the category of an unwitting sinner is one who at the time of action was aware that it was prohibited; if he were fully aware, in what sense was his action unwitting? The Gemara answers: It is referring to a case where he was unwitting with regard to the sacrifice. He was aware that he was committing a transgression for which one is liable to be punished with karet when performed intentionally; however, he was unaware that he would be liable to bring a sin-offering if he performed the transgression unwittingly. Since he was not aware of all punishments and forms of atonement associated with that transgression, he is considered an unwitting sinner and is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis who disagree with Munbaz hold? They hold: Unwitting with regard to a sacrifice is not considered unwitting.,The Gemara asks: And in the opinion of the Rabbis, lack of awareness with regard to what aspects of the prohibition renders the action unwitting? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is an unwitting transgression since he was unwitting with regard to the fact that the punishment for his transgression is karet, even though he was aware that his action was in violation of a Torah prohibition, and he performed the transgression intentionally. And Reish Lakish said that according to the Rabbis it is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to both the prohibition and karet,i.e., he was unaware that his action was prohibited by Torah law. Rava said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish? The verse said: “And if one soul shall sin by mistake from the common people, by performing one of God’s commandments that may not be done, and he becomes guilty” (Leviticus 4:27), indicating that it is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to the prohibition and its concomitant karet. The verse indicates that the individual was unaware that he violated “one of the commandments that may not be done,” i.e., that there is a Torah prohibition with regard to that action.,The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yoḥanan do with that verse cited as proof by Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish? The Gemara answers: He needs it for that which was taught in a baraita: The phrase: “From the common people” (Leviticus 4:27) teaches that only some sinners, not all, bring sacrifices for their unwitting sins. It comes to exclude an apostate. When an apostate sins unwittingly, he is under no obligation to bring a sin-offering even after he repents. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: This halakha is derived from the phrase in that verse: “That may not be done, and he becomes guilty.” One who repents due to his awareness, i.e., one who repents as soon as he becomes aware that he performed a transgression, brings a sacrifice for his unwitting transgression. However, one who does not repent due to his awareness that he sinned, e.g., an apostate who continues to sin even after he becomes aware that he committed a transgression, does not bring an offering for his unwitting action. Rabbi Yoḥanan understood the verse in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.,The Gemara cites proof from what we learned in a mishna: The number of primary categories of prohibited labors on Shabbat is forty-less-one, which the mishna proceeds to list. And we discussed this mishna: Why do I need this tally of forty-less-one? Isn’t merely listing the prohibited labors sufficient? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if he performed all of the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. Therefore, the mishna indicated that one could conceivably be liable to bring thirty-nine sin-offerings. Under what circumstances can you find a case where one would be liable for unwittingly violating all thirty-nine labors? It must be in a case where with regard to Shabbat his actions were intentional, as he was aware that it was Shabbat; and with regard to the prohibited labors his actions were unwitting, as he was unaware that these labors are prohibited on Shabbat.,Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: Once he was unwitting with regard to the fact that the punishment for his transgression is karet, even though he was aware that his action was in violation of a Torah prohibition, and he performed the transgression intentionally, he is considered to have sinned unwittingly, you find that possibility in a case where he was aware that performing labor on Shabbat involves violation of a Torah prohibition, but he was unaware that the punishment for violating that prohibition is karet. However, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said: It is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to both the prohibition and karet, the result is that he is completely unaware of all the prohibited labors of Shabbat. If so, when Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the case where one would be liable to bring thirty-nine sin-offerings is one where with regard to Shabbat, his actions were intentional as he was aware that it was Shabbat, the question arises: With regard to what aspect of Shabbat was he aware? If he was completely unaware of all the labors prohibited on Shabbat, in what sense were his actions intentional with regard to Shabbat? The Gemara answers: He was aware of the halakhot of the prohibition of Shabbat boundaries, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. According to Rabbi Akiva, the prohibition to go beyond a certain distance outside the city limits on Shabbat is by Torah law and not merely a rabbinic decree.,The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught this baraita? As the Sages taught: If one acted unwittingly with regard to both this, the fact that it is Shabbat, and that, the specific prohibited labors, that is the case of unwitting transgression stated in the Torah. If one acted intentionally with regard to both this and that, that is the case of intentional transgression stated in the Torah. If one acted unwittingly with regard to Shabbat and intentionally with regard to the labors, i.e., he forgot that it was Shabbat, but he was aware that those labors are prohibited when it is Shabbat; or if one acted unwittingly with regard to the labors and intentionally with regard to Shabbat, i.e., he was unaware that these labors are prohibited, but he was aware that labor is prohibited on Shabbat, or, even if he said: I know that this labor is prohibited on Shabbat; however, I do not know whether or not one is liable to bring a sacrifice for its performance, he is liable to bring a sin-offering like anyone who sins unwittingly. In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Munbaz, who holds that one is considered an unwitting sinner even in a case where he was unwitting only with regard to the sacrifice.,Abaye said: Everyone agrees with regard to an oath on a statement, a case where one swore to prohibit or to obligate himself to perform an action, that the halakha is as follows: If he violates his oath he is only liable to bring an offering if he was unwitting with regard to its prohibition, i.e., he was unaware that it is prohibited by Torah law to violate an oath. The Gemara asks: To whose opinion is Abaye referring in the phrase: Everyone agrees? Certainly, it is the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan with regard to the opinion of the Rabbis in their dispute with Munbaz. Even though Rabbi Yoḥanan generally holds that the fact that one is unwitting with regard to karet is sufficient to render his action unwitting, the case of an oath is different. The Gemara asks: In the case of an oath, it is obvious that he would agree. When Rabbi Yoḥanan says that one need not be unwitting with regard to the prohibition, it is in a case where there is a prohibition punishable by karet; however, here, where there is no punishment of karet, Rabbi Yoḥanan would not say so. Obviously, he agrees that one must be unwitting with regard to the prohibition. There appears to be nothing new in Abaye’s statement.,The Gemara explains: It might enter your mind to say the following: Since the obligation to bring an offering in the case of the oath is a novel halakha, as throughout the whole Torah in its entirety we do not find a prohibition for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring an offering and for whose intentional violation is not punishable by karet; and here, one is liable to bring an offering for its unwitting violation, I might have said that if he was unwitting, i.e., unaware that he would be obligated, with regard to the offering, let him be liable also according to the Rabbis, who disagree with Munbaz.

Therefore, Abaye teaches us that this is not so. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: What is an unwitting violation of an oath on a statement relating to the past? What is an example of one who unwittingly swore falsely with regard to an incident that occurred in the past? It cannot be a case where he forgot the incident, as in that case he is exempt from bringing an offering. It is a case where if he said: I know that taking this false oath is prohibited, but I do not know whether or not one is liable to bring an offering for swearing falsely, he is liable to bring an offering for an unwitting transgression. Apparently, with regard to an oath on a statement, unwitting with regard to the sacrifice renders the action unwitting. The Gemara rejects this: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is the opinion of Munbaz. In his opinion, one who commits a transgression while unaware whether or not one is liable to bring an offering if he performs that transgression unwittingly is considered to have performed the transgression unwittingly.,There is another version of the discussion of Abaye’s statement where, after quoting the halakha with regard to an oath on a statement, the question was raised: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? If you say it is in accordance with the opinion of Munbaz, that is obvious: Now, if throughout the entire Torah where there is no novelty in the obligation to bring an offering, he said that unwitting with regard to an offering is considered unwitting; here, where there is a novelty and the offering in the case of an oath on a statement is more significant than other sin-offerings, certainly unwitting with regard to the offering should be considered unwitting. Rather, is it not the opinion of the Rabbis, and this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Abaye? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation.,And Abaye said: Everyone agrees with regard to teruma that one is only liable to add a payment of one-fifth the value of the teruma for eating it unwittingly if he is unwitting with regard to its prohibition. The Gemara asks: To whose opinion is Abaye referring in the phrase: Everyone agrees? Certainly, it is the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Even though, in general, he holds that unwitting with regard to karet is sufficient to render the action unwitting, the case of teruma is different. The Gemara asks: In the case of teruma, it is obvious that he would agree. When Rabbi Yoḥanan says that one need not be unwitting with regard to the prohibition, it is in a case where there is a prohibition punishable by karet; however, here, where there is no punishment of karet, Rabbi Yoḥanan would not say so. The Gemara answers that nonetheless Abaye introduced a novel element: Lest you say that since one who intentionally eats teruma is subject to death at the hand of Heaven, perhaps death stands in place of karet. And where he was unwitting with regard to the punishment of death for this sin, he should also be liable to pay the added fifth as one who performed the transgression unwittingly because his case is analogous to one who is considered unwitting due to lack of awareness of karet. Therefore, Abaye teaches us that it is not so. Rava said: Indeed, death stands in place of karet and the added one-fifth stands in place of a sacrifice. One who is unwitting with regard to death at the hand of Heaven and the added fifth has the same legal status as one who is unwitting with regard to karet and an offering.,Rav Huna said: One who was walking along the way or in the desert, and he does not know when Shabbat occurs, he counts six days from the day that he realized that he lost track of Shabbat and then observes one day as Shabbat. Ḥiyya bar Rav says: He first observes one day as Shabbat and then he counts six weekdays. The Gemara explains: With regard to what do they disagree? One Sage, Rav Huna, held: It is like the creation of the world, weekdays followed by Shabbat. And one Sage, Ḥiyya bar Rav, held: It is like Adam, the first man, who was created on the sixth day. He observed Shabbat followed by the six days of the week. The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Ḥiyya bar Rav from a baraita: If a person was walking along the way and does not know when Shabbat occurs, he observes one day for every six. What, does this not mean that he counts six and then observes one day in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna? The Gemara rejects this: No, it could also mean that he observes one day and then counts six.,The Gemara asks: If so, if that is what the baraita meant, why employ the phrase: He observes one day for six? It should have stated: He observes one day and counts six. And furthermore, it was taught in a baraita: If one was walking along the way or was in the desert, and he does not know when Shabbat occurs, he counts six days and observes one day. That is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rav. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Ḥiyya bar Rav.,Rava said: The person who lost track of Shabbat and treats one day a week as Shabbat, each day he makes enough food to sustain himself, except for that day which he designated as Shabbat. The Gemara asks: And on that day let him die? Rather, it means that the day before he makes twice the amount of food that he prepared on the other days to sustain him for that day and the following day. The Gemara asks: And perhaps the day before was actually Shabbat? In that case, not only did he perform labor on Shabbat, but he also performed labor on Shabbat in preparation for a weekday. Rather, on each and every day he makes enough food to sustain himself for that day, including on that day that he designated as Shabbat. And if you ask: And how is that day which he designated as Shabbat distinguishable from the rest? It is distinguishable by means of the kiddush and the havdala that he recites on that day.,Rava said: If he had partial knowledge of the day on which he left, i.e., he does not recall what day of the week it was but he does recall the number of days that passed since he left, every week he can perform labor throughout the day of his departure, since he certainly did not leave his house on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: That is obvious, and what novel element was introduced here? The Gemara answers: Lest you say, since he did not leave on Shabbat, he also did not leave on Friday, and this person, even if he left on Thursday, should be permitted to perform labor for two days, the eighth day and the ninth day from his departure, the same day of the week that he left and the following day. Therefore, Rava teaches us that at times one finds a convoy and happens to leave on a journey even on Friday. Therefore, he is not permitted to perform labor on the day of the week following the day of his departure.,We learned in the mishna that there is a difference in halakha between one who knows the essence of Shabbat and one who does not know it. The Gemara asks: From where in the Torah are these matters derived? Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: Two verses are written. One states: “And the children of Israel observed the Shabbat, to perform the Shabbat through their generations, an everlasting covenant” (Exodus 31:16). And it is written: “And you shall observe My Shabbatot and you shall revere My Sanctuary, I am God” (Leviticus 26:2). How is it that Shabbat is in the singular in one verse, while in the other it is in the plural [Shabbatot]? It should be understood as follows: “And the children of Israel observed the Shabbat”: One observance for multiple Shabbatot. If one commits several transgressions, in certain cases he is only liable to bring one sacrifice. “And you shall observe My Shabbatot”: One observance for each and every Shabbat. In certain cases, one is liable to bring a sin-offering for each time that he unwittingly desecrated Shabbat.,Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak strongly objects: On the contrary, the opposite is reasonable. “And the children of Israel observed the Shabbat”: One observance for each and every Shabbat. “And you shall observe My Shabbatot”: One observance for multiple Shabbatot. In any case, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak also holds that the halakha of our mishna is derived from comparing and contrasting these two verses.,We learned in the mishna that there is a difference between one who is aware that the day is Shabbat and performs labor and one who forgets the essence of Shabbat and performs prohibited labors.
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The Gemara asks: What is different about the former clause, which states that he in only liable to bring one sin-offering for each Shabbat, and the latter clause, which states that he is liable for each and every primary category of labor that he performed? Rav Safra said: Here, where he is unaware that the day was Shabbat, when he realizes that he sinned, it is due to awareness of Shabbat that he desists. When he is told that it was Shabbat, he stops immediately. And here, where he is unaware that the labors are prohibited, it is due to awareness of the labors that he desists. When he is told that this labor is prohibited, he stops immediately. Rav Naḥman said to Rav Safra: Does he desist due to Shabbat for any reason other than because he knows that the labors are prohibited? If he did not know that the labor is prohibited, telling him that it is Shabbat would not cause him to desist. And similarly, does he desist from performing the labors when told that it is prohibited for any reason other than because he knows that it is Shabbat? If he did not know that it was Shabbat, there would be no reason for him to desist from labor. Ostensibly, attributing the distinction between the two parts of the mishna to what eventually became known to him in the different cases is incorrect. Rather, Rav Naḥman said: The offering that the Torah obligated him to bring; for what is he so obligated? It is for performing an unwitting transgression. There, where he was unaware that the day was Shabbat, he was unwitting with regard to one matter; here, where he was unaware of the prohibited labors, he was unwitting with regard to multiple matters, and he is liable to bring sin-offerings in accordance with the number of matters of which he was unaware.,We learned in the mishna that one is liable to bring a sin-offering for each prohibited labor that he performs on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive the division of labors? What is the source of the halakha that if one performs numerous prohibited labors on Shabbat in the course of one lapse of awareness, each prohibited labor is considered a separate offense with regard to punishment? Shmuel said that the verse says: “And you shall observe the Shabbat, for it is holy to you; he who desecrates it shall surely die [mot yumat]” (Exodus 31:14). We learn from the double language, mot yumat, that the Torah amplified multiple deaths for a single desecration. Although several violations were committed in the course of a single lapse of awareness, each is considered a separate offense with regard to punishment. The Gemara asks: That verse was written with regard to intentional transgression. The Gemara is seeking a source for multiple sacrifices brought for unwitting transgression. The Gemara answers: If it does not refer to the matter of intentional transgression, as the verse does not teach a halakha applicable to intentional acts, as it was already written: “Six days you shall perform work, and on the seventh day it shall be holy to you, a Shabbat of rest to God; all who desecrate it shall die” (Exodus 35:2), refer it to the matter of unwitting transgression. The verse teaches that that which was written with regard to the death penalty for desecration of Shabbat in general applies to all halakhot of Shabbat, including cases of unwitting transgression. And what, then, is the meaning of the term: Shall die, in the verse? Does it mean that one who commits an unwitting transgression is punishable by death? It means that he shall die by payment of money. Death is used in the sense of punishment; he will be forced to pay for numerous sacrifices to atone for his sins.,The Gemara asks: And let him derive division of labors from where it was derived according to Rabbi Natan, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says that it is written: “You shall not kindle fire in all your dwellings on the day of Shabbat” (Exodus 35:3). Why does the verse state this halakha? The prohibition against kindling is included in the general prohibition against performing labor on Shabbat. Rather, it should be understood as follows. Since it is already stated: “And Moses gathered the entire assembly of the children of Israel and said to them: These are the things [eleh hadevarim] that God has commanded to perform them. Six days you shall perform work, and on the seventh day it shall be holy to you, a Shabbat of rest to God” (Exodus 35:1–2), and Rabbi Natan derives as follows: “These are the things,” which refers to the halakhot of Shabbat, there are emphases in this phrase that are superfluous in the context of the verse. The Torah could have simply stated: This is a thing [davar]. When it states: Things [devarim] in the plural, it teaches at least two points. The addition of the definite article: The things [hadevarim], adds at least a third point. The numerological value of letters of the word eleh: Alef, one; lamed, thirty; and heh, five, is thirty-six. The total numerical value, three plus thirty-six, derived from the phrase: “These are the things.” This alludes to the thirty-nine prohibited labors that were stated to Moses at Sinai.,I might have thought that if one performed them all in the course of one lapse of awareness, forgetting that they are prohibited, he would be liable to bring only one sin-offering? Therefore, the verse states: “Six days you shall work, and on the seventh you shall rest; in plowing time and in harvest time you shall rest” (Exodus 34:21), indicating that there are prohibitions specific to both plowing and harvesting. And still I can say: For plowing and for the harvesting he is liable to bring two sin-offerings, as they were stated explicitly. However, for performing all the other prohibited labors, he is liable for only one. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall not kindle fire in all your dwellings on the day of Shabbat” (Exodus 35:3). This is derived in the following manner: Kindling was included in the general prohibition prohibiting all labors, and why was it singled out and prohibited explicitly? It was singled out in order to equate the other labors to it and to tell you: Just as kindling is a primary category of prohibited labor, and one is liable for performing it on its own, so too, with regard to every primary category of prohibited labor, one is liable for performing it on its own.,Rabbi Natan cited a source proving that there is liability for performance of each prohibited labor of Shabbat on its own. Why doesn’t Shmuel derive that halakha from the same source? The Gemara answers: Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who disagreed with Rabbi Natan’s interpretation of the verse, as Rabbi Yosei said: The prohibition against kindling on Shabbat was singled out to teach that one who lights a fire on Shabbat merely violates a prohibition. Performing other primary categories of prohibited labor is punishable by stoning or karet. In contrast, one who lights a fire on Shabbat has merely violated a prohibition, as it was taught in a baraita: The prohibition of kindling was singled out as a prohibition; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. Rabbi Natan says: Kindling is like any other labor prohibited on Shabbat. It was singled out to divide the various labors and to establish liability for performance of each of them.,The Gemara raises an additional challenge to Shmuel’s opinion. If he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei with regard to the explicit prohibition of kindling, let him derive the division of labors from where Rabbi Yosei derives it. As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says, it is stated: “Speak to the children of Israel, saying: A soul that sins in error, from all the commandments of God that may not be performed, and performs from one of them [me’aḥat me’hena]” (Leviticus 4:2). Rabbi Yosei interprets the verse that at times one is liable to bring one sin-offering for all of his transgressions, and at times one is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every transgression. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? He interprets the unique phrase employed in that verse: From one of these. The Torah could have merely stated: One [aḥat]. Instead, it stated: From one [me’aḥat]. It could have merely stated: Them [hena]. Instead, it stated: Of them [me’hena]. Rabbi Yosei derives that there are cases of one transgression that, with regard to punishment, are them, i.e., many. And there are cases of them, several transgressions, that, with regard to punishment, are one.,Furthermore: The term one refers to a full-fledged transgression of Shabbat, e.g., one who intended to and wrote a complete name, Shimon. The term from one refers to a case where he performed only part of the transgression, e.g., one who wrote

only shem, part of the word, the letters shin and mem, from Shimon. Them refers to one who performed the primary categories of labor. Of them refers to one who performed subcategories of prohibited labors. One that is them refers to one transgression with multiple punishments, as in a case where his action was intentional with regard to Shabbat in that he was aware that it was Shabbat, and his action was unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors in that he was unaware that the labors were prohibited. In that case, he is liable for each primary category of labor. Them that are one refers to several transgressions with one punishment, as in a case where his action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat in that he was unaware that it was Shabbat, and his action was intentional with regard to the prohibited labors in that he was aware that the labors were prohibited. In that case, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. Apparently, Rabbi Yosei has a source for the division of Shabbat labors. Why doesn’t Shmuel derive the halakha from that source? The Gemara answers: Shmuel did not derive one that is them and them that are one from the verse.,Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: What is the halakha if a person had a lapse of awareness of both this, Shabbat, and that, a particular labor? He said to him: He had a lapse of awareness with regard to Shabbat and is liable to bring only one sin-offering. Rava said to him: On the contrary, he had a lapse of awareness with regard to prohibited labors, and he should be liable for each and every labor that he performed. Rather, Rav Ashi said: We see, if it is due to awareness of Shabbat that he desists from performing the labor when he is told what day it is, then, apparently, it was a lapse of awareness with regard to Shabbat, and he is liable for only one. And if it is due to awareness of the prohibited labor that he desists, then, apparently, it was a lapse of awareness with regard to the labors and he is liable for each and every one. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Does he desist due to Shabbat for any reason other than because he knows that the labors are prohibited? And similarly, does he desist from performing the labors when told that it is prohibited for any reason other than because he knows that it is Shabbat? When one desists from labor when he is told that it is Shabbat, it is because he understands that the labor he is performing is prohibited on Shabbat. Similarly, when one desists from his labor when he is told that the labor is prohibited, it is because he understands that the day is Shabbat. Rather, there is no difference between the cases, and in both he is considered unwitting with regard to Shabbat.,The Gemara further discusses the matter from a different perspective. We learned in a mishna: The number of primary categories of prohibited labors on Shabbat is forty-less-one, which the mishna proceeds to list. And we discussed this mishna: Why do I need this tally of forty-less-one? Isn’t merely listing the prohibited labors sufficient? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if he performed all the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. Granted, if you say that one who had a lapse of awareness of both this and that is liable for each and every one, it works out well. However, if you say that since one who had a lapse of awareness of this and that had a lapse of awareness with regard to Shabbat, and he is liable to bring only one sin-offering, under what circumstances can you find a case where one would be liable for unwittingly violating all thirty-nine labors? It must be in a case where, with regard to Shabbat, his actions were intentional, as he was aware that it was Shabbat, and, with regard to the prohibited labors, his actions were unwitting, as he was unaware that these labors were prohibited on Shabbat.,It works out well if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: Once he was unwitting with regard to the fact that the punishment for his transgression is karet, even though he was aware that his action was in violation of a Torah prohibition and performed the transgression intentionally, he is considered to have sinned unwittingly. You find that possibility in a case where he was aware that performing labor on Shabbat involves violation of a Torah prohibition, but he was unaware that the punishment for violating that prohibition is karet. However, if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said: It is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to both the prohibition and karet, the result is that he is completely unaware of all the prohibited labors of Shabbat. The question then arises: With regard to what aspect of Shabbat was he aware? If he was completely unaware of all the labors prohibited on Shabbat, in what sense were his actions intentional with regard to Shabbat? The Gemara answers: He was aware of the halakhot of the prohibition of Shabbat boundaries, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that that prohibition is by Torah law.,Rava said: One who reaped and ground grain in the measure of a dried fig-bulk, the measure that determines liability for the labors of reaping and grinding on Shabbat, while in performing those actions he was unwitting with regard to Shabbat and intentional with regard to the prohibited labors. He was unaware that it was Shabbat, but he was aware that the labors were prohibited. And he did not realize that he had sinned until he again reaped and ground grain in the measure of a dried fig-bulk, while in performing those actions he was intentional with regard to Shabbat and unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors. He was aware that it was Shabbat, but he was unaware that the labors were prohibited. And afterward he became aware that he had performed the labors of reaping and grinding while unwitting with regard to Shabbat and intentional with regard to the prohibited labors. He set aside a sin-offering to atone for his sin, based on the principle that he need set aside only one sin-offering even though he performed two primary categories of labor in the same lapse of awareness. And afterward he became aware that he had performed the labors of reaping and grinding while intentional with regard to Shabbat and unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors. For performing two categories of prohibited labor unwittingly, reaping and grinding, one should be liable to bring two sin-offerings.
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Nevertheless, in that case, the sin-offering that atoned for the unwitting act of reaping, which he performed when his action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat, draws with it atonement for the second unwitting act of reaping, which he performed when his action was unwitting with regard to the prohibited labor, and for which he also was liable to bring a sin-offering. And similarly, the sin-offering that atoned for the unwitting act of grinding, which he performed when his action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat, draws with it atonement for the unwitting act of grinding, which he performed when his action was unwitting with regard to the prohibited labor. Since the offering was sacrificed after he had committed both transgressions, he attains atonement with one sacrifice, even though he performed several forms of the transgression in a single lapse of awareness. However, if the order of events in that case was different in that he became aware of reaping performed when his action was intentional with regard to Shabbat and his action was unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors, and he set aside an offering to atone for his unwitting transgression, and only afterward he became aware that he had performed the labors of reaping and grinding when his actions were unwitting with regard to Shabbat, the sin-offering that he brings for the reaping draws with it atonement for the previous reaping and the concomitant grinding. As far as the lapse of awareness with regard to Shabbat is concerned, reaping and grinding are considered like one sin, and atonement for one atones for the other. And the parallel grinding that he performed together with the latter reaping remains in its place, i.e., he does not attain atonement for that transgression. When he becomes aware of it, he brings a separate offering for atonement.,Abaye said: Grinding also draws the latter grinding with it, as the designation of grinding is one. Since he attained atonement for one act of grinding, atonement is attained for the second act of grinding as well, as they were performed in one lapse of awareness, and he became aware only after the acts were completed. The Gemara asks: And is Rava of the opinion that atonement can be attained by means of drawing? Wasn’t it stated that there is a dispute with regard to that matter in a case where one unwittingly ate two olive-bulks of forbidden fat in one lapse of awareness, e.g., he ate two pieces of forbidden fat from different parts of an animal in the belief that they were permitted fat? One is liable to bring a sin-offering for that transgression. And in a case where he became aware that one of the olive-bulks was forbidden fat, and then ate a third olive-bulk while still in the midst of the lapse of awareness of the second piece of forbidden fat, i.e., he had not yet become aware that the second of the original olive-bulks was indeed prohibited and after eating the third olive-bulk, he became aware of both the second and the third pieces of fat. Rava said: If he brought a sacrifice for the first, atonement is attained for the transgressions of the first and second olive-bulks, since he ate both in one lapse of awareness. However, atonement is not attained for the third because awareness of the first olive-bulk interposes.,If he brought a sacrifice for the third after he became aware that he had sinned, atonement is attained for the transgressions of the third and second, since both were performed in one lapse of awareness. However, atonement is not attained for the transgression of the first, which occurred in a separate lapse of awareness. If he brought a sacrifice for the middle one, atonement is attained for all, since both the first and third olive-bulks have a lapse of awareness common with the second. Abaye said: Even if he brought a sacrifice for any one of them, atonement is attained for all of them by means of drawing. Since he attained atonement for one of the olive-bulks, that atonement draws with it atonement for the other olive-bulks with which it shared a lapse of awareness. In any case, apparently Rava is not of the opinion that atonement draws with it atonement. How, then, does he say that atonement for reaping draws with it atonement for other acts of reaping? The Gemara answers: After he heard this halakha from Abaye, he adopted it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, if Rava accepts the principle of drawing, by that same principle grinding should also draw with it grinding. The Gemara answers: There is a difference. Although he is of the opinion that atonement can be attained by means of drawing, he is not of the opinion that atonement that was attained through drawing can draw additional atonement through drawing. Atonement for the initial transgression of grinding was only attained by means of being drawn by the atonement for reaping. Rava holds that it cannot then proceed to draw atonement for the latter act of grinding.,The Gemara comments: A matter that was obvious to Abaye and Rava was a dilemma for Rabbi Zeira. In a case where one’s action was intentional with regard to Shabbat and unwitting with regard to the labors, and in a case where one’s action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat and intentional with regard to the labors, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering for the unwitting violation of Shabbat. This was not obvious to Rabbi Zeira, as Rabbi Zeira raised a dilemma before Rabbi Asi, and others say that Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma before Rabbi Zeira: If one reaped and ground grain in the measure of half a dried fig-bulk, and his action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat and intentional with regard to the prohibited labors. He is certainly not liable by Torah law because he reaped and ground less than the minimum measure for liability. And then he reaped or ground grain in the amount of half a dried fig-bulk and his action was intentional with regard to Shabbat and unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors, do they join together to constitute the minimum measure that determines liability to bring a sin-offering when he becomes aware that he sinned? He said to him: They are separate with regard to sin-offerings, i.e., if one reaped and ground the minimum measure that determines liability, he is liable to bring two sin-offerings, and therefore they do not join together to constitute the minimum measure.,The Gemara asks: And wherever they are separate with regard to sin-offerings, do they not join together? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: If one ate one piece of forbidden fat and then ate another piece of forbidden fat, each larger than the measure for liability, in one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering? In the next case in the mishna, four items are listed. If one eats them unwittingly he is liable to bring a sin-offering. If he ate forbidden fat, and blood, and notar, sacrifices that remained after the time when they may be eaten has expired, and piggul, sacrifices that were invalidated due to inappropriate intent while being offered, in one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every one. That is the stricture that applies to many types of prohibitions relative to one, the same, type. And this is the stricture of one type relative to many types: That if one ate half an olive-bulk, and then ate another half an olive-bulk from one type, he is liable because the two half measures join to constitute a single measure. And if he ate two halves of an olive-bulk from two types, he is exempt.,And we discussed this mishna: When we learned of one who ate two halves of an olive-bulk from one type, was it necessary to say that he is liable? That is obvious. And Reish Lakish said in the name of the Sage, bar Tutni: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he ate two halves of an olive-bulk from two dishes, where each half was prepared separately, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who said that dishes separate. One who eats two olive-bulks of prohibited food that was prepared in two different dishes in the course of one lapse of awareness is liable to bring a sin-offering for each one. Lest you say that Rabbi Yehoshua stated his opinion that dishes separate both as a leniency and as a stricture, and therefore one who ate two halves of an olive-bulk from two dishes would be exempt, the mishna teaches us that Rabbi Yehoshua did not state his opinion as a leniency. He stated his opinion as a stricture.,But here, where they are separate with regard to the number of sin-offerings, i.e., according to Rabbi Yehoshua one who eats an olive-bulk from each of the two dishes is liable to bring two sin-offerings, and, nevertheless, the two halves of an olive-bulk from the two dishes join together and constitute a full measure and render him liable to bring a sin-offering. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yirmeya: The Master taught Reish Lakish’s response with regard to the first clause of the mishna, and it is difficult for him. We taught Reish Lakish’s response with regard to the latter clause of the mishna, and it is not difficult for us. When we learned in the latter clause of the mishna: One who ate two halves of an olive-bulk from two types, was it necessary to say that he is exempt? That is obvious. Reish Lakish said in the name of bar Tutni: Actually, it is referring even to a case where the prohibition was from one type of food. And why then does the mishna call it two types? Because he eats it in the two separate dishes in which it was prepared. And this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who said that dishes separate. And this teaches us that Rabbi Yehoshua stated his opinion that dishes separate both as a leniency and as a stricture.,The Gemara asks: From the fact that the latter clause is referring to one type of food and a case where the two halves of an olive-bulk were prepared in two dishes, as explained above,

by inference, the first clause in the mishna is referring to one type of food and one dish. The problem is then more difficult. In a case where one ate two halves of an olive-bulk from one type of food and in one dish, was it necessary to say that he is liable? That is obvious. Rav Huna said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he had a period of awareness between eating the two half olive-bulks. After eating the first half of an olive-bulk, he became aware that he had eaten food that was prohibited. Then he became unaware again and ate the second half of an olive-bulk. Although, with regard to sacrifices, awareness usually serves as a line of demarcation between unwitting transgressions performed prior to the period of awareness and unwitting transgressions performed thereafter, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel who said: There is no awareness for half a measure. Since one is not liable to bring a sacrifice for half a measure, the fact that one became aware between consumption of the two halves of an olive-bulk is of no significance and does not demarcate between the two half-measures with regard to liability to bring a sin-offering.,A dispute between amora’im was stated: With regard to one who ate two olive-bulks of forbidden fat in one lapse of awareness, and became aware of the transgression of eating the first olive-bulk, and then became aware of the transgression of eating the second, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is liable to bring two sin-offerings, one offering for each transgression. And Reish Lakish said: He is liable to bring only one. Both Sages cite proofs for their opinions. Rabbi Yoḥanan said that he is liable as it is stated: “And he shall offer for his sin that he sinned…and he shall bring the ox” (Leviticus 4:3–4), indicating that he is liable to bring a separate sacrifice for each sin. And Reish Lakish said he is exempt, as it is stated: “And the priest shall atone for him from his sin, and it shall be forgiven for him” (Leviticus 4:26), indicating that even if he atoned from his sin, i.e., for part of his sin and not all of his sin, the entire transgression is forgiven.,The Gemara asks: And how can Reish Lakish say that one sin-offering is sufficient? Isn’t it written: “For his sinand he shall bring”? The Gemara answers: That verse refers to a case where he only became aware of the second sin after attaining atonement for the first. However, if he became aware prior to atonement, he is required to bring only one sin-offering. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yoḥanan, too, how can he say that one is liable to bring two sin-offerings? Isn’t it written: “From his sin, and it shall be forgiven for him? The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, with what are we dealing here? It is a case where one ate an olive-bulk and a half, and he became aware of his transgression of eating a single olive-bulk, and then he ate another half of an olive-bulk in the course of the lapse of awareness of the second half of an olive-bulk that he ate together with the whole olive-bulk. Lest you say that the two halves of an olive-bulk should join together, and he is liable to bring an additional sin-offering, the verse teaches us that in that case he is exempt because he has already atoned for part of his transgression.,Ravina said to Rav Ashi: In the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, they disagree in a case where one became aware of the second transgression prior to designating an animal for the first sin-offering, and this is the point over which they disagree: That one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that periods of awareness separate. Since one became aware of his sins at two different stages, he is liable to bring two sin-offerings. And one Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that only designations of animals for sacrifices separate. However, if one became aware of the second transgression after designation of the animal for the first sin-offering, Reish Lakish agrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan that he is liable to bring two sin-offerings. Or, perhaps they are disagreeing in a case where he became aware of the second sin after designating an animal for the first sin-offering, and this is the point over which they disagree: That one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that designations separate; and one Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that only atonements separate. Only after the sin-offering has been sacrificed on the altar and the sinner has obtained atonement can it be said that the sacrifice’s capacity to atone is spent and cannot atone for a sin of which he became aware afterward. However, if he became aware of the second sin prior to designation of the sacrifice, Rabbi Yoḥanan agrees with Reish Lakish that he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. Or, perhaps, the dispute between them is both in this case, before designation, and in that case, after designation.,Rav Ashi said to him: It is reasonable to say that the dispute is both in this case and in that case. As, should it enter your mind that they disagree only in a case where he became aware of the second sin prior to designation of an animal for the first sin-offering, and in a case where he became aware after designation Reish Lakish agrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan that he is liable to bring two sin-offerings, then rather than establishing the verse that posed a difficulty to Reish Lakish’s opinion in a case where one became aware of the second sin after atonement for the first, let him establish it in a case where one became aware of the transgression after designation of an animal for the first sin-offering. And similarly, if you say that they disagree only in a case where he became aware of the second sin after designation, and in a case where he became aware prior to designation Rabbi Yoḥanan agrees with Reish Lakish that he is only liable to bring one sin-offering, then rather than establishing the verse that posed a difficulty to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion in a case where he ate an olive-bulk and a half, let him establish it in a case where he became aware of the transgression prior to designation.,Ravina does not accept this proof, as, in his opinion, it is flawed: And perhaps there is uncertainty with regard to this matter, and he spoke employing the style of: If you wish to say. If you wish to say that they disagree in a case where he became aware of the second sin prior to designation, then how does Rabbi Yoḥanan establish the verse? He establishes the verse in a case where one ate an olive-bulk and a half. And if you wish to say they disgaree in a case where he became aware of the second sin after designation, then how does Reish Lakish establish the verse? He establishes the verse in a case where one became aware of the second sin after attaining atonement.,Ulla said: According to the one who said that in order to designate a definite guilt-offering, a sacrifice brought by one who committed a robbery, misused sacred objects, or had relations with a designated maidservant, one does not require prior knowledge that he definitely sinned,
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one who had relations with a designated maidservant five times is only liable to bring one guilt-offering, even if he became aware of his transgression between each instance of relations with her. Because awareness is insignificant with regard to this sacrifice, it does not demarcate in terms of the number of guilt-offerings that he is liable to bring. Rav Hamnuna strongly objects to this halakha: But if what you say is so, one who had relations with a designated maidservant, and again had relations, and designated an animal for the offering, and said: Wait for me before sacrificing the offering until I have relations again, so that the guilt-offering will atone for this transgression as well, would you say that the same applies in that case too, that he is only liable to bring one guilt-offering? Ulla said to him: You referred to an action performed after designation of an animal for the guilt-offering. I did not say that halakha with regard to an action that was performed after designation.,When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: According to the one who said that in order to designate a definite guilt-offering one requires prior knowledge that he definitely sinned, one who had relations five times with a designated maidservant is liable to bring a guilt-offering for each and every one. Because awareness is significant with regard to guilt-offerings, the awareness between the acts of cohabitation renders each a separate transgression. Abaye said to Rav Dimi: That is not so, as with regard to a sin-offering for which we require prior knowledge, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish disagree whether or not awareness following an unwitting sin demarcates one transgression from another. Rav Dimi was silent and had no response. In an attempt to resolve the problem, Abaye said to him: Perhaps you said your statement with regard to an act that the sinner seeks to commit after designating an animal as a guilt-offering but wants to attain atonement for by means of that same designated sacrifice. That statement is in accordance with the statement of Rav Hamnuna. Rav Dimi remembered and said to Abaye: Yes, that was what was originally stated.,When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he cited several disputes concerning the halakhot of guilt-offerings and said: Everyone agrees with regard to a designated maidservant, and everyone agrees with regard to a designated maidservant, and there is a dispute with regard to a designated maidservant. The Gemara elaborates: Everyone agrees with regard to a designated maidservant; one is liable to bring only one guilt-offering, even for many acts of cohabitation, in accordance with the opinion of Ulla. Ulla said that since prior knowledge is not required for liability to bring a guilt-offering, even if one became aware of his transgression between each time he had relations, he brings only one sacrifice. And everyone agrees with regard to a designated maidservant; one is liable for each and every act of cohabitation, if it occurred after designation of an animal for a guilt-offering for the previous transgression, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Hamnuna. And there is a dispute with regard to a designated maidservant; this refers to the one who said that, in order to designate a definite guilt-offering, one requires prior knowledge that he definitely sinned. In that case, the legal status of the guilt-offering is equal to that of the sin-offering and is the subject of a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who disagree whether awareness between two unwitting transgressions demarcates and requires two offerings.,It was stated that amora’im disagreed with regard to the halakha in the following case:

One who intended to lift a plant detached from the ground on Shabbat and mistakenly severed a plant still attached to the ground, which under other circumstances constitutes performance of the prohibited labor of reaping, is exempt from bringing a sin-offering for his mistaken act, since he did not intend to perform an act of cutting. One who performs an action unawares [mitasek], i.e., he had no intention to perform the act at all, incurs no liability whatsoever. One who intended to cut a detached plant and unwittingly severed a plant still attached to the ground, Rava said: He too is exempt. Abaye said: He is liable. The Gemara elaborates: Rava said that he is exempt because he did not intend to perform an act of prohibited severing. He intended to perform an action completely permitted on Shabbat. He had no misconception with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat. It was merely a mistaken act. And Abaye said that he is liable because he intended to perform a standard act of cutting. Since he intended to perform that act, and he carried out his intent, the Torah characterizes it as unwitting and not as unawares.,Rava said: From where do I derive to say this opinion? As it was taught in a baraita: There is a stricture with regard to the prohibitions of Shabbat that is greater than the stricture with regard to other mitzvot, and a stricture with regard to other mitzvot that is greater than the stricture with regard to Shabbat. The Gemara elaborates: A stricture with regard to Shabbat that is greater than the stricture with regard to other mitzvot is that, with regard to Shabbat, one who performed two transgressions on Shabbat, even if he did so in the course of one lapse of awareness, is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every one, which is not the case in other mitzvot. In other mitzvot, if an individual commits a transgression several times in the course of one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. And a stricture with regard to other mitzvot that is greater than the stricture with regard to Shabbat is that, with regard to other mitzvot, one who performs an act unwittingly without intent is liable, which is not the case with regard to Shabbat. Apparently, the phrase unwittingly without intent refers to the case disputed by Abaye and Rava. Therefore, this is proof for Rava’s opinion that, with regard to Shabbat, one who acts unawares, i.e., whose action resulted from involvement in another matter and who had no intention to perform an action that is prohibited, is not considered to have performed an unwitting act.,Before the Gemara discusses the baraita in the context of the dispute between Abaye and Rava, the Gemara analyzes its text. The Master said in the baraita: A stricture with regard to Shabbat that is greater than the stricture with regard to other mitzvot is that, with regard to Shabbat, one who performed two transgressions on Shabbat, even in the course of one lapse of awareness, is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every one, which is not the case with regard to other mitzvot. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If you say that he unwittingly performed acts of reaping and grinding on Shabbat, the corresponding situation with regard to other mitzvot is a case where he ate forbidden fat and blood. If so, there is no difference between Shabbat and other mitzvot. Here one is liable to bring two sin-offerings and here one is liable to bring two sin-offerings. Rather, what are the circumstances in other mitzvot where he is liable to bring only one sin-offering? It is in a case where he ate forbidden fat and again ate forbidden fat within one lapse of awareness. The corresponding situation with regard to Shabbat is a case where one performed an act of reaping and performed another act of reaping within one lapse of awareness. However, in that case too there is no difference between Shabbat and other mitzvot. Here one is liable to bring one sin-offering, and here one is liable to bring one sin-offering.,The Gemara explains: Actually, it is referring to a case where one performed acts of reaping and grinding. And what is the meaning of the phrase: Which is not the case with regard to other mitzvot? It is not referring to all mitzvot in general. It is referring to the prohibition of idolatry, which is comprised of separate component prohibitions, each of which incurs independent liability. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ami, as Rabbi Ami said: One who sacrificed to idolatry, and burned incense before it, and poured wine as a libation before it in the course of one lapse of awareness is liable to bring only one sin-offering. That is the ruling, even though, had he performed those rites separately, he would be liable to bring a sin-offering for each. That, then, is the stricture of other mitzvot relative to Shabbat.,The Gemara asks: In what case did you establish the baraita, in the case of idolatry? If so, state the latter clause and determine whether that explanation applies there as well. The latter clause states: A stricture with regard to other mitzvot that is greater than the stricture with regard to Shabbat is that, with regard to other mitzvot, one who performs an act unwittingly without intent is liable, which is not the case with regard to Shabbat. One who acts unawares with no intent to perform a prohibited act is not considered to have performed an unwitting act. That case of performing an act unwittingly without intent with regard to idolatry, what are the circumstances? If you say that it is referring to a case where he thought that it was a synagogue and bowed to it, and it turned out that he bowed to idolatry, he committed no transgression. Since his heart was directed toward Heaven, it is not even an unwitting transgression. Rather, it is referring to a case where he saw a statue [andarta] in the image of the king and bowed to it. What are the circumstances? If the baraita is referring to a case in which he bowed because he accepted that image upon himself as a god, he worshipped idolatry intentionally and is not liable to bring a sin-offering. And if he did not accept that image upon himself as a god and bowed merely in deference to the monarch, it is meaningless and is not an act of idolatry.,Rather, it is referring to a case where one bowed due to love of someone who requested that he bow before the statue and due to fear of someone coercing him to do so. He is under the impression that unless he wholeheartedly has the intention to worship the idol, there is no prohibition involved. This works out well according to the opinion of Abaye, who said: One who bows due to love or fear is liable to bring a sin-offering. However, according to the opinion of Rava, who said: One who bows due to love or fear is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, what can be said? According to Rava’s opinion, the problem remains. There is no case in which there is a difference between the ruling in the case of idolatry and the ruling in the case of Shabbat. Rather, it is referring to a case where one says to himself that this is permitted. He is under the impression that idolatry is permitted, and his unwitting act was the result of ignorance, not forgetfulness. The statement in the baraita: Which is not the case with regard to Shabbat, is referring to one who was under the impression that performing labors on Shabbat is permitted. One who performs prohibited labors under those circumstances is completely exempt.,That conclusion contradicts another statement of Rava. With regard to one who is unaware of both the essence of Shabbat and the individual prohibited labors, Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman only whether to deem him liable to bring one or whether to deem him liable to bring two sin-offerings. However, the possibility to exempt him completely did not enter Rava’s mind. That explanation of the baraita is incompatible with Rava’s opinion.
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Rather, is it not that the first clause of the baraita is dealing with the contrast between Shabbat and idolatry, and the latter clause of the baraita is dealing with contrasting Shabbat and other mitzvot? And what are the circumstances of: Unwitting without intent, with regard to other mitzvot? It is in a case where one thought that it was permitted fat, and ate it, and later discovered that it was forbidden fat. This is one example of other mitzvot where one is liable. That is not the case with regard to Shabbat, where he is exempt, as one who intended to cut a detached plant and unwittingly severed a plant still attached to the ground is exempt. And according to Abaye, who holds that he is liable in that case, what are the circumstances of: Unwitting without intent, with regard to other mitzvot? It is in a case where one had something in his mouth and he thought it was spittle and swallowed it with no intention to eat it, and it turned out to be forbidden fat that he swallowed. This is one example of other mitzvot, where he is liable. That is not the case with regard to Shabbat, where the phrase: He is exempt, is referring to the case of one who intended to lift a plant detached from the ground and mistakenly severed a plant still attached to the ground. In that case, even Abaye agrees that he is exempt. However, one who intended to cut a detached plant and unwittingly severed a plant still attached to the ground is liable since he intended to perform a standard act of cutting. Therefore, no proof can be cited from this baraita.,A similar dispute between Abaye and Rava was stated. In the case of one who intended to throw an object two cubits in the public domain, for which he would not be liable by Torah law, and it turned out that he threw it four cubits, in violation of the prohibition by Torah law against carrying an object four cubits in the public domain, Rava said: He is exempt. Abaye said: He is liable. The Gemara elaborates: Rava said: He is exempt, as he does not intend to execute a throw of four cubits, and, consequently, does not intend to perform a prohibited act. Abaye said: He is liable, as he intends to execute a standard throw, and ultimately a throw that traveled a prohibited distance was executed. Another dispute between them was stated. In the case of one who thought that he was in the private domain and threw an object more than four cubits, and, ultimately, it was found to be the public domain, Rava said: He is exempt. And Abaye said: He is liable. The Gemara elaborates: Rava said: He is exempt, as he does not intend to execute a prohibited throw. In a private domain, he may throw an object as far as he chooses. And Abaye said: He is liable, as he intends to execute a standard throw.,The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to mention these three disputes, despite their similarities, because each one teaches a unique element. As, had the Gemara taught us only the first, the case of one who intended to lift a plant detached from the ground and mistakenly severed a plant still attached to the ground, we would have said that it was only in that case that Rava said he is exempt, as he does not intend to perform an act of prohibited severing. He had no intention to perform an action that entails desecration of Shabbat. However, the ruling in the case of one who intended to throw an object two cubits in the public domain and he threw it four cubits would be more stringent, as an object cannot be thrown four cubits without being thrown two cubits. A throw of two cubits is a component part of the four-cubit throw. Consequently, say that in that case Rava agrees with Abaye, as he performed an act that has a prohibited dimension to it. And, had the Gemara taught us the dispute in this case of throwing two cubits as well, we would have said that it is only in that case that Rava says that he is exempt, as he does not intend to execute a throw of four cubits. A throw of fewer than four cubits does not constitute a transgression. However, in the case of one who thought that he was in the private domain, and ultimately it was found to be the public domain where the individual intends to execute a throw of four cubits, which is a prohibited distance, say that Rava agrees with Abaye that he is liable. Therefore, it is necessary to mention all three cases in which they disagree.,We learned in a mishna: The primary categories of labor are forty-less-one, and we discussed it and asked: Why do I need this tally of forty-less-one? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if one performed all of the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. Granted, according to Abaye, who said that in a case like that one mentioned above, where one intended to throw an object two cubits and it traveled four cubits he is liable, you find that circumstance in a case where he was aware that the prohibition of Shabbat applies to certain labors, and he was aware that particular labors were prohibited, and was mistaken with regard to measures. He intended to perform an act involving less than the prohibited measure, and it turned out that the action he performed involved an amount equal to or greater than the prohibited measure. That is an unwitting act that renders him liable to bring a sin-offering, according to Abaye. However, according to Rava, who said that he is exempt in a case where one intended to throw an object two cubits and it traveled four cubits, in what circumstances do you find that he would be liable for each and every one? Is it in a case where, with regard to Shabbat, his actions were intentional, and, with regard to the prohibited labors, his actions were unwitting?,It works out well if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: Once he was unwitting with regard to the fact that the punishment for his transgression is karet, even though he was aware that his action was in violation of a Torah prohibition and performed the transgression intentionally, he is considered to have sinned unwittingly. If he holds in accordance with that opinion, you find a case where one could be liable for each and every prohibited labor when he was aware that performing labor on Shabbat involves violation of a Torah prohibition, but he was unaware that the punishment for violating that prohibition is karet. However, if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said: It is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to both the prohibition and karet, the result is that he is completely unaware of all the prohibited labors of Shabbat. The question then arises: With regard to what aspect of Shabbat was he aware? If he was completely unaware of all the labors prohibited on Shabbat, in what sense were his actions intentional with regard to Shabbat? The Gemara answers: He was aware of the halakhot of the prohibition of Shabbat boundaries, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that this prohibition is by Torah law.,MISHNA: This fundamental mishna enumerates those who perform the primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat, which number forty-less-one. They are grouped in accordance with their function: One who sows, and one who plows, and one who reaps, and one who gathers sheaves into a pile, and one who threshes, removing the kernel from the husk, and one who winnows threshed grain in the wind, and one who selects the inedible waste from the edible, and one who grinds, and one who sifts the flour in a sieve, and one who kneads dough, and one who bakes.,Additional primary categories of prohibited labor are the following: One who shears wool, and one who whitens it, and one who combs the fleece and straightens it, and one who dyes it, and one who spins the wool, and one who stretches the threads of the warp in the loom, and one who constructs two meshes, tying the threads of the warp to the base of the loom, and one who weaves two threads, and one who severs two threads for constructive purposes, and one who ties a knot, and one who unties a knot, and one who sews two stitches with a needle, as well as one who tears a fabric in order to sew two stitches.,One who traps a deer, or any living creature, and one who slaughters it, and one who flays it, and one who salts its hide, a step in the tanning process, and one who tans its hide, and one who smooths it, removing hairs and veins, and one who cuts it into measured parts.,One who writes two letters and one who erases in order to write two letters. One who builds a structure, and one who dismantles it, one who extinguishes a fire, and one who kindles a fire. One who strikes a blow with a hammer to complete the production process of a vessel (Rabbeinu Ḥananel), and one who carries out an object from domain to domain. All these are primary categories of labor, and they number forty-less-one.

GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that the primary categories of labor number forty-less-one. The Gemara asks: Why do I need this tally? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if he performed all of the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness, during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one.,We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who sows, and one who plows. The Gemara asks: Since, after all, in terms of plowing, one plows first and only then sows, let the tanna teach first one who plows, and afterward let him teach one who sows. The Gemara answers: The tanna ordered the mishna based on the practice in Eretz Yisrael, where they sow first and then plow. In Eretz Yisrael, the practice was to plow a second time after sowing to cover the seeds.,A baraita is taught with regard to the prohibited labor of sowing: One who sows, and one who prunes the branches of vines to accelerate their growth, and one who plants, and one who bends the branch of a vine or a tree into the ground so that it takes root while still attached to the trunk, and one who grafts the branch of one tree onto another have all performed one type of labor, as they all stimulate plant growth. The Gemara asks: What is the baraita teaching us? The Gemara explains: This teaches us that one who unwittingly performs numerous prohibited labors subsumed under a single primary category of labor, like those listed in the baraita, is liable to bring only one sin-offering, since they are considered aspects of the same labor. Rabbi Aḥa said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rabbi Ami said: One who prunes is liable for the labor of planting. And one who plants, and one who bends, and one who grafts is liable for the labor of sowing. The Gemara is surprised at this: Is that to say that one who bends and one who grafts a branch, for sowing, yes, he is liable; for planting, no, he is not liable? These labors, performed on trees, are more similar to planting. Rather, say as follows: One is liable even for sowing, as with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat there is no difference between sowing and planting.,Rav Kahana said: One who prunes a tree and needs the wood that he hewed from the tree for fuel or some other purpose is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One sin-offering due to the labor of reaping, like anyone who severs an item from the ground for the purpose of harvesting the detached object, and one sin-offering due to the labor of planting, since he thereby stimulates growth of the plant. Similarly, Rav Yosef said: One who reaps alfalfa is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to reaping, since he is cutting the plant for animal feed, and one due to planting, since cutting stimulates the growth of the alfalfa. Similarly, Abaye said: One who cuts beet leaves is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to reaping and one due to sowing.,We learned in the mishna among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who plows. A tanna taught in a baraita with regard to the labor of plowing: One who plows, and one who digs, and one who makes a furrow in the ground have all performed one type of labor. Rav Sheshet said: One who had a mound of earth and removed it in the house, thereby evening the surface, is liable due to the labor of building, as he thereby engages in construction of the house. In the field, he is liable due to the labor of plowing. Similarly, Rava said: One who had a hole and filled it, in the house he is liable due to the labor of building. In the field, he is liable due to the labor of plowing.,Rabbi Abba said: One who digs a hole on Shabbat and digs the hole only because he needs its dirt is exempt for that act, which is not the labor of digging prohibited on Shabbat by Torah law. And even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said that in general one who performs labor that is not necessary for its own sake, i.e., he performs the labor for a purpose other than the direct result of that action, is liable for it; that ruling applies only to a purpose that is constructive. However, this purpose is destructive, as one performs an act that unnecessarily mars the surface of the ground. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda would agree that in this case he is exempt.,And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who reaps. It was taught in a Tosefta with regard to the labor of reaping: One who reaps, and one who picks grapes, and one who harvests dates, and one who collects olives, and one who gathers figs have all performed one type of labor, as they all involve picking fruit. Rav Pappa said: One who threw a clod of earth at a palm tree and severed dates is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to severing, which is a subcategory of the primary category of reaping; and one for extracting, which is a subcategory of the primary category of threshing, as he removes something edible, the date, from its cover, its cluster. Rav Ashi said: In that case, one is exempt, since that is not the typical manner of severing, and that is not the typical manner of extracting, and one who performs a labor in an atypical manner is exempt.,And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who gathers. Rava said: One who gathers salt from salt pools is liable due to the labor of gathering, as he gathers a substance from the field into a pile. Abaye said: That is not so, as the prohibition of gathering by Torah law applies only to produce that grows from the ground.,And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who threshes. A tanna taught in a Tosefta: One who threshes, and one who beats flax to remove it from the hard cover of its stalk, and one who strikes a cotton plant to remove the cotton seeds have all performed one type of labor.,And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who winnows, and one who selects, and one who grinds, and one who sifts. The Gemara asks: The prohibited labor of winnowing is the same as the prohibited labor of selecting, which is the same as the prohibited labor of sifting. They are all identical in the manner in which they are performed and have the same objective: Separating food from the accompanying waste. Why was it necessary to list them all? An answer was provided by Abaye and Rava, who both said and established a principle: Any manner of labor that was performed in the Tabernacle, for the purposes of the Tabernacle,
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even though there is a different labor that is similar to it, the mishna enumerated it. Every labor that was performed in the Tabernacle is significant. The Gemara asks: And let him enumerate the labor of pounding as well, as wheat was pounded to remove its outer kernel in the Tabernacle. Abaye said: The labor of pounding is not one of the essential stages in the baking of bread, as paupers eat their bread without pounding the wheat to remove the bran. Therefore, since the tanna enumerated threshing, there was no need to include pounding among the labors enumerated in the breadmaking process. Rava said a different explanation: Who is the tanna of this mishna? It is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: The primary categories of labor are forty-less-one, a number derived from a textual allusion. Therefore, the list cannot be expanded. And had the tanna enumerated pounding, there would be forty labors rather than thirty-nine. The Gemara asks: And let him take out one of these, selecting or winnowing, and insert pounding, thereby leaving the number intact. Rather, the reason that the tanna did not include pounding is clear, according to the explanation of Abaye.,The Sages taught in a baraita with regard to the laws of selecting: If there were several types of food before him, and he wants to remove one or more from the mixture, one selects and eats, selects and puts aside. And one may not select, and if one did select, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: What is the baraita saying? The end of this baraita contradicts the beginning. Ulla said: It is saying as follows: One selects and eats if he is doing so for the purpose of that day, Shabbat. And he selects and puts aside food for the purpose of that day. And one may not select for the purpose of the next day. And if one did select for the next day, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rav Ḥisda strongly objects to this explanation: And is it permitted to bake for that day, and is it permitted to cook for that day? No other labor prohibited on Shabbat may be performed for the purpose of Shabbat, and the same should hold true for selecting.,Rather, Rav Ḥisda said it is to be understood as follows: One selects and eats less than the measure of a dried fig-bulk, which is the smallest amount for which one is liable by Torah law. One selects and puts aside less than that measure. And one may not select the measure of a dried fig-bulk, and if one did select that measure, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rav Yosef strongly objects to this explanation: And is it permitted to bake less than the measure for liability ab initio? Although performing a prohibited labor on a minute measure does not engender liability, it is prohibited. Therefore, the baraita cannot be interpreted as saying that one may ab initio select an amount that is less than the measure for liability. Rather, Rav Yosef said: One selects and eats by hand, selects and put aside by hand. However, with a tray [kanon] or with a plate, both of which are large, flat vessels used for sorting sizeable quantities, one may not select ab initio. And if he did select, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering if he did so unwittingly. If he did so intentionally he is exempt from stoning. However, it is prohibited. And one may not select with a sieve or with a sifter. And if he did select with those utensils, he is liable to bring a sin-offering.,Rav Hamnuna strongly objects to this: Does the mishna teach anything about a tray or a plate? Rav Yosef’s explanation is based on the addition of details that do not appear in the baraita either. Rather, Rav Hamnuna said: One selects and eats if he is removing food from the waste, and similarly, selects and puts aside if he is removing food from the waste. However, one may not select waste from food, and if he did select in that manner, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. The typical method of selecting is the removal of waste from the food. An individual who alters the procedure is not liable. Abaye strongly objects to this: Does the mishna teach anything about food from waste? That detail is not mentioned in the baraita either. Rather, Abaye said: One selects and eats if he is removing food for immediate use, and similarly one selects and puts aside for immediate use. However, one may not select for use later that same day. And if he did select, he is considered like one who selects for storage, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering. This explanation requires no emendation of the mishna. It is merely an interpretation of the phrase: One selects and eats, as referring to selecting for immediate use. The Gemara relates that the Sages stated Abaye’s explanation of the baraita before Rava. He said to them: Naḥmani, Abaye, spoke well.,Until this point, the Gemara discussed selecting food from waste. The Gemara proceeds to discuss a different case. If there were two types of foods before him, and he selected and ate one type, and selected and put aside one type, Rav Ashi taught: He is exempt. Rav Yirmeya from Difti taught: He is liable. Rav Ashi taught: He is exempt. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that in that case he is liable? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult: This, where Rav Ashi said that he is exempt, is referring to a case where he selects by means of a tray or a plate, as that method of selecting is not considered expert work; and that, where the baraita said he is liable, is in a case where he selects by means of a sieve or a sifter, as that method of selecting is considered expert work.,The Gemara relates that when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said: It was the Shabbat of Rav Beivai to serve food to the students, and Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi happened to come to his house. He placed before them a basket of fruits without removing the leaves and the stems. And I do not know whether he did so because he holds that it is prohibited to select food from waste when it is not for immediate consumption, or whether he did so because he intended to show generosity to his guests by creating the impression that the basket was full. A fruit-filled basket conveys to the guests that there is plenty and that they may take as much as they wish. Therefore, there is no clear proof from this incident.,Ḥizkiya said: One who selects lupines from their waste after boiling them is liable for performing the prohibited labor of selecting. The Gemara asks: Let us say, based on this statement, that Ḥizkiya holds that even selecting food from waste is prohibited. The Gemara rejects this proof: Lupines are different,

as they are boiled seven times. And, if one does not remove them from the shells, they rot. Therefore, it is considered like removing waste from food. The rotting edible portion of the lupine causes the shell to reek. Removing the edible portion, therefore, has the legal status of removing waste.,We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who grinds. Rav Pappa said: One who chops beets into small pieces on Shabbat is liable due to the prohibited labor of grinding, as the actions are similar. Rav Menashe said: One who chops wood chips for sawdust (Rambam) is liable due to the prohibited labor of grinding. Rav Ashi said: If he is particular in his chopping with regard to the measurement, i.e., he is careful to cut all the chips to a particular size, he is also liable due to the labor of cutting.,We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who kneads and one who bakes. Rav Pappa said: Our tanna left out the labor of cooking the spices for dye, which was performed in the Tabernacle, and included the labor of baking, which was not performed in the construction of the Tabernacle. If, as stated above, all the primary categories of labor were derived from the labors in the Tabernacle, why did the tanna omit cooking? The Gemara answers: Our tanna cited the sequence of preparing bread, which was the underlying principle behind his organization of the primary categories of labor. He opened with plowing and concluded with the preparation of bread.,Rav Aḥa bar Rav Avira said: One who places a peg into an oven to dry is liable for performing the labor of cooking. The Gemara asks: That is obvious. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that he intends to strengthen the utensil, as ultimately, the peg is hardened in the oven, in contrast to cooking in which the fire softens the item being cooked. Therefore, he teaches us that initially the wood is softened in the oven, and only afterward it is hardened. Rabba bar Rav Huna said: One who boils pitch is liable for performing the labor of cooking. The Gemara asks: That is obvious. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that since it proceeds to harden afterward, say that it is not considered cooking. One might think that since the pitch was hard before it was cooked and will ultimately be hard after it is cooked, boiling pitch is not considered cooking. Therefore, he teaches us that even a temporary change is considered cooking.,Rava said: One who unwittingly crafted an earthenware barrel on Shabbat is liable to bring seven sin-offerings: He crumbles the lumps of dirt; which is (1) grinding; (2) selects the stones from the dirt; (3) kneads the mortar; (4) cuts the mortar into pieces of a suitable size; (5) builds the mold; (6) kindles the fire, and then fires the earthenware vessel, which is (7) baking (ge’onim). One who crafts an oven is liable for eight sin-offerings, since in addition to those seven labors, he spreads another layer of mortar to finish the job, performing the prohibited labor of (8) smoothing. Abaye said: One who unwittingly crafts a receptacle from reeds on Shabbat is liable to bring eleven sin-offerings. In pruning the reeds, he performed both (1) reaping and (2) planting, as he stimulates growth of the remaining reeds. He (3) gathers the reeds; (4) selects them; (5) smooths and levels them; cuts them into small pieces, which is (6) grinding; and (7) cuts them to a particular measurement. When he begins weaving the reeds, he performs the labors of (8) stretching the warp; (9) constructing two meshes; and (10) weaving. Crafting the object as a whole constitutes (11) building (ge’onim). And if he sews the mouth of the receptacle, he is liable to bring thirteen sin-offerings with the added labors of (12) sewing and (13) tying.,We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who shears wool, and one who whitens it, which are labors in the process of shearing and spinning wool. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who unwittingly spins wool still attached on the back of an animal on Shabbat is liable to bring three sin-offerings: One due to shearing, since, in the process, some of the wool is detached from the sheep; and one due to combing the wool; and one due to spinning. Rav Kahana said: This is not a typical manner of shearing, and this is not a typical manner of combing, and this is not a typical manner of spinning. The Gemara asks: And is that not a typical manner of spinning? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita in the name of Rabbi Neḥemya that the verse in the context of the work of the Tabernacle: “And all the women whose hearts lifted them with wisdom spun the goats” (Exodus 35:26) means that they washed the hair on the goats, and they spun it into threads on the goats themselves without first shearing the hair? Apparently, spinning on the back of an animal is considered a typical manner of spinning. The Gemara answers: Extraordinary wisdom is different. Although certain individuals are capable of spinning wool that way, the typical person is not capable of performing that feat.,The Sages taught in a Tosefta: One who unwittingly plucks a large feather from the wing of a bird on Shabbat, and who snips the tip of the feather, and who pulls out the thin threads that comprise the feather is liable to bring three sin-offerings. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said in explanation: One who plucks the wing is liable due to the labor of shearing. One who snips the tip of the feather is liable due to cutting. And one who pulls out the threads is liable due to smoothing.,We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who ties and one who unties. The Gemara asks: Where was there tying in the Tabernacle? Rava said: They tied the tents of the Tabernacle to the pegs. The Gemara rejects this: And is that considered performance of the labor of tying? That was tying a knot in order to untie it. When the children of Israel departed from an encampment, they dismantled the Tabernacle, which involved untying all of the knots. One is not liable for tying a temporary knot on Shabbat. Rather, Abaye said: As the weavers of curtains for the Tabernacle, when a thread would rip, they would tie it. Rava said to him: You have resolved the problem with regard to the labor of tying; however, with regard to the labor of untying, what can be said? Where, in the construction of the Tabernacle, was the labor of untying performed? And if you say that it was performed if one found two threads with knots tied next to each other, he untied one and left one tied; now, before a king of flesh and blood one would not do so, as the curtain would look flawed, in the Tabernacle, before the King of kings, the Holy One, Blessed be He, would one do so? Rather, Rava said, and some say that Rav Elai said: The trappers of ḥilazon, whose blood was used in the Tabernacle as a dye, tie and untie their nets.,We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who sews two stitches. The Gemara asks: That does not endure; two stitches will unravel immediately. A prohibited labor whose result is temporary is not considered a prohibited labor. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: That has the legal status of a prohibited labor only in a case where, after sewing the stitches, he tied them. He tied a knot at each of the two ends of the thread so that the stitches would not unravel.,We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who tears in order to sew two stitches. The Gemara asks: Was there tearing in the construction of the Tabernacle? The Gemara answers that it was Rabba and Rabbi Zeira who both said the following explanation:
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As, when a curtain had a worm which made a tear in it, they would tear the curtain further to lengthen the tear, and that enabled them to then sew it in a manner that obscured the tear.,Rav Zutra bar Toviya said that Rav said: One who tightens the thread of a stitch on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering. If two parts of a garment that were sewn together begin to separate, and one pulls the thread to reattach them, it is tantamount to having sewn them. The Gemara cites additional halakhot cited by Rav Zutra in the name of Rav. And one who learns even one matter from a magosh, a Persian priest, is liable to receive the death penalty. And one who knows how to calculate astronomical seasons and the movement of constellations, and does not do so, one may not speak with him because his actions are improper.,The Gemara proceeds to discuss the additionl halakhot cited by Rav Zutra bar Toviya. With regard to the magosh, Rav and Shmuel disagreed. One said that they are sorcerers, while the other said they are heretics. The Gemara adds: Conclude that Rav is the one who said that they are heretics, as Rav Zutra bar Toviya said that Rav said: One who learns one matter from the magosh is liable to receive the death penalty. As, if it should enter your mind that they are sorcerers, wasn’t it written: “When you come into the land which the Lord your God gives you, you shall not learn to do after the abominations of those nations. There shall not be found among you any one that makes his son or his daughter to pass through the fire, one that uses divination, a soothsayer, or an enchanter, or a sorcerer” (Deuteronomy 18:9–10)? And the Sages inferred: You shall not learn to do, but you may learn to understand and to teach the topic of sorcery. Apparently, merely learning about sorcery does not violate a prohibition. Only acting upon that learning is prohibited. Rav, who prohibited learning even a single matter from a magosh, must hold that they are heretics, not merely sorcerers. The Gemara states: Indeed, conclude that Rav is the one who said that they are heretics.,Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of bar Kappara: Anyone who knows how to calculate astronomical seasons and the movement of constellations and does not do so, the verse says about him: “They do not take notice of the work of God, and they do not see His handiwork” (Isaiah 5:12). And Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: From where is it derived that there is a mitzva incumbent upon a person to calculate astronomical seasons and the movement of constellations? As it was stated: “And you shall guard and perform, for it is your wisdom and understanding in the eyes of the nations” (Deuteronomy 4:6). What wisdom and understanding is there in the Torah that is in the eyes of the nations, i.e., appreciated and recognized by all? You must say: This is the calculation of astronomical seasons and the movement of constellations, as the calculation of experts is witnessed by all.,We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who traps a deer or any other living creature. The Sages taught in a Tosefta: One who traps a ḥilazon and breaks its shell to remove its blood for the dye is liable to bring only one sin-offering. He is not liable for breaking the shell. Rabbi Yehuda says: He is liable to bring two, for performing the prohibited labors of trapping and for threshing, as Rabbi Yehuda would say: The breaking of a ḥilazon is included in the primary category of threshing, as its objective is to extract the matter that he desires from the shell that he does not. The Rabbis said to him: Breaking the shell is not included in the primary category of threshing. Rava said: What is the rationale for the opinion of the Rabbis? They hold: Threshing applies only to produce that grows from the ground. One who extracts other materials from their covering is exempt. The Gemara asks: Even if extracting blood is not considered threshing, let him be liable for taking a life as well. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is referring to a case where he broke its shell after it was dead.,Rava said: Even if you say that he broke it when it was alive, he is exempt. Since he had no intention of killing the ḥilazon, he is considered as one who is acting unawares with regard to taking a life. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Didn’t Abaye and Rava both say that Rabbi Shimon, who rules that an unintentional act is permitted, agrees that in a case of: Cut off its head and will it not die, one is liable? One who performs an action that will inevitably result in a prohibited labor cannot claim that he did not intend for his action to lead to that result. Lack of intention is only a valid claim when the result is merely possible, not inevitable. Since one who extracts blood from a ḥilazon inevitably takes its life, how can Rava claim that his action is unintentional? The Gemara answers: Here it is different, as the longer the ḥilazon lives, the better it is for the trapper, so that its dye will become clear. Dye extracted from a live ḥilazon is a higher quality than that which is extracted from a dead one. Rabbi Shimon agrees that one who performs an action with inevitable consequences is liable only in a case where the consequences are not contrary to his interests. Since he prefers that the ḥilazon remain alive as long as possible, he is not liable for the inevitable consequences.,We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who slaughters an animal on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: As there was no slaughter necessary for construction of the Tabernacle, one who slaughters an animal, due to what prohibited labor is he liable? Rav said: He is liable due to dyeing, as in the course of the slaughter the hide is dyed with blood. And Shmuel said: He is liable due to taking a life.

The Gemara wonders: Is that to say according to Rav, that due to dyeing, yes, he is liable; due to taking a life, no, he is exempt? Rather, emend Rav’s statement and say: He is liable due to dyeing as well. And Rav said: I will say something as an explanation with regard to the statement I said, so that later generations will not come and laugh at me: In what sense is dyeing a desired consequence for him? It is desired that the area of the slaughter will be inundated with blood, so that people will see it freshly dyed and come to purchase fresh meat from him. Therefore, the one slaughtering the animal also wants its neck dyed.,We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who salts it and one who tans it. The Gemara asks: The prohibited labor of salting is the same as the prohibited labor of tanning, i.e., salting is a stage in the tanning process. Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both said: Remove one of them and replace it with drafting. In their opinion, the labor of drafting, drawing lines on the hide to indicate where it should be cut, should replace salting in the list of thirty-nine labors. Rabba bar Rav Huna said: One who salts meat on Shabbat to preserve it is liable due to the labor of tanning. Rava said: There is no tanning with regard to food. No action taken with food falls into this category. Rav Ashi said: And even Rabba bar Rav Huna said it falls into the category of tanning only when he needs to pack the meat for a trip and salts it thoroughly. However, to eat in the house, a person does not render his food inedible, tantamount to a piece of wood. In that case, he certainly would not salt the meat to a degree that would approximate tanning.,We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who smooths it and one who cuts it. Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina said: One who rubs the hide between the pillars on Shabbat, i.e., places the skin between pillars made for that purpose (Rav Hai Gaon) and rubs it between them, is liable due to the labor of smoothing. Rav Ḥiyya bar Abba said: Rav Ashi told me three statements in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: One who planes the tops of posts on Shabbat to make them even is liable due to the labor of cutting, due to his insistence that they all be equal. One who spreads a bandage onto a wound on Shabbat is liable due to the labor of smoothing. And one who chisels a stone on Shabbat is liable due to the labor of striking a blow with a hammer, as he thereby completes work on the stone. Rabbi Shimon ben Kisma said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: One who engraves a figure onto an earthenware vessel and one who blows in order to craft a glass vessel is liable due to the labor of striking a blow with a hammer. Rav Yehuda said: One who removes protruding, irregular threads from a cloak is liable due to the labor of striking a blow with a hammer. And that applies only if he is particular about them and would not wear the garment until all protruding threads are removed. In that case, work on the garment is not complete until the threads are removed.,We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who writes two letters. The Sages taught: One who wrote one large letter, and in its space there is room to write two, is exempt, as he wrote only one letter. However, one who erased one large letter, and in its space there is room to write two, is liable. Rav Menaḥem, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: And that is a greater stricture with regard to erasing than with regard to writing. Although greater stringency is usually accorded to creative acts, here the destructive act of erasing is more stringent. Although he erased only one letter, he made room for two, which is the essence of the prohibited labor.,We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who builds and one who dismantles; one who extinguishes and one who kindles; and one who strikes a blow with a hammer. With regard to the labor of striking a blow with a hammer, it is Rabba and Rabbi Zeira who both stated a principle: One who performs any action on Shabbat that contains an element of completion of work is liable for the labor of striking a blow with a hammer.,The mishna concludes: These are the primary categories of labor. The Gemara explains that the emphasis on the word these, indicating these and no others, comes to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who renders one liable for the performance of a subcategory of prohibited labor when performed together with a primary category under which it is subsumed. Rabbi Eliezer deems one who performs two prohibited labors, a primary category and its subcategory, liable to bring two sin-offerings. In his opinion, one who unwittingly performed all the labors in one lapse of awareness would be liable to bring more than thirty-nine sin-offerings. Therefore, the mishna emphasizes that there are only thirty-nine primary categories of prohibited labor, and one could not possibly be liable to bring a greater number of sacrifices. When the mishna repeats that the labors number forty-less-one, that is to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. As it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda added lining up the threads of the warp and beating the threads of the woof to the list of primary categories of labor. They said to him: Lining up is a subcategory subsumed under the primary category of stretching the threads of the warp within the loom, since both involve arranging the threads of the warp. Beating is subsumed under the primary category of weaving. The mishna teaches that there are no more than thirty-nine primary categories of labor.,MISHNA: And they stated an additional principle with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat. Anything fit to store, in the sense that it is large enough to make it worthwhile to store for future use, and people typically store items like it, and one carried it out into a prohibited domain on Shabbat, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for that action. And anything not fit to store and people typically do not store items like it, since it is too insignificant to warrant storage, and one carried it out on Shabbat, only the one who stores it is liable. By storing the item, one indicates that the item is significant to him, even though it is not significant for the typical person. Therefore, he alone is liable for carrying it out into a prohibited domain.,GEMARA: With regard to the principle in the mishna: Anything fit to store, the Gemara asks: What does it come to exclude? In the opinion of the tanna, what is not fit for storage? Rav Pappa said: It comes to exclude the blood of a menstruating woman. Mar Ukva said: It comes to exclude the wood of a tree designated for idolatry [ashera]. Since one may derive no benefit from a tree designated for idolatry, it has no monetary value. The Gemara explains these opinions: The one who said that blood of a menstruating woman is not fit for storage, all the more so that the wood of an ashera is unfit, as, by Torah law, one is required to destroy it. However, according to the one who said that the wood of an ashera is unfit for storage, the blood of a menstruating woman is fit, as one stores it to feed to the cat. Although it is not typically stored, it does have some use. And the other, who holds that the blood of a menstruating woman is not fit for any use, isn’t it fit for use as cat food? In his opinion, since feeding a person’s blood to an animal weakens that person, one does not store it.,Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: All of these objective criteria mentioned in our mishna are not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as, if one would attempt to say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, didn’t he say: The Sages in the mishna only stated all these fixed measures for items carried out with regard to those who store them? Only one who stores those items is liable for carrying them. However, one who does not store the item, and for whom it is insignificant, is not liable even if that item met the measure for liability delineated in the mishna.,We learned in the mishna: And anything not fit to store, that is too insignificant to warrant storage, only one who stores it is liable for carrying it out.
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Rabbi Elazar said: This is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: Anything that is not fit to be stored and people do not typically store items like it, but it was deemed fit to be stored by this person and he stored it, and another person came and carried out the object that was stored, that person who carried it out is rendered liable by the thought of this person who stored it. Once one person deemed it significant by means of thought and action, it is considered significant for all people. According to our mishna, however, only the person who stored the object is liable for carrying it out.,MISHNA: The mishna lists the measures in which various substances are significant and generally stored. One who carries out straw in a measure equivalent to a cow’s mouthful is liable. The measure that determines liability for etza is equivalent to a camel’s mouthful. Because it is a coarser food, he must carry out a greater amount in order to be liable. The measure that determines liability for ears of grain is equivalent to a lamb’s mouthful. The measure that determines liability for grass is equivalent to a goat’s mouthful, which is smaller than that of a lamb. The measure that determines liability for garlic leaves and onion leaves, if they are moist and fit for human consumption, is equivalent to a dried fig-bulk. A dried fig-bulk is the standard measure for human food. If the garlic leaves and onion leaves are dry, the measure for liability is equivalent to a goat’s mouthful. And none of these substances join together with one another to constitute a measure for liability because they are not equal in their measures.,GEMARA: The Gemara first asks: What is etza mentioned in the mishna? Rav Yehuda said: It is straw of types of legumes. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: In the case of one who carries out a measure of straw equivalent to a cow’s mouthful for a camel, for which it is an insignificant measure, is his liability determined based on the measure that he carried out or based on the objective for which he carried it out? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is liable. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: He is exempt. In the evening, Rabbi Yoḥanan said that; however, in the morning, he reversed his opinion and agreed with Reish Lakish. Rav Yosef said: He did well to reverse his opinion, since that amount is not suitable for a camel. There is no liability for carrying out less than a camel’s mouthful for a camel. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: On the contrary, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s original statement that he is liable is reasonable, as it is suitable for a cow. He carried out a significant measure that is fit for use, and he is liable for carrying it out even though it is insignificant for a camel.,Rather, when Ravin later came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he transmitted a revised version of the dispute and said: With regard to one who carries out a measure equivalent to a cow’s mouthful of straw for a camel, everyone agrees that he is liable. Where they disagree is in a case of one who carries out a measure of etza, which cows do not typically eat, equivalent to a cow’s mouthful for the purpose of feeding a cow. Here the question is more difficult. Clearly, if one were to carry out that measure for a camel, or for no particular purpose, he would be exempt. However, since he designated the food for a cow, for which it is a significant amount, perhaps he should be liable for carrying out.,And the opposite was stated in the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is exempt. Reish Lakish said: He is liable. The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is exempt because he holds that eating under duress, i.e., food that is not typically eaten but could be eaten if necessary, such as a cow eating etza, is not considered eating. Reish Lakish said: He is liable because he holds that eating under duress is considered eating.,We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for an ear of grain is equivalent to a lamb’s mouthful. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: Its measure for liability is equivalent to a dried fig-bulk? The Gemara explains: This, a lamb’s mouthful, and that, a dried fig-bulk, are one, the same, measure.,We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for one who carries out garlic leaves and onion leaves, if they are moist, is equivalent to a dried fig-bulk. If the garlic leaves and onion leaves are dry, the measure for liability is equivalent to a goat’s mouthful. And none of these substances join together with one another to constitute an amount for which one would be liable because they are not equal in their measures. Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: Substances that have a more lenient legal status and have a greater measure for liability do not join together with the substances among them whose legal status is more stringent and whose measure for liability is smaller. For example, one who carries out a goat’s mouthful of a mixture of straw, which is more lenient, and grass, which is more stringent, is exempt. However, substances whose status is more stringent, like grass, join together with the substances among them whose status is more lenient, like an ear of grain. One who carries out a lamb’s mouthful of a mixture of grass, which is more stringent, and an ear of grain, which is more lenient, is liable.,The Gemara questions this principle: And do any items that are not equal in their measures join together? Don’t their fundamental differences preclude any combination? Didn’t we learn in a mishna that the opposite is true? The garment must be at least three by three handbreadths in order to become a primary source of ritual impurity by means of ritual impurity imparted by treading of a zav. And the sack made from goats’ hair must be at least four by four handbreadths. And the animal hide must be five by five, and a mat must be six by six. And a baraita was taught about the mishna: The garment and the sack, the sack and the hide, and the hide and the mat join together with one another. And Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason that they join together? Because all the component materials are fit to become ritually impure through the ritual impurity imparted to a seat upon which a zav sits, as they can each be used to patch a saddle or saddlecloth. Since they are all suitable for the same use, they join together with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity. By inference: The reason they can combine is because they are fit to become ritually impure through the ritual impurity imparted to a seat. However, in a case where the combination is of several items not fit to become ritually impure through the ritual impurity imparted to a seat, no, they do not join together even to the more lenient, larger measure. Apparently, in general, items with different measures do not join together.,Rava said:

Here too, since these substances are suited to be piled together in the sample of a merchant seeking to sell them, they join together with regard to carrying out on Shabbat as well.,MISHNA: One who carries out a measure of foods fit for human consumption equivalent to a dried fig-bulk into a domain where carrying is prohibited on Shabbat is liable. And all those foods join together with one another to constitute that amount because they are equal in their measures. This amount is calculated without their shells, and their seeds, and their stems, and their bran, the husk that comes off of the wheat kernel when pounded, and their coarse bran that remains in the flour. Rabbi Yehuda says: None of the shells are calculated, except for the shells of lentils, which join together with the lentils to comprise the measure for liability because they are cooked and eaten with them.,GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And do the bran and coarse bran of cereals not join together? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: Dough made from five-quarters of a log of flour and a bit more obligates one to separate ḥalla? That amount includes them, the flour, and their bran, and their coarse bran. Apparently, bran and coarse bran join together with the flour to constitute the requisite measure. Abaye said: Bran joins together with the flour with regard to ḥalla and the making of bread, since a pauper eats his loaf made from dough mixed with bran. However, with regard to carrying out on Shabbat, the food items in question must be suitable for all people, since the measures are small and are calculated by their significance.,We learned in the mishna that shells do not join together to constitute the measure of food. Rabbi Yehuda says: Except for the shells of lentils because they are cooked and eaten with them. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that with lentils, yes, the shells do join together; but with beans, no, they do not? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: Except for the shells of beans and lentils? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult: This baraita, which teaches that, according to Rabbi Yehuda, shells of beans join together with the beans, is referring to new, fresh beans. That mishna, which teaches that, according to Rabbi Yehuda, shells of beans do not join together with the beans, is referring to old beans. The Gemara asks: Why do the shells of old beans not join together? Rabbi Abbahu said: Because their shell fragments look like flies in the dish; people are repulsed by those shell fragments, they do not eat them and discard them.,,MISHNA: One who carries out undiluted wine from a private domain to a public domain or vice versa is liable only for a measure equivalent to the wine typically diluted in a cup. Pure wine was diluted with water. The measure that determines liability for carrying out wine is a measure suitable to be diluted for a significant cup of wine. The measure that determines liability for carrying out milk is equivalent to that which is swallowed in one gulp. The measure that determines liability for carrying out honey is equivalent to that which is used to place on a sore caused by chafing. The measure that determines liability for carrying out oil is equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb. The measure that determines liability for carrying out water is equivalent to that which is used to rub and spread on an eye bandage. And the measure that determines liability for carrying out all other liquids is a quarter of a log. And the measure that determines liability for carrying out all waste water is a quarter of a log. Rabbi Shimon says: The measure that determines liability for all liquids is a quarter of a log. He further stated: And all these measures were only stated with regard to those who store them. One indicates that he considers these liquids significant by storing them. One is only liable for carrying out an object that is significant to him. Others, for whom these measures are insignificant, are not liable for carrying them out.,GEMARA: It was taught in a Tosefta: The measure that determines liability for carrying out wine is equivalent to the wine diluted for a significant cup of wine. The Gemara explains: And what is the significant cup of wine to which the Tosefta referred? It is a cup of blessing. And Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: A cup of blessing must have a quarter of a quarter of a log of undiluted wine in it, so that one will dilute it with water, and the cup will contain a quarter of a log. The ratio of dilution is typically three parts water to one part wine.,Rava said: We too
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learned that in the mishna: One who carries out undiluted wine is only liable if he carries out a measure equivalent to the wine typically diluted for a cup. And it was taught with regard to the mishna: A measure equivalent to the wine diluted for a significant cup of wine. And it was taught in the latter clause of the mishna: And the measure that determines liability for carrying out all other liquids is a quarter of a log. Since a quarter of a log is the significant measure for liquids, that is also the significant measure for diluted wine. And Rava is consistent with his line of reasoning, as Rava said: Any wine that does not hold one part wine diluted by three parts water is not wine. Wine must be sufficiently potent to be capable of being diluted with water three times its measure.,Abaye said: There are two possible responses with regard to this matter. One, as we learned in a mishna: Diluted wine, which is used to determine the exact color of red, is two parts water and one part wine from the wine of the Sharon. Apparently, wine constitutes one-third and not one-quarter of the diluted cup. And furthermore: Rava’s opinion is that the measure that determines liability for carrying out wine is a measure that, when diluted, would equal a quarter of a log, i.e., a quarter of a quarter of a log of undiluted wine. Is it possible that the water is in the jug and yet joins together with the wine? The wine that he is carrying out is less than the required measure and is not fit for drinking.,Rava said to him: That which you said that the dilution ratio that determines the color red is two parts water and one part wine, from the wine of the Sharon, is no proof. Wine of the Sharon is unique in that it is weak, and therefore two parts of water are sufficient to dilute it. Alternatively, there the dilution ratio mentioned is for determining the appearance of the color red; however, for the purpose of taste, more water is necessary. And that which you said: Is it possible that the water is in the jug and yet joins together with the wine? With regard to the liability of carrying out on Shabbat, we require an object that is significant, and this quarter of a quarter of a log of wine is also significant.,A tanna taught in a Tosefta: The measure that determines liability for carrying out congealed wine on Shabbat is an olive-bulk; this is the statement of Rabbi Natan. Rav Yosef said: Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said the same thing. Rabbi Natan’s statement is that which we just stated. And the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, is as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: Six matters are among the leniencies of Beit Shammai and among the stringencies of Beit Hillel. They include the blood of a carcass. Beit Shammai deem it ritually pure, as, in their opinion, only the flesh of a carcass imparts impurity; and Beit Hillel deem it ritually impure. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said: Even when Beit Hillel deemed it impure, they deemed impure only a measure of blood that contains a quarter of a log, since it can congeal and constitute an olive-bulk. Rav Yosef draws a parallel between the two opinions. Both tanna’im agree that a quarter of a log of liquid congeals to the size of an olive-bulk.,Abaye said: Perhaps that is not the case, as Rabbi Natan said that a quarter of a log is required only here, with regard to wine, which is liquid; however, with regard to blood, which is viscous, in order to produce an olive-bulk when congealed, a quarter of a log is not required. Less than a quarter of a log of blood congeals into an olive-bulk. Alternatively, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said that in order to create a congealed olive-bulk, a quarter of a log is sufficient only there, with regard to blood, which is viscous; however, wine, which is liquid, in order to create a congealed olive-bulk, more than a quarter of a log of wine is required. And, therefore, even when he carries out less than an olive-bulk on Shabbat, let him be liable. There is no proof that the two tannaitic opinions are parallel.,We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out milk is equivalent to that which is swallowed [kedei gemia] in one gulp. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is the correct version of the mishna: Kedei gemia with an alef or kedei gemia with an ayin? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It should be written with an alef as we find in the Torah: “And he said: Give me to swallow [hagmi’ini with an alef ] please, a little water from your jug” (Genesis 24:17).,A similar dilemma with regard to spelling was raised before the Sages.

In the mishna at the end of the previous chapter we learned that the measure that determines liability for carrying out foods is calculated without their seeds [garinin]. Is the correct version garinin with an alef or garinin with an ayin? Rava bar Ulla said: It is with an ayin, since it stems from the same root as: “And it shall be subtracted [venigra with an ayin] from your valuation” (Leviticus 27:18).,A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Do we describe dimming coals as omemot with an alef or omemot with an ayin? Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said: It is written with an ayin, as it is stated: “The cedars in the garden of God could not hide it [amamuhu with an ayin]” (Ezekiel 31:8).,A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to closing the eyes of the dead, did we learn in the mishna me’amtzin with an alef, or me’amtzin with an ayin? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is written with an ayin as it is stated: “And closes [ve’otzem with an ayin] his eyes from seeing evil” (Isaiah 33:15).,With regard to carrying out milk, the Sages taught: One who carries out the milk of an animal on Shabbat is liable only for a measure equivalent to that which is swallowed in one gulp. The measure that determines liability for carrying out a woman’s milk and the white of an egg is equivalent to that which is used to place on the part of an eye bandage upon which the ointment is placed directly on the wound. And the aforementioned eye bandage must be sufficiently large to use it to rub both his eyes with water. Rav Ashi raised a dilemma: Is the measure that determines liability for the bandage equivalent to that with which water can be rubbed on both eyes, or is it equivalent to that which can be held and rubbed? Is the part of the bandage held in his hand when applying the bandage to his eyes also taken into account? No resolution was found for this dilemma. Therefore, let it stand unresolved.,We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out honey is equivalent to that which is used to place on a sore caused by chafing. A tanna taught in a Tosefta: The precise measure is equivalent to that which is placed on the opening of a sore, i.e., on the wound itself. Rav Ashi raised a dilemma: Does the term on a sore mean the measure of honey spread on the opening of the entire sore; or, perhaps it means the measure spread on the primary protuberance of the sore, to the exclusion of the surrounding area upon which he does not spread honey? No resolution was found for this dilemma either. Therefore, let it stand unresolved.,On the subject of sores, the Gemara cites a statement referring to one of the methods for healing a sore. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Everything that the Holy One, Blessed be He, created in His world, He did not create anything for naught. He created a snail as a remedy for a sore; He created a fly to be crushed and spread as a remedy on a wasp sting; He created a mosquito as a remedy for a snake bite; and He created the snake itself as a remedy for a skin rash; and He created a gecko as a remedy for a scorpion bite. The Gemara explains: How does one implement the remedy? He brings two geckos, one black and one white, cooks them, and spreads the resulting ointment on the affected area.,With regard to these creatures, the Gemara cites that which our Sages taught: There are five dreads, i.e., dread that the weak cast over the mighty: The dread of the mafgia, a small creature, over the lion; the dread of the mosquito over the elephant; the dread of the gecko over the scorpion; the dread of the swallow over the eagle; the dread of the kilbit, a small fish, over a whale. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: What is the verse that alludes to these matters? As it is written: “He that causes destruction [shod] to flash upon the mighty, so that destruction comes upon the fortress” (Amos 5:9), which is interpreted as: He who lifts the downtrodden [shadud] over the mighty.,On the topic of the nature of the world, the Gemara relates that Rabbi Zeira found Rav Yehuda, who was standing at the entrance of his father-in-law’s house, and observed that he was in an especially cheerful mood. And Rabbi Zeira understood that were he to ask Rabbi Yehuda about anything in the entire world, he would tell him the answer. He therefore posed questions to him on a variety of topics unrelated to halakha. He asked: Why do goats walk in front of the flock and then ewes follow? He said to him: It is just as it was in the creation of the world, which at first was dark and then light followed. Goats, which are typically black, precede the ewes, which are typically white. And he asked: Why are the genitals of these ewes covered with a tail, whereas these goats are exposed? He answered: These ewes, whose wool we use to cover ourselves, are rewarded in that they are covered; and those goats, whose hair we do not use to cover ourselves, are exposed. And he asked: Why is the camel’s tail short? He answered: Because a camel eats thorns, and a long tail would become entangled in the thorns. And he asked: Why is the ox’s tail long? He answered: Because the ox lives in a swamp and must fend off mosquitoes.,He continued to ask: Why is the grasshopper’s antenna soft? He answered: Because it lives in the plains among the grass, and if the antenna were hard it would break and the grasshopper would go blind. When the grasshopper loses its antenna it is unable to move, as Shmuel said: One who seeks to blind a grasshopper should remove its antenna. And he asked: Why does the chicken’s lower eyelid cover the upper one? He answered: Because a chicken lives on rafters in houses, and if the smoke from the houses were to enter its eyes without the protection of the eyelid, it would go blind. He asked further: Why is a door called dasha in Aramaic? He said to him: It is an acronym for derekh sham, which means through there. Why is a stair called darga? He said to him: It is an acronym for derekh gag, which means the way to the roof. Why are spices called mitkolita? He said to him: It is an acronym for matai tikhleh da, which means when will this be finished. Since spices are used sparingly, they last a long time. Why is a house called beita? He said to him: It is an acronym for bo ve’eitiv ba, which means come and I will sit in it. Why is a small house called bikta? He said to him: It is an acronym for bei akta, which means a narrow house.,A barrel is called kufta, which is an acronym for kuf vetiv, which means turn it over and sit. Bricks are called livnei, which is an allusion to livnei benei, which means for the children of children. A fence made of thorns is called hutza and Rav Yehuda said that it is merely a ḥatzitza, which means partition, as opposed to a true fence. A jug used for drawing water is called a ḥatzba because it hews [ḥotzev] water from the river. A small jug is called kuza, alluding to kazeh, which means: Give me one like that. Myrtle branches with which people dance at a wedding are called shutita, an allusion to shetuta, which means madness, as the frenzied dancing appears to be madness. The large vessel used for washing is called meshikhla, which is an acronym for mashei kula, which means: It washes all. A small vessel used for washing is called mashkhilta, and Rav Yehuda explained that it is an acronym for mashya kalta, which means: It washes the bride. A mortar is called asita, alluding to ḥasirta, which means lacking, since it has a large cavity. The pestle that is inserted into the mortar for pounding its contents is called bukhna, which is an acronym for bo ve’akkena, which means: Come and I will strike it.,An outer garment is called levusha, which is an acronym for lo busha, which means no shame, as one who is clothed is no longer ashamed. A broad outer garment is called gelima, an allusion to the fact that, by wearing it, one is transformed into an amorphous golem-like figure, as his limbs are indistiguishable. A beautiful coat is termed golta, which is an acronym for geli ve’eitiv, which means reveal, remove the coat, and only then I will sit, so that the coat will not get dirty. A bed is called purya, an allusion to the fact that people parin veravin, which means procreate, upon it. An empty pit is called bor zinka, which is an acronym for bor ze naki, which means that this pit is empty of water. The head covering of Torah scholars is called sudara, an acronym for sod yareh, which is a reference to the verse: “The counsel of the Lord is with them who fear Him [sod Hashem lire’av]” (Psalms 25:14). A palace is called apadna, which is an acronym for apitḥa dein, meaning: To this entrance all come. The Gemara cites an additional baraita related to the nature of the creatures. There are three creatures that grow mightier with age, and they are the fish, and the snake, and the pig.,We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out oil is equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb. The school of Rabbi Yannai said it should be explained as follows: The measure that determines liability for carrying out oil is equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb of a day-old child. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: The measure that determines liability for carrying out oil is equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb and a day-old child. Does this not mean: A small limb of an adult and a large limb of a day-old child? The Gemara rejects this: The school of Rabbi Yannai could have said to you: No, this is what the baraita is saying: The measure that determines liability for carrying out oil is equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb, and the small limb in question is that of a day-old child.,The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as it was taught in a baraita: The measure that determines liability for carrying out oil is equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb and a day-old child; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. Rabbi Natan says: Equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb. Is it not that they disagree about the following? Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds: It refers to a small limb of a small child, and Rabbi Natan holds: The measure for liability is equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb of an adult or a large limb of a child, but for a measure equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb of a day-old child, no, one is exempt. The Gemara rejects this: No, everyone agrees that for carrying out oil in a measure equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb of a day-old child, no, one is exempt,
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and the opinion of the school of Rabbi Yannai is not accepted. And here, in this baraita, they disagree about this: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds: A small limb of an adult and a large limb of a day-old child are equal to one another, and Rabbi Natan holds: For carrying out oil in a measure equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb of an adult, yes, one is liable; however, a large limb of a day-old child, no, he is exempt. The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached in this matter? Come and hear a proof, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says explicitly: The measure that determines liability for carrying out oil is equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb of a day-old child.,We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out water is equivalent to that which is used to rub and spread on an eye bandage. Abaye said: Now, since, with regard to any substance that is utilized for both common and uncommon uses, the Sages, in their ruling, followed the common usage even as a leniency, i.e., one is liable only for carrying out the larger measure. However, when a substance has different uses and one is common and the other is common as well, the Sages, in their ruling, followed the common use that leads to a stringency, i.e., one is liable for carrying out even the smaller amount.,Proof for this principle can be seen in the following examples. Wine, its use for drinking is common and its use for healing is uncommon. The Sages, in establishing the measure that determines liability for carrying out wine, followed its use for drinking, which is common, which led to a leniency. The amount of wine that one typically drinks is greater that the amount of wine used for healing. Milk, its consumption is common and its use for healing is uncommon. The Sages, in establishing the measure that determines liability for carrying out milk, followed its consumption, which is common, as a leniency. Honey, its consumption is common and its use for healing is also common. The Sages, in establishing the measure that determines liability for carrying out honey, followed its use for healing, the smaller amount, as a stringency.,However, water, since its drinking is common and its use for healing is uncommon, what is the reason that the Sages followed its use for healing as a stringency? Based on the above principle, the Sages should have determined the measure based on its use for drinking. Abaye said: They taught this halakha in the Galilee where they typically drink wine. There, water is used as commonly for healing as it is for drinking (Tosafot). Rava said: Even if you say that this halakha applies in the rest of the places as well as in the Galilee, the use of water in treating the eye is common, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: All liquids placed on the eye effect a cure and cloud the vision, except for water which cures and does not cloud the vision.,We learned in the mishna: And the measure that determines liability for all other liquids is a quarter of a log. The Sages taught in a Tosefta: The measure that determines liability for carrying out blood and all types of liquids on Shabbat is a quarter of a log. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: The measure that determines liability for blood is less than that. The measure that determines liability for carrying out blood is equivalent to that which is used to apply to one eye, as one applies blood to heal a wart on the eye. The Gemara asks: And what type of blood effects this cure? The blood of a wild chicken. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says: The measure that determines liability for carrying out blood is equivalent to that which is used to apply to one eye, as one applies blood to heal a cataract. And what type of blood effects this cure? The blood of a bat. And a mnemonic to ensure that you do not confuse these cures: Inside for inside, outside for outside. The blood of a bat, which lives in inhabited areas, for the cataract, which is inside the eye; the blood of a wild chicken, which lives outside inhabited areas, for the wart, which is external to the eye.,The Gemara cites a Tosefta: In what case are these matters, the measures for the substances in the mishna, stated? They were stated with regard to one who carries them out from one domain to another without ascribing special significance to them. However, with regard to one who stores them, thereby ascribing significance to them, the ruling is that he is liable for carrying out any measure. Rabbi Shimon says: In what case are these matters stated? They were stated with regard to one who stores those amounts. However, if one merely carries them out, he is liable only if he carries out a quarter of a log. And the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Shimon with regard to one who carries out waste water to the public domain that even when one merely carries it out, the measure that determines liability is a quarter of a log.,The Master said in the Tosefta: In what case are these matters, the measures for the substances in the mishna, stated? They were stated with regard to one who carries them out from one domain to another without ascribing special significance to them. However, with regard to one who stores them, he is liable for any amount. The Gemara is surprised at this: Isn’t the one who stores also the one who carries out? One is not liable for merely storing. He is liable only for carrying out the stored item. Abaye said: With what are we dealing here? With the case of a student whose teacher said to him: Go and clear for me space for a meal, and he went and cleared space for him and removed the items to another domain. If he cleared an item that is significant to all, he is liable for carrying it out. If he cleared an item that is not significant to all, then, if his teacher had stored it, he is liable for carrying it out, and if his teacher had not stored it, he is not liable for carrying it out, since the student is fulfilling his teacher’s wishes.,The Master said in the Tosefta: And the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Shimon with regard to one who carries out waste water to the public domain, that the measure that determines liability is a quarter of a log. The Gemara asks: For what use is waste water fit? Rabbi Yirmeya said: It is used to knead clay. The Gemara asks: If that is its purpose, why is such a large amount required? Was it not taught in a baraita: The measure that determines liability for carrying out clay on Shabbat is equivalent to that which is used to make an opening for the bellows to be placed in a crucible, which is a much smaller measure? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This, where the measure for clay is equivalent to that which is used to make an opening for the bellows to be placed in a crucible, is referring to a case where it was already kneaded; that, where the measure for waste water is a quarter of a log to knead clay, is referring to a case where it is not yet kneaded, as a person does not go to the trouble of kneading clay just to make an opening for the bellows to be placed in a crucible. When carrying out water to knead clay, a large amount is required; however, clay that was already prepared is fit for use for smaller objects as well.,MISHNA: One who carries out a rope is liable in a measure equivalent to that which is used to form an ear-shaped handle for a basket. The measure that determines liability for carrying out reed grass is equivalent to that which is used to make a loop for hanging a sifter or a sieve. Rabbi Yehuda says: The measure for liability is equivalent to that which is used to take the measure of a shoe for a child, as the reed is used to measure the size of the foot. The measure that determines liability for carrying out paper is equivalent to that which is used to write a tax receipt. And one who carries out a tax receipt itself on Shabbat is liable.

The measure that determines liability for carrying out paper from which the writing has been erased and which can no longer be used for writing, is equivalent to that which is used to wrap around a small jar of perfume. The measure that determines liability for carrying out animal hide is equivalent to that which is used to make an amulet. The measure that determines liability for carrying out dokhsostos, a layer of the animal hide, is equivalent to that which is used to write a mezuza. The measure that determines liability for carrying out parchment is equivalent to that which is used to write the shortest portion in the phylacteries, which is the portion of Shema Yisrael. The measure that determines liability for carrying out ink is equivalent to that which is used to write two letters.,The measure that determines liability for carrying out blue eye shadow is equivalent to that which is used to paint one eye blue. The measure that determines liability for carrying out glue is equivalent to that which is used to place on the top of a board to catch birds. The measure that determines liability for carrying out tar and sulfur is equivalent to that which is used to seal a hole in a vessel and to make a small hole in that seal. The measure that determines liability for carrying out wax is equivalent to that which is used to place on the opening of a small hole to seal it. The measure that determines liability for carrying out crushed earthenware is equivalent to that which is used to knead and make from it an opening for the bellows to be placed in a gold refiners’ crucible. Rabbi Yehuda says: Equivalent to that which is used to make a small tripod [pitput] for the crucible. The measure that determines liability for carrying out bran is equivalent to that which is used to place on the hole of a gold refiners’ crucible. The measure that determines liability for carrying out lime is equivalent to that which is used to spread as a depilatory on the smallest of girls. Rabbi Yehuda says: Equivalent to that which is used to spread on the hair that grows over the temple so that it will lie flat. Rabbi Neḥemya says: Equivalent to that which is used to spread on the temple to remove fine hairs.,GEMARA: We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out a rope is equivalent to that which is used to form an ear-shaped handle for a basket. The Gemara asks: In the case of rope, too, let one be liable for carrying out a measure equivalent to that which is used to make a loop for hanging a sifter or a sieve, as he is with a reed. The Gemara answers: Since rope is tough and would cut grooves in the vessel, people do not make loops from it. The Sages taught: The measure that determines liability for carrying out hard palm leaves is equivalent to that which is used to make an ear-shaped handle for an Egyptian wicker basket, which is made from woven palm branches. Aḥerim say: The measure that determines liability for carrying out bast is equivalent to that which is used to place on the opening of a small funnel to filter the wine. The measure that determines liability for carrying out fat is equivalent to that which is used to smear beneath a small cake. And how much is its measure? Equivalent to the size of a sela. The Gemara asks: Was it not taught in a baraita that its measure is equivalent to a dried fig? The Gemara answers: This, the width of a sela, and that, the volume of a dried fig, are one measure. The measure that determines liability for carrying out soft material is equivalent to that which is used to make a small ball. And how much is its measure? It is like the size of a nut.,We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out paper is equivalent to that which is used to write a tax receipt. A tanna taught in a Tosefta: How much is the measure of a tax receipt? Enough to write two letters characteristic of a tax receipt, which are larger than regular letters. And the Gemara raises a contradiction: One who carries out blank paper; if it has space equivalent to that which is used to write two letters, he is liable, and if not, he is exempt. That paper is smaller than a tax receipt. Rav Sheshet said: What are the two letters taught in the Tosefta? Two letters of a tax receipt. Rava said: The Tosefta can even be explained as referring to two standard-size letters of ours and blank space with which to hold the paper on which the text is written, which is the size of a tax receipt.,The Gemara raises an objection: One who carries out paper from which the writing has been erased or a promissory note whose debt has been repaid, if there is in its white section, the space with no text, equivalent to that which is used to write two letters, or if the entire paper is equivalent to that which is used to wrap around a small jar of perfume, he is liable; and if not, if it is smaller, he is exempt. The Gemara elaborates: Granted, according to Rav Sheshet, who said: What are the two letters taught in the Tosefta, two letters of a tax receipt, it works out well. However, according to Rava, who said: Two standard-size letters of ours and blank space with which to hold the paper on which the text is written, which is the size of a tax receipt, here, on this paper or document, blank space with which to hold the paper is not necessary, as one can hold it on the erased part or on the text of the voided promissory note. Nevertheless, the measure for liability in the Tosefta for carrying out paper from which the writing was erased is no smaller. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is difficult.,The Sages taught in a Tosefta: One who carries out a tax receipt on Shabbat before he has shown it to the tax collector, and he still needs it, is liable for carrying out on Shabbat. Once he has shown it to the tax collector he is exempt, as it has no significance. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even once he has shown it to the tax collector he is liable because there will be a time when he needs it. The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between their opinions? Abaye said: There is a practical difference between their opinions with regard to tax runners. Occasionally, the tax collectors send inspectors after those who already passed the tax audit in order to verify that they indeed paid. In that case, even though one already showed it to the original tax collector, he will be required to produce it again. Rava said: There is a practical difference between their opinions with regard to a senior tax collector and a junior tax collector. Sometimes, when the first tax collector that one encounters is a minor official, he will need to keep the receipt with him and produce it if he encounters a more senior official. Rav Ashi said: There is a difference between them even in a case where there is just one tax collector. Nevertheless, it is to his advantage to keep it in his possession because he needs it to show it to a second tax collector whom he may encounter in the future, as he says to him: Look, I am a man trusted by the tax collector. The document in his possession proves that he is on good terms with the tax authorities.,The Sages taught: One who carries out a promissory note on Shabbat before he repaid the debt is liable; however, once he repaid it, he is exempt. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even once he repaid the debt, he is liable for carrying out the document because he needs it. The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between their opinions? Rav Yosef said: There is a practical difference between their opinions with regard to the halakha whether or not it is prohibited to keep a repaid promissory note in one’s possession. The Rabbis hold: It is prohibited to keep a repaid promissory note in one’s possession, so that the creditor will not use it to collect the debt a second time. Since it is prohibited to keep a repaid promissory note, the document has no value. And Rabbi Yehuda holds: It is permitted to keep a repaid promissory note in one’s possession and use it as paper.,Abaye said: Everyone agrees that it is prohibited to keep a repaid promissory note in one’s possession, and here they disagree with regard to the question whether or not, in a case where a debtor admits that he wrote a promissory note, the creditor must ratify it in court. The first tanna holds: When a debtor admits that he wrote a promissory note, the creditor must ratify it in court to confirm that it is not a forgery. If it cannot be ratified, the debtor can claim that he already repaid the debt. And Rabbi Yehuda holds: When a debtor admits that he wrote a promissory note, the creditor need not ratify it in court and can collect his debt without ratification. The document is considered more reliable than the debtor’s claims. And what is the meaning of: Before he repaid the debt and once he repaid it?
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It means: Until the debtor says: I repaid the debt, or, I did not repay the debt. If the debtor says: I repaid the debt in the promissory note and there are no witnesses to ratify the document in court, the document has no value. That is the opinion of the Rabbis who hold that an unratified document cannot force a debtor to pay. According to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that a document need not be ratified, the debtor’s claim that he repaid the debt is not accepted and the creditor can collect his debt with the unratified promissory note.,Rava said: Everyone agrees that when a debtor admits that he wrote a promissory note, the creditor need not ratify it in court. And here, it is with regard to the question whether or not one writes a receipt that they disagree. The first tanna holds: One writes a receipt for a promissory note that was repaid. Since the debtor has the receipt in his possession, the creditor may keep the note and use it as paper. And Rabbi Yehuda holds: One does not write a receipt. Therefore, the creditor is required to return the note to the debtor immediately upon repayment of the debt. It is in the interest of the debtor to destroy the document, and he has no reason to keep it. Rav Ashi said: The dispute is with regard to a case where the debtor carried out the promissory note into the public domain. Rabbi Yehuda said he is liable because he needs the repaid document to show it to a second creditor, as he says to him: Look, I am a man who repays his debts.,We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out animal hide is equivalent to that which is used to make an amulet. Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: With regard to one who carries out animal hide, how much must he carry out on Shabbat in order to be liable? He said to him, it is as we learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out animal hide is equivalent to that which is used to make an amulet. He raised another dilemma: With regard to one who tans that hide, how much must he tan in order to be liable? He said to him: It is no different, the same measure. He raised another dilemma: With regard to one who carries out animal hide to tan it, how much must he carry out on Shabbat in order to be liable? He said to him: It is no different.,And from where do you derive and say that there is no difference whether or not the hide one carries out is tanned? As we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who whitens, and one who combs, and one who dyes, and one who spins, the measure of wool for which one is liable in performing those prohibited labors is double the full width of the distance between the forefinger and the middle finger. And the measure that determines liability for one who weaves two threads is double the full width of the distance between the forefinger and the middle finger. Apparently, since the wool is designated for spinning, the measure for which one is liable for whitening, combing, and dyeing is equal to the measure for which one is liable for weaving that spun thread. Here too, since it is designated for tanning, its measure that determines liability for carrying it out into the public domain is equal to the measure that determines liability for carrying out tanned hides. Rava raised another dilemma: With regard to one who carries out animal hide and has no intention to tan it, how much must he carry out on Shabbat in order to be liable? He said to him: It is no different.,Rava asked: And is there no halakhic difference between carrying out tanned hides and carrying out hides that are not tanned? He raised an objection to him based on a baraita: One who carries out herbs that were soaked in water and ready for use as a dye is liable if he carried out a measure equivalent to that which is used to dye a sample the size of a stopper for the shuttle of a loom. While with regard to herbs that were not soaked, we learned in a mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out nutshells, and pomegranate peels, and for carrying out safflower, and madder, which are herbs used as dyes, is equivalent to that which is used to dye a small cloth to cover the opening of a woman’s hair net. Apparently, the measure for which one is liable for carrying out raw materials is greater than the measure for which one is liable for carrying out prepared dyes. The Gemara answers: But wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: Because a person does not go to the trouble to soak herbs just to dye a sample for the shuttle of a loom? As a rule, there is no distinction between finished and unfinished products. The case of dye is different, as people do not typically prepare dyes in amounts that small. Therefore, even though that size is significant in and of itself, he is exempt for carrying them out.,He asked further: And with regard to seeds of garden plants before one sowed them, we learned in a mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out seeds of garden plants is less than a dried fig-bulk. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: He is liable if he carries out five seeds. While with regard to carrying out seeds after he sowed them, we learned in a mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out manure or fine sand is equivalent to that which is used to fertilize one stalk of cabbage with it; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis say: The measure that determines liability for carrying it out is equivalent to that which is used to fertilize a leek. Apparently, after the seed was sown, the measure for liability is one plant. Before it is sown, the measure is at least five. The Gemara answers: As a rule, there is no distinction between an object that was processed and one that was not. However, this case is different. Wasn’t it stated with regard to that halakha that there is a distinction between this, where one is liable for carrying out one plant, and the mishna is referring to a case where it is already sown; and that, where one is only liable for carrying out at least five, and the mishna is referring to a case where it is not yet sown, because a person does not go to the trouble to carry out just one seed for sowing?,He asked further: And with regard to clay before one kneads it, it was taught in a baraita: And the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Shimon with regard to one who carries out waste water to the public domain, that the measure that determines liability is a quarter of a log. And we discussed this question: For what use is waste water fit? Rabbi Yirmeya said: It is used to knead clay. Apparently, the measure that determines liability for the raw material is the amount kneaded with a quarter of a log of waste water to form clay. While with regard to clay after one kneads it, it was taught in a baraita: With regard to clay, the measure for liability is equivalent to that which is used to make an opening for the bellows to be placed in a crucible, which is a small amount. The Gemara answers: There too, it is as we stated: Because a person does not go to the trouble of kneading clay just to make an opening for the bellows to be placed in a crucible.,In order to resolve the dilemma with regard to the measure that determines liability for carrying out an animal hide on Shabbat, the Gemara states: Come and hear a halakha that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ami said in the name of Ulla: There are three hides, i.e., three stages in the process of tanning hides, and at each stage it is known by a different name: Matza, and ḥifa, and diftera. Matza, as per its plain meaning, with no additives. It is not salted, and not treated with flour, and not treated with gallnuts. And how much is the measure that determines liability for carrying out that hide on Shabbat? Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yehuda taught: It is equivalent to that which is used to wrap around a small weight. And how big is this small weight? Abaye said: A quarter of a quarter of a litra in the system of weights in use in Pumbedita.,Ḥifa is hide that is salted, and not treated with flour, and not treated with gallnuts. And how much is the measure that determines liability for carrying out that hide on Shabbat? As we learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out animal hide is equivalent to that which is used to make an amulet. Diftera is hide that is salted, and treated with flour, and not treated with gallnuts. And how much is the measure that determines liability for carrying out that hide on Shabbat? The measure that determines liability for carrying it out is equivalent to the amount which is used to write a bill of divorce on it. In any case, it was taught that before it is tanned the measure for liability is equivalent to that which is used to wrap around a small weight. And Abaye said: A quarter of a quarter of a litra in the system of weights in use in Pumbedita. That is not the same as the measure that determines liability for a tanned hide, which is equivalent to that which is used to make an amulet. The Gemara answers: There, it is referring to wet hide just flayed that was left out to dry in the sun and is suitable only for wrapping around a weight (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). However, for carrying out hide that is tanned, his measure for liability is equivalent to that which is used to make an amulet.,The Gemara raises another difficulty: And didn’t we learn in a mishna: The garment must be at least three by three handbreadths to become impure with ritual impurity imparted by treading? And the sack made from goat hair must be at least four by four handbreadths. And the animal hide must be five by five, and a mat must be six by six. Those are the minimum measures for becoming a primary source of ritual impurity by means of both ritual impurity imparted by treading and ritual impurity imparted by a corpse. And it was taught in the Tosefta with regard to that mishna: With regard to the garment and the sack and the hide; like the measure for ritual impurity, so too is the measure for carrying out on Shabbat. That is significantly larger than the measure for liability cited in the mishna for carrying out hide. The Gemara answers: That Tosefta is referring to kortovela, which is hide that was tanned in a manner that rendered it unfit for writing or wrapping. It is used for covering vessels and other similar uses (Rambam).

We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out parchment is equivalent to that which is used to write the shortest portion in the phylacteries. And the Gemara raised a contradiction from that which was taught: The measure that determines liability for carrying out parchment and dokhsostos is equivalent to that which is used to write a mezuza on it. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of mezuza in this context? It means those Torah portions of the mezuza that also appear in the phylacteries. The Gemara asks: And are the phylacteries called mezuza? The Gemara answers: Yes, as it was taught in a baraita: The straps of the phylacteries, when they are with the phylacteries, render the hands ritually impure as is the case with regard to contact with any sacred texts. When they are on their own, they do not render the hands ritually impure. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: One who touches the strap of the phylacteries remains ritually pure even if it is attached to the phylacteries, unless he touches the actual box of the phylacteries. Rabbi Zakkai says in Rabbi Shimon’s name: One remains ritually pure until he touches the mezuza itself. Apparently the Torah portions in phylacteries are called mezuza.,The Gemara asks: And from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna teaches: The measure that determines liability for carrying out parchment is equivalent to that which is used to write the shortest portion in the phylacteries, which is the portion of Shema Yisrael, by inference, in the first clause of the mishna we are dealing with a mezuza itself. Rather, this is what it teaches: With regard to parchment and dokhsostos, how much is the measure that determines liability for carrying them out? The measure that determines liability for carrying out dokhsostos is equivalent to that which one uses to write a mezuza on it. The measure that determines liability for carrying out parchment is equivalent to that which one uses to write on it the shortest passage that is in the phylacteries, which is Shema Yisrael.,Rav said: Dokhsostos has the same legal status as parchment: Just as one may write the portions of the phylacteries on parchment, so too, one may write the portions of the phylacteries on dokhsostos. The Gemara asks, we learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out parchment is equivalent to that which is used to write the shortest portion in the phylacteries, which is the portion of Shema Yisrael. By inference: Parchment, yes, the portions of the phylacteries may be written on it. Dokhsostos, no, the portions of the phylacteries may not be written on it. The Gemara answers: That is no proof, as the mishna is referring to the optimal manner in which to fulfill the mitzva, i.e., writing the portions of the phylacteries on parchment. However, one fulfills the mitzva by writing on dokhsostos as well. Come and hear that which was taught in a baraita: It is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai that the portions of the phylacteries are written on parchment, and a mezuza is written on dokhsostos. When writing on parchment, one writes on the side of the hide that faced the flesh; on dokhsostos, one writes on the side of the hide on which there was hair. This contradicts the opinion of Rav, who said that phylacteries may be written on dokhsostos. The Gemara answers: The baraita is also referring to the optimal manner in which to fulfill the mitzva.,The Gemara asks: And wasn’t it taught in a baraita that if one deviated and wrote on something else it is invalid, indicating that the portions of the phylacteries may not be written on anything other than parchment? The Gemara rejects this: This baraita is referring to a mezuza, which is invalid if written on parchment. The Gemara asks: But was it not taught in a different baraita: If one deviated in this, phylacteries, and that, mezuza, it is invalid? The Gemara rejects this: Both this and that are referring to a mezuza, and this additional invalidation is in a case where one deviated and wrote it on parchment, on the side that faced the hair; or, alternatively, where he deviated and wrote it on dokhsostos, on the side that faced the flesh. And, if you wish, say instead: Actually, this and that are referring to phylacteries and a mezuza. However, the halakha with regard to a case where one deviated in this and that is subject to a tannaitic dispute, as it was taught in a baraita: If one deviated in this and that it is invalid. Rabbi Aḥa deems it valid in the name of Rabbi Aḥai bar Ḥanina, and some say in the name of Rabbi Ya’akov, son of Rabbi Ḥanina. Rav Pappa said: Rav said his statement in accordance with the opinion of the tanna from the school of Menashe. As it was taught in the school of Menashe: If one wrote it on paper or on a cloth it is invalid. However, if one wrote it on parchment or on a hide that was treated with gallnuts [gevil] or on dokhsostos it is valid.,The Gemara elaborates: If he wrote it; wrote what? If you say that it is referring to a mezuza, do we write a mezuza on parchment? Rather, isn’t it referring to phylacteries? Apparently, as Rav said, there are Sages who hold that the portions of the phylacteries may be written on dokhsostos. The Gemara rejects this: And according to your reasoning, do we write phylacteries on gevil? Rather, that baraita was taught with regard to a Torah scroll. The Gemara comments: Let us say that the following supports the opinion of Rav: Similarly, phylacteries that became tattered and a Torah scroll that became tattered, one may not make them into a mezuza, despite the fact that identical Torah portions appear in all three. This is prohibited because one does not downgrade from a level of greater sanctity, i.e., a Torah scroll or phylacteries, to a level of lesser sanctity, i.e., a mezuza.,The Gemara infers: The reason that one may not do so is because one does not downgrade. However, if the halakha were that one does downgrade, one would make a mezuza from phylacteries. The Gemara elaborates: On what is the portion of the phylacteries written? Isn’t it written on dokhsostos? This supports the opinion of Rav. The Gemara answers: No, the portion of the phylacteries is written on parchment. The Gemara asks: If so, how could a mezuza be made from it? Do we write a mezuza on parchment? The Gemara answers: Yes, as it was taught in a baraita: If one wrote a mezuza on parchment, or on paper, or on a cloth, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: Rabbi Meir would write it on parchment, as it is thereby better preserved. Apparently, even a mezuza may be written on parchment, and there is no proof from the previous baraita. In reaction to the previous baraita, the Gemara comments: Now that you have arrived at this opinion that a mezuza may be written on both dokhsostos and parchment, according to Rav, as well, do not say: Dokhsostos has the same legal status as parchment with regard to phylacteries; rather, say: Parchment has the same legal status as dokhsostos. Just as on dokhsostos, one may write a mezuza, so too, on parchment, one may write a mezuza, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.,We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out ink is equivalent to that which is used to write two letters.
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A tanna taught in a Tosefta: The measure that determines liability for carrying out ink is equivalent to that which is used to write two letters when he carries out dried ink, and two letters when the ink is in the quill, and two letters in the inkwell [kalmarin]. Rava raised a dilemma: What is the halakha if one carried out sufficient ink to write one letter in the form of dried ink, and sufficient ink to write one letter in the quill, and sufficient ink to write one letter in the inkwell? Do they join together to constitute the measure for liability, or is each considered separately? No resolution was found for this dilemma. Therefore, let it stand unresolved.,Rava said: One who carried out a measure of ink equivalent to that which is used to write two letters on Shabbat, and he wrote two letters as he walked, even though he did not place the written material in the public domain, he is liable for carrying out the ink. Their writing is their placement. He is liable even without placing the ink on the ground. And Rava said: One who carried out sufficient ink to write one letter and he wrote it, and then proceeded to carry out sufficient ink to write one more letter and he wrote it, is exempt. What is the reason that he is exempt? At the time that he carried out the last drop of ink, he was lacking the first measure of ink. The ink that he carried out first dried slightly in the interim and not enough remained to write one letter.,And Rava said with regard to a similar issue: One who carried out half of a dried fig on Shabbat and placed it in a different domain, and proceeded to carry out another half of a dried fig and placed it, the first becomes as one that was snatched by a dog or burned and he is exempt, as he did not carry out the measure of a dried fig for which he would be liable. The Gemara wonders: And why is he exempt; isn’t an entire dried fig placed together? Why isn’t he liable for carrying it out? The Gemara explains: This is what Rava is saying: And if he lifted the first half-fig first before placement of the second, i.e., the two half-figs were never placed together, the first becomes as one that was snatched by a dog or burned and he is exempt. And Rava said: One who carried out half of a dried fig on Shabbat and placed it in a different domain, and proceeded to carry out another half of a dried fig and passed the second half-fig over the already placed first half-fig, is liable even though they were never placed together. The Gemara asks: And why is he liable? The second half-fig did not come to rest. The Gemara answers: It is referring to a case where he passed the second half-fig within three handbreadths of the first half-fig. The halakha is that objects less than three handbreadths apart are considered attached.,The Gemara asks: And didn’t Rava himself say: An object that passes within three handbreadths of the ground, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, must come to rest atop some defined place and if it does not it is not considered placed? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, where Rava said that it must actually come to rest, it is referring to one who throws the object; here, where proximity alone is sufficient to render him liable, it is referring to one who passes an object in his hand, since he can place the object down at any point.,The Sages taught: One who carried out half of a dried fig into the public domain on Shabbat and proceeded to carry out another half of a dried fig, within one lapse of awareness, is liable; within two lapses of awareness, he is exempt because in neither lapse did he carry out a measure that would render him liable. Rabbi Yosei says: If he carried out the half-figs within one lapse of awareness to one domain he is liable; to two domains he is exempt. If he carried the two half-figs to two separate sections of the public domain, he is exempt because there is no permitted manner to unite the two halves. Rabba said with regard to Rabbi Yosei’s statement: That is only in a case where there is an area in which there is liability to bring a sin-offering between them. It only applies in a case where there is a private domain between the two sections of the public domain and carrying between them is prohibited by Torah law. However, if the two sections of the public domain were separated by a karmelit, no, he would not be exempt. In that case, there is no Torah prohibition against carrying between the two sections of the public domain through the karmelit, and by Torah law they are not considered separate.,Abaye said: Even if they were separated by a karmelit it is not considered one domain, and he is exempt. However, if the two sections were separated by a large beam, no, they are not considered separate. And Rava said: Even if the two sections were separated by a large beam, according to Rabbi Yosei, they are considered separate and he is exempt. The Gemara comments: And Rava follows his line of reasoning stated elsewhere as Rava said: The definition of domain for Shabbat is like the definition of domain for bills of divorce. Just as with regard to bills of divorce, two areas separated by a beam are not considered one domain, so too, with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat, they are not considered one domain.,We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out blue eye shadow is equivalent to that which is used to paint one eye blue. The Gemara asks: How could the mishna say one eye? Women do not paint only one eye blue. Rav Huna said: Because modest women, who cover their faces with a veil, paint only the one eye that shows blue. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: For carrying out blue eye shadow, if it is used for healing, the measure for liability is equivalent to that which is used to paint one eye blue; if it is used to adorn the eye, the measure that determines liability for carrying out is equivalent to that which is used for two eyes. Hillel, son of Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani, explained it: When this baraita was taught it was in reference to village women. Because immodest behavior is less common there, women do not customarily cover their faces.,We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out wax is equivalent to that which is used to place on the opening of a small hole to seal it. A tanna taught in a Tosefta: Enough to place on the opening of a small hole in a receptacle holding wine. The size of a hole that enables pouring wine is smaller than the size of the hole required when pouring more viscous liquids.,We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out glue is equivalent to that which is used to place on the top of a board [shafshaf ]. The Sages taught: This means an amount equivalent to that which is used to place on the top of a board that is attached to the top of a hunter’s rod. Hunters would spread glue to trap the birds that land on the board.,We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out tar and sulfur is equivalent to that which is used to seal a hole in a vessel and to make a small hole in that seal. Tar and sulfur were used to seal large cavities in jars. Holes were sometimes made in those seals. A tanna taught in a Tosefta: One is liable for carrying out a measure equivalent to that which can be used to make a large hole into a small hole.,We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out crushed earthenware is equivalent to that which is used to knead and make an opening for the bellows to be placed in a gold refiners’ crucible. Rabbi Yehuda says: An amount equivalent to that which is used to make a small tripod for the crucible. The Gemara wonders: Is that to say that the measure of Rabbi Yehuda is greater? Don’t we maintain that the measure of the Rabbis is greater, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says with regard to reeds: The measure for liability is equivalent to that which is used to take the measure of a shoe for a child? That is smaller than the measure determined by the Rabbis. The Gemara answers: Here too, say it does not mean sufficient material to make the entire tripod, but to plaster the cracks in the small tripod of a small stove, which requires a minimal amount of plaster.,We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out bran is equivalent to that which is used to place on the opening of a gold refiners’ crucible.

The Sages taught: One who carries out hair is liable in a measure equivalent to that which is used to knead clay with it, as hair would be mixed with clay to reinforce it. The measure that determines liability for carrying out clay is if it is sufficient to make an opening for the bellows to be placed in a gold refiners’ crucible.,We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out lime is equivalent to that which is used to spread as a depilatory on the smallest of girls. A tanna taught in a Tosefta: In a measure equivalent to that which is used to spread on the finger of the smallest of girls, who would use lime to soften and pamper the skin. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said that initially, lime was used for a different purpose. It was used for daughters of Israel who reached physical maturity, but had not yet reached the age of maturity, and women who sought to remove hair for cosmetic purposes. They would smear daughters of the poor with lime; they would smear daughters of the wealthy with fine flour; they would smear daughters of kings with shemen hamor, as it was stated: “For so were the days of their anointing filled, six months with shemen hamor (Esther 2:12). The Gemara asks: What is shemen hamor? Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya said: Setaket. Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said: It is olive oil extracted from an olive that has not yet reached a third of its growth; the acidic oil is effective as a depilatory. It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says that anfiknon is olive oil from an olive that has not reached a third of its growth. And why is it spread on the body? Because it removes the hair and pampers the skin.,With regard to lime, the Gemara relates: Rav Beivai had a daughter. He smeared her with lime limb by limb and, as a result, she became so beautiful that when marrying her off, he received four hundred zuz in gifts for her beyond her dowry. There was a certain gentile in Rav Beivai’s neighborhood. He had a daughter and wanted to do the same. He smeared her entire body with lime at one time and she died. He said: Rav Beivai killed my daughter. Rav Naḥman said: Rav Beivai, who drinks beer, his daughters require that they be smeared with lime, as beer causes hair growth; we, who do not drink beer, our daughters do not require that they be smeared with lime.,We learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: An amount equivalent to that which is used to spread on the hair that grows over the temple [kilkul] so that it will lie flat. Rabbi Neḥemya says: An amount equivalent to that which is used to spread on the temple [andifi] to remove fine hairs. The Gemara asks: What is kilkul and what is andifi? Rav said: The temple and the area beneath the temple. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that the measure of Rabbi Yehuda is greater? Don’t we maintain that the measure of the Rabbis is greater? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda’s measure is smaller than that of the Rabbis and greater than the measure of Rabbi Neḥemya. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita where Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The statement of Rabbi Yehuda and his measure appear to be correct with regard to dissolved lime, and the statement of Rabbi Neḥemya appears to be correct with regard to blocks of lime. And if it should enter your mind that these terms refer to the temple and the area beneath the temple, both that which is spread on this, kilkul, and that which is spread on that, andifi, are referring to dissolved lime. Rather, Rabbi Yitzḥak said that the school of Rabbi Ami said: When Rav Neḥemya said andifi he meant a’andifa, meaning the lime which was spread on the inside of earthenware vessels containing wine.,Rav Kahana strongly objected to this: And does a person turn his money into a loss [anparot]? In doing so, he ruins both the lime and the wine. Rather, Rav Kahana said: This lime is not placed inside the vessel, but it is used to make markings on the outside of the vessel to measure the contents of the vessel, as we learned in a mishna: In the Temple, there were markings on the hin vessel to measure wine. These would indicate that when it is filled to here, that is the measure of wine required for the libation of the sacrifice of an ox, half a hin; when it is filled to here, the measure of wine required for the libation of the sacrifice of a ram, a third of a hin; when it is filled to here, the measure of wine required for the libation of the sacrifice of a sheep, a quarter of a hin. And if you wish, say instead: What is andifa? It is the forehead upon which lime is smeared, not to remove hairs, but to pamper and soften the skin. Thick lime can be used for this purpose. And proof for that is cited from a certain Galilean who happened to come to Babylonia, to whom they said: Stand and teach us the esoteric Act of the Divine Chariot [Ma’aseh Merkava]. He said to them: I will teach it to you as Rabbi Neḥemya taught it to his colleague. And a hornet emerged from the wall and stung him on his forehead [andifi] and he died. Apparently, andifi means forehead. And with regard to the incident itself, they said about him, in a play on words: From his own, that came to him [min dilei da lei]. He was punished for his arrogance in seeking to teach Ma’aseh Merkava publicly.,MISHNA: The measure that determines liability for carrying out earth on Shabbat is equivalent to the seal of large sacks; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Earth was used to seal the openings of sacks so that any tampering would be evident. And the Rabbis say: The measure for liability is much smaller, equivalent to the seal of letters. The measure that determines liability for carrying out manure and fine sand is equivalent to that which is used to fertilize one stalk of cabbage; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis say: The measure that determines liability for carrying it out is equivalent to that which is used to fertilize a leek, which is less than that used for cabbage. The measure that determines liability for carrying out coarse sand is equivalent to that which is used to place on a full spoon of plaster. The measure that determines liability for carrying out a reed is equivalent to that which is used to make a quill. And if the reed was thick and unfit for writing, or if it was fragmented, its measure for liability is equivalent to that which is used to cook an egg most easily cooked, one that is already beaten and placed in a stew pot.,GEMARA: We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out coarse sand is equivalent to that which is used to place on a full spoon of plaster. A tanna taught in a Tosefta: An amount equivalent to that which is placed on the opening of a plasterer’s trowel, and not on a spoon used for eating. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who holds that sand is beneficial for plaster and is, therefore, mixed with it? Rav Ḥisda said: It is Rabbi Yehuda, as it was taught in a baraita: In mourning the destruction of the Temple, one may not plaster his house with plaster, which is white, unless he mixed straw or sand in it, which will make the color off-white and less attractive. Rabbi Yehuda says: Straw is permitted, but sand is prohibited because when mixed with plaster it forms white cement [teraksid]. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda holds that sand is typically mixed with plaster. Rava said: Even if you say that our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda, we can say that its ruination is its improvement. Even though the Rabbis hold that mixing sand with plaster is not beneficial, since following the destruction of the Temple only partially ruined plaster may be used, adding sand to plaster enables its use.,We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out a reed is equivalent to that which is used to make a quill. The size of the quill was not specified. A tanna taught in a Tosefta: This refers to a quill that reaches to the joints of one’s fingers. Rav Ashi raised a dilemma: Is this referring to the upper joint of the fingers, or the lower joint? No resolution was found to this dilemma, and therefore let it stand unresolved.,We learned in the mishna: And if the reed was thick and unfit for writing, it is considered as fuel, and its measure for liability is equivalent to that which is used to cook a beaten egg. A tanna taught in a Tosefta: Beaten means beaten in oil and placed in a stew pot. Mar, son of Ravina, said to his son: Have you heard what an egg cooked easily is? He said to him: The egg of a turtledove. He asked his father: What is the reason? Is it because it is small? If so, say the egg of a sparrow. He was silent and had no explanation. He subsequently asked his father: Have you heard anything about this? He said to him that Rav Sheshet said as follows: This refers to the egg of a chicken. And what is the reason that they call it an egg cooked easily? Because the Sages estimated that there is no egg easier to cook than the egg of a chicken. He asked his father: And what is different about this measure? All measures of prohibited labors on Shabbat involving food are a dried fig-bulk, and here the measure is like an egg cooked easily? He said to him that Rav Naḥman said as follows: He is liable for carrying out a dried fig-bulk from an egg cooked easily, not the entire egg.
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MISHNA: The measure that determines liability for carrying out a bone is equivalent to that which is used to make a spoon. Rabbi Yehuda says: In a measure equivalent to that which is used to make from it a key. The measure that determines liability for carrying out glass is equivalent to that which is used to scrape and smooth the top of a bobbin, a sharpened stick used by weavers. The measure that determines liability for carrying out a pebble or a stone is equivalent to that which is used to throw at a bird to chase it away. Rabbi Elazar bar Ya’akov says: Equivalent to that which is used to throw at an animal, which is larger.,GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Is that to say that the measure of Rabbi Yehuda is greater? Don’t we maintain that the measure of the Rabbis is greater? Ulla said: Rabbi Yehuda did not refer to the entire key, but to the teeth of a key. With regard to the above, the Gemara cites that which the Sages taught in a baraita: The teeth of a key are ritually pure, and they cannot become impure when separate from the key, as they have no function on their own. However, if one affixed them to a key, they can become ritually impure as part of a utensil. And teeth of a lock, even though one attached them to the door and affixed them with nails, are ritually pure, as anything attached to the ground has the same legal status as the ground itself, which cannot become ritually impure.,We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out glass is equivalent to that which is used to scrape and smooth the top of a bobbin. A tanna taught that halakha in a Tosefta in a different manner: The measure that determines liability for carrying out glass is equivalent to that which is used to cut two threads at once, as a glass shard can be used in place of a knife.,We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out a pebble or a stone is equivalent to that which is used to throw at a bird to chase it away. Rabbi Elazar ben Ya’akov says: Equivalent to that which is used to throw at an animal. Rabbi Ya’akov said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And that is only if the stone is large enough that the animal feels it. And how much is the measure of that stone? It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Elazar ben Ya’akov says: A weight of ten zuz.,The Gemara relates: Zunin entered the study hall and said to the Sages: My teachers, with regard to stones that may be moved on Shabbat for wiping in the bathroom, how much is their measure? They said to him: Stones of only three sizes may be moved for that purpose: An olive-bulk, a nut-bulk, and an egg-bulk. He said to them: And will he take scales [turtani] into the bathroom to weigh each stone? They were counted and the Sages concluded that one need not measure the stones. He simply takes a handful of stones. It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei says the measure of bathroom stones is an olive-bulk, a nut-bulk, and an egg-bulk. Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yosei, says in the name of his father: One need not measure the stones. He simply takes a handful of stones.,Our Sages taught in a baraita with regard to Shabbat: Three sharpened stones may be taken into the bathroom. And what is their measure? Rabbi Meir says: A nut-bulk; Rabbi Yehuda says: An egg-bulk. Rafram bar Pappa said that Rav Ḥisda said: Like the dispute here, so too, there is a dispute between these Sages with regard to the minimum size of a citron. The Gemara is surprised at the comparison. Why does the Gemara cite this baraita as a mnemonic to recall the dispute about the size of a citron? There, with regard to an citron, it is a mishna that is known by all; here it is a baraita, which is more obscure and more likely to require a mnemonic and a comparison to a more popular source. Rather, the phrasing is reversed: Like the dispute with regard to an citron, so too, there is a dispute here.,Rav Yehuda said: However, one may not move the payis for use in a bathroom. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of payis? Rabbi Zeira said: It refers to clods of Babylonian earth, which is soft and flaky. Rava said: It is prohibited to manipulate the anus with a stone on Shabbat to help discharge bodily functions in the manner that one manipulates it on weekdays. Mar Zutra strongly objected to this: According to Rava, should one endanger himself by refraining from relieving himself? The Gemara explains: He meant he should do so in an unusual manner and not in the manner it is typically done. With regard to the size of stones, Rabbi Yannai said: If he has a fixed place for a bathroom, he may take a handful of stones; if he does not need them on Shabbat, he can use them on another occasion. If he does not have a fixed place he may bring in an average size stone, which is the size of a small mortar used for crushing spices. Rav Sheshet said: If the stone has an indication on it that it has already been used in the bathroom, one is permitted to move it for that purpose on Shabbat, regardless of its size.,The Gemara raises an objection: Is it permitted to wipe with a stone that was already used? Didn’t the Sages say: Ten things bring a person to suffer from hemorrhoids and they are: One who eats the leaves of bulrushes, grape leaves, tendrils of grapevines, the palate and tongue of an animal, as well as any other part of the animal which is not smooth and which has protrusions, without salt, the spine of a fish, a salty fish that is not fully cooked, and one who drinks wine dregs, and one who cleans himself with lime and clay, the materials from which earthenware is made, and one who cleans himself with a stone with which another person has cleaned himself. And some say: One who suspends himself in the bathroom as well. Apparently, using a previously used stone is dangerous to one’s health. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, where it is prohibited, is referring to a case where the stone is still moist. Here, where it is permitted, is referring to a case where the stone is dry. And if you wish, say instead that here, where it is prohibited, is referring to one side, using the side that was already used; here, where it is permitted, is referring to both sides, using the other side of the same stone. And if you wish, say instead that this, where it is permitted, is referring to one’s own stone, which he used to clean himself; this, where it is prohibited, is referring to another person’s stone, which poses a danger.,Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is the ruling if rain fell on the stone and the indications that it had been used previously in the bathroom were obscured? The dilemma is: Is moving it permitted like a stone that is designated for use in the bathroom on Shabbat, or, is moving it prohibited since its indications were obscured and it might have the legal status of set-aside? Rav Yosef said to him: If indication on them is apparent, even though it is partially obscured, it is permitted, since the stone remains clear that it is designated for use in the bathroom.,Rabba bar Rav Sheila raised a dilemma before Rav

Ḥisda: What is the halakha with regard to taking those stones up with him to the roof if his bathroom is there? Is it permitted or is it prohibited due to the exertion involved? He said to him: It is permitted; great is human dignity as it overrides a prohibition in the Torah. The Gemara relates: Mareimar sat and stated this halakha. Ravina raised an objection to the statement of Mareimar from a baraita where Rabbi Eliezer says: A person may take a wood chip from the ground before him to clean his teeth on Shabbat. And the Rabbis say one may take a wood chip only from the animal’s trough, which is already designated for the animal’s use, but not from wood on the ground, which is set-aside. Apparently, despite the fact that using the wood chip enhances human dignity, it is nevertheless prohibited due to the prohibition of set-aside. The Gemara rejects this: How can you compare? There, a person determines the place for his meal. Since he knows where he will eat he should have prepared toothpicks beforehand. Here, does a person determine the place for a bathroom? He relieves himself wherever he finds a discreet place to do so.,Rav Huna said: It is prohibited to defecate in a plowed field on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for that prohibition? If you say it is due to the fact that in doing so he treads on the furrows and destroys them, it should be prohibited even on weekdays. Rather, it is due to the concern that he will clean himself with a clod of earth on which grasses have grown. Didn’t Reish Lakish say that it is permitted to wipe with a stone upon which grasses have grown even though the grasses will be detached as a result? And that is the halakha even though one who unwittingly detaches grasses from it on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rather, the concern is lest he take a clod of earth from a high place, a pile of dirt, and throw it to a low place, into a hole in the ground. And in that case, he would be liable due to that which Rabba said, as Rabba said: If one had a hole and filled it, in the house, he is liable due to the prohibited labor of building; in the field, he is liable due to plowing.,With regard to the matter itself, Reish Lakish said: It is permitted to wipe with a stone upon which grasses have grown. And one who detaches grasses from it unwittingly on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rav Pappi said: Learn from that which Reish Lakish said that it is permitted to carry this perforated flowerpot on Shabbat. Rav Kahana strongly objects to this: If they said that it is permitted to carry a stone with weeds on it for a purpose, will they say it is permitted to carry a flowerpot for no purpose? Abaye said: Since the topic of a perforated pot has come to our hands, let us say something with regard to it: If it had been placed on the ground and one lifted it and placed it on top of pegs on Shabbat, he is liable for the labor of detaching. The roots of the plant could have protruded through the holes to draw sustenance from the ground, and when one lifts it he detaches it from that sustenance. Similarly, if it had been placed on pegs and one placed it on the ground, he is liable for the labor of planting.,Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is prohibited to wipe with an earthenware shard on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for that prohibition? If you say that it is due to the danger that he might injure himself with the sharp edges of the shard, it should be prohibited also on weekdays. Rather, it is due to the fact that it invites witchcraft. If so, he should also not do so on weekdays. Rather, the concern is lest he remove hairs with the earthenware shard. However, that is an unintentional act, which is permitted. Rav Natan bar Oshaya said to those who raised the question: A great man said something, let us say a reason for it, and explain Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement as follows: It is not necessary to say that it is prohibited on a weekday for the aforementioned reasons because he has the option of using a stone. However, with regard to Shabbat we would have said that since this shard has the status of a utensil and is not set-aside, he may well use it, as it is preferable to a stone, which is set-aside. Therefore, he teaches us that it is prohibited.,Rava taught that Rabbi Yoḥanan ruled that it is prohibited due to the removal of hairs, and he raised a difficulty between that which Rabbi Yoḥanan said here and that which Rabbi Yoḥanan said elsewhere. Did Rabbi Yoḥanan say it is forbidden to wipe with an earthenware shard on Shabbat? Apparently, he holds that an unintentional act is prohibited. Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan state a principle: The halakha is ruled in accordance with an unattributed mishna? And we learned in a mishna: A nazirite, for whom it is prohibited to cut his hair, may wash his hair on a weekday with sand and natron and separate it with his fingers; however, he may not comb it, which would certainly pull out some hair. Apparently, the unintentional act of removing hair while shampooing is permitted. Rather, it is clearly in accordance with the explanation of Rav Natan bar Oshaya.,The Gemara asks: What is the witchcraft involved with wiping with an earthenware shard? The Gemara explains: It is as that which transpired when Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna were going on a boat. A certain matron [matronita] said to them: Let me sit with you, and they did not let her sit. She said something, an incantation of witchcraft, and stopped the boat. They said something, the Holy Name, and freed it. She said to them: What will I do to you, to enable me to harm you with witchcraft,
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as you do not clean yourselves with an earthenware shard, and you do not kill lice on your garments, and you do not pull out a vegetable and eat it before you untie the bundle that was tied by the gardener? This implies that all these actions carry with them the danger of witchcraft.,Rav Huna said to his son Rabba: What is the reason that you are not to be found among those who study before Rav Ḥisda, whose halakhot are incisive? Rabba said to him: For what purpose should I go to him? When I go to him, he sits me down and occupies me in mundane matters not related to Torah. For example, he said to me: One who enters a bathroom should not sit down immediately and should not exert himself excessively because the rectum rests upon three teeth, the muscles that hold it in place, and there is concern lest the teeth of the rectum dislocate through exertion and he come to danger. Rav Huna said to his son Rabba: He is dealing with matters crucial to human life, and you say that he is dealing with mundane matters? Now that I know what you meant, all the more so go before him.,The Gemara continues to discuss these halakhot. Rav Huna said: One who relieves himself and needs to wipe and has before him a stone and an earthenware shard, wipes with the stone and does not wipe with the earthenware shard, since he might injure himself. And Rav Ḥisda said: He wipes with the earthenware shard and does not wipe with the stone, which is set-aside. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: If one had before him a stone and an earthenware shard, he wipes with the earthenware shard and does not wipe with the stone. That is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna. Rafram bar Pappa explained it before Rav Ḥisda in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna: It is not referring to earthenware shards, but to the smooth rims of vessels, which pose no danger.,There were before him a stone and grasses. With regard to the preferred method to wipe on Shabbat, what is the ruling? There is a dispute between Rav Ḥisda and Rav Hamnuna. One said: He wipes with the stone and does not wipe with the grasses; and one said: He wipes with the grasses and does not wipe with the stone. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: One who wipes with something flammable, his lower teeth, which hold the intestines in place, fall out. How then, may one clean himself with grasses? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult: This, where it is permitted, is referring to moist grass; that, where it is prohibited, is referring to dry grass.,The Gemara continues to discuss this topic. With regard to one who needs to defecate and does not do so, there is a dispute between Rav Ḥisda and Ravina. One said: An evil spirit dominates him; and one said: An odor of filth dominates him. It was taught in a baraita in accordance with the one who said that an odor of filth dominates him, as it was taught: One who needs to defecate and eats is comparable to an oven that was heated on top of its ashes; and that is the onset of an odor of filth.,The Gemara continues to discuss the issue: One who needed to defecate and is unable to do so, Rav Ḥisda said: He should stand and sit, stand and sit. Rav Ḥanan from Neharde’a said: He should move to the sides and attempt to relieve himself in a different spot. Rav Hamnuna said: He should manipulate with a stone in that place. And the Rabbis said: He should divert his thoughts to other matters. Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: All the more so that when he diverts his thoughts he will not be able to defecate. Rav Ashi said to him: He should divert his thoughts from other matters, and focus exclusively on his effort to relieve himself. Rav Yirmeya from Difti said: I saw a certain Arab who stood and sat, stood and sat, until it poured out of him like a pot. Apparently, that advice is effective.,The Sages taught in a baraita: One who wishes to enter and partake of a regular meal that will last for some time, should pace a distance of four cubits ten times, and some say, ten cubits four times, in order to expedite the movement of the bowels, and defecate, and enter, and sit in his place.,MISHNA: One who carries out a shard of earthenware on Shabbat is liable if it is in a measure equivalent to that which is used to place between one pillar and another when piled on the ground to separate them; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: In a measure equivalent to that which is used to stoke a fire with it. Rabbi Yosei says: In a measure equivalent to that which is used to hold a quarter of a log in it. Rabbi Meir said: Although there is no proof for the matter, there is a biblical allusion to my opinion, as it is stated: “And He shall break it as a potter’s vessel is broken, smashing it without sparing; and there shall not be found among its pieces a shard to rake fire on the hearth” (Isaiah 30:14). Rabbi Yosei said to him: Is there proof from there? The verse concludes: “And to extract water from the cistern,” indicating that earthenware is significant if it is large enough to hold water.,GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is the measure stated by Rabbi Meir greater, or is the measure stated by Rabbi Yosei greater? The Gemara responds: It is reasonable to say that the measure of Rabbi Yosei is greater; however, based on the verse it appears that the measure of Rabbi Meir is greater. As, if it enters your mind to say that the measure of Rabbi Yosei with regard to the shard of earthenware is greater, would the prophet first curse him by saying that a small vessel will not be found, and then curse him by saying that a larger vessel will not be found? Abaye said: The mishna is also referring to a large shard of earthenware required to stoke the fire of a large conflagration. Even in the mishna, Rabbi Meir’s measure is larger.,We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yosei said to him: Is there proof from there? He cites proof for his opinion from the conclusion of that same verse. The Gemara comments: Rabbi Yosei spoke well to Rabbi Meir. And how does Rabbi Meir address that proof? He explains that the verse is stated employing the style of: There is no need. It should be understood as follows: There is no need to say that an item that is significant to people, e.g., a large shard of earthenware to stoke a fire, shall not be found, but even an item that is insignificant to people, i.e., a shard to extract water, shall not be found. Therefore, the conclusion of the verse does not contradict Rabbi Meir’s opinion.,,MISHNA: Rabbi Akiva said: From where is it derived that idolatry, e.g., a statue of a deity, transmits impurity imparted by carrying even when the person who carries it does not come into contact with it, just as a menstruating woman does? As it is stated: “And you will defile the silver overlays of your statues, and the golden plating of your idols, you will cast them away as you would a menstruating woman [dava], you will tell it, get out” (Isaiah 30:22). Just as a menstruating woman transmits impurity imparted by carrying, so too, idolatry transmits impurity imparted by carrying.,gemara Since the halakhot of idolatry and the impurity it causes are beyond the scope of tractate Shabbat, the fundamentals of this halakha are cited from tractate Avoda Zara. We learned in a mishna there: One whose house was adjacent to a house of idolatry, sharing a common wall, and the dividing wall fell, it is prohibited to rebuild it as he would thereby have built a wall for idol worship. What should one do? He moves four cubits into his own land and builds the wall there.

If the wall stood upon ground that belonged to him and to the house of idolatry, the area is calculated as half and half as far as moving into his property before rebuilding the wall, and one may build the wall four cubits from the middle of the wall. Its stones and its wood and its dust from the house of idolatry transmit impurity like creeping animals, and by rabbinic decree, one who touches them becomes impure like one who touches a creeping animal, as it is stated: “And you shall not bring an abomination into your house and become banned like it, you shall utterly detest it [shaketz teshaketzenu] and you shall utterly abhor it, for it is a banned object” (Deuteronomy 7:26). Shaketz is a term used with regard to creeping animals. Rabbi Akiva says: Idolatry transmits impurity like a menstruating woman, as it is stated: “You will cast them away as you would a menstruating woman [dava]” (Isaiah 30:22). Just as a menstruating woman transmits impurity imparted by carrying, as one who moves a menstruating woman without touching her becomes impure, so too, idolatry transmits impurity imparted by carrying. Rabba said in explanation of that which the verse said: “You will cast them away”: Make them foreign to you like a stranger. The end of the same verse: “You will tell it, get out” means that under no circumstances can you say to it, come in.,And to the essence of the dispute, Rabba said: With regard to impurity imparted by carrying, everyone agrees that idol worship transmits impurity, as it is juxtaposed to a menstruating woman in the verse. Where they argue, it is with regard to the halakha of a very heavy stone. There is a special law with regard to the ritual impurity of a zav and a menstruating woman. If they sit on an object, even if it is an object that cannot become ritually impure, and beneath that object is a vessel, even though the weight of the zav and the menstruating woman has no effect on the vessel, it becomes ritually impure. Rabbi Akiva holds that the impurity of idolatry is like the impurity of a menstruating woman in all respects; just as a menstruating woman transmits impurity via a very heavy stone, so too, idolatry transmits impurity via a very heavy stone. And the Rabbis hold that in this regard, the impurity of idolatry is like the impurity of a creeping animal; just as a creeping animal does not transmit impurity via a very heavy stone, so too, idolatry does not transmit impurity via a very heavy stone.,The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Akiva, who holds that the impurity of idolatry is similar to that of a menstruating woman in all respects, for what halakha was it juxtaposed to a creeping animal? The Gemara explains: In his opinion, it was not stated in reference to idolatry itself, but rather to its accessories, objects used for the purposes of idolatry. The Gemara asks further: And according to the Rabbis, for what halakha was it juxtaposed to a menstruating woman? To teach that it transmits impurity through carrying. And instead of juxtaposing idolatry to both a menstruating woman and to creeping animals, let the Torah juxtapose it to an animal carcass, which transmits impurity through carrying and does not transmit impurity via a very heavy stone, since according to the Rabbis the law is the same for idolatry. The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so. In that sense, juxtaposition to an animal carcass would suffice. However, the juxtaposition to a menstruating woman teaches: Just as a menstruating woman does not transmit impurity through limbs, as if the limb of a menstruating woman is supported by a vessel, the vessel does not become ritually impure (Ra’avad), so too, idolatry does not transmit impurity through limbs, as a severed part of an idol does not transmit impurity. The Gemara is puzzled by this: But that which Rav Ḥama bar Guria raised as a dilemma: Does idolatry have the capacity to transmit impurity through limbs or does it not have the capacity to transmit impurity through limbs? Resolve the dilemma from this, as according to the opinion of the Rabbis, it does not transmit impurity through limbs. And the Gemara replies: Although that is so, Rav Ḥama bar Guria raised the dilemma in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva and the dilemma is unresolved.,And in another approach to this dispute, Rabbi Elazar said: With regard to a very heavy stone, everyone agrees that idolatry does not transmit impurity in that manner. Where they disagree is with regard to impurity imparted by carrying. Rabbi Akiva holds that the legal status of idolatry is like that of a menstruating woman: Just as a menstruating woman transmits impurity through carrying, so too, idolatry transmits impurity through carrying. And the Rabbis hold that the legal status of idolatry is like that of a creeping animal: Just as a creeping animal does not transmit impurity through carrying, so too, idolatry does not transmit impurity through carrying. The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, with regard to what halakha was idolatry juxtaposed to a creeping animal? The Gemara answers: With regard to the halakha that its accessories do not transmit impurity through carrying. The Gemara asks: And according to the Rabbis, with regard to what halakha was idolatry juxtaposed to a menstruating woman? The Gemara answers: Just as a menstruating woman does not transmit impurity through her limbs, so too, idolatry does not transmit impurity through its limbs.
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And according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, with regard to what halakha was idolatry juxtaposed to a menstruating woman? If it was to teach the halakha of impurity imparted by carrying, let it be juxtaposed to an animal carcass and not to a menstruating woman and creeping animals. The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so. However, the juxtaposition to a menstruating woman teaches: Just as a menstruating woman does not transmit impurity through her limbs, as a menstruating woman who leans on an object by a single limb does not transmit impurity imparted by carrying (Ra’avad), so too, an idol does not transmit impurity through its limbs, and a section of an idol does not transmit impurity. The Gemara asks: But that which Rav Ḥama bar Guria raised as a dilemma: Does idolatry have the capacity to transmit impurity through limbs or does it not have the capacity to transmit impurity through its limbs; resolve the dilemma from this, as according to both the Rabbis and Rabbi Akiva, it does not transmit impurity through limbs. According to this explanation, Rabbi Akiva agrees with the Rabbis. The Gemara rejects this: Rav Ḥama bar Guria taught in accordance with the explanation of Rabba and raised the dilemma in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.,The Gemara now clarifies the explanations of Rabba and Rabbi Elazar in light of other sources. The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in a baraita: The ritual impurity of idolatry is like that of a creeping animal, and the ritual impurity of its accessories is like that of a creeping animal. Rabbi Akiva says: The ritual impurity of idolatry is like that of a menstruating woman, and the ritual impurity of its accessories is like that of a creeping animal. Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, it works out well. However, according to the opinion of Rabba, it is difficult. The dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis in this baraita is whether idolatry is likened to a creeping animal and does not transmit impurity imparted by carrying or whether it is likened to a menstruating woman and it does transmit impurity imparted by carrying. According to Rabba, the Rabbis agree that it does transmit impurity imparted by carrying. Rabba could have said to you: Is the proof from this baraita stronger than the mishna in tractate Avoda Zara, which taught: Its wood and stones and dirt transmit impurity like a creeping animal? With regard to that mishna we established: What is the meaning of like a creeping animal? It means that it is like a creeping animal in the sense that it does not transmit impurity by means of a very heavy stone. Here too, the analogy to a creeping animal in the baraita is in the sense that it does not transmit impurity via a very heavy stone.,The Gemara raises an objection from what we learned: A gentile man and a gentile woman, with regard to whom the Rabbis issued a decree that they transmit impurity like a zav, idolatry and its accessories, all transmit impurity. They transmit impurity, and not their movement, i.e., they do not transmit impurity to one who moves them. Rabbi Akiva says: Both they and their movement transmit impurity. Granted, according to the explanation of Rabbi Elazar, this works out well; however, according to the explanation of Rabba, it is difficult. Rabba could have said to you: And according to your reasoning, with regard to a gentile man and a gentile woman as well, do they transmit impurity and their movement does not transmit impurity? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “Speak to the children of Israel and say to them, when any man has an emission from his body, his emission is impure” (Leviticus 15:2), by Torah law, only the children of Israel become impure through the emission of a zav, and gentiles do not become impure through the emission of a zav? But the Sages decreed that they should be considered like a zav for all their halakhic matters. Since gentiles have the legal status of a zav, they should transmit impurity through carrying. Therefore, the baraita that states that gentiles do not transmit impurity through carrying is corrupted and must be emended.,Rather, Rabba explains and adds to the baraita in accordance with his reasoning: A gentile man and a gentile woman transmit impurity, they and their movement and their very heavy stone. And idolatry transmits impurity, it and its movement but not its very heavy stone. Rabbi Akiva says: Idolatry transmits impurity, it and its movement and its very heavy stone. And Rabbi Elazar explains and adds to the baraita in accordance with his reasoning as follows: A gentile man and a gentile woman transmit impurity, they and their movement and their very heavy stone. Idolatry transmits impurity, it and not its movement. And Rabbi Akiva says: Idolatry transmits impurity, it and its movement.,Rav Ashi strongly objects to this explanation: According to this explanation, what is the meaning of the word they in the context of this baraita? It would have been sufficient to say that their movement transmits impurity. The fact that the gentiles themselves are ritually impure is obvious. Apparently, the word they is emphasized in order to teach an additional halakha. Rather, Rav Ashi said, this is what the baraita is saying: With regard to a gentile man and a gentile woman, whether they moved others or others moved them, the others are ritually impure. The impurity of a gentile is like that of a zav, which is unique in that anything that a zav moves becomes impure even if he did not touch it directly. Idolatry that moved others, the others remain ritually pure; however, others who moved it are ritually impure. With regard to its accessories, whether they moved others or others moved them, the others remain ritually pure. Rabbi Akiva says: A gentile man and a gentile woman and idolatry, whether they moved others or others moved them, the others are ritually impure. Its accessories, whether they moved others or others moved them, the others remain ritually pure. According to this explanation, both the word they and the word movement, both of which appear in the baraita, are significant.,Rav Ashi’s explanation explains the baraita, but the Gemara questions the matter itself. With regard to idolatry, granted, a case where others moved it can be easily found. However, a case where the idolatry moved others, under what circumstances can it be found? How can an idol move another object? Rami, son of Rav Yeiva, said, a case like that is possible, as we learned in a mishna: In a case where the zav sat on one pan of a balance scale, and food and drinks were on the second pan, if the zav tipped the scales, the food and drinks on the other pan are ritually impure because the zav moved them.

Even an inanimate object can move a source of impurity in that way. And if the food and drink tipped the scales, they remain ritually pure. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which was taught in a baraita: All impure items that move other objects remain pure, meaning that an object does not become impure if moved by a source of impurity, except for movement by a zav, which has no counterpart in the whole Torah in its entirety? Let us say that this is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, there is also the case of idolatry. In his opinion, idolatry also transmits impurity to an object by moving it. The Gemara answers: Even if you say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, teach: Zav and everything similar to it. According to Rabbi Akiva, just as a menstruating woman falls into that category, so too does an idol.,The dilemma that was cited incidental to an earlier discussion is examined here in depth. Rav Ḥama bar Guria raised a dilemma: Does idolatry have the capacity to transmit impurity through limbs or does it not have the capacity to transmit impurity through limbs? The Gemara narrows the parameters of the dilemma. In a situation where a common unskilled person can restore it to its original form, do not raise the dilemma, as in that case it is certainly considered to be attached and is not considered broken. The case where you could raise the dilemma is where a common unskilled person cannot restore it to its original form. What is the ruling in that case? The two sides of the dilemma are: Do we say that since a common unskilled person cannot restore it, it is considered broken? Or perhaps we say that it is not lacking anything? Idolatry can only be nullified by breaking it in a case where, as a result, it is incomplete. And some raise this dilemma in another direction based on a different assumption: In a situation where a common unskilled person cannot restore it to its original form, do not raise the dilemma, as in that case it is certainly considered to be broken. When you could raise the dilemma is in a situation where a common unskilled person can restore it to its original form. What is the ruling in that case? The two sides of the dilemma are: Do we say that since a common unskilled person can restore it, it is considered attached? Or perhaps we say that at present, it is in pieces and permitted? No resolution was found for either version of this dilemma. Therefore, let it stand unresolved.,Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami raised a dilemma: What is the halakha with regard to idolatry that is less than an olive-bulk? Rav Yosef strongly objected to this: With regard to what use was this dilemma raised? If you say it was raised with regard to the matter of the prohibition of idolatry, let it only be like Zevuv, the Baal of Ekron, which was the size and form of a fly, as it was taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And they made Baal Berit into their god” (Judges 8:33). The Sages said that this is referring to Zevuv, the Ba